REGIONAL ASPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN-KAZAKHSTAN FRONTIER
(USING RUSSIA’S ALTAI TERRITORY AS AN EXAMPLE)
Oleg Boronin, Ph.D. (Hist.), senior lecturer, Department of Oriental Studies, Altai State University, academic secretary of the Altai Center of Oriental Research Studies (Barnaul, Russian Federation)
Andrei Bykov, Ph.D. (Hist.), senior lecturer, Department of Oriental Studies, Altai State University, researcher at the Altai Center of Oriental Research Studies (Barnaul, Russian Federation)
In 1917-1920s, the competent structures at that time were responsible for designating the Altai section of the administrative border with Kazakhstan. It is interesting to note that no borders were shown between the Kazakh A.S.S.R., the West Siberian regions, and the Altai Territory of the R.F.S.F.R. on the Soviet maps of 1932. This was supposedly done in the best interests of the local population and its ethnic composition, but in reality economic expediency was the primary consideration.1 And no significant changes in this sphere have been made since.
After the collapse in the Soviet Union, the question of administrative division, as well as precise interstate demarcation of the new independent states assumed particular urgency. Demarcation is made difficult by the fact that the Altai section of the border has never been designated in terms of the local relief, and there are no natural boundaries in its steppe sections, such as rivers, ravines, or mountain ranges. During Soviet times, the “boundary paths” between the state farms of the Kazakhstanian and Russian regions were extremely conditional and they were frequently marked by forest-protected anti-erosion belts. But most of these belts were destroyed by fires in 1997-1999, and the local residents used everything that did not burn as firewood. What is more, the maps provided by economic entities contradict each other. And without preliminary delimitation, it is impossible to carry out demarcation of the border in one fell swoop.
Questions regarding the rates of these processes have stimulated an irresolute discussion not only at the local, but also at the federal level. Representatives of the customs, border, migration, and sanitary-hygienic services, as well as of the Interior Ministry, and several other agencies are in favor of speeding up the demarcation process. Whereas criminal groups interested in keeping the borders “transparent” are secretly opposed to this, since it will make it harder for them to engage in drug, metal, and petroleum product smuggling, or to help illegal immigrants to cross the border, and so on, without being brought to criminal account. What is more, in the Russian Federation, many parties and public leftist organizations in favor of restoring the U.S.S.R. and which see demarcation as a serious threat to implementing their ideological precepts are among the blatant adversaries of speeding up demarcation. Representatives of Russian public organizations in Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan, particularly the leaders of Cossack associations, are against demarcation for the same reasons. These forces enjoy serious support in the State Duma, and to some extent in the Russian government and presidential administration. They believe an “indefinite” situation to be strategically more advantageous to Russia than to Kazakhstan and, in so doing, an effective lever of pressure on the Nazarbaev administration.
As for the Kazakhstan official structures, they are in favor of rapid delimitation in terms of the contribution it will make to gaining “complete” state independence [from Russia]. What is more, as the republic’s foreign minister stated, Kazakhstan is next in line to join NATO. All the same, official Kazakhstan structures are generally against changing the border regime and border demarcation.2 Here it should be noted that the delimitation process in Altai section of the border entails the resolution of several problems. For example, disputes are arising with respect to the status and procedure for using the seventy-kilometer section of the Almaty railroad that passes through our territory, and there are also several other unresolved issues.
The total length of the border between the Altai Territory of the Russian Federation and the Eastern Kazakhstan and Pavlodar regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan amounts to approximately 860 km. At present, there are five customs posts, as well as six vehicle and three railroad entry points in the border zone on the Russian side. The entry points operate pursuant to an agreement between the RF and RK of 12 March, 1993, and the Altai customs house functions on the basis of a Russian government order of 18 December, 1995, according to which the airport in Barnaul was also given the status of an international freight and passenger aviation entry point. A new agreement between the RF and RK on entry points across the border was signed in 1998, but it has not been ratified by the Russian parliament.
