

**ETHNIC TENSION
IN KYRGYZSTAN
IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD:
ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY RESULTS**

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ABSTRACT

The author analyzes the ethnocultural and psychological factors contributing to the continued ethnic tension in Kyrgyzstan in the post-conflict period. These factors figured prominently in the flare-ups of ethnic tension and continued ethnic strain.

Dr. Chotaeva proceeds from the results of an ethnosociological survey carried out in five regions of Kyrgyzstan.

The ethnocultural factors are related to various aspects of ethnic identity—the extent to which the family and close relatives affect ethnic self-identity and the degree to which the survey respondents were familiar with their ethnic history and follow ethnic traditions and customs in everyday life.

The psychological factors were determined by the degree of trust the members of one ethnic group feel toward another.

The sociological survey also included questions designed to identify the respondents' civic identity, which directly depends on the degree to which the republic's ethnic groups are integrated and which, on the other hand, is slowed down by ethnic and regional specifics. The continued ethnic tension has intensified an awareness of ethnic identity; however the sociological survey demonstrated that a common civic identity still prevails over ethnic identity. The absolute majority of the respondents consider themselves to be citizens of Kyrgyzstan and are not contemplating emigration.

KEYWORDS: *Kyrgyzstan, ethnic tension, ethnic relations, ethnic situation, ethnocultural factors, psychological factors, common civic identity, ethnosociological survey.*

Introduction

According to the 2009 population census, Kyrgyz constituted 71% of the country's population; Uzbeks 14.3%; Russians 7.8%; and people of other nationalities 7%. Kyrgyz live throughout the republic and in its capital, Bishkek; Uzbeks are concentrated mainly in the south: the Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken regions; while Russians live mainly in the north: the Chu and Issyk Kul regions and in Bishkek. There are other fairly large ethnic groups: Dungans (1.1%); Uighurs (0.9%); Tajiks (0.9%); Turks (0.7%); Kazakhs (0.6%); Tatars (0.6%); Ukrainians (0.4%); Koreans (0.3%); Azeris (0.3%); Kurds (0.3%); and Germans (0.2%).

Negative social, economic, political, cultural, psychological, and other factors have done nothing to improve ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan. This holds true for both the end of the Soviet period and continues to be the case during the country's independent development. Whereas in 1990, the ethnic conflict in the Osh Region was triggered by political factors—centrifugal trends, mounting national self-awareness, Kyrgyz as the only state language, etc.—the ethnic conflict of 2010 in the republic's south was rooted in social and economic problems, such as the deepening economic crisis, inflation, unemployment, and plummeting standard of living. However, ethnocultural and psychological factors come to the fore every time ethnic relations become tense. While social, economic, and political factors set the ball rolling and help to feed the further development of ethnic conflicts, ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the fire.

The author analyzes the ethnocultural and psychological factors that have contributed to the ethnic troubles and continued tension in Kyrgyzstan a year after the 2010 ethnic conflict in the republic's south based on information gleaned from an ethnosociological survey carried out in 2011.

How the Ethnosociological Survey was Conducted

The author carried out this ethnosociological survey in 2011 within the framework of a UNESCO project called Encouragement of Ethnic Tolerance among the Youth of Kyrgyzstan to reveal the state of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 ethnic conflict and identify the factors conducive to ethnic stabilization and harmonization.

The survey covered four regions (Chu, Issyk Kul, Osh, and Jalalabad) and the city of Bishkek. The regions were selected based on ethnic criteria: they are the areas of the country with the greatest ethnic diversity on a national scale and the greatest share of non-titular peoples.

A total of 1,000 people aged 16 and over participated in the survey: 200 people in each of the covered areas. The sample was representative and proportional in terms of three main categories: nationality, age, and gender.

As representatives of the three largest ethnic groups, Kyrgyz comprised 58.9%, Russians 16.3%, and Uzbeks 15.3% of the survey sample. Representatives of other nationalities (9.5%) were classified together in the "Others" category.

The survey was carried out using questionnaires consisting of three parts with a total of 38 questions.

