

CHINA'S SOFT POWER METHODS APPLIED IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES (THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN)

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, China began assuming a more active stance on the international arena, in particular, by using soft power methods. The application of such methods is especially apparent in the politics pursued by Xi Jinping. China's foreign policy during his leadership is characterized by the combination of hardline and soft methods. The growth of China's soft power methods is partly determined by the strong interest of Western researchers in China's current projects and initiatives. Following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, the interest in the China's successful economic development model has significantly increased.

In this paper, the authors attempted to analyze China's soft power methods applied in Kazakhstan. China possesses a set of soft power instruments that allow it to exert a degree of influence over Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan. The main components of PRC's soft power foreign policy in Kazakhstan are culture and education. The first component is based on the familiarization and further popularization of Chinese culture and its achievements in the Kazakhstan society. The second aims to strengthen the ties between the two countries in the sphere of humanities, in particular, via the development of bilateral scientific

and educational programs and the expanded accessibility of Chinese educational grants. Both components are implemented in Chinese foreign policy in Kazakhstan as two independent vectors. Meanwhile, there are Confucius Institutes that function in Kazakhstan and combine the cultural and edu-

cational components in their activities. It is also important to note that one of the strongest sides of China's soft power policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan is the image of economic success, which attracts the entire international community, and, as the result, draws in a huge influx of investments.

KEYWORDS: *China, Kazakhstan, soft power policy, investment policy, educational collaboration, Confucius Institute.*

Introduction

The Central Asian region is traditionally very significant for China. This fact is determined by the requirements of national and energy security, established economic ties, the aim to expand political influence and the implementation of a number of integrative projects in the region. China's growing interest in Central Asia is easily understandable. It can be explained by the increase of this region's importance in international politics and economy; along with growing threats and challenges there are new opportunities and prospects that open up here. The key element of China's foreign policy in Central Asia is the economic infiltration of the region via the implementation of bilateral and multilateral economic and infrastructural projects.¹

The value of Central Asia for PRC is determined by other factors, such as the presence of selling markets, ore mineral reserves, development of transportation projects, etc. In September 2013, during his visit to Astana, the Chairman of PRC Xi Jinping articulated the idea of the Silk Road Economic Belt, aimed at the economic development of the countries located along the transportation corridors between China and Europe. Along with the idea of the 21st Century Marine Silk Belt, which runs in the direction of Africa and the Middle East, it comprises the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a significant direction of the PRC's foreign policy. The countries embraced by these initiatives have become some of the key targets of China's soft power.

It is also significant to point out that China is changing swiftly and in multiple ways. PRC is placing a lot of effort into not being perceived as a threat. In the near future, numerous states will face a sharp expansion of China's influence in many regions of the world. The Chinese education system will also deliver its benefits in the coming years, as many thousands of students who receive an education in the PRC will have an opportunity to immerse in its culture in a more profound manner. This implies that, having become one of the most important players in contemporary world order, China cannot but develop such an important component of its politics as soft power, and that is precisely why it is so relevant today.

Research Methods

Joseph Nye's concept of soft power forms the theoretical concept of this research. The authors correlate the content of the concept with practices adopted by the Chinese authorities with the aim of

¹ See: S.G. Luzianin, "Tsentralnaia Azia: izmerenie bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva", available at [<http://goo.gl/yvAAOE>], 27 April, 2018.

promoting the country's interests in Kazakhstan. In order to analyze the Chinese soft power approaches and justify the conclusions, the authors examined the discourse in the official speeches of the CPC leaders, using the traditional source research methods. Historical, statistical and comparative research methods were also used, which allowed to recreate an integrated image of China's soft power policy mechanisms in Kazakhstan.

The Concept of Soft Power in International Relations: Theoretical Aspect

The concept of soft power has managed to gain great popularity in a short time in the contemporary international relations theory. Introduced into scientific discourse in the 1990s by Joseph Nye, the concept of soft power is currently a relevant discussion topic and the focus of scientific research and analysis by international experts, appearing in official documents that determine the foreign policy of various states.