The Constitution and several legislative acts of the Russian Federation form the legal foundation for existence of the border. Delimitation issues were indirectly reviewed at multi- and bilateral negotiations. Their results were set forth in such acts as the Agreement between the Russian Federation Government and Republic of Kazakhstan Government on the Main Principles for Creating Russian-Kazakhstani Financial and Industrial Groups (Moscow, 28 March, 1994), the Declaration on Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and Border Inviolability of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Moscow, 15 April, 1994), the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Border Cooperation Among Member States of the Treaty on Strengthening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Spheres of 29 March, 1996 (Moscow, 26 February, 1999), and other documents. Despite such a broad legal base, the question of defining the status of the Russian-Kazakhstan border has still not been resolved in practice. Therefore, attempts are being made to find a solution to several of the problems ensuing from this situation at the local level. For example, in 1997, the city administrations of Rubtsovsk (the Altai Territory) and Semipalatinsk (the Eastern Kazakhstan Region) entered a treaty on border cooperation, and on 18 December, 1998, a statement was signed in Rubtsovsk on interaction among the interior departments of the Altai Territory, the Eastern Kazakhstan Region, and the Pavlodar Region in order to further strengthen cooperation among the interior structures in fighting crime. Official delegations from the Eastern Kazakhstan Region made two trips to Altai in 1999, as well as in 2000, and one trip in 2001. The last (time-wise) bilateral assembly attended by Kazakhstan Interior Minister and Russian Deputy Interior Minister was held on 15 July, 2002 in Ust-Kamenogorsk.3
The border zone that has formed incorporates 12 regions of the Altai Territory (with a population of more than 350,000), in which there are 47 population settlements. The appearance of a new frontier has aroused understandable interest in this phenomenon from official state, public, and scientific organizations, including independent ones. On the initiative of the Russian Federal Border Service (FBS), a sociological poll was conducted in October 2000 among 1,000 respondents in 10 of the territory’s border regions. Its goal was to find out what the local population thought about the formation of a Russian-Kazakhstan border. The responses to several of the questions in the questionnaire yielded extremely interesting data. In particular, the respondents singled out and differentiated several factors caused by the border situation in the territory that pose a threat to the local residents. They included: smuggling (44%), criminal activity (27%), immigration from Kazakhstan and other CIS countries (11%), and the porno business (2%). It is interesting that to the question of which organizations participate in border affairs, 85% of the respondents answered the municipal structures, and 8% criminal groups. A significant percentage of the problems singled out by the respondents involved threats to Russian national security. Admittedly, their range has changed somewhat. In response to the question about the actual state of the border in their section, 61% of those polled said it was semi-transparent at that moment, 37% open, and only 2% considered it closed. In so doing, 59% of those polled (out of 340 respondents) thought that the Russian border guards were dealing satisfactorily with their duties, 6% said they were dealing well, and 30% said they were doing a poor job. To a similar question on the activity of the Kazakhstanian border services, the responses were even more negative. Only 0.5% of the respondents thought that the Kazakhstanian border guards were doing a good job, 32.2% said they were working satisfactorily, and 52.3% believed their efforts left much to be desired. And even though 78% of the respondents put most trust in the FBS (rather than in the Interior Ministry or customs structures), 37% evaluated the work of the Russian border guards on their section according to a five-point scale as poor, 59% as satisfactory, and only 4% as good, that is, not one of the respondents gave the Russian border guards the highest mark for their work.
In 2001-2002, within the framework of a joint project conducted by the Scientific Education Forum on International Relations (Moscow) and the Altai Center for Oriental Research Studies (Barnaul) on Security in “Contact Zones” of the Asian Part of Russia and Central Asia, field studies were carried out in the territory’s border zones (visual observations, interviews with anonymous representatives of the Federal Border Service, customs house, Russian Interior Ministry, and regional administration, as well as questionnaires of random citizens). The goal of this work was to identify the main problems of the “new frontier” at the specific regional level.
Within the study, we were primarily interested in the following questions: the border and customs regime; the viewpoint of citizens and official agencies on the problem of reinforcing the border regime and demarcation of the border with Kazakhstan; the state of ethnic relations, particularly the level of ethnic confrontation; and the dynamics of the criminal situation caused by the border situation.
