ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN: CREATIVE POTENTIAL AND VISIBLE THREATS
Bakhodir Musaev, Ph.D. (Philos.), independent researcher (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
An analysis of political events that have taken place between the late 1970s and the latest developments will demonstrate the growing role of the Islamic factor related to the problems of social stability and regional and national security. In the twenty-first century it will affect domestic policies and, in the geopolitical context, will determine Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. I am convinced that the terms “Islam” and “Islamic” as applied to my republic and to all other predominantly Muslim states should be used with reservation. First, a great deal of information about Islam in Uzbekistan is vague and nearly inaccessible; second, the media misuse the term as a screen for the phenomena unrelated to religion.
The religious processes in a newly independent country are often described as Islamic resurrection. The country itself has been listed as an Islamic state by certain political scientists.
I find it hard to agree with Alexei Malashenko who writes about the Central Asian republics: “We should always bear in mind that we are dealing with Muslim states, the society in which material problems often require religious application.”1 Indeed, Islam is an important part of the culture and history of the peoples of Uzbekistan. We all know that it plays an important part in the republic’s social development and functioning. In Islam the secular and religious spheres remain blended together. In this way it was exercising a total control over the minds and conduct of the faithful. It combined both cultic and legal, moral, educational and aesthetic functions, it regulated the family and marriage relations and influenced the way of life. We should also bear in mind that present secularization is one of the fundamental features of Uzbekistani society. When people call Uzbekistan an Islamic country, they do not mean to say that it is ideologically and politically Islamic. It should be noted that the republic’s political leaders are neither militant secularists nor anti-clericals. The degree of the freedom of conscience allowed in the country shows that there is a considerable gap between the former totalitarian system and the nascent democratic regime in the country. The Republic of Uzbekistan is a secular country in which all religious associations are separated from the state.
Under Art 3.1 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan “the freedom of conscience is guaranteed for all. Each citizen has the right to profess any religion or to profess none. It is banned to force religious ideas on people.” In fact, this principle was registered in Art 15 of the Constitution of the Turkestan A.S.S.R. adopted in 1920 and in the 1927 Constitution of Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan as many other Soviet republics had no legal acts to generalize and regulate the relationships between the state and religion. This explains why the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations adopted on 14 June, 1991 by the republic’s Supreme Soviet became a milestone in the nation’s life. Upon gaining independence the state legally formalized the entire set of problems related to the rights of the faithful and the status of the clergy. On 3 September, 1993 the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations was adopted. It seems that certain destructive elements have profited from the grim realities of the transition period in Uzbekistan best seen in the declining standard of living and the growing absolute poverty of large numbers of people.
In these conditions there is an obvious danger of new myths, false idols and mass infatuation with ideological, political and religious fundamentalism. Being aware of this, on 1 May, 1998 the 11th session of Olii Majlis (the parliament) passed the Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (new variant). The state relies on it when correcting its religious policy.
Talking of the key features of Uzbekistani society and the place Islam holds in it, one can say that the Muslim mentality of the majority of the Central Asian title nations is a fairly important factor that, together with religion, has been exerting (and will exert) considerable influence on the social processes and on the interaction between society and the state. At the same time the elements of “Islamic resurrection” do not suggest that Uzbekistan is a Muslim country. What it needs is a methodological discipline of thought so that to avoid entanglements in the question of Islam’s role in the history and culture, the problem of its globalization and its social role. Some say, without grounds, that Uzbekistan (as distinct from other former Soviet republics) has never looked for a new ideology—it is just replacing the socialist one with Islam that never retreated altogether.2 Others formulate the problem of how Eastern countries respond to speedy modernization—in line with the context of world science.3 Any attempt to identify the place of Islam in the region’s social and political transformations in light of the above betrays its ambiguous role. First, Islam as a consolidating factor of the title nation can be used to maintain peace. Second, religious extremists have stepped up their activities and thus endangered national and regional security. When translated into the local ethnic and cultural conditions and other social conditions in Uzbekistan, these propositions point to the following.
The religion is actively looking for a niche of its own against the background of ethnic and cultural revival that presupposes that the nation has become consolidated on the basis of shared cultural and historical past, ethnic values and interests. Politization of Islam should be prevented: this is a new task born by the radically new socioeconomic and political conditions created by independence.
