TURCO-ARMENIAN RELATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Bülent ARAS
Havva KARAKAŞ-KELEŞ


Bülent Aras, Associated Professor, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Istanbul, Turkey)

Havva Karakaş-Keleş, Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Istanbul, Turkey)


The demolition of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave way to the rise of our modern age of globalizationan age that can be best characterized with such concepts as multiculturalism, difference and post-modernism. These developments have brought about a new and unprecedented world order that created new questions regarding the ongoing problems of the past such as the issue of the Armenian Genocide and a present issue such as the Nagorno-Karabakh. It is these issues that lead the current Turco-Armenian relations. This paper claims that the shadow of the past is heavily cast over the current Turco-Armenian relations. The relations have been hostage to historical enmities and anachronistic way of conducting diplomacy, which is indeed direct implication of the burden of history on the relations. On the theoretical plane, this paper further claims that the present situation of Turco-Armenian relations after the Cold War can be best described in constructivist terms.

What Theories Have To Say?

No event would have given Armenia a chance to put forward its historical ties with Turkey had the Armenian Genocide not happened. The same opportunity was granted to Turkey via the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. The volatile relations between the two neighboring states sharing a long border and everlasting ties arising out of their common past have come to be explained through some norm-dominated concepts such as perception, concept of history, past hatreds, societal construction and identity. Although there are no diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, the problem of the perception of history has come to the forefront regarding Turco-Armenian relations.

While our fragile world is transforming itself into a global entity, the theoretical works explaining everything in Realist terms now find it difficult to give an account for most of the events taking place in the so-called Third World countries, since the role these countries play in world politics and their values have become noticeable as a result of the globalization process and especially after the end of the Cold War. Realism played a much influential role with its firm standing in the former world order, especially during the Cold War era. Now, other theoretical formations such as constructivism are needed to explain certain concepts and developments that came to the scene after the Cold War and with the globalization of the world and world politics. The continuous interplay of the pieces of the chessboard of IR theories leads to the accession of new ones to the scene. Especially after the end of the Cold War, with the new world order, we have come to notice what we neglected before: our perceptions, identities, norms and the societal influences based on both present and past considerations that channel the current foreign policy considerations of the states. Moreover, the aforesaid process also unveiled the effect of history on foreign policy considerations. The globalization of the world also uncovered the curtains on our perceptions and identities that shape the conduct of the foreign policy in the same direction. In other words, the foreign policy that a country conducts cannot be assessed without taking into consideration the past and present facts and values of the relevant society. Constructivism, with its emphasis on culture, identity and perceptions, is employed as a main force to explain what Realism does not need to do, since after the end of the Cold War we now appreciate the importance of the ideas and social norms much more than before. During the Cold War, the world witnessed the power struggle of the two dominant powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Russia. Now, after the end of the Cold War, the world is witnessing the struggle of the so-called Third World countries not for power in realistic terms but for ideological and sociocultural dominance in constructivist terms. The struggle of Turkey and Armenia to construct self-images after the end of the Cold War is based on their so-called glorious history and ultra-nationalistic ideologies as opposed to the others offences that can only be explained in constructivist terms. Because both countries are proud of their glorious past and defy the others evil acts.

As a norm-governed theory, in other words, a theory that can be explained only when the norms of a certain society are taken into consideration, constructivism provides us with statements of explanatory power to account for the course of Turco-Armenian relations in the last decade. The constructivist point of view sheds light on the Turco-Armenian relations with a strong emphasis on the historical and societal background and civil roots of foreign policy, because Turkish foreign policy on Armenia is shaped depending on how Turkey perceives Armenia. The same also holds when it comes to Armenian perception of Turkey. Referring to the perceptions of individuals when explaining the international relations and foreign policy orientations of the states, constructivism has its own alternatives to the basic claims of realism such as conception of the state as the main actor struggling in order to achieve its self-interest in an anarchic environment. What is clear is that the struggle of Turkey and Armenia is not that of power or self-interest. On the contrary, similar to the Third World countries, they struggle for self-esteem and a respective nationalist identity based on the past at the expense of the others degradation in terms of its historical faults. With the changing face of the world politics, the subject matters of IR studies have also changed with the replacement of the dominance of the Realpolitik with the importance of cultural and societal dynamics along with it. Paul Rich explains this shift in the study of IR in the following words: Cultural dynamics have until quite recently been rather marginal to the study of IR, despite the fact that in a general sense it is impossible to distinguish cultural categories from the most basic intellectual categories of modernity.1

