ON THE TYPOLOGY OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS
Igor Dobaev, Ph.D. (Political Science), work on a doctor thesis at Rostov State University (Rostov-on-Don, Russia)
Islamism is not merely a system of ideas, it is translated into practice in certain Muslim states by certain parties, movements, groups, etc. Their field of activity is vast and varied; they employ a wide range of means and methods—both legal and illegal. Terror is one of them.
Today, radical Islamists are ruling only over Iran and Sudan. Between 1996 and 2001 Afghanistan lived under a radical movement Taliban; until late June 1997 in Turkey there were Islamists in the ruling coalition; in Yemen they survived in such coalition until May 1997.
In other countries Islamists are working either openly or secretly or are prosecuted by the ruling regimes. At best they are semi-legal. Everywhere, except Iran and Sudan, they are in opposition to the ruling regimes and are their most uncompromising critics.
Despite the present variety of the radical Islamist movements and the processes going on in them one can discern two major trends, or wings, among them. They use different methods and are either “moderately radical” or “ultra-radical” (extremist). The division is conventional but it helps identify the best approach to extremist groups and how they should be treated. Not all radical Islamist organizations can be classed among one or another group: many of them display both moderate and extremist features. They can be called organizations of a “mixed type.”
All their specific features apart, the radical Islamic groups have a common aim: a Muslim state either on the territories of their countries or parts of them that means that all the socioeconomic and political institutions should become Islamic. This means, in turn, that the legal system should be guided by the Shari‘a, all levels of executive power should be patterned according to the Islamic model. Economy should become a so-called Islamic economy.
In fact, the ideologists of radical Islam cannot agree over the nature of the Islamic legislative and executive structures, therefore the 20-year-long experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran is especially interesting. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who headed the Islamic revolution tried to translate his conception of Islamic rule (velayat-e faqih) into practice. This contradicts the Shi‘a doctrine that says that a just order in an Islamic state is impossible until the 12th imam (mahdi) comes. According to this doctrine it is the mahdi who will be able to connect the Shi‘ite community and Allah.1 Khomeini departed from this scholastic approach and announced that there was a third (Islamic) way of development based on the principles of justice and better life for all people as a result of a correct road selected by one man—the faqih.
The religious upper crust in Iran rejected this opinion: they supported the principle of non-interference of the clergy in the affairs of the state.2 However, velayat-e faqih still dominates state development and state administration in Iran.
The structures of power in Iran are organized according to this conception that ensures domination of the religious leaders and its key link—the spiritual leader (Ayatollah Khomeini was the first of them replaced after his death by Ayatollah Khamenei). Under Art 110 of the Constitution of the IRI he has unprecedentedly wide rights in the legislative, executive and judicial spheres, he has a decisive say in the questions of war and peace, appointment and removal of officials, etc.
Arts 58 and 114 of the Constitution say that the nation elects the president and members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles-e Shoura-ye Eslami, or the parliament). However, the decisive role in politics belongs to religious figures. They are in an absolute majority in the Assembly that performs auxiliary, rather than legislative, functions. It is its duty to find in the sacred texts provisions and propositions to meet current problems. There is a so-called Expert Council (Supervising Council, or Council of Guardians) above the Assembly. It is formed out of Shari‘a experts: half of it (6 members) is approved by the parliament, the rest, by the spiritual leader. It is for the Council to check whether the decisions of the parliament correspond to the Shari‘a. In fact, it can veto any decision.
Political disagreements in the top echelons of power became evident when a representative of the reformist trend Mohammad Khatami had won the 1997 presidential elections. In the past, during the Islamic revolution certain important elements of Shi‘te radicalism had brought together the opposition against the shah. Today, these ideas serve the interests of the Islamists’ conservative wing. This explains why the liberals headed by Khatami are trying to snatch the initiative from the conservatives and are working toward a civil society within the already existing Islamic order. They also want to introduce a certain amount of democracy and the freedom of speech. Khatami has even coined a new political term “Islamic democracy” that he described as one of the major aims of the 1978-1979 Islamic revolution in his country.3
“Export of the Islamic revolution” has declined: two decades after the victory of the ideas of “Islamic rule” at least some of the country’s leaders are gradually abandoning the theory and practice of extremism and side with the moderate Islamists.
