MIDDLE EAST AND THE CASPIAN IN THE U.S. ENERGY STRATEGY

Adil KOZHIKHOV


Adil Kozhikhov, Leading research associate, Foreign Policy Studies Department, Kazakhstani Institute of Strategic Research at the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)


An analysis of the current political processes suggests that the global energy balance may be upset some time in future. The largest states have reached the point beyond which lies either a totally revised or at least re-adjusted energy policy. It is clear now that little by little the center of geopolitical and geo-economic processes is shifting back from Afghanistan to the Middle East and the post-Soviet space.

The Unites States is regaining its former long-term interest in obtaining control over the strategic hydrocarbon resources. The While House officially announced that it would seek access to energy fuels extracted in all corners of the world. With this aim in view it is encouraging further integration of the North American energy market, growing investments and field development in Russia and Central Asia.

The oil factor is one of the traditional foreign policy priorities in the U.S. In the past decade oil consumption in the country increased by 14 percent while domestic oil extraction rose by 2 percent. To cover the gap the country has to buy oil abroad. Oil import has risen by 30 percent in the last years that says that the United States is growing increasingly dependent on it and is thus becoming more vulnerable.

The aims and priorities of the American energy policy are described by the National Energy Strategy first adopted in 1991, revised in 1998 and amended in 2001. Its main aim is to increase the United States energy security while strengthening and further developing the global energy system.1 The main task is to prevent any interruptions in fuel supply and sharp fluctuations of world energy prices, and to maintain a certain level of energy fuels (oil, in the first place) in the United States. This prompts diversification of the sources of oil import that makes it more reliable. On 17 October, 2001 President Bush presented his energy-related program with the words: Our country needs more independence in the energy field. This is a national security problem.2

An impartial analysis says that an inability to decrease the dependence on the energy sources outside the country was the greatest foreign policy failure of the last decades. Today, the United States is even more responsive to the fluctuations on the oil market than during the Gulf War when a barrel of oil fetched $40. At that time a worldwide excessive capacity was 5m barrels a daytoday, it is 50 percent lower because oil extraction in Libya and Iran, and in other oil producers is underfunded.3

In this conditions any increase of oil prices may provoke a serious economic crisis in the U.S. now engaged in the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, and therefore, may negatively affect world economy (the United States accounts for up to 25 percent of the worlds GDP). There is an opinion that American economy can show dynamism only if the oil prices stay below $18 per barrel.4

It should be added that the forecasted increase of the worldwide use of gas and a gradual shift toward it has next to nothing to do with the United States that cannot import gas for technical reasons. In the mid-term perspective America is doomed to the use of oil. This makes the oil-bearing and oil-transporting regions the areas of U.S. vital interests.

The Middle East and the Caspian states occupy a special place in the American global energy strategy.

Force in the U.S. Strategy in the Middle East

There is no other region in the world where Washington has been exerting its direct military-political influence longer and more consistently than in the Persian Gulf. It has been doing this despite the obviously hopeless problems that defied solutions and irregardless of the courses obviously inflated cost.5 Any political-economic changes there created a danger of irregular oil supply to the American and the world markets, thus threatening American security. The oil producers in the Middle East that will remain in control of oil exports from the Gulf zone for at least several decades will also remain the U.S. foreign policy priority.

Table 1

World Oil Production in 1996-2020. Shares of the Middle Eastern OPEC Members and the Rest of the World (million barrels per day and %)

 

1996

2010

2020

 

Mbd

%

Mbd

%

Mbd

%

Middle Eastern OPEC members

18.5

26

43.8

47

49

55

Rest of the world

52

74

48.9

53

40.8

45

Total

70.5

 

92.7

 

89.9

 

Source: International Energy Agency, World Economic Outlook, 1998, p. 101.

What happened after 11 September showed that in the foreseeable future one should expect much greater dangers of destabilization in the Middle East than it was believed before. The present regime in Iraq presents a multiple threat to the United States that embraces the oil sphere. No wonder the Bush Administration is inclined to employ all (including military) means to maintain stability in the Gulf zone.