It would be wise to look into our recent past: the Soviet leaders ignored both the Islamic problems that existed in Central Asia and the warnings that came from Orientalists and specialists in Islam not to be superficial when assessing life in the Central Asian republics. The so-called international support to the fraternal Afghan people rendered in the 1980s was the peak of superficiality, if not absurdity. It created a radically negative attitude to the war, lack of confidence in the country’s leaders and the political system as a whole and, in the final count, boosted ethnic self-awareness of the Muslim nations of Central Asia. The Islamic factor was also underestimated in the West: the blunders in Iran and Algeria clearly manifested this. For example, on 29 December, 1978 Michel Poniatowski reported President of France Giscar d’Estaing from Tehran: “The two forces active in the country—the clergy and the army—are close in many respects. They may probably move closer. Both are nationalist, traditionalist, and anti-communist.
“From the very beginning of the crisis the Americans proceeded from the following equation: the Shah = the army = independence. This was wrong. One can suggest a different equation: the clergy = the army = independence. It seems to be correct—the country’s independence is the key element.”4
I would like to point out in this connection that we should pay attention to what prominent Western analysts have to say about Uzbekistan’s geopolitical self-identification, domestic and foreign political problems related to the Islamic factor.
Martha Brill Olcott, professor of political science at Colgate University, believes that the idea that Islam is dangerous per se and therefore should be restrained is one of the myths about the past. She adds that we cannot accept the conclusion that the dogmatic and ideologized religions flourish among those destitute materially or spiritually, or both.5 This opinion deserves attention.
Islamic revival in Uzbekistan is a search for ways to restore the traditional way of life to its former positions: archaic customs are brought back together with everyday sociocultural models and behavior that have little to do with the present day.
The president of Uzbekistan has said on that score that spontaneous and blanket restoration of values, traditions and ways of the past may cause rejection of the present day and of modernization, which may lead to an opposition to spirituality.6
These trends, in their turn, give rise to religious beliefs that were absent from the region in the past. This is especially obvious among the confessionally ignorant social groups. For example, religious fundamentalism as a form of extremism rather than a turn to the religious principles is regarded as a negative phenomenon. The state should protect the interests of all social groups through painstaking and purposeful efforts undertaken by those who know how to do this. Regrettably, many local bosses strive to manipulate people’s minds. This has become especially clear when they started fighting religious extremists.
The theory and practice have demonstrated that the use of force as a method employed to prevent and remove social dangers has exhausted itself. A failure to recognize this and the continued use of force at the expense of political and ideological methods may negatively affect the social and political context in the republic.
There is no doubt that the state can and should employ the legitimate forms of violence and coercion when dealing with religious extremists. Yet, religious convictions are a too sensitive sphere where a strictly balanced approach should be used.
There is a danger of a misuse of the revived religious and ethnic values, that are, in a certain sense, the spiritual and moral backbone of human culture, to satisfy personal ambitions and achieve aggressive political aims that have nothing to do with religion. This shows that the problems related to religious fundamentalism and extremism should be settled as early as possible so that not to let society reach the brink of self-destruction.
To identify the social, cultural-psychological, political, and economic roots and tasks of all Islamic trends it is important to monitor them and study their values and programs. Sufi wisdom says: “Everything that happens outside should first happen inside. The seed is placed inside, yet the tree grows up outside.” An uncompromising struggle against religious extremism should not be reduced to selective tree felling for sanitary purposes.
We should also bear in mind that the critically tense social factors contribute to religious extremism together with ideological and political factors. The developments in the Ferghana Valley have amply demonstrated this.
The above factors are very important for the following reasons.
First, a huge mass of young people joins the able-bodied population every year, especially in the countryside. A considerable part of them has no work, knows no skills or even is illiterate. It is homogeneous ethnically, socially, culturally, and economically. Their spontaneous, that is, uncontrolled actions, may present a serious threat to society. The Andizhan, Ferghana, and Namangan regions with high population density are the most critical in this respect. This creates prerequisites for social exclusion of part of the young people there.
Numerous researches have already proved beyond doubt that an individual with no anchor living in a world he does not understand sinks into latent aggression, abandons social norms, and rejects laws. The least provocation may make his aggression obvious—it may take the most dangerous and unpredictable forms. If armed detachments of Islamists penetrated the Ferghana Valley, this part of the youth will become a threat to public safety and national security.
Second, the threat of Islamic political radicalism accompanies the present semi-natural type of agriculture and land hunger. Religious extremism is not the only danger in the region: the situation may be aggravated to the point of an explosion by the rising contradictions between the state and non-state agricultural sectors in the land-deficient areas.