A similar situation can be seen in Sudan: since 1989 the country has been ruled by General al-Bashir, a radical Islamic leader. The leader of the Sudan fundamentalists Hasan al-Turabi is his spiritual teacher. At the early stage of his career al-Turabi could be described as a faithful follower of the ideologists of the Egyptian movement The Muslim Brothers headed by Hasan el-Banna and was especially inclined to follow even more radically minded Seyyid Qutb. At later period of his career Hasan al-Turabi moved toward Islamic modernism and reformism. Life forced the Sudanese revivalists to abandon their favorite methods through which they planned to realize their Islamist dreams: accusation of Muslims in heresy (taqfir) and spiritual withdrawal from the society steeped in sins (hijjra). Today, they have opted for a relatively wide consolidation not only with those who share their ideas but also with ideological allies. This shows that from the point of view of ideological purity of the doctrine of fundamentalism the supporters of the National Islamic Front are losing their extreme radicalism. They can no longer be identified with the ultra-radical Islamic groups.4 In other words, Iran and Sudan have demonstrated that under the pressure of geopolitical and other factors radical Islamic regimes gradually shed their extreme radical and expansionist designs. This is a phenomenon known to all political scientists: the left move right while the right move left.
The so-called Islamic economy is based on three major provisions according to the ideological ideas of the Islamist theoreticians: the system of inheritance determined by the Shari‘a; special taxation system “zakiat”, and ban on usurious rate, “riba.”
The system of inheritance excludes any wishes of the property owner: everything he owns is divided among his numerous relatives to avoid concentration of capital by one person. As a result, during the life span of several generations capitals are equally spread among all members of Muslim society.
Zakiat is a capitation tax on wealth designed to help the poor and develop Islam (there are strictly determined size of taxes on each of property types). It is expected that the tax will bring considerable sums in the coffers of a “genuinely Islamic state” and will allegedly allow the state to deal with the social problems of the poorest groups at the expense of the rich who are expected to pay from 2 to 3 percent of their property to the community fund.
The Islamic theoreticians believe that a ban on usurious rates does not allow people to hoard money that is not earned in a legal way. The so-called Islamic banks working according to this principle charge no interest.
The Islamist theoreticians are convinced that these three principles ensure social equality, harmony and material well being for all.
The radical ideologists believe that the Islamic state can be reached through peaceful transformations or by force. The moderates among them prefer the former variant—the extremists prefer the latter.
The moderately radical wing consists of organizations, groups and individual leaders who abandoned, at least in words, the extremist and terrorist forms of struggle. Their ideologists believe that the Islamic state can be built up peacefully. They concentrate on propaganda to create the so-called “call of Islam” (da’wah) to win elections and come to power legally. Typically the Islamic radicals, while rejecting the democratic principles of state administration are prepared to use them to reach their aims. This paradox is explained by the fact that they were forced to abandon terrorist practices because they feared the authorities. Islamists believe that they have to play according to the generally accepted rules for a while, as a temporary armistice with the “infidels” in the person of the official structures is caused by temporary (military or political) weakness of the “faithful.” The fight against the “unfaithful” will resume as soon as the “faithful” restore strength. As soon as they come to power the Islamists will surely discard the democratic principles and will start implementing their ideas of radical political and socioeconomic systems.