According to Nye, "the essence of soft power is an actor's persuasiveness and attraction. In other words, states, and even nonstate actors, pursue soft power to burnish their image and to shape the policy preferences and outlooks of other states through persuasion and attraction rather than coercion, so that they are more in line with or have a favorable view of the rising power. This quest for legitimacy, leadership, and authority is what drives states to pursue power politics through nonmilitary inducements and approaches."²

The concept of soft power, formulated in the West, is reflected in the foreign policy of Eastern states. This idea and the opportunities and prospects its use offers for securing national interests is actively discussed in political and academic circles of the majority of Eastern countries.³ PRC's political elite talks about the concept of soft power increasingly more often. Wang Yiwei, an ex-employee of the PRC's mission in the EU, had reasonably noted that "few ideas from the Western international relations theories have managed to penetrate Chinese rhetoric so deeply and widely in recent years."⁴

Nye's statement regarding the universal nature of his theory and its correspondence to the interests of any country, group or individual may be contradicted by the diversity of "national" approaches and the soft power strategies of Eastern countries, which are increasingly more active in seeking the competitive attractiveness contest. The analysis of this struggle, which is gaining power according to a number of experts, allows to expose the emergence of strategies with explicitly apparent national specifics of certain countries that add to and modernize the initial idea, rather than one universal concept.⁵

Most notably, this is linked to the fact that the majority of Eastern countries has perceived the concept of soft power as an orientation cue that referenced their own resources, which went unnoticed or was not properly used in the past, rather than an external concept with Western origins. For instance, in China the origins of soft power were discovered in Confucian values, the ideas of subjugat-

² Chin-Hao Huang, *China's Soft Power in East Asia*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013, pp. 5-6.

³ See: S.K. Pevtsov, A.M. Bobylo, L.R. Rustamova, "Miagkaia sila" v Aziatskom-Tikhoookeanskom regionalnom kontekste. *Teoreticheskaia adaptatsia i natsionalnye praktiki*, Monograph, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, 2016, p. 4.

⁴ S. Breslin, "The Soft Notion of China's 'Soft Power'," *Asia Programme Paper*, 2011, p. 8.

⁵ See: Yee-Kuang Heng, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall. Who is the Softest of Them All? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese Strategies in the 'Soft Power' Competition Era," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 10, Issue 2, 2010, p. 290.

ing an enemy without a struggle. Thus, it is apparently reasonable to consider the ideas of soft power in ancient Chinese political thought.

China's Soft Power Political Methods in Kazakhstan

Although Nye's concept has shaped up only by the end of the 20th century, Chinese policy of soft power has always been present in the PRC's foreign policy in various forms, from the assistance of other nations' assimilation to religious leverage. Meanwhile, the philosophy of combining soft and hard power had existed from time immemorial, thus it is erroneous to assume that such an approach is a novel one. In fact, the impulse for using China's soft power in was provided by the address of China's President Hu Jintao at the 17th All-China Communist Party Congress in October 2007. "We must ... use cultural expansion as the component of our country's soft power in order to ensure people's main cultural rights and interests, to enrich the cultural life of the Chinese society and inspire enthusiasm in people for the sake of progress," he said at that time. This phrase became the reference point for China's strategy to improve its position outside the country.⁶

It is precisely with Hu Jintao's rise to power, for the first time since the establishment of the PRC, that China began paying this much attention to soft power. It is under the leadership of Hu Jintao, who was known for soft, harmonious foreign policy strategy, that new accents related to the use of traditional instruments of soft power have emerged in Chinese foreign policy and the work on the formation of a positive image of China abroad has focused on new details. PRC's foreign policy course was focused on the support of peace declarations, denunciation of the unipolar world order and politics from the position of strength. It was during the very same period that such new initiatives as "public diplomacy" and "peripheral diplomacy" have emerged in China. In addition, PRC's administration had come up with a number of foreign policy programs aimed at enlisting the support of the international community, propagating the idea of China's peaceful development path. The Chinese authorities are currently investing a lot of effort in implementing efficient soft power policy. The main areas of realizing such policies in PRC's foreign policy concept are the Asia-Pacific Region, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia.

