THE KARABAKH CONFLICT AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF AZERBAIJANIANS
David Babaian, Lecturer on international law, Stepanakert Office of the Russian-Armenian Humanitarian Academy (Stepanakert, Republic of Nagorny Karabakh)
The conflict is usually presented either in the context of the right of nations to self-determination (the position of Nagorny Karabakh) or as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan’s position). This confrontation, however, brought to the fore one more no less important aspect so far ignored for various reasons. I have in mind here the problem of self-identification of Azerbaijanians. As distinct from the self-identification problem of the people of Nagorny Karabakh that involves the problem of political status, in case of Azerbaijan we are dealing with national self-identification and a quest for ethnic identity and ethnic self-awareness.
Azerbaijan’s Ethnic Specifics
Azerbaijanians are a young nation: as late as the first half of the 19th century the population was an ethnically patchy one; tribes and ethnic (especially Turkic-speaking) groups freely migrated across the country. One of the founders of Azerbaijanian historiography Abas-Kuli-Aga Bakikhanov (1794-1846) wrote in his Giulistan-Iram (one of the first histories of Azerbaijan): “All those living in the magals (uyezds) between the cities of Shemakha and Quba and the entire Baku uyezd, except six villages, use the Tat language, which speaks of their Persian origins… All other Shirvan magals and Sal’ian, six Baku villages and the Sheki uyezd speak the Turki tongue, which points to their origins from the Turks, the Mongols and Tatars who came during the Turko-Persian wars when the Safavids ruled Persia and after them.”1 This refers to the 17th-18th centuries; sometimes tribes were resettled for far-reaching political aims. Persian Shah Abbas I (1578-1629) moved semi-nomadic Turkic tribes to the Southern Caucasus to strengthen his power there.2 Late in the 19th century a fairly large migration wave of Turkic-speakers reached the Southern Caucasus. According to far from complete information, starting with 1880 about 30 to 35 thou arrived in the territory of contemporary Azerbaijan from the northwestern provinces of Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan every year.3 From this it follows that out of the total one million Turks living there in 1897 about 600 thou (or 60 percent) arrived from the Iranian territory in less than 20 years.
This massive migration of peoples and tribes naturally interfered with national cohesion, no wonder, on many occasions the Turks looked at their towns or magals as their homeland.4 It was the great Azerbaijanian writer and enlightener Mirza Fatali Akhundov who introduced the concept of the “milliet” (nation) in the 1870s. This was the first attempt at Turkic consolidation into an ethnic community. In many respects the process was slowed down by the still surviving patriarchal and feudal relationships and the people’s ignorance. For example, by the late 19th century there were only 8 primary schools in the oil-extracting districts of Baku with a total number of about 850 pupils; less than 8.5 percent among them belonged to Azerbaijanian (Turkic) families. There were four schools in the Black and White cities (two historical districts in Baku) that taught 325 pupils (about 2 percent of them were Turks).5 In the Caucasus there was one school per 3,000 Russian children; one per 4,800 Georgian children; one per 5,400 Armenian children, and one per 17,300 Azerbaijanian (Turkic) children. Early in the 20th century there were 10 times less Turkic students in relation to the total number of students in the Baku grammar schools than students of other ethnic affiliations. According to the 1897 population census, there were not more than 2.5 percent of literate people among the Muslims of the uyezds of the Baku gubernia and 4.7 percent among the gubernia’s total population.6 Still, one can say that the Turkic-speaking tribes and peoples of Azerbaijan started consolidating into a single community late in the 19th century. The process was promoted, to a great extent, by capitalist developments, especially in the oil-producing areas of Baku with national bourgeoisie in the vanguard of the process.
Ethnic Consolidation in the First Republic
The events of the early decades of the 20th century influenced the process of national cohesion of Azerbaijanians to the extent that altered its natural course. This happened because the great powers and the neighboring states had far-reaching aims in the area. One has to admit that politics is an inevitable element of emergence and consolidation of any people; in the majority of cases it takes a lot of time, in individual cases it takes centuries. In the case of Azerbaijanians the natural cycle was destroyed; spurred on by foreign interference, it was proceeding at a fast pace while the elite was self-identifying itself even at a much faster pace than the common people.