A Pakistani al-Maududi, the author of the theory of Islamic state quite popular in the Islamic world and the leader of the Jama’at-i-Islami party, is recognized through the Islamic world as an Islamic fundamentalist theoretician. He is one of the better-known ideologists of this wing of Islamic radicalism. His theoretical heritage of over 120 books and thousands of articles covers a wide range of problems: from the state system and Islamic constitution to the position of women in Islamic society. His ideas affected to a great extent the way the state developed in Pakistan. Over time, he moved away from the conservative utopian ideas of the “Medina type” to limited democracy in a contemporary Islamic state.5
Immediately after the state of Pakistan had been formed in 1947 Maududi postulated that it should become a truly Islamic state. He plunged into political and ideological struggle over his constitutional drafts. The result was 22 principles of an “Islamic state.”6 Supremacy of God was the linchpin of his theory of the Islamic state that he explained as Divine legislative power in the legal and political meanings of the word. Sovereignty belongs to God, while the emir (or a caliph) serves an intermediary between God and the nation. The emir rules the Islamic state. Maududi wrote: “When selecting the emir attention should be paid to his righteousness, his wide knowledge of Islam, his ability to rule the people in peace and war.”7 The emir controls all branches of power—the final decision belongs to him. Other structures should formulate recommendations that the caliph can accept or reject.8 The Consultative Council (Majlis-i Shura) elected by the people helps him to make decisions: the emir has to seek its advice on all questions of state importance. At the same time, he can veto the Council’s decisions and even disband it. The disputes are resolved through a referendum.9
It should be said that at first Maududi supported the idea of dictatorship and believed that the emir should enjoy unlimited powers. He opposed elections on the party basis and favored limited suffrage for women and non-Muslims. His ideas changed by the early 1970s: he and his party recognized the need for general elections on the party basis, an elected assembly that should have limited legislative powers, and a possibility for non-Muslim and women to work in the parliament.
He was convinced that legislative and juridical activity of the Islamic state should be limited by the Shari‘a: “As for the ambiguous question the faithful should try to find the right answer that fits the true meaning of the Shari‘a best.” Such questions should be discussed by a commission of theologians and jurists in the Shura.10 For him “theodemocracy” was the best form of state. He wrote that the Islamic state should be headed by “ulemas of a new type” that “were religious as a mujahed and quite modern in their ideas about the world.”11
According to Maududi the Islamic state should crown the “Islamic revolution” that was expected to improve the people’s morals with the help of Islam rather than to radically change the social and economic structure. He believed that the revolution would create “a perfect social order under which virtue will flourish while all forms of exploitation and injustice … would be prevented and destroyed.” He used to point out that this state would be similar to the rule of the Prophet.12
His ideas were implemented to the greatest degree under military dictator Zia ul-Khak who came to power in Pakistan in 1977. Constituencies were based on religious communities, there were consultative councils at the provincial and state levels, the Shari‘a system of criminal law “hudud” was restored. Zakiat and ushr, two Muslim taxes, were introduced to make the economy Islamic, the usurious rate was banned. There appeared the Islamic Ideological Council to control how the injunctions of Islam were obeyed by artists, writers, and teachers.13
Maududi was a consistent enemy of the use of force when building a Muslim state: talking to the youth he never recommended to set up clandestine organizations to change the state order or to use force and take up arms. He went even further and described the use of force as a hasty and unpromising measure despite an illusion that it looked like the shortest way to the aim. He believed that open and widest possible propaganda addressed to the hearts and minds was an instrument of a peaceful and victorious revolution best suited for the Muslim community and each of its members engaged in disseminating the ideas of Islam.14
In his commentaries to Al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya Nasir al-Din al-Albani, another representative of moderate Islamic radicalism, said that the Islamic state should be built in the hearts of Muslims, not by the force of arms and plotting against rulers. He looked at the use of force as the inventions (bid’a, pl. bida) of the present epoch15 that contradicted the Shari‘a, according to which the souls should be reformed first of all. The Koran says: “Surely never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves” (13:11).
When writing about the ways leading to Islamic society that excluded the use of force Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti from Syria reminded that a country should acquire the Islamic state order and develop the basic elements of the Islamic statehood by Divine providence. To reach this those who want to build an Islamic society, their relatives and children should, first, abide by the rules of Islam; second, those who want to join such people should observe the Islamic prescriptions; third, they should frequently refer to Allah, rely on his will and ask for his help. Al-Bouti was convinced that the practice based on these principles would exclude the use of force to change the existing state of things. At the same time this reminded that the future favorable changes in the Muslims’ social conditions could be brought about by the “call of Islam.”16
There are countries in which the moderate radical Islamic groups work legally (The Movement of the Society for Peace in Algeria, Islah in Yemen, The Muslim Brothers in Jordan, and others). In certain other countries they are semi-legal (The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the moderate wings of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and An-Nahda in Tunisia, etc.). In some places they are illegal (The Muslim Brothers in Syria, etc.).