The Barnaul contingent of the FBS Southeast Border District is stationed in the Altai Territory. It is made up of contract servicemen, primarily residents of the border population settlements. The presence of border posts in the border areas has a certain socioeconomic significance for the region. In light of the collapse in the agricultural sector, and the economic slump as a whole, as well as the high unemployment level, border posts help to provide the local residents with work and a salary that is higher than most for Altai’s peripheral regions. This largely explains the cautious attitude of the Altai border guards toward the shift in accent in Russian policy toward protection of the CIS’s external borders and hence the possible elimination of border protection with Kazakhstan. Correspondingly, the local border guards welcome rapid demarcation of the Russian-Kazakhstan border and transfer of its regime to the level of protecting Russia’s borders with the countries of the far abroad. But they also confess that both Russians and Kazakhs, including a significant percentage of the border region residents, have an extremely ambiguous attitude toward this issue. According to the information we obtained during the poll of residents in the Altai’s border regions, ethnic Kazakhs are against demarcation. They explain this by the possible difficulties that may arise with respect to their relatives. The poll showed that half of the Kazakh respondents visit Kazakhstan and their relatives from this republic come to visit them several times a year, and another 40% receive guests from Kazakhstan and travel there themselves approximately once a year. Most of the residents who have been living in Altai for more than ten years are also against demarcation. This is because they are loath to lose the contacts they established as far back as Soviet times. In contrast, most newcomers (whereby immigrants from Kazakhstan) support the idea of border demarcation.
As we have already noted, the border regime in its Altai section is rather “transparent.” Only stretches close to border crossings are controlled in reality, whereas along the entire borderline, automobile raids are periodically carried out, since there is no fortification, technical, or signalization equipment installed here. Military-technical support of the Barnaul contingent leaves much to be desired, there are not even enough personal small arms, and the shortage of transportation is keenly felt.
It should be noted that in the Altai section, the territory of the Russian and Kazakhstanian border posts does not coincide. The latter do not set up posts at all; they only carry out automobile raids. According to unofficial statements by the Russian border guards, there is no interaction to speak of with their Kazakh colleagues in terms of joint border protection and maintenance of the border regime.4 However, according to Russian border guards, extremely effective cooperation has been established with representatives of the Russian Interior Ministry and Customs Service. At the same time, Interior Ministry representatives are not confident about the effectiveness of their interaction with the FBS, explaining this by the low professional level and poor military-technical maintenance of the border guards.
The situation is naturally having an impact on the criminal situation in Altai’s border regions. According to official Interior Ministry representatives, in the past few years, the number of crimes involving the storage, shipment, and spread of drugs has grown (up to 80% of the “poison” intercepted in its territory comes to Russia over the border with Kazakhstan). What is more, the instances of cattle hustling are on the constant rise. Five such crimes are committed on average every month in each border region. And according to Interior Ministry representatives, their level of exposure is extremely low. As I. Tsvetkov, head of the Barnaul border contingent, noted, in 2001, merchandise amounting to 66 million rubles was detained, which amounted to 54% of the cost of all the shipments detained in the Southeast Border District.5
It should be noted that representatives of the Kazakhstan interior structures also complain about the Russians, who, by taking advantage of the transparent border, also hustle cattle and steal vehicles (particularly agricultural machinery) from Kazakhstan and hide them in the Altai Territory. Moreover, in Kazakhstan this problem has been discussed at the supreme level, and on 1 September, 2001, a decree by the country’s president came into effect, according to which export of all imported vehicles and agricultural machinery from the republic is prohibited. In July, 2002, its government adopted the resolution On Permanent Prohibition on the Export of Certain Types of Lumber…6 This problem is extremely urgent since local criminal groups set fire to some of the border forests on purpose in order to receive official permission to process the so-called burned trees, and then send the lumber to China. On the whole, according to the statements of official Russian Interior Ministry representatives, the damage inflicted as a result of cattle hustling and other illegal actions committed by the Kazakhstanians is much higher than similar damage inflicted by the Russians.
The change in composition of the local residents, due to members of the large German diaspora leaving for Germany and migration of the Russian-speaking population from Kazakhstan, is also having a significant impact on the criminal situation in the border regions. The number of crimes in the former “German” villages drastically increased after immigrants from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan moved into them. But, in general, the arrival of Kazakhstanians in the border regions has not worsened the criminal situation. What is more, residents “deal” with criminals themselves, based on the norms of common law. Representatives of the law enforcement structures quite justifiably note that the border situation is helping to raise the population’s mobility, many immigrants see their stay in the border regions as temporary before moving on to other population settlements in the Russian Federation, primarily Barnaul (the territory’s administrative center) and its environs.
