SALAFISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Bakhtiar MIRKASYMOV


Bakhtiar Mirkasymov, Head, sector of the APR Problems, Russian Institute of Strategic Research (Moscow, Russian Federation)


By 2000 population of the Muslim countries reached the figure of 1,263m and is growing at a fast pace (by 2.6 percent every year against the worlds of average 1.7 percent1). While in the mid-1990s the Muslims comprised 18.5 percent of the worlds population the total GDP of all Muslim countries barely reached 4.4 percent. These figures reflect the low and dropping per capita income, the factor that drives socially excluded groups to radical Islam and that makes religion an instrument of dramatic changes of state order in certain countries. Some of the Muslim ideologists have armed themselves with Islamic slogans to demonstrate their determination to adjust the entire world (and its Muslim part, in the first place) to their ideas. No wonder certain Islamic political forces turned their attention to Central Asia and the Caucasus, an arena on which fundamentalists and Salafis are especially active.2

The Situation in Central Asia

Although the new independent Central Asian states are predominantly Muslim they differ radically from the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. Under Soviet power they were living in the conditions of official atheism with Muslim traditions partly preserved in everyday life. Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School was restricted to the madrasahs of Samarkand and Bukhara while the official religious structures slavishly obeyed the authorities. Parallel Islam in the form of Sufi brotherhoods Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya was practiced mainly in the countryside.

Students from the Soviet Union were sent to theological universities of friendly Libya and Syria and also to the famous universities of Egypt and Jordan while Iran was carefully avoided. Quite unexpectedly those of the Soviet students who studied in the Sunni Arab countries succumbed to the ideas of the Muslim Brothers3 though none of them joined the anti-Soviet dissident movement.

Having obtained independence the Central Asian countries joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and other international Islamic structures. Some of the republics included Muslim symbols in their national emblems. More people chose to obey the norms of Islam and performed hajj to Mecca.

Money to the local Muslim institutions started flowing from Saudi Arabia in 1989. It was used to restore old and build new mosques, distribute the Koran in millions of copies, organize hajj, pay for Central Asian students who studied in Saudi Arabia where they imbibed the ideas of Wahhabism. It was several years later that Riyadh established diplomatic relations with the post-Soviet Central Asian states. As a result, in the latter half of the 1990s the ruling Central Asian regimes described Wahhabism as the greatest threat to their stability. The events in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that political Islam had gained weight in these countries, especially in the Ferghana Valley, and became a force to be reckoned with.

Tajikistan

It is the only Farsi-speaking Central Asian republic, 80 percent of its population is Sunnis and 5 percent is Shia.4 The Imam Khomeini Foundation is active in the country yet Iran has never betrayed its political ambitions there because the membership of the politically active Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) is predominantly Sunni.

In the early period of independence the country was mainly shaken by regional and clan rather than religious contradictions. Later, the opposition that widely used Islamic slogans to gain power moved to the political scene.

The IRPT developed from a youth organization set up in 1978 under chairmanship of Said Abdullo Nuri to study and disseminate the ideas of Sheikh Hassan El-Banna, brothers Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb, and Abul Ala Maududi who preached the ideas of the Muslim Brothers. Despite an official ban the organization convened its constituent conference in October 1990. A year later the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan held its first congress that elected Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda its Chairman. Being aware of the need to enlighten the nation to make Islamic revival possible the party was determined to win seats in the parliament. It was pursuing the following aims: spiritual resurrection, the republics economic and political independence, political and legal education of the citizens to bring them back to Islam.5

In 1991, it ran for the parliament together with the movements of Rastokhez (leader Tokhiri Abdudjabbor) and Lali Badakhshon (leader Atobek Amirbekov) as part of the Union of Democratic Forces. Having lost the elections to the communist leader Rakhmon Nabiev who represented the old republican nomenklatura and the Leninabad clans, the Islamic Revival Party together with its allies moved to organizing antigovernment rallies, hunger strikes and armed clashes with the law enforcement structures. The country was divided into two parts: the victorious Kulob-Leninabad-Hissar coalition drove the defeated Union of Democratic Forces to Karategin, the Pamir foothills and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. In June 1993, the Islamic Revival Party and its allies were outlawed. The larger part of the opposition had to emigrate to Afghanistan (about 60 thou) and CIS countries (over 250 thou).6