Iraq is becoming the cornerstone of the current American energy strategy in the Middle East. With oil deposits discovered back in the 1980s Iraq is the second largest oil-rich country in the world after Saudi Arabia. This is a huge resource of decisive importance for the future of the world oil market. On top of this the cost value of Iraqi oil is extremely low because the fields are found either along the coast or offshore. The oil is cheap to extract and its location does not require costly infrastructure (long pipelines, pumping stations, etc.). It is mostly high-quality and easy-to-extract oil: in some promising fields its cost value does not exceed $0.60-0.90 per barrel (primary investments included).6 Obviously, on the highly competitive oil market Baghdad is in an advantageous position.

There is an expert opinion that two or three years after the embargo is lifted Iraq will extract about 120m tons of oil a year, later its annual yield will reach 300m tons. The available production capacities will not cope with the volume (today the country can export to the West up to 80m tons a year). There is no doubt that the economically tempting projects in Iraq will attract money. Despite the embargo Iraq still carries weight with OPEC, which the Americans see as too independent. They have, therefore, look for other levers to influence decision-making of the oil producers.

The presence of foreign (Russian included) companies in Iraq makes the situation even more complicated. The TotalFinaElf of France, ENI of Italy, RoaylDutchShell of the U.K. and others have already tried to work with Baghdad within the Oil-for-Food program. Vagit Alekperov, president of LUKoil of Russia, said that when realized the Iraqi projects would increase his firms oil extraction by 30m tons a year, the total amount would go under world prices to the rapidly developing Asian markets.7 He had in mind the West Qurna field, one of the worlds richest (about 100 km to the northwest of Basra) with the estimated resources of 20 billion barrels. In December 1997, a group of Russian companies (LUKoil, Zarubezhneft, Mashinimport) leased the West Qurna oil field for 23.5 years on a sharing basis. The share of the Russian side (estimated at $3.7 billion) is 70 percent.8

In this situation the U.S. has no access to Iraqi oil. This has formulated for Washington a priority task: to obtain such access by all means (force included). There are two accompanying factors: first, the quality and prices of Middle Eastern oil make it unbeatable on the world markets. This means that no company will abandon the source of it by its own free will. Second, anti-American sentiments that prevail at present in the majority of Arab states affect their policies to a great extent. Any serious concessions to Washington may aggravate domestic situation practically in all Middle Eastern countries. This shows that the American positions are shakyno wonder it is doing its best to strengthen them.

The White House is regarding the use of force as one of the variants designed to replace the regime of Saddam Hussein with a government loyal to America. Washington intends to realize the variant that involves the use of force with approval by other countries or, better still, by the U.N. Security Council. Third, American success will resolve several strategic tasks: it will create an access to the Iraqi oil reserves and become another instrument to put pressure on OPEC through one of its most active members.

In January 2002, after Iraq had been described as an axis of evil state allegedly supporting international terrorism the U.S. president first said that Hussein should be removed. The world community became divided over these plans. For several months, until mid-August international support of a military operation was declining. As a result, Washington was left with one reliable ally, London. At that point, the administration stepped up its propaganda campaign by using the method tested in 1991 on the eve of the Operation Storm in the Desert when American delegations were dispatched to all world capitals to resolve contradictions through concessions and preferences.

Today, we are witnessing a more or less similar situation: the majority of the U.S. partners in the antiterrorist coalition are inclined to think that the U.N. Security Council should approve an operation against Iraq. Oil is the U.S. trump card in its fight against Saddam Hussein: it is used to enlist support. All five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have international oil companies very much concerned with the regime-change in Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War many of them either have already signed or are working toward contracts on developing Iraqi oil fields, restoring the infrastructure, and prospecting. The majority of such contracts will remain frozen until the U.N. sanctions are lifted. Iraqi opposition has already hinted that it will disregard these contracts. On the one hand, a military operation will offer new advantages to the transnational oil companies. On the other, it may create a serious risk for the global world markets. An access to the Iraqi oil and incomes will depend on the new government. This is what the key states are guided by.

