

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN: RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

Sergey ZHILTSOV

*D.Sc. (Political Science),  
Head of the Department of Political Science and Political Philosophy,  
Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia;  
Professor, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia;  
Research Fellow, the Sergey Witte University of Moscow  
(Moscow, Russian Federation)*

Igor ZONN

*D.Sc. (Geography), Research Fellow, the Sergey Witte University of Moscow  
(Moscow, Russian Federation)*

### ABSTRACT

**K**azakhstan has been following its own path of social development that differed a lot from its Central Asian neighbors: it did not opt for total democratization as Kyrgyzstan did (viewed at a certain time as the region's most democratic country) and was not tempted by the autocratic trends typical of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan where, back in 1992, the president became the central figure with the parliament and the judicial system pushed aside.

Kazakhstan took time to build up its political system, where the president invariably remained the main figure. The First President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev played a huge role in the political processes unfolding in the country and its development as a whole. His well-balanced foreign policy helped avoid the shocks of economic reforms and political upheavals inside and outside the country and establish good relationships with its Central Asian neighbors as well as with Russia, the U.S., and China.

For a long time the First President was consistently consolidating the executive power vertical in order to concentrate it in

the hands of the president and stabilize the social and economic situation by keeping the multifaceted influence of regional elites in check.

On the other hand, consolidation of presidential power caused certain political problems, which negatively affected the country's development, namely, lack of political elite rotation and complete domination of the president in the country where the parliament had no independent role to play.

The political system, therefore, was adjusted to the interests of Nazarbayev and his closest circle, which became especially clear when he decided that time had come to start looking for ways and means to preserve political stability and remain in control. It was vitally important to continue his well-balanced foreign policy, to prevent cardinal changes in the balance of power inside the country and ensure the continuity of power. On the other hand, changes at the country's highest post could no longer be postponed, which explains why in recent years the First President of Kazakhstan has been working hard to resolve the problem.

*In 2019, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev won the off-year presidential elections to become the second president of Kazakhstan. The process attracted a lot of attention for the simple reason that the head of state is the key figure in the country's political system. The fact that Nursultan Nazarbayev stayed away from the elections for the first time in the country's history and suggested To-*

*kayev as a presidential candidate stirred even more interest.*

*This election summed up the presidency of Nazarbayev, who remained the key figure on the republic's political arena.*

*Tokayev's advent to power opened a new stage for the country's political development, the results of which are hardly predictable.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Kazakhstan, political process, power, political system, Nazarbayev, Tokayev.*

## *Introduction*

The story began in the late 1980s, when the federal center lost some of its influence in Kazakhstan, one of the Soviet republics at the time, and forced the local leaders to redistribute the rights and duties. The presidency introduced in all Union republics was one of the obvious signs of their stronger positions. In April 1990, that is when the Soviet Union was still a unified whole, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan established the post of the president and elected Nursultan Nazarbayev President of the Republic. In December 1991 he was reelected during the general presidential elections. His victory was the result of a covenant between the republic's main political forces and launched political changes in Kazakhstan.

The political system, which was created from scratch, formally relied on Western patterns while being deeply rooted in the country's past; it relied on the informal practices of regional-clan division that, having survived Soviet power, proved to be very much alive. In Soviet times, the party and administrative mechanisms kept clan disagreements in check: none of the clans was allowed to consolidate its power at the expense of others.

In independent Kazakhstan the president acquired enough power to build up a system of authority based on available experience and relevant to the tasks the country was facing at the time. It was highly important to trim the influence of the Supreme Soviet, the president's main opponent. As distinct from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan where the presidents never hesitated to deal harshly with the opposition parties<sup>1</sup> or to limit the powers and influence of the parliament and the judicial system, in Kazakhstan the institution of presidency was building up its power and influence gradually. It was in April 1995 that the referendum expanded presidential powers; in August, after a conflict between the president and the legislature<sup>2</sup> and a referendum, the country acquired a new Constitution which buried the issue of a parliamentary republic in Kazakhstan.<sup>3</sup>

