THE TRANSCASPIAN AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER, 2001
Constantine Dmitriev, Ph.D. (Political Science), University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Mark Eaton, Ph.D. (Hist.), University of Western Ontario (Canada)
The republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia have enjoyed fairly uneven media coverage since achieving independence in 1991. By virtue of possessing sizeable oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have attracted significant international attention. So did Georgia and Armenia, albeit for reasons related to ethnic conflict and civil war. The remaining three Central Asian republics received very little attention before 2001. However, the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States put the greater Transcaspian region back on the international radar screen, given their proximity to Afghanistan, the participation of these republics in the anti-terrorist campaign, and a sustained commercial interest in the region’s vast energy resources.
The American-led anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan legitimizes, to a great extent, the trend toward developing regional security structures in the Transcaspian region. This process is not entirely new, but rather is an extension of long-term efforts on behalf of the Central Asian states and Russia to enhance regional security. The Transcaspian republics are becoming more eager to work together and with Russia to respond to common threats to regional security. Unfortunately, the growing U.S. military presence in a region that Russia has always considered vital to its national interests both simplifies and complicates bilateral relations between the two states. On the one hand, both countries share an interest in combating international terrorism, thus enhancing prospects for bilateral cooperation. Conversely, the increased American presence in the Transcaspian region has intensified Russian fears that its influence in the region could deteriorate further. However, as the international campaign against terrorism evolves, it is becoming clear that the prospects for bilateral cooperation far outweigh the barriers.
The impact of the 11 September attacks on the region is not yet fully felt. On the one hand, new anti-terrorist measures require additional expenditures to strengthen domestic security and border controls. Falling hydrocarbon prices also negatively affect local economies. The presence of American and other international anti-terrorist forces in Central Asia and additional aid packages promised by the current U.S. Administration, on the other hand, will result in increased Western investment, financial aid, and additional attention to the region. Regional economic cooperation is also on the rise. There is definite progress in resolving the Caspian’s legal status, as well as in the planned construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and the possible creation of a CIS oil and gas cartel.
Central Asian Security
Security-related organizations have been created involving the Central Asian states, cooperation agreements have been signed, and proposals have been forwarded by regional leaders, all with the aim of increasing regional security cooperation. This trend has increased in recent years and has continued since the events of 11 September, 2001. In fact, the need for such regional cooperation is greater in light of the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan.
The members of the Central Asian Union (CAU) have increased military cooperation within the organization since 1994 with the establishment of a Council of Defense Ministers and the tri-lateral peacekeeping battalion, Centrasbat. In addition to conducting annual military exercises and concluding numerous security cooperation agreements, meetings of the organization since 11 September, 2001 have stressed the importance of increasing such regional cooperation against the numerous threats to security they share, and most importantly against international terrorism.1
The Shanghai Forum (founded in 1996 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan: Uzbekistan joined in June 2001 and the group was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]) is increasingly addressing issues of regional security as a complement to its original role as a forum for resolving border disputes and developing confidence-building measures (CBMs). The determination of the group to fight international terrorism was evident in the Astana Communiqué of 30 March, 2000 and the declaration adopted following the Dushanbe summit meeting in July 2000. The growing U.S. military presence in the region in the wake of the 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks has led Russia and China to further promote the organization as the primary locus for regional security cooperation. Meeting in Beijing in early 2002, SCO foreign ministers announced plans for the creation of a regional anti-terrorism organization and a coordinated emergency response system which would “enable the SCO to rapidly intervene in a Central Asian crisis.”2 The prospects for further cooperation among regional states are promising due to their willingness to participate in these multilateral forums. The military capabilities of individual Central Asian states remains limited, however, thus making regional security cooperation and external military aid crucial for the long-term stability of each regional state.