Social dissatisfaction among the peasants may take radical forms and develop into a religious movement. The danger is real enough: the demographic situation in the Ferghana Valley does not allow many of the local peasants to help their grown-up sons buy land, houses, etc. This swells the ranks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The latter has already formulated a slogan that speculates on man’s desire of justice and his religious feelings: “The way of Allah is the only right way out of the present socioeconomic crisis.”
While respecting the ethnic Islamic values that demand an equally respectful attitude to followers of other confessions, one has to bear in mind that there have always been aggressive trends in Islam rooted in inner and outer prerequisites. They provoke and stimulate extremism in ethnic, confessional and other relations. It seems that those at the helm fail to take into account the fact that any type of religious extremism on the post-Soviet expanse may be boosted by uncompromising ethics and the syndrome of violence that are parts of the personality structure of the so-called Soviet man.
We should never forget that today religious terrorism threatens many Islamic states: blended with politics religion becomes an ideology of the civil war, while its aggressive nature extends the areas of regional conflicts.
One of the ideologists of the Islamic revolution, Jalaluddin al-Farsi, has openly explained how dangerous is religious extremism and fanaticism for Central Asia and Uzbekistan as its part: “We have performed an Islamic revolution in Iran and we are convinced that we should turn it into a world-wide Islamic revolution. For this we need an Islamic revolution in Sunni Afghanistan… An Islamic revolution in Afghanistan will be followed by a genuine global Islamic revolution. It will be more powerful than the French and all other revolutions… We shall inspire the third Islamic revolution in Central Asia.”7
There is obviously an evil force in the world that is quite open about its intentions. This is why Islam should not be “imported.” The conflict-prone situation, the wave of aggression coming from Afghanistan and the fact that many have not yet forgotten the violence and sufferings of the past and have not yet discarded the repressive type of thinking suggest the question: “Can the forces of evil create a repressive social atmosphere and plunge the region into the sea of chaos while relying on the elements of mass consciousness enumerated above?”
I may be probably over-dramatic, yet my reasoning helps identify the so far neglected problems of ensuring the region’s security, stability and development. What is more, studies of ethnopolitical processes in some of the post-Soviet areas revive Samuel Huntington’s idea of the “civilizational clashes,” the differences between the Western (modern) and Eastern (in the process of modernization) cultures to which Vladimir Lefevre pointed in his time. The differences are not limited to the material sphere, traditions and customs—they also belong to the sphere of psychology. According to Lefevre, the Oriental cultural type contains mechanisms of conflict escalation while the Western type tries to settle conflicts and destroy its sources. Zbigniew Brzezinski has predicted a grim future for Central Asia that will become a battlefield.
One is very much impressed by the scenarios of “the violent chaos” offered by Western publicist writers that may engulf Central Asia under certain circumstances. What is left is a hope that the forecasts are nothing more than theoretical constructs and that reality will be governed by reason and rational politics. Indeed, the leading countries of the world need Central Asia following along the road of modernization.
Finally, there are the frightening depths of human nature. Today, there are attempts to comprehend it in the context of cultural studies. Vassili Nalimov, well-known Russian philosopher, says that romanticism is one of the most needed human requirements: “We should understand that in the twentieth century the pressure of romanticism proved especially destructive…
“We are still living amid the crumbling Great Empire created by the Father of Nations. There is certain romanticism in the destruction of a hated civilization.
“There is passionarity turned negative and destructive. The romanticism of violence is used to remove all problems by force…
“At the same time, somewhere people are looking forward to new positive romanticism aimed at non-violent social organization based on harmony and renovated free spirituality.”8
One is tempted to think that Nalimov is right when calling to restore the feeling of the sacred nature of life and to open the non-violent path toward cooperation with Earth, Nature, and people. He insists that the path will become obvious when religion understands that the great spiritual experience of the past should be re-interpreted with the help of contemporary problems.9 There is another reason for anxiety. This is an opinion shared by many experts in cultural and political studies that the main ideas and achievements of contemporary civilization and the elements of nascent global culture (recognized across the world as ideals) meet with obstacles. Here is what Rex Honey has to say: “Dissemination of global culture is ensured by satellite TV, e-mail, and travels between continents. Those with no access to these advantages are left outside the sphere of global culture—not because it was their choice but because global culture reaches them at a slower pace and its influence is weaker. Here is an example of the same phenomenon within one and the same country: the hard-to-reach areas poorly connected with communication and transport lines are involved in national culture to a much lower degree.”10
As a result, there are countries and regions that probably are not totally embraced by modernization: the Pyrenees, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the mountainous regions of Central Asia stretching from Tajikistan to Northern India. They have experienced cultural and migration impacts of centers of civilization but because of their natural features the process failed to reach the areas in each of the regions. In Tajikistan, for example, with relict social forms still preserved in the Pamir traditional and contemporary social institutes have to coexist.