- The first part included questions about the respondent's native language, how proficient they were in Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian, and their language preferences. The same part contained questions about various aspects of ethnic identity; the degree to which the family affected ethnic self-identity; the degree to which the respondent was familiar with the ethnic history, customs, and traditions of his or her ethnic group; and religious affiliation and the extent to which the respondent followed religious rites.
- The second part dealt with the problem of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan; in particular, the environment in which the respondent lived, studied, and worked; the causes of ethnic discrimination and the measures needed to eliminate it; the level of ethnic tension in the given region; and the prospects for ethnic relations in the country.
- The third part dealt with civic identity; in particular it asked the respondents to identify their predominant identity, assess the extent of ethnic integration and the factors that could promote integration of ethnic groups, and specify whether they would prefer to continue living in the country or emigrate.

In the course of the sociological survey, two hypotheses were formulated:

1. There is ethnic tension caused by numerous social, economic, political, and cultural problems;
2. Continued ethnic tension contributes to actualization of ethnic identity and its domination over civic identity.

The Level and Factors of Ethnic Tension

We all know that ethnic tension is a special state of ethnic relations characterized by inflated enmity among ethnic groups; its level depends on the content and form of ethnic relations, and ethnocultural and psychological factors play an important role in fanning ethnic tension.

Ethnic tension continues to linger a year after the tragic events of 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan. When assessing the level of ethnic tension in the republic, most of the respondents (46% of the Kyrgyz; 49% of the Uzbeks; 38.7% of the Russians, and 34.7% of the “Others”) described it as “average” (see Table 1). At the same time, 44.2% of the “Others,” 31.9% of the Russians, 29.2% of the Kyrgyz, and 24.2% of the Uzbeks described it as “low”; 11.8% of the Uzbeks, 11.7% of the Russians, 10.5% of the Kyrgyz, and the same share of the “Others” spoke of it as “high.”

Table 1

**Answers to the Question
“How Do You Assess
the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Low	29.2	31.9	24.2	44.2
Average	48.6	38.7	49.0	34.7
High	10.5	11.7	11.8	10.5
Undecided	11.2	17.8	15.0	10.5
No tension	0.5	0	0	0

The largest share (17.6%) of those who described ethnic tension as “high” live in the Osh region (see Table 2). The largest share (57.5%) of those who described ethnic tension in their region as “average” live in the Jalalabad Region, while in the Issyk Kul Region 45.7% assessed ethnic tension as low (the largest share among the five regions).

Table 2

**Answers to the Question
“How Do You Assess
the Level of Ethnic Tension in Your Region?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Low	32.2	30.0	45.7	25.1	18.5
Average	46.7	37.9	38.2	48.2	57.5
High	9.5	13.3	4.0	17.6	10.0
Undecided	10.6	18.7	12.1	8.5	14.0
No tension	1.0	0	0	0.5	0

It was established that social, economic, political, historical, cultural, and psychological factors were thought to have a negative effect on the republic’s ethnic environment.

The social and economic factors (unemployment, poverty, poor living conditions, etc.) were described as the main causes of worsening ethnic relations by 49.7% of the “Others”; 41.3% of the Kyrgyz; 35.9% of the Uzbeks; and 41.7% of the Russians (see Table 3).

Table 3

**Answers to the Question
“What are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Social-economic problems: economic crisis; unemployment; poverty; housing and land problems	41.3	41.7	35.9	49.5
Political problems: absence of political rights for ethnic minorities; inadequate representation of ethnic minorities in the power structures	10.2	19.0	10.5	17.9
Historical-cultural problems: the language problem; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; shortage of objects of culture; absence of cultural rights	16.8	6.1	14.4	2.1
Psychological problems: predominance of negative stereotypes about different ethnic groups (nationalities); rumors about discrimination against different ethnic groups	16.6	17.2	18.3	12.6
Undecided	14.3	16.0	20.9	16.8
Other	0.8	0	0	1.1

Political factors came second for 19% of the Russians; 17.9% of the “Others”; 10.5% of the Uzbeks; and 10.2% of the Kyrgyz. They pointed to the fact that ethnic minorities had no political rights and, therefore, had almost no representation in the power structures, etc.

Cultural, historical, and psychological factors comprised the third group; 16.8% of the Kyrgyz; 14.4% of the Uzbeks; 6.1% of the Russians; and 2.1% of the “Others” pointed to cultural and historical problems: the language issue; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; inadequate number of cultural objects; and the absence of cultural rights. Psychological problems—negative stereotypes about ethnic groups and negative rumors about ethnic discrimination across the country—troubled 18.3% of the Uzbeks; 17.2% of the Russians; 16.6% of the Kyrgyz, and 12.6% of the “Others.”