The armed detachment of the United Tajik Opposition made up of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan (the former Islamic Revival Party) and the Democratic Party established themselves in training camps in four regions of Afghanistan (Khost, Farhor, Kamni Bobo, Shamshatoo) where up to 9 thou were training. Not more than 3 thou stayed behind in Tajikistan.7 The IRPT and its fighters received unofficial financial aid and military-material support from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and certain Muslim centers, among them the Islamic World League (Saudi Arabia,) the Committee for Muslim Call (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), the Islamic Charity Organization (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Libya), Committee for Ties with Afghanistan (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan), the International Islamic Aid (Saudi Arabia), the Muslim Brothers and al-Qaeda (Sudan, Afghanistan).8

In Afghanistan the IRPT established contacts with Chechens and an Arab fighter Khattab. D. Usmon, deputy party chairman and former vice-premier, asked the Taliban9 for help. Khattab who had just arrived from Nagorny Karabakh where he fought together with Azeris joined the Tajik opposition. In spring 1994 his group of seven Arabs together with a Tajik-Afghan detachment destroyed a Russian frontier post on the River Panj.10

Iran that enjoyed great influence with the Tajik opposition and that was doing its best to contain Arab influence on it insisted that Khattab who opposed peace talks between the two sides in the Tajik conflict be removed. Being aware that if continued the conflict would consolidate the ties between the movement and the Taliban Iran together with Russia promoted a peaceful settlement of the Tajik conflict thus preserving its positions in the region.

Today, members of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan sit in the cabinet; the party has got a chance to continue its political struggle with legal, including parliamentary, means. The republic is relatively calm yet possible political repercussions of a socioeconomic crisis either in Tajikistan or in its Central Asian neighbors are not clear.

Uzbekistan

Late in the 1980s at the crest of perestroika the republic recovered its interest in Islam, its values and norms. More mosques were built, more students enrolled in religious institutes, more contacts with Muslim countries were established. Wealthy ethnic Uzbeks started coming to the Ferghana Valley to build mosques in memory of their ancestors.

Foreign Islamic fundamentalist centers responded to the developments much faster than foreign government and the official clergy. The clandestine religious schools mainly concentrated in Ferghana taught radical social and political ideas thus adding to the influence of more radical Hanbali Sunni School and raising a new generation of extremists.

Many registered religious organizations that remained loyal to the state abandoned the former active position in fighting fundamentalists and limited themselves to calls to religious tolerance, friendship among nations, etc. The extremist minded clergy stepped up their activities. In cooperation with certain intellectual circles and public figures they initiated new Muslim parties and organizations with far-reaching political aims including Islamic domination in sociopolitical life.

At the first stage of their activities Adolat, Towba, Islam lashkarlari and other Islamic parties and groups of fighters demonstrated their tolerance for the existing political order yet never bothered to camouflage their final goal: the rule of Sharia. In the Namangan Region the militarized Adolat organization developed into a real force that controlled public life according to the Muslim principles. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami that attracted crowds of supporters in Namangan, Ferghana, Andizhan, Surkhandaria and Tashkent regions is working toward changing the regime and seizing power. These organizations receive money, literature, and weapons from similar structures in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.

According to Bishkek political scientist U. Botobekov, in August 1992 Uzbekistan deported 70 members of the clergy who had arrived from Saudi Arabia for their ties with radical Islamic organizations Birlik and Erk.11 It was at the same time that part of the local religious extremists crossed into Afghanistan where they could get weapons and receive military training. The Islamist parties of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan established close contacts.

In 1996 Uzbek Islamists set up the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)12 under Tohir Yuldosh. Together with him Juma Namangani and Zubair ibn Abdurrahim gained prominence as two other IMU leaders. The movement had training camps of their own in Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz (Afghanistan). Between November 1999 and 2001 its ranks swelled from 600 people to 2,000 fighters and their families.13 These ranks included Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley, young men from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan as well as Chechens, Daghestanis and Uighurs from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. At times, the detachments comprised up to 5,500 fighters.14 In 1999 they raided the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley, in 2000 they invaded the Surkhandaria and Tashkent regions and the Kamchik Pass; together with the Taliban they fought against the Northern Alliance. This organization established close cooperation with the Arab brigade 055 of Osama bin Laden and extremist anti-Shia groups in Pakistan (Sipakh-e-Sahaba and Lashkar i Jhangvi15 that also fought side by side with the Taliban. In this way IMU became an international pan-Islamist organization open to all local extremists.