This radical change in the subject matter of the IR was the harbinger of the rise of the constructivism along with realism, since realism did not give an account of what was happening in the third world countries. As a well-defined account of what happened during the Cold War that can be described as a balance of power between the two superpowers, the realist theoretical point of view is not apt to explain all the issues that do not contain any power politics. A constructivist point of view can give the best account of the Armenian and the Turkish perception of the history. The concept of power politics cannot explain every policy consideration of Armenia and Turkey. In parallel to this view is what the constructivist theoretical view is concerned with, in the words of Wendt, how the world politics is socially constructed.2 Moreover, we ourselves create the norms according to the constructivist theoretical view, and the norms dominating us are not given and as Wendt says, Anarchy is what states make of it.3 Furthermore, in contrast to the realist and neo-realist conception of power politics, perceptions and identity, which were embedded in the societal structure of a country, matter in constructivism as Hawkes states in the following words: In fact, every perceivers method of perceiving can be shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant degree. A wholly objective perception of individual entities is therefore not possible: any observer is bound to create something of what he observes In consequence, the true nature of things may be said to lie not in things themselves, but in the relationships that we construct, and perceive between them.4

In parallel to the above-mentioned words, the perceptions of both sides, those of Armenians and Turks, are based on what each perceives to be the others historical faults. At that point, the basic assumption of constructivism, which puts forth that identity and perceptions lead foreign policy orientations of a state, proves to be valid regarding the Turco-Armenian relations after the end of the Cold War in the way they try to construct their identity and self-image and follow a relevant foreign policy. One cannot talk about an objective reading of the present situation of the Turco-Armenian relations because the current situation is largely shaped by the subjective reading of their common past. Armenia stresses the Armenian Genocide claimed to be committed by the Ottoman Empire as a basis for possible relations between the two countries while Turkey stresses the Armenian cruelties committed during WWI and the Karabakh issue. Hawkes is also right in that there has always been what is called an inherent bias regarding the Turco-Armenian relations5 since none of the parties can consider the other regardless of past prejudices.

Identity is a socially constructed concept that takes its final form in a certain society in parallel to the norms and values of that specific society. The societal background of the formation of an identity is too strong to be ignored, regarding furthermore the element of individual as a determining factor with his/her own perception of the societal and political environment in the international relations and the conduct of the foreign policy of a state. In the Turco-Armenian case, the perception of the past is also deeply involved.

Furthermore, identity is the product of perceiving an other. This construction of otherness defines the conduct of foreign policy of Turkey and Armenia in the same direction with their perceptions of each other as the other, if we speak in constructivist terms. These internal structures play the most determining role in forming the foreign policy considerations and conduct of foreign policy regarding the Turco-Armenian relations. Both Armenia and Turkey perceive each other from their own history-loaded point of views in line with how they perceive their respective social environment. With constructivism, also the relationship between state identity and interest had to be redefined.6 It is not pure material interest such as power, as was the case with Realism, that triggers the construction of interest, but it is state identity and internal, in other words, cultural and societal structures that play the role of the basic determinants regarding the relations between Turkey and Armenia.

In Turkey, the main determining factor that defines the formulations of the aforementioned perceptions is the Turkish nationalism based on the point of view of both the civilian and the military elite. The Kemalist elite in Turkey, that hold all sources and uses of power via infusing in both the civilian and military technocrats, could not go beyond a retrospective policy when evaluating the current issues. The issue of the Turco-Armenian relations cannot be freed from that point of view. Turkey does not differentiate between some of its domestic problems and fears such as the possibility of the break-up of the state, any possible reactivation of the Sevres agreement, an agreement designed to divide the territory of the state, and the revival of religious fundamentalism and its bilateral relations with the other states. Although the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, mentioned the Armenian Issue (provided for the establishment of an independent Armenian State), the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) did not mention it. When it comes to the issue of the Armenian Genocide, Turkey fears that any international recognition of it will harm its Kemalist, Western identity and territorial integrity by reactivating the Treaty of Sèvres that provided for the foundation of an independent Armenian State. One cannot explain such a situation by realist assumptions because we cannot talk about power politics dominating the Turco-Armenian relations.