It was in the same year that the Supreme Soviet passed the Law on Temporal Powers of the Presidents and Heads of Administrations that had widened their powers; a new parliament was elec-

<sup>1</sup> See: E.T. Seylekhonov, *Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Kazakhstan: opyt razvitiia i perspektivy*, KISI (Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies) under the President of the RK, Almaty, 2009, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> See: R.N. Zhanguzhin, *Kazakhstan postsovetskiiy*, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, NAN of Ukraine, Kiev, 2002, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> See: M. Karsakov, "Osobennosti transformatsii politicheskoy sistemy Kazakhstana v kontse 80kh-seredine 90kh godov," *Tsentralnaia Azia*, No. 14, 1998.

ted at the same time. Nobody noticed that the parliament was thrust aside and nobody stood up to defend it.<sup>4</sup>

The president, meanwhile, was consistently expanding his powers: in October 1998, a Constitutional amendment extended the term of presidency to seven years with no limitations on the number of terms; in January 1999, the off-year presidential elections allowed Nazarbayev to remain in power; in June 2000, the Constitutional Council ruled that it was Nazarbayev's first presidential term because his previous terms had been acquired under the "old" Constitutions; in December 2005, Nazarbayev won the presidential elections for the third time.

Post-Soviet Kazakhstan tried to fit the democratic principles into the form of parliamentary and presidential elections, a multi-party system and the principle of separation of powers. Very soon, however, it became clear that the Central Asian countries were not ready to cut their political garments according to Western patterns.<sup>5</sup> Kazakhstan, which developed economic and political relationships with the West, tried to fit the demands of democratic states. The parliamentary and presidential elections, the multi-party system and the separation of powers were treated as evidence that the country was aligned with the Western political principles. In real life, however, the ruling regime exploited the democratic procedures and elections as one of the forms of political mobilization.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Kazakhstan had relied on the traditional methods of governance with compromises between informal groups of influence achieved behind the scene rather than in official structures. This system left no place for opposition parties; it was nothing more than a screen behind which a tribal and clan system was structured according to traditions and historical experience. As could be expected, this created highly specific conditions for domestic and foreign policies.<sup>7</sup> The viable self-regulation structures of local societies (religious, tribal, clan and other traditional ties) strongly affected the conditions in which external and internal policy of Kazakhstan was taking shape.<sup>8</sup>

This made the president the key figure in Kazakhstan's political system: he determined the country's foreign policy and strongly affected everything that was going on inside the country. Formally, Kazakhstan was a country of political pluralism, where the legislature with all sorts of informal groups was protected against direct pressure. The president, however, went to all lengths to neutralize powerful regional and ethnic clans<sup>9</sup> locked in an uncompromising struggle for the redistribution of power. In this context true democracy was replaced with its bleak copy.<sup>10</sup> This was the case in all Central Asian countries, whose leaders paid lip service to the liberal democratic values and ideals. In practice, however, this was propaganda pure and simple, far removed from the real intention to arrive at a liberal democratic system of governance.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> See: N.I. Petrov, M.S. Gafarly, "Kurs na politicheskuiu stabilnost i sotrudnichestvo s sosiediami," in: *Postsovetskaiia Tsentralnaia Azia. Poteri i obretenia*, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, RAN, Moscow, 1998, p. 50.

<sup>5</sup> See: S. Zhiltsov, "Political Processes in Central Asia: Peculiarities, Problems, Prospects," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 21-29.

<sup>6</sup> See: A. Kurtov, *Demokratia vyborov v Kazakhstane: avtoritarnaia transformatsia*, ASTI-IZDAT, Moscow, 2001, p. 331.

<sup>7</sup> See: A.D. Bogaturov, A.S. Dundich, V.G. Korgun *et al.*, *Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v Tsentralnoy Azii: sobytia i dokumenty*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> See: *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> See: *Tsentralnaia Azia: 1991-2009*: Monograph, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI under the President of the RK, Almaty, 2010, p. 199.

