TURKEY AND THE RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR OF 1994-1996
David Gudiashvili, Ph.D. (Hist.), senior research associate, Academician Tsereteli Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Georgia, assistant professor, Tbilisi Institute of Asia and Africa
On 27 October, 1991 Chechnia elected leader of the Congress of the Chechen People General Dudaev president of Chechnia by a majority of votes. On 1 November the newly elected president issued a decree on the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The Soviet leaders neither recognized its sovereignty nor interfered with the process.
On 11 December, 1994 the Russian leaders moved federal forces to Chechnia where they met with frantic opposition of the units loyal to Dudaev. The world community was following with anxiety the unfolding armed conflict in the Northern Caucasus. The countries that bordered on the region or were found in close proximity to it were especially worried. Turkish authorities, for example, were afraid that the war would spread to the entire Caucasus.
Throughout many centuries Turkey has been maintaining close ties with the Caucasian peoples. Many Ottoman subjects of Caucasian extraction filled high posts, including the highest of them, that of the Grand Vizier, in administration and the army. In the latter half of the 19th century during the period of massive muhajir movement hundreds of thousands of people from the Northern Caucasus moved to Turkey. According to the Turkish media, the country is a home for about 7 million Turkish citizens of Caucasian extraction.1 According to American experts there are from 2 to 2.5 million of them in Turkey. The Chechen diaspora is relatively small and is living in the Konya area (in the country’s center part), Sivas (its central-eastern part), and Maras in the south.
The Turkish government was closely following the events that were unfolding in the Caucasus early in the 1990s. We all know that the world community did not recognize Chechnia’s independence, yet other North Caucasian peoples inspired by its example started talking about their autonomies’ independence from Russia. In this context Russia’s sudden invasion of Grozny was an unexpected and rather alarming warning. Being aware of the anti-Russian sentiments in the region Western analysts described military invasion of Chechnia as pouring oil on the fire. They were convinced that the events were fraught with a full-scale war that might envelop other North Caucasian republics.
This was what Turkey feared. According to press reports its government came to the following conclusion: “We are afraid that the spread of the conflict that has already enveloped the entire Caucasus may turn the region into another Yugoslavia… Everything that is going on in the Caucasus is evoking a direct and serious response in Turkey.” There was a lot of talk about a possibility that the ethnic Caucasians present in the great national assembly of the country and in other state structures may probably form an anti-Russian lobby that would try to force the government to support Chechnia.2
Today there are about 100 public organizations in Turkey set up by descendants of those who moved away from the Caucasus. In the past these ethnic structures were mainly involved in domestic politics and public life. Since the 1960s certain Turkish politicians have been displaying an active interest in them and have been trying to draw them into all sorts of nationalist events connected with their historical homeland. The Islamic factor and enmity with Russia of long standing were two major points. The majority of the Caucasian ethnic structures shared the nationalist ideas of the radical Bozkurtlar organization and supported its plans of the Greater Turan state. Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration the country has been displaying an even greater interest in the newly created Muslim states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Ankara started paying more attention to the North Caucasian republics that are part of the Russian Federation.
With a certain share of encouragement from the authorities the Caucasian ethnic structures established contacts with their historical homeland. The 400 thousand-strong Daghestanian diaspora in Turkey participates in the Shamil and Northern Caucasus public organizations. There are top Turkish army officers, parliament deputies and other politicians among them. Official Ankara has established close ties with these two structures that are extending their contacts with the Daghestanian religious organizations, public movements, and participate in their meetings, conferences, in discussions of the republic’s religious and political future if it withdrew from Russia.3
Yet the enthusiasm of the Caucasian ethnic organizations that wanted the Turkish cabinet to extend an active support to Chechnia created a dilemma for the Turkish establishment. If it did what the Caucasian lobby was insisting on and succumbed to its pressure Turkey would have found itself in confrontation with Russia. This would have upturned the balanced relations between the two countries, a result of both sides’ painstaking efforts. The Turkish government that strictly adheres to the principle of territorial integrity of states and inviolability of their frontiers could not support Chechnia that wanted independence: under international law it belonged to the territory of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, Turkey’s neutral attitude to the events in the Northern Caucasus could incur the widest popular masses’ displeasure with the government’s foreign policy. The public unanimously condemned the fact that Russia brought its troops into Chechnia and expected an adequate response from the government. At first the Turkish leaders refrained from sharp comments. After 11 December, 1994 when federal troops were moved to Chechnia the foreign ministry made several statements calling the warring sides to settle the conflict peacefully under conditions of Russia’s territorial integrity. Representatives of the Caucasian communities and associations did not spare angry words to criticize leaders in Ankara and Washington for what they believed to be an excessively mild reaction to the tragic events in Chechnia.