From this it follows that the search for a contemporary niche for Islam in the context of very much needed stability and security is possible only through modernization.
It seems that we have to revise the experience of industrial modernization that was going on for 70 years. We should derive the right conclusions and learn the right lessons: the modernization started by Soviet power is still going on—it uses different mechanisms and aims at different targets.
The recent past of our republic, the historical collisions, the present problems and the nearest future cannot be understood and forecasted without taking into account the modernization processes directly related to all spheres of life of contemporary human society starting with the period of industrial revolution.
To close the gap between it and the developed Western countries Uzbekistan has to actively master all the achievements of modern European civilization. How can this be done? President Karimov has already supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to this question: “We can modernize our country only if we integrate into the world community, find our place in the international division of labor and actively contribute to setting up the systems of regional and global security.”11 It is important to understand that when studying the problems of security and social technologies as a means of joining the world community we should correctly identify and grasp the content, causes and aims of modernization. We should avoid “provincialism ignorant of the scope of global thinking” (Nikolai Berdiaev) because much is at stake: renovation, progress, and a chance to join the world civilization.
In this context the problem of modernization has acquired a new meaning in Uzbekistan.
First, we still have to overcome the tragic results of the revolution and other historical earthquakes of the twentieth century connected with the so-called social modernization. Here is what Russian academic A. Fonotov has to say on this score: “The most typical feature of the Soviet state was development through mobilization. It was one of the possible forms of adaptation of the socioeconomic system to the realities of the changing world and boiled down to the use of extreme measures to reach extreme aims, normally after periods of stagnation.”12
Second, it has become clear that modernization is needed to help independent Uzbekistan switch to a new quality of its social system. In these conditions a transfer to relatively rich, urbanized and industrial conditions calls for modernization. This means that contemporary European civilization should be accepted and a revival of the national spirit and traditions should be achieved. Still, we cannot say that the people of Uzbekistan are not prepared to respond to forced modernization. According to some analysts, such modernization might erode ethnic and cultural identity, cause a defensive response of ethnic mentality at the level of deeply rooted spiritual foundations and a possibility of dissatisfaction with modernization policy. Alexei Malashenko has written: “In the East the problem of reaction to forced modernization is much more acute than in the West. The disharmony between the civilizational values and the requirements of forced ‘catching-up’ development is too great. Society is not ready to accept the new ideals and ideas in a prompt and adequate way because objectively they deform such society and may bring it to the brink of self-destruction.”13 This is absolutely correct. The same author says that this has been confirmed in the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf, in Iran, Algeria, and Turkey. In Uzbekistan the trends toward the revival of traditionalism do not exclude the threats to society’s secular pillars. Since the late 1920s the people of the republic have already traveled along the road of modernization. It seems that the Uzbeks acquired more from social history of the twentieth century than they have lost.14 According to experts, modernization of all formerly socialist countries requires a period of transition so that they, having changed their cultural codes, could erect a society patterned on the West. Genuine state independence and new ethnic identity are very much needed to attain one of the major aims—political modernization.
I should say here that Uzbekistan needs modernization of that sort to prevent further politization of Islam and stem religious extremism. The country should also address some other problems connected with the ideals, moral principles, the moral pillars of the human community by which the best minds guided themselves and to which they called others.
It seems that the ethical and humanistic potential of the Islamic teachings may help deal with the strategic tasks of the Central Asian states’ domestic and foreign policies. These tasks are related to the attempt to prevent, with political means, the viruses of the “Islamic revolution” spreading far and wide (the process that started in the last decades of the twentieth century) and to fight international religious terrorism and totalitarian trends in Islam.
It is important to point out that the rational aspects of the Muslim faith can provide organic links between the traditional and modern societies. They can also help the nation to revive and develop its spirituality thanks to the human values and moral imperatives inherent in Islamic culture. No wonder that in our time of troubles lofty religious principles find response in human souls: they express their deepest thoughts and feelings. The Koran says: “If you did well, you did well for yourselves; if you did evil, you did it against yourselves” (17:7). Islam, as any other religion, can undoubtedly inculcate high spiritual, moral, and ethical values in people and open to them their historical and cultural heritage. Stable moral foundations and efficient cooperation between the fundamental ethnic and general human values can be established through devotion to Islam in everyday life. The fact that throughout centuries Islam has been preserving traditional national culture speaks of its real influence on the values now being formed in society.