As early as in October 2011, the document under the name of Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Certain Major Issues on Deepening Cultural System Reform and Promoting the Great Development and Great Prosperity of Socialist Culture was adopted. It contained the discussion of the growing significance of soft power in interstate competition, as well as the need to "implement the strategy of externalizing the culture, increase the international influence of Chinese culture, and demonstrate the new image of China's reforms and openness to the world."⁷

Just as in the rest of the world, the "successful economic model" component has great significance in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a relatively young state that actively aims to embrace other countries' experience for successful development, hence China's positive experience draws the attention of Kazakh society.

The relationship between China and the Republic of Kazakhstan has begun to form prior to Kazakhstan obtaining its independence, in other words, since the 18th century, when the Middle Zhuz

⁶ See: G. Nursha, "Kak 'miagkaia sila' Kitaia rabotaet v Kazakhstane?", available at [www.kisi.kz], 20 October, 2017.

⁷ A. Shustov, "'Miagkaia sila' drakona: kak Kitai pytaetsia zavoevat vliianie v Tsentralnoi Azii," available at [http://eurasia.expert/myagkaya-sila-drakona-kak-kitay-pytaetsya-zavoevat-vliyanie-v-tsentralnoy-azii/], 9 January, 2018.

began adopting dual citizenship – Russian and Chinese. Since the break-up of the U.S.S.R., China began to form an entirely new relationship with the new state, the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan had fallen under China's soft charm a quarter of a century ago, almost immediately following the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. It began with the supply of cheap goods, household chemicals and textiles from Urumqi, which had provided an income to a large part of the Kazakhstan population who had lost their jobs and become shuttle traders. Over time, the "Made in China" tags appeared even on brand-name clothes. Any product with a "Beijing factory" tag was considered of great quality.

During the last 25 years, the bilateral relations between the PRC and Kazakhstan have been dynamically developing in different areas. Kazakhstan is China's key trade partner in the post-Soviet space in Central Asia. The trade turnover indicator is growing 10-12% per year. According to official PRC data, while in 2012 the trading volumes comprised \$25.68 billion, in 2017 they have gone up to over \$28.6 billion.⁸ According to the Charge d'Affaires of the PRC embassy in the Republic of Kazakhstan Sung Wei Dong, China has become Kazakhstan's major trading partner. In turn, the Republic of Kazakhstan has become the "world leader in the amount of Chinese investments attracted."⁹ Chinese companies are primarily investing in the hydrocarbon sector, with Chinese stock holders currently owning stakes in over 22 oil companies in Kazakhstan.¹⁰ The creation of a free trade area on the China-Kazakh border in 2006 has contributed to an increase of trading volumes.

Apart from promoting economic cooperation, participation in joint integrative projects also allows the countries to positively influence each other in cultural and civilizational terms. Up until recently China and Kazakhstan had no common points in this area, but with the formation of the Silk Road Economic Belt, Kazakhstan has become not only one of its important conduits, but also an active participant.

Aside from the trade and economic cooperation between the two states, close collaboration is taking place in the educational sphere with the aim of fostering human resources. Collaboration in the science and education spheres is based on two documents, namely, the Agreement between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Education of PRC dated 3 June, 2003, and the Agreement among the Governments of SCO member states on Cooperation in the Sphere of Education dated 15 June, 2006. The first agreement provides a framework for annual student exchange of up to 100 people. Over 3,000 Chinese students study in higher education institutions of the Republic of Kazakhstan, while over 11,000 students from Kazakhstan study in Chinese colleges and universities.¹¹ The State Council on Propagation of the Chinese Language under the Ministry of Science and Education of PRC (Hanban), which manages the Confucius Institutes, operates actively in Kazakhstan. Confucius Institutes are the instruments of propagation and popularization of Chinese culture abroad. This is China's long-term communication strategy. The first such institute was established in 2004 in Seoul. Although the history of such Chinese language centers dates back to 1987, the creation of a unified brand "allowed to establish a more consolidated team of scholars of Chinese, organize the learning process and promote Chinese culture abroad more efficiently." As of early 2017, there were 511 Confucius Institutes and 1,073 Confucius classes in 140 countries, where 2.1 million people were studying Chinese.¹²

⁸ See: Statistical Data of the PRC Foreign Ministry, available at [<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn>], 24 April, 2018 (in Chinese).