The legal radical Islamic organizations can freely disseminate their ideas, sometimes in a veiled form, in so doing, they declare that they support democracy and peace and oppose violence. At the same time they are consistently trying to coordinate all Islamist forces to seize power. In many countries the ruling regimes have to tolerate the “legal moderates” to avoid a possible split in society if they are banned and to prevent them from becoming extremist—in this case the extreme radicals will strengthen their positions.
Semi-legal groups as a rule can be described as Islamist organizations of the mixed type. To realize their far-reaching plans they frequently set up two structures, some of them legal and some clandestine. Such are The Muslim Brothers working in Egypt or Hezbollah working in Lebanon. Their legal parts are working quite openly like any other moderate legal group. They attract people by sermons in mosques, they help those who need help, build mosques and hospitals, collect donations, etc.
Members of clandestine organizations of semi-legal groups as well as members of the clandestine organizations set up by the moderates driven underground by the authorities are extremists who do not object to violence and the use of force. In this respect they are very close to the extreme radicals (extremist and terrorists).
The moderate Islamic radicals attach special importance to establishing contacts and pooling efforts to reach better results. They frequently meet for all sorts of conferences, consultations, and discussions. In May 1996 the radical Islamic groups arrived in Istanbul for their first international conference that decided to set up a World Islamic Organization with a single center.
Aware of the danger presented by all Islamists, including the moderates, authorities in some of the Muslim countries interfere with their “call of Islam” and exclude them from politics. In those countries where they are operating openly the regimes do their best to curb their influence, sometimes acting quite resolutely.
In December 1991 the radical Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria won the first round of parliamentary elections—the authorities responded with annulling the results and banning the organization. In Turkey, the leader of the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party Necmettin Erbakan was removed from the post of the country’s premier under pressure of the military.
The moderate Islamist wing demonstrates that it rejects (at least in words) violence as a political instrument; recognizes the secular regimes and demonstrates its readiness to cooperate with them; conducts propaganda as the core of “call of Islam;” uses democratic institutions and procedures to strengthen its positions in the eyes of the nation and to boost its influence; works toward wider propaganda possibilities; conducts anti-government propaganda in a veiled form while proclaiming its loyalty to the authorities and the state; runs clandestine structures (especially of semi-legal groups) designed to penetrate into the state machine and respected nongovernmental structures; coordinates its efforts with similar structures in its own country and abroad, etc.
The extremist wing includes organizations, groups, and leaders that rely on armed struggle to achieve their aims and that are not shy of using terror. Propaganda is seen as an auxiliary method mainly to attract new members. Sayyid Qutb, Mustafa Shukri, ‘Ali ‘Abdu Ismail and others are the best-known theoreticians of radical Islamism.
Sayyid Qutb, a theoretician and ideologist of The Muslim Brothers of Egypt, wrote a series of works in which he presented various aspects of the ideology of “Islamic revival.” A fanatic, a no mean author, a skillful polemist who died a death of a martyr (in 1966 he was sentenced to death and executed in Egypt), he remains one of the most respected figures among the ultra-radicals. His works, published in huge numbers throughout the world are one of the pillars of Islamic propaganda. (In Russia they are published in Russian translations by the Badr and Santlada publishers.) His works are in the center of a persistent struggle in the camp of his opponents and among his followers who belong to different trends of Islamic revival. One of his theoretical propositions, the conception of the pre-Islamic (pagan) state of Arabian society (jahiliyya) says that the entire world was steeped in jahiliyya: the countries of “materialistic communism,” the countries of “commercial capitalism” and the Muslim states where the principles of Islam had been considerably distorted. This thesis is used by the extremists to prove that Egyptian, and Muslim in general, society should be accused of taqfir (lack of faith) and that struggle against the regimes was justified. Moderate leaders insist that when talking about the Muslim countries Qutb had in mind the moral and intellectual aspects and never called to taqfir.