We have already mentioned that drugs also pose a certain danger. In addition to transit, in which, according to representatives of the local law enforcement agencies, the territory’s residents are not involved, there is the problem of drug addiction and trading in this poison in the border regions. There is a dependency between the shipment of drug consignments over the border and the price for them on the local underground market.
The criminal situation in the border regions could also be improved by such measures as strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Russia and Kazakhstan. If this is not done (if cooperation remains low), the border regime will have to be toughened up. For example, department head of the interior structures of the Kulunda District suggests digging a ditch along the entire section of the border with Kazakhstan, and this same thought has also been expressed by several border officers. This experiment was conducted in the Kliuchi District and in the section controlled by the Kulunda outpost, close to the village of Popasnoe. But it did not yield the desired results. According to most of the representatives of the law enforcement structures, such measures are ineffectual, since criminals frequently have better technical equipment than the interior structure employees and use temporary means to overcome obstacles, and ditches only interfere with law enforcement activity, particularly the detention of criminals. At present, they are frequently detained by the Russian police on Kazakhstan territory, which creates difficulties with respect to further investigation and judicial measures, and often leads to cases being closed. This is due to procedural violations, again caused by poor cooperation between the Russian and Kazakhstan interior structures in the border regions.
Another method for preventing certain crimes is self-organization of the local population (the creation of voluntary people’s patrols) aimed at protecting property. But representatives of the border troops do not believe that these measures can prevent law violations in this sphere. According to interior structure representatives, however, such patrols will definitely improve the criminal situation.
A possible way to improve the situation is to optimize the activity of the structures of power and encourage their closer coordination at the local level. Certain steps are already being taken in this direction. For example, assemblies of representatives of the interior structures, border troops and customs administration are being held regularly at the public prosecutor offices of the regions. Nevertheless, despite the attempts to coordinate efforts and even carry out joint operations, for example Operation Border, we cannot say that cooperation in this sphere is particularly effective. Even in conversations with the leadership of the above-mentioned structures of powers in the border regions, the authors of this article noted a certain amount of rivalry on their part with respect to the actions of their colleagues. The police force and customs officers are more loyal toward each other, whereby they are dissatisfied with the level of their cooperation with the border guards. In particular, the customs officers noted that the border guards have stopped passing on detained goods to them, but simply send smuggled items back to Kazakhstan. Admittedly, there are objective reasons for this. For example, pursuant to the law, 25% of the sum of confiscated merchandise should go to the border guards, but this law is not observed, and it is not considered any big violation not to do work that does not bring the department profit.
The main export articles, both legal and illegal, are coal, lumber, and metal, and the top import items are fruit and vegetables. What is more, drug (most of it is transit, whereby, according to employees of the Altai customs house, the flow has burgeoned recently) and liquor smuggling from Kazakhstan has been organized. The customs administration assured us that the illegal shipment of liquor is already history, particularly since a Kazakhstan government resolution came into effect on 1 July, 2001, which toughened up the procedure for exporting alcoholic products from the republic. At the same time, local residents told us that the smuggling of these commodities goes on (they are much cheaper in Kazakhstan). In the Slavgorod and Tabuny regions of the Altai Territory smuggling of biological resources has been organized via Kazakhstan to China. These resources mainly constitute endemic crustaceans from the local saline lakes, which are used as raw material in the perfume industry and make excellent bird feed. In so doing, local businessmen are lowering the prices on this product not only to reduce taxes, but also to decrease customs duties, and, in the case of smuggling, to avoid criminal punishment, which ensues if the cost of the illegally exported commodity is higher than 150,000 rubles. If its cost is lower than this amount, only administrative measures are enforced, which does not intimidate smugglers, bearing in mind the amount of profit they make from this business.
But the special situation in Altai’s border regions is giving their residents several advantages. These include lower prices on fruits and vegetables compared with other regions of the territory, jobs in structures relating to protection and servicing of the border, the opportunity to engage in small and medium business, based on the difference in prices on the Russian and Kazakhstani markets, and so on.
A significant factor influencing the situation is the multiethnic composition of the population in the territory’s border regions. In addition to Russians, who predominate in numbers, a significant percentage of the residents are Germans, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Tartars, Bashkirians, and Belorussians. At present, they are not dispersed equally. There are villages where predominantly Germans, Ukrainians, or Kazakhs live. What is more, there are settlements where the representatives of these ethnic groups live dispersedly. A special feature of the demographic situation in the past decade is the increase in the population’s mobility related to the immigration not only of Russians, but also of Kazakhs from Kazakhstan, as well as the emigration of Germans to Germany. Due to the border situation in the territory, ethnic relations (particularly Russian-Kazakh) play a special role.
