Marina KhramovaPh.D. (Phys.-Math.), Deputy Director, Institute for Demographic Research—Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Sergey RyazantsevD.Sc. (Econ.), Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Director of the Institute for Demographic Research—Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Abubakr RakhmonovJunior Research Fellow, Institute for Demographic Research—Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Osim KasymovJunior Research Fellow, Institute for Demographic Research—Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)


The relevance of this article is due to the importance of labor migration and remittances from migrant workers for the economy of Tajikistan. The purpose of the article is to determine the impact of remittances on living standards in Tajikistan at both the national and local levels. It is known that labor migration has become a significant socio-economic phenomenon for the country and society, involving a large part of Tajikistan’s population. Using statistical and sociological research methods, the authors show the key trends and the scale of labor emigration from Tajikistan in 1990-2020, as well as the socio-demographic structure of migrant worker flows from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation and other countries, with identification of a new trend towards a reorientation of migration flows to OECD countries. It has been established that migrant remittances have a positive impact on GDP growth, helping to open small businesses, develop entrepreneurship, create new jobs in the private sector, and boost construction. Remittances stimulate additional consumption: migrant workers’ households have more opportunities to meet their basic needs for food, consumer goods and durables, education, etc. The negative impact of remittances is that they actually help to meet only current needs, while the creation of new, high-technology jobs is slow and insufficient, lagging behind population growth. The country thus becomes hostage to external market conditions: the demand for foreign labor and crisis phenomena in the receiving countries.

Keywords: labor migration, GDP, migrant workers, Tajikistan, remittances, households.


Remittances from migrant workers are a powerful resource for socio-economic development in some countries of the world, playing a significant role in the formation of gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Bank, officially recorded annual remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached a record high of $526.1 billion in 2018, an increase of 8.6% from 2017.1 Remittances to Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) totaled $8.3 billion in 2018. The most remittance-dependent countries in Central Asia are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is among the world’s top countries in terms of remittances as a share of GDP. In 2008, the contribution of migrant remittances to the country’s economy reached a maximum of $4.8 billion, or 49% of GDP. In 2018, remittances totaled $2.8 billion, or about 29% of GDP.2 At least 90% of that amount came from Russia. There is a similar situation in Kyrgyzstan (in 2018, remittances accounted for 29.6% of GDP).

There have been quite a few studies on how remittances have contributed to the development of the Tajik society at the macro level, but relatively little is known about their impact at the meso level (on the regional economy and the development of production) and the micro level (on the position and income of households, the people’s welfare, the development of entrepreneurship, private business, etc.). The purpose of this article is to determine how remittances influence living standards in Tajikistan at both the national and local levels.

Research Methods and Information Sources

Two methods were used in this study. First, we employed the statistical-mathematical method, including correlation-regression analysis of data on labor migration, socio-economic parameters, and remittances. This approach has made it possible to determine the extent to which migrants’ remittances affect the macroeconomic situation in their home countries. And second, we used the sociological method to analyze the results of public opinion surveys and expert interviews (secondary analysis of sociological data). The article is based on statistical data on the scale and structure of labor migration from Tajikistan and the amount of remittances for a number of years provided by the World Bank, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia), the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat), the Main Directorate for Migration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of Russia, the Agency on Statistics under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. At present, the World Bank has information on the amount of migrant remittances and their share of GDP in most countries of the world up to 2018, and the Bank of Russia provides data until the first quarter of 2019. Data on the scale and structure of labor migration from Tajikistan and on the purposes of entering the Russian Federation are available until the end of 2019 (year-on-year or month-on-month) and are posted on the official website of the Main Directorate for Migration of the MIA of Russia. Unfortunately, data on the number of migrant workers who have left Tajikistan to work in Russia and other countries provided by the Tajik side are far from complete and can only be used for comparison and correlation with data provided by the statistical services of other countries.

The Trends and Scale of Labor Migration from Tajikistan

From the beginning of the 2000s to 2020, labor migration was the largest emigration flow from Tajikistan, which had a significant influence on various aspects of the socio-economic development of the country, its regions, and individual households. Some data on the number of migrant workers from Tajikistan are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Labor Migration from Tajikistan in 2017

Figure 1 shows the number of migrant workers from Tajikistan who entered Russia from 1997 to 2017, according to Rosstat. When analyzing the data presented in Figure 1, one should take into account the categories of migrants included in Russian statistics. In 2011, for example, there was a change in the methodology for estimating the number of migrants. Prior to 2011, the statistics showed the number of migrants who had stayed in the territory of the respective regions of Russia for a year or more, while since 2011 the period of stay has been nine months or more. This is why starting from 2011 we see a significant increase in the number of migrants from Tajikistan.