⁹ Interview with the *Charge d'Affaires* of the Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Kazakhstan Sun Wei Dong, available at [<http://kz.china-embassy.org/rus/sgxx/sgdt/t1199322.htm>], 18 April, 2018.

¹⁰ See: "V RK 22 neftnyye kompanii s kitayskim uchastiem," available at [http://forbes.kz/process/probing/v_rk_rabotayut_22_neftnyye_kompanii_s_kitayskim_uchastiem], 27 April, 2018.

¹¹ See: *Brief Statistical Report for 2016 regarding foreign students arriving in China*, available at [<http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s5987/201303/148379.html>], 3 October, 2017 (in Chinese).

¹² See: G. Nursha, op. cit.

There are four Confucius Institutes in Kazakhstan, and since 2007 the International Kazakh-Chinese Academy has also been in operation. Also, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of PRC on mutual recognition of educational and academic credentials dated 20 December 0, 2006 is in place. Another agreement, this time between the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation, was concluded in 2011 in regard to cooperation in the education sphere, which provided the framework for personnel training for the oil and gas industry.

Annual cultural exchange also occurs between the two countries. This vector is also one of the instruments of China's soft power in Kazakhstan. Two Chinese cultural centers are currently functioning in the Republic of Kazakhstan – The Center of Chinese Culture in Almaty and the Chinese National and Cultural Center in Karaganda. For instance, a Special Commission for Cooperation in the Cultural Sphere was established in 2002. Practically every year PRC organizes performing tours in major Kazakhstan cities in the wake of the Chinese New Year. In 2011, it was a band from Nanjing, in 2012—a Hainan folk ensemble, in 2013—a troupe from Hunan.¹³ In addition, Chinese traditional art exhibitions, Chinese Culture Day and other events are held.

Since the ancient times, China and Kazakhstan have been friendly neighbors, the ancient Silk Road has tied the two countries closely. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the cooperation between China and the Republic of Kazakhstan has been developing productively, and the cultural contacts, which have attained great success, are a significant part of the process. Regular annual meetings of the China-Kazakhstan Subcommittee for Cultural and Humanitarian Cooperation have been held since its creation in 2005. The work of the subcommittee, which is presided over by the deputy ministers of culture of the two countries, embraces cultural artefacts, radio broadcasting, journalism, publishing industry, archives, writers' union, and other areas, becoming an efficient platform for bilateral academic exchange and cooperation. In the last several years, both sides have conducted cultural days, film weeks of both countries and other major events. In the sphere of cultural artefact protection, China and Kazakhstan have sent a preliminary inquiry to the UNESCO World Heritage Center regarding the jointly developed project Silk Roads: The Routes Network of the Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor. The *Kazakhstan Treasures* exhibition was held at China's National Museum, and a gala concert "Kazakhstan Culture Days" was conducted at the National Grand Theater of China as part of Culture Days in 2013. Also, in 2014 China held Chinese Culture Days in Kazakhstan. Exceptional Chinese performance troupes were sent to reveal unique Chinese culture and art to the people of Kazakhstan.

It is well known that China is a multi-national country that is home to 56 nationalities, including the Kazakhs. The Chinese government is making a great financial and material investment in assisting the Kazakh people in preserving and developing their unique national culture and identity. Many Chinese Kazakhs travel to Kazakhstan or visit it on business, and plenty of Kazakhstan citizens visit and study in China. Such grassroots exchange also contributes significantly to cultural exchange and contacts between the two countries and promotes mutual understanding and friendship between the two nations.

In addition, let us review the instruments that not only reflect the degree of efficiency of China's soft power, but also demonstrate the integration of Chinese culture with that of Kazakhstan. They include Chinese film distribution and the widespread presence of Chinese food. China currently invests a lot of money in film production. In 2013, it took the second place after the U.S. in the film production market volume, outperforming even Bollywood in India. Soon enough Chinese films will have a major presence in the cinemas of the post-Soviet countries.