<sup>10</sup> See: V. Tuleshov, "K voprosu o formirovani i razvitiu identichnosti v Kazakhstane i Tsentralnoy Azii," in: *Tsentralnaia Azia-25: mysli o proshlom, proektsiia budushchego*, 2017, ed. by M. Laruelle, A. Kurmanova, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, the George Washington University, Washington, 2017, pp. 36-38.

<sup>11</sup> See: P.N. Zhanguzhin, *Novye nezavisimye gosudarstva Tsentralnoy Azii v sisteme sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, NAN of Ukraine, Kiev, 2005, p. 52.

## Political Construction Kit

Redistribution of power in favor of the president of Kazakhstan created a very specific political system based not so much on the parliament and not on the institute of presidency, but on Nazarbayev. His wider powers allowed him to realize a unified state policy and keep in check political rivalry among the branches of power.<sup>12</sup> At a certain stage of development, when the task of building up a modern state made important economic decisions essential or even inevitable, this approach was justified.

In the course of time, however, the super-presidential republic became a negative factor: false political stability could no longer conceal the gradually rising social tension and the absence of political competition. The political model practically ignored the interests of the regional elites. Konstantin Syroezhkin pointed to the weak political institutions as the main danger: the presidential vertical of power that relied on the authority of President Nazarbayev was the only viable and efficient structure.<sup>13</sup>

The president of Kazakhstan tried to take this into account. In 2007, he suggested a reform of the political system that widened the powers of the parliament.<sup>14</sup> Constitutional amendments of 2007 strengthened the legislature<sup>15</sup> and consolidated the power of the president.<sup>16</sup> The presidential term was cut to five years, yet the first president was excluded from the Constitutional norm of the maximum of two presidential terms in a row. In June 2010, Nursultan Nazarbayev received the official status of the First President of Kazakhstan. In February 2011, the Constitutional amendment allowed the president to run in off-year presidential elections. Several months later, in April, Nazarbayev won the next off-year elections.

The formally observed democratic changes did not bring the country closer to Western democracy. Elections presented to the public as one of the democratic processes<sup>17</sup> were not democratic at all. The Western countries did all they could to develop democracy in Kazakhstan, which proved to be a very difficult endeavor.<sup>18</sup> The leaders of Kazakhstan wanted to remain in power no matter what; this can be partly explained by the inter-clan relationships. Democratic procedures were nothing more than an instrument of attracting investments and maintaining political contacts.<sup>19</sup>

The Constitutional changes, likewise, were superficial; they could not improve and never improved the situation: the nature of presidential power remained intact. During the years of independence, the Central Asian countries have revived and consolidated their clan systems as a guarantor of relative political stability and an instrument of regulation of political processes. The president remains the key figure and as such plays a great role in the balance of power inside the country.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See: D.E. Furman, "Evolutsia politicheskikh sistem stran SNG," in: *Sredizemnomorie-Chernomorie-Caspian: mezhdru Bolshoi Evropoi i Bolshim Blizhnim Vostokom*, ed. by N.P. Shmelev, V.A. Guseynov, A.D. Iazkova, Granitsa, Moscow, 2006, p. 136.

<sup>13</sup> See: K.L. Syroezhkin, "Sotsialno-politicheskiy protsess v Kazakhstane (opyt rekonstruktsii)," in *Politicheskiy protsess v Tsentralnoy Azii: rezultaty, problemy, perspektivy*, IV RAS, Moscow, 2011, pp. 194-195.

<sup>14</sup> See: S. Shkel, "The Political Regime in Kazakhstan: Its Current State and Possible Future," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6 (60), 2009, pp. 101-108.

<sup>15</sup> See: *Kazakhstan: 20 let nezavisimosti*, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI under the President of the RK, Almaty, 2011, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> See: *Tsentralnaia Azia: 1991-2009*: Monograph, p. 69.

<sup>17</sup> See: Iu.O. Buluktaev, S.O. Bokaev, *Elektoralnaia demokratia v Respublike Kazakhstan*, KISI under the President of the RK, Almaty, 2011, 244 pp.