The U.S. military presence in the Transcaspian region has increased for obvious reasons since 11 September, 2001. However, Russian apprehension that the U.S. intends to diminish its influence in the region may be somewhat exaggerated. Influential American analysts warn that any long-term U.S. presence in the region may have negative consequences. The questionable economic significance of the region, the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the unique characteristics of the region, the threat of domestic opposition to the U.S. government’s support of unstable, and for the most part authoritarian regimes, among other factors, reduce the likelihood of a permanent American military presence in the region.3 U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has stated that Russia will not be “squeezed out” of Central Asia as a result of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, and the Commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, stated publicly and in talks with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that Washington does not plan to maintain permanent bases in Central Asia.4 American policy-makers realize that Russia will continue to have a significant interest in maintaining its influence in the region. And as the interests of the two states coincide with regard to the desire to eliminate the threat of international terrorism, Russia’s military experience and proximity to the region may facilitate bilateral cooperation in this area.
U.S. assistance to develop national armed forces in the region multilaterally through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and bilaterally through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, has been beneficial in the past and will likely continue to be in the future. Through NATO’s PfP program, the Central Asian states (excluding Tajikistan) have participated in military exercises and training, however, participation in these forms of cooperation does not imply future membership in the alliance. In fact, in recent years the growing threat posed by Islamic extremism has led regional governments to develop closer military ties with Russia, “a country which has demonstrated the will and ability to act forcefully against Islamic extremists.”5 At the same time, NATO’s often unfocussed Transcaspian policy characterized by vague “commitments and understandings” with regional governments threatens its relations with these countries, and could also potentially damage its relations with Russia, China, and Iran, all of which have significant interests in the region and at times are unsure about NATO’s intentions. Nevertheless, by aiding in the development of national armed forces in the region, NATO is contributing to the capability of regional states to effectively deal with threats to their security. In this regard NATO and Russia share a common interest.
While the U.S. increases its military presence in the region leading to closer security ties with regional governments, this should not preclude an influential role for Russia. Its security ties with regional states have increased in recent years, and its experience in the region makes it a potentially valuable ally for the U.S. It is thus reasonable to conclude that a new strategic alliance could develop out of the current crisis.
Russia Promotes Regional Security
No country or international organization possesses the interests, capacity, or will, to cooperate with regional states on issues of security to the extent that Russia can. Its interests in the region are substantial, and it can draw on its historical, cultural, political, economic, and military ties to Central Asia, accumulated over the long period of Tsarist and Soviet control of the region. Arguably the most important factors binding Russia and the region together are the internal threats to security they share. Russia fears that if left unchecked, regional instability resulting from the illicit drug and arms trades, political and religious extremism, and international terrorism could spillover onto its territory. To a large extent its Central Asian policy is aimed at localizing these threats. This motivation can be clearly detected in Russia’s renewed sponsorship of closer military/security ties within Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structures, and bilaterally with regional states, particularly since President Putin’s accession to power. The events of 11 September, 2001 and the ongoing U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan have only served to increase the emphasis Russia places on multilateral and bilateral security cooperation with its neighbors in the Caspian region.
Despite Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CST) in 1999, the idea of military and security cooperation within the CIS has been given a new impetus. Due to the emerging threats to regional security and later as a response to the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia, the remaining members of the Tashkent Treaty (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) have drawn closer together on Russia’s initiative. Treaty members signed nine documents enhancing cooperation against international terrorism and political and religious extremism in May 2000. Cooperation was further enhanced on 11 October, 2000 with the signing in Bishkek of an agreement on the establishment of a CIS Collective Rapid Reaction Force to be deployed in conflict areas on the territories of the signatories. The Secretary of the CIS Collective Security Council, Valerii Nikolayenko, has credited the force with limiting terrorist activity in Central Asia in the last half of 2001, and the force commander declared in January 2002 that it is combat ready and prepared to fight if the security of the region is seriously threatened. The CIS Integrated Air Defense System is also being given higher priority in the security policies of member states, particularly in Central Asia.6
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. led the CIS member states to call for increasing mutual security cooperation. Following talks among the CIS Collective Security Treaty members in November 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stressed that Russia and its CST partners supported the ongoing U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan and intended to cooperate with the international anti-terrorism coalition. Military exercises planned for 2002 involving all of the CST member states, as well as Uzbekistan and Ukraine, reflect the desire to enhance multilateral cooperation.7 Plans for the establishment of a CIS anti-terrorist center in Moscow may also be given higher priority in light of current events.