During World War I this process among the political elite became even faster: top politicians dispatched numerous delegations of intelligentsia to Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In 1915, heads of two of them (A. Agaev and A. Guseinzade), who called themselves “representatives of the Muslims of Russia,” asked Germans to support their effort “to detach Muslim regions from Russia.”7 This shows that at that time even the intellectuals had not clear ethnic self-awareness and took their religious affiliation in the broad sense of the word as such. When the Russian Empire fell apart and several independent states appeared in the Southern Caucasus, the political elite of sovereign Azerbaijan (1918-1920) embraced Turkish identity as the nation’s ethnic identity. This was for the first time that the so-called “self-awareness dilemma” came to the fore: the people and the political elite disagreed over their ethnic identities.
The Musavat Party that ruled the country at that time was preaching pan-Turkism and tried to set up a single Turkic state in which Turkey was supposed to play the leading role. The first step in this direction was a new name for the new state—Azerbaijan—that had nothing to do with its territory. In ancient times it was part of Caucasian Albania (a state union of 26 tribes) and Armenia separated by the Kura River.8 Arabian conquerors brought a new toponym to the Southern Caucasus—Shirvan—applied to Caucasian Albania and some areas on the right bank of the Kura River. In the 13th century Turkic tribes penetrated the Southern Caucasus and gradually altered the demographic situation there: part of the Albanian tribes were assimilated, another part was pushed to the mountainous areas and to Daghestan. The Lezghians and the Christian Udins who mainly lived in the Kutkashi and Vartashen districts of Azerbaijan were descendants of the Albanian tribes (the majority had to leave the republic after the 1988-1990 events). The Turkic tribes were simultaneously driving away the settled Armenian population of the Kura-Arax Lowland up to the mountains. As a result by the 18th century the ethnic composition of the Karabakh valleys became predominantly Turkic. The very name of Azerbaijan is an Arabic variant of the Persian name applied to the region of Atrpatena found to the south of Lake Urmia. In 1918, this was a geopolitical choice that added legitimacy to further claims to the neighboring Iranian provinces (Western and Eastern Azerbaijan). Recently, something like this happened in the Balkans when Macedonia, one of the former Yugoslav republics, acquired independence. Greece still refuses to recognize the name despite the fact that the new republic occupies part of Macedonia of ancient times.
In the early 20th century the Republic of Azerbaijan was short-lived; two years was not enough to plant common ethnic self-awareness and identity among the local Muslims; the ethnonym “Azerbaijanians” was not used for the local Turks’ self-identity. The leader of the first republic Mamed Emin Rasulzade in one of his articles offered a graphic illustration of ethnic self-awareness of the Turkic population. To the question about his nationality an Azerbaijanian answered: “Thank Allah I am a Muslim.”9
National Consolidation under Soviet Power
When Azerbaijan became part of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin saved the name to consolidate its positions in Iran and through it in the Muslim East. At first Soviet power did nothing to create a single ethnic community of the republic’s Muslim peoples. Nearly twenty years had passed before the “Azerbaijanians” ethnonym struck root in the republic. Before that, ethnic specifics had been encouraged while the Turkic population was referred to as “Azerbaijanian Turks”; Persian Turks were regarded as an individual ethnos.10 In the 1920s-1930s the republic’s administrative division coincided with the areas of individual peoples. For example, in the mid-1920s the Caucasian peoples (mainly Lezghians) and Iranian-speaking Tats comprised nearly 59 percent of the Quba uyezd (that included the present-day Kusary, Quba, Divichi and Khachmas districts); the Caucasian mountain peoples and Georgians, 59.9 percent (45.7 and 14.2 percent, respectively) of the total population of the Zakataly uyezd (now Belokany, Zakataly and Kakhi districts); the Talyshes, 43.2 percent of the Lenkoran uyezd (Astara, Djalilabad, Lenkoran, Lerik, Massaly and Iardymly districts) where there were many Russians; the Kurds, 80.7 percent of the population of the Kurdistan uyezd (Kel’bajar, Lachin, Qubatli districts, part of the Zangelan and Jebrail districts).11 Nagorny Karabakh acquired the autonomous region status because Armenians predominated there.