In fact, terrorist methods under the banner of Islam in politics are rooted in the past: three out of four “righteous” caliphs (Umar, Uthman, and Ali) were victims of terrorist acts. In the 11th century the Ismaili sect of the Nizarites practiced terror with the help of professional killers—the Assassins. However, in the past terror was not as wide-scale as today.
The largest and most active extremist Islamic groups are: The Armed Islamic Group and the Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria); Al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya and Jihad Islami (Egypt), Islamic Jihad and the military wing of Hamas (Palestine), Harakyat ul-Ansar, Jama’at ul-Faqra, Al-Qa‘eda (the Arab-Afghans), the World Islamic Front for Jihad (Pakistan), etc. Their leaders and ideologists stake on force to resolve political problems. As distinct from moderate theoreticians they are convinced that the road to the Islamic state lies through armed struggle. They reject the legitimate nature of the secular regimes, accuse them of lack of faith, and call to their removal.
This was reflected in the at-taqfir wal-hijjra movement (accusation of lack of faith and removal from the world), one of Qutb’s theoretical constructs. This expression appears in the name of certain extremist groups active in all corners of the world. It means that contemporary society in any Islamic state (with the exception of Iran) is not Muslim at all. It is a conglomeration of “infidels” who have “departed from true Islam,” therefore “true Muslims” should detach themselves from such society and such world and perform a spiritual hijjra, by analogy with the hijjra of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca where his teaching was not recognized to Yasrib (now Medina).
Qutb wrote in one of his works: “Islam needs revival. The revival is started by a minority that isolates itself from the society of barbarians and opposes it. This minority refuses to regard this society as its homeland and family, and rejects all ties, laws, and customs. The minority recognizes only one absolute truth: destruction by force and violence, complete annihilation that leaves neither big nor small. To reach the human hearts the faithful community should wipe away all barbarian obstacles that separate it from people. Before entering into a discussion or persuasion the ruling regime in Egypt should be destroyed as a barbarian one. It is as barbarian as are all other regimes even those that call to Islam in their documents and constitutions.”17
The Al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya association that works in Egypt is one of the groups guided by the ideology of ultra-radical Islamism in their theory and political practices. Set up in the late 1960s in Upper Egypt by students in the city of Asyut it was closely connected with The Muslim Brothers organization and for some time worked under its patronage. In the mid-1970s when The Muslim Brothers abandoned violence Al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya disrupted the contacts. Late in the 1970s it acquired its final organizational shape and launched vigorous independent activities. It was at that time that the group declared an Islamic state in Egypt as its final aim and announced that it was resolved to fight the American and Israeli interests in the region.
It started with organizing massive disorders and moved gradually to terrorism, especially after the Islamic revolution had won in Iran. The organization followed the logic of events when it announced that power could be won in armed struggle. It accused its opponents of lack of resolution caused by their total ignorance of the true spirit of Islam or their fear of radical social reforms.18 Starting with 1992 the group has been attacking foreign tourists to destabilize the situation inside the country and undermine its economy.
Repressions resulted in a certain organizational structure Al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya similar to many other extremist Islamic groups operating in similar conditions. Some of its leaders are in prison, others, in exile and try to guide their supporters in Egypt at a distance. Today, the group has neither a single ruling body nor a rigid organizational structure. Its core consists of numerous small autonomous groups headed by emirs.
On the one hand, an absence of a rigid structure does not allow the groups to compete for the minds; the groups’ activities are decentralized, there are disagreements among them and among their leaders, etc. On the other, an absence of a rigid structure allows the organization to avoid large-scale repressions: one or two destroyed groups do not annihilate it.
Al-Gam’a al-Islamiyya combines terror with legal forms such as propaganda, seminars, and rallies to attract new members.