We conducted a poll of 971 residents in several of Altai’s border regions. In addition to everything else, the data gathered make it possible to define features and qualitative characteristics of mutual understanding in the Russian and Kazakh population. This in turn allows us to evaluate the ethnic conflict potential here and define stereotypes of ethnic perceptions. All the population settlements in which polls were conducted can be classified as follows: those where the overwhelming majority of residents are Kazakhs; multiethnic settlements, in which Russians, Russian-speaking residents (Ukrainians, Germans) and Kazakhs reside dispersedly; and population settlements where Russians are in the absolute majority.
According to the polls conducted, the Kazakhs in the mono-ethnic settlements generally have a neutral image of Russians. In terms of the pairs of antonyms presented, the average indices on a seven-point scale for all parameters fluctuated in the region of 4.5 points. The extremes showed that Kazakhs see Russians as rich and lucrative, that is, their positive image is formed mainly by the economic factor. Individual opinions confirm this conclusion, whereby the number of Kazakhs who have a negative attitude toward Russians (6.7% of the respondents) was three-fold less than those who have formed a positive image (20% of the respondents).
The picture is slightly different with respect to Russians’ evaluation of Kazakhs. For example, the residents of settlements in which Russian predominate evaluate the personal qualities of Kazakhs much lower than Kazakhs assess those of Russians. The average index here amounts to 3.71 points. Against the background of a generally neutral attitude, one in ten parameters exceeded the norm: Russians consider Kazakhs to be indelicate (a two-point deviation from the mean). What is more, the insincerity and slovenliness of Kazakhs were close to the critical mark. In this way, whereas Kazakhs based their evaluation of Russians on rational (economic) factors, emotions took the upper hand among Russians. Individual indices demonstrate the following: 9.1% of the respondents made higher than average evaluation of Kazakhs, whereas the attitude of almost twice as many, 15.9%, is lower than the norm.
In the multiethnic settlements, all the parameters of ethnic evaluation not only do not go beyond the mean (+ 1), but are also close to the absolute average index (4.0). For example, the average statistical evaluation by Russians of Kazakhs amounted to 3.86, and by Kazakhs of Russians to 3.94. The relative index of the individual extreme characteristics in this type of settlement was also the lowest: 3.75% of the respondents had a positive and the same amount had a negative attitude.
In this way, in mono-ethnic villages, the image of a member of another ethnic group deviates to a greater extent from the mean than in villages with a diversified population. In villages where one ethnic group predominates, the percentage of extreme deviations in individual evaluations is significantly higher, in other words, the percentage of “extremists” is higher. In the latter group, 35-50-year-old women with secondary education dominate among those with an extremely positive or an extremely negative attitude in all the villages.
The level of ethnic tolerance can be judged from the following indices. Seventy point six percent of Russians do not want Kazakhs to live in settlements where Russians are in the absolute majority, and only 26.8% are inclined toward joint residence. Forty-seven point four percent of the respondents are willing to invite Kazakhs into their homes, but 68.4% of them are against Russian-Kazakh marriages. In mono-ethnic settlements, Kazakhs are more tolerant: 86.5% of the respondents are willing for Russians to settle in their villages, 91.7% are in favor of inviting them into their homes, and 50% consent to their child marrying a Russian.
But despite their greater ethnic tolerance, Kazakhs are less tolerant with respect to religion. On the other hand, 83.2% of Russians in settlements where they are in the absolute majority generally have a positive attitude toward Muslims. In contrast, only 65.4% of Kazakhs in villages where they are in the majority consider Christianity to be worthy of respect. One of the reasons for this is apparently the significant role religion plays in the self-identification of Kazakhs in their enclave existence in a different ethnic and confessional milieu. Therefore, it seems expedient to follow the dynamics of the religious situation in the border regions.