Figure 1

Number of Migrants Entering Russia from Tajikistan in 1997-2017, persons

In order to understand the actual scale of migration from Tajikistan to Russia, one should also turn to data on labor migration from Tajikistan provided by the Main Directorate for Migration of the MIA of Russia. In 2019 alone, there were 2,754,915 recorded facts of registration of migrants from Tajikistan, including 1,585,146 first registrations, with 1,179,423 persons registered for employment purposes.3 In fact, this can be taken as the lower estimate of the number of migrant workers from Tajikistan in Russia. Let us also note that Tajikistan accounts for 21.5% of the total number of migrants from all countries of the world who have entered Russia for the purpose of work. According to Saidasror Saidov, head of the Migration Department of the Ministry of Labor of Tajikistan, the number of Tajik migrants living in Russia in 2019 for employment purposes could be around 1.3 million people.4 On the other hand, according to the Agency on Statistics under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, migration loss in 2017-2018 was 6.6 thousand people.5

Figure 2 also shows data on the number of Tajik citizens registered at their place of residence in Russia. There is an obvious trend towards a steady increase from 2016 to 2019. In terms of this indicator, Tajikistan is second only to Uzbekistan. In the past few years, Tajik citizens have actively acquired Russian citizenship: in 2019 alone, 44,707 citizens of Tajikistan became Russian citizens.

Figure 2

Number of Citizens of Tajikistan Registered at Their Place of Residence in Russia in 2016-2019, persons

Table 2 presents data on the number of Tajik citizens registered at their place of residence in different regions of Russia. The top five regions include the Samara, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Moscow, and Kaluga regions, while the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg are in 8th and 12th places, respectively. This does not mean, however, that these two cities are not attractive destinations for migrants from Tajikistan. Rather, this reflects the deficiencies of the Russian registration system. Registration of migrants is in large part a vestige of the previous Soviet system of control over the movement of people in the country and currently does not reflect the actual location of migrants or their number in Russia.6

Table 2

Number of Citizens of Tajikistan Registered at Their Place of Residence in Different Regions of the Russian Federation in 2016-2019, persons

Amounts and Dynamics of Remittances to Tajikistan

Tajikistan is among the world’s leading countries in terms of migrant remittances as a share of gross domestic product. For example, at the beginning of the global crisis, in 2008, migrant remittances accounted for 49% of Tajikistan’s GDP. Naturally, in this situation Tajikistan is heavily dependent on external conditions, on the demand for migrant labor in the global labor market, the stability of national currencies against the dollar in the destination countries for Tajik migrants, and the foreign policy situation. Figure 3 presents data on changes in migrant remittances as a share of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2002-2018.

Figure 3

Remittances as a Share of GDP in Tajikistan in 2002-2018, %

Considering that the Russian Federation and recently also the Republic of Kazakhstan are the main emigration destinations for Tajik citizens, the bulk of remittances comes from these two countries. In 2010-2018, for example, about 81% of all remittances were received from Russia and Kazakhstan. Increasing labor emigration to OECD countries brought their share of total migrant remittances to Tajikistan in that period to 6.4%. Other countries, mainly those of the Persian Gulf, accounted for about 12.8% of total remittances to Tajikistan (see Fig. 4).

Figure 4

Geography of Remittances to Tajikistan in 2010-2018, %

The share of remittances from Tajik migrants living in OECD countries has varied in different years. In 2010-2012, for example, it was around 7%, with a subsequent decline to 5.6% in 2017 (see Fig. 5). This may indicate a decline in labor emigration to OECD countries in the last few years.

Figure 5

Remittances from OECD Countries as a Share of Total Remittances to Tajikistan in 2010-2017, %

According to data cited by Jamshed Nurmahmadzoda, Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan, remittances to Tajikistan in 2019 totaled $2,731 million, an increase of $163 million (or 7%) from 2018.7 Despite a slight reduction in the dependence of Tajikistan’s economy on migrant remittance inflows, Russia remains the largest source of remittances to Tajikistan in both absolute and relative terms.

