THE TURKISH FACTOR IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
Zakir Chotoev, M.A. (International Relations), doctoral candidate at the Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences International Relations Department (Ankara, Turkey)
Ever since the late 1980s, Turkey has been closely watching the changes in the Soviet Union and the events that followed in the aftermath of its breakup. It has been especially interested in Turkic peoples, related to its in language and culture, in particular the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. Back in 12 through 17 September, 1991, with Moscow’s permission, a high-level official delegation from Turkey toured the republics of Central Asia with a view to studying their intentions over a possible rapprochement and subsequent advancement of relations.1 As early as 16 December, 1991, Turkey (the country first in the world) officially recognized the sovereignty of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
With the end of the Cold War and a rapprochement between the West and the Soviet Union, Turkey, which had lost its former geopolitical significance, felt that it was being slighted by the West, especially following the refusal to admit it to the European Union (February 1990). That prompted Ankara toward a search for new foreign policy guidelines. The evolution of relations with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus proved to Turkey its importance and value both in the region and on the international arena as a whole, showing that Ankara could play an alternative role. What is also noteworthy in this context is the part played by the West, especially the United States, in encouraging Turkey to advance relations with the newly independent republics, which was essential for Washington in countering the growing influence of Iran, Afghanistan, and China in the region as well as in weakening, to the degree possible, the Central Asian states’ attachment to Russia. On the other hand, the newly independent post-Soviet states, euphoric over their newly acquired independence and intent to open themselves up to the outside world and strengthen their sovereign status, reached out to Turkey—a culturally, linguistically and spiritually related nation—as a proponent of a pro-Western course and a secular path of development.
It should also be noted here that in the course of his visits to the Central Asian republics (December 1991-February 1992), U.S. Secretary of State James Baker tried to persuade “their leaders to adopt the Turkish model of secularism, liberal democracy, and market economy.”2 Thus, as of 1991, a burgeoning relationship between Turkey and the Turkic states in the post-Soviet area transformed into cooperation in the economic, trade, cultural, and educational sphere; also, there were efforts to establish contacts in the military and security sphere as well as to bring the countries’ general policy courses closer together. In 1992, diplomatic relations were established between Turkey and the newly independent republics with embassies and consular missions opening and summit meetings being held almost every year.
To coordinate assistance to the countries in the region and promote cooperation with them, in January 1992, the Turkish Foreign Ministry created the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA).3 Since 1993, annual forums (kurultays) of the Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Foundation (TUDEV) have been a constant fixture, organized with assistance from right-leaning nationalist movements, headed by Alparslan Turkeş, leader of the Turkish National Movement Party (MHP). The country’s government officials have regularly been taking part in the activities of this informal organization, promoting Pan-Turkism and a unification of all Turkic peoples, which aroused serious discontent within the Russian leadership.4 During this period, Turkey endeavored to emerge as the leader of Turkic states. Thus, its government actively expedited the admission of the Central Asian republics to the U.N., the OSCE, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and other international structures. Furthermore, within two years, the government provided, through Eximbank, nearly $1.2 billion worth of credits to the region’s Turkic republics.5
Before long, however, it transpired that, while seeking to establish contacts with the world’s advanced states and end their self-imposed isolation, the newly independent countries did not want to limit their relations to just one such state, especially if it aspired to a role as their new patron. Already at the first summit of the Turkic heads of state, which was held in 1992 in Ankara, leaders of the Central Asian republics politely turned down multilateral agreements on political and economic cooperation that were proposed by Turkey. They only signed bilateral documents as well as the Ankara declaration envisioning, in general outline, cooperation in the cultural, educational, language, security, economic, and legal sphere. Furthermore, in the course of the meeting, President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan stressed his unwillingness to develop relations on an ethnic or religious basis, speaking out in favor of civilized relations based on mutual respect and independence of states.6
At the same time, Turkey showed its economic weakness by failing to provide these countries the financial and economic assistance it had pledged, which resulted in mutual disappointment. Ankara had to review the sporadic relations with these republics, putting them on a more pragmatic basis, taking into account the interests of the newly independent states in Central Asia both within and outside their borders as well as its own capabilities and the balance of forces in relations with other CIS countries, especially Russia. To illustrate the evolution of Turkey’s relations with the republics in the region (and its influence on them at present), let us consider some of the more dynamic aspects of this cooperation: culture, trade and economic contacts, security, and human rights.
