TURKISH-IRANIAN COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
Keywords:
South Caucasian politics, Central Asian politics, Turkish-Iranian relationsAbstract
Turkey and Iran have maintained stable relations for decades and established cooperation by exploring their common interests despite many political disputes, ideological differences, or economic competition. But recently, many emerging disagreements of the two neighbors started to test the breaking point of this longtime balance. Today, Ankara and Tehran are trying to get a better hand against each other through diplomatic, military, and economic instruments. Starting by presenting an overview of Turkish-Iranian relations, this article focuses on the main points of friction between the two actors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The region is going through a critical juncture with crucial events such as the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the aftermaths of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. So far, Turkey has increased its regional influence by strengthening its economic and diplomatic presence and establishing military cooperation. This target is pursued through the Turkic identity, which provides the ideological basis for Ankara’s regional strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, is trying to defend the regional status quo to resist the containment strategy and international isolation that it has been facing since the revolution. The “axis of resistance” idea that Iran pursues, especially in the Middle East, is almost nonexistent in the Central Asian and Caucasian region due to the Russian factor, lack of sympathy to such an approach on the part of the regional actors, and the Regime’s reluctance to change the status quo in its Northern and Eastern borders. In addition to Ankara and Tehran’s competing regional desires, several bilateral problems to solve in energy, trade, security, and migration management put the actors on the opposing sides. The study claims that the incompatibility between the actors’ regional strategies increases to the point that their rivalry in the Middle East will expand to Central Asia and the Caucasian region. But in contrast to this slow process, there are imminent common issues that can only be solved by a joint effort by Turkey and Iran, and this necessity will restrain the damages of this incompatibility on bilateral relations.
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