It should be said that the largest share of those who pointed to social and economic problems lived in the north (the Chu Region and Bishkek—51.2% and 43.7%, respectively) (see Table 4). Much smaller shares of respondents concerned with these problems were found in the south (the Osh and Jalalabad regions—37.2% and 33%, respectively).

Table 4

**Answers to the Question
“What are the Causes of Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Social-economic problems: economic crisis; unemployment; poverty; housing and land problems	43.7	51.2	41.2	37.2	33.0
Political problems: absence of political rights for ethnic minorities; inadequate representation of ethnic minorities in power structures	14.1	7.9	12.6	17.6	10.0
Historical-cultural problems: the language problem; few or no schools and universities that teach in the native language; shortage of objects of culture; absence of cultural rights	6.5	10.8	17.6	18.1	13.5
Psychological problems: predominance of negative stereotypes about different ethnic groups (nationalities); rumors about discrimination against different ethnic groups	21.1	15.8	13.1	14.6	15.8
Undecided	14.1	13.3	14.6	12.6	24.5
Other	0.5	1.0	1	0	0.5

The largest share of respondents concerned with political and historical-cultural problems lived in the Osh Region (17.6% and 18.1%, respectively). The share of those concerned with psychological problems is not small either: 14.6% and 15.8%, respectively. The largest share of respondents concerned with psychological problems live in Bishkek (21.2%).

Social and economic factors affect the ethnic context to a much greater extent than the other factors, yet they proved to be less prominent in the country's south, the scene of the 2010 ethnic disturbances, than historical, cultural, and psychological problems. They figured much more prominently in the development of ethnic relations there, which explains the larger number of respondents

in the southern regions than elsewhere who pointed to political, historical, cultural, and psychological problems.

When asked about the measures conducive to regulating ethnic relations, the respondents primarily pointed to social and economic measures, such as more jobs to ease unemployment, more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem, subsidies for poor and needy families, and economic reforms. These measures were recommended by 34.6% of the Uzbeks; 46.2% of the Kyrgyz; 47.2% of the Russians, and 49.5% of the “Others” (see Table 5).

Table 5

**Answers to the Question
“Which Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Socio-economic measures: more jobs; more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem; subsidies for poor and needy families; economic reforms	46.2	47.2	34.6	49.5
Political measures: political rights for the minorities and their greater representation in the top state and power structures	8.8	16.0	13.7	14.7
Cultural measures: schools teaching in the native language; events devoted to culture and history of different ethnicities (nationalities); addressing the problem of the absence of cultural rights	9.0	6.7	7.8	2.1
Educational measures: school and university courses in ethnic tolerance; wide propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio)	21.9	16.6	22.2	23.2
Undecided	13.2	12.9	21.6	10.5
Other	0.8	0.6	0	0

Education comes second as an important instrument: special courses in ethnic tolerance at schools and universities; wider propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio): 16.6% of the Russians, 21.9% of the Kyrgyz, 22.2% of the Uzbeks, and 23.2% of the “Others” pinned their hopes on education.

Political measures (broader political rights for ethnic minorities and their broader representation in the corridors of power) were favored by 8.8% of the Kyrgyz; 13.7% of the Uzbeks, 14.7% of the “Others,” and 16% of the Russians.

The smallest share of respondents (2.1% of the “Others”, 6.7% of the Russians, 7.8% of the Uzbeks, and 9% of the Kyrgyz) complained about the lack of cultural rights and believed that the cultural problems could be resolved by having a greater number of schools that teach in the native language and holding events devoted to the culture and history of particular ethnicities (nationalities).

The largest share of respondents who pointed to social and economic measures (54.2%) lived in the Chu Region (see Table 6), while a fairly large share in the Osh Region spoke about political and educational measures (16.6% and 25.1%, respectively). In the Issyk Kul and Jalalabad regions, 9.5% said that cultural measures were needed.

