ARE THE HEARTLAND AND RIMLAND CHANGING IN THE WAKE OF THE OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN?

Farkhod TOLIPOV


Farkhod Ph.D. (Political Science), Assistant Professor, University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)


Introduction

In his book What Is Asia to Us?, which takes an in-depth look at the long geopolitical struggle between Great Britain and Russia, Milan Hauner analyzes this clash, known as the “Big Game,” in which India was the main factor in resolving the Central Asian question. Two important aspects of this question were the movement toward warm seas and so-called railroad imperialism.1 The southern tier then assumed an important dual function: the first function was to form a convenient platform for threatening British India, and the second function was to back up the vulnerable lifeline connecting the two extremities of the Empire.

Another author, Daniel Pipes, wrote an article in 1994 called, “The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East,” in which he argued that the independence of the South Caucasian and Central Asian republics has had a profound impact on the Middle East, particularly on their four immediate neighbors—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Taking into account the Turko-Persian (one could add Turko-Persian-Arabic) tradition of the Central Asian people, he concluded that due to their newly obtained independence the map from Turkey to Bangladesh could undergo drastic changes on short notice.2

What we see today is that both Hauner’s and Pipe’s conclusions have come true in the sense that after the former Soviet state collapsed, the Central and South Asian macro-region underwent a fundamental geopolitical transformation which has had a profound impact not only on the emerging status quo in this part of the world, but also on the very process of self-determination of the Central Asian peoples. The recent events related to 11 September, 2001 and the subsequent antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan have only accelerated this process.

Today we are witnesses to so-called geopolitical actualization and, what is most important, the civilizational significance of Central Asia is growing in the sense of the term “civilization” that Samuel Huntington envisaged in his Clash of Civilizations. The new world order that could emerge as a result of the world community’s mobilization against terrorism is something Central Asia will be a vitally important part of. Central Asia today faces a threefold problem, which has been scientifically actualized and politically articulated: (1) new, the post-Soviet Central Asian geopolitics of the superpowers and the overall geopolitical transformation of the region after 11 September, 2001; (2) the U.S.’s arrival in Central Asia—the Heartland of Eurasia—bringing inevitable changes to the status quo in this part of the world; and (3) the establishment and implications of the strategic partnership between the U.S. and the Republic of Uzbekistan (RUz) in the wake of the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan.

The Geopolitical Dimensions of Terrorism and Antiterrorism. The Lessons of Afghanistan

One of the main lessons of Afghanistan is the “discovery” that terrorism and antiterrorism have geopolitical dimensions. The permanent geopolitical struggle in the IRAFPAK zone (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), which always had the form of a “zero sum game,” has brought this region to a state of geopolitical stalemate.3

This stalemate, of which Afghanistan became the main victim, was a source of the global threat of terrorism that emanated from this country at the end of the 20th century. The very start of the antiterrorist operation in that country revealed the world community’s three delusions about the ways and means to settle the Afghan conflict:

(1) It was widely believed that this conflict was solely Afghanistan’s internal affair. However, this notion proved erroneous, and external interference was extremely necessary, inevitable, and the only possible way to resolve the conflict.

(2) It was widely believed that the Afghan conflict did not have a military solution. However, settlement of the conflict proved to be primarily military.

(3) It was widely believed that the Islamic Taliban movement, or part of it, could be admitted to the future government of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Taliban was just one step away from being internationally recognized as the country’s legal and real government. But after 11 September, 2001, the Taliban was blamed and condemned for what had always been obvious—international terrorism.

The international community was misled by: (1) its wrong assessment of the sources and driving forces behind the Afghan conflict; (2) its rather outmoded conceptions of international interference and means of peace-enforcement, and, last, (3) its inadequate vision of the new form of social and political arrangement in Afghanistan.

As a result, the international community was faced with a dilemma: “universal antiterrorism versus national antiterrorism” or “geopolitics versus antiterrorism.” This dilemma could have immense implications for Central and South Asia. The operation in Afghanistan is essentially leading to the juxtaposition of two realities: the international and unifying fight against terrorism, on the one hand, and the conflict-prone, disuniting geopolitical rivalry in the Central-South Asian macro-region, on the other hand.

