AFGHANISTAN: AN ETHNOPOLITICAL PORTRAIT. A UNITARY OR A FEDERAL STATE?
Alexander Khamagaev, Editor, Afghanistan Service, Tashkent World Radio (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)
Federalization of Afghanistan is a touchstone of its ethnopolitical condition: the idea is revived every time the Pashtoons lose their role as the military-political core of the state. This happened, in particular, in 1992 with the decline of the Najibullah regime. The ethnic minorities leaders agreed to divide the country into four federal parts; 2001, the year the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan set by the Taliban fell under the blow of the counter-terrorist coalition, witnessed similar developments. This time the federal idea was supported by a neighbor, Uzbekistan. Inside Afghanistan and outside it there was an opinion that the new state structure could be entered into the new constitution. The Pashtoon intellectual elite resolutely rejected these plans as threatening the country’s unity. This is quite understandable: the federal structure is not a panacea—it can be both constructive and destructive. A superficial observer may think that the country’s polyethnic composition is a good reason for its federal structure. On the other hand, the idea of Afghanistan’s federalism is not new: it regularly resurfaced in the past and was as regularly buried. Can it survive in the current ethno-political conditions if realized by somebody’s political decision? Anybody wishing to answer this question should first investigate the very foundations of self-awareness of the Pashtoons, the largest ethnic group that played a very special role in the emergence of the Afghan nation-state; take into account the specific features of the historical processes now unfolding in the country and of the Pashtoon great power nationalism and its treatment of all ethnic minorities living side by side with it. At the same time, one should not forget that the other side has interests of its own. Today, the military-political leaders of two ethnic groups—the Uzbeks and the Hazaras—are actively promoting the idea of federalism. If realized, how will it affect the future of these peoples?
Shaping Pashtoon Great Power Nationalism
Pashtoon nationalism is rooted in the Pashtoons’ ideas about their origins that have nothing to do with science and that stem from the oral and written tradition steeped in mythical and emotional attitudes. The ideas deeply embedded in the Pashtoons’ minds cannot be taken away from them without a danger of destroying the nation’s self-identity. The conviction that they descended from the children of Israel (Bani Israel) rests on legends that are commonly taken for a historical fact. For many centuries generation after generation repeated the story about their origin from one of the twelve Israeli tribes and insisted that on the strength of this they could call themselves a “God-chosen people.” This claim has been developing with the Islamic interpretation of the prophetic mission of Muhammad chosen by the Most High to revive the “true” faith proclaimed in ancient times by Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham of the Bible).1
Having received Islam from the Arabs, Afghans adjusted it to their ancient customs and behavior norms in an attempt to prove that they were not subjugated pagans but descendants of the “children of Israel” with whom the Most High had entered into a “union” long before Muhammad. These ideas have found their way to the Afghans’ literature and affected to a great extent their ethno-religious awareness, which, in turn, consolidated the idea: “Pashtoon is Islam, Islam is Pashtoon.” The legend about the Judaic-Israeli origins of the contemporary Pashtoons started an idea of how their ancestors adopted Islam.
It is believed that Halid Ibn Al-Walid, one of the prominent patriarchs of the “children of Israel,” was a blood relative of the Pashtoons of Hur (a historical area in Afghanistan), became a Muslim and sent a letter to all Pashtoons with an instruction to adopt Islam. The Pashtoons of Hur decided to send a jirga (council) headed by Qais (a legendary forefather of all Afghans) to Medina. There the jirga members were converted into Islam by Prophet Muhammad himself from whom Kais got a Muslim name of Abdul Rasheed. Having returned home, the newly converted leader convinced his people to embrace Islam; he married a daughter of Halid Ibn Al-Walid by whom he had three sons who started three large tribal groups. Prominent Afghan psychoanalyst Qabir Storai writes: “This suggests that Islam became part of Pashtoon culture in the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime and that it was adopted not through war but through peace and jirga.”2
This legend is the quintessence of the ethnoreligious syncretism of Pashtoon nationalism; it is in it that the roots nourishing the Afghans’ idea about their self-sufficiency and their equality to other nations also claiming a special role in the Islamic world are found. They used this syncretism to build a wall around their own world to keep it intact. The maxim “Pashtoon is Islam, Islam is Pashtoon” served a foundation for the later history of unification of disunited princedoms and peoples within a centralized Pashtoon state; it was a moral and spiritual imperative of sorts for all Afghan rulers, a power urge to extend and consolidate a unified state. This is confirmed by the fact that until the 1930s all Afghan rulers called themselves “amirs” rather than “kings” in recognition of their formal subordination to the Caliph as the head of all Muslims. They hinted that being Pashtoons by origin they were Muslims by the same token: within the Islamic tradition religious affiliation comes ahead of ethnic affiliation.