Culture and Education
Development of cultural-historical and linguistic contacts with the culturally related peoples of Central Asia is a high priority in Turkey’s foreign policy. In the course of a series of visits to the republics in the region (March 1992), Turkish officials signed a number of agreements in the sphere of culture, education and science, providing, in particular, for free training of students from several Central Asian countries at Turkey’s colleges and universities as well as student exchange programs, the opening of several educational establishments in these republics, advancement of cooperation in science and technology, specialist retraining and advanced training programs, and so forth. As of April 1992, Turkish TRT Avrasya television began to be beamed to these republics via a satellite communication channel. Although Turkey is a secular country, its State Administration for Religious Affairs became involved in disseminating religious literature in Central Asia. One mosque and one cultural center were built in each republic as models of Turkic-Islamic culture with theology departments opening in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan universities. The TIKA was instrumental in drawing up programs for the development of small and medium-sized businesses and the finance and banking sector, putting in place democratic institutions, and so forth.7
With a view to producing literature, history, and language textbooks, in July 1993, the Turkish and Central Asian culture ministries worked out a project for the Turkish Cultures and Arts Joint Administration (TÜRKSOY). It oriented the states in the region toward transition to a Latin alphabet. The project, however, did not achieve the expected results. Thus, within days of proclaiming their independence, the Turkic republics that had initially expressed the wish to adopt the Latin alphabet (except Azerbaijan), put the process on hold. Also, the plan to produce common history textbooks failed over the aspiration by each side to emphasize its own past.8
The Turkish government gave high priority to attracting students to the country’s educational establishments and opening its own educational institutions in the Central Asian states. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, more than 10,000 students from these republics have received training in Turkey since 1992; in 2000, there were approximately 7,000 students studying at Turkey’s colleges and universities. According to the Science and Education Ministry, as of 1998, 16,692 students (not only from Central Asia) had visited Turkey with 2,133 completing a course of studies and 5,889 returning home without taking a degree. In the 1992-1997 period, $55 million was spent on these training programs.9 Pursuant to interstate agreements, the Turkish government opened Hodja Ahmet Yassawi International Kazakh-Turkish University (IKTU) in the city of Turkestan, Manas Kyrgyz-Turkish University in Bishkek, and Turkish-Turkmen International University in Ashghabad. Furthermore, a large number of Turkish non-state colleges and universities opened in the region.10 In offering training to students from the Central Asian states and opening higher educational establishments in their territory, Ankara pursued far-reaching objectives—primarily to educate the indigenous intelligentsia, spiritually close to the Turkish people, in a bid to create an alternative to the Russian educational system, Russian culture and mentality. These efforts basically justified themselves among the young people who were able to find a niche in Turkey or back at home, in various spheres of activity, building on the knowledge and skills they had acquired abroad. But on the other hand, a rather large group of students failed to complete their training at Turkish universities which, in addition to the difficulties involved in receiving instruction in Turkish, was due to a sharp deterioration in the students’ living standards. Thus, compared to 1993, scholarships, transport and meal subsidies, and so forth reduced two or three times. All of this made for a negative perception of Turkey in Central Asia not only in the educational sphere but also with regard to Turkish society as a whole.
A survey of Turkish schools in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, conducted by the Central Asian Technical University, studied the impact of Turkish educational establishments in the region on its development.11 The survey targeted schoolchildren, their parents and teachers at nine private and public schools, mainly five-days-a-week boarding schools, where children are in a certain way separated from their parents (the total sample—approximately 100 respondents). The survey showed that schoolchildren, their parents and teachers (local residents) were on the whole happy with these schools despite the fact that children here are exposed to religious instruction.12 Schoolchildren study four languages (English, Turkish, Russian, and their native tongue), computer technology and other technical subjects and sciences. The schools are technically well equipped and have qualified, committed teachers who are highly motivated thanks to the good working conditions, discipline, and attractive compensation packages. Furthermore, the staffs of these educational establishments closely interact with the parents, taking their wishes and proposals into account: In other words, there is a mutual enrichment of cultures.
Given that approximately one-half of these schools are public, where the standards may not necessarily be quite so high, as well as the fact that curricula have to be adapted to the local conditions, not all Turkish schools can measure up to the same standards of excellence.