As a matter of fact, it should be admitted that neither terrorism nor the conditions for terrorism have been eradicated in Afghanistan. This can only be done if two interrelated tasks are accomplished: achieving full success during the military phase of the antiterrorist operation and creating a full-fledged nation-state. Who controls the territory—the state or other forces—is in fact the primary simple and obvious, in the conceptual sense, question, although it is also too complicated when applied to Afghanistan. In other words, it is a question of nation- and state-building. (Let’s remember that during the last days of its rule, the Taliban resorted to nationalist rhetoric and called on the Afghan people to unite in fighting the “American invaders,” while instantly forgetting “their own” foreign mercenaries.)

Demilitarization, decriminalization, and rebuilding of the state should be the three top priorities if the world community is to eliminate any possible future threats to international security emanating from Afghanistan. “The events of 11 September, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”4

What is more, since Afghanistan lost its statehood and a terrorist network arose on its territory against the background of and due to mass, intensive, and destructive external influence, the very process of nation- and state-building can only develop with the help of a mass, intensive, and constructive external presence. Dr. E. Krakowski’s arguments deserve to be mentioned: “The key to the Afghan problem is to be found not within Afghanistan but in the countries surrounding it… While it is true that the Afghans are fiercely independent and have stood up to mighty conquerors, it is also true that it is the neighboring states that have fanned and maintained ongoing warfare for more than twenty years now. It is also this external intervention and the chaos it has engendered that has allowed the country’s gradual hijacking by an international terrorist network.”5 This is another lesson that can be drawn from the geopolitical stalemate in Afghanistan.

What is more, the lessons of terrorism and antiterrorism in Afghanistan tend to confirm the geopolitical character of the Central Asian division in the early 21st century.

A New Big Game in Central Asia?
(The U.S. Military-Political Presence in Central Asia)

“By early 2002, most governments appeared reconciled to the fact that a networked threat like the one posed by al-Qa‘eda called for a networked international system that would pool information resources and harmonize national objectives…

“…the U.S. and its allies cannot rely only on realpolitik and hardnosed assessments of clear-and-present dangers in executing foreign policy in an epoch of ill-defined threats from multiple directions. But while this idealistic emphasis may help provide focus for grand strategy, it is no more a substitute for it than was Ronald Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ characterization of the Soviet Union. Grand strategy requires resolute application as well as high purpose. And it is, once again, an obligation.”6

An indication of this new strategic approach to the new international security threats can be considered America’s newly established military presence in Central Asia in the wake of the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan. In March 2002 the Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership was signed between the U.S. and Uzbekistan.

The U.S.’s geopolitical entry into the region and, in particular, U.S.-RUz rapprochement were largely evoked by the global threat of terrorism and the international antiterrorist coalition’s actions in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the very fact of America’s newly established military-political presence in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan, induced many politicians, observers, experts, and analysts to speculate on the revival of a struggle between the traditional geopolitical rivals.7

The establishment of a strategic partnership between the U.S. and Uzbekistan not only proved Zb. Brzezinski’s strategic vision of geopolitical pluralism in the Heartland of Eurasia, but also indicated that post-Soviet Uzbekistan had become a key country in U.S. global strategy. This state of affairs was also envisaged, for example, by Professor Frederick Starr in his article “Making Eurasia Stable.”8 At the same time, Uzbekistan’s newly acquired status in U.S. strategy was implementation of America’s conception for the pivotal countries.9

Such a specific partnership is a new phenomenon not only for the U.S. in its dealing with the traditionally Russian sphere of influence, but also for the new world order taking shape. Therefore, it will have certain international and geopolitical implications.