In the 1930s, the Center changed its approach. The republic was living through an unprecedented economic boom, art, culture and education were flourishing—all this could not but affect the process of formation of national self-awareness. This mainly affected the Turkic-speaking peoples, the most numerous population group that lived among peoples with long histories of statehood (Persians, Armenians, and Georgians). The autochthonous peoples, especially small ones, looked at the Turkic speakers as aliens. It was in these conditions that the local Muslims began consolidating into a single Azerbaijanian nation. As a rule this is a long and far from simple process; from the very beginning people should accept their common self-identity based on common territory within one administrative unit. In case of Azerbaijan people of different ethnic origins had to identify themselves as Azerbaijanians, that is, people living in Azerbaijan. When this process is complete, common identity should develop into national self-awareness and national identity (nation).
Americans covered this road; today we are witnessing similar developments in Europe. Azerbaijan was the only Soviet republic where this could be done because its name was not derived from the ethnonym of the local ethnic majority. In this way descendants of the Caucasian Albanians—Lezghians and carriers of Iranian culture—Talyshes, Tats, Kurds, and others, mountain peoples and the Turkic ethnos became part of the new Azerbaijanian entity. In this way the new entity claimed the entire millennia-old historical, spiritual, and political heritage on the territory of Azerbaijan. Common identity based on the territorial-administrative division made it possible to relieve fears of other Muslim nations about their assimilation with the Turkic ethnos and offered good possibilities for further developments. Nationalism was punishable while members of all ethnic groups were represented in the republic’s governing structures. Change of nationality was encouraged when Muslims registered themselves as Azerbaijanians. This explains why by 1963 there were no Talyshes, Tats, and Kurds in Azerbaijan while the Caucasian mountain peoples and Lezghians, the most numerous groups in the past, became ethnic minorities.12
Still, the process went not as smoothly as it was expected: the Turkic-speaking peoples readily embraced Azerbaijanian self-identity later developed into national self-awareness and national identity. This perfectly fitted Moscow’s interests. Yet the process proceeded much slower among other peoples where it took a different direction. Having covered the road from self-identification through self-awareness to national identity, the Turkic elite began imposing it on other Muslim peoples and their elites still at the stage of self-identity. This process (started in the latter half of the 1950s) reached its peak when Heydar Aliev came to power in the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. In the 1970s, discrimination against ethnic minorities increased. As a result, the Muslim ethnic minorities regarded the idea of Azerbaijanian entity as an attempt of one people to impose its national identity on others. This explains why the ethnonym “Azerbaijanians” began to be applied to the entire Turkic ethnos while the Azerbaijanian entity stopped being the consolidating element of the republic’s Muslim peoples.
It should be added that among the Turkic-speaking population of the north of Iran (who are also called Azerbaijanians) the Azerbaijanian entity is still at the stage of common self-identification and has not yet reached the national identity stage. President Aliev agrees with this. In February 2001, speaking at a sitting of Milli Mejlis that discussed the Karabakh issue, he said: “You said here that we should strengthen the Azerbaijanian diaspora. There is no such diaspora! There are at least 500 thou Azerbaijanians living in the United States 99 percent of whom have never looked at themselves as Azerbaijanians and consider themselves Iranians.”13 Aliev had met members of this diaspora who openly told him about their national identity; they were obviously not afraid of any repressions from the Iranian authorities which confirmed what he said.
Why did the Turkic elite want to impose Azerbaijanian identity on others? They did this under the pressure of certain objective and subjective factors, the main of them being Nagorny Karabakh. The Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region (that Bolsheviks tied to the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. by force contrary to the will of the local people who repeatedly raised the question of reunification with Armenia) turned out to be a stumbling block on the road toward consolidation of the Azerbaijanian people. Indeed, Armenians as Christians with a thousand-year long history could not make part of the new Azerbaijanian entity. While the Muslims with shared traditions, culture, religion and mentality found it easy to blend together, the Armenians, in the same way as Russians, Jews and other non-Muslim peoples living in the republic, preserved their national identity. Had Nagorny Karabakh remained outside Azerbaijan, the process of consolidation of the Muslim peoples would have been much more successful.