According to the World Bank, remittances from Russia to Tajikistan reached a maximum of $3.2 billion in 2013 (see Fig. 6). From 2014, they began to decline owing both to the economic crisis and the devaluation of the Russian ruble. After 2016, remittances from Russia began to increase once again. The total amount of remittances sent home in 2010-2017 by Tajik migrants working in Russia was $16.3 billion. In the structure of remittances from non-residents in Russia, Tajikistan accounts for about 15%: in 2018, for example, they amounted, according to the Bank of Russia, to $1.51 billion, while the figure for all other countries in the world was $10.77 billion.8 Among the countries of Central Asia, Tajikistan is the second-largest recipient of remittances from Russia after Uzbekistan, which receives about 30% of all remittances from non-residents in Russia, while Kyrgyzstan is in third place.

From OECD countries, Tajik migrants sent home about $1.4 billion in 2010-2017. Among these countries, the largest amounts of money were transferred by Tajiks from Western and Eastern European countries: $693 million (about 49%). The reasons for the decline in remittances from OECD countries and Russia in crisis years were different. The main reason for Russia was a significant depreciation of the Russian ruble, while the reduction in remittances from OECD countries was largely due to a decrease in labor emigration from Tajikistan to OECD countries in that period. As we see from Figure 6, remittances from Kazakhstan have also had an effect on Tajikistan’s economy.

Figure 6

Dynamics of Remittances to Tajikistan from Russia, Kazakhstan, and OECD Countries in 2010-2017, $m

From the perspective of individual countries, the top OECD countries from which Tajik migrant workers sent remittances back home were Germany ($539 million), Israel ($443 million), United States ($199 million), Latvia ($61 million), and Canada ($32 million) (see Table 3).

Table 3

Remittances to Tajikistan from OECD Countries in 2010-2017

The role of remittances from Tajik migrants in Tajikistan’s socio-economic development, both at the national level and at the level of individual households, is very great. They have a direct positive impact on GDP growth: migrant workers’ relatives have an opportunity to open their own small businesses, develop entrepreneurship, and create new jobs in the private sector (cafes, shops, bakeries, etc.). Migrant remittances have stimulated growth in the construction sector: many Tajik families with relatives working in other countries have invested their money in housing repair and construction (purchasing flats or building new homes). Remittances stimulate additional consumption: migrant workers’ households have been spending more on food, consumer goods and durables, education, and other basic needs. The flow of migrant remittances from abroad also spurs the development of social initiatives at the local level. In most mahallas (neighborhood communities) in Tajikistan, funds have been collected, at the initiative of local residents, for the repair and construction of public places, buildings, water and gas supply systems, various structures, roads, etc.9

The Impact of Remittances on Living Standards in Tajikistan

Table 4 presents data that give an idea of the impact of remittances on living standards as they help to increase total income per capita, earned income, and the country’s GDP while reducing the poverty rate.

Table 4

Selected Socio-Economic Indicators for Tajikistan in 2010-2018

To quantify the impact of remittances on selected socio-economic indicators for Tajikistan, we calculated the correlation coefficients between them, as presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Correlation Matrix of Selected Socio-Economic Indicators for Tajikistan in 2010-2018

What conclusions can we draw from our analysis of the values presented in this table? First, there is obviously a close inverse relationship between per capita income and the poverty rate: income growth leads to a reduction in the percentage of poor people. Second, there is a fairly close direct relationship between the poverty rate and the inflation rate; in this case, they obviously influence each other, because, on the one hand, inflation drives up prices in the domestic market, which leads to an increase in the poverty rate, and on the other hand, a large share of poor people leads to lower consumption, which makes it possible to adjust inflation. Third, labor emigration reduces, albeit insignificantly, both the inflation rate and the poverty rate (weak inverse relationship), and this is easily explained, because tension in the national labor market is actually reduced as a result of labor emigration to Russia and other countries, while migrant remittances account for a significant share of total household income. And fourth, there is a weak direct relationship between remittances and the poverty rate. This might seem to be an illogical result, but in this case the relationship may be mediated. On the one hand, remittances help to reduce the poverty rate, but on the other, they are mainly used by households for personal consumption, while the problem of economic development in Tajikistan at the national level remains unresolved: the job creation rate is much lower than the population growth rate as there are virtually no new large-scale production facilities, so that labor emigration is practically the only opportunity to ease tensions in the labor market. This leads us to an important conclusion about the mixed role of remittances: on the positive side, they reduce short-term risks to the development of the national economy, and on the negative side, they serve to perpetuate structural imbalances over the long term.