Its political and spiritual leader T. Yuldosh pointed out that his immediate aim was to fight corruption and social injustice, to liberate his comrades-in-arms from prisons. An Islamic state that would live according to the Sharia under a religious cabinet was his distant aim.16 The party extended its sphere of interests from one republic to the entire region and confirmed its pan-Islamic goals when Juma Namangani announced that the Islamic Party of Turkestan had been set up.17 Members of this and other radical Islamic groups cooperated with al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization, and were its grass-root basis.18

Hizb ut-Tahrir is functioning as a clandestine organization in Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors; a caliphate that would unite all states of the region is described as its aim. Theoretically, the party favors peaceful means yet it does not rule out the use of force. With the beginning of Americas antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan the party became even more radical: today, according to different sources, the number of its members in the Central Asian republics has reached tens of thousands. Nearly all its theoretical works and periodicals (al-Wai and al-Hadara journals) are translated into all local languages and Russian and are widely distributed especially in mosques, higher educational establishment, and means of transport. The party prints a lot of leafletsall of them rather primitive and mainly aimed at official politicians (especially at the Central Asian presidents). As the party was growing radical it started calling to self-sacrifice for the sake of jihad.

In 2000, Hizb ut-Tahrir supported the IMU raids into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. (On the eve of the raids members of these two organizations met to discuss the situation.) M. Falkov, an Israeli analyst of security and special services and editor of the Special Department magazine, mentioned that there were financial ties between the leader of the IMU military wing Namangani (D. Hojiev) and Hizb ut-Tahrir. He also wrote that in summer 1993 Namangani had used the money of the ISI and several Islamic organizations (mainly Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen and the Saudi Foundation Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Ibrahim) to open a military training camp in the Karategin Valley of Tajikistan. The IMU leaders are closely cooperating with certain international and regional Islamist organizations and movements, with Hizb ut-Tahrir, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Muslim Brothers, and others.

The then Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan Abdulaziz Kamilov accused Pakistan of training terrorists who later crossed into his republic. According to the media, up to 400 people from Central Asia (mainly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) were trained in Pakistan. The greatest number of them arrived from the Ferghana Valley, an Islamic region with a high unemployment rate among the youth. They formed the core of those who came to Central Asia for terrorist acts. In 1994-1997, one of such groups committed grave crimes in the Namangan Region. Investigation revealed that its members had been trained in Pakistan and proliferated the ideas of radical political Islam.19

It should be noted that the leaders deny that they belong to the Hanbali Sunni School (that is, Wahhabism) and call themselves supporters of pure faith. In their statement in Uzbek that was transmitted by the Iranian Radio the IMU leaders described themselves as supporters of the Hanafi School.20 There are experts who believe that the problem of the terrorists religious affiliation is devoid of meaning because by violating all Koranic prescriptions the extremists have placed themselves outside Islam.21

All attempts to settle the problem by force failed. Repressions against the faithful suspected of disloyalty to the authorities drove Islamists out of the country. In exile, they are used to promote the interests of their new home countries. In recent years hundreds of families fled to Tajikistan and Afghanistan where their men joined the fighters. Accusations that Tashkent hurled at the Arab countries and Iran that broadcasts in Uzbek (Khorasan ovozi (the Voice of Khorasan) radio) finally triggered a wide campaign of collecting money for the Muslims of Uzbekistan in distress.22 The collected money was used to finance further fighting.

Together with the traditional methods of struggle against Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups the republic has set up reconciliatory committees. Special commissions that comprise ulema-Hanafi, specialists in Islam and Oriental studies travel from one city to another to organize discussions to convince the young Hizb ut-Tahrir members to return to the Hanafi mosques where open discussions and sermons were also conducted. The greatly increased number of voluntary repentances says that the discussions as a means of neutralizing Hizb ut-Tahrir have been successful.