Russia is also reasserting itself in its bilateral security relations with regional states, a policy Putin has promoted since assuming power. The Central Asian leaders recognize that Russia may be the only practical, long-term external source of security cooperation, despite the increased American military presence in the region. The states continue to rely heavily on Russia both economically and militarily. Most Central Asian exports end up in Russia, and those that do not, natural gas and oil in particular, are transported through Russia to Western markets.8
Russia’s security presence in Central Asia is most strongly felt in Tajikistan. It remains Tajikistan’s closest military ally and under recent agreements, Russian troops may remain in Tajikistan for 25 years and can assume the legal status of a military base. Currently Russia’s forces in Tajikistan are cooperating with the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition forces by aiding in the delivery of humanitarian supplies into northern Afghanistan. In an apparent reaction to the presence of U.S.-led forces in Tajikistan, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stepped up negotiations with Tajik officials regarding the upgrade of the weapons and capability of Russian forces stationed in that country. Russian officials have also stated that despite the increased American military presence in the region, its forces would remain in Tajikistan for several years to come.9 Nevertheless, the ongoing cooperation between Russian and U.S.-led forces in the region reflects their shared desire to combat international terrorism and may foreshadow closer cooperation in this and other areas in the future.
Energy and Politics
Important questions are being asked about the region’s commercial potential. Many analysts are wondering whether the Caspian Sea basin has the potential to replace the Persian Gulf as a reliable source of energy for Europe and the United States, and to reduce dependence of the West on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers. There is no doubt that the Transcaspian region contains substantial energy resources. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the region contains up to 34 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves, and another 235 billion barrels of oil in potential reserves.10 Potential gas reserves could reach 328 trillion cubic feet. Though significant, Caspian energy reserves are comparable to the North Sea reserves, but are inferior in comparison with those of the Persian Gulf. Oil and gas development in the Transcaspian region faces numerous challenges, one of which is the remoteness of the region from the open seaports and world markets in general. This remoteness necessitates the construction and development of pipelines that stretch across several countries, including politically unstable areas before reaching open sea terminals.
Unresolved Legal Status of Caspian Sea
Between the 1920s and 1991 only two countries, the Soviet Union and Iran, bordered the Caspian Sea; and the Sea’s legal status was based on several Soviet-Iranian treaties. When the three other littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, became independent in 1991, matters of borders, fishing rights, seabed exploration, and development rights in the Sea became significantly more complicated owing to the fact that the five littoral states failed to work out a suitable delineation of ownership of the Sea’s resources. In fact, Iran became so impatient about the other countries’ attempts to develop energy resources in disputed waters that in July 2001 an Iranian naval ship ordered two Azeri oil-exploration vessels, contracted by British Petroleum, away from a part of the Caspian Sea that Iran claims as its own.
Having failed to agree upon a common principle, practically all the littoral states, excluding Iran, proceeded to conclude bilateral agreements with each other. Kazakhstan and Russia started cooperating on the issue back in 1998 and have subsequently signed several border agreements. During the CIS November 2001 summit in Moscow, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also signed a bilateral agreement that allowed for the division of the Caspian seabed using median lines.11 The most attractive feature of median lines approach is that they are applied only to the seabed and do not affect shipping and fishing rights. Standing to benefit from them, Russia actively promotes the median lines approach, and on several occasions tried to organize a conference where the presidents of all five littoral states could assemble and craft a new legal status for the offshore development. One of the most recent attempts was made in the fall of 2001, albeit an unsuccessful one due to objections raised by Turkmenistan and Iran.
In January 2002, Turkmenistan’s president Saparmurad Niyazov and Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliev visited Moscow to discuss a variety of issues, one of them being the division of the Caspian seabed. During the visit, Aliev and Russia’s Vladimir Putin settled the status of a Russian missile-tracking station in Gabala, and agreed to delineate their Caspian borders using median lines. As a result, Aliev stated, “the issue of the use of the Caspian’s mineral resources between three states will then be definitively settled.”12 Although the agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan has not been signed thus far, Niyazov’s recent visit to Moscow certainly made many hopeful that Turkmenistan is slowly changing its opposition to median lines approach, and is moving closer to concluding bilateral agreements with Russia and Azerbaijan, similar to those reached between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Should this happen, Iran will be isolated if it continues to insist that the Caspian be divided into five equal shares of 20 percent per country. In the past, Tehran could count on Turkmenistan’s support but today mounting pressure from the remaining four littoral states may force Iran to become more accommodating. The signing of bilateral agreements is a positive indication that the Caspian’s legal status will soon be resolved. Thus, following the Caspian envoys’ meeting in Moscow on 24 January, 2002 Russia’s Caspian representative Viktor Kaliuzhniy optimistically predicted that an accord regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea will be signed by all five littoral states very soon.13 However, Kaliuzhniy’s optimism turned out to be premature, since Iran refused to change its position at the Caspian Sea summit held in late April 2002 in Ashghabad.