The fear of a possible break-up of the Turkish Kemalist system, a system mainly based upon the endurance of the Republic regime and the secular institutions at the expense of a functioning democracy, makes it impossible to free Turkey from the burden of the past. Forgetting the Ottoman past has never been an issue outside Turkey, and issues such as the Armenian Genocide have created acute problems for Turkish foreign policy makers throughout the Republic's history. Since the Kemalist system was based upon a supra-nationalist point of view, it is impossible for such a system to accept the existence of the Armenian Genocide with the fear that its long-term rule may be harmed. That is why the denial of the Armenian Genocide has both historical roots and societal bases around the nationalistic perceptions of the state establishment in Turkey. As a result, each country perceives the other as the other.

The Burden of the Past in the Turco-Armenian Relations

For nearly ten years, there have been no direct diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and the Turco-Armenian border has been closed since then. The underlying reason of this situation can be looked for in the issues of the Armenian Genocide and The Nagorno-Karabakh since Turkey closed down its border with Armenia in order to show its support to Azerbaijan that is struggling against Armenia in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh and other territorial issues.7 The burden of history and its living legacy on the present Turco-Armenian relations, in other words the perceptions of each country within the framework of the past, do matter. The deterioration and the non-existence of Turco-Armenian relations much or less stem from the disinformation regarding the past events.8 There is no common point regarding the common past of two countries that would put an end to the past hatreds and develop new relations.

Historical myths, legends, narrations, convictions about the past events and beliefs about the historic figures, all constitute a general historical imagination, which in the end can affect the choices of the peoples, their responses to the challenges, their behavioral tendencies, and their fundamental attitudes. Historical imagination is in this sense also an untestable realm of human consciousness. Its epistemic status, its informational products, and its cognitive possessions cannot reasonably be subjected to demonstration, proof, or evidence. It, however, still exerts its influence upon our thoughts and deeds as an element of our general ideas described above.

When the present situation, after the end of the Cold War, of the Turco-Armenian relations is taken into consideration, there is no history-proof view to base the evaluation of the relations on. Because both countries view each other from the perspective of the past as a result of the ongoing debates and tensions on the Armenian Genocide that took place during WWI under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, at every phase of the relations, both countries feel the effects of their common past. This situation results in either lack of relations between the two countries or the conduct of relations via the third parties. Then, how to come to terms with our past in order to efface the negative effects it has on our present day? According to Habermas, we must come to terms with our past by facing up to and criticizing it.9 On the contrary, maybe the most crucial failure of Turkey regarding the Armenian Genocide is the complete denial of the fact that history bears witness to killings and deportations either on the part of the Turks or of Armenians. Turkey has never been ready to have a critical account of its past. Under these conditions, the shadow of the past seems to go on affecting the Turco-Armenian relations in a negative way in the future.10 Contrary to what Eroğlu stated, the past atrocities seem to be difficult to be forgotten by the Turks and vice versa.11 This situation renders any positive developments regarding the Turco-Armenian relations difficult if not impossible.

Another aspect of the Turco-Armenian relations that can be accounted for only by constructivism is the nature of the past that is self-explanatory since we cannot talk about any established texts or past since there are only interpretations of the past events. In the words of Stanford, historical past is only creation of present historians, rather than existing in its own right. This is constructivism.12 Furthermore, Stanford points out: We all tend to bring judgments already formed (hence pre-judices) to a new situation. Indeed, these pre-formed judgments are not, for the most part, consciously our own; they are embedded in the very language that we use. This is the importance of tradition We live in society. The interpretation that we give to any personal or social phenomenon is likely to spring from, and hence conform to, the norms, values and conventions of our society.13

At this point what becomes clear is the determinant role of the hermeneutics in explaining the language used regarding the relations between Turkey and Armenia. Importance of language cannot be ignored since the language used by both sides determines the Turco-Armenian relations or lack of relations. For example, in the historical and current literature of the Armenians, the word that one will encounter most frequently is genocide while the Turkish archives render the same event with the word tehcir (deportation or resettlement). The language that a nation uses cannot be taken in isolation from the very culture of that nation, as is the case with Turkey and Armenia.

Another theory that renders explanation to the Turco-Armenian case in line with the constructivist approach is the mirror-image theory. It gives account for the consideration of both nations of each other, namely the Turkish and Armenian nations. Turkey considers Armenia a nation that committed offences against Turkey and Turkish nation and vice versa.