Great Britain remains the U.S. most consistent allyLondon is doing its best to secure a niche in the Iraqi oil sector something that RoyalDutchShell, the largest British company, has been trying to do for several years. A military operation seems inevitable. As a result the United States will capture the oil industry. London is obviously willing to get all privileges it can possibly obtain.

Having realized that the war cannot be avoided France is also trying to register its interests in the Iraqi oil industry: TotalFinaElf, one of the largest companies, has already made attempts to cooperate with Baghdad. In particular, it has already reached an agreement on developing the Majnun oilfield at the border with Iran with an estimated reserve of up to 30 billion barrels. In July 2001, Iraq announced that the French companies would not get any priorities because Paris was observing the U.N. sanctions.9 This means that France has no reasons to support Saddam Hussein.

Out of five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council China is most actively objecting to the military option yet it no less actively tries to persuade Iraq to resume its cooperation with U.N. inspectors. Beijings traditional passivity on the world political scene suggests that China will continue avoiding active steps during the voting in the Security Council and will not veto despite its own interests in the Iraqi oil business. In June 1997, Beijing reached an agreement with Baghdad that as soon as the sanctions were lifted it would move in to take part in developing the Ahdab field. The contract is worth $1.2 billion.10

Russias expectations concerning Iraq are somewhat inflated: its political and economic potential does not allow it to interfere with the American aims in the Middle East. The Kremlin has concentrated on its economic interests that include the recovery of Baghdads debt of $8 billion and realization of the contracts worth many billions of dollars that Russian oil companies signed with Iraq.

In this way, practically all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council guide themselves by their national interests when dealing with the planned military operation against Saddam Hussein.

* * *

One of the major factors negatively affecting the American positions in the Middle East is the noticeably cooler relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. The former is the largest oil producer with proven reserves of 261.5 billion barrels (nearly a quarter of the worlds proven oil reserves). Every day it extracts more than 8m barrels, its daily refining capacities being 1.6m barrels. The lions share of oil imported to the United States comes from Saudi Arabia.

The U.S.-Saudi Arabia alliance was tested several times in the course of the 20th century, especially during the oil crises of the 1970s-1980s and in 1991. The sides invariably found their cooperation mutually advantageous. It was with the help of Saudi Arabia that Washington cushioned the possibly crippling effects that loomed on the horizon in those years: Saudi Arabia, the key OPEC member (an influential organization that often clashed with the United States over the world oil prices), acted as an intermediarythe situation from which both the U.S. and the oil producers profited.

The alliance that looked firm is rapidly dissolving. The process is a bilateral one: the United States is vexed with the partners passivity in relation to the Iraqi threat. In addition, it is suspected that certain sides in Saudi Arabia played a certain role in the events of 11 September. The anti-Saudi sentiments in the United States reached their peak when Washington brought a $1 trillion suit against Saudi citizens.

Saudi Arabia responded with a massive withdrawal of financial assets from U.S. economy. The Saudi rulers have to take into account the mounting popular resentment against the United States. This explains why they refused to act together with the U.S. in the anti-Iraqi operation, thus complicating its realization. What is more Riyadh is demonstrating its intention to use OPEC for the same purpose.

The American strategists have always said that any hostile state exercising control over the Arabian Peninsula can potentially increase the world oil prices.11 This directly affects the U.S. interests and explains why the current relationships between America and Saudi Arabia may seriously aggravate Washingtons energy-related efforts.

Recently, Riyadh had to address the problems caused by the economic crisis triggered by the plummeting energy-fuel prices. For the first time since 1975 when oil industry had been nationalized it let in foreign companies: on 4 June, 2001 it signed framework agreements with a consortium of eight foreign firms prepared to invest in the gas sector. Exxon Mobil, Philips, Conoco, Marathon, and Occidental are among the members.12

If we take into account that American companies have never been interested in gas for the reasons described above one can surmise that their involvement in the gas sector was prompted by their desire to penetrate the oil sector as soon as possible. This, and the growing financial requirements of the Saudi rulers means that the United States will spread its influence to the region as a whole.