¹³ See: "Chinese-Kazakhstan Cultural Ties," available at [<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0905/c64387-22819235.html>], 15 April, 2018.

As the director of the UNESCO Center at the Al-Farabi Kazakhstan National University Layla Akhmetova notes, China is increasing its cooperation with film professionals in the post-Soviet space. Chinese films do not yet have sufficient presence in Kazakhstan. A Kazakhstan-China film about the love of a Chinese man for a Kazakh girl in Kazakhstan will become the first such project in the cultural sphere. The Eurasian Academy of Kazakhstan has also signed an agreement with China regarding the creation of a feature film about Almaty in 1942-1944.¹⁴ Apparently, China is searching for common points with its neighbors through film. While Hollywood blockbusters often portray technology manufactured in China, films about the common pages in the history of the war that is sacred for post-Soviet countries, signify that China is guided by strategic rather than economic interests in the post-Soviet space.

In addition, China is set on Chinese citizens beginning to explore Kazakhstan, coming to work and establishing their business there. It is not an accident that China is also working on the creation of a positive image of Kazakhstan and Kazakhs within China. A documentary *China and Kazakhstan: History of Friendship* has been widely broadcast on Chinese television. Kazakh TV channels have broadcast documentaries on Chinese culture and life—*China on the Tip of the Tongue*, *Family on Wheels*, and Chinese TV series.

A number of Chinese media resources operate in Kazakhstan, with cable TV packages with over 40 Chinese-language channels available to Kazakhstan residents, all the more so as Chinese enterprises are responsible for the socioeconomic climate in some of the regions, which stimulates the studying of Chinese. The fact that knowledge of the Chinese language is valuable in finding a good job has, for instance, become a norm in Western Kazakhstan. Just as in many other countries, there are offices of the Xinhua information agency, Renmin Ribao daily newspaper and Guanmin Ribao newspaper, China's international radio, China Central Television (CCTV) and Xinjian TV channel (in Kazakh). Meanwhile, the fact that Xinhua offices in Kazakhstan operate in Russian, which expands their audience in Kazakhstan, is also worth noting.

The situation with national cuisine is somewhat different—there are over 150 Chinese cafes and restaurants in various cities in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which are as popular as the Russian and American (fast-food) cafes. The PRC has started with the import of a small number of Chinese tea varieties, but the quality of the goods was always exemplary, with the assortment increasing year to year. Gradually Chinese dishware and figurines began appearing in Kazakh stores. Simple and elite tea ceremonies began to be held, with the aim of familiarizing the Kazakh population with Chinese culture. The precisely calibrated tea-drinking ceremony, where everything is governed by feng shui, reflects China's general strategy in its dealings with Kazakhstan—familiarize its population with Chinese culture in a non-obtrusive manner, but set its own rules of the game.

Special attention is heeded to the scale of bi-directional tourism between China and Kazakhstan. The number of tourists entering from the PRC is growing with each passing year. Health tourism in China is particularly attractive to the people of Kazakhstan, with business and recreational visits in the second place. However, Kazakhstan citizens cannot directly access China's tourism market, since all major social media networks are banned there.

Another important point in China's soft power policy in regard to the Republic of Kazakhstan is the migration of Chinese citizens. In recent years, certain experts have even expressed their concerns that it will increase social tension in the regions of Kazakhstan with a large migrant presence. There are also positive assessments of the situation, which claim that the number of foreign workers

¹⁴ See: "Kitai perenimaet gollivudskiy opyt," Interview with the Director of the UNESCO Center at the al-Farabi Kazakhstan National University Layla Akhmetova, available at [<https://www.ritneurasia.org/news-2016-12-18--kino-i-politika-na-prostorah-evrazii-mjagkaja-sila-iskusstva-27434>], 18 December, 2018.

does not exceed 3-5% in large cities, and tenths or hundredth of one percent of the entire workforce outside of metropolitan areas.¹⁵

In this regard, we would like to mention certain peculiarities that have emerged in Kazakhstan. For instance, the fear of the “Chinese threat,” pervasive in Kazakhstan, has become a certain hindrance. In the first years of Kazakhstan’s independence, an image of China as it has formed in the Soviet period was dominant there, since it was an ex-Soviet republic. This approach was determined, on the one side, by the U.S.S.R.’s view of China as a junior partner on the international arena, and on the other hand, following a deterioration in relations and a border conflict, as a potential enemy.