True, this also applies to Turkey itself, where in addition to public schools, there are excellent private English schools. The latter, however, have one serious shortfall. They were established mainly with funds from such religious charities as the Turkish Religious Charity Society and the Fethullah Gülen Community and have a slight conservative-religious bias. As of 2000, there were 120 Turkish schools in the Central Asian countries, more than half of them private, with a total student body of 20,000.13
As for tuition standards in Turkish higher educational establishments that were opened in the Central Asian countries, the quality of education in state universities is maintained directly through the Turkish Higher Education Council, on a par with the level of standards adopted in Turkey, which is higher than at private universities. Thus, by 2002, the Manas Kyrgyz-Turkish University, founded in 1997, was among the five most prestigious institutions in the country. In other words, all of these training establishments compete with the local institutions, stimulating their performance and on the whole promoting higher educational standards in the region.
Trade and Economic Relations
As soon as Turkey established diplomatic relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia (1992), it granted them credits through Eximbank. As of now these credits total nearly $1.5 million, approximately $900 million of which had been used by 2000. A substantial share of funds was provided for export of goods from Turkey: Kazakhstan received $55.7 million; Uzbekistan, $125 million; Turkmenistan, $75 million, and Kyrgyzstan, $37.5 million.14 Thus, by advancing trade relations with its regional partners, the Turkish government expanded, much to its own advantage, the volume of export, which, in turn, helped saturate these countries’ markets. Whereas in 1992 its trade with the Central Asian republics was worth $160.9 million, in 1998 it grew to $969.5 million. As trade relations expanded, an appropriate legal framework was put in place. Thus agreements on trade and economic cooperation, mutual encouragement of investment and investment guarantees, and avoidance of double taxation were signed.15
A substantial part of credits provided through Eximbank was funneled to construction and restoration projects. Furthermore, during a decade of operation in Central Asia, Turkish contractors carried out several large- and a great number of small-scale projects. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, as of 2002, more than $7 billion had been invested in these projects.16 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan account for the lion’s share of construction projects with the participation of such firms as Alarko, Axel, Enka, Meka, Tekfen, BMT, and others. Good-quality residential and office buildings, industrial enterprises, banks, hotels, retail and training centers, health-care establishments, roads, berths and mooring facilities, airports, and other infrastructure elements have been built within short spans or are in the process of being built.17
Furthermore, Turkey invested more than $3 billion in the region through other channels. As of now there are approximately 1,200 Turkish companies operating in the region, including 150 in Kazakhstan, 200 in Kyrgyzstan, 100 in Uzbekistan, and 300 in Turkmenistan.18 In the early 1990s, Turkish companies (the first among other foreign firms) came to Central Asia at their own risk without firm guarantees or large capital. Nonetheless, the majority of them contributed to the development of local small and medium-sized businesses. At the same time, the Turkish side, often in cooperation with such European structures as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, initiated a large number of projects in the economic and business sector—not only in the purely practical sphere but also in regional specialist training and retraining programs. Thus Ankara promoted the development of market relations and a legal groundwork in Central Asia, so providing a more favorable environment for the operation of private (including its own) companies. Subsequently, the operation of Turkish firms in the region encouraged its leaders to attract foreign capital, thus prodding Western investors to invest in their economy.19 Turkey’s contribution to the development of the region’s banking system was another factor in promoting market relations in these countries and attracting capital to the region. The Turkish side provided substantial funding, leading to the emergence of a network of commercial banks, including Turkish subsidiaries. Thus, the Turkish-Kazakh International Bank (Emlak) with a Turkish share of capital of 35 percent, Ziraat bank (94 percent), and Demir bank (99.97 percent) were opened in Kazakhstan; in Kyrgyzstan, Demir bank (60 percent); in Uzbekistan, Ziraat bank (50 percent), and in Turkmenistan, the Turkish-Turkmen Commercial Bank (Ziraat, 50 percent) and People’s Bank (Khalk, 25 percent).20
Turkey takes a special interest in the region’s energy resources and their transportation to the world market, working to make sure that oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and natural gas from Turkmenistan be transported through its own territory. Ankara insisted on the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, actively promoted by Washington, which objected to the export of hydrocarbons via Russia and Iran. And although Ankara and Washington had some disagreements (true, in other spheres), at the Istanbul OSCE Summit (November 1999), with U.S. President Bill Clinton looking on, the Turkish government signed, with Azerbaijani, Georgian, Uzbek, and Kazakh leaders, an agreement on building the pipeline.21