This is taking part against the background of a gradual change in the alignment of forces inside the country: the conservative wing under King Fahd is retreating under pressure of more progressively minded politicians under Crown Prince Abdallah (today the de facto ruler). On the whole, the royal familys positions are far from stable that affects to a great extent its tactics on the international arena.

In any case, the current political trends in the Middle East are weakening, to a certain extent, the Saudi Arabias position in the region.

* * *

In these conditions Iran, with 9 to 10 percent (14-17 billion tons, or 90 billion barrels) of world oil resources is gaining more political weight. The current changes attract foreign investors. Under the constitution they cannot join oil and gas concessions, however the 1987 Oil Law set the doors ajar for foreign investors in the form of joint ventures formed by local and foreign physical and legal persons. As a result, investments in the oil and gas sector increased considerably. Between 1995 and the present day they reached the sum of $6 billion.13

The planned military action in Iraq directly affects Irans security and other interests. In anticipation of the U.S. operation Tehran has already concentrated its armed forces along its border with Iraq. Its units returned to the positions they occupied in the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. The Revolution Guards Corps and other troops were deployed along the entire border stretch.14

One cannot exclude a possibility that this measure has other purposes besides protecting the country: the Iranian troops may move to Iraqi Kurdistan and the eastern regions of Iraq to prevent the U.S.-British troops from moving close to the Iranian border. In fact, the largest oil and gas reserves and the Iranian largest oil and gas terminals are found in Shatt al Arab, close to the Iraqi border.

Heads of the Kurdish organizations of Iraq are afraid that the Iranian army is just waiting for the beginning of the American operation to interfere in the affairs of the Kurdish region and the rest of the country.15 Iran is objecting to the idea of installing a pro-Western government in Baghdad and Turkeys involvement in the anti-Iraqi action: the Iranian analysts are convinced that Ankara will undoubtedly demand Iraqi Kurdistan (the richest oil and gas region) and the oil and gas pipelines stretching to the ports in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. (The majority of these claims have been on the agenda since the 1920s.16)

In addition, Iran suggested that a conference of major oil exporters be urgently called to discuss a joint agreement that would tighten oil imports because of a possible aggression against Iraq and blockade of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states supported the idea. The Iranian analysts forecast a slump of world oil prices (from $30 to $22-23 per barrel) when Iraq is routed. Economies of nearly all oil producers will be sent into a prolonged, nearly endless crisis while the largest oil consumers will flourish. The Organization of the Arab States Oil Exporters produced similar forecasts.17

If Iraq is divided Iran will gain more weight as an oil producer and exporter. One cannot exclude a possibility that Iran may have at least 70 percent of Baghdads OPEC quota that amounts to nearly 30m tons a year.18

From this it follows that a military operation against Iraq may strengthen Irans positions and its role as a regional power while Washington will be forced to adjust its politics in relation to Tehran.

* * *

An analysis of the current situation in the Gulf area says that the United States has to act promptly to consolidate its positions in this strategically key region. Its oil reserves are escaping from the American control while the conditions today are best suited to the use of force. If successful the operation will give Washington a direct access to the virtually unlimited source of energy.

The New Phase on the Caspian

The critical situation in the Middle East has forced the White House to diversify the energy sources import and strengthen its ties with the oil producers outside the Gulf area, in the first place, on the Caspian. This is a result of a confrontation between the U.S. and OPEC in which Saudi Arabia and other Arab states play the first fiddle and of instability in the Middle East.