Better Prospects for BTC?
The United States has actively supported the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline since the mid-1990s. Although the U.S. government declared on numerous occasions that it supports multiple pipelines, including the BTC, to ensure maximum profitability and optimal competition, many analysts argue that the U.S. supports the BTC primarily in order to reduce dependence of the Caucasus and Central Asian republics on Russia and Iran. High costs of constructing the 1,745-kilometer pipeline, fear of terrorist attacks, concerns over the size of the Azeri oilfields, and volatile oil prices caused a lot of skepticism regarding the BTC’s commercial viability. However, there are several positive signs that the BTC project is finally coming around. For example, ChevronTexaco joined the BTC consortium consisting of such major oil companies as BP, ExxonMobil, Statoil, and ENI Agip in December 2001, which many analysts interpret as a confirmation of the BTC’s viability. Another hopeful sign is successful drilling in the offshore Kashagan-2 field that revealed substantial underwater oil reserves.14 If Kazakh oil fields are connected with the BTC in some fashion, the BTC’s capacity will receive a significant boost; just enough to make it profitable. In late September 2001, U.S. Caspian Envoy Steven Mann said that “the $150 million detailed engineering study of the pipeline is nicely on schedule,” and the actual construction is to begin in the summer of 2002.15 British Petroleum (BP) used to be most skeptical about the BTC, but recently BP’s spokesperson Mike Bilbo stated: “Everyone’s much more determined to see this [BTC] through after September 11th,” because “it made people realize the importance of diversifying energy sources.”16
Russia originally opposed the project saying that the pipeline is not economically viable, and is promoted by the United States for political reasons. However, past spring Moscow dropped its earlier firm objections to the BTC, and today the Russian government appears more amenable to regional cooperation with the United States. Russian oil companies have expressed interest in becoming involved in more Caspian projects, and LUKoil will be participating in the construction and exploitation of the BTC. However, Russia remains to some extent undecided whether to fully participate in the pipeline project. According to Nikolai Riabov, Russia’s ambassador in Azerbaijan, Moscow is watching the BTC’s development with keen interest and is still waiting to make a decision.17 However, even this timid admission of interest is a marked improvement in comparison with the previous position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the United States is using the BTC to squeeze Russia out of the Caspian region.
Russia’s hesitation is not entirely surprising. On the one hand, Russian political elites tend to treat any American involvement in the region with wariness, suspecting that Americans may have some long-term geopolitical plans for what was traditionally considered Russia’s ‘backyard.’ On the other hand, new energy routes are being developed that could compete with the BTC. For example, a new oil pipeline, operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), running from Tengiz in northern Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, was officially opened in November 2001. The pipeline has a current capacity of 560,000 barrels per day, and is expected to reach 3 million barrels per day in 15 years.18 The key downside of the CPC is that to reach European markets oil has to be transported by tanker through the Turkish straits. However, Turkey will not tolerate any significant increase in the tanker traffic through the Bosporus due to the increased risk of oil spillage. In November 2001 Russia signed a protocol of intent with Croatia to construct a pipeline with a 5-15 million tons capacity that would run through Belarus, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia into Italy while bypassing the Bosporus.19
CIS Energy Cartel?
The global economic recession coupled with reduced demand for oil in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks has put OPEC on the defensive. The oil cartel is struggling with drastically falling oil prices, and is trying to get world oil producers, especially Russia, to cut production in order to stabilize prices. Growing international demand for oil, and consequently, a growing competition between non-OPEC producers and OPEC, is fueling talk of a new energy association that will comprise the energy rich former Soviet republics of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and possibly Uzbekistan. If created, such a cartel could pose a threat to OPEC’s ability to manipulate oil prices.