In substantiating its economic policy in the region, Turkey cites the following considerations. First, by transporting energy via its territory, these countries diversify their transport capacity, which lessens their dependence on just one state, also promoting the liberalization and democratization of their economies. Second, Turkey, which has an acute need for oil products and natural gas, will become a major consumer of hydrocarbons transported via its territory. Third, it puts a special emphasis on the bad weather conditions in the Black Sea and the low throughput capacity of and pollution problems in the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.22
To Ankara, the significance of Kazakh oil consists in that without it the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be economically unviable. Furthermore, the Turkish side, which holds a stake in Kazakh oil companies, is interested in oil export to Turkey. As far as Turkmen natural gas is concerned, although the governments of both countries signed agreements on its transportation via Turkey (which will consume a half of gas shipment), the project, lacking the necessary support and capital investment, hung in mid-air. As a result, Turkey gave priority to cooperation with Russia, in 1997 signing with it an agreement on the Blue Stream pipeline project, which will soon go into operation. This worried Ashghabad which had to sign with Moscow an agreement on selling it natural gas (at a lower price) and on its transportation abroad.23 So, despite Turkey’s kinship contacts with the Central Asian republics and its aspiration to promote market relations in the region, this example shows that strategic interests sometimes compel Ankara to give preference to an economically and strategically more important partner—in this case, Russia.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and Russia’s temporary pullout from the Central Asian region created a vacuum that attracted other forces. Turkey immediately expressed interest to promote cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the security and military sphere. In the course of an exchange of military delegations in the 1992-1993 period, a number of agreements were signed: on friendship and cooperation—with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan; on personnel training and technical and scientific cooperation in the military sphere—with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan; on cooperation in military personnel training—with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan; on cooperation in the defense industry—with Kazakhstan.24 On the one hand, Turkey apparently wanted to tap the remaining Soviet military-industrial capability in these countries, but most important, to convert the former Soviet republics in the region into its allies. Thus, speaking at National Defense University in Washington, in February 1998, General Cevik Bir, Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff, stressed that 2,300 representatives from the Central Asian and Caucasian republics had graduated from Turkish military academies and 1,700 were continuing their studies at the moment.25
It needs to be said that Ankara’s proposal on military cooperation got a lukewarm response in the region, even in Uzbekistan, which had already been promoting direct relations with the United States. Nonetheless, Turkey continued to advance contacts in the regional security sphere both as a NATO member state and as a friendly state—within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program, developed at the 1994 Brussels Conference, also taking part, together with Russian and U.S. military units, in exercises of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion in the 1998-2000 period, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.26
Even so, despite Turkey’s all-out effort, its cooperation with the Central Asian states in the military and security sphere did not go much beyond personnel training programs and exercises by the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion, which is due to a number of reasons. First, the fact that in the second half of the 1990s, Ankara followed a low-key, balanced policy toward Russia, which had already returned to the region, as well as, to a certain extent, toward China. Second, Turkey’s technical and economic weakness in the military sphere. And finally, its remoteness from the region as a whole and its greater concern about the security of the resource-rich Caspian region, in particular Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and of course the Transcaucasus. In this connection, in the interest of ensuring the security of the oil pipelines, Ankara is deploying considerable effort also to transform GUUAM as a NATO-related structure.27
On the other hand, the Central Asian countries, in seeking to ensure their own security as well as regional security as a whole (not only in the face of internal but also external threats), are seeking security cooperation with Russia, thus striving to expand its military patronage and assistance. Thus, while advancing contacts within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Central Asian countries and Russia showed no interest to bring Turkey into the setup, as could be seen in, among other things, the conflict resolution process in Tajikistan and Afghanistan: Ankara was not invited to participate in the process while its proposals on holding a peace conference on Afghanistan in Turkey (1996) were ignored.28 Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the events in Batken, Kyrgyzstan, in 1999, and a series of terrorist acts in Uzbekistan, the question of military cooperation with Ankara, especially in combating terrorism in Central Asia, took center stage again. Furthermore, the events of 11 September, 2001, as a result of which the United States established its military presence in the Central Asian countries while Turkey, after Great Britain, took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, showed that Ankara has a good chance of being included in regional security activities (under U.S. auspices).