Table 6

**Answers to the Question
“Which Measures Would Help to Remove Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Socio-economic measures: more jobs; more better quality housing and successful solution of the land problem; subsidies for poor and needy families; economic reforms	44.7	54.2	48.2	38.7	38.5
Political measures: political rights for the minorities and their greater representation in the top state and power structures	9.5	10.3	5.1	16.6	14.5
Cultural measures: schools teaching in the native language; events devoted to culture and history of different ethnicities (nationalities); addressing the problem of the absence of cultural rights	4.0	7.9	9.5	8.0	9.5
Educational measures: school and university courses in ethnic tolerance; wide propaganda of ethnic tolerance in the media (TV and radio)	21.6	19.2	21.1	25.1	19.0
Undecided	18.1	7.9	15.1	11.6	18.5
Other	2.0	0.5	0.5	0	0

Ethnocultural Factors

By ethnocultural factors we mean all sorts of aspects responsible for an individual's ethnic identity, in particular, influence of the family and relatives on ethnic self-identification; familiarity of the respondents with their ethnic history; and observance of traditions and customs in everyday life.

The absolute majority of the respondents were born into mono-ethnic families in which both the mother and the father belonged to the same nationality (see Tables 7 and 8).

Table 7

**Answers to the Question
"What was Your Father's Nationality?"
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Kyrgyz	99.7	1.2	0	1.1
Russian	0.3	96.3	1.3	0
Uzbek	0	0	98.7	0
Other	0	2.5	0	98.9

Table 8

**Answers to the Question
"What was Your Mother's Nationality?"
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Kyrgyz	97.8	3.1	4.6	11.6
Russian	0.7	93.9	3.3	9.5
Uzbek	0	1.2	88.2	6.3
Other	1.5	1.8	3.9	72.6

Parents and the family were the most prominent factors in shaping the respondents' ethnic awareness: 90.0% of the Uzbeks; 83.4% of the Russians; 72.7% of the Kyrgyz, and 85.3% of the "Others" pointed to the family as the most important factor shaping their ethnic self-awareness (see Table 9).

When asked to point to specific individuals, 55.6% to 73.6% of the respondents pointed to their mother and father as the two people who shaped their ethnic self-awareness to the greatest extent; 34% to 52.6% pointed to their grandmother and grandfather; and 4.6% to 16% to their friends, colleagues, and fellow students (see Table 10).

Loyalty to cultural traditions and customs is another factor that has a significant influence on shaping ethnic identity. The respondents who grew up in families that observed ethnic traditions,

Table 9

**Answers to the Question
“What is the Strongest Factor Shaping Your Self-Awareness?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
The family	72.7	83.4	90.2	85.3
State policy and ideology	14.1	8.6	5.9	7.4
Books, literature	37.7	17.8	20.9	24.2
Music, songs	8.3	25.8	5.9	11.6
National holidays and important dates	10.7	12.3	6.5	21.1
Religious rites and rituals	4.2	6.1	2.0	16.8
Other	0.5	0.6	0	1.1

Table 10

**Answers to the Question
“Who has Shaped Your Ethnic Self-Awareness
to the Greatest Extent?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Grandfather, grandmother	35.8	42.9	34.0	52.6
Mother	67.6	73.6	64.7	61.1
Father	65.5	58.3	55.6	55.8
Husband/Wife	4.6	4.9	4.6	2.1
Children	0.3	1.8	1.3	0
Other relatives	3.4	2.5	1.3	7.4
Friends, fellow students, colleagues	8.3	16.0	4.6	8.4
Other	2.6	1.2	1.4	1.1

rites, and holidays knew much more about them than others: 65.4% of the Uzbeks, 56.8% of the “Others,” 56.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 38.7% of the Russians grew up in the families that observed ethnic rights, traditions, and holidays (see Table 11).

Table 11

**Answers to the Question
“To Which Extent did the Family
in Which You Grew Up Observe Ethnic Traditions,
Rites, and Holidays?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Observed to a great extent	56.4	38.7	65.4	56.8
Observed, but not to a great extent	36.3	47.9	25.5	34.7
Practically never observed	3.6	8.6	2.6	6.3
Undecided	3.7	4.9	6.5	2.1

A home atmosphere permeated with ethnic traditions and culture affects the choice of nationality of a future spouse. Nearly all of the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Russian respondents were married to spouses of the same nationality (see Table 12).