Remittances have not translated into significant investment in local production, but have mainly been used to develop small business and entrepreneurship. For example, some migrants or their relatives, as mentioned above, have opened small businesses. Many Tajik migrant workers have invested their earnings in renovating their homes, building new ones, or purchasing flats.10

Many migrant workers returning from Russia to Tajikistan already have a good knowledge of Russian, understand Russian culture, are acquainted with traditional Russian cuisine, try to speak Russian at home, and send their children to schools with Russian as a language of instruction. According to sociological surveys, migrant workers’ children attending schools where Russian is the language of study or schools that have Russian classes make up almost 50% of all students. Some of these schoolchildren plan to continue their education at universities or colleges, but most of them note that they intend to go to work in Russia as soon as they leave school. Migrant workers’ children are often influenced by their parents who have returned from Russia. Girls in such families frequently refuse to marry right after leaving school and ask permission to continue their education, although early marriages are traditional in many Tajik families. This shows that the significant scale of labor emigration of both men and women leads to major transformations in the institution of family and marriage in Tajikistan.

Upon their return home, migrant women open small sewing workshops, mini bakeries, pastry shops, and mini dairy farms, engage in handicrafts, etc. Here are some life stories of Tajik women who have earned a small capital and gained experience in Russia and have opened their own business upon their return to Tajikistan. Take Shoira, a resident of eastern Tajikistan, who used the money saved during her work in Russia to open a fast food kiosk in her home village, borrowing the idea from the Russian outlet she frequented when living and working in Yekaterinburg. According to Shoira, although the village is small, she is never short of customers because the locals love her shawarma and hot dogs. Another migrant, Ruhshona, who trained as a seamstress at a Russian college, has opened a small tailoring shop that makes national and European clothing, as well as traditional embroidery. She has her own clientele and orders for a month ahead. Tajik women are taught since childhood to make dough, traditional flatbreads, pelmeni and mantu (steamed dumplings), which is why in Russia they engage in these activities in cafes and restaurants while learning to make confectionery. The opening of cafes, confectioneries, and tailoring shops is traditional for Tajikistan and allows women with migration experience to earn relatively good money by Tajik standards.11

These examples show the positive experience of Tajik migrant workers who have returned home.

Labor Migration and Remittances to Tajikistan during Crises and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Tajik migrants working in Russia face the same difficulties as the local population in times of economic crisis and during the current COVID-19 pandemic. But the impact of different kinds of crisis on migrant workers can be more significant and prolonged than on Russian citizens.

The global financial crisis of 2008 affected the economies of many countries, including the economy of Tajikistan. At that time, a great many migrant workers lost their jobs as a result of enterprise closures or personnel cuts.

We can identify the following negative effects of the global financial crisis on the economy of the Republic of Tajikistan: mass return migration; reduced remittances; reduced foreign investment in strategic projects; increased external public debt; and slower export growth.

Mass return migration was one of the main negative effects of the global crisis on the economy of Tajikistan. At that time, the country’s economy was largely dependent on migrant remittances (as mentioned above, they accounted for 49% of GDP). As a result of the crisis, remittances for the first quarter of 2009 alone were down 33% year-on-year.12 The recovery of remittance flows was relatively slow and took about a year (seasonally adjusted).

The drop in global oil prices and the anti-Russian sanctions caused by the 2014 events in Ukraine and the accession of Crimea to Russia triggered a collapse of the ruble exchange rate at the end of 2014. With the weakening of the ruble and the slowdown in production, some of the migrant workers from Tajikistan left Russia, either returning home or moving to third countries in search of higher earnings. In that period, the Bank of Russia recorded another decline in migrant remittances. The main reason in this case was precisely the depreciation of the Russian ruble: in ruble terms, the amounts were roughly the same, while in dollar terms they fell by up to 40%. According to the Western Union payment system, the total amount of money transfers to CIS countries in November 2014 was down 35% from October of the same year and 50% from August. Such a significant drop in remittances was a blow to the economy of Tajikistan, where migrant remittances play a very big role.13