At the same time there is a trap and a danger that history may repeat itself here: Islam is being resurrected in the total absence of modernization in Uzbekistan. In his book Mezhdu lozungami kommunizma i zakonami islama (Between the Communist Slogans and Islamic Laws) Marfua Tokhtakhodzhaeva pointed out that it looks as if the realities of the early twentieth century suddenly revived themselves at the end of the same century: “All of a sudden the majority of the population started looking at a religion-based society as an ideal.”15
Her concern is totally justified. We are not going to demonize Islam, yet I am concerned with the social situation and the moral and psychological atmosphere created by the policies of the republic’s government in relation to Islam. This raises a number of urgent questions related to the most important aspects of social life.
First, the political elite of Uzbekistan is over-concentrated on Islam and the traditional values. Even superficial attempts to identify the empirical indications of society’s spiritual and moral condition reveal that traditional values and religious norms are gaining weight.
Today independent Uzbekistan is creating conditions for the revived forces of traditionalism that are strengthening themselves. This is done at the expense of the new elements of historical, national, and cultural structures of mentality that took shape in the twentieth century.
When following these developments I am tempted to say: we do not know what we are doing. Indeed, in an attempt to rebuff those who disseminate the ideas of the Caliphate (that is, obscurantists) we are busy creating new, I should say national, forms of Islamic propaganda, totally unaware of the danger to society.
Only the deaf can remain unmoved by the thunder of the coming storm. Unfortunately, the republican government driven by the desire to prevent a split in society and neutralize the forces that want to make a “ruffled-up society” (to borrow a term from Iuri Levada) out of our country, which can plunge the region into primitive chaos, seems to be moving in a wrong direction.
Everywhere one can see the society tired of the “reforms” that is declining against the background of the relict social forms that are gaining ground. This is not an overstatement.
Our country is entering the twenty-first century as an Oriental state with the so-called Oriental specifics. It means that religion potentially and actually dominates the rational types of activity (science, politics, administration, etc.) or, at least, is trying to fit itself into the contemporary system of social relations as an equal element of the state and social institutes.
The results of flirtations with religion in the context of an amorphous social structure and declining standard of living of the absolute majority are obvious.
For the sake of an argument one can admit that a return to the basic Islamic values, its behavior norms and an absolutization of the religious traditions are fraught with new challenges and threats: in future social life may become organized according to the Islamic patterns.
It seems that we fail to discern the real processes and are not aware of the spiritual atmosphere of our time. Jadid Chulpan, who was repressed in 1938, said in his time: “Your only problem is that you do not know what this time is about.”16 These words ring true today.
Second, in some of its segments society’s spiritual life is ambivalent, to say the least. It was quite recently that we were repeating a Marxian formula: “If a man is dissatisfied with the world, he should change it.” Today, it has become clear that we missed feedback and listened neither to ourselves, nor to the world. To avoid more tragic mistakes that cost dearly to mankind we should give thought to the question: What do people want? We should learn to select the best alternative out of the multitude of possibilities. We should not deprive life of ideology.
Spirituality abhors a vacuum. If people do not find answers to their questions, if they are aware of the gap between the declared aims and reality, then they will turn to other ideologies for answers.
Potential threats of the social organism’s spiritual ailments are not on the agenda—we are confronted with a very acute spiritual crisis caused by sham Islamic ideas and religious extremism supported psychologically and materially from abroad. This cannot be tolerated for long: we should urgently blend popular hopes, wishes, and thoughts into an ideology. It is the task of the new ideology to create a fairly high psychoenergetic potential in the popular masses with a functional content, an adequate verbal form, and an ability to provide adequate answers.
Third, proceeding from the concept of ideology introduced by French philosopher and economist Destutt de Tracy in 1801, which he described as a science of general laws of the origin of human ideas out of sense impressions… that makes it possible to create firm foundations for politics, ethics, etc., one can say the following.
The above formula explains in a convincing, simple, and graphic way that people live according to the thought-images of their actions (ideas), trying to foresee possible consequences of their actions. At the same time, there is an opinion that treats the place of ideology in social life in a negative way. Some people (like Francis Fukuyama) think that the end of ideology is near. As a result the concept of ideology in the contemporary world has acquired moral and ethical assessments. This is typical of Uzbekistan or, rather, its ideology called “the ideology of independence.” At the same time, the state, society and man also need ideologies of democracy, entrepreneurship, of building the state ruled by law, civil society, and social management at all levels, etc.