<sup>18</sup> See: E.U. Sharipov, "Energeticheskie resursy Kaspiyskogo regiona i vneshnie svyazi Kazakhstana i Turkmenistana v oblasti ugleodorodov," in: *Strany SNG v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy*, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Moscow, 2008, p. 406.

<sup>19</sup> See: Iu.G. Aleksandrov, *Kazakhstan pered bar'erom modernizatsii*, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Moscow, 2013, 288 pp.

<sup>20</sup> See: A.M. Vasiliev, "Rossia i Tsentralnaia Azia," in: *Postsovetskaia Tsentralnaia Azia. Poteri i obreteniia*, p. 7.

In Kazakhstan, therefore, the president remained at the helm, which made the country's political future vague and the elite—too concerned to avoid squabbles. In the absence of well-oiled mechanisms of transit of power (presidential elections) the risk of conflicts was very high.

In 2015, the country went to the polls to vote at the next off-term presidential elections carried out a year earlier than scheduled. Formally, this was done to give Nazarbayev a chance to realize his new initiatives; in fact, this deprived the opponents of the time needed for a proper election campaign. The authorities, in turn, used this chance to take the lead, detracting the attention of the country's population from the social and economic reforms and the highly unpopular measures. Kazakhstan was in turmoil, despite his huge political and economic experience, Nazarbayev lost the initiative.<sup>21</sup> At that time the question of Kazakhstan's political future came to the fore.<sup>22</sup>

## In Search of an Ideal Model

In recent years, Nazarbayev was looking for a power transfer formula, so to speak, which, while imitating similar Western procedures, that is, rotation of power, would allow him to preserve his role in politics. In 2017, the Constitution was amended once more to redistribute the powers between the president, the government and the parliament. The latter, or, rather, its lower chamber, acquired the right to review all ministerial candidates before their appointment; the head of state, however, retained a fairly big share of his powers.

In 2017-2018, the Constitutional amendments limited the rights of presidential candidates: for instance, the civil service experience requirement closed the doors to self-nominees. Kazakhstan expert Islam Kuraev presupposed, and with good reason, that “the transfer of power will be fairly smooth and will be accepted by all political groups.”<sup>23</sup>

In the course of time, the mechanism of pre-term elections created certain problems: out of seven parliamentary elections five were carried out ahead of schedule. This means that the “resetting” of the parliament was carried out to consolidate the positions of the president and limit the role of the parliament. More than that, this technology made considerable changes at the top possible.

Nazarbayev's quest for a version of power transition that would have preserved his domination when he left the post of the president has begun. In 2017-2018, the main groups of influence and the political elite clashed for the right to nominate the next president. The key figures in his closest circle were actively seeking his support to be nominated as candidates at the next presidential elections.

## A New Trend

Political changes appeared on the horizon after a long period of seeking the best possible option that would allow Nazarbayev to remain in power but leave the post. Time was short: political changes were long overdue. The next presidential elections were scheduled for 2020, and there was a chance of new candidates appearing. Unrelated to the president and his closest circle, they may have

---

<sup>21</sup> [<http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2019/03/04/1767411.html>], 7 August, 2019.

<sup>22</sup> See: *Integratsionnye proekty v Evrazii: problemy sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya*, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, K. Kaiser, Scientific Research Institute for the International and Regional Cooperation at the Kazakh-German University, Almaty, 2016, 248 pp.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted from: A. Ivanov-Vayskopf, “Prezidentskie vybory v Kazakhstane: poka tikho, no...” *Kursiv*, 4 April, 2019, pp. 1, 2.

looked acceptable to Russia, China, the EU and the U.S., which demonstrated significant interest in the ongoing events in Kazakhstan.

A higher status for the Security Council in the republic's system of authority looked attractive enough: its new status and wider powers would have put its head on an equal basis with the president.

The draft Law on the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan presupposed that it would be headed by Nazarbayev who would thus remain in power for the rest of his life. This called for Constitutional amendments.