On 12 December, at a press conference President of the North Caucasian Cultural Association Kh. Kandemir declared: “Russia is out to strangle Chechnia’s urge for independence… Yet the war is not over and Chechnia is still fighting… Not only the Chechens in Turkey and outside it but all ethnic Caucasians are supporting the Chechens’ right cause and Chechnia’s struggle for independence.” He pointed out that the Russian invasion dealt a heavy blow at the prestige of Turkey that had been in contact with the Caucasus for many centuries, and sharply criticized the position taken by President Clinton. On 11 December the U.S. president made a statement in which he expressed his concern over the events in the Northern Caucasus yet described the military actions in Chechnia as the domestic affair of the Russian Federation.
President of the Chechen Association Kh. Unal referred to the foreign ministry’s statements as too mild and feeble: “At no time Chechnia was a Russian land. It was only for a limited historical period that the Chechen people remained subjugated and the Chechen lands belonged to Russians. Chechnia belongs to Russia to the same extent as Vietnam to the United States or India to Britain.” Heads of the other Caucasian associations and communities announced that many of their young members (not only Chechens) were prepared to fight Russians in Chechnia.4
Moscow was closely following the response of the Turkish government and the public to the events in Chechnia. According to the Russian foreign ministry Ankara responded in an objective and positive way: despite insistent calls of the local Caucasian nationalist organizations to support the Chechens the government spoke of the Russia Federation’s territorial integrity and the need to preserve it. “We are fully aware of the anti-Russian pressure put on the cabinet that had withstood it and took a balanced and objective position,” said a statement issued by the foreign ministry of Russia. The statement also pointed out that the military actions in Chechnia did not infringe on the interests of other states and would not infringe on them in future and that in case of Russia’s defeat in the Northern Caucasus the chaos would envelop the region and refugees would flow to Turkey.
At the same time the Russian media were doing their best to justify the introduction of troops into Chechnia. “According to the principles of international law and the definitions of international treaties Chechnia is part of the Russian Federation. Its illegal desire to gain a status of an independent state ignores the principle of territorial integrity of the Russian state and creates a bad pattern for other republics of the Russian Federation,” wrote political observers. “Chechnia is a center of organized crime from which it spreads across Russia. There is huge amount of unregistered weapons that are kept illegally there. None of the sovereign states, be it the U.S., Turkey or Germany would have tolerated this on their territories.” The press insisted that Moscow was the only real force able to restore stability in the Northern Caucasus and prevent chaos spreading to the entire region. “If we fail to do this the Northern Caucasus will become an inferno. Confrontation among dozens of ethnic groups living in the Northern Caucasus and their traditional dislike of each other may develop into a fight that will destroy the entire region. This will produce millions of refugees that may look at Turkey as the best possible asylum,” said the Russian media.
Three days before the invasion Turkey and Russia conducted negotiations in Ankara within the OSCE Flank Agreement on the quotas for the sides’ conventional forces. (The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was signed in Paris on 19 November, 1990.) Deputy Foreign Minister G. Mamedov who headed the Russian delegation announced that Russia had abandoned its demand for permission to deploy troops in the Caucasus in excess of the established quota.5
When the Russian invasion had become a fact President of Turkey Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and spokesmen of the Foreign Ministry made official statements in which they limited themselves to a mere concern and called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with due regard for the Russian Federation’s territorial integrity. It was only on 21 December that the Foreign Ministry of Turkey used a sharp tone to express its concern with the ferocious bombardment of Grozny, the Chechen capital, and regretted the numerous losses of civilian lives.
Why did Ankara display tolerance for the North Caucasian conflict while the opposition in Moscow condemned what the Russian troops were doing in Chechnia?
There is one possible answer to the question: the Turkish government never tired of insisting on the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders recognized by the world community. It has to follow these principles because of the complex domestic political situation that for many decades has been threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity.