Table 12

**Answers to the Question
“What Nationality is Your Spouse?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Kyrgyz	53.5	3.1	2.6	9.5
Russian	0.8	52.8	2.0	10.5
Uzbek	0	0	63.4	2.1
Not married	45.0	41.1	27.5	37.9
Other	0.7	3.1	4.6	40.0

Over 48.6% of the Kyrgyz, 24.8% of the Uzbeks, 24.8% of the Russians, and 16.8% of the “Others” responded negatively to their children marrying a man or woman of another nationality (see Table 13).

This means that the immediate social environment, namely, family and relatives, plays an important role in shaping the respondents’ ethnic identity. Loyalty to ethnic traditions and customs in the family determines the individual’s ethnic identity. This is especially important for young people who follow in the footsteps of their parents when starting their families; they observe ethnic traditions and rites to the same degree as they were practiced in the families of their relatives.

Table 13

**Answers to the Question
“How Would You Respond to Your Child Marrying
a Man (Woman) of Another Nationality?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Positively	31.1	41.7	30.1	60.0
Negatively	48.6	26.4	24.8	16.8
Indifferent	5.8	16.0	13.7	6.3
Undecided	14.1	15.3	31.4	16.8
Positively to a Muslim	0.5	0.6	0	0

Psychological Factors

The negative or positive nature of psychological factors depends on the degree of trust of the members of one ethnic group toward another; it, in turn, depends on personal experience with discrimination. Our respondents not only were the victims of discrimination, they also infringed, either involuntarily or intentionally, on the rights of members of other ethnic groups.

Under pressure of the worsening ethnic relations and the resultant ethnic tension, ethnic groups are gradually losing their mutual trust. Most of the respondents gave negative answers to the question “Do you trust members of other ethnicities (nationalities)?”

At the same time, 46.3% of the “Others” trust *most members* of other ethnic groups; the same can be said about 35.9% of the Uzbeks, 35.6% of the Russians, and 20.2% of the Kyrgyz (see Table 14). *Some members* of other nationalities are trusted by 49.7% of the Russians, 46% of the Kyrgyz, 38.9% of the “Others,” and 34.4% of the Uzbeks; 19% of the Uzbeks, 10.9% of the Kyrgyz, 7.4% of the “Others,” and 3.1% of the Russians *do not trust some* of the members of other nationalities, while 22.8% of the Kyrgyz, 11.7% of the Russians, 11.1% of the Uzbeks, and 7.4% of the “Others” *do not trust anyone*.

The largest share of the respondents (38.9%) who *trust most* other ethnic groups live in the Chu Region (see Table 15). The largest number of those who *do not trust some* members of other nationalities live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions—12.6% and 12.5%, respectively, while the largest share of those who *do not trust anyone* (34%) live in the Jalalabad Region.

Trust in the members of other ethnic groups frequently depends on whether the particular individual has had personal experience with ethnic discrimination. Most of the respondents (42.5%-65.5%) had no such experience (see Table 16). At the same time, 49.1% of the Russians, 45.3% of the “Others,” 45.1% of the Uzbeks, and 28.7% of the Kyrgyz were *sometimes* exposed to ethnic discrimination; 2.9% of the Kyrgyz, 6.3% of the “Others,” 6.7% of the Russians, and 7.8% of the Uzbeks *frequently* suffered from discrimination, while 0.6% of the Russians, 2.1% of the “Others,” 2.9% of the Kyrgyz, and 4.6% of the Uzbeks were *constantly* discriminated against.

Table 14

Answers to the Question
 “Do You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?”
 (% by nationality)

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Yes, most	20.2	35.6	35.9	46.3
Yes, some	46.0	49.7	34.4	38.9
No, not all	10.9	3.1	19.0	7.4
No, I do not trust any	22.8	11.7	11.1	7.4
Other	0.2	0	0	0

Table 15

Answers to the Question
 “Do You Trust Members of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?”
 (% by region)

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Yes, most	28.1	38.9	27.6	26.1	17.0
Yes, some	42.2	42.4	50.8	48.7	36.5
No, not all	6.5	9.4	11.6	12.6	12.5
No, I do not trust any	23.1	8.9	10.1	12.6	34.0
Other	0	0.5	0	0	0

Table 16

Answers to the Question
 “Have You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
 (% by nationality)

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Constantly	2.9	0.6	4.6	2.1
Frequently	2.9	6.7	7.8	6.3
Sometimes	28.7	49.1	45.1	45.3
Never	65.5	43.6	42.5	46.3

The largest share of respondents *constantly* discriminated against for ethnic reasons (4.4%) lived in the Chu Region (see Table 17). The Osh Region is the place where the largest number of those who are *frequently* and *sometimes* exposed to ethnic discrimination live (6.5% and 45.7%, respectively).