Currently, however, Kazakhstan has formed its own approach that differs both from the Russian outlook, and those of other post-Soviet countries’ citizens. Another factor that influences Kazakhstan’s perception of China is the fact that the two countries are neighbors. The peoples have interacted for several thousand years, and know each other well enough. That is why, unlike other countries that are geographically removed from China, Kazakhstan has formed a certain perception of its culture and traditions.

Meanwhile, in the context of China’s growing economic and military power, the neighbor factor gives rise to a “more sensitive attitude of Kazakhstan citizens to speculations on the topic of the Chinese threat,” and in very different spheres at that.¹⁶ An example is provided by the outbursts of internal polemics on the land issue in Kazakhstan.

In connection with this, and under the influence of the complicated perception of China by Kazakhstan population, the efficiency of Chinese soft power in the country is slowly declining. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the programs that aim to popularize and promote Chinese culture is decreasing as well. Educational programs, on the contrary, are attaining maximum results in Kazakhstan. There is, however, another difficulty that arises—the graduates have difficulties with finding employment, since there is a career ceiling for Kazakh citizens in Chinese companies, with the latter preferring to hire their countrymen for middle and high-level management positions. It is also important to mention that the demand for the Chinese language is extremely low outside of the retail sphere. Thus, despite the increasing opportunities of receiving education in China, the opportunity of subsequently utilizing it in Kazakhstan is scarce.

Conclusion

Summing up, we would like to note that while analyzing China’s foreign policy Joseph Nye states that “soft power primarily is produced by civil society—everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture—not from the government.”¹⁷

The authors of this paper have attempted to examine which elements of soft power of China’s policy have been or will be implemented in Kazakhstan. As of now, Chinese authorities have not yet developed an official program on promoting its soft power policy in Central Asia. Nonetheless, judging by China’s activity in realizing all-pervading cultural and educational events in the region, it can be assumed that the country’s authorities are close to adopting such a program document. Meanwhile, it would be fair to state that China’s soft power policy is implemented using the following instruments: grants, Confucius Institutes, mass media activities, Chinese public foundations and other organizations, as well as various economic projects and China-Eurasia exhibitions.

¹⁵ See: “Pochemu my boimsia kitaiskikh migrantov?”, available at? [<http://goo.gl/ABfKPY>], 20 April, 2018.

¹⁶ See: G. Nursha, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ See: J.S. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” available at [<http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-russia-dont-get-about-soft-power>], 21 March, 2018.

In a period of time considered short by historical standards, China became a key international economic partner for Kazakhstan, as well as many other countries in the world. As the chief research associate of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies Konstantin Syroezhkin suggests, China's economic success will gradually transform into political leverage.¹⁸ As it becomes far more important than just a buyer of energy resources and supplier of consumer goods, China is working on its image, on the proper ways to implement its policy without a negative attitude, continuing to expand its presence in the region.

In conclusion, we would like to note that the cultural and educational components dominate China's soft power politics. It can be stated that the soft power instruments currently utilized in Kazakhstan are universal, in the sense that they are used in the same way in any spot on the planet where China is present, and are not adapted to the realities of Kazakhstan.

Culture as the soft power of a country is the basis for long-term development, it determines countries' real weight and their future. The Chinese government invariably pursues a peaceful development politics. The Silk Road Economic Belt joint implementation initiative intends to become not only a business channel between China and the Central Asian states, but also a cultural exchange and integration conduit between China and countries of Central Asia.

¹⁸ Quoted from: K. Ezenova, "Kitaiskaia 'miagkaia sila'. Realnost ili mif?", available at [<http://www.exclusive.kz/expertiza/politika/11991/>], 9 May, 2018.