PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL REGULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER AND ENERGY RESOURCES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Esenkul Usubaliev, Professor at the Kyrgyz National State University (Kyrgyzstan)
Esen Usubaliev, Graduate student of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Kyrgyzstan)
The state independence acquired by the Central Asian countries has aroused an ebullient sense of sovereignty and democracy. Roused by a feeling of national self-consciousness, it has unfortunately promoted a breakdown in economic and interstate relations, which has led to a profound economic crisis. The region still has to deal with the fragile process of peaceful settlement in Tajikistan, the danger of border conflicts, the increase in religious extremism and terrorism, the use and smuggling of drugs, the unequal distribution of water resources, the critical environmental situation, the influx of refugees, and the absence of self-sufficiency in the economy. These factors together present a direct and real threat to the stability and security of almost all the countries of the region, although they are each experiencing a different degree and level of these risks.
For several objective reasons, it is impossible to include all the problems existing in the regional security of Central Asia in this study. But it is quite legitimate to focus on two important and interrelated aspects: border regulation and the distribution of water and energy resources.
The Question of Border Regulation
The border problem is of immense importance in forming a state and maintaining its security. It became particularly urgent after the Soviet Union disintegrated into a multitude of independent countries, and they began acquiring unforeknown features of real statehood. This large-scale process, which has encompassed the whole of the post-Soviet space, has led to tens of thousands of kilometers of the administrative borders of a once huge nation being declared as state borders. And the appearance of the former Soviet republics on the world political arena as independent entities has not only acutely augmented the problems that existed during Soviet times, but also aroused a multitude of new territorial and ethnic claims and conflicts. During the formation of a new world order and the evolvement of new centers of power in world politics, unsettled territorial disputes are leading to an inevitable increase in destabilizing factors with respect to the security of each state individually, as well as of a particular region as a whole.
The national-state structure which began after the establishment of Soviet power but was not completed is the main reason for the unprecedented aggravation of territorial and ethnic claims and conflicts in the former Soviet space. Despite the fact that the union leadership’s plan for national-territorial division worked largely to suppress national-religious resistance in Central Asia, this division remained technical in nature. Nevertheless, as events show, the epicenter of many recent problems is located in the Ferghana Valley, which can be said to be the “heart” of the region.
The borders in Central Asia are inconsistent, making it difficult in some of its countries to get from one region to another. For example, goods shipped from the capital of Tajikistan to its regional center of Khujand (former Leninabad) have to pass through Uzbekistan. Moreover, at present, reliable transportation routes between the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Dzhalal-Abad) are only possible through Uzbek territory. In this way, the current situation with the state borders harbors the potential of disputes which could be manifested in the form of territorial and ethnocultural conflicts. In turn, the overlapping of land belonging to different nationalities and disputes about territorial borders are one of the main reasons preventing the formation of a common security zone in the region.
The Ferghana Valley is a kind of “Achilles heel” of regional stability. The fact that border regulation has not been resolved is not only raising the issue of delimitation and demarcation, and the drawing up and introduction of border conditions, but also creating a major ethnic problem, that is, the national character of the borders, or to be more precise, the national maintenance of the boundary zones. For the problem also consists of the fact that large diasporas of other nationalities live in enclaves on different sides of the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and vice versa. The percentage of Uzbek diasporas in the ethnic structure of Tajikistan amounts to 24.4%, and of Kyrgyzstan to 13.8%. In contrast, there are 4.8% Tajiks and 0.9% Kyrgyz among the Uzbekistan population. What is more, the absolute majority (73.5%) of Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan live in three regions of the Ferghana Valley, the Andizhan, Ferghana, and Namangan.1 Whereas the number of Kyrgyz in the total Uzbekistan population (24 million people) is relatively small, the number of Uzbeks (300-350,000 or 13.8%) in the Kyrgyzstan population (5.4 million people) constitutes a large diaspora. It should be kept in mind here that most Uzbeks live in the Batken, Osh, and Dzhalal-Abad region (the Ferghana Valley) of Kyrgyzstan. Such a large number of Uzbeks has a negative impact on border delimitation, since minor clashes and conflicts arise between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on a daily basis and serve as a kind of argument in favor of Uzbekistan at intergovernmental negotiations.
The problem of enclaves of other nationalities in Kyrgyzstan is directly related to border issues. At present, the Vorukh (territory of Tajikistan), Sokh, and Shakhimardan enclaves, which belong to Uzbekistan, are located in Kyrgyzstan. Why now, ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has the urgent need arisen to demarcate the borders in the Ferghana Valley?
Let us begin with the fact that when Uzbekistan withdrew from the Bishkek agreement on non-visa conditions for the CIS countries in 1999, Tashkent not only introduced a visa regime, but unilaterally began establishing its state boundaries and setting up border posts. This was primarily due to the abrupt activation of opposition forces in the country at that time, and to the fact that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) even carried out several terrorist acts in Tashkent against Islam Karimov’s regime. The leadership of this republic explained its response by the need to intercept terrorist attempts to penetrate its territory from neighboring states.
The introduction of the visa regime gave rise to a paradoxical situation—in order to travel from one region of their own state to another, Kyrgyzstan citizens had to obtain a visa. This problem has become even more urgent among ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks who live on one side of the border, but work, or have relatives and close family on the other side. The actions of the Uzbek government were marked by an outburst of minor clashes and conflicts at posts on the Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan borders.2
The opposition forces in the Ferghana Region of Uzbekistan, the deterioration in the population’s economic situation, and the repression by the country’s president of Muslims suspected of anti-state activity and affiliation with religious extremists led to armed resistance from the IMU, which also made an attempt to illegally enter the republic through Kyrgyzstan (events of the summer and fall of 1999). Uzbekistan responded to this action by intensifying border control, setting up armed checkpoints and mining disputed sections of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time as these events, a bilateral commission on border regulation between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was created.
The Kyrgyzstan border with the countries of Central Asia was defined by the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991, which stated: “the previous administrative borders within the former Soviet Union are inviolable and not subject to change.”3 This was confirmed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which in 1994 created the Central Asian Union (CAU).4
But, as we have noted more than once, there is a vast amount of disputed territory on the current borders between Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors. Specialists believe that some 75 such sections exist in the Dzhalal-Abad and Osh regions of Kyrgyzstan alone, which border on Uzbekistan. There are also disputed sections between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the Batken Region alone, some 70 sections have been counted. There are also disputed areas on the border with Kazakhstan. But they are not as aggravated as those with other neighbors of the region.
There is a positive example in the question of border regulation. For example, of the four states contiguous with Kyrgyzstan all controversial border issues have been settled with China. In 1996, the agreement On the Kyrgyz-Chinese State Border was signed, and in 1999 an additional agreement was signed on two “windows.” In 1997, the heads of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, within the framework of the Shanghai Five, signed two important documents—On Strengthening Confidence Building Measures in the State Border Zone and the agreement On Reducing Armed Forces in the Border Zone, which legally enforced the territorial integrity and inviolability of Kyrgyzstan’s borders with China.
The problem of border regulation and interrelations with neighbors, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, is currently one of the most disturbing. It is seriously destabilizing relations not only between individual states, but in the region as a whole.
All the existing contradictions are forming a kind of Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan triangle. At present, Uzbekistan is the strongest state in the economic, political, and military respect. Its advantageous geographic location (in mid-Central Asia), raw material and energy base, as well as its high level of human resources allow it to conduct its policy without “glancing back” at its regional neighbors. Sometimes this “independent” course acquires the form of open pressure on opponents. A case in point was Uzbekistan’s attempt at a regular meeting of the bilateral commission on border regulation in February 2001 to link the delivery of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan to territorial concessions (of course, in its favor) in the region of the Sokh enclave in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan. These demands boiled down to the Uzbek side offering to transfer an area of Kyrgyzstan to this region, which would create a broad passage from the Sokh enclave to Uzbekistan, while incorporating the adjacent oil and gas fields into this corridor, constituting a total area of 11,000 hectares.5 “A special feature of these negotiations was the fact that on 25 February, right before the commission session began, the delivery of gas to the north of Kyrgyzstan was halted.”6 In other words, to resolve border problems, the Uzbek side tried to put “gas” pressure on its neighbor by stopping deliveries of this commodity for the past two years during the coldest part of the winter. After trying out this “argument” and failing, Tashkent found a stronger and fresher argument—the Kyrgyz enclaves on Uzbek territory. While resolving this problem, it was advantageous for Uzbekistan to have these Kyrgyz enclaves on its territory, since this argument is much more effective than “gas” pressure. The “new approach” to resolving border issues, in which “enclave bargaining” comes to the forefront, could lead to serious problems in the long-standing opposition between Tashkent and Bishkek.
For example, the village of Barak, which during Soviet times did not have any enclave features, has de facto acquired the status of an enclave during the past two years due to the efforts of the Uzbekistan border services. According to Kyrgyz experts from the commission on border regulation, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan foresaw the difficulty of resolving border problems with its neighbors and did everything possible to find counter arguments to the Sokh and Shakhimardan enclaves. The Kyrgyz enclave in the Andizhan Region of Uzbekistan was the result of this “masterpiece of creative thinking.” While Kyrgyzstan was fighting the IMU militants, who tried to intrude into Uzbekistan, official Tashkent presented Bishkek with the facts. But whereas 42,000 Uzbek citizens live in the Sokh enclave, only 121 Kyrgyz families live in the village of Barak. And the territory of this village is a dozen times smaller than the Sokh enclave. And while the armed forces of Uzbekistan set up antipersonnel mine fields around the Sokh enclave, thus “taking” 150-200 meters of Kyrgyzstan territory, the land around the village of Barak was not mined. It is a well-known fact that Sokh has significant Uzbekistan regular army forces and military property, which is having a negative effect on the moral and psychological climate in the region. While there are no such armed forces of Kyrgyzstan in Barak. Based on this, Bishkek believes that this village cannot be a lever of pressure on Kyrgyzstan in resolving the problem of the Uzbek Sokh enclave and granting it a corridor.7
As of the present, delimitation of the first section of joint border has been carried out—approximately 250 km—both by Bishkek and Tashkent. But more than 70 controversial sections of territory have not been settled, as well as the problem of the enclaves, which has recently become a major bone of contention.
Judging from everything, border division between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be a long and difficult process. If the “enclave bargains” are conducted successfully, Tashkent could force Bishkek to make some territorial concessions, which, considering the current increase in Uzbekistan’s role in Central Asia, is not at all surprising. In this case, the “enclave bargains” may become a significant destabilizing factor in the Ferghana Valley and create a dangerous precedent for other countries of the region. What is more, reviewing and refashioning the current borders is also fraught with serious consequences for security in the Central Asian countries, particularly in face of the anticipated attacks by groups from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which are forecast for the spring when the snow starts to melt in the mountainous regions of the Ferghana Valley.
As mentioned above, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are embroiled in a dispute over several border sections. They are mainly localized in the southern part of the Ferghana Valley, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan meet. In the intergovernmental dialog between Dushanbe and Tashkent on border regulation, Uzbekistan is clearly applying widespread pressure, that is, seizing the disputed sections. As for the negotiations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, even before 1989, the intergovernmental commission had essentially completed delimitation of the common border between these republics. But due to the civil war that began in Tajikistan, this commission ceased its activity, which explains disputes on certain border sections. Pursuant to the law on the state border of Kyrgyzstan, adopted by the republic in 1999, the commission’s work should be revived, which is being assisted by the contractual base created by the two republics in 1996. But for several reasons, the commission has not revived its activity, although the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan understand the importance of this.
Summing up the aforesaid, it should be noted that border regulation in the Ferghana Valley should be resolved on the basis of mutually acceptable alternatives and compromises, without any pressure (economic, political, or military). Of course, no national or ethnic borders are propitious by their very nature. The only sensible move is to stop the useless attempts to give the conception of state borders ethnic content as quickly as possible and start with the actual borders established under the national-state demarcation of 1924, no matter how bad they may be.
The Problem of Water and Energy Resources
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many natural resources ended up on different sides of various borders and the regulations for their use had to be defined anew. Whereas oil and gas became someone’s specific property and are sold at world prices, water, one of the most valuable resources in Central Asia, is still free of charge. But this is not the gist of the problem, the situation surrounding water and energy resources, water use and water distribution contains a multitude of diverse elements.
First, the fact that questions relating to payment for accumulating, storing and supplying water during the spring and summer from the reservoirs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—the main owners of water resources in Central Asia—have still not been resolved presents a direct threat to the economic security of these countries. And the shortage of funds for technically maintaining the safety of dams and reservoirs could lead to an environmental disaster—there is the risk of flooding almost half of the low-lying area of the Ferghana Valley. Second, the increase in population in the valley, the expansion in the area of land cultivated with cotton and tobacco plantations, as well as the shortage of irrigated fields are aggravated by territorial disputes among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The events of recent decades show that not only economic problems arise due to the lack of irrigation water, but also the current situation could give rise to ethnic tension and escalate into a conflict. And, third, with each passing year, the use of water resources is acquiring an increasingly political, rather than economic nature, and each country is trying in every way to ensure itself control over water distribution.
The hydraulic power stations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which regulate water supply, are currently working more for their neighbors, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. “If they operate under energy and not irrigation conditions, that is the main decrease in storage lakes occurs in the winter, rather than in the summer, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will gain a significant increase in electric power production.”8 The summer decrease in storage lakes is not advantageous to either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. But it is very convenient for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which continue to obtain approximately 80 percent of their water from their neighbors almost free of charge. The economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are losing enormous funds because of this, by producing electricity and dumping water to their own detriment.
A meeting of representatives of the water and energy complexes of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan held on 1-4 July, 1997 in the Issyk Kul Region discussed the efficient use of water resources supplied by the Naryn-Syrdaria Cascade of reservoirs.9 And despite the fact that all the participants in this meeting agreed that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had the right to compensation for the significant financial resources these countries invest in the upkeep and exploitation of the large interstate hydraulic power stations built on their territories, neither Bishkek nor Dushanbe have as yet received even the smallest compensation payment. This unfair attitude on the part of their stronger neighbors is giving rise to tension among the countries and preventing stability in the region.
Along with the territorial problems, questions of water use and distribution are having a particularly acute impact on interstate relations and arousing a multitude of conflicts. These conflicts primarily consist of cultural-economic clashes between the representatives of different ethnic groups. A graphic example of this is the “conflict around the distribution of water and land in the Shaartuz, Kabodien, and Piandzh districts of the south of Tajikistan between semi-nomadic Arabs and Uzbeks, on the one hand, and farmers—Karategin Tajiks—on the other.”10 This conflict became the bloodiest page in the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1993. But similar conflicts, which are unfolding in the border zones, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, have an even greater destructive potential.
Ethnic opposition in the Ferghana Valley is related to water or a shortage of irrigated land. For example, the reason for the extremely serious political differences between the two neighboring republics was the conflict (1998) between the Tajiks of the Isfara District of Tajikistan’s Khujand Region and the Kyrgyz of the Batken District of Kyrgyzstan’s Osh Region. It abated only after joint societies for controlling the distribution of water were created at the local self-government level.
The conflict potential will rise as the irrigated fields of cotton expand and the size of the population in this valley increases. According to the information of statistical studies, during 1996-1998, the number of Uzbeks in this region increased by 104.9%, Tajiks by 103.8%, Kyrgyz by 103.3%, and Kazakhs by 102.4%.11
“The population of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is essentially doubling every 30 years, while the Kyrgyzstan population undergoes the same increase every 43 years, and the Kazakhstan population every 81 years. And the fact that Uzbeks and Tajiks are the main representatives of the local farming culture, which means the irrigated area of land will rise, indicates the development of inevitable disputes and conflicts around water distribution in the Ferghana Valley.”12 The Central Asian states have still not found a solution to these problems. The main obstacle preventing a fair solution to the problem of water use is the reluctance of the leaders of several countries in the region to recognize and define the status of water channels. In so doing, the economic interests of the states who are the main owners of water resources must be taken into account, and questions of disputed border sections settled fairly.
It goes without saying that the rational use of water and energy resources is of strategic importance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where the main water sources of the region are formed. They provide these vitally important resources to Central Asian states which experience a shortage of water. The problem is sufficiently complex and acute. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan only draw up their interstate positions with respect to this natural resource, which could bring them economic dividends (in the form of services for supplying water to their neighbors) for the expenses they bear on accumulation and storage, as well as on the upkeep of interstate hydraulic power stations. But the current situation is having a negative effect on the socioeconomic and environmental state of the countries which own water, and on the interstate relations between contiguous countries. For all the republics of the region do not have any experience in resolving and settling disputes, including the mutually advantageous distribution of water resources on an economic basis.
For the past 15 years, trends have been observed in the Central Asian countries with insufficient water potential toward a decrease in natural surface water. In so doing, we should keep in mind that according to experts, “Uzbekistan’s residual oil and gas supplies are estimated to last for thirty years, and Kazakhstan’s for 70 years, and these countries will not only need water in the future, but also hydrocarbons, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have endless supplies of fresh high-quality water (high mountain glaciers).”13
A corresponding legal base is required to reach a civilized solution to the problems of water distribution. At present, there is no information on legislative support of this sphere in Tajikistan with respect to water sales (by way of services) to neighboring states. On the other hand, the situation with water use in Kyrgyzstan is slightly different. For example, on 6 October, 1997, the country’s president signed a decree On the Foundations of Foreign Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic Regarding the Use of Water Resources in Rivers Formed in Kyrgyzstan and Flowing into the Territories of Contiguous States, which says, in particular: “The Kyrgyz Republic bases its considerations on the fact that each state has the right to use the water resources within its own territory for gaining maximum profit. Questions relating to water supply, the regulation of rivers’ run-off and payment for water use or distribution of the profit gained from the use of water resources shall be a subject of interstate negotiations.” In addition, in July 2001, the Law on Interstate Use of Water Facilities, Water Resources, and Hydraulic Power Stations in the Kyrgyz Republic was adopted. Pursuant to this document and according to international practice, the republic is to levy compensation fees for services on neighboring countries, that is, for the accumulation, storage and sale of water, as well as for the technical upkeep of interstate hydraulic power stations that operate in favor of our neighbors.
These documents were ambivalently, even rather brusquely accepted in the official circles of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, openly ignoring the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan. They review Kyrgyzstan’s position as a “dangerous tendency” and manifestation of “national egoism,” and are attempting to resolve the problem by infringing on Bishkek’s interests and not trying to find mutually acceptable alternatives which take Kyrgyzstan’s prerogatives into account. Until recently, Bishkek has been forced to make certain concessions to Tashkent and Astana by delivering its water resources free of charge within the stipulated time and in the necessary amounts. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan constantly violate the obligations they assumed with respect to the delivery of energy resources. For example, in the fall and winter of 1999-2001, this led to a critical situation in Kyrgyzstan’s energy supply, and it incurred enormous material damage (which has still not ultimately been defined). This situation suits Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan who, by creating various structures, for example, the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC), are trying to take control over the supply of water to their countries. And, as we already mentioned, the question of payment for its storage and delivery, as well as for the use of Kyrgyzstan’s hydraulic power stations, arouses a negative reaction.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to draw Kyrgyzstan into a multilateral format for resolving the problem. To this end, they are also creating supra-state institutions, that is, they are trying in every way possible to ensure themselves the possibility of participating in the distribution of Kyrgyzstan’s water resources free of charge. They believe that they are acting primarily on the basis of an agreement among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on cooperation in joint management of the use and protection of the region’s water resources signed on 18 February, 1992 in Alma-Ata. This document contains the following provision: “Recognizing the common ownership and integrity of water resources in the region, the sides shall possess the same rights to their use and responsibility for ensuring their rational use and protection.”14 To be frank, this provision is a trump card in the hands of neighboring states, giving them the unrestricted right to control Kyrgyzstan’s water resources. But there are at least two “buts” here. First, the agreement was signed by the Kyrgyzstan minister of hydraulic engineering, and he did not have the authority to sign this kind of document. Second, it was not ratified by parliament, that is, it does not have legal force. However, this is not stopping either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, and the aforementioned Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (the headquarters of which are in Tashkent), which is not recognized by either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, is continuing its work. According to its creators, it will not only establish limits on the use of water resources, but, as strange as this may seem, has already defined the level of water supply for the population of Kyrgyzstan, which is extremely low compared with its consumption by the residents of neighboring states. According to the data of the ICWC, the daily level of drinking and municipal water supply in the Central Asian region in 2010, calculated per person, will amount to 540 liters in Kazakhstan, 137 liters in Kyrgyzstan, 621 liters in Tajikistan, 592 liters in Turkmenistan, and 525 liters in Uzbekistan.15
Kyrgyzstan considers this “decision” a violation of the norms of civilized international relations and disrespect for the Constitution of our country. The executive agencies of the ICWC have not been approved by either the president, the government, or the parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, and such a hydraulic engineering structure operating over states contradicts international practice.
In 2001, the fourth session of the Project Working Group on Energy and Water Resources was held. Delegations from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, representatives of the European Economic Commission (EEC), Interstate Council of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), the International Foundation for Saving the Aral (IFSA), and UNDP, the United States Agency of International Development (USAID), and others, participated in it. The Turkmen and Uzbek delegations did not attend the meeting. The first said it was too busy, and the second referred to a lack of financing.
The regulation of water relations with neighboring countries is very important from the point of view of Kyrgyzstan’s political, economic, and environmental security. The resolution of this problem should be closely tied to stability both within the state, and in its relations with other countries. And this envisages not only retaining the necessary water balance in trans-border rivers and reservoirs, and drawing up common stances on their joint use and protection, but also preventing pollution and the depletion of water resources. In addition, measures must be taken to maintain and raise the safety of hydraulic power stations in the Kyrgyz Republic, which have been in operation for many years without undergoing any major overhaul. And due to the high level of seismologic danger or possible acts of sabotage, this situation could be catastrophic not only for Kyrgyzstan, but also for its neighbors.
1 See: B. Musaev, “Uzbekistan: Regional Security and Hazardous Social Trends,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3, 2000, p. 78.
2 See: Vecherniy Bishkek, 21 May, 1999.
3 Quoted from: A.K. Kerimbekova, K.K. Moldobaev, Vvedenie v politologiiu bezopasnosti, Bishkek, 2000, p. 62.
4 In 1998, Tajikistan also entered the CAU.—Author’s note.
5 See: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 22 February, 2001.
7 See: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 22 February, 2001.
8 M. Suiunbaev, A. Mamytova, “Prirodnye resursy kak faktor razvitiia Tsentral’noi Evrazii,” Tsentral’naia Asia i Kavkaz, No. 1, 1998, p. 31.
9 See: T.U. Usubaliev, “K voprosu o vodnykh resursakh Kyrgyzstana,” Tsentral’naia Azia, No. 1 (13), 1998, p. 88.
10 M. Olimov, A. Kamoliddinov, “Regionalnoe sotrudnichestvo po ispol’zovaniiu vodnykh i energeticheskikh resursov Tsentral’noi Azii,” Tsentral’naia Azia i Kavkaz, No. 2 (3), 1999, p. 12.
11 See: A. Januzakov, Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva Tsentral’noi Azii v mirovom soobshchestve, Moscow, 2000, p. 95.
12 A. Januzakov, op. cit.
13 Kh. Mukhabbatov, “Vodnye resursy Tajikistana: formirovanie i ispolzovanie,” Tsentral’naia Azia, No. 1 (13), 1998, p. 93.
14 T.U. Usubaliev, Voda— dorozhe slata, p. 189.
15 See: T.U. Usubaliev, Voda— dorozhe zlata, p. 71.