During the November 2001 CIS summit, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev made an impassioned speech reminding the participants that the former Soviet republics have a lot in common. He called upon the CIS countries to establish a common economic market similar to the European Union. And what is more, Nazarbaev proposed that the main energy producers in the CIS “should set up an oil and gas alliance in the CIS,” similar to OPEC, with Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as its members in order to strengthen their position on the world markets.20 However, many experts are skeptical about the feasibility of a CIS energy cartel capable of seriously challenging OPEC. Arguably, CIS energy producers need OPEC to influence world oil prices and prevent them from falling too low. Some suggest that Nazarbaev’s efforts to promote the idea of energy alliance are actually about forming closer energy relations with Russia to ensure that Russia does not curtail Kazakhstan’s access to its oil and gas pipelines network.
As recently as 21 January, 2002, during his meeting with the President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov, Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a gas cartel that would include Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The proposed alliance would coordinate production volumes, the construction of new gas pipelines, transit tariffs, and prices.21 The Russian president also emphasized that Gazprom’s pipeline network so far remains the only gas export channel for Central Asia. Putin’s proposals may be a hidden message to remind the Central Asian states not to become too friendly with the United States, and to remember who the regional hegemon is. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on Russia for gas export routes as the only gas pipeline network that Central Asian republics use to access world markets passes across Russian territory. The oil company Unocal and Bridas of Argentina once contemplated an alternative pipeline to transport gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and further to Southeast Asia, but this project has long been off the table and is unlikely to resurface in the near future given the high risks involved. Meanwhile, Russia can provide incentives to entice its reluctant partners in Central Asia by offering reduced prices for pumping gas and perhaps even participation in major gas projects like Blue Stream.
Overall, it is unlikely that a full-fledged CIS energy cartel will be created. Any association of the CIS energy producers would be even less likely to present any serious threat to OPEC. This is due to several factors. The energy-rich members of the CIS depend on high oil and gas prices for export revenues, and some of the energy projects in the region will become unfeasible if oil prices drop below a certain level. Selfish interests of local political and business elites as well as potential political instability in several Transcaspian republics also add to the improbability of such a cartel emerging soon. The nature of the political regimes in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Georgia is closely connected with their current leaders. The departure of Aliev, Niyazov, or Shevardnadze may have a fundamental impact on the political future and role of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, or Georgia in the Transcaspian energy and security architecture. Rather, talks of the CIS energy cartel reflect several processes including political intrigues on the part of Russia and Kazakhstan, the economic necessity to pull resources together to become more competitive, and the reintegration of the old Soviet economic space in the Transcaspian region. This process of reviving regional economic cooperation began in the early 1990s, was largely unsuccessful, and was reanimated in 2000 under Vladimir Putin. Its success will depend heavily on Russia’s economic recovery, further political and economic development of the Transcaspian republics, and regional stability.
Thus far, the interests of Russia and the West have coincided in the recent Afghanistan crisis. The presence of U.S. and other western troops in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has led some Moscow officials to conclude that the U.S. is aiming to push Russia out of the region. However, the Russian military presence in the region remains strong and Russia’s forces are cooperating militarily with regional governments, with the Northern Alliance, and with western coalition forces. Russia’s interest in combating international terrorism in the Caspian region and elsewhere has motivated much of its recent efforts to coordinate its security policies with those of its Caspian neighbors, both bilaterally and within multilateral forums like the CIS and the SCO. Therefore, Russia could play a stabilizing role in the region once the U.S.-led forces depart. For this to occur, however, both Russia and the U.S. must recognize that their intentions in the region may foster rather than stifle constructive bilateral relations.
Since 11 September the Caspian littoral states have come closer to reaching an agreement on the division of the Caspian Sea. Despite Iran’s continuing opposition to the division of the Sea using median lines, the increasing harmony between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan on this issue has generated significant optimism in official circles and regional capitals. The prospects for economic development and foreign direct investment in these states will certainly benefit from the resolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, especially regarding seabed exploration.
A potential contribution to regional economic development and closer interstate relations, the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has been given considerable attention by major international oil companies and the U.S. government since 11 September. Although in the past the project has created significant tensions between the U.S. and Russia, the involvement of the Russian oil company LUKoil may result in the Russian government’s tacit if not outright support of the project.