The newly discovered oil reserves in South America, West Africa and elsewhere have not attracted much attention from Washington: the geopolitical situation in these corners is absolutely clear while the Caspian remains an area of geopolitical tension where the situation with the local countries remains vague.19

Strategic importance of any region rich in oil and gas depends on their quantity and geographical location. From this point of view the geographical location of the Caspian wedged between the major oil and gas markets of today and tomorrow (Europe and Asia) and between the major suppliers (the Middle East, North Africa, and Russia) to the Eastern Hemisphere rather than the quantity of its hydrocarbon reserves determines the areas strategic weight.20

American experts are looking at the Caspian as a potential source of the worlds largest amounts of energy fuels.

Table 2

Proven and Possible Hydrocarbon Reserves on the Caspian

 

Oil
(billion barrels)

Natural Gas
(trillion c m)

 

Proven

Possible

Proven

Possible

Azerbaijan

8

15

1

2

Kazakhstan

15

65

2

3

Turkmenistan

1

3

2

4

Uzbekistan

1

2

1

2

Total

25

85

6

11

Iran

90

110

23

33

North Sea

17

27

4

5

Source: Jan Kalicki, in: Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2001, p. 123.

Extraction of energy fuels in the area may create important results: the worlds resources will increase while their supply will diversify. The United States spare no efforts to emphasize that new players on the world energy market boost its competitiveness and transparency and increase the markets ability to respond to the changing sales potential, thus adding to the markets stability and efficient development.

In the Caspian area America is addressing three major tasks: a stable supply of energy fuels to the United States; attainment of its geostrategic aims, and further promotion of its commercial opportunities.

This process can be divided into three stages.

The first (between the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s). The United States just turned their gaze to the region while the Soviet Union was still alive. It was at that time that the CIA predicted that the oil that could be extracted from the Caspian Seas northern part would have saved entire Soviet energy sector.

Naturally, this amount of the strategically important raw material could not but attract Washingtons attention. It was at that time that it first betrayed its desire to be closer involved in the Caspian. An influential Soviet lobby helped Chevron of the U.S. that risked negotiations over the Tengiz oilfield in the last years of Soviet power when the changes had already began. It was the Soviet Center, gradually replaced with Kazakhstan, that first started talks about Tengiz with Chevron.

The Soviet Unions unexpectedly fast decline and appearance of new independent states took the United States unawares. Washington doubted that the Central Asian countries would free themselves from the hegemony of Moscow and acted accordingly. The U.S. preferred Moscow as its main partner, entrusted Turkey with defending its interests and delegated some of its powers in this sphere to Ankara. In other words, at that period Washington let the geopolitical initiative in the Caspian slip between its fingers.

A new U.S. approach to the Caspian states had taken shape by the mid-1990s. By that time it had become clear that the area was indeed rich in energy fuels. It was also at that time that Washington started looking at Moscow as its main rival in the area because nearly all pipelines from the Caspian states crossed Russia. Today, only one of thema low-capacity pipeline between Baku and Batumi, via Tbilisibypasses the Russian territory. This is why Russia, as the owner of the majority of the regions outlets to the world markets was reaping economic and political advantages that urged the United States to create alternative routes for the Caspian oil. A conception of numerous export pipelines was formulated and presented to the world. It became one of Washingtons main political principles in the region. There was a conception of an East-West oil transportation corridor that developed into an idea (and later a project) of a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.21

In 1997, the U.S. Administration announced that the Caspian had become an area of its interests and formulated related tasks: reliable global supplies of energy fuels that would meet Americas strategic and economic needs, as well as the interests of its regional partners; promotion of economic development; strengthening political independence and democratization in the local countries; creating reliable alternatives to the export of local fuel, which presupposes, in particular, pipelines bypassing Iran.

With this aim in view the United States launched active efforts designed to establish good relations with the post-Soviet Caspian states. At the same time, there appeared the first signs of a new task for the United Statesto prevent an ascendance of a new regional hegemon in the Gulf area, which, in the final analysis, caused a further revision of American Caspian policy.