The Armenian-Azerbaijanian Relations Through the Prism of Time
It is very important to say here that there has never been ethnic intolerance or hatred between the Armenians and the Turkic part of the Azerbaijanians. In fact, throughout their history their relations remained friendly for a number of objective reasons. One of them was the structure of winter and summer pastures that forced large numbers of people fluctuate between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Jointly used pastures drove Armenians and Azerbaijanians closer together, it was mutually advantageous, created shared economic interests and eliminated everyday differences.14 Both peoples used similar agricultural methods; they traded with each other, were engaged in handicrafts in the towns of Azerbaijan and Eastern Armenia (in the 17th and 18th centuries) populated mainly by Armenians and Azerbaijanians.15 In the 18th century, Armenian and Azerbaijanian merchants traded together in the Southern Caucasus, Russia, and even in the West.16
Poetry of both peoples reflects their close ties: the greatest poets of Azerbaijan Nizami (1141-1209) and Khagani (1120-1199) spoke highly of Armenia. Khagani wrote in his time: “It was some time ago that I came to Armenia a solitary and unhappy man. I am leaving it rewarded with great boons.”17 Mikael Nalbandian (1829-1866), one of the greatest Armenian poets, had the following to say: “The Turk and the Armenian are living practically on the same land. Their peoples live off the same land, eat the same food and are influenced by the same nature.”18
Armenians and Azerbaijanians fought shoulder to shoulder for freedom; special mention should be made of an uprising of Armenian and Azerbaijanian peasants in the first half of the 17th century headed by Mykhlu-baba, a former deacon and economic manager of the Gandzasar monastery (the center of political and spiritual life in Karabakh of that time). The uprising spread far and wide and reached Erevan, Karabakh, and Ganja. Another example of the comradeship-in-arms is a Karapachachin uprising of the 1670s-1680s. According to Armenian historian Zakaria Sarkavag Kanakertsi (1626-1699), it was triggered by religious persecutions of the Armenians in the Erevan khanate by the Persian court. The local Turks supported the Armenians and expressed their indignation in a letter to the Persian court: “We are neighbors of Christians, are living among them, trade with them and profit from this while the Erevan khan Sefi-Kuli-khan wants to deprive us of our profits. Why were the Christians forbidden to get out in rainy weather? Why are we not allowed to go to places where Christians pray?”19 The latter was caused by the fact that during Christian festivals, Easter in particular, local Azerbaijanians attended churches and lighted lamps there to show their respect for the Armenian Christian customs. This was an evidence of very close ties between the two nations.
Armenians and Azerbaijanians fought together against the Turks in the 18th century. In one of the letters to the Russian court the people of Ganja complained that Turks were plundering the homes of Armenians and Muslims (Azerbaijanians), took away women and children, desecrated churches and mosques and turned them into stables.20 The 1724 treaty between the Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanians of Ganja concluded to fight together against the Ottoman Empire deserves special mention. On 26 July, 1726, commander of the Russian troops in the Southern Caucasus received the following message: “The Shi‘a Shakhsevans under Jalil-bek and Mirza-Ali-bek united in a fortified area held by Avan Iuzbashi (Avan Iuzbashi, alias Melik Avan—head of the national liberation movement of the Karabakh Armenians against Persian and Ottoman conquerors in the first quarter of the 18th century.—D.B.) There are up to 15 thou families there… Not far from the fortified area the Shakhsevans vowed that they would remain loyal to the Armenians and fight the Turks.”21 Azerbaijanians took an active part in the struggle Eastern Armenia was waging against the Ottoman and Persian conquerors in the first half of the 18th century under David-bek. Azerbaijanians’ violent resistance to the Turks cannot be explained merely by the fact that one side was Shi‘a and the other Sunni; their national identities were different. Here is what one of the encyclopedias said: “Western blood imbibed by the Turkic tribe radically changed its anthropological makeup while the Turks who are still living in the khanates differ greatly from the Ottomans. The latter have detached themselves from the East and call the former ‘turk’ which means ‘boorish’ or ‘cruel.’”22
The Armenians and Azerbaijanians had also close ties in Baku, especially at the time when oil industry was rapidly developing there; together they took part in class struggle. It was at that time, however, that the two peoples confronted one another for the first time. This happened in Baku in 1905, yet this was not a confrontation between the two peoples—the clash was provoked by the czarist special services: they staged clashes and exploited the contradictions between the Armenian and the Azerbaijanian (Turkic) business elites. At that time Armenians played the first fiddle in Baku. According to available information, early in the 1870s it was mainly Armenian capitalists who owned Apsheron oil well.23 In the first decades of the 20th century Armenian industrialists controlled 55 out of 167 oil enterprises (32.9 percent); Azerbaijanians had no share in the local oil industry.24 Dissatisfaction among them and among business elites of other nationalities caused this and other clashes.