Table 17

**Answers to the Question
“Have You Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Constantly	1.5	4.4	3.0	2.0	2.5
Frequently	5.5	4.9	2.5	6.5	3.5
Sometimes	35.2	36.5	30.7	45.7	32.5
Never	57.8	54.2	63.8	45.7	61.5

Among those who have experienced ethnic discrimination at one time or another, most (15.3%-22.2%) were exposed to insults against their nationality, 11.0%-15.8% were exposed to indifference

Table 18

**Answers to the Question
“In What Form Have You, If Ever,
Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
In the form of indifference to my problems	10.4	11.0	12.4	15.8
In the form of violation and infringement on my rights to services, information, etc.	6.5	8.6	10.5	8.4
In the form of rudeness	5.8	19.6	11.8	13.7
In the form of insulting comments about my nationality	16.5	15.3	22.2	14.7
In the form of physical violence	0.7	1.8	4.6	0
Never experienced	60.3	43.6	38.6	47.7

to their problems, while the rest (5.8%-19.6%) to rudeness, and 6.5%-10.5% to infringement on their rights. Between 0.7% and 4.6% of the respondents had experienced physical violence.

The largest number of respondents exposed to insults and infringement on their rights are found among the Uzbeks (22.2% and 10.5%, respectively); the Uzbeks also suffered from physical violence more than other ethnic groups (4.6%). The Russians were exposed to rudeness more than the other nationalities (19.6%); the group of "Others" experienced indifference to their problems more than any other group (15.8%) (see Table 18).

The largest number of those who ran up against a wall of indifference and inattention to their problems live in the Osh Region (15.1%) (see Table 19). The largest number of those who (or whose nationality) were exposed to insults live in the Jalalabad Region (24%). The largest number of those exposed to physical violence live in the Osh and Jalalabad regions (2.5% in each of them).

Table 19

**Answers to the Question
"In What Form Have You, If Ever,
Been Exposed to Ethnic (National) Discrimination?"
(% by region)**

	Nationality				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
In the form of indifference to my problems	13.6	11.3	7.0	15.1	9.5
In the form of violation and infringement on my rights to services, information, etc.	6.0	10.3	8.0	9.5	4.0
In the form of rudeness in my address	11.6	14.3	5.0	12.6	5.0
In the form of insulting comments about my nationality	11.1	11.8	16.1	22.1	24.0
In the form of physical violence	1.5	0.5	0	2.5	2.5
Never experienced	56.3	51.7	63.8	38.2	55.0

At the same time, the respondents were not only objects, but also subjects of ethnic discrimination: 26% of the Russians, 23% of the Kyrgyz, 16.9% of the "Others," and 11% of the Uzbeks were subjects of ethnic discrimination either by chance, or were forced into this or did this without any obvious reasons (see Table 20). The largest share of such respondents (35%) live in the Osh Region (see Table 21). The majority of the respondents never infringed upon the rights of other nationalities.

Table 20

**Answers to the Question
“Have You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Never	73.0	67.5	83.0	80.0
Sometimes by chance	10.0	14.7	6.5	10.5
Sometimes unwillingly	6.6	6.7	2.6	3.2
Yes	6.5	4.9	2.0	3.2
Undecided	3.9	6.1	5.9	3.2

Table 21

**Answers to the Question
“Have You Ever Infringed Upon the Rights of
Other Ethnicities (Nationalities)?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Never	69.3	77.3	83.4	65.3	76.0
Sometimes by chance	12.1	9.4	7.0	14.1	9.0
Sometimes unwillingly	4.0	3.0	3.0	11.6	7.0
Yes	10.1	3.9	3.0	4.5	5.6
Undecided	4.5	6.4	3.5	4.5	3.5

Possible Development of Ethnic Relations

Despite the continued ethnic tension, 50.6% of the Kyrgyz, 43.8% of the Uzbeks (see Table 22), 25.3% of the “Others,” and 15.3% of the Russians believe that ethnic relations will improve. At the same time, 46.3% of the “Others,” 39.3% of the Russians, 22.6% of the Kyrgyz, and 19.6% of the Uzbeks do not expect any changes for the better. There is even more pessimism among 24.5% of the Russians, 17.9% of the “Others,” 15.0% of the Uzbeks, and 11.0% of the Kyrgyz, who are convinced that relations will become even worse. Many people found it hard to offer any forecasts on that score.