Outside Egypt it is (or was) active in Britain, Afghanistan, Denmark, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, the U.S., Turkey, Switzerland, and Yemen. Its groups of militants that unite from 10 to 50 thousand, consist mainly of Egyptians who fought in Afghanistan. The organization is popular among the common people. Egyptian authorities believe that the group gets its money from Iran and Sudan.19
Muhammad ’Ammara wrote that violence (the “problem of the sword” as he put it) for the sake of a newly created or restored Islamic state is a very disputable issue yet Al-Gamaat el-jihad and other extremist groups are prepared, theoretically and in practice, to overturn all objections of their ideological opponents who reject violence as an instrument of building up the Islamic statehood.20
Al- Gam’a al-Islamiyya coordinates its activities with other similar structures, their cooperation extending and strengthening all the time with an aim of setting up a powerful international organization with a single commanding center. It should be said that the World Islamic Front for Jihad set up in February 1998 under personal supervision of Osama bin Laden is a prototype of such worldwide structure. The events of 11 September forced the world community to launch anti-terrorist activities.
Recently, it has become obvious that the extremist Islamic groups are blending with organized crime and drug business: they create common structures to carry out criminal activities. Criminal business supplies extremists with money to be spent on reaching their own aims. According to foreign experts until recently the drug mafia in Afghanistan and Pakistan earned about $10 billion a year.21
From this it follows that the extremist wing of the Islamists relies on armed struggle and terror as the main instruments; it does not recognize the ruling secular regimes; legal propaganda is seen as an auxiliary instrument of attracting new members; its organizations are amorphous with decentralized leadership that makes their network more viable; extremism works on an international scale and coordinates activities of all its organizations; extremism has fused with international organized crime and drug mafia.
All differences between the moderates and the extremists apart, they do cooperate: on the one hand, the latter do their best to convince the public that they have nothing to do with the radicals and condemn their terrorist actions. Extremists in their turn accuse the moderates of excessive loyalty to the authorities and betrayal of the Islamic interests. On the other hand, their shared aim—an Islamic state—drives them together.
The ties between them are especially obvious in the organizations of the mixed type that include both wings and combine legal and illegal methods. There are certain structures (Hamas in Palestine, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, and An-Nahda in Tunisia) that are functioning semi-legally since they have no official status. At the same time, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the National Islamic Front in Sudan, Jama‘at-i Islami and Jama‘at-i Ulema-i Islami in Pakistan are legal organizations and disseminate the Islamist ideas openly. There are 2,500 madrasahs in the province of Punjab (Pakistan) run by the Jama‘at-i Ulema-i Islami with tens of thousands of students.
These organizations have camps of their own where they provide military training to “home-grown” fighters and members of extremist Islamic organizations from other states. Trained militants are then moved to all sorts of “hot spots,” including the North Caucasian republics. Obviously, the organizations of the mixed type do not fight the ruling regimes of their countries—they demonstrate their loyalty to them. These organizations are supporting the radical Islamic movement and its extremist wing across the world.
Recently, many of the purely extremist groups have borrowed this tactics but they concentrate mainly on fighting the political regimes in their countries.
The above suggests a conclusion that the moderate and the extremist wing in the radical Islamic movement today are two sides of the same coin. They employ different tactics that may change depending on the situation: armed struggle against the authorities or propaganda as the main instrument.
Foreign and Russian researchers agree with the above. Prof. Emmanuel Sivan from Israel believes that both those whom Western experts describe as moderates and those who are described as extremists profess the same ideology, i.e. they say that Islam is facing a deathly peril and may be destroyed by “Western poison” in the form of secular and materialist ideas and a corresponding way of life. To oppose the evil the Muslims should join ranks and unite into voluntary unions (jamaats) working outside states. These autonomous enclaves should try to seize power through parliamentary and other elections, by influencing the elite and compromising the unfaithful authorities that ignore the laws of Islam. Terror as a destabilizing factor is also recommended. The Israeli academic believes that if we concentrate on the differences between the moderate radicals and the extremists we may miss the fact that they select their “medicine” for the “Western poison” according to their abilities. Their choice depends on a number of circumstances: a possibility of penetrating political structures, an efficiency of the regime and the law enforcement structures, the state’s social and economic conditions, followers serving in the army and the special services, etc. No matter what the radicals do in this or that country they are fighting for political power. Their aim is a regime based on the Shari‘a.22
The Israeli professor is right yet it should be noted that in those states where the Islamists have got a chance to conduct legal political activity (Turkey, Jordan, and Yemen) they are less inclined to use terror. It is obviously much more profitable to remain moderate than to suffer repressions. In those countries where they have no chance to work legally (Algeria and Egypt) their armed struggle against the authorities is vehement.