This is what Joseph Stalin had to say in his time: “The desire of the economically strong Armenian bourgeoisie to extend its positions to Azerbaijan and Georgia at the expense of the comparatively weak Azerbaijanian bourgeoisie could not but cause opposition; it was a prerequisite of much more bitter struggle for economic and political influence. The aim was to sell goods and achieve victory over the bourgeoisie of other nationality. Market is the first school where bourgeoisie learn nationalism.”25 He wrote about Georgia of the same time: “There are no more or less pronounced anti-Russian nationalist sentiments because there are no large Russian landowners and big businessmen who could have triggered nationalist feelings. There is anti-Armenian nationalism there because there is large Armenian bourgeoisie.”26 Even in 1918-1920, when independent states appeared in the Southern Caucasus, Azerbaijan tried to include Karabakh within its borders with the help of Turkish troops. In 1920, they burned the city of Shusha, capital of Karabakh, and killed over 20 thousand Armenians. Even this did not create enmity between the two peoples: in 1920, the Turks who lived on the territory of the contemporary Fizuli, Jebrail, Agdam, and Mirbashir districts of Azerbaijan supplied the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh with oil, salt, bread and other foodstuffs in defiance of bans imposed by the Musavat authorities. In 1919, when Azerbaijanian peasants of the Fizuli District rebelled against the Turkish troops, armed Armenian detachments from the neighboring Gadrut District of Nagorny Karabakh came to their aid.27
Nagorny Karabakh Factor and Philosophy of Building-up the Azerbaijanian State
The events of 1918-1920 left their clear imprint on the further relationships between the Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijanians. The pro-Turkish bias of the political elite of Azerbaijan created antagonism between the top crust of Azerbaijan and the people of Nagorny Karabakh and urged them to become even more vigilant than before. The Armenian genocide of 1915 organized by Turkey was a personal tragedy of the Karabakh Armenians. Even in Soviet times when Nagorny Karabakh became part of Azerbaijan, its local population responded even to the slightest signs of ethnic discrimination from Baku. This could have created very much unwanted response from other Muslim peoples of the republic (mainly the Lezghians and Talyshes living in compact groups in the north and south) among whom Azerbaijanian self-identity had not yet developed into national identity as this happened among the Turkic-speaking peoples.
In this context the Azerbaijanian (Turkic) elite looked at Karabakh as a threat to its interests and applied pressure in all spheres from economics and culture to demography. In 1926-1980, for example, 85 (30 percent) Armenian villages ceased to exist in the region, yet all Azerbaijanian villages survived. Between the population censuses of 1970 and 1979 the number of Armenians in the autonomous region increased by 1.7 percent (2 thou people), the corresponding figure for Azerbaijanians being 37 percent (10 thou people). With the election of Heydar Aliev First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan discrimination became even harsher. Minister of the Interior Ramil Usubov has said the following: “It would be no exaggeration to say that under Aliev Azerbaijanians felt and behaved in the region like its masters. In the 1970s, jobs attracted Azerbaijanians from the neighboring regions (Lachin, Agdam, Jebrail, Fizuli, Agjabedi and others). The measures carried out under the far-sighted First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.A. Heydar Aliev brought in Azerbaijanians in great numbers.28 Aliev described his aims in the following way: “When I was at the head of Azerbaijan, we were paying great attention to Nagorny Karabakh. I have to admit that dilettantes saw this as my fault. I did this because I knew that, first, Azerbaijanians had to be brought to the region and, second, Armenians had to be prevented from objecting to this.”29