Table 22

**Answers to the Question
“What are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Improving	50.6	15.3	43.8	25.3
Everything will remain the same	22.6	39.3	19.6	46.3
Worsening	11.0	24.5	15.0	17.9
Undecided	15.8	20.9	21.6	10.5

Respondents in the Issyk Kul and Osh regions (57.3% and 50.3%, respectively) proved to be more optimistic; 20.6% in Bishkek were the most pessimistic among the respondents (see Table 23). The largest share of those who believed that nothing would change (35.7%) also live in Bishkek.

Table 23

**Answers to the Question
“What are the Prospects for Ethnic Relations in Your Region?”
(% by region)**

	Region				
	Bishkek	Chu	Issyk Kul	Osh	Jalalabad
Improving	29.6	35.5	57.3	50.3	34.5
Everything will remain the same	35.7	29.6	20.1	18.1	32.0
Worsening	20.6	15.8	9.0	15.6	11.5
Undecided	14.1	19.2	13.6	16.1	22.0

Civic Identity

This section contained control questions of the ethnosociological survey and was intended to find out the respondents' civic identity, which directly depends on the degree of integration of the ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and which, on the other hand, is slowed down by ethnic, regional, and tribal identity.

The absolute majority of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Russians primarily regard themselves as citizens of Kyrgyzstan; this is true of 78.4% of the Uzbeks, 68.3% of the Kyrgyz, 59.5% of the Russians, and 58.9% of the “Others” (see Table 24).

Table 24

**Answer to the Question
“What is Your Prevailing Identity?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Member of my tribe and clan	13.8	6.7	6.5	9.5
Representative of my region	3.2	1.8	4.6	6.3
Member of my ethnic group	11.9	21.5	6.5	17.9
Citizen of Kyrgyzstan	68.3	59.5	78.4	58.9
Citizen of the world	2.9	8.0	3.3	6.3
Stateless person	0	2.5	0	0

Among the Kyrgyz, 13.8% regard themselves as members of their tribe and clan, while 11.9% see themselves as members of their ethnic group. This means that tribal identity prevails over ethnic identity among the Kyrgyz.

Among the Russians, 21.5% regard themselves as representatives of their ethnic group; the share among the Uzbeks is 6.5%.

Over 70% of the respondents, members of all ethnicities of Kyrgyzstan, regard the country in which they were born (Kyrgyzstan) (see Table 25) as their motherland. Much fewer respondents regard their historical homeland as their motherland: 20.9% of the Kyrgyz; 14.7% of the Russians, 11.6% of the “Others,” and 3.3% of the Uzbeks.

Table 25

**Answers to the Question
“Which Country Do You Call Your Motherland?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Country of birth	72.2	71.8	76.5	74.7
Country of residence	7.0	13.5	19.6	12.6
Where life is better	0	0	0.7	1.1
Historical homeland	20.9	14.7	3.3	11.6

Over half of the respondents answered that they are not contemplating emigration (see Table 26); 24.5% of the Russians, 22.1% of the “Others,” 16.1% of the Kyrgyz, and 15.7% of the Uzbeks want to, but cannot, leave the country; 21.1% of the “Others” and 14.7% of the Russians are determined to leave the country. This means that migration sentiments are most pronounced among the Russians and “other” ethnicities; practically none of those who want to leave intend to come back.