There are countries (Libya, Tunisia and Syria) in which the moderate radicals are banned and yet remain moderate. It seems that they are an exception rather than a rule: these states have strong authoritarian regimes that do not allow any semblance of political struggle and crush any dissent with the help of special services.
1 See: Seid Mohammed Hosein Tabatabai, Barrasiha-ye eslami (Islamic Studies), Tehran, 1976, pp. 169-229.
2 See: S.B. Druzhilovskiy, “O teorii i praktike islamskogo pravlenia v stranakh Srednego Vostoka (Iran, Afganistan, Turtsia),” Islam i politika, ed. by V.Ia. Belokrinitskiy and A.Z. Egorin, Kraft Publishers, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2001, p. 61.
3 See: S.M. Aliev, “Sovremennoe islamskoe vozrozhdenie i ego osobennosti (na primere Afganistana, Irana i Turtsii),” Islam i politika, pp. 30-31.
4 See: K.I. Poliakov, Islamskiy fundamentalizm v Sudane, Institute of the Israeli and the Middle Eastern Studies, Moscow, 2000, pp. 64-66.
5 See: G.I. Gareeva, “Islamskiy fundamentalism i opyt gosudarstvennogo stroitel’stva v Pakistane,” Islam i politika, p. 237.
6 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, p. 217.
7 A.A. Maududi, Obraz zhizni v islame, Santlada, Moscow, 1993, p. 40.
8 See: O.V. Pleshov, “Islamizm i nominal’naia demokratia v Pakistane,” Islam i politika, p. 222.
9 See: K. Bahadur, The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan, New Delhi, 1977, p. 142.
10 A.A. Maududi, op. cit., p. 41.
11 A.A. Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. and edit. by Khurshid Ahmad, Lahore, 1960, pp. 47-60.
12 G.I. Gareeva, op. cit., p. 235.
13 See: Ibid., p. 236.
14 See: A.A. Maududi, Islam segodnia, Santlada, Moscow, 1992, pp. 26-27.
15 For more detail, see: Al-‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya. Commentaries and notes by Nasir al-Din al-Albani, El-Matab el-Islami Publishers, Beirut, 1404/1984, p. 47.
16 See Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti, Hakaza fa-l-nad’u ila-l-islam, Damascus, [s.a.], pp. 48-49.
17 S. Qutb, Tsennosti islamskogo predstavlenia, Baku, 1997, p. 64.
18 See: Z.S. Arukhov, “Vooruzhennye konflikty na Severnom Kavkaze v svete teorii i praktiki jihada,” Islam i politika na Severnom Kavkaze, ed. by V.V. Chernous, SKNTs VSh Publishers, Rostov-on-Don, 2001, p. 123.
19 See: Z.S. Arukhov, Ekstremizm v sovremennom islame, Kavkaz Publishers, Makhachkala, 1999, pp. 70-71.
20 See: Muhammad ’Ammara, Al-Farida al-gaiba. ’Ard wa hiwar wa taquyyim, Cairo, 1980, pp. 29-30.
21 See: M.B. Olcotte, N. Udalova-Zvart, “Narkotrafik na Velikom shelkovom puti: bezopasnost’ v Tsentral’noi Azii,” Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi. Rabochie materialy, Issue 2, 2000, p. 3.
22 See an article by E. Sivan in Internationale Politik, No. 8, 1997, pp. 6-7.