The other important aspect is the role of the established traditions of both parties in explaining the Turco-Armenian relations. Weber defines traditional behavior as the expression of a settled custom.14 In the behavior of both sides, the expressions of the settled customs are witnessed clearly. Because the ongoing tension and the history-based point of view can only be the expressions of the respective settled customs that exist in both countries. In both countries, traditional view of history paves the way to build nationalism-based ideologies. German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer explains the effects of the past in the following vocabulary: The modern mind that does the reconstructing is itself the product of the (often unfelt) influence of the past. All past events have some effect on subsequent ones. Effects of history largely constitute our present mind. History, in short, is always effective.15

The fact that history is always effective also shapes what was mentioned above, the language used regarding Turco-Armenian relations while at the same time determining the present and future of the relations that have arrived at a deadlock. One should always take into consideration the deeply rooted effect of the past while evaluating the Turco-Armenian relations in the post-Cold War period and this fact makes it necessary to look at the events from the constructivist point of view.

The Armenian Genocide: The Focus of the Turco-Armenian Relations

Turkey closed the Turkish-Armenian border in April 1993. Years after the date on which Turkey closed its border with Armenia, Turkey established its first official contact with Armenia on the death of the Prime Minister of Armenia in an armed attack.16 The reason for the closure of the border is the ongoing Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh but the real reason can only be found in history/past. Because there are some limits to possible, if any, Turkish-Armenian relations such as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (the Azerbaijani factor) in the Turkish discourse and the problem of Armenian Genocide in the Armenian discourse. The main reason hindering the development of close relations between Turkey and Armenia has always had something to do with the Armenian Genocide. As a result, when it comes to the evaluation of the current Turco-Armenian relations after the Cold War, the historical memory predominates. The historical memory regarding the Armenian Genocide and the perceptions of both countries matter when explaining the lack of the relations between the two countries except for the relations conducted via the third parties.

The Armenian Genocide is claimed to have taken place during WWI under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. During the years 1915-1917, the Young Turk Regime ruled over the Ottoman Empire. In the year 1915, according to the Turkish claims, the officials of the Ottoman Empire decided to resettle the uprising Armenian people living in Anatolia. Turkey tries to prove that the forced resettlement of the Armenian people was only a necessity of the ongoing war since the Armenian people supported the Russian side that was fighting Turkey during WWI. Arts 1 and 2 of the temporary law of displacement dated 27 May, 1915 provide that: If during the war time the army and army-corps and military divisions commanders and their assistants and the independent local commanders meet with opposition and armed attack and resistance against the Government and defense of the country and protection of the discipline and order in any way by the people in relation with the applications and arrangements done, immediately they have and are permitted to exterminate the attack and the resistance with the military forces in a most powerful way.

The army and independent Army-Corps and Military Divisions can singly or together send and inhabit the people of the villages and districts which they feel it is suitable because of military purposes or in relation to espionage and betrayals they feel to other places.17

From the perspective of many Turkish historians, Turks were justified in resettling the Armenians because they massacred the innocent Turks without differentiating between men, women and children.18 Hocaoğlu also mentions the same articles that put forth the justification of the Turkish side to resettle the Armenian people.19 On the contrary, the rest of the world including the United States considers the same issue the other way around: The Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, woman and children were killed, 500,000 survivors were expelled from their homes, and which succeeded in the elimination of the over 2,500 year presence of Armenians in their historic homeland.20

However, Turkey strongly opposes the idea that the forced resettlement of the Armenian people was a genocide. The Turkish government has spent millions of dollars each year to deny the genocide, to annihilate it as apolitical issue, said Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of Eastern Massachusetts. In parallel with this point of view, the deportations are considered a death warrant of a whole race, mainly the Armenians.21