In the east the radical national liberation movement of the Kurds was trying to create an independent state; there are about 25 million Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Armenia—Turkey is a home for nearly half of them. Tension in eastern Anatolia first appeared in the latter half of the 19th century and survived till our day. In 1925 and 1937 powerful Kurdish uprisings shattered the very foundations of the Turkish state—the government strained all forces to quench them. In 1946 the state of emergency was introduced in the Kurdish southeastern regions that has not been lifted since. The fight became even bitterer when in 1978 the separatist-minded Kurds that were Turkish citizens founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party under Ocalan. In 1985, the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan6 was set up. About 23.5 thousand Kurdish militants died in armed clashes with the Turkish security forces.7 In 1994, the government banned the only legal pro-Kurdish party—the Democratic Party (in 1993 its predecessor, the People’s Labor Party had been banned).8
The difference between the separatist movement in Russia and Turkey is minimal: Chechnia as an autonomous republic is part of the Russian Federation while in an absence of a federal structure in Turkey southeastern Anatolia is one of the regions. Western analysts pointed out that while opposing the separatist movement at home the Turkish government cannot and should not support separatist movements in another state and that the local Caucasian communities and associations should not put pressure on the government. Western analysts also emphasized that the Turkish leaders knew that Moscow might play the “Kurdish card” if Ankara decided to support the Chechens. This turn could have created certain difficulties in Turkey’s struggle against its own separatists. In October 1994 Russia stated its concern caused by the Turkic summit in which Turkey and five post-Soviet Turkic republics participated. After that Moscow convened a conference of the Kurdish communities of the CIS countries. As could be expected the conference passed a resolution about an all-round support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its leader Ocalan.
The Russian leaders expressed their displeasure with two private visits of Chechen leader Dudaev to Turkey and his relationships with the heads of the Turkic Republic of Northern Cyprus. Ankara took these statements as a warning: in view of the previous statements made by Moscow and wishing no part in the North Caucasian conflict the Turkish government ignored Dudaev’s invitation to become an intermediary in the Russian-Chechen conflict. The request was addressed to President Demirel on 18 December.
The Kurdish nationalist public organizations in Russia stirred up. On 26 December, 1994 the Kurds living in the CIS countries opened the Kurdish House in Moscow, a public and political center. The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held an international conference on the problems of Kurds. A group of Turkish parliamentarians made up of members of the banned Democratic Party accused of ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party visited Russia.9
Having ignored Dudaev’s invitation to mediate, Demirel and Çiller sent letters to President Yeltsin and Premier Chernomyrdin in which they expressed their concern with the bloodshed in the Northern Caucasus and called on the leaders of the Russian Federation to use peaceful means to settle the conflict. No answer came. Very soon hundreds of tanks and aircraft of the federal troops launched a large-scale offensive on the Chechen positions that claimed hundreds of civilian lives.10
The world community interpreted the messages of the Turkish leaders as concrete steps toward a peaceful settlement. Not wishing to be drawn into the conflict Demirel and Çiller made no further steps. Russia greeted this approach to the North Caucasian confrontation and described the calls for a peaceful settlement with due regard for Russia’s territorial integrity as objective and positive.
People in Turkey thought differently: on 18 December Istanbul was an arena of a massive rally in which ethnical Caucasians participated in great numbers. It called to defend the Chechen people’s independence. Within a week similar actions took place in other cities.
Gradually, the Turkish government was toughening its stand on the Chechen issue. At a briefing of 4 January the Foreign Ministry spokesman declared: “We resolutely condemn the invasion of Chechnia by Russian troops. This spelt tragedy for the Chechen people and claimed numerous civilian lives.” Before that, late in December 1994 the government of Turkey had asked a permission of the government of Russia to extend humanitarian aid to the Chechen refugees. On 5 January having received permission a Turkish military transport aircraft with 11 tons of foodstuffs, medicine, medical equipment, clothes, woolen blankets and tents landed in Beslan (North Ossetia) not far from the Chechen border.11
Caucasian communities and associations held numerous briefings and met the public. At a briefing held on 2 January, 1995 the heads of the Chechen Committee of Turkey announced that the actions of the Russian troops in Chechnia had reached the genocide level. President of the Chechen-Caucasian Solidarity Committee Kh. Unal called on Turkey and all European countries to take measures to stem further advance of the Russian troops. Speaking at a press conference of 3 January, 1995 he said the following: “Turkey should not avoid helping Chechnia. A victory of Chechens in the Caucasus will promote Turkish interests in the region.” On the next day the same committee disseminated among the Turkish media a statement of Deputy Foreign Minister of Ichkeria R. Chimaev about Russian storages of chemical weapons in Mozdok (North Ossetia) that he was afraid were intended for use against his republic.