Table 26

**Answers to the Question
“Would You Like to Leave Kyrgyzstan?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Yes, by all means	6.5	14.7	7.2	21.1
I would like to leave but cannot	16.1	24.5	15.7	22.1
No, I have no plans as yet	59.3	59.5	54.9	55.8
I want to leave but will definitely come back	0.8	0	0	0
No	16.0	1.2	22.2	0
To study	0.8	0	0	0
As a tourist	0.5	0	0	1.1

A large share of those who want to leave Kyrgyzstan point to economic reasons (see Table 27): 17.2% of the Russians, 11.6% of the “Others,” 11.2% of the Kyrgyz, and 5.2% of the Uzbeks want to leave in search of permanent employment and adequate wages; 14.7% of “Others,” 8% of the Russians, 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.8% of the Kyrgyz want to leave because of the low standard of living; 13.7% of “Others,” 11% of the Russians; 6.5% of the Uzbeks, and 5.6% of the Kyrgyz want to leave because of political instability.

Table 27

**Answers to the Question
“What is the Reason for Your Intention to Emigrate, if Any?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Lack of permanent employment and adequate wages	11.2	17.2	5.2	11.6
Low living standards	5.8	8.0	6.5	14.7
Political instability	5.6	11.0	6.5	13.7
Ethnic (national) discrimination	0.5	1.8	2.0	2.1
Crime and corruption	1.0	1.8	2.6	1.1
To study abroad	0.8	0	0	0
Do not plan emigration	74.0	60.1	77.1	55.8
To spend holidays	1.0	0	0	1.1

The results speak of a certain degree of integration of all the ethnic groups; among all the ethnicities, most of respondents describe the desire to unite as average (see Table 28). This is the opinion of about half of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian respondents.

Table 28

**Answers to the Question
“How Do You Assess the Degree
to Which Different Ethnic Groups Want Unity in Kyrgyzstan?”
(% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Considerable	29.2	18.4	9.8	28.4
Average	46.2	44.2	49.7	37.9
Insignificant	15.4	17.8	11.8	15.8
Undecided	9.2	19.6	28.8	17.9

The respondents pointed to the following unifying factors: a strong state and the rule of law: 58.4% of the Kyrgyz, 48.4% of the “Others,” 46.6% of the Russians, and 43.1% of the Uzbeks; political stability: 33.7% of the Russians, 33.7% of the “Others,” 26.1% of the Uzbeks, and 22.9% of the Kyrgyz; economic reforms and fighting corruption and unemployment: 31.3% of the Russians; 29.5% of the “Others,” 20.4% of the Kyrgyz, and 17% of the Uzbeks; ethnic stability: 27.4% of the “Others,” 23.9% of the Uzbeks, and 13.8% of the Kyrgyz; and social security: 26.4% of Russians; 24.2% of the “Others,” 14.4% of the Uzbeks, and 10.4% of the Kyrgyz (see Table 29).

Table 29

**Answers to the Question
“Which Factors Can Unite Ethnic Groups (Nationalities)
in Kyrgyzstan?” (% by nationality)**

	Nationality			
	Kyrgyz	Russians	Uzbeks	Others
Strong state and the rule of law	58.4	46.6	43.1	48.4
Political stability	22.9	33.7	26.1	33.7
Economic reforms and struggle with unemployment and corruption	20.4	31.3	17.0	29.5
Social security	10.4	26.4	14.4	24.2
Ethnic stability	13.8	23.9	21.6	27.4
Other	1.7	1.8	4.0	1.1

The above suggests that today the situation regarding emerging civic identity can be described as encouraging; civic identity predominates over ethnic identity, even if the share of the latter is fairly large. Those who want to leave the country are driven by economic problems. Those who want to leave for ethnic reasons describe the absence of a stronger state and the rule of law, political instability and unemployment as the main obstacles to unification of the country's ethnic groups.

Conclusion

The sociological survey produced the following results.

Ethnic tension continues in the post-conflict period; it is caused mainly by the still nagging social and economic problems, while political, ethnocultural, and psychological factors continue to figure prominently in ethnic tension. Ethnocultural and psychological factors contribute to the unfolding and continued ethnic tension. While social, economic, and political factors trigger ethnic conflicts, ethnocultural and psychological factors add fuel to the fire; these factors are responsible for the continued ethnic tension at the post-conflict stage. This means that our ethnosociological survey confirmed Hypothesis 1.

Continued ethnic tension emphasizes ethnic identity. In Kyrgyzstan, however, civic identity still dominates over ethnic identity: the absolute majority of the respondents identify themselves as citizens of Kyrgyzstan and do not plan to emigrate. This means that Hypothesis 2 was only partly confirmed. The results refuted its second part, which said that ethnic identity prevails over civic.