“The U.S. faces an enormous challenge in keeping allies and newfound friends focused on a war that may appear to conform to a purely American agenda. Indeed, the transatlantic differences in threat perceptions prevalent before 11 September began to return in early 2002, as some European capitals appeared to relax counter-terrorism postures while the U.S. remained on highest alert…

“In any event, maintaining a wider counter-terrorist coalition will require an intensity of diplomacy and degree of cooperation with culturally different powers that is unprecedented.”10

Such unprecedented U.S. cooperation with a “culturally different” and “geopolitically alien” area cannot but affect the interests of traditional U.S. geopolitical rivals in this part of the world, that is, Russia, China and Iran. Moreover, a “small game” against the background of the “Big Game” could also break out between and among the Central Asian states themselves. If this happened, the last scenario would be the most dramatic consequence not only of the revitalized “Big Game” but, primarily, of the independence gained by these states in 1991.

In any case, a so-called security dilemma is likely to arise from the geopolitical dimensions of counter-terrorism, a dilemma faced both by the Central Asians themselves in their relationships with each other in the context of Afghanistan campaign and by Russia in its dealings with Central Asia. Thus, Head of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation Totskiy was one of those Russian officials who reacted painfully to the American presence in Central Asia. He frankly spoke out: “The deployment of U.S. military bases on the territory of Tajikistan can be permitted only for the period of the counter-terrorist operation of the coalition forces in Afghanistan… [But] if this is for a longer period of time, then we will not be friends.”11

This statement means, among other things, that some political circles in Russia still regard this region as an area of its exclusive domination. Indeed, talking about the inadmissibility of the American presence in Central Asia they overlook the fact that the foreign military presence is not only American (rather not so much American); it is twofold, taking into account the permanent Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, several Russian military installations on the territory of Kazakhstan, and, in particular, the deployment of the newly created CIS Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) for Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan. This double military presence is nothing but a reflection of the ongoing geopolitical competition over Central Asia and Afghanistan between Russia and the United States. These two great powers are now equal players in this part of the world as far as their military presence is concerned.

Under these conditions the assessment by the sides of each other’s interests in the region will help to give a greater understanding of the modality of this competition. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that American officials are fond of reiterating the following set of strategic directions pursued by Washington in Central Asia: (1) assistance in strengthening regional stability and security; (2) assistance in building democratic institutions and a market economy; (3) stimulating regional cooperation; (4) providing fair and transparent development of the Caspian’s energy and other natural resources, as well as of the region as a whole. Such a systemic and official articulation of the US’s four goals in Central Asia is instrumental in analyzing the would-be short- and long-term implications of America’s presence in Central Asia. In contrast to the U.S., Russia has never articulated any strategic goals in such a systemic form. In other words, the Russian strategy was mostly reactive—neither defensive nor offensive.

Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones made it clear that American goals are anti-monopolistic in nature, but not anti-Russian. She emphasized that Central Asia is no longer an area of the “zero sum game,” and the United States does not have any aspirations to reproduce the “Big Game” of the 19th century in the 21st century.12

In any event, Russia has other means of counteraction if its vital interests in Central Asia are threatened. Therefore, as W. Merry so precisely noted, Washington is no more able to dominate in Central Asia than Russia is to establish its supremacy in Central America.13

As J. Burke noted, democracy is an idea against which terrorists have no counter-arguments. American military assistance complemented by economic one can create a unique opportunity for Central Asians, on the one hand, and the U.S.—on the other.14 Moreover, it can hardly be denied that regional stability and security, as well as democracy, are objectively the common interests of all the key players in Central Asian geopolitics. (However, it should be recognized that this is not a widespread thesis.) This was confirmed politically and legally on the surface of the political process at the Moscow summit between the RF and the U.S. in May 2002.

The Central Asian Security Complex vis-à-vis the CIS Security Complex

Central Asia is a full-fledged and independent security complex in the sense used by B. Buzan. According to B. Buzan, a security complex is a group of countries, whose security interests unite them sufficiently closely, and whose national security cannot be viewed in isolation.15 He believes that the transformation of any security complex can take one of four forms: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation, or “overlay.”16 In the case of Central Asia, the second and fourth processes are most likely to take place at the same time.

Indeed, all five countries in the region have no objective interest in maintaining the status quo, since this means merely conserving their dependence, the domination of one of the great powers, and the continuation of the old “Big Game” in its destructive form. So the Central Asian states are objectively predisposed toward pursuing the anti-status-quo policy. The emergence of the South Asian geopolitical factor in Central Asia’s security concerns is, among other things, an indication of the changing status quo in the Heartland and Rimland.

The internal transformation of Central Asian security complex is occurring, following Buzan’s theory, because “its essential structure is changing within the context of its existing outer boundary.” This type of transformation, in turn, could take one of the following forms: chaos, “regional conflict formation,” security regimes, security community, or, finally, regional integration. Central Asia is an example of internal transformation that is evolving toward security community and regional integration.

The region is not experiencing external transformation because the essential structure of the complex is not being altered either by expansion or contraction of its existing outer boundary. Central Asia is neither expanding (by absorbing other territories) in any one direction, nor is it being absorbed by some other larger security complex (even the CIS).

As far as “overlay” is concerned, the region is experiencing, as mentioned above, a double external power presence. This is what is typically perceived as the so-called security umbrella. In other words, according to B. Buzan, it is a voluntary form of submission to a certain great power. “Under this arrangement, overlay takes the form of an unequal alliance. Local security concerns are subordinated to the security orientation of the dominating power, and this orientation is reinforced by the stationing of that power’s military forces directly within the local complex.”17

Central Asia is overlaid by the juxtaposition of the Russian and American military presence. However, this presence does not yet mean control. Therefore, the question is “whether” or “how” such a presence can serve the task of strengthening regional security in Central Asia, but not vice versa? The question is “whether” or “how” the interests of Central Asia can be reconciled with the external military presence. The first answer to these questions is that the common interest of all the participants in the fight against terrorism within the framework of counter-terrorist coalition repels any suspicions on every side (Russian, Chinese, American and Central Asian) that strengthening the Russian military base, and the newly established U.S. military presence, as well as the deployment of the so called CIS RRF, will evoke a new phase in the old “Big Game.”

Another answer, however, is that the prospects for regional development, including security problems, cannot, of course, be considered only in the context of fighting terrorism. From this point of view, it is vitally important for the Central Asian countries to prevent the process from turning from rapprochement into a clash, as well as to prevent the emergence of a so-called security dilemma. Although all five states in the region are not self-sufficient in maintaining national security and therefore regional security, they are more in need of foreign security assistance than a security umbrella.

By no means does this imply expediency of the let-alone policy. It only means that political, economic, military, and technical assistance is more appropriate for the security needs of the five states concerned than direct military involvement in security building in the region. The thing is that Russia and China are unlikely to tolerate America’s permanent military presence in Central Asia, but Russia’s permanent military presence is not acceptable to Central Asia either, nor is it in the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. As long as any kind of overlay, be it assistance or an umbrella, is in the interests of the recipients, it seems expedient for this overlay to help form their own system of collective security.

The CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST), of which three Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—are members, and from which Uzbekistan withdrew in 1999, is no longer an organization that can provide a real collective security system. An analysis of the military doctrines of the CIS states reveals that there is no unity among them in assessing the security challenges and threats. It deserves mentioning that in the same 1999 two other CIS states—Georgia and Azerbaijan—also withdrew from the CST. Now only six CIS members compose the CSTO (since 2002 the CST is an organization). They are the Russian Federation, Belarus, Armenia, and the three above-mentioned Central Asian states. Given its limited composition, the CSTO can hardly serve the entire CIS. This can mean that either the CIS or the CSTO is a figment of the imagination.

Moreover, the creation and further deployment of the RRF in Kyrgyzstan does not appear timely, since the most severe threats to Central Asia from Afghanistan have already been mitigated; such forces might have been created when the Taliban stood at the CIS’s southern borders and the probability of a spillover of the Afghan conflict northward was high. Moreover, the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division and the Border Guard Forces deployed in Tajikistan soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were unable to eliminate these threats, especially large-scale drug trafficking. It should also be mentioned that the terrorist groups, training camps and bases of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were located on the territory of so-called “well protected” Tajikistan.

At the same time, many people in Russia believe that the withdrawal of the 201st Division and the Border Guard Forces from Tajikistan would exacerbate the chaos in this Central Asian country, therefore it is undesirable to leave it. Moreover, during his visit to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, for the summit of the Euro-Asian Economic Community, Vladimir Putin stated Russia would strengthen its military base in that Central Asian country.

Unfortunately, such an issue as strengthening all the Central Asian countries in order to ensure their own sufficiently powerful resistance to any possible challenge is still beyond any serious consideration and analysis. In this regard, one thesis deserves to be contemplated, namely: as Russian analyst D. Trenin argues, “the threat to Russia’s national security emanates not so much from international terrorists, extremists, and separatists as from the weakness of the new states… In other words, it is not a question of the Taliban being too aggressive, rather of Uzbekistan being too weak. Under these conditions, Moscow should not create new antiterrorist centers, but rather take advantage of its membership in the G-8, its relations with the CIS countries, and its oil and gas projects, in order to eliminate poverty in the Caucasus-Caspian region and assist in the social-political consolidation of the new states”18 (one might add “assist in their regional integration”).

There is another organization that, in the view of some analysts, might manifest itself as a provider of security assistance for Central Asia—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It was created in 1996 and consists of six states: the Russian Federation, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. But the SCO’s overlay of the Central Asian security complex could become an artificial superstructure, lead to the overextension of Central Asia and overburden its states in their search for a real and adequate regional mechanism for institutionalizing their collective security policy.

Meanwhile, taking into account the permanency of the geopolitical factor and the apparent asymmetry between and among the SCO members in political, economic and military matters, the organization’s activity is not always likely to be effective. We must recognize in this respect that the SCO’s prospects will depend to a large extent on what strategy the Central Asian countries choose, and whether they will be able to direct their strategies toward greater unity and use the SCO’s goals and mechanisms for achieving a greater guarantee of regional security and thereby a higher degree of integration within their own Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC).

Coming back to the question asked above about “whether” or “how” the interests of Central Asians can be reconciled with an external military presence/overlay, there are four possible visions of the geopolitical status of the Central Asian region.

First is the status of a buffer zone. This will most likely be in the interests of Russia for at least two reasons: one is offensive in nature—considering the Central Asian region a zone of historical responsibility and geopolitical control in Russia’s imperial thrust toward the Indian Ocean; the other is defensive in nature—considering the Central Asian region a zone that protects the Empire from immediate and direct contact with the geopolitical rival—initially Great Britain and later the United States. Only the buffer status of Central Asia could serve these Russian geopolitical interests.

The second possible status is a cordon sanitaire. This would be more in the interests of the U.S., which is pursuing the above-mentioned strategy of geopolitical pluralism and declared its intention to prevent any power from dominating in Central Asia.

The third possible role is a springboard for expansion. This is more likely to be in the interests of China. The latter can objectively regard Central Asia as its geopolitical rear and be predisposed to use this region in its move westwards. This move could take one of two forms—territorial expansion and extension of its economic and political influence. But the first form seems less likely.

All the above-mentioned scenarios are hardly acceptable for Central Asian countries, because these three positions primarily imply their subordination to the will and actions of external powers and neglect the will and role of the Central Asian states themselves.

Therefore the only relevant choice for the states of the region is to become a united center of power. Nowadays it is becoming more and more obvious that they cannot be fully independent and sovereign states unless they become an integrated, independent, and sovereign region. Such a “project,” if realized, is objectively in the interests of all the great powers—the actors in Central Asian geopolitics. The approaches of these actors to this project might just be a test of their real intentions in this part of the world.

Conclusion

Several theses can be drawn from our analysis:

1. Uzbekistan objectively has a special historic responsibility for the evolution of Central Asia. The contents of the U.S.-RUz strategic partnership should be used to reinstate Uzbekistan as a pillar of stability and democracy in the region and as a driving force behind regional integration. Whether this wish comes true or not depends mainly on three developments: (1) the political will and strategic readiness of both sides to implement the Declaration; (2) the mid- and long-term vision of America’s military presence in Uzbekistan, and Central Asia in general; (3) the regional and international context.

2. The would-be “neo-Marshall Plan” for Central Asia can be contemplated. (Yet in 1998 Professor W. Kunzweiler from the U.S. Naval War College put forward the idea that “the U.S.’s first step ought to be recognition of Central Asia in its entirety as a pivotal state”.19) At the same time, “The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.”20 It is an important and stimulating message to Central Asian countries.

3. It is for the Central Asian states to decide whether the regional system of collective security is a myth or not. If they choose to go separately, they will encounter a security dilemma and security competition; then they will have to balance not only external powers, but primarily each other within the region. But if they choose, which is more likely, the integrationist strategy, then their action as a single center of power would provide them with real independence, which is the first precondition of security. Either way, disintegration or integration will, in one way or another, reflect the high degree of their interdependence and therefore will have immense national and regional implications.

4. It is in the interests of all the Central Asian actors to reject the geopolitical “zero sum game” strategy and apply the so-called “win-win” strategy. Only then will the emerging status quo in this region far from resemble Zb. Brzezinski’s prediction of the “Balkanization” of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The de-facto established geopolitical pluralism in this part of the Heartland should not take the form of geopolitical antagonism based on the traditional Sea Power versus Land Power dualism. One of the most relevant contemplations of the constellation of interests might be formulated as D. Gladney did (though this thesis concerns only one sphere of interests): “Energy will continue to be the economic incentive for cooperation and the most contentious issue between the CIS, Russia, and China, as well as Iran, Turkey, Japan, and the United States… It is in the U.S. and Japan’s interests to support cooperative energy arrangements between China and Central Asia.”21 A cooperative, that is, win-win arrangement is what is most needed by locals and expected from outsiders.

5. The lessons of Afghanistan demand that the antiterrorist operation conducted in this country should be effective and carried to completion. Otherwise, the international struggle against terrorism will be unable to rid itself of geopolitical calculations and speculation.

6. Finally, in response to the question asked in the title of the article, we can conclude that the Heartland and Rimland are changing in the wake of counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. To be more precise, the geopolitical transformation of Central Asia brought about by the dissolution of the former Soviet state has only accelerated after 11 September, 2001. Central Asia is very likely to become a strategically important area, not “overlaid” by the Heartland or the Rimland as a subordinate entity, but represented in them as an independent entity.


1 See: M. Hauner, What Is Asia to Us?: Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday & Today, Routledge, London, New York, 1992, pp. 75, 96, 98, 115.
2 See: D. Pipes, “The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East,” in: Central Asia and the World, ed. by M. Mandelbaum, Council of Foreign Relations Books, New York, 1994, pp. 47-93.
3 See: F. Tolipov, “Geopolitical Stalemate in Afghanistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6, 2000.
4 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America [http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm], September 2002.
5 Statement by Dr. Elie D. Krakowski, Senior Fellow, Central Asia/Caucasus Institute, the School of Advanced International Studies, the John Hopkins University, and Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council at a Hearing on “The Future of Afghanistan” before the House Committee on International Relations, 7 November, 2001.
6 Strategic Survey, 2001/2002, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 14-15.
7 See, for example: X. Guangcheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight against Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism,” and M. Laumulin, “Central Asia after 11 September” (both in: Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (16), 2002).
8 F. Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable,” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1996.
9 See, for example: R.S. Chase, E.B. Hill, P. Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1996.
10 Strategic Survey, 2001/2002, pp. 7-8.
11 Kommersant (Moscow), 18 January, 2002.
12 USIA, 17 December, 2001.
13 W. Merry’s presentation at the Marshall Center Conference in Almaty, e-mail, 23 July, 2001.
14 See: EurasiaNet. Quoted from: Vremya PO, 23 October, 2001.
15 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 190.
16 Ibid., pp. 216-221.
17 Ibid., p. 220.
18 D. Trenin, “Unreliable Strategy,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 6, No. 1-2, Winter-Spring 2001, p. 64.
19 W. Kunzweiler, “The New Central Asian Great Game,” Strategic Review, Summer 1998.
20 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
21 D. Gladney, Central Asia and China: Security Implications of Transnationalization, Islamization, and Ethnicization, Paper presented for the George Marshall European Center for Security Studies Conference “Regional Stability and Security in Central Asia”, 7-11 December, 1998, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

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