It is also noteworthy that owing to its kinship and cultural contacts with the Turkic republics in the region, Turkey unwittingly became a source of destabilization of their regimes. Say, the motorcar accident near the Turkish town of Susurluk on 3 November, 1996 prompted an investigation into a case involving the mafia, nationalist groups, the government, and security services. One of its threads was traced to Abdullah Catli, an ultranationalist and high-profile mafia figure who was killed in the motorcar accident. According to some sources, he had been operating under security service cover and had been involved in plotting a coup in Azerbaijan (March 1995), directed against the country’s president, Heydar Aliev.29 Another example is the reaction by President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to the presence in Turkey of M. Salikh, leader of the Uzbek opposition party Erk (1993), and to the support that he and other pro-Islamic movements received in the republic, which led to a worsening of relations between the two countries.30 Tensions came to a head at a time when the country was run by the leader of the Turkish Islamic Party Refah, who connived at the dissemination in the Central Asian republics of such religious sects as, e.g., Nurdzhular.31 Also consider the recent events in Turkmenistan, where, on 25 November, 2002, an attempt was made on the life of the country’s president, Saparmurad Niyazov, with Turkish citizens being among the perpetrators.32 And although these events did not result in a worsening of relations between Ashghabad and Ankara while the six Turkish citizens who were involved in the assassination attempt will be returned to Turkey,33 they are bound to leave an unpleasant after-taste. Recurrence of such events could damage Turkey’s credibility in Central Asia.
Several stages can be singled out, characterizing different trends and priorities in Turkey’s relations with the Central Asian republics in the past decade. Thus, the period of spontaneous, dynamic development of their economic and cultural contacts gave way to a more pragmatic approach toward the process, and then, under the Erbakan government, was followed by some loss of interest in the region on the part of Ankara. As for the present stage, the Turkish government is returning to regular, mutually beneficial cooperation with its Central Asian partners.
This, in particular, calls into question the view by Prof. N. Kireev, who believes that even now Turkey, in its relations with the Turkic states in the region, is mainly interested to build a Pan-Turkic/Islamic community, based on ethnic and religious unity.34 Sure, in the early 1990s, in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, amid the general euphoria and under the influence of far-right nationalist forces, also with support from the newly independent states themselves, aspiring to strengthen their sovereignty and become independent of Russia, Turkey put forward a number of ideas—for the most part impracticable. Such ideas and ill-considered, imprudent slogans as “unification of all Turks under Turkish leadership,” “establishment of a Turkic world order—from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” and so forth were floated in the period of the evolution of relations with the states in the region.
By playing up its historical/cultural proximity to the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union, Ankara sought to advance trade and economic, cultural and educational, and sociopolitical relations with them while its presence in the newly independent states gave it cause to hope also for an economic payoff. Time showed, however, that puffed-up ideological slogans and unfulfilled promises were in effect but a cover-up for Turkey’s economic weakness. It turned out that it was simply not in a position to deliver on its pledge of aid to the countries in the region. Furthermore, it so happened that the Central Asian states, which had just freed themselves from the patronage of Big Brother, refused to accept tutelage from the newly minted agabey, and so Ankara had to review its policy toward the states in the region, shifting priority to trade and economic and cultural and educational contacts.
It needs to be stressed that even now, despite the advent of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party, Turkey’s first priority is its relations with the West, which has to do with its aspiration to join the EU. Other priorities include a balanced relationship with Russia and the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. To reiterate—balanced trade and economic and cultural cooperation, not building a Turkic community and ensuring domination over it. Although Turkish media and government officials often come up with hollow, politicized comments and ideologically biased slogans with regard to the Turkic countries, no one is impressed anymore. A similar trend can be observed in “specialist” literature. Analysis of Ankara’s present-day relation toward the countries in the region, however, shows otherwise. Thus, as of the second half of the 1990s, some Turkish researchers have sought to make a distinction between two different terms: türki (Turkic), as opposed to the more common türk (Turkish), which is often used interchangeably.35
Despite the aforementioned, there is good reason to say that over the past decade Turkish-Central Asian relations have on the whole been built on mutually beneficial cooperation, evolving steadily, with some ups and downs. The sides concerned primarily advance their own interests while Turkey’s participation in promoting market infrastructure in the region is not of a missionary character, but rests on pragmatism. Say, by granting credits to the Central Asian countries it strengthens not only trade relations with them but also develops markets for its own goods. By helping to put in place a legal framework for business activity and advance the banking system Turkey creates a favorable environment for the operation of its own companies. By training students at Turkish universities and opening educational establishments in the region, it exposes people to its own culture, facilitating a rapprochement between nations and raising a new generation, or rather, a certain stratum, of people who have an adequate perception and understanding of Turkey. (Sure, the interaction process is not devoid of mistakes and aberrations, resulting in a measure of mistrust toward Turkey.)