The president's closest circle expected that these changes would make criticism of the Western states impossible. To avoid accusations of the desire to establish an authoritarian regime, the president planned to initiate another Constitutional redistribution of powers in favor of the parliament at the expense of the president.

Early in 2018, the country closely approached the realization of this idea, yet the changes were not free from certain risks. It remained unclear how the Security Council and the Presidential Administration would coexist in future; the potential Law on the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan that might have established dual power in the republic caused apprehensions. Indeed, the Head (Nazarbayev) of the Security Council with extensive presidential powers and the wide powers that would remain in the hands of a new head of state might have led to a conflict of interests between them and aggravate the political situation.

Nazarbayev was not in a hurry, but the idea of a political reform survived: a new mechanism of interaction between the Security Council and the Presidential Administration and between the Head of the Security Council and the new President was needed.

The Law on the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted in 2018; it transformed the Council from a consultative structure headed by the president into a Constitutional structure with wide powers and the Leader of the Nation (Elbasy) as its head for life.

Nazarbayev did this to achieve a smooth transit of power and in order to remain in power. The Constitutional changes upgraded the status of the Security Council and lowered the status of the Presidential Administration.

The law intensified the undercover rivalry between the two structures, which was especially obvious in the process of drafting and discussing the documents in the corridors of power. The country acquired two centers of power with extensive rights; Nazarbayev used his authority to suppress open competition: he wanted to remain in control over both groups and to preserve political stability.

The system of checks and balances and the mechanisms that was fine-tuned for the acting president and allowed him to remain in power will not survive political changes: it contained preconditions of future exacerbations and political rivalry. Two power centers with practically equal rights will compete between themselves, while internal forces and extra-regional players will try to capitalize on their rivalry.

## **Moving towards Clarity**

The First President of Kazakhstan did not want to exacerbate political tension: on 19 March, 2019 he stepped down from the post of the head of state; Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, speaker of the Senate, was appointed president. On the next day the new president suggested that Dariga Nazarbayeva would be appointed speaker of the Senate; the upper chamber agreed.

On 20 March, 2019, having taken the oath, President of Kazakhstan Tokayev suggested in his inaugural speech that Astana, the republic's capital, should be renamed Nur-Sultan, in honor of the First President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. The parliament agreed; on 23 March, the pres-

ident signed a Decree on the new name for the country's capital; on the same day Art 2 of the Constitution was amended.

It was expected that Tokayev would fulfill the duties of the head of state until April 2020, when the presidential term of his predecessor would expire. The next presidential elections should be carried out in December 2020. On 9 April, 2019, however, President Tokayev announced that the next off-year presidential elections would take place on 9 June: "I firmly believe that early elections of the Head of State are a vital necessity. In order to ensure political and social consent, confidently move forward, and solve the tasks of socio-economic development, it is of vital importance to remove any uncertainty. Moreover, the situation in the world is changing rapidly, and, unfortunately, we are facing new challenges ahead. We must confirm the continuity, predictability and stability of our domestic and foreign policy. We shall continue working on the effective, successful implementation of social programs and strategic course of Elbasy. This can be fulfilled only through direct expression of the will of the people in the elections."<sup>24</sup>

The fairly complicated social and economic situation meant that pre-term elections were needed. Food prices were climbing up along with the prices on essential goods; everything that the government was doing to raise wages in the strategically important sectors (metallurgy and oil extraction) may have proven futile and fanned latent dissatisfaction across the country.<sup>25</sup> The First President wanted to complete the so-called transit of power as quickly as possible to clarify the political situation. Expert Tolganay Umbetaliyeva from the Central Asian Foundation for the Development of Democracy has pointed out that "the two centers of political decision-making created a system of dual power—on the one hand, there is acting President Mr. Tokayev, on the other, an informal and, more likely than not, the main center of political decision-making represented by former president Mr. Nazarbayev. In the absence of mechanisms of settling contradictions between these two centers operating inside a new construct might lead to dual power in our political system."<sup>26</sup>

On 9 June, 2019, Tokayev won the presidential elections; the new president is in perfect alignment with Nazarbayev's interests. Having worked abroad for a long time, he was excluded from the political changes that had taken place in Kazakhstan; not an appointee of financial-industrial groups, he belonged to Nazarbayev's closest circle and, as president, would remain under his strong influence.