The COVID-19 pandemic has also had a significant effect on the scale of labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia and remittance flows. Traditionally, labor migration processes accelerated in spring, when migrants from Central Asian countries, including Tajik migrant workers, came to Russia in search of work after the slack winter period. As a result of the imposition of the self-isolation regime in Russia at the end of March 2020, the Russian labor market contracted, and many migrant workers lost their jobs or had to take an unpaid leave. Some migrants tried to exit Russia and return to their countries of origin, but far from all of them were able to do so, because Russia had closed its air borders. Many potential migrant workers were unable to enter Russia for the same reason. It is difficult to predict the consequences of this situation for Tajikistan and other countries whose economy is heavily dependent on migrant remittances, but this impact will clearly be something of a shock and will last for a long time, because the lifting of quarantine restrictions will probably take months.

Let us look at the chronology of events after the imposition of the self-isolation regime in Russia. Initially, President Vladimir Putin announced a week’s holiday starting from 28 March.14 This regime was subsequently extended until 30 April.15 In that period, many Tajik migrants lost their jobs because of the closure of a significant number of building sites, their traditional place of work. To stabilize the situation, the MIA of Russia took a decision to extend, as of 19 March, migrant workers’ visas and work permits until 15 June, 2020. But monthly payments for labor patents remained unchanged. Most migrant workers from Tajikistan who were left without jobs simply did not have enough money to pay for these patents and were faced with a choice between obtaining a patent, paying rent or purchasing basic foodstuffs.

Aware of the plight of Tajik citizens, Imomuddin Sattorov, Ambassador of Tajikistan to Russia, as well as the government of Uzbekistan and Vadim Kozhenov, President of the Federation of Migrants in Russia, requested the Russian government to grant a “patent holiday” to migrant workers for the period of the quarantine. As of 11 April, 2020, there was still no official answer from Moscow.16

An additional problem was that a number of migrant workers were stranded in Russian airports in a futile attempt to fly away home. There were cases where Tajik citizens were obliged to stay at airports for more than two weeks. For example, on the night of 31 March, an estimated 300 migrants, including about 200 citizens of Tajikistan, were ejected from Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport.17 Tajik businessmen and other migrant workers came to the aid of their compatriots, purchasing food, water, and hygiene supplies and delivering them to airports.

A number of migrants from Tajikistan were held in deportation centers. According to their staff, it was difficult to say how long this situation would last, since everything depended on the lifting of quarantine restrictions.18

Clearly, given the pandemic and significant loss of earnings, migrant workers are unable to send remittances to their home countries. In April 2020, many money transfer systems already recorded a significant drop in remittances to all countries, including Tajikistan. For example, according to the KaronaPay system, money transfers in March 2020 were down 30% year-on-year, with analysts expecting a further drop of 50% in April. Money transfers through the Unistream system fell in March by up to 35%.19

Migrant workers from Tajikistan are a high-risk group for COVID-19 as they usually live in more crowded conditions than the local population. Some migrants have been able to change their line of work, finding jobs in delivery services, pharmacies, and food stores, but during the pandemic employers are more inclined to hire Russian citizens. From this perspective, the risk of income loss is also higher for migrant workers.

As noted above, remittances from Russia are a significant or even the only source of income for many families in Tajikistan. This makes it clear that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause serious damage to Tajikistan’s national economy, both through the system of remittances and through the lack of opportunities for potential migrant workers to find employment in other countries. The share of low-income families in Tajikistan increased significantly in the post-pandemic period.20 Prices for food and essential goods have been growing rapidly. In Dushanbe, for example, the price of a kilogram of potatoes rose from 3.80 somoni (about 27.51 rubles) at the beginning of March to 6-7 somoni (43-50 rubles) in mid-April; a kilogram of onions was priced at 3.5-4 somoni (25-29 rubles), a sack of flour cost 235 somoni (1,702 rubles), etc.21 While pushing up prices, the crisis phenomena in Tajikistan’s economy will lead to higher unemployment, especially in rural areas, because many potential migrants will be unable to go abroad in search of work for an indefinite time to come.