* * *

An analysis of the current trends suggests that we are watching the beginning of the third period on the Caspian created by an increased importance of its raw-material resources. The Caspian is now regarded as an alternative to the Persian Gulf and one of the major oil-producing areas.

This trend has already added another dimension (Russia-Kazakhstan) to the American energy strategy and its direct outcomea greater importance of the American factor in the relations between Moscow and Astana in the oil sphere. This means that in this sphere Washington is concentrating on cooperation with these states (potentially the largest oil producers). After 11 September the U.S. revised its attitude to Russiait is no longer a rival but rather an important partner on the Caspian. The United States would like Russia and Kazakhstan to pursue a common policy concordant with its interests. In other words, from this time on Washington will have a say on all major oil-related issues. Separately, Moscow and Astana are less attractive economically and as a field of possible investments. This is a radical change in the American regional strategy.

At first glance the Caspian CIS states are justifying the hopes pinned on them. An Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecast says that by 2020 the former Soviet republics will set up one of the most ramified and powerful energy systems in the world while its annual supply will increase approximately by 0.9 to 1.2 percent.22

Russia has opted for larger oil exports the priorities being formulated in the Energy Strategy that says that despite the fact that Europe so far remains the main consumer of oil and gas from Russia Moscow intends to move in other directions as well. Speaking on 29 January, 2002 in the State Duma Energy Minister Igor Iusufov said: To be able to compete on the world markets with Arab oil producers we should step up oil extraction to move away from lower to higher production of oil.23

According to the Moscow investment bank United Financial Group, Russia is exporting about 4m barrels of oil and petroleum products a day (about 10 percent of the worlds oil trade).24 In February 2002, Moscow with 7.28m barrels a day outstripped Saudis extraction of 7.19m barrels that can be interpreted as Moscows desire to demonstrate its potentials. On average, Russia comes second in the world (after Saudi Arabia) and outstrips Iran (the second OPEC country where its export potential is concerned) in its oil and petroleum products export.

This explains why the post-Soviet oil producers are seeking closer economic contacts with the United States that is seeking an access to the oil and gas fields for its companies under adequate conditions and an adequate protection of their investments. As a result Washington is demonstrating more activity in the Caspian region that so far cannot compete with the traditional oil producers elsewhere. The major oil consumers, however, are estimating the regions middle-term prospects.

There are several factors that negatively affect cooperation in the energy sphere between the U.S. and post-Soviet states. For example, in 2001 the share of Russian oil in the American import never went higher than 1 percent.25 High transportation costs is one of the reasons why oil export to the United States cannot be increased: it requires an adequate infrastructure that includes marine terminals for large-capacity tankers with displacement of 300 thou tons and more. Russia will profit from exporting oil to America only if the oil price remains on the $25 per barrel level that, for America, will deprive oil imports from Russia of their economic expediency. Cost efficiency of oil extraction in the CIS countries is the second factor. It is much higher than that in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There is the third factor: more oil on the world markets will send prices down. Any of the large oil producers will be able to replace the post-Soviet states as large-scale suppliers of oil to the U.S. marketwhat will be needed is Washingtons political decision. This means that the energy situation in the United States will not depend exclusively on the CIS countries.

According to the EIA forecast, energy consumption in the former Soviet republics will grow by 1.4 percent every year while oil production will increase by 0.9 to 1.2 percent.26 This is the fourth factor: the actively developing domestic energy market will consume the large part of extracted fuel.

Finally, the fifth factor. Strengthening Iran as a regional power that we have been watching for some time may spur on division of the Caspian. Tehran has considerably increased its pressure on the neighbors and confirmed that it still wanted to divide the sea into five equal sectors. It stated that the legal regime of the sea should be established through consensus and it will not allow any other state to infringe on its national interests. This position may create a stalemate and stem a compromise that has been forming. We should also bear in mind that Iran is the only Caspian state that is also an active and influential member of OPEC.