The transit of power, however, was not completed; the 2019 elections were but the first step towards a new political system in which Nazarbayev would remain the most influential player as the Leader of the Nation and Chairman of the Security Council for life and would balance out the power of the president.<sup>27</sup> On the whole, the off-year elections created preconditions for even fiercer political competition between the practically equal centers of power. A conflict of interests cannot be excluded as well as an open confrontation.

The transit of power is realized against the background of slower economic growth and the worsening socio-political situation accompanied by a crisis of the middle class, lower incomes of the main population groups, increasingly more noticeable inequality of economic growth due to unstable urbanization, problems with the development of infrastructure and the complicated ecological situation.<sup>28</sup>

No matter how attractive the scheme—the First President at the head of the Security Council and Tokayev as President—looks at first glance, it is not free from certain faults, dual power being

---

<sup>24</sup> [[http://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/internal\\_political\\_affairs/in\\_speeches\\_and\\_addresses/address-of-the-president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayev-to-the-nation](http://www.akorda.kz/en/speeches/internal_political_affairs/in_speeches_and_addresses/address-of-the-president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayev-to-the-nation)], 12 August, 2019.

<sup>25</sup> [<https://ia-centr.ru/experts/sergey-masaulov/kazakhstan-politicheskaya-sfera-v-2019-godu/>], 7 August, 2019.

<sup>26</sup> [[https://kz.expert.ru/materials/polemika/1373\\_o\\_riskah\\_tranzitnoy\\_vlasti](https://kz.expert.ru/materials/polemika/1373_o_riskah_tranzitnoy_vlasti)], 12 August, 2019.

<sup>27</sup> [<https://ia-centr.ru/experts/gaziz-abishev/nyneshniy-sostav-kazakhstanskogo-parlamenta-ustarel-ikh-mesto-dolzhnyazanyat-odnomandatniki/>], 12 August, 2019.

<sup>28</sup> [<https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/perekhodit-reku-nashchupyvaya-brod-prezidentskie-vybory-v-kazakhstane-2019/>], 12 August, 2019.

the main of them. The president elected by general vote has extensive powers and will pursue an independent foreign and domestic policy. Nazarbayev as head of the Security Council will keep the president in check. If and when his role in domestic policies decreases, the entire political structure will become unbalanced. Regional groups may try harder to gain control over the post of the head of the Security Council.

The absence of a mechanism of cooperation between the Security Council and the Presidential Administration will intensify the struggle between Nazarbayev and the second president of Kazakhstan for greater control of the situation in the country. This means that after the pre-term presidential conditions the conflict between these two structures may develop into a serious one, and further on into an acute conflict of interests among all branches of power and regional elites. This will not have a positive effect on the social and political situation and economic growth. Moreover, it will fan the competition between Russia and China—both will increase their pressure on Nur-Sultan.

### *Conclusion*

The desire of the First President and his closest circle to remain in power pushed aside the problems of interregional relations, the relations between the center and the regions and the problems of economic development. The Constitutional amendments that followed one another, the alterations to the parliamentary elections system, the off-year presidential elections did and are doing nothing good to the country's political development. Dissatisfaction among the regional elites that are unable to protect their interests is rising.

The new functions of the Security Council, just recently a consultative structure, created the precedent of adjusting the Constitution to the interests of any influential politician. The role of the First President in the development of Kazakhstan was immense, a fact that is fraught with potential problems for his successors.

The reformed role of the Security Council of Kazakhstan is, in fact, a Constitutional reform of unprecedented importance. It has led to subsequent constitutional amendments, stripping the country of political stability. The tipped balance of power between the parliament, the president, and the government may cause conflicts between them in the future.

---