The trend toward increasing military cooperation among the CIS member states is mirrored in the economic sphere. Not just Russian, but also Central Asian leaders have made statements in recent months calling for further economic integration of the CIS and closer cooperation in the energy industry between the CIS energy rich states. The proposals for the creation of a CIS energy cartel represent a signal that regional governments intend to consolidate existing ties and create new ones.
1 See: M. Eaton, “Major Trends in Military Expenditure and Arms Acquisitions by the States of the Caspian Region,” in: The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 113; “Central Asian Summit Focuses on Regional Security, Expanding Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline, 3 January, 2002.
2 “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Seeks to Strengthen Anti-Terrorism Component,” Eurasia Insight, 20 January, 2002, on-line at: [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010802.shtml].
3 See: A.M. Jaffe, R.A. Manning, “The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000; S.E. Cornell, R.A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 193-206.
4 See: O. Dzyubenko, “Franks Sees no Permanent U.S. Bases in Central Asia,” Reuters, 23 January, 2002; “Russia: U.S. Won’t ‘Squeeze Moscow Out’ of Central Asia,” RFE/RL, 15 October, 2001; S. Blagov, “Russia Probes to Bolster Its Authority in Central Asia,” Eurasia Insight, 27 March, 2002, on line at: [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032702.shtml].
5 R. Bhatty, R. Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 129-133.
6 See: “CIS Summit Talks Up Economic Integration, Anti-Terrorist Cooperation,” RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 1, No. 20, 6 December, 2001; “Collective Rapid Reaction Force Ready for Combat Missions in Central Asia,” Interfax, 24 January, 2002; M. Eaton, op. cit., p. 111.
7 See: “CIS Summit Talks Up Economic Integration, Anti-Terrorist Cooperation; “Russia, Other Collective Security Treaty Signatories Seeking to Get Involved in Afghan Settlement,” Interfax, 28 November, 2001; S. Blagov, op. cit.
8 See: “Kyrgyzstan to Consult with CIS States on Granting Anti-Terrorism Coalition Use of Its Air Bases,” RFE/RL Newsline, 3 December, 2001; B. Pannier, A. Blua, “Central Asia: Six Months After—Alliances Shift with West, Russia (Part I),” Radio Free Europe, 12 March, 2002.
9 See: N. Novichkov, in: Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 April, 1999; “Moscow Reaffirms Its Foothold in Tajikistan,” RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 1, No. 21, 13 December, 2001; “Russian Border Guards to Remain in Tajikistan,” RFE/RL Newsline, 24 January, 2002.
10 See: “Caspian Sea Region,” Country Analysis Brief, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, July 2001, on-line at: [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html].
11 See: M. Lelyveld, “Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan Caspian Accord Irks Tehran,” RFE/RL, 5 December, 2001.
12 R. Popeski, “Azerbaijan Leader Sees Caspian Accord,” Reuters, 26 January, 2002.
13 See: M. Lelyveld, “Caspian Meeting Ends with Few Clues on Progress,” RFE/RL, 25 January, 2002.
14 See: A. Gorizontov, “Baku-Djeikhan: Zhizn Posle Smerti,” Rusenergy.com, 25 October, 2001, on-line at: [http://smi.eurasia.org.ru/2001/econom/10_25_254.htm].
15 “US Ambassador Affirms Caspian Investment Pledge,” The Oil Daily, 21 September, 2001.
16 Quoted from: O. Matthews, “The Next Move Is Check,” Newsweek International, 8 April, 2002.
17 See: “Russia Undecided on Participation in Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline,” AFP, 27 January, 2002.
18 See: “Kazak Export Pipeline Opens,” The Oil Daily, 28 November, 2001.
19 See: “Russia Signs Accord on Major Pipeline to Southern Europe,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 5, No. 223, 27 November, 2001.
20 See: F. Mereu, “Nazarbaev Calls for Stronger CIS,” EurasiaNet.org, 1 December, 2001, on-line at: [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp120101.shtml].
21 See: A. Bekker, “Putin Ozvuchil Gazoviy OPEC,” Vedomosti, 22 January, 2002.