JIHAD IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS—THEORY AND PRACTICE
Igor Dobaev, D.Sc. (Philos.), Deputy Director, Regional Center of Systemic Research and Forecasting, Rostov State University (Rostov-on-Don, Russia)
According to Muslim theoreticians the world is divided into the “area of Islam” (dar-al-islam) and the “area of war” (dar-al-harb). The former comprises the countries ruled by the Muslims; the latter, the countries ruled by the unfaithful. Theoretically, “the area of Islam” should remain at a perpetual war with “dar-al-harb.” Truces may happen but should not last for more than 10 years. Some of the faqihs discern another area—the “area of peace” (dar-al-sul’h) that does not belong to the Muslims and is not ruled by them. The rulers of this area accept their subordination to Islamic states and pay tribute to them.
At the early stage jihad was interpreted as a struggle to protect the new religion of Islam and promote it over vast territories; it was also seen as hard work on the road of Allah to disseminate the faith in Allah everywhere. Involvement in jihad was seen as a direct road to heaven. Let’s have a look at what the Koran has to say on the issue: “O you who believe, shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous Chastisement?” “(It is) that you believe in Allah and His Apostle, and that you strive (your utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your property and your persons. That will be best for you, if you but knew”; “He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity; that is indeed the Supreme Achievement” (Surah As-Saff: 10-12).
Over time, even the Prophet Muhammad changed his ideas about jihad: during his stay in Mecca he said: “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (Surah Al-Baqarah: 256); suggested: “Therefore expound openly what you are commanded, and turn away from those who join false gods with Allah” (Surah Al-Hijr: 94), and continued: “Invite (all) to the Way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious, for your Lord knows best who have strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance” (Surah An-Nahl: 125). During the Medina period when the Mecca followers of “false gods” attacked Muslims the latter were allowed to fight. At first, defense against the enemies of Islam was sanctioned; later it was permitted to attack the unfaithful outside the holy months; finally it was allowed to attack the unfaithful everywhere and at all times.1
In other words, during the Mecca period jihad was regarded as an effort to save one’s own soul rather than the struggle to convert others. At that time, there was no commonly shared opinion about whether jihad was obligatory for all. The Medina surahs impose on all the Muslims a duty to fight for their faith; it is regarded as a divine mission supported by the authority of Allah: “Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter. To him who fights in the cause of Allah, whether he is slain or gets victory, soon shall We give him a reward of great (value)”; “And why should you not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are still ill-treated (and oppressed)?—Men, women, and children, whose cry is: ‘Our Lord, rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from You one who will protect; and raise for us from You one who will help;” “Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil: So fight you against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan;” “Then fight in Allah’s cause—you are held responsible only for yourself—and motivate the Believers...” (Surah An-Nisa: 74-76, 84).
Those of the religious preachers who are using Islam for political ends refer to the ayats that openly state that it is not enough to perform religious rites to reach heaven. Those of the believers who perform namaz, pay zakat, fast in the month of Ramadan, perform hajj but prefer to keep away from a war against the unfaithful and are afraid of fighting, are regarded as people who prefer their earthly existence to heaven. This is unworthy of any Muslim, therefore the Koran strongly affects the minds of the faithful: the Koran and the Sunnah threaten those reluctant to fight for Islam with tortures normally reserved for the unfaithful and the apostates: “Unless you go forth, He will punish you with a grievous Chastisement, and put others in your place...” (Surah Al-Tawba: 39).
While the early Muslims were waging a jihad against the Arab pagans and later against the apostates and “hypocrites,” after Muhammad’s death such wars were waged against the neighbors; under certain historical conditions they acquired exceptional importance in the world of Islam as the way to perform a holy “heavenly” mission.