Religiously tinged extremism has not yet reached the same scope in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan though the Batken events of 1999 in Kyrgyzstan showed that extremism recognizes no borders especially in the Ferghana Valley.

Islam in the Northern Caucasus

Today, there are three Islamic trends in this part of Russia: Sunni, Tarekats (Sufi brotherhoods) and Salafism. The North Caucasian Sunnis belong either to the Shafiite or Hanafi schools. In the Northern Caucasus Islam traditionally exists in the form of one of the Sufi brotherhoods: Qadiriya, Naqshbandiya, and Shadhiliya. Naqshbandiya predominates in the valleys, Qadiriya is more popular in the mountains. The Qadiriya clergy supported Jokhar Dudaev who favored the idea of an Islamic state. Salafism is not homogenous either and can be identified by the degree of its radicalism. It seems that Islam proved to be best suited for ideological confrontation in Russia.

In the Northern Caucasus the conflict between the Salafis and the bloc of Tarekat followers with the traditionalists was the main contradiction inside Islam. Since 1997 such contradictions have been detected between Sufism that is traditional for Chechnia and imported fundamentalism (Salafism) that the media tend to call Wahhabism.

The Salafi movement concentrated mainly in Chechnia and Daghestan comprises two trends: moderate and radical. The moderate trend represented by A. Akhtaev until his death concentrated on educating the masses and proliferating religious knowledge through its Al-Islamiya society.

There are from 5 to 20 percent of radically minded Muslims among the total Muslim population of Russia.23 Bagautdin Muhammad (Kebedov) of Kiziliurt is the head of the radical Salafis in Daghestan. There are about two thousands of his supporters in the republic.24 Aiub (Omarov), another prominent Salafi, has from 500 to 1,000 followers. All of them live in the Tsumadinskii and Kiziliurt regions, while Aiub himself lives in Astrakhan. The radical wing of the Salafis used to publish a newspaper al-Halif, ran a publishing center called Santlada (later renamed Badr) that published works by fundamentalists Hassan El-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, the ideologists of Wahhabism Muhammad ibn Sulayman at-Tamimi, Salih ibn Fawzaan Al Fawzaan and other Salafi books.

Bagautdin wants to create an Islamic state in Daghestan or even on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. As distinct from the Daghestani Salafis the Chechen Salafis believe that they first should detach themselves from Russia. They look at radical Islam as one of the means. The following people are well known as supporters of the Chechen Salafis: Zelimkhan Iandarbiev, Movladi Udugov, Shamil Bassaev, I. Khalimov, A. Khusainov who exploit Islam as a form of separatism and an instrument of obtaining foreign financial and political support.

When he found himself face to face with the radical Salafi clergy President of Chechnia Aslan Maskhadov introduced full-scale Sharia rule by a decree even though the Sharia norms had nothing in common with the traditional lifestyle and customs (adat) of the Chechens. In July 1998, over 50 people died in armed skirmishes between fundamentalists and Tarekat followers in Gudermes.25 Maskhadov tried to neutralize the Wahhabis: he removed several supporters of religious radicalism from the cabinet; disbanded the Sharia guard, and deported four foreign Wahhabi missionaries. This was not enough to successfully oppose the Wahhabis who had enlisted support of many field commanders, Khattab among them. Maskhadov lost control over some of the republics regions; after that nearly all field commanders sided with the Wahhabis.

When Russian troops entered Chechnia in 1999 the fundamentalists and the Tarekat followers pushed away their contradictions. In the second campaign, however, Chechen society proved less united than in the 1994-1996 war. The republican mufti Akhmad Kadyrov who during the first war had been among those who fought against the Russian troops blamed the second campaign on the fundamentalists and sided with the Russian government. He has survived several aborted assassinations. It should be said that many of the Tarekat followers who are still opposing the federal force have distanced themselves from the fundamentalists.

Islamists are not as numerous in other North Caucasian republicsthere are not more than several hundreds of them. For example, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kabardino-Balkaria, there are 300 Islamists in the republic. Approximately the same number of them live in the neighboring Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In Ingushetia to which Chechens come in great numbers there are more Islamists. According to certain sources, there are up to 1,000 of them.26 The leaders of the republic are very much aware of the danger that Islamic radicalism may spread in their republic.