In the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide (1965), the Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide started. Societal background has a crucial role in explaining the events in the constructivist terms. The Armenian side has accused Turkey of the forgetfulness of the historical truths since then. The denial of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish officials since the foundation of the Turkish Republic also proves the official view of history by the Kemalist elite in Turkey and their struggle to impose this view upon the society as a whole. Turkey insists on denying the purposeful deaths of Armenians from starvation as they were sent on forced marches. The Turkish side also claims that the harsh weather conditions and the epidemics caused the Armenians to die during the deportations. The official historical conception of Turkey, which accepts the historical consciousness that opposes everything that digresses from the borders of the Kemalist ideology, has made Turkey deny the Armenian Genocide since 1915. According to the Armenians, the American documents prove, without a shadow of doubt, that the real purpose of the Ottoman government was not the resettlement of the Armenians, but rather their total destruction and annihilation while resettlement was cynically reserved for Muslim refugees.22 Furthermore, according to the Armenians, the Turkish denial basically aims to reshape history in order to rehabilitate the perpetrators and demonize the victims.23 At this point one can see that the domestic and cultural limits on foreign policy should not be disregarded while explaining the past events since the Muslim and nationalist identities of Turkey are stressed here.

Because of the burden of history and its legacy determining the Turco-Armenian relations nearly a century after, the issue of the Armenian Genocide is still a hot topic of debate. Both Armenia and Turkey find it difficult to move beyond past hatreds. On the contrary, replacing the old interpretations and assumptions are strongly required in order to have any progress in the current Turco-Armenian relations24 and in order to move beyond history. The history mentioned here does not mean the history during which the Turks and Armenians lived together in the Anatolia, rather, the history during the wars. Armenians, Swiss, Czechs, Kurds and Sikhs afford other instances of strategically located communities whose sense of common ethnicity, even when it did not originate from these events, was crystallized in time and again by the impact of protracted warfare between foreign powers in which they were caught up.25

The issue of the Armenian Genocide has also something to do with the war conditions. However, David Marshall Lang questions the basis of the Armenian claims and accusations toward the Turks by clarifying whether the Armenians were all angels.26 Also these words carry in themselves subjectivity since people learn, nevertheless, not from dispassionate and non-partisan studies, but from sensational fancy work.27 The case of the Turco-Armenian relations can be explained according to the above-mentioned argument since it has a lot to do with the sensations and the perceptions of both countries.

The shape of the Turco-Armenian relations is determined by the real or alleged atrocities committed by the Ottoman Empire. The historically rooted hatred still predominates regarding the Turco-Armenian relations because of the penetration of the foreign policies of both countries into the domestic politics of both parties especially in the area of supra-nationalism. The denial of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish side is a result of the ultra-nationalism that is the living heritage of the Kemalist thought. This situation has been the case since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. In one sense, it is the burden of the republican history of at least a century that channels the Turkish foreign policy.

The Third-Party Effect in Turco-Armenian Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey and Armenia have conducted their relations via the third parties, especially France and the U.S., due to the ongoing dispute over the Armenian Genocide. It is also partly due to the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh, at least it is the Turkish justification for the deterioration of the relations. As a result, the Turco-Armenian relations occur under the name of the Armenian issue in the Turco-American or Turco-French relations.

When it comes to the issue of the Armenian Genocide in the Turco-American relations, it has focused on the approval of the Armenian Genocide in the U.S. On 5 October, 2000, the House International Relations Committee voted overwhelmingly to pass the Armenian Genocide Resolution. This event immediately reflected on the Turco-American relations and Turkish Parliamentarian Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik stressed the possible result that this would seriously affect the Turco-American relations.28 Turkey also wanted to hinder any mention of the Armenian Genocide in a United States report and this policy also was effective in persuading Reagan and Bush administrations to hinder the Congress to pass the resolution that would designate 24 April as a national day of remembrance of the Armenian Genocide.29 Turkey gave a similar response to Italy whom Turkey considered the supporter of the leader of PKK, a terrorist organization active in Turkey for nearly two decades, Abdullah Ocalan. The similarity between the two afore-mentioned events also proves Turkeys dominant nationalistic perceptions about the other countries within the framework of the foreign policy.

Another country whose relations with Turkey have an aspect of the Armenian Genocide is France. In May 1998, the French Parliament passed the draft law accepting that Turks committed genocide toward the Armenian people in 1915 during the Ottoman Empire.30 As a result, Turkey put an embargo on France. This situation makes clear the rise of the issue of Armenia in Turco-French relations.

The third-party effect is also clear regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue since normalization of the Turco-Armenian relations will also give way to the normalization of the Azerbaijanian-Armenian relations.31 Furthermore, in the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijanian conflict, Turkey shall form the most effective platform.32

If we mention Turco-Armenian relations, we can mention the Armenian issue in Turkeys relations with other Western countries. The shadow of history seems not to give up dogging both sides. It can only be purged by the true knowledge of history,33 rather than denying the facts that are clearly known to the real history.