Despite Western economic sanctions against Russia, the depreciation of the ruble, and tough migration policy, Russia remains an attractive destination for Tajik migrant workers. Its advantages include the lack of a language barrier, visa-free entry, a common mentality, and the prospect of citizenship. Russia is the largest “donor” of Tajik migrant remittances, which account for a significant part of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product. In 2010-2017 alone, Tajik migrant workers sent home from Russia a total of $16.3 billion. In recent years, there has also been an increase in labor migration flows from Tajikistan to Kazakhstan and some OECD countries. Remittances from Tajik migrants play a significant role in the socio-economic development of the whole country, as well as individual households, allowing them to meet their basic needs for food and consumer durables and to invest in housing construction and repair and in the education of their children. Such is the positive impact of migrant remittances on the country’s economy. The downside of remittances, however, is the lack of a long-term development strategy as they only enable people to meet their current needs, while the creation of new, high-technology jobs is slow and insufficient, lagging behind population growth. The country thus becomes hostage to external market conditions: the demand for foreign labor and crisis phenomena in the destination countries.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of Tajik migrant workers in critical situations. Loss of jobs and partial or total loss of earnings have not only made it impossible for many migrants to send remittances back home, but have also put them in a situation where they often have no money to buy food or essential goods. The way out of these problems will largely depend on the lifting of restrictive measures and the demand for migrant workers in production across Russia. But it is already clear that this period will be quite long and will require decisions agreed between the two countries, Russia and Tajikistan.

The article was prepared as part of a project supported by the Council on Grants of the President of the Russian Federation for State Support of Leading Scientific Schools in the Russian Federation (Grant No. NSh-2631.2020.6). Back to text
1 See: World Bank data on migrant remittance inflows. Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Oct. 2019), available at [Link]. Back to text
2 See: World Bank data. Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2017, available at [Link]. Back to text
3 See: Data from the Main Directorate for Migration of the MIA of Russia for January-December 2019, available at [Link]. Back to text
4 See: “Mintruda Tadzhikistana usomnilos v rossiiskoi statistike migrantov,” Sputnik Tajikistan, 25 July, 2019, available at [Link]. Back to text
5 See: Migration of Population 2000-2018. Database on Socio-Demographic Sector, Agency on Statistics under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, available in Russian at [Link]. Back to text
6 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, “Sovremennaia migratsionnaia politika Rossii: problemy i podkhody k sovershenstvovaniiu,” Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, Vol. 45, No. 9, 2019, pp. 117-126, available at [Link]. Back to text
7 See: J. Nurmahmadzoda, “Za 2019 god trudovye migranty pereveli v Tadzhikistan bolee 2.7 mlrd doll.,” 5 February, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
8 See: Data from the Central Bank of Russia, 18 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
9 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, “Labour Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the Context of the Economic Crisis,” 31 August, 2016, available at [Link]. Back to text
10 Ibidem. Back to text
11 See: “Kak vernuvshiyesia is RF v Tadzhikistan migranty uchat russki i otkryvaiut biznes,” Sputnik Tajikistan, 17 May, 2018, available at [Link]. Back to text
12 See: J.B. Chiniyev, “Vliyanie mirovogo finansovogo krizisa na ekonomiku Respubliki Tadzhikistan,” Vestnik RUDN, Economics Series, No. 1, 2010. Back to text
13 See: “Trudovye migranty nachali massovo pokidat Rossiiu iz-za oslableniia rublia,” Novosti ekonomiki i finansov SPb, Rossii i mira, 19 December, 2014, available at [Link]. Back to text
14 See: “Vladimir Putin ob’yavil nedeliu s 30 marta to 5 aprelia nerabochei,” Interfax, 25 March, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
15 See: A. Dzhamankulova, “Prezident podpisal ukaz o prodlenii karantina do 30 aprelia,” 14 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
16 See: Kh. Khurramov, “Samoizoliatsiia v tolpe: tadzhikskie migranty v Rossii zhaluiutsya na slozhnosti v period karantina,” 11 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
17 See: “Stranded Central Asian Migrants Kicked Out of Moscow Airport,” Current Time, 1 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
18 See: “Migranty zastriali v deportatsionnykh tsentrakh iz-za koronavirusa,” Nastoyashchee Vremia, 25 March, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
19 See: “Ob’yom denezhnykh perevodov iz Rossii upal na tret iz-za koronavirusa,” Ferghana—Mezhdunarodnoye agentstvo novostei,, 7 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
20 See: “Epidemiia koronavirusa v Rossii obrekla tysiachi tadzhikskikh semei na nishchetu,”, 14 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text
21 See: A. Zarifi, “Tseny na stolichnykh rynkakh prodolzhaiut rasti,” 14 April, 2020, available at [Link]. Back to text

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