Foreign Support of the North Caucasian Salafis

According to many observers, during the first Chechen war the separatists got money from Chechen criminal structures acting in the republic and elsewhere in Russia. Starting with the late 1990s they have been receiving considerable amounts of money from Islamic funds in other countries, mainly charities and funds of the Arab Gulf countries. In Kuwait the money was collected and dispatched by the Social Reform Society27 (head Abdallah al-Mutaui) that regularly supplied Khattab and his group with money through its Baku office (representative Ahmad Abu Said); the Islamic Salvation for Chechnia Organization (Munazzamat al-igasa li Sheshen) also sent money to Khattab with special couriers traveling across Turkey and Azerbaijan; Revival of Islamic Heritage28 (Ihya at-turas al-islamiy) supplied the Wahhabi Kavkaz Center with money.

In Qatar the Qatar Charity Society (Jamiat Qatar al-heyriya) and Id ben Muhammed (headed by Muhammed ben at-Thani) were involved in financial transactions. In Bahrain Chechens dealt with members of the Jamiat al-Islah, in the UAE the Chechen delegation was received by Defense Minister Crown Prince Sheikh M. al-Maktum and by the Islamic Bank headed by ethnic Chechen Said Luta. In addition, the mass media of OAE (MBC, Al-Jazeera, 33) organized a propaganda campaign to support correligionists.29

In the 1990s, the Saudi authorities somewhat changed their attitude to nongovernmental religious organizations. When the Soviet Union fell apart Islamic organizations connected with Saudi Arabia started working among Muslims of Russia. They were an International Association of Charity Taiba, Commission of Scientific Knowledge about the Koran and Sunnah, the Russian Foundation Ibrahim ben Abd al-Aziz al-Ibrahim, the International Islamic Organization of Salvation (Al Igasa), Islamic Relief, al-Hairiya, Ikraa, Benevolence International Foundation, and Qatar.30 All of them laid the foundations of parallel Islam in Russia that differed from official Islam and the traditional madhabs.

Since the late 1960s Riyadh has been maintaining secret contacts with some of the radical Islamic groups and helped them. In 1994 it had to disrupt its contacts with extremist organizations after insistent requests from the governments of Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and India to do this. Despite the change of leadership in the Islamic World League, the International Islamic Salvation Organization, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and cutting down their budget funding the local governments failed to stop the flow of Saudi money to the Chechen separatists. Radical fundamentalists started sending money through the U.S., Western Europe, and the Gulf countries. Riyadh officially asked the government of Russia to stop using the term of Wahhabism as applied to the fighters in Daghestan.31

In September 1999 the emissaries of Bassaev and Khattab organized military training of fighters for Chechnia in the Ayn Heluk camp (Lebanon). The emissaries were received by Sheikh Tahir Mahmud al-Murshidi who headed the Brigades of Haled al-Istambouli group. He also provided a group of Arabic volunteers ready to fight in Chechnia. It is probably thanks to financial support supplied by al-Qaeda that the Sunni Asbat al-Ansar group32 shifted its attention from Israel to Chechnia. In January 2000 two of its members shelled the Russian embassy in Beirut from a grenade thrower. A week later the national security service cut short another attempt of this kind. Asbat al-Ansar is associated with another extremist organization acting under the name of Tafkir wa al-Hijra.33 Since the camps of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were autonomous and since the Syrian special services closed eyes at or even connived with such activities the camps were used to train volunteer fighters for Chechnia.

In Yemen the Association for Reforms (head Sheikh Abd al-Majid az-Zindani), the International Charity (head Ismail Ali Salekh), the U.S.-registered International Islamic Organization (head Ahmed Yasni) also became interested in the Chechen developments. According to their foundation documents, they should limit themselves to sermons, building mosques and madrasahs, and organizing hajj.

Jordan with its about 50,000-strong population of Circassians and Chechens whose ancestors left the Caucasus in the late 19th century after the Caucasian war occupies a special place among other Arab countries. The Chechen Charity and the Society of Friends of Checheno-Ingushetia, headed by Said Beno, former minister of public works, and Salikh Beno, head of the countrys security service, are working together with the local branch of Muslim Brothers and the Al-Haramain Foundation to help Chechnia.