The Russian leaders, in their turn, did their best to justify the Russian troops’ actions in Chechnia. On 31 December, 1994 President Yeltsin sent a letter to President Demirel in which he specially emphasized that the Russian military in Chechnia were observing the norms of international law proceeding from the principle of the states’ territorial integrity.
The position of the United States was made public by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke who at a meeting with the press in Nicosia said: “Turkey has many problems…Chechnia is one of them. Today, in Turkey there are 50 thousand Chechens and millions of Turkish citizens who associate their genealogical roots with the Caucasus. What is even more important there are 50 thousand active Chechens in Turkey many of whom are prepared to go to the Caucasus to fight for the independence of the Chechen people.”
In this connection on 5 January, 1995 the Russian leaders addressed the government of Turkey with a demand that it should take all the necessary measures to prevent Turkish volunteers from joining Dudaev’s forces in the Northern Caucasus.
As the military actions were spreading far and wide and the number of victims among the civilians was growing the Turkish government was toughening its stand on the conflict and was elaborating a more consistent position. On 10 January, at a meeting of the parliamentary faction of the True Path Party Prime Minister Çiller declared: “The conflict in the Northern Caucasus has obviously outstripped the limits of a domestic affair of the Russian Federation. The world community is ready to discuss the issue within the OSCE framework.” She also confirmed Ankara’s readiness to receive wounded refugees for treatment in Turkish hospitals. On 11 January she initiated a special sitting of the Great National Assembly of Turkey dedicated to the Chechen issue. The parliamentarians demanded that international actions be held to settle the conflict. The resolution said in part: “The Great National Assembly of Turkey … believes it an urgent necessity to address the U.N. Security Council and the OSCE with a request to take measures, in full accordance with their documents, to immediately reach a ceasefire, ensure security of the civilians, protect the rights of refugees and observe human rights everywhere.” The parliamentarians invited the State Duma of the Russian Federation to conduct a joint sitting of the deputies of both countries to discuss conflict-settlement measures. They stressed that the military confrontation spread negative influence across the Caucasus and was directly influencing the interests of Turkey.12
Having moved its troops to Chechnia Russia closed its borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan as a security measure that practically amounted to an embargo in relation to the two republics. Prime Minister Çiller called on Moscow to reopen the frontiers; on 10 January President Demirel sharply criticized the federal troops: “We are not interfering in the Russian Federation’s internal affairs but we are using the right that everybody can use to express our opinion about the shedding of blood in Chechnia. The Chechens are our brothers and we resolutely condemn the appalling bloodshed.” Turkey was the only country in the world that declared, through its top political leadership, that the conflict in the Northern Caucasus was not exclusively Russia’s internal affair.13
Despite the sharp statements the Turkish leaders were avoiding direct contacts with the Chechen officials. Shortly before the war started Moscow had clearly expressed its displeasure with Dudaev’s two private visits to Turkey. Early in January 1995 Foreign Minister of Ichkeria Shemseddin Iusuf came to Turkey with an unofficial visit during which he met only people from unofficial organizations: heads of Caucasian communities and associations and members of humanitarian organizations. According to press reports they discussed humanitarian aid to Chechnia.
On 6 January, the Chechen-Caucasian Solidarity Committee called on the Turkish public to start a campaign of gathering humanitarian aid to the Chechen people fighting for its independence. Several days later, on 12 January a military transport aircraft delivered to Beslan the second batch of humanitarian aid (9 tons of foodstuffs, 500 kg of medicine and medical equipment, 500 woolen blankets) gathered by the Turkish Red Crescent Society. At a briefing on 11 January Foreign Ministry spokesman said: “If there is a desire to evacuate the wounded from Chechnia to Turkey our transport aircraft is prepared to take them on a return flight from Beslan.”
The Russian diplomats in Ankara tried to justify Moscow and expressed their concern with a possible worsening of relations between the two countries. At a reception at the Turkish foreign minister’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia V. Kuznetsov said to the press: “Like any other country Russia has the right to defend its territorial integrity… The Chechen problem will be resolved but it should not negatively affect our relationships today.”