It was Aliev’s regime that made continued existence within Azerbaijan impossible for the people of Nagorny Karabakh. Later new challenges appeared. In 1992, the People’s Front under Abulfaz Elchibey came to power in Baku; the new elite openly sided with Turkey. The Turkish tongue became the state language; Cyrillic was replaced with the Latin alphabet while Turkish generals were invited to build up an army for the republic. The second advent of Aliev to power in 1993 changed nothing: he went on with what Elchibey had started. Azerbaijanians’ pro-Turkish self-identity was put in a nutshell by the slogan “One nation—two states.” In October 1999 at a ceremonial opening of the Baku airport the then President of Turkey Demirel said: “Your grief is our grief. If you prick your finger with a needle, we shall feel it like an awl prick.”30 Aliev followed in the steps of his predecessor and staked on Turkish generals; in particular, he invited Brigadier General Iasar Demirbulak who had been Elchibey’s military advisor to go on with the task of building up an army. The general was made member of the Security Council of Azerbaijan.31
Official Baku stepped up anti-Armenian propaganda and protested every time any country recognized Armenian genocide of 1915 in Turkey. In October 2000, when commenting on the removal of this issue from the agenda in U.S. Congress, Aliev said: “I express my resolute protest to the pro-Armenian congressmen and state once more that injustice done to Turkey will be an injustice done to Azerbaijan.”32 Moreover, the present leaders of the republic do not conceal their claims to the entire Armenian territory: “In future we should continue writing creative works that would consistently prove that the present territory of Armenia belongs to Azerbaijan. We should do this to open a road for future generations.”33
One can presuppose that Baku’s anti-Armenian politics was caused by the syndrome of its defeat in a war with Karabakh (1991-1994). One should say, however, that the military phase was a result, not the cause, of these policies. It reminds very much of the policies pursued in relation to other peoples. For example, permanent representative of Azerbaijan at the Geneva U.N. office Isfendiakh Vagabzade explains the problems Baku had to overcome on the international arena by the fact that false Azerbaijanians had wormed their way into the country’s diplomacy. In summer 2001 in an official letter to speaker of the Azerbaijanian parliament Murtuz Aleskerov he wrote that among the Azerbaijanian diplomats there are many people with alien blood. This could not be tolerated, he said, because diplomats with Armenian, Jewish, Russian mothers, to say nothing of ethnic minorities, could not represent Azerbaijan with dignity and loyally serve it.34 This diplomat is not merely a member of the country’s political elite—as son of People’s Poet of Azerbaijan Bakhtiar Vagabzade he belongs to the creative elite as well.
This approach makes consolidation of the non-Turkic peoples into a single Azerbaijanian nation impossible. The authorities’ pro-Turkish bias added urgency to the old “self-awareness and national identity dilemma” among the Turkic part of the population. I have already written that in 70 years of Soviet power these people acquired Azerbaijanian national self-awareness; today the state is trying to impose a different national identity on them. This gives rise to another dilemma and widens the gap between the elite and the common people.
The Karabakh conflict also created in Azerbaijan a dilemma of political philosophy related to the future state. What sort of a state does Azerbaijan want? Will it become a democratic and multinational one in which the Azerbaijanian people will consolidate in a natural way moving from general self-identification to national self-awareness and national identity and in which identity of a large nation will not be imposed on ethnic minorities? The Karabakh conflict allowed the Azerbaijanian elite to outline the future philosophy of building up a state and ponder on real, rather than declared dedication to a democratic state ruled by law. At the same time, the elite should not evade responsibility for the failures in building up a state rather than shift the blame onto the problems created by the Karabakh conflict. In any case the philosophy of imposing national identity has no future in Azerbaijan. In the new geopolitical conditions when the country is integrating into European and Western structures the forces rejecting the democratic methods of state building will become unacceptable both at home and on the international arena; they will be gradually removed from the political scene.
1 Abas-Kuli-Aga Bakikhanov, Giulistan-Iram, Society for the Investigation and Study of Azerbaijan Publishers, Baku, 1926, p. 16.
2 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, ed. by A.S. Sumbatzade, A.N. Guliev, E.A. Tokarzhevskiy, Vol. 1. S drevneishikh vremen do prisoedinenia Azerbaidzhana k Rossii, Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. Publishers, Baku, 1958, p. 266.