These factors hint that the American interest in the northern oil-producing area (that includes the post-Soviet expanse) is demonstrative rather than real. There are obvious attempts to set Russia and the Caspian states against OPEC. Such confrontation will inevitably weaken both sides and send the world oil prices down. This is the main goal the U.S. has set itself in the energy sphere.

* * *

Kazakhstan is involved in all processes around the Caspian to the fullest possible extent. In principle, the U.S. close attention to the region is creating favorable conditions for progress in oil production in Kazakhstan. Today, domestic demand is fairly low, therefore larger export is possible. This fits well in the countrys energy strategy that demands diversification of the routes of oil exports. In the mid-term perspective the republic may find a better niche on the energy fuels market, more actively invite foreign (American, in the first place) investments in its oil sector. The fears that larger oil exports from Kazakhstan may cause a price drop are unfounded because the amount of extracted oil is much lower than those in the Middle East and Russia. This explains why Kazakhstan never felt a great pressure from OPEC when this organization tried once more (in spring and summer 2002) to bring pressure on independent producers.

The unfolding active cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the energy sphere suggests that Moscow will readjust its attitude to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Its efficiency will depend on oil from Kazakhstan that offers the republic an alternative route, a wider niche in the world energy market and, therefore, better conditions for the further development of its oil industry.

In the mid-term perspective the United States wants not so much to bring more Caspian oil (from Russia and Kazakhstan, in the first place) on its domestic market as to liquidate the OPEC monopoly on price formation and to establish American control over the world oil market.


1 See: S. Maksimov, Energeticheskiy dialog: Rossia i SShA, Mirovaia energeticheskaia politika, No. 4, 2002.
2 Quoted from: A. Zverev, Dlia SshA seichas vazhno umenshit svoiu zavisimost ot blizhnevostochnoi nefti, 27 November, 2001 [www.aina.kz.].
3 See: N. Mironov, Novye tendentsii obespechenia neftianoi bezopasnosti v SShA, Mirovaia energeticheskaia politika, No. 4, 2002.
4 See: A. Zverev, op. cit.
5 See: A. Abishev, Kaspii: neft i politika, Almaty, 2002, p. 41.
6 See: Iu. Bialy, Komu ne nuzhna irakskaia neft, Rossia, 13 October, 2000.
7 See: I. Gribanov, Saddamazokhizm: s kem rabotat v Irake posle vozmozhnogo ukhoda diktatora? RusEnergy, 22 July, 2002.
8 See: D. Zelenin, Sanktsii OON Irak ne pugaiut, Mirovaia energeticheskaia politika, No. 2, 2002.
9 See: Dan Morgan, David B. Ottaway, In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue, Washington Post, 15 September, 2002.
10 See: Iu. Bardakhchiev, Plus antrekotizatsia vsei strany, Zavtra, 8 January, 1998.
11 See: K. Denchev, Neftegazoviy faktor v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh, Politia, No. 3, 1999, p. 136.
12 See: D. Zelenin, Ostanetsia li Persidskiy zaliv osnovnym neftegazovym resursom planety? Mirovaia energeticheskaia politika, No. 5, 2002.
13 See: A. Fedotov, Ot islamskoi revoliutsiik neftegazovoi evoliutsii, Neft Rossii, No. 7, 2002.
14 ITAR-TASS, 23 August, 2002.
15 Ibidem.
16 See: A. Chichkin, Tsena iranskoy karty, GazetaSNG.ru, 12 September, 2002.
17 See: Ibidem.
18 See: Ibidem.
19 See: K. Syroezhkin, Neft i geopolitika, Kontinent, No. 4, 1999, p. 23.
20 See: K. Denchev, op. cit., p. 135.
21 See: A. Abishev, op. cit., pp. 340-341.
22 See: Washington ProFile, 4 July, 2002.
23 Le Nouvel Economiste, 5 April, 2002.
24 See: Kaspiiskoe informatsionnoe agentstvo, 7 February, 2002.
25 See: S. Maksimov, op. cit.
26 See: Washington ProFile, 4 July, 2002.

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