An official assessment of the Russo-Turkish relations in connection with the armed conflict in the Northern Caucasus was amply demonstrated in an interview Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation A. Chernyshev gave to a Turkish foreign policy analytical journal Turkish Probe on 25 January, 1995. In the past A. Chernyshev had served for six years as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. (later of the RF) to Turkey. As a deputy minister he was responsible for Russia’s foreign policy relations with Turkey and the Middle East and as such was one of the architects of Russia’s foreign policy.14
“Question: Can the Chechen problem be a factor of creating an enmity between Russia and Islam?
“Answer: Every time the separatists run into difficulties they exploit nationalist and religious slogans. For this reason the fighters of Dudaev’s shout ‘Allahu Akbar’ and are out to present Russia as an enemy of Islam. This is not true. Russia is partly a Muslim country and a home for about 18 million Muslims. It has nothing against Islam, on the contrary, Islam is the second most important religion in the Russian Federation where it is respected everywhere.
“We are against extremism in any form. We reject all forms of extremism—be it Islamic, nationalist or separatist. The recent Casablanca summit condemned Islamic extremism.
“Q.: Do you think there is something in common between the Chechen crisis and Turkey’s problems in the southeast?
“A.: I’d prefer to avoid direct comparisons yet the two problems do have something in common. At the same time, your problem has typical features of its own—our problem has its own peculiarities. I should say once more that the Russian Federation completely support Turkey’s desire to preserve its territorial integrity. We support your intention and would like to see your problem settled through negotiations in the context of respect for human rights to the extent it is possible.
“Q.: Can you offer your comments on the results of the talks of Minister of the Interior of Turkey Nahit Mentese in Moscow? You obviously know that he came to convince Russia not to display tolerance for anti-Turkish actions.
“A.: Russia did its best to reassure Turkey in connection with the Turkish question. I believe that Mr. Mentese’s visit to Moscow was most fruitful. During the talks the sides reached an absolute clarity in their approaches to the problem. All related problems were discussed in every detail. I hope that the Turkish side is completely satisfied with the Russian stand on the problem. Mr. Mentese confirmed this at the end of his visit.
“Q.: Turkey expressed its displeasure with activities of the Kurdish House in Moscow. It is closely connected with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Is Russia worried, in its turn, about the activity of the Chechen associations in Turkey and the official support they get from many Turkish politicians?
“A.: All statements about the existence of extremism on one side only are bad statements. We are concerned with statements of Chechens in Turkey, visits of Dudaev’s representatives to your country and statements made by certain Turkish parliamentarians in support of Dudaev’s regime to the same extent as you are concerned with Kurdish declarations in Moscow.”
* * *
The first Russo-Chechen war coincided with certain changes on the political scene in Turkey. Islamic fundamentalists started displaying more activity. According to the Ministry of the Interior the majority of fundamentalist organizations maintained close ties with the Iranian religious circles and were out to set up an Islamic republic in Turkey.15
The legal Islamist Welfare (Refah) Party that in 1987 had elected Necmettin Erbakan its leader was especially visible on the domestic political stage. It scored its first big victory at the municipal elections in March 1994 when it carried away central, eastern, and southeastern regions, the capital and “cosmopolitan” Istanbul.16
On 24 December, 1995 this party outstripped two other influential organizations (the True Path Party and the Motherland Party) and collected 21.38 percent of the votes that gave it 158 seats in the parliament. In summer 1996, it formed a coalition government together with the True Path Party.17
Stronger Islamist positions in the parliament and the cabinet accelerated the process of a revision of an official position on the North Caucasian issue. In 1995-1996 the authorities, Islamist and nationalist cabinet members in particular, were actively campaigning for a more efficient support of Chechnia. Despite political and ideological differences the political elite unanimously approved of the Chechens’ independence struggle and openly expressed its indignation at the Russian Federation’s aggressive and repressive policies. The media were actively shaping public opinion by calling to extend all sorts of assistance to the fraternal Muslim peoples of the Northern Caucasus.
Turkish volunteers (members of the Chechen and other Caucasian diasporas) rushed to the Caucasus to fight together with Dudaev. They were dispatched by ethnic public organizations. Great role in the process belonged to the so-called seats of Islamic order set up by the parliamentary Great Unity Party. All volunteers were trained in military camps in Turkey and the Turkic republic of Northern Cyprus, the largest of them being the Men of Khaibakh at Trabzon and Girne (former Kyrenia) in Northern Cyprus. Spokesmen of the official structures insisted that it was the Chechen diaspora that was training them.18 There is information that there were about 2 thousand Turkish volunteers fighting on Dudaev’s side.19 The events of January 1996 in Trabzon confirmed that the ultra-right and fundamentalists were supporting the independence struggle of Chechnia and the entire Northern Caucasus. On that day a Turkish North Caucasian terrorist group under ethnic Abkhazian Muhammed Tokcan captured Avrasia ferry.