According to its representative Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, the London-based International Islamic Front enlisted volunteers and collected money for the Chechen separatists.

* * *

Today extremism operating under the banner of Islam is not tied to any territory, it is ideologically primitive and has no social and economic programs. Its proponents are convinced that the faith in Allah, observance of the rules of Sharia in the their fundamentalist interpretation, and jihad against all enemies are enough to set up an Islamic caliphate. Import of the radical Islamic ideas that has already destabilized the political situation in Chechnia, Daghestan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan presents a real threat to all countries. It may trigger clashes between followers of traditional Islam who support legal authorities and newly formed radical religious associations. Such confrontation will change the forms and methods of what the extremist organizations are doing in Central Asia. What will never change are their claims for political power, which they need to achieve their aims and realize their interests.

Transformation of Islam into a political instrument and destabilization in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia are connected with the spread of Salafism (sometimes not quite correctly called Wahhabism) in these two regions. The problem of international terror and internationalization of the conflict in Chechnia was brought about by the supporters of Salafism. If the North Caucasian and Central Asian religious traditionalists manage to preserve their positions in the sphere of Islamic theory, customs and rites, then politically Salafism will become one of the development factors not less and not more important than the others.


1 See: Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 9, 2000, p. 2.
2 Some of the students of Islam call selective actualization of the early Islamic heritage Salafism, the term derived from Salafancestors, meaning return to what the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims were devoted to.
3 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures (see: Izvestia, 15 February, 2003).
4 [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/political_parties_and_leaders.html].
5 See: S. Olimova, M. Olimov, The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan in the Context of the Tajik Conflict and Its Settlement, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7), 2001, p. 114.
6 See: Ibid., pp. 115-116.
7 See: Ibidem.
8 See: Profi, No. 2, 2000, p. 36.
9 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures.
10 See: S. Shermatova, Islamskii faktor v rukakh politicheskikh elit, Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri, ed. by A. Malashenko and M.B. Olcott, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2001, p. 222.
11 See: O. Moldaliev, Sovremennye vyzovy bezopasnosti Kyrgyzstana i Tsentralnoy Azii, Bishkek, 2001, p. 68.
12 The U.S. State Department included it in the official list of international terrorist organizations.
13 [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/political_parties_and_leaders.html].
14 See: M. Zelenkov, Voenno-politicheskie posledstvia terroristicheskikh aktov v SShA dlia Tsentralnoaziatskogo regiona, Grazhdanin, 20 November, 2001.
15 The U.S. State Department included it in the official list of international terrorist organizations.
16 See: . Rashid, Namanganis Foray Causes Concern Among Central Asian Governments, 2 May, 2001, EURASIANET [http://www.afghanradio.com/news/2001/february/feb7k2001.html].
17 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures.
18 See: Janes Intelligence Review, August 2001.
19 See: Ekstremizm v Tsentralnoi Azii, Institute of Russia and China, Almaty, 2000, p. 19.
20 See: V. Ponomarev, Ugroza islamskogo ekstremizma v Uzbekistane: mify i realnost, Moscow 1999, p. 2.
21 See: O. Moldaliev, op. cit., p. 85.
22 S. Shermatova, op. cit., p. 218.
23 See: A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, Vremia Iuga: Rossia v Chechne, Chechnia v Rossii, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2002, p. 87.
24 See: A. Malashenko, Islamskie orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2001, p. 110.
25 See: I. Rotar, Pod zelenym znamenem islama. Islamskie radikaly v Rossii i SNG, AIRO-XX Publishers, Moscow, 2001, p. 33.
26 See: A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
27 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures.
28 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures.
29 See: K. Poliakov, Vliianie vneshnego faktora na radikalizatsiu islama v Rossii, Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri, p. 294.
30 See: I. Maksakov, Islamskii missioner v Dagestane, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 13, 2001.
31 See: K. Poliakov, Arabskiy Vostok i Rossia: problema islamskogo fundamentalizma, Moscow, 2001, p. 80.
32 In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF entered this organization together with 14 other extremist Islamic organizations in the list of terrorist structures. The U.S. State Department included it in the official list of international terrorist organizations.
33 [http://www.meib.org/articles/0109_l1.htm].

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