The main task of an independent state is to integrate into the international structure of high tech production. This will lead it along the shortest way to the general civilizational road. It is in this context that the ideologies understood as sciences (teachings) of formulating aims, means and methods of their attainment should be crystallized. Here I have in mind only realistic aims.
From this point of view our society has no ideology (the state ideology of independence cannot be regarded as such) that could bring people closer together by its scope and the force of its life assertion, that could defend the most important social values or call to the values that elevate the soul, instill hope, faith and conviction that democracy and justice can be reached. For my part, I am convinced that the ideology of independence is an artificial construct.
To sum up.
First, Islam as a world religion has not been used in Uzbekistan as a deeply rooted, cultural and civilizational phenomenon with a great deal of continuity and accumulated human experience and creativity of the peoples of Turkestan.
Second, it seems that the role of Islam in Uzbekistan was correctly assessed but, unfortunately, remains on the level of its comprehension and interpretation only by the political elite. It is with Islam that the elite identifies its great expectations and illusions that religion all by itself (and only religion) can revive spirituality, resolve the moral and ethical dilemmas of contemporary society and even quench the rising social tension in the country and the region.
Third, I believe that the place of religion in contemporary society should be clearly understood if we want to comprehend and explain Islam and its purpose. In this respect I tend to agree with Russian academic V. Nalimov: “Religion, in practically all its manifestations, has been pushed to the side of the main road. It is not progressing. For some reason it fails to understand that the great spiritual experience of the past should be re-interpreted with the help of the problems of today.”17
Fourth, in its pure form religion is barren and leads nowhere. In everyday life people are rarely rewarded for their faith, therefore it is hardly wise to make plans and strategies based on religion alone. To reject Islam would not be wise either—this would mean a retreat to atheism and, probably, to another round of total violence. When certain researchers say “Islam or Communism,” one can hear another formula: “Communism is dead! Long live Communism!”
Fifth, Islam can and should be used in a constructive and pragmatic way if its invariant core and positive potentials are submitted (adapted) to the problems on the agenda (peace, security, economic and political modernization, and shaping an open civil society).
The social realities of Uzbekistan and the regional context are fraught with serious threats to security. This is connected, first and foremost, with religious extremists and their activities.
1 A. Malashenko, “Islam glazami rossiiskoi oppozitsii. Fenomen sovremennoi politicheskoi zhizni,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 February, 1996.
2 See: S. Ivanov, V. Shengelia, “Stabil’nost’ na vostoke zavisit ot Uzbekistana,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 September, 1997.
3 See: A.V. Malashenko, “Religiozniy fundamentalizm v kontekste global’nykh peremen,” Global’nye sotsial’nye i politicheskie peremeny v mire, Moscow, 1997, pp. 191-192.
4 See: Valeri Giscar d’Estaing, Vlast’ i zhizn’, Moscow, 1990, p. 306.
5 See: M.B. Olcott, “Navstrechu budushchemu—Dvenadtsat’ mifov o Srednei Azii,” Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 3, 1995, p. 107.
6 See: I. Karimov, Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka. Ugrozy bezopasnosti, uslovia i garantii progressa, Uzbekiston Publishers, Tashkent, 1997, p. 132.
7 Argumenty, Politizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1988, pp. 113-114.
8 V. Nalimov, V poiskakh inykh smyslov, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1993, pp. 137-138.
9 See: Ibid., p. 237.
10 R. Honey, “Komponenty global’noi kul’tury,” Global’nye sotsial’nye i politicheskie peremeny v mire, p. 188.
11 I. Karimov, op. cit., p. 290.
12 A. Fonotov, Rossia: ot mobilizatsionnogo obshchestva k innovatsionnomu, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1993, p. 258.
13 A.V. Malashenko, “Religiozniy fundamentalizm v kontekste global’nykh peremen,” p. 191.
14 About this see: B. Musaev, “Religious Extremism Threatens Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5, 2000, p. 60.
15 M. Tokhtakhodzhaeva, Mezhdu lozungami kommunizma i zakonami islama, Tashkent, 2000, p. 8.
16 A. Chulpan, “Den’ i noch,” Zvezda Vostoka, No. 9, 1989, p. 36.
17 V. Nalimov, op. cit., p. 237.