As soon as Islamists appeared in the parliament and the cabinet they started openly interfering in North Caucasian events. It was with an active participation of Chairman of the Welfare Party Erbakan and leader of Chechnia Dudaev that a Turkish citizen, an ethnic Chechen B. Iashar (who was also a member of the Istanbul Committee of the True Path Party Board), was appointed state minister and press secretary of the Republic of Ichkeria. Chairperson of the True Path Party Çiller supported this appointment. He was also appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Ichkeria to Turkey.20
Ankara was actively working to provide Chechnia with an international legal status. The government repeatedly stated that it was doing its best to make the Republic of Ichkeria a full-fledged member of the Community of the Islamic states.21
Early in 1996 Aslan Maskhadov and Zelimkhan Iandarbiev, two highest Chechen officials, visited Turkey where they met not only North Caucasian public organizations but also official representatives and thanked both for moral and material support.
The Turkish government was completely satisfied with the end of the military actions in the Northern Caucasus and withdrawal of the federal forces from Chechnia, yet it refrained from an official recognition of Chechnia’s independence and establishing full-scale diplomatic relations with the Republic of Ichkeria.
1 See: Nokta, No. 24, 1998.
2 See: Ü. Erginsoy, “Turkey Fears Transcaucasia Will Be Another Yugoslavia,” Turkish Probe, 16 December, 1994, p. 10.
3 See: Z. Menteshashvili, Islamskoe vozrozhdenie na Severnom Kavkaze i v Tsentral’noi Azii, Tbilisi, 1999, p. 57.
4 See: Ü. Erginsoy, op. cit., p. 11.
5 See: Z. Batiashvili, Vooruzhennye sily Turtsii, Tbilisi, 2000, pp. 81-82 (in Georgian).
6 See: M. Komakhia, “Kurdskaia problema: vozmozhniy istochnik destabilizatsii v regione?” Sakartvelos strategiuli kvlevebis da ganvitarebis tsentri, Bulletin No. 50, Tbilisi, March 2001, p. 17 (in Georgian).
7 See: Ibid., p. 25.
8 See: Ibid., p. 26.
9 See: A. Menteshashvili, “Rossiisko-turetskie vzaimootnoshenia i kurdskaia problema na sovremennom etape,” Orientalisturi dziebani, Collection 3-4, Tbilisi, 1995, p. 324 (in Georgian).
10 See: Ü. Erginsoy, “Turkey Tries to Save Face on Chechnya Crisis,” Turkish Probe, 23 December, 1994, p. 12.
11 See: Ü. Erginsoy, “Turkey Toughens Stance Against Russia,” Turkish Probe, 6 January, 1995, p. 11.
12 See: Ü. Erginsoy, “Çiller: Chechnya No Longer Russia’s Internal Affair,” Turkish Probe, 13 January, 1995, p. 12.
13 A. Menteshashvili, “Rossiisko-turetskie vzaimootnoshenia i kurdskaia problema na sovremennom etape,” p. 323.
14 See: Turkish Probe, 3 February, 1995.
15 See: E. Machitidze, “Islamskie partii v sovremennoi Turtsii,” Orientalisturi dziebani, Collection 3-4, p. 172.
16 M. Komakhia, “Politicheskii Islam v Turtsii,” Sakartvelos strategiuli kvlevebis da ganvitarebis tsentri, Bulletin No. 47, February 2001, p. 40.
17 See: Z. Batiashvili, “Sovremennaia Turtsia,” Sakartvelos strategiuli kvlevebis da ganvitarebis tsentri, Bulletin No. 12, July 1998, p. 24.
18 See: L. Lagvilava, “Okazhetsia ili net iadernoe oruzhie v rukakh u terroristov,” Sruliad arasaidumlod, September 1996, p. 21 (in Georgian).
19 See: Nokta, No. 4, 1996.
20 See: Aktuel, No. 198, 1995.
21 See: Zaman, 12 January, 1996.