Conclusion

The issue that determines the Turco-Armenian relations is the problem of the concept of history and the way Turkey and Armenia conceive of history. The factor that shapes the current Turco-Armenian relations is the past, in other words, the burden of history. Although there are not any diplomatic relations between the two countries, from the Turkish perspective, this situation results in the third-party effect regarding the relations. Furthermore, the negative pace of the relations has an effect on Turkeys relations with the West and it appears as the Armenian issue in Turco-American or Turco-French relations. Perceptions that can only be explained in constructivist terms do matter regarding the Turco-Armenian relations. The argument regarding whether or not the Armenian Genocide took place affects the Realpolitik via the perceptions of two countries.

The part of history explaining the turbulent years of Armenian Genocide (1915-1918) should be clarified in order to reach a clear understanding of what really happened in the past. Objectivity serves to be a crucial factor at this point. Turkish archives have remained closed. However, it is crucial to open up all the archives in order to give an account of what happened in the past and in order to determine the pace of the current and future relations. Durable Turco-Armenian relations will never be possible unless everything becomes clear. In order to reach a resolution, there should be a conception of history purged from ultra-nationalistic ideologies and perceptions, not a conception of history that is official in its core and that can present ready-made solutions to every problem as is the case with the Turkish one. To reach some kind of modus vivendi between the realities of our global age and the ongoing struggle between two countries conception of history requires long time because the perceptions and the historical memories of two states are too powerful to be effaced in the near future.


1 P. Rich, European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment, Review of International Studies, No. 25, 1999, p. 436.
2 A. Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 71-81.
3 A. Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992.
4 T. Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotic, Clays Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 17-18.
5 See: Ibidem.
6 See: T. Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, p.171.
7 See: Hürriyet, 27 December, 1997.
8 See: S.R. Sonyel, Disinformation: The Negative Factor in Turco-Armenian Relations, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, June-August 1999 [http://www.mfa.gov.tr].
9 See: M. Stanford, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1998, p. 47.
10 See: Zaman, 17 July, 2001.
11 See: M. Eroğlu, Armenian Issue According to the Russian Documents in the Archive of the Institute of Turkish Revolution History, KÖK Series of Social and Strategical Researches, No. 8, Ankara, 1999, p 66.
12 M. Stanford, op. cit., p. 234.
13 Ibid., p. 194.
14 M. Weber, Selections in Translation, Transl. by Eric Matthews, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1978, p. 28.
15 Quoted from: M. Stanford, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
16 See: Yenisafak, 3 November, 1999.
17 A. Süslü, The Armenians and the 1915 Event of Displacement, KÖK Series of Social and Strategical Researches, No. 7, Ankara, 1999, pp. 113-114.
18 See: M. Hocaoğlu, Arşiv Vesikalarıyla Tarihte Ermeni Mezalimi ve Ermeniler, Anda, Istanbul, 1976, pp. 645-646.
19 See: Ibidem.
20 Armenian News Network/Groong, House Report 106-933. To accompany H. Res. 596, 4 October, 2000.
21 See: H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthaus Story, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1918, p. 308.
22 See: D.R. Papazian, A Review Essay, United States Official Documents on the Armenian Genocide, Vol. 1: The Lower Euphrates, compiled and introduced by Ara Sarafian, Watertown, Armenian Review, 1993.
23 See: D.E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, The Free Press, New York, 1993, p. 217.
24 See: T. Ataöv, The Armenian Question: Conflict, Trauma and Objectivity, SAM papers, No. 3, April 1997, p. 45.
25 A.D. Smith, National Identity, University of Nevada Press, London, 1993, p. 27.
26 See: D. Marshall Lang, The Armenians: A People in Exile, Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 7.
27 T. Ataöv, op. cit., p. 24.
28 See: Hürriyet, 3 October, 2000.
29 See: L. Kuper, Problems in Education and Genocide, Internet on the Holocaust and Genocide, No. 14, February 1998, Special Supplement, p. 1.
30 See: Yenisafak, 31 May, 1998.
31 See: J. Molla-zade, Recent Memoirs: An Interview with Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Vol. 1, No. 3, Summer-Fall, 1995.
32 See: Yenisafak, 29 March, 1999.
33 See: R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.

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