In multiethnic villages, where Russians and Kazakhs live together, the opinion on the desirability of this differs. This situation suits all of the Kazakhs, but only a little over half of the Russian respondents are of the same opinion. Eighty percent of Kazakhs have a positive attitude toward inviting Russians into their homes, but only 20% are in favor of mixed marriages. In these same villages, 73.1% of Russians are willing to invite Kazakhs into their homes, and 64.0% of the non-Kazakh respondents are not against their children marrying a Kazakh, although one third of the Russians participating in the poll would like to see the Kazakhs expelled from their villages.
One of the aspects of security in the border regions is the attitude of the local population toward possible mutual territorial claims by the states concerned and separatism in them, on the one hand, and interstate integration, on the other. For example, 32% of the respondents in the villages of the Kulunda District, where Russians constitute the absolute majority, believe that the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan should be joined to Russia. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents are against this. Four percent of those polled were in favor of Russia giving Kazakhstan parts of the Ural and Siberian regions, while 78% were against. Thirty-four percent of the respondents are willing to support the transformation of the CIS into a single state, while exactly the same number of residents in the district center believes this to be inexpedient and undesirable. Seventeen percent of those polled were in favor of the region being granted its independence, whereas 55% were against. In so doing, the respondents fully understand the difference between separatism and federalism: 17% supported restricting the independent rights of the Russian Federation constituencies, while 43% were against.
These indices differ from the opinions of the Kazakhs in the population settlements where they constitute the ethnic majority. In particular, only 20.5% of them think it expedient to join the territory of present-day Kazakhstan to Russia (59% were against) or to join Russian territory to Kazakhstan — 5.2% (7.1% against). At the same time, the expectations for interstate integration are strong. For example, 62.2% of the respondents were in favor of transforming the CIS into a single state, while only 13.5% were against. The threat of separatism in Russia is just as undesirable for the Kazakhs: 82.1% of the respondents were against possible independence of the region, and only 7.6% were willing to support this idea. At the same time, the Kazakhs do not see any serious need for changing the current model of Russian federalism: 36.8% were in favor of increasing the Center’s authorities and restricting the independence of the regions, 26.4% were against, and 36.8% of the respondents are still undecided on this question.
The population of the multiethnic villages supports joining the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan to Russia: 69.6% of the Russian respondents were of this opinion, whereas a total of 100% of the Kazakhs were in favor of this idea. Nevertheless, the residents of these villages were against the possible transfer to Kazakhstan of several areas of the Russian Federation (84.6% of Russians, and 80/0% of Kazakhs). It turned out that 73.1% of the Russian respondents and 100% of the Kazakhs supported integration of the post-Soviet space and transformation of the CIS into a single state, whereas 84.6% of the Russian respondents and again 100% of the Kazakhs were against the region gaining its independence.
In general, however, the potential for ethnic tension in all the population settlements polled in terms of all the integral scales and essentially all the quantitative and qualitative parameters is low and within the permissible norms (both according to our observations and in keeping with the calculations). In so doing, the likelihood of any aggravation in ethnic relations in these regions today is minimal.
1 See: Altaiskaia guberniia—Kazakhstan. 1917-1925. Istoriia administrativno-territorial’nogo razgranicheniia (sbornik dokumentov i materialov). Compiled by N.I. Razgon and V.A. Moiseev, OAO Altai Printing Combine, Barnaul, 2001; N.I. Razgon, “Neizvestniy dokument po istorii razgranicheniia Altaiskoi gubernii s Kazakhstanom,” Vostokovednye issledovaniia na Altae, Issue III, ed. by V.A. Moiseev, Azbuka Publishers, Barnaul, 2002, pp. 205-214; idem, “Bukhtarminskiy vopros v territorial’nom razmezhevanii Altaiskoi gubernii i Semipalatinskoi oblasti (1917-1921),” in: Aktual’nye voprosy istorii Sibiri, Altai University Press, Barnaul, 2002, pp. 457-464.
2 See: M. Gordeeva, “NATO—byt’ ili ne byt’,” Novoe pokolenie (Almaty), 26 July, 2002, p. 3.
3 See: “Krepnet prigranichnoe sotrudnichestvo,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 16 July, 2002, p. 1.
4 At the same time, in the western sector of the Russian-Kazakhstan border, contacts are more fruitful and joint maneuvers are even carried out (see: “Prekratit’ narkotraffik,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 23 July, 2002, p. 6).
5 ATN television news, 7 February, 2002.
6 See: L. Vinokurova, “Poka derevia stanut bol’shimi,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 30 July, 2002, p. 2.