The Kingdom of Durrani was the most vivid illustration of Pashtoon nationalism; when it fell apart in 1819, the idea about identity of Pashtoon and Islam became the foundation of the Afghan rulers’ efforts to consolidate independent princedoms that appeared on the Durrani ruins. In fact, the kingdom crumbled under the weight of weak central power and feudal anarchy. The provinces that the kingdom’s founder Ahmad Shah included in his state gained independence one after another or fell prey to stronger neighbors. One should say in all justice that those of the Afghan princes who preserved independence quickly realized that a unified state was needed and did their best to restore it. Amir Dost Muhammad Khan who ruled from 1843 to 1863 was one of the most active and consistent supporters of the idea of unity. He looked at the north, at Afghan Turkestan in a conviction that colonized fringes would strengthen the state. He conquered Balkh, Khulm, Akcha, the left bank of the Amu Darya, Kattagan, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Herat.3 Amir Sher Ali Khan continued this line and kept half of his army in Herat and Turkestan to consolidate the Pashtoon positions in the north.4
The treaty between Britain and Russia on the northwestern boundary of Afghanistan signed in 18875 promoted its further centralization. It was thanks to this treaty that the amirs got carte blanche in Turkestan from Russia and Britain. Amir Abdurrahman Khan who came to power in Kabul in the early 1880s successfully used it to complete conquering the khanates on the left bank of the Amu Darya, in 1892 he conquered Hazarajat.6 To strengthen its restored unified state the amir launched an active Pashtoonization of Afghan Turkestan and Hazarajat. Thousands of Afghan families moved to the northwest and the east, up to the Amu Darya. At the turn of the 20th century there were at least 62 thou such families, mainly recent nomads and semi-nomads, in the Andkhui – Akcha – Shibarghan – Sar-i-Pul area.7
The settlers received considerable material and political assistance and the best irrigated lands and pastures. The Ahmadzais, Momands, and other Pashtoon tribes that had supported the amir when he fought for Hazarajat received wide pastures and plough land peopled by the Hazaras. Pashtoon colonization of Northern Afghanistan extended into the first decades of the 20th century under Amir Khabibullah Khan and in the first years of Ammanullah Khan. Many of the Pashtoon settlers moved to the north and northeast and reached the oases of Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Khanabad, Talikan, and Imamsahib.8
Colonization was accompanied by revolts and uprisings of the local people who wanted independence; in July 1888 Muhammad Iskhak Khan, first cousin of the amir, used economic problems that plagued his possessions to announce that Charvilayat (four provinces with capital in Mazar-i-Sharif) would become independent under Russia’s patronage.9 The czarist government did not respond positively—the revolt was quenched. Obviously, in the 19th century the idea of independence was very much alive among the local people.
The October Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War in Russia that followed, as well as putting down the basmachi movement in Central Asia (1918-1938) changed the ethnic composition of Afghan Turkestan. The results of Pashtoon colonization of the northern territories were reduced to naught in several years when a flood of refugees from the former Russian empire engulfed the area. There were about 500 thou of them.10 This caused a quantitative, and even more important a qualitative, shift in the minds of local Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens. Yusuf Hewaddust, an Afghan researcher, has written that the newly arrived refugees became Afghan citizens in great numbers. As a result, “Tajiks became the second largest ethnic group, while Uzbeks became as numerous as the Hazaras, our compatriots.”11 He quotes Prof. Muhammad Hasan Qakar who said: “About 2 to 2.5m Tajiks and Uzbeks came to Afghanistan after the October Revolution. Today, there are about 5.5m of them.”12 These are rough estimates because until 1979 there were no population censuses in Afghanistan.13
What is even more important is the fact that three waves of migration from Central Asia between 1918 and 1938 added political awareness to the local people. This is confirmed by the revolt of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens under Ibrahim-bek Lokai in 1930-1931. Kh. Khashimbekov, specialist in Afghan studies, has written that the rebels opposed the Nadir Shah government (1929-1933) and proclaimed: “The Afghan regime was deposed and an independent Uzbek and Tajik state formed within Kattagan and Badakhshan.”14 The revolt was suppressed but its aims clearly indicated that early in the 1930s the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens of Northern Afghanistan acquired ethnic self-awareness and the idea of independence from the Pashtoons. The foreign political context of the time, the rapidly strengthening Soviet Union in the first place, did not allow the idea to stuck firm roots: it was developing latently until better times.
Despite huge efforts to turn the north into a Pashtoon area, the lands remained a seat of discontent and centrifugal sentiments. This is what we can see today. While in the past local discontent cropped up as revolts and uprisings, today it has manifested itself as a federation idea with all the necessary gimmicks of Western democracy up to and including the right of nations to self-determination.
An analysis of the ethnosocial situation has testified that the Afghan society today is not yet ready to become a federal state for economic and political reasons and because of instability that is shaking the country.
Federation: Ethnopolitical Aspect
The prospects of federalization will become much clearer if we acquire at least a vague idea about the country’s population strength and its ethnic composition. I have already written that there were no population censuses before 1979. According to the 1979 census, there were 15.5 million living in the country, every year the population increased by 2 percent. According to rough estimates, in 2000 there were about 30 million people.15
It is much harder to outline the ethnic composition: the majority of materials that appeared in the Soviet Union point to the following ethnic groups as the largest: the Pashtoons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Chahar Aimaks, and Turkmens. Until 1990 the former three were the most numerous in the country. The studies conducted between 1991 and 1996 by the Waq Foundation produced different figures: the Pashtoons remained the largest ethnic group (18,822 thou, or 62.73 percent) followed by the Tajiks (3,714 thou, or 12.38 percent); the Hazaras became the third largest ethnic group (2,697 thou, or 9 percent), the Uzbeks came next (1,830 thou, or 6.1 percent), followed by the Turkmens (807 thou, or 2.69 percent), and the Aimaks (804 thou, or 2.68 percent). The general strength of these groups is 30m people. Other ethnic groups taken together (1m) comprised 4.42 percent.16
The above suggests that the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks could demand independence, yet there are other sides of the picture. For example, the Hazaras (now the third largest ethnic group) are actively promoting the idea of federation. Muhammad Inam Waq, a profound researcher of the Afghan issue, has disputed their claim for autonomy by saying that they are scattered across several provinces. Two-thirds of them live in the central provinces (Bamiyan, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Wardaq, and Samangan). In all of them with the exception of Bamiyan they comprise less than a half of the population; they comprise even less, mere 12 percent of the total population, in Baghlan, Juzjan, Balkh, and Parwan.17 There are no large Hazara settlements in border areas, especially along the border with Iran, which is a Shi‘a country (Hazaras are also Shi‘a).
This explains why