3 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, Vol. 2. Ot prisoedinenia Azerbaidzhana k Rossii do fevral’skoy burzhuazno-demokraticheskoy revolutsii, Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. Publishers, Baku, 1960, p. 261.
4 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, Vol. 1, p. 267.
5 See: Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 335.
6 See: Ibidem.
7 Ibid., p. 748.
8 See, for example, Strabo, Geografia, Moscow, 1964, Book XI, Point 4; Abas-Kuli-Aga Bakikhanov, op. cit., pp. 3, 8, 9, 26.
9 See: “Stanovlenie natsional’nogo samosoznania azerbaijantsev,” Regional’nye konflikty I sredstva massovoy informatsii. Nauchno-obrazovatel’ny web-resurs [http://conflicts.aznet.org/conflicts/konf/konf_k1.htm#stanov], 14 July, 2003.
10 See: Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, ed. by O.Iu. Schmidt, Vol. 1, “Azerbaidzhanskaia S.S.R.” Section, Joint stock company Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1929, p. 641.
11 See: Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, p. 642.
12 See: Atlas Azerbaidzhanskoy S.S.R., “Naselenie” Section, Akademia Nauk AzS.S.R., Institute of Geography, Baku, 1963, pp. 14, 15.
13 Sitting of the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan devoted to the Karabakh settlement, AzTV-1, 23 February, 2001.
14 See: S.A. Mamedov, Istoricheskie sviazi azerbaidzhanskogo i armianskogo narodov (vtoraia polovina XVII v. i pervaia tret’ XVIII v.), Elm Publishers, Baku, 1977, p. 35.
15 See: A.P. Novosel’tsev, Goroda Azerbaidzhana i Vostochnoy Armenii v XVII-XVIII vv., Moscow, 1959, p. 89.
16 See: S.A. Mamedov, op. cit., p. 114.
17 Khagani, Izbrannye proizvedenia, Baku, 1965; Literaturniy Azerbaijan, October 1960, p. 4.
18 “M. Nalbandian, “Neizdannye proizvedenia,” in: A.G. Ioannisian, Vopros natsional’nosti v publitsistike Mikaela Nalbandiana, Erevan, 1955, p. 61.
19 Zakaria Sarkavag, Khroniki, Book 2, Moscow, 1969, p. 90.
20 Central State Archives of Ancient Documents, Record Group Kabinet Petra Velikogo, Section II, Book 66, p. 552.
21 Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia at the RF Foreign Ministry, Record Group SPR, 1726, File 9, p. 89b.
22 Istoria chelovechestva, ed. by G. Gelmol’t, Vol. V, Iugo-Vostochnaia i Vostochnaia Evropa, St. Petersburg; printed by the Prosveshchenie Book Publishers, 1905, pp. 117, 122.
23 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, Vol. 2, p. 255.
24 See: Ibidem.
25 I.V. Stalin, Sochinenia, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1951, p. 305.
26 Ibid., p. 258.
27 See: S.N. Barse, Nagorny Karabakh. Concise Local Lore Texbook, Azerbaijanian Publisher of Teaching Aids, Baku, 1963, p. 62 (in Armenain).
28 See: R. Usubov, “Nagorny Karabakh, missia spasenia nachinalas’ v 70-e gody,” Panorama, 12 May, 1999.
29 Sitting of the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan devoted to the Karabakh settlement, AzTV-1, 23 February, 2001.
30 Istanbul Milliyet (Ankara Edition), 19 October, 1999 (in Turkish).
31 See: Ifran Sapmaz, “Aliev Is Having a Turkish General Establish an Army,” Hurriet, 13 October, 1993, p. 13.
32 Zerkalo Internet newspaper, 24 October, 2000.
33 “Zakliuchitel’naia rech prezidenta Azerbaidzhana Geidara Alieva na zasedanii Gosudarstvennoy kommissii po 75-letnemu iubileiu Nakhichevanskoy Avtonomnoy Respubliki,” Bakinskiy rabochiy, 11 February, 1999, p. 1.
34 See, for example: A. Useynov, “Chuzhaia krov’,” Vremia MN (Baku), 5 June, 2001; Sh. Abbasov, “Otozvan polpred Azerbaijana v OON Eldar Guseinov,” Echo Internet newspaper, 5 June, 2001.