Ankara’s pragmatism also manifests itself in strategic and geopolitical contexts. Say, in the energy sphere, it preferred cooperation with Russia—i.e., a more strategically and economically important partner (although also a competitor), not with an ethnically related Turkmenistan. This approach is well evident in the actions by Turkey’s new governing elite. When Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the party that won the latest parliamentary election, was making his first visit to Central Asia, he first went to the energy-rich republics, then, skipping Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, going on to China.36
In closing, it should be said that the Turkish model of a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population has caused a certain measure of disappointment in the Central Asian republics as it did not fully match the peculiarities of their nations’ mentality and cultural and general life experience. There was more disappointment over Ankara’s failure to deliver on the promises that it made during the dynamic development of relations with the countries in the region. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to underestimate the positive aspects of cooperation in the economic, trade, cultural and educational sphere or to downplay the impact of these contacts on the development of the Central Asian republics as a whole. Turkey’s relations with these states have become more balanced, mutually beneficial, and based on pragmatism.
1 See: M. Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla İlişkiler,” in: Türk Dış Politikası (II. Cilt: 1980-2001), ed. by Baskın Oran, İleteşim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001. S. 376.
2 E. Urazova, “Trends in Turkey’s Economic Cooperation with Post-Soviet Turkic States,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (11), 2001, p. 115.
3 See: “I. Relations with the Central Asian Republics,” in: Turkey’s Relations with the Central Asian Republics [http://www.mfa.gov.tr].
4 See: R. Allison, L. Jonson, Central Asian Security: New International Context, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2001, pp. 202-203; M. Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995), 9 Baskı, Siyasal Kitabevi. Ankara, 1996, S. 701.
5 See: M. Gönlübol, op. cit., S. 698-699.
6 See: M. Aydın, op. cit., S. 388-389.
7 See: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı: TİKA, Kırgızistan Ülke Raporu, Ankara, 1996, S. 176-178.
8 See: Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1997 [MERIA homepage].
9 See: M. Aydın, op. cit., S. 385.
10 See: B. Kurtuluş, “Türkiye ve Türk Cumhuriyetleri Arasında Eğitim ve Bilim Alanlarında İşbirliği,” Avrasya Etüdleri, Sayı 17, İlk Bahar-Yaz 2000, S. 43.
11 See: E. Demir, A. Balcı, F. Akkok, “The Role of Turkish Schools in the Educational System and Social Transformation of Central Asian Countries: The Case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey, No. 19 (1), 2000, pp. 141-155.
12 See: Ibid., pp. 145, 152.
13 See: M. Aydın, op. cit., S. 385. Source: Ministry of Education.
14 See: Ö. Kabasakal, “Türkiye’nin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkileri,” Avrasya Etüdleri, Bağımsızlığın 10. Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetleri Özel Sayı: 20, Yaz 2001, S. 43-44.
15 See: Ibid., S. 53.
16 See: “II. Commercial and Economic Relations,” Turkey’s Relations with the Central Asian Republics [http://www.mfa.gov.tr].
17 For more detail, see: E. Urazova, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
18 See: Ö. Kabasakal, op. cit., S. 41.
19 See: E. Urazova, op. cit., p. 141.
20 See: Ö. Kabasakal, op. cit., S. 42.
21 See: İ. Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO ile İlişkileri,” in: Türk Dış Politikası (II. Cilt: 1980-2001), S. 281.
22 See: M. Aydın, op. cit., S. 435-436.
23 See: Ibid., S. 438.
24 See: Ibid., S. 387.
25 See: R. Allison, L. Jonson, op. cit., p. 207 (footnote 14).
26 See: Z. Chotoev, “Kırgız Cumhuriyeti’nin Dış Politikasına Genel Bakış,” in: Türkler (Cilt 19), Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002, S. 501.
27 See: R. Allison, L. Jonson, op. cit., p. 212.
28 See: Ibid., p. 211.
29 See: Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit.
30 See: D. Trofimov, “Tashkent between Ankara and Tehran: Lessons of the 1990s and Outlook for the Future,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (11), 2001, p. 110.
31 See: Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit.
32 See: Radıkal, 26 November, 2002, p. 10.
33 See: Radıkal, 14 January, 2003, p. 10.
34 See: N. Kireev, “Turkey in Search of a National Strategy of Eurasian Cooperation,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (13), 2002, pp. 24-25.
35 This distinction is made, in particular, in Turkish Foreign Policy, a collection of articles by a group of research associates and academics at the Ankara University International Relations Department as well as a number of universities offering instruction in English, including the Bilkent Middle East Technical University. See: M. Aydın, op. cit., S. 371.
36 See: Radıkal, 14 January, 2003, p. 10.