Further on the conception of jihad acquired six variants: jihad against the enemies of Allah (against those who threatened the umma; those who persecuted the Muslims, and against the pagans); jihad against those who violated the dar-al-islam limits; jihad against the apostates (munafiqun); jihad against those who persecuted the Muslims (al-bagi); jihad against the robbers; jihad against the monotheist non-Muslims who refused to pay “djizia.”2
Due to certain disunity inside the Islamic movement divided into all sorts of trends, ideologies and madhabs there is still no classical doctrine of jihad3 in the same way as there is no idea of faith obligatory for all Muslims. Islam as an ideology was taking shape and is functioning amid the struggle of ideas and opinions of all sorts; it is still looking for one common road to follow. In each country there is any number of groups each with its own idea about the future and the remedies for the present afflictions. One can say with a great deal of certainty that there is no faith binding on all Muslims just as there is no common Islamic way while Muslim society concentrates on various or even contradictory models. The above fully applies to the Islamic conception of jihad: no Islamic authority can put an end to the discussion about what the holy war for the faith is and how it should be conducted.
Throughout the history of Islam the idea of jihad often performed different functions and underlay domestic and foreign policies of those involved in the political process. At all times the idea was filled with varied or contradictory interpretations: it was a battle for bringing in harvest; the battle against illiteracy; the battle between the new and the old; and even the class struggle.4
On the whole Muslim “theology” (in fact, there is no generally recognized one) applies the term to the fight for the true faith which assumed various forms: jihad by the heart meaning a fight against one’s own failures; jihad by the tongue meaning “commending good conduct and forbidding the wrong”; jihad by the hand meaning adequate measures against criminals and violators of the norms of morality; jihad by the sword meaning an armed struggle against the infidels. All slain in this fight will go straight to Paradise.5
“European public opinion, however, preserved the idea of jihad as the ‘jihad by the sword’ while according to the Koran and the Sunnah this idea has many meanings.”6 This is confirmed by the fact that orthodox Islam does not regard the idea of jihad as one of the five pillars of the faith (ash-shahad—faith; as-salat—prayer; as-saum—fasting; az-zakat—alms; al-hajj—pilgrimage). Different ideological trends (traditional, modern and fundamentalist Islam) interpret jihad in different ways.
Traditional Islam interprets jihad as an effort at self-perfection rather than violence in relation to others while the smaller jihad (jihad by the sword), as a defensive war against the oppressors. The neo-traditionalists (modern traditionalists) observe the principle “let there be no compulsion in religion” as applied to jihad as one of the key ideas of Islam. This explains why traditional Islam, as distinct from fundamentalism, looks at jihad as an effort at self-perfection rather than violence in relation to others while the smaller jihad (jihad by the sword), as a defensive war against the oppressors. At the same time, “a holy war” is recognized as a duty of any Muslim. It proceeds from the idea that mankind is divided into the faithful (Muslims) and unfaithful who should be converted by any means, including force.7 In times of serious social troubles traditionalists may close ranks with fundamentalists where interpretations of jihad are concerned.8
As distinct from the traditionalists and especially fundamentalists the reformers (modernists) insist that Islam is a religion of universal humanism (insania) that preaches brotherhood of all people. The modernists are opposing nationalism as an ideology that disunites mankind. This stand logically suggests that religious tolerance is one of the key Islamic ideas.9 Therefore, jihad is interpreted either as a purely defensive war, as struggle for economic prosperity or as struggle for spiritual rebirth.
Fundamentalists look at jihad as armed struggle, which is probably explained by their aims and tasks. While the traditionalists want to preserve Islam as it exists on a certain territory, and the modernists insist on its evolution, the fundamentalist “revolutionaries” want to take it back to the so-called “golden age” (the 7th century). One finds it hard to believe that people will willingly exchange their values and world perception for those of the early Middle Ages, therefore the use of force is not excluded (moderate fundamentalists) or even deliberately planned (radical fundamentalists).
The Islamic radicals (Islamists) are the most consistent supporters of the idea of jihad as armed struggle. They insist that a holy war (jihad) that uses force is the only possible response the Muslim world can give to the regimes in the Muslim countries where Western ideals predominate. The Islamic radicals look at jihad as the sixth pillar of the faith. It is this interpretation as well as an extended interpretation of the term “taqfir” (accusation of lack of faith) that separates the Islamists from the faithful Muslims. The moderate Islamists insist on jihad’s defensive nature while the ultra-radicals want to regard it as an offensive holy war.
Al-Maududi from Pakistan, one of the most respected in the Islamic world theoretician of the moderately radical wing, has written: “In the language of the Shari‘a the word ‘jihad’ is used to denote a war waged in the name of Allah against the enemies of Islam. If an Islamic state is attacked by non-Muslims each and everyone should join the jihad. ...If there is not enough force the neighboring Muslim states have to come to the rescue. This is their religious duty. If they fail the Muslims of the entire world have to fight their common enemy. Jihad is a duty in the same way as the daily prayer and fasting. He who tries to avoid this is a sinner.”10 The same author, however, at all times objected to the use of force for the sake of building an Islamic state. In one of his lectures he called on the young people to abandon the practice of clandestine groups and the use of force and violence to reach the tasks Islamic society was facing and to change the state order. For him violence meant hate and promised little even if it looked like a shortcut to the desired aim. Al-Maududi regarded a peaceful revolution for the sake of a right aim completed through open and wide-scale propaganda addressed to the heats and minds as the most acceptable solution for the Muslim umma and each of its members engaged in promoting the Islamic call.11
A modern Turkish author Harun Yahya explains jihad in the full sense of the word as “any type of ideological struggle against anti-religious and atheist teachings and the teachings that reject God.”12 In addition to the above, he interprets jihad as a real war that “according to the Koran can be a defensive one and be waged in strict accordance with the Islamic moral principles. It is one of the greatest injustices and distortions of the truth to apply the idea of ‘jihad’ to any form of violence aimed against innocent people, that is, to terror.”13
Al-Ashmawi, a moderate Egyptian Islamic theoretician, has written: “Jihad in Islam was described in full in one of the hadiths of the Prophet who addressed the faithful after the victorious battle of Badr: ‘We have returned from Smaller Jihad back to Greater Jihad.’ From the point of view of correct (Orthodox.—I.D.) Islam a war against enemies, in which people risk their lives and property, is a smaller, or Small Jihad. As for the true Greater Jihad—it means that the soul should be tested, that man should overcome the worst traits of his nature and conduct, that (human) nature should be elevated and the soul taught lavishness.”14
However, not only Muslim theologians but also the majority of foreign and Russian Orientalists doubt the authenticity of the hadith al-Ashmawi quoted: its origins are very vague while it contradicts other, undoubtedly genuine, hadiths.15 The ultra-radicals prefer to completely ignore the doubtful hadith: they refuse to divide jihad into a “smaller” and “greater” ones and resolutely reject its defensive nature. Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, the most prominent among radical theoreticians, resolutely objected to this: “If we have to call the movement of Jihad in Islam a defensive movement then we have to inevitably change the meaning of the word ‘defense’ and interpret it as ‘protection of man.’ In its desire of peace Islam does not mean that cheap peace which boils down to safety of the Muslim-populated territory. Islam wants a peace of the sort under which all religion would belong to Allah, that is, that all people protected by that peace would worship Allah.”16
A teaching created and realized in the 18th century by an Arabian religious reformer Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab from Nejd, known today as Wahhabism, is one of the forms of radical Islam.17
The Northern Caucasus too fell victim to Wahhabism; there, as elsewhere, its supporters are known as Wahhabis. The process went on (and goes on) especially actively in Chechnia where the separatist leaders headed by Djokhar Dudaev not only did nothing to prevent its proliferation—they deliberately supported the Islamic radicals. It was at that time that the Wahhabis opened a center to disseminate religious publications, carry out collective prayer and promote their teaching in the media. The local Wahhabis were encouraged by the statements that Dudaev and his cronies were building an Islamic state that needed a single ideology. Wahhabism was selected as such.
Certain foreign factors helped disseminate the ideology of this highly politicized Muslim trend: money that came from international Islamic fundamentalist organizations; brainwashing to which their emissaries subjected Chechen pilgrims and the students who studied in Islamic universities abroad; massive spread of Salafi books and activity of Muslim agents in the region. Domestic factors added attractiveness to a certain part of the local people, mainly deeply faithful youth that comprised a key segment of the movement’s social basis.
Islamic fundamentalism in the Northern Caucasus became even more radical during the events of 1994-1996 in Chechnia and its “sovereignty” that followed. The measures at “restoring constitutional order” in the republic resulted in grave consequences for Russia and its statehood. Guided by the idea of Muslim unity the local society divided into teips and virds taken apart by numerous contradictions in peacetime closed ranks in front of the federal center. The idea of Muslim unity attracted hundreds of “warriors of jihad” from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and several Arab countries who came to the Caucasus to fight in Chechnia.
During the same period, several large-scale terrorist acts carried out under command of well-known field commanders altered the situation and led the “restoration of the constitutional order” into an impasse. Here I have in mind the acts of 1995 in Budennovsk carried out by Shamil Basaev and of 1996 in Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe carried out by Salman Raduev. These unprecedented terrorist sorties accompanied by Islamic symbols and rhetoric led to the Khasaviurt and later Moscow agreements.
As soon as the 1994-1996 military actions had been completed the leaders of the Chechen separatists staked in Wahhabism, the fundamentalist teaching that was expected to unite the republic. Later Wahhabism was planted in Chechnia with the help of numerous foreign mojahedin who had come to the republic to fight in the first campaign. In spring 1995, a detachment of foreign mercenaries who called themselves Jamaat Islami was formed under command of a Chechen from Jordan Habib Abd al-Rakhman (Amir Khattab). This proved to be an event of signal importance. He formulated his aim in Russia as the need to take part in jihad and fight until a “black banner of victory of jihad would be hoisted over the Kremlin.”18
In 1996, the Chechen community of Jordan helped set up a training center for Islamic terrorists at the village of Serzhen-Iurt (Shali District) called the Caucasian Institute of the Islamic Call (The Caucasian Institute—Da’wa); later it developed into a branch of Muslim Brotherhood, an international extremist organization.19
This was a specialized camp that made saboteurs and terrorists out of potential mojahedin of 17 and over. For two months while their minds were stuffed with radical Islamic ideology they were trained according to special programs. Some of them were sent to Muslim countries for further training. Khattab taught the future terrorists to hate Russians: “All patriotically minded Russians are fascists. Those wishing to join our ranks under the banner of the Prophet should be bound to it by spilt blood.”20 The so-called Institute opened their recruiting centers in Baku and Kiev and sent new mercenaries to Serzhen-Iurt for special training.21 Between 1996 and 1999 the training centers in Chechnia produced hundreds of terrorists.
The positions of the Chechen Wahhabis were further strengthened when in January 1998 the General Staff and the military infrastructure of the Wahhabi Jamaat (earlier based in Daghestan) moved to Chechnia together with its leader M. Bagautdin. The move followed the attack of 23 December, 1997 of Khattab’s fighters at a Russian detachment stationed in Buynaksk (Daghestan).
It was a time when crime dominated Chechnia; illegal oil business was flourishing; people were kidnapped and sold into slavery. In December 1998, the criminal group of Wahhabi Arbi Baraev cruelly murdered three British and a New Zealander.
On 17 April, 1999 Grozny hosted another sitting of the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan that passed a decision to invade the neighboring republic. The April issue of the Kavkazskaia konfederatsia newspaper published by Iandarbiev carried a call by “Amir of Urus-Martan” Ben-Ismail and “Amir of the Islamic Jamaat of Daghestan” M. Bagautdin to the young people “to take part in jihad” and join their newly created Islamic Army of the Caucasus. The young people were told that they “should fight for their precious religion and start a jihad.”22
On 2 August, 1999, Wahhabi detachments invaded Daghestan and captured several settlements of the Tsumada and Botlikh districts. Shamil Basaev was in command as head of the so-called United Command of Mojahedin of Daghestan”; the main forces operated in three groups: The Islamic Caucasian Army under M. Bagautdin; The Daghestani Rebel Army of Imam under M. Tagaev, and The Peacekeeping Forces of the Majlis of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan under Khattab. The operation planned as the first stage of liberation of Daghestan had been code-named Imam Kazi-Magomed; the local supporters of pure Islam had been expected to close ranks with the invaders together with the Chechen Akkintsy and certain other forces. This did not happen though: the invasion increased local intolerance of any signs of Islamic extremism. The negative response of the absolute majority of local population and international public was one of the reasons why the local Islamists remained passive. The people of Daghestan, especially those living close to the border with Chechnia regarded the fighters as bandits since the Wahhabis not only called to a jihad against the infidels; they also called on the local people to fight those of the Muslims who rejected their variant of Islam.
In October 1999, this aggression triggered an anti-terrorist operation directly in Chechnia in the course of which the Wahhabi enclaves were destroyed and jamaats dispersed. The agonizing criminals carried out large-scale terrorist actions in Moscow and Volgodonsk that shook the country and the world with their senseless cruelty.
Today the protest and separatist movement in Chechnia is no longer united. It consists of the following trends: nationalist (A. Maskhadov, R. Gelaev, etc.), Wahhabi (Abu al-Walid, Sh. Basaev, etc.); and criminal (numerous small groups each with a field commander of its own). Their ideological differences do not prevent them from exploiting the Islamic rhetoric and symbols to justify everything, terror included. They are constantly performing terrorist technologies by using on an increasing scale “suicide terrorists,” both men and women. At the same time, the Chechen separatist leadership is affected by deep-cutting contradictions born by the struggle for power and foreign and domestic resources. Life has shown that the ideas of “independence” and “Islamization” of the republic favored by some of the field commanders are not supported by the wide masses. The majority of the subversive and terrorist acts are carried out because they are paid for (in some cases, with money coming from abroad), and not for ideological reasons. Such acts were frequently falsified, money embezzled by top commanders such as Maskhadov, Gelaev, and others and field commanders under them. There is a lot of mutual mistrust and enmity among the armed groups: the Gelaev people find it hard to accept the Wahhabis and refuse to act together with them.
So far, the Wahhabis, though not closely united either, are the most battle-worthy force. They get more money from abroad than other fighting groups; there are many foreigners from the Middle East in their ranks. At the same time, according to experts, the Chechen followers of “pure” Islam (Basaev, Udugov, Iandarbiev, etc.) cannot be called Wahhabis. This is taken for an insult in the countries with the predominant Wahhabi ideology (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, etc.) where the Wahhabi variant of Islam is a tradition. These people should be called separatists, nationalists or even criminals—this moves them closer to other criminal Chechen groups. D. Makarov, one of the students of North Caucasian radical Islam, described the developments in Chechnia as “Wahhabization of radical nationalists.”23
This shows that more often than not the Islamic factor is exploited as an ideological and organizational wrapping of practical interests pursued by far from Islamic forces and entities of political and social action. We are dealing with fairly common separatists, nationalists, criminal structures and clans. “Islamic extremism” and “Islamic terrorism” frequently manifest itself as the archaic forms of the mountain dwellers’ social conduct: raids, social exclusion and blood feuds. Islamism is flourishing on this soil; its ideological skeleton can be used to justify political practices and mobilize the local people against the infidels.
The religious-political terrorism is frequently intertwined with ethnically tinged terrorism camouflaged as an Islamic movement. I believe that Russia is facing a type of modern terrorism everywhere (in Chechnia, in the first place) that brought together the ideology of radical Islam and religious, ethnic, and criminal terrorism supported by international extremist and terrorist structures.
In 2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury listed quasi-Wahhabi Shamil Basaev as international terrorist while the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 report issued by the U.S. Department of State pointed out that at least three bandit groups operating in Chechnia were directly connected with international Islamic terrorists and were using terrorist methods. The following groups were listed as terrorists: the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs; the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment; and the Islamic International Brigade. They are headed by Basaev, Movsar Baraev, and Abu al-Walid, respectively. In all of them there are tens of foreign, mainly Arab, mojahedin who carry out terrorist acts against Russian troops and the republic’s civilian population and are paid by international terrorist organizations, al-Qae‘da being one of them.
I think that terrorism in the Northern Caucasus cannot be viewed as a jihad in its traditional meaning. This is confirmed by those who represent “true” Islam and who say that the terrorists “are using the methods that contradict all Muslim injunctions.”24 The terrorist organizations are following an ideology of their own; they are “pursuing an aim of removing the regimes and rulers they see as unjust and cruel and of creating a much happier and more just life for people. Meanwhile, this approach is totally wrong. The All-Mighty Allah warns those who follow it that they are completely wrong25: ‘When it is said to them: “Make not mischief on the Earth,” they say: “Why, we only want to make peace.” Of a surety, they are the ones who make mischief, but they realize (it) not.’” (Surah Al-Baqarah: 11-12).
The absolute majority of the Muslim ulema, faqihs and official clergy condemn terrorism. In his fatwa dedicated to one of the terrorist acts (the explosion in July 1989 in Mecca) the former Grand mufti of Saudi Arabia Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah Ibn Baz pointed out: “All Muslims regard this as an atrocious and disgusting crime because it was an attempt to scare the pilgrims who came to the sacred House of Allah… This is a revolting crime because it used explosives next to the sacred House of Allah. It should be regarded as one of the gravest crimes and one of the gravest sins.”26 Sheikh Saleh bin Fauzan al-Fauzan answered the question: “Are such actions as assassinations and explosions of state structures in the non-Muslim countries necessary and can they be described as jihad?” with: “Assassinations and explosions are impermissible because they invite misfortunes to all Muslims and cause their murders and persecutions. As for the jihad on the way of Allah one can admit it, under certain conditions, as an open clash.”27
Let us analyze how the Muslim countries treat the problem of global terrorism posing as Islam. Ten years before the tragic events of 9/11 in New York and Washington, in 1991 the Organization of Islamic Conference adopted the Dakar Declaration that resolutely condemned international terrorism: “We resolutely condemn once more the phenomenon of terrorism that contradicts the teaching of Islam, the values, norms and traditions of our countries where human lives are treated with respect and dignity. We confirm our resolution to sincerely cooperate with the world community in its fight against international terrorism in all forms and manifestations. We shall do this within the limits of law and respect for the international legal principles.”28
The antiterrorist position of another influential international organization, the League of Arab States, the members of which are mainly Muslim countries, is no less consistent. Back in 1998, the Arab countries concluded a joint agreement on antiterrorist struggle that confirmed, “united Arab position against global terrorism.” The extraordinary meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States convened in the wake of the 9/11 events to express its solidarity with the American people confirmed once more its devotion to the above-mentioned antiterrorist declaration.29
Leaders of the Muslim World League also issued a special statement to condemn the terrorist acts in the United States and called on the heads of Muslim countries and the Islamic spiritual leaders to consistently fight terrorism. They also recommended carrying out explanatory work in all mosques. This was done.30
This shows that secular scholars, Islamic theologians, official clergy and the majority of rank and file Muslims do not recognize terrorism; they do not associate it with jihad, and condemn inadequate use of violence for political aims. One can say that the conception of jihad in its aggressive form is the ideological and practical product of extremists and terrorists who exploit and compromise Islam as a respected world monotheist religion.
1 See: Islam. Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar, Moscow, 1991, p. 51.
2 Ibid., p. 67.
3 See, for example: N.V. Zhdanov, Islamskaia kontseptsia miroporiadka, Moscow, 2003, p. 77.
4 See: Ibid., p. 79.
5 There are other classifications of jihad: “jihad an-nafs” (struggle for spiritual serf-perfection”); “jihad ash-shaitan” (struggle against the Satan); “jihad al-kuffar” (struggle against the infidels) and “jihad al-munafiqin” (struggle against the hypocrites) (see: al-Jauzi Ibn al-Din Muhammad ibn Bakr, Zaad al-mi ad fi had’a hair al-ibad, Beirut, 1412/1991; Muhammad ibn Jamil Zinu, Islamskaia Akida (verouchenie, ubezhdenie, vozzrenie) po sviashchennomu Koranu i dostovernym izrecheniam proroka Muhammada, Baku, 1997, p. 54).
6 Islam protiv terrorizma. Fetvy imamov po voprosam, kasaiushchimsia tiazhkikh bedstviy, Moscow, 2003, p. 41.
7 See: M.T. Stepaniants, “Reformatorstvo kak antiteza traditsionnosti,” in: Bog—chelovek—obshchestvo v traditsionnykh kul’turakh Vostoka, ed. by M.T. Stepaniants, Moscow, 1993, p. 222.
8 See: I.P. Dobaev, Islamskiy radikalizm: genezis, evolutsia, praktika, Rostov on Don, 2003, p. 52.
9 See: W. Shepard, The Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual. The Religious Aspects and Implications of the Writings of Ahmad Amin, Delhi, 1982, p. 132.
10 Al-Maududi, Osnovy islama, Moscow, 1993, pp. 100-101.
11 See: Al-Maududi, Islam segodnia, Moscow, 1992, pp. 26-27.
12 H. Yahya, Islam proklinaet terror, Astana, 2002, p. 35.
13 Ibid., p. 36.
14 Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi, “Jihad v Islame,” Al-islam as-siyyasi (Political Islam), 3rd edition, Cairo, 1992, p. 116.
15 See: A.A. Ignatenko, “Endogenny radikalizm v islame,” Rossia i musul’manskiy mir (Moscow), No. 12, 2000, p. 99.
16 S. Qutb, Vekhi na puti Allaha, Badr Publishers, Makhachkala, pp. 245-246.
17 For more detail, see: I. Dobaev, “Radical Wahhabism as an Extremist Religious-Political Ideology,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (16), 2002, pp. 128-138.
18 Al-Kaf, April 1998.
19 See: A. Chelnokov, “Wahhabity v Tobol’ske,” Sovershenno sekretno, No. 10, 1999.
20 Trud, 7 April, 1999.
21 See: Middle East International, 2 September, 1995, p. 17.
22 Kavkazskaia konfederatsia, April 1999.
23 See: D.V. Makarov, “Radikal’niy islamizm na Severnom Kavkaze: Daghestan i Chechnia,” Konflikt—Dialog—Sotrudnichestvo (Etnopoliticheskaia situatsia na Severnom Kavkaze), Moscow, No. 1, 1999, pp. 42-58.
24 See: H. Yahya, op. cit., p. 59.
25 See: Ibid., p. 62.
26 Islam protiv terrorizma, pp. 24, 26.
27 Ibid., p. 41.
28 A.A. Nurullaev, “Islamskiy mir: otvety na vyzovy globalizatsii,” Materialy serii seminarov, provedennykh v aprele-dekabre 2002, Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University, Moscow, 2003, p. 12.
29 See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 13 April, 2001.
30 See: A.A. Nurullaev, op. cit.