AZERBAIJAN: PRIVATIZATION OF STATE PROPERTY AND ITS EFFECTS
Rauf Jabiev, D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, department head, Economic Reform Center, Ministry of Economic Development, Azerbaijan Republic
Privatization of state property is a major instrument for building democratic institutions, reforming the economy, and accelerating the country’s economic and social development.
In Azerbaijan, privatization was carried out against the background of a general crisis, inflation, a year-on-year decline in the efficiency of social production, closure of many enterprises and organizations, growing unemployment, occupation of a part of the republic’s territory, etc. Moreover, the country was short of funds and of skilled personnel capable of addressing these tasks on a due level. So, the starting conditions for privatization were much worse than in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other Commonwealth states. For this and other reasons, privatization in Azerbaijan was launched 4-5 years later than in other republics of the former U.S.S.R.
One should also bear in mind that privatization is a very painful, complicated and laborious process which not only requires a great deal of knowledge and effort and calls for sizeable capital outlays, but is also highly sensitive in social terms. After all, it amounts to a redistribution of property and can only be successful given the consent of the whole population and the authorities.
Nevertheless, nearly all economists and business executives, including foreign experts, attach great importance to privatization. It should be a condition for pulling the republic out of the crisis, an important stage in the drive to deepen the economic reforms, and an integral element of the overall strategy of market-oriented transformations.
Privatization schemes used in different countries are highly diverse: from the sale of state property to strategic investors to employee buyouts of enterprises and voucher programs. Each of these has its own merits and carries certain risks. From the standpoint of long-term prospects, it is still too early to say which of these approaches will yield the greatest positive effect. If the purpose of privatization is to break the dependence between enterprises and the state, to acquaint the population with the basic principles of the market economy, and to ensure more equitable distribution of property, then voucher privatization should be seen as its most acceptable variant, which, however, does not lead to the emergence of an effective owner.
Under a presidential decree issued on 23 June, 1992, a State Property Committee (SPC) was set up in the country. It was to prepare within a short period (by early September) a program for the privatization of state property for 1992-1993 and to put it before the National Assembly (Milli Mejlis). The first program was drafted and submitted for approval, but since it did not take full account of the institutional framework or of the principles of property transfer, it was not approved.
In order to create the necessary legal framework, on 7 January, 1993, the National Assembly adopted a Law on the Privatization of State Property, and then approved a Decision on the Privatization of State-Owned Motor Vehicles (No. 522 of 24 February, 1993). That document gave the go-ahead for the privatization (at market prices) of fixed-route minibuses and taxis belonging to the Azavtotransport state-run concern and the Baku Passenger Transportation Department. Execution and control of the course of privatization was vested in the State Property Committee, which, for its part, drew up a set of regulations on the privatization of state-owned motor vehicles. It ruled that motor vehicles could be purchased only by their drivers, and that 50% of the revenue received from privatization was to go into the state budget and the other 50% was to be entered on the accounts of motor transport enterprises. In 1993-1994, a total of 7,157 units of property, including 6,065 motor vehicles, were privatized at 101 motor transport enterprises. The total revenue from sales was 2bn manats ($3.2m), of which 1bn manats ($1.6m) went into the state budget.
But the question of mass privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises had yet to be resolved. Following protracted work on the draft of a new program and its discussion at various levels, including the Cabinet of Ministers and the President’s Office, the first privatization program for 1995-1998 was finally approved and enacted (Law of the Azerbaijan Republic No. 1120 of 29 September, 1995). The program listed the main purposes, priorities, methods, stages and timetables of privatization, gave a classification of enterprises and facilities to be privatized, and specified the ways of their conversion into joint-stock companies, the concrete incorporation variants, the procedure for using revenue from privatization, the amount, terms of issue and rules of using privatization checks (vouchers) and so on. From 1 August to 1 October, 1996, 32m vouchers or 8m state privatization shares (1 share equals 4 vouchers) were distributed among the republic’s population. Roughly 95% of the country’s inhabitants entitled to such vouchers became their owners.
The program for 1995-1998 provided for the privatization of 75% of state property. According to the State Property Committee, the republic’s entire property in that period was worth around 70 trillion manats ($15.8bn), and the plan was to privatize property worth a total of 50 trillion manats ($11.3bn).1 Consequently, the value of property due per voucher was around 156 thousand manats ($35.3).
Meanwhile, fixed assets in the republic were repeatedly revalued during that period by decision of the government, so that the value of the property scheduled for privatization kept rising and finally reached 60 trillion manats ($13.6bn), or 181 thousand manats ($41) per voucher.2 According to expert estimates, however, the property due to be denationalized in the course of the mass privatization campaign was assessed at around 90 trillion manats ($20.4bn), while the price of a voucher on the black market now ranges from 20 to 30 thousand manats (around $4-6).
The mass privatization of small enterprises started with gasoline filling stations: at the first auction held on 26 March, 1996, the first five of the republic’s 696 filling stations, including 156 stations in Baku, were put up for sale. The minimum price of one filling station was around 33m manats ($7.7 thousand), and the maximum price, 112m manats ($26.1 thousand). All five of them were purchased that very day by the work collectives of these filling stations at the starting prices established by the State Property Committee.
But at the third auction (on 16 April), the results of the first auction were cancelled, and the price of all the five filling stations sold was raised. One of them was now purchased for 199.6m manats ($46.5 thousand), or at nearly double the initial price. Out of a total of 21 filling stations put up for sale on 16 April, 1996, only four were sold. Just as at the two earlier auctions, they were purchased by their own work collectives.
At subsequent auctions, all gasoline filling stations and other facilities put up for sale were usually purchased by work collectives at starting prices. In actual fact, there was no real bidding, but merely a legalization of property rights, that is, property was officially transferred to buyers at an “agreed price.” Of course, since all these facilities had previously passed into the hands of their former owners by private arrangement, no one was willing to pay for them a second time.
By January 1999, a total of 27,712 facilities with an initial value of 396.5bn manats ($98m) were privatized in the republic. These included 9,306 consumer service establishments, 499 industrial, 106 agricultural, 190 construction, 1,916 trade and 513 public catering enterprises, 88 incomplete construction projects, 436 gasoline filling stations, 12,816 transport facilities, 37 utility enterprises, and 1,805 other objects. Most of these (except transport vehicles) were sold at auctions; the average sales price of each of these enterprises and facilities was 22.1m manats ($7.4 thousand), with most of them purchased below their initial value. In 1998, for example, 6,644 enterprises and facilities initially priced at 145,076.4m manats ($37.5m) were sold for 130,312.9m manats ($33.7m), or 10.1% cheaper. These included 155 enterprises in industry, 62 in agriculture, 3,546 in transport, 680 in trade, 152 in construction, 190 in public catering and 289 in consumer services, 48 incomplete construction projects, 56 gasoline filling stations, and 1,466 other facilities.
Whereas prior to 1996 the amount of privatization proceeds entered on a special budget account was around 1.3bn manats ($0.7m), from 1996 onward that amount rapidly increased and by the end of 1998 reached a total of 301.2bn manats ($76.7m). In particular, the annual amount came to 14.6bn manats ($3.4m) in 1996, 143.6bn manats ($36m) in 1997, and 141.7bn manats ($36.6m) in 1998.
The monies received were entered on a special budget account at the National Bank, and it is only by presidential decree that they can be used for public purposes, notably for covering the budget deficit.
One should note that by the end of 1998 it was planned to privatize 25,000 small enterprises, whereas the actual figure was around 20,000, or 80% of the target number. The most attractive spheres for investors were the service sector (9,400 small enterprises sold), transport (5,200), trade and public catering (1,800) and pharmacies.
As regards large and medium-sized enterprises, around 4,500 of these were subject to privatization under the state program. But first they were to be converted into joint-stock companies, with a part of the shares of the newly formed companies to be placed by closed subscription among their employees, and the rest to be sold at voucher and cash auctions.
According to SPC data, 967 joint-stock companies were set up as of 1 January, 1999, on the basis of large and medium-sized enterprises, and closed subscriptions were effected at 954 of them. In addition, the shares of 954 joint-stock companies were put up for sale at voucher and cash auctions. Voucher auctions started on 18 May, 1997. At the 14 auctions held that year, the shares of 724 companies were offered for sale to the public, including those of 407 companies for the first time.
In 1998, the State Property Committee held another 22 voucher auctions, at which the shares of 1,175 companies were offered to the public, including those of 547 companies for the first time. So, out of a sum-total authorized capital of 3,930.6bn manats ($1bn), shares with a face value of 1,238.5bn manats ($315.3m) were offered to the public at 36 voucher auctions held in 1997-1998, and around 98% of these were exchanged for vouchers. As a result, around 2.8m vouchers or 700 thousand privatization shares were written off and withdrawn from circulation. A total of 41 thousand vouchers or 10,250 privatization shares were removed from circulation by closed subscription. The number of vouchers cancelled in the course of small-scale privatization was 300 thousand (75 thousand shares).
As regards privatization for cash, one should note its specific features: removal of a sizeable segment of state property from under the control of the state and its involvement in market turnover; transition from distribution of property free of charge to actual sale; attraction of strategic foreign investors; provision of enterprises being privatized with cash required for their restructuring; and raising of additional revenue for the state budget.
Cash auctions started on 22 June, 1997. At the 13 auctions held that year, the shares of 744 joint-stock companies were put up for sale, including those of 407 companies for the first time. By the beginning of 1999, out of a total of 967 joint-stock companies, 170 companies (17.6%) were privatized through sale at voucher and cash auctions. Overall, 3,141 thousand vouchers or 785 thousand privatization shares were cancelled and withdrawn from circulation. This means that by the beginning of 1999 a total of 785 thousand people, or around 10% of the country’s population, had taken part in privatization.
But according to officials and the mass media, many vouchers were acquired by foreign natural and legal persons. Thus, the republic’s former minister of state property Farhad Aliev maintains that only 5% of all vouchers are still held by the country’s population, whereas 95% have been acquired by foreigners.3 True, there are also other estimates on that score.
Until recently, vouchers were traded in a haphazard and unorganized way, with a large army of speculators operating in this field. That is why there were no accurate statistics on vouchers either at the State Committee for Securities (SCS), at the Ministry of State Property or in other agencies of the republic. Foreign investors, to say nothing of the public at large, had no such information either.
In order to study the situation on the securities market, to regulate and control the turnover of vouchers, and to systematize these data, the State Committee for Securities under the President approved (on 26 January, 2000) a document entitled Rules for Regulating the Circulation of State Privatization Shares (Vouchers). This document regulates matters relating to the conclusion of transactions involving state privatization vouchers, their registration, safekeeping, use and liquidation, and also with the legalization of major holders of vouchers and privatization shares.
Under the new rules, transactions in the purchase and sale of vouchers may be performed by legal entities and natural persons engaged in business activity without the establishment of a legal entity only upon the receipt of a special permit (license). In the purchase and sale of vouchers, the person buying or selling them must obtain a receipt confirming the transaction, with a copy of the receipt remaining at the office where the transaction was performed. Persons in possession of more than 400 privatization vouchers and having no receipt to that effect obtained from broker’s offices had to register them with the State Committee for Securities prior to 11 March, 2000. If a person wishing to take part in an auction or an investment tender has over 100 thousand privatization vouchers, he must present them for deposit at the National Depositary Center at least 30 days prior to the end of the auction or the time of payment of vouchers under the terms of the tender.
In accordance with the new rules, a total of 14,164,908 vouchers were registered in early 2000; 4.8% of these were held by residents, and 95.2%, by nonresidents.
So, most of the registered vouchers are concentrated in the hands of foreign investors. This constitutes 42.1% of all the vouchers distributed among the population (the overall number was 32m vouchers or 8m privatization shares). If one bears in mind that by the beginning of 1999 a total of 3,141 thousand vouchers had been withdrawn from circulation, while the number of vouchers registered with the State Committee for Securities was 14,164,908, one will find that the population, foreign investors, etc., still hold 14,694,042 vouchers or 3,673,523 shares (11.5% of those distributed among the country’s citizens).
According to some of the republic’s news agencies, these vouchers have mostly been bought up by two foreign investment companies: Minaret Group and AJA Investment.4 As I see it, however, there is no need to panic or be indignant, since the republic’s economy cannot recover without the assistance of foreign investors. The power industry alone is in need of $2.3bn worth of investment, and another $1.3bn should be invested in 3,500 enterprises in metallurgy, machine building and the chemical industry, including $920m in ferrous metallurgy.
A point to note is that under the State Privatization Program foreign investors may acquire privatization vouchers, and also shares of enterprises undergoing privatization only upon submitting for redemption so-called state privatization options, that is, they have to pay for the options as well. There was a time when the price of an option was 2 thousand manats, then it rose to 4 thousand, and when the privatization fervor among foreigners hit fever pitch, the price of an option per voucher jumped to 100 thousand manats (around $23).
Since 1 February, 2000, the State Committee for Securities has been fixing the price of state privatization options on a daily basis in accordance with the new rules. Here is how this is done: in the morning, upon the receipt of information from licensed broker’s offices and on its basis, SCS specialists determine the price of an option, which is equated to the average market price of a privatization voucher. Considering that out of the six companies and two banks holding licenses for the right to engage in the purchase and sale of vouchers not more than two broker’s offices are usually in operation, SCS specialists collect information from unorganized markets as well.
In 1997, the sale of options brought in over 51bn manats ($12.8m), and in 1998 a total of 8,167 options were sold for 816.7m manats ($211 thousand). Such a sharp decline in the purchase of options by foreign investors is connected, in my view, with the fact that favorable conditions for foreign capital have not yet been created in the republic. Besides, the changes in the “rules of the game” for the privatization of large and medium-sized enterprises stipulated in the second program can hardly be expected to induce foreign investors to put their money into the republic’s economy.
Under the Rules of Issue, Circulation and Cancellation of State Privatization Options, a registration of options purchased but not exercised by foreigners was held from 17 January to 17 April, 2000. According to the State Committee for Securities, 17,702,192 options were registered in that period by 61 legal entities and 1 natural person. According to the National Depositary Center, the balance of cancelled options was 53,397, and the number of options deposited by foreign investors was 152,500.5 So, as of the date of registration of options with the State Committee for Securities, residents and nonresidents were in possession of another 4,219,806 options.
The approval of Regulations on Investment Tenders in September 1998 marked the beginning of a new stage in the privatization of large and medium-sized enterprises: the stage of investment tenders. Bids were invited for the privatization of the joint-stock company Bakelectrogaynag, set up on 29 October on the basis of the Baku plant for the production of heavy electric welding equipment (NPO Azerelektroterm).
The tender commission established in accordance with the above Regulations included representatives of the State Property Committee, the Ministry of Economics, the Central State Tax Inspectorate, the State Antimonopoly Committee, the Executive Committee of the Nariman District and the Bakelectrogaynag joint-stock company. The winner of the tender, as announced by the commission, was the Baku Steel Company.
Under the investment plan presented by the winner company, $1m was transferred into the state budget, and over the next five years investments in Bakelectrogaynag are to amount to $1.8bn.
Here is another example. On 18 August, 1999, the State Property Committee announced an investment tender for the shares of AOOT Baku-Staleliteinoe, which ended on 21 September. Under the terms of the tender, preference was to be given to an investor with a positive track record of capital investment in the production and sale of steel ingots. The joint-stock company issued 225,577 ordinary shares with a face value of 100 thousand manats each ($23), and 150,665 of these were put up for sale.
The tender was won by Inecotex, a private company. The State Property Committee made the following demands: the company’s investment program had to provide for measures to protect the environment and to ensure compliance with environmental standards in production, and also for measures to ensure social protection, training and refresher training of employees.
Within 20 banking days after the signing of the contract, Inecotex submitted 28 thousand vouchers (7 thousand privatization shares) to the State Property Committee. Under its investment program, the company undertook to invest in Baku-Staleliteinoe a total of 8,800m manats ($2m) over the following three years and to transfer $1,500m manats ($333.3 thousand) into the state budget. In addition, it had to repay 50% of the debt owed by the enterprise to the budget in the amount of 814,625 thousand manats ($181 thousand), including 196,549 thousand manats ($43.7 thousand) of wage arrears. The company’s restructuring and development program provided for the repair of the plant’s electric furnaces, process equipment and communication lines, so that in 2000 it could achieve a sales target of 24bn manats ($5.4m). Before its privatization, this plant with a capacity of 22 thousand tons of steel ingots a year had stood idle.
So, the first stage of privatization carried out in pursuance of the first privatization program was completed, but no decisions were adopted on its results. Nevertheless, on 16 May, 2000, Milli Mejlis voted for a new Law on the Privatization of State Property. Here are some of the points on which it differs from the old law. First, a State Commission was set up to control the course of privatization and to ensure its transparency (the Commission’s powers and composition are determined by the country’s president, and it is headed by the prime minister). Second, the new law includes two articles safeguarding the rights of the work collectives of enterprises slated for privatization. Third, a list of facilities to be privatized and their starting prices are to be published in the press three months prior to their privatization. The starting prices may be lowered in three stages, depending on the existence of prospective buyers. After the third attempt to privatize the enterprise, the State Commission is entitled to declare it bankrupt and to auction it off in parts. The funds received are to be used to settle accounts with its creditors.
In addition, the new law provides for several privatization variants. The first of these is preferential sale to members of the work collective. In this case, the preferences apply to employees of the enterprise; to persons who worked at the enterprise for more than seven years before going on pension; and to those discharged from the enterprise after 1 January, 1995 because of staff cuts and granted unemployed status. The second variant is based on individual projects. In this case, at least 51% of the shares of an enterprise are offered for sale in order to attract a strategic investor. The list of enterprises to be privatized under this arrangement is determined by the respective executive agency. The third variant provides for specialized voucher and cash auctions for the sale of enterprises at the request of investors. The fourth variant is sale by auction to the highest bidder. The fifth variant is an investment tender to be won by the bidder presenting the most attractive investment program. The sixth variant is sale of leased state property. And the seventh variant is when the commission for control of privatization declares bankrupt an enterprise which has not been bought at auction. In this case, the enterprise may be liquidated and its assets auctioned off in parts, with the funds received going to settle accounts with creditors.
The law also designates the areas which cannot be privatized. These include border lands, forest stock, historical and cultural monuments, roads of national importance, etc. Foreign investors may take part in privatization by presenting state privatization options. At the same time, they are also entitled to take part in privatization without presenting such options but with the use of net profit earned in Azerbaijan. Foreign investors are taken to mean foreign nationals, stateless persons, foreign legal entities, and also Azeri legal entities with a foreign stake in excess of 50% of their authorized capital.
Another novelty is that a part of the revenue from privatization must be transferred to the account of the Ministry of State Property, which is to use a definite part of these monies to help reorganize enterprises being privatized. The amount of these deductions is determined at the stage of preparation of the state budget.
In the course of drafting and approval of this law and other regulatory enactments on privatization, a presidential decree signed on 24 December, 1999, disbanded the State Property Committee and established a Ministry of State Property on its basis. Later on, the President issued a decree (No. 475 of 30 April, 2002) establishing a Ministry of Economic Development, which incorporated the Ministry of State Property and four other ministries, state committees and agencies.
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So, in summing up the results of privatization carried out under the first privatization program, one may say that these results were neither made known to the public nor analyzed or discussed at government level. In fact, nothing was done to make a socioeconomic assessment of privatization and its consequences for the country.
Having analyzed and summed up numerous data and factual material obtained from various organizations, the author of this article has identified the reasons slowing down privatization and reducing its effectiveness. Here are some of the basic ones. First, although the State Property Committee established by presidential decree (23 June, 1992) was to draft a program for the privatization of state property by September of the same year, such a program was prepared and enacted by an appropriate law only on 29 September, 1995, that is, three years later. And the first auction for the privatization of gasoline filling stations was held even later, on 26 March, 1996.
Second, privatization in Azerbaijan was launched 4-5 years later than in other republics of the former U.S.S.R. and proceeded, as it was noted above, in the conditions of a general crisis, inflation, a decline in production, closure of many enterprises, unemployment, low purchasing power of the population, and occupation of 20% of the republic’s territory, which seriously dented its effectiveness.
Third, in the initial period of property denationalization the country had no skilled personnel in this area (the chairman of the State Property Committee was a journalist, and his deputy, a mathematician). Hence the incompetence, leading to mistakes and miscalculations in the very arrangement of the privatization process. Incidentally, the Committee’s ex-chairman Nadir Nasibli admitted his mistakes, pointing to his lack of experience in this field.6 Moreover, the republic lacked the financial resources required to stimulate enterprises undergoing privatization.
Fourth, the privatization process itself turned out to be isolated from the other reforms being implemented in the republic (economic restructuring, macroeconomic stabilization, etc.), and at the first stage of privatization the authorities were unable to stop the decline in production, notably in branches designed to meet everyday consumer demand.
Fifth, the first stage of privatization was not conducive, despite what was declared to be one of its main objectives, to the attraction of foreign investment, while the funds received were insufficient to ensure the technological, production and social development of enterprises and organizations.
Sixth, there was no individual approach to each enterprise (case-by-case privatization) with due regard for its specific features and sectoral peculiarities, and also for possibilities of increasing its export potential. Facilities had not been divided into liquid and illiquid, with the result that some enterprises were put up for auction several times.
In addition, since the tasks of transferring enterprises into the hands of effective owners were not resolved in the course of the first stage, voucher privatization failed to raise the efficiency of production. A public opinion poll showed that 68% of respondents wanted to sell their vouchers, 20% had decided to take some part in privatization, and only 12% were prepared to put their vouchers in an investment fund.7
Cash privatization at the first stage did not yield any tangible results either, despite the great hopes pinned on it. The privatization of joint-stock companies was ineffective: out of a total of 967 companies, only 170 (17.6%) were privatized by the beginning of 1999. Besides, the conversion of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies led to an unprecedented increase in the role of their top executives, who got an opportunity to dispose of the capital belonging to the enterprise as if it were their own. The denationalization of state property was associated with high social costs, including a tangible reduction in employment at most enterprises (over 80% of privatized facilities are at a standstill), and did not lead to an improvement of relations between the work collectives and the owners of these enterprises. The elaboration of debt repayment measures for these enterprises was not completed (debt arrears of enterprises entered on the privatization schedule amounted to billions of manats). As a result, enterprises were sold at book value plus arrears.
Owing to the deficiencies of the mechanism used in this process, the estimated value of the property of enterprises scheduled for privatization was ill-matched with the imputed value of property due per privatization voucher. Following three or four property revaluations, the book value of enterprise assets multiplied dozens of times, whereas the face value of vouchers was never indexed. As a result, in 1998 alone 6,644 facilities were sold at auctions below their initial value. That is why enterprises must first be put up for sale at full value, with a gradual lowering of the price (in the absence of demand) to 75%, 50% and 25%. If the enterprise is not purchased even then, it must be liquidated and sold in parts (equipment, machinery, buildings, installations, etc.). Besides, it is not right to vest all powers in evaluating the property of enterprises slated for privatization in a single agency (the Ministry of State Property).
Privatization in the republic was carried out on the instructions of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international organizations, which was at variance with its goals and purposes. In the process of denationalization, their experts kept putting tough conditions before the country. Thus, the World Bank demanded that the entire cotton-ginning industry should be privatized within two months. No sooner said than done. In that way, 17 of the country’s 19 cotton-ginning plants were purchased by foreigners. In particular, 14 of them now belong to the Turkish consortium MTK. As soon as these plants resumed their activity, it became clear that their new owners would establish monopoly prices for raw materials. That was exactly what happened: over the past two seasons, cotton has been sold below cost, which has resulted in heavy losses for cotton suppliers, with a sharp reduction in output and in area under cotton. Unfortunately, the mistakes made in this industry cannot be rectified in the next few years. That is why before accepting the proposals of international organizations the authorities should consult with national experts as well.
The arbitrary choice of such indicators as the number of privatized enterprises and the amount of revenue going into the budget as the basic criteria of privatization had a negative effect on the economic and social effectiveness of the denationalization process.
In this context, it is necessary to develop and introduce a procedure under which at least 50% of the revenue from cash privatization and from the sale of shares would go to commercial banks for the purpose of crediting privatized enterprises. Nothing was done to ensure the transparency of the entire privatization venture: despite its importance for the country, it took place behind “closed doors.” The State Property Committee barred all interested persons, including foreign investors, from gaining access to the required information. All of that had an adverse effect both on privatization itself and on confidence in it. That is why it is necessary to seriously upgrade and enhance the information support of the privatization process and to devise an effective system of indicators and criteria that would make it possible to follow the course of denationalization step by step, on a case-by-case basis. Openness and publicity of the privatization process should be pivotal to the activities of the recently established Ministry of Economic Development. With this aim in view, it is necessary to ensure access to information on the postprivatization activities of enterprises and to encourage citizens to take a more active part in privatization.
In addition, we need to make a serious effort to improve the legal, regulatory and methodological framework of privatization, to formulate its goals and chart its immediate prospects, to intensify government control at all its stages, and to develop an effective system of indicators taking due account of the sectoral peculiarities of enterprises being privatized, the specifics of their products, etc.
1 See: Kapital, No. 2, 1997, p. 45.
2 See: Nalogovye vesti, No. 15, June 1996.
3 See: Trend, 31 March, 2000.
4 See: Konsalting, No. 9, 1998.
5 See: Trend, 3 May, 2000.
6 See: Ezhednevnye novosti, 5 November, 1999.
7 See: Monitor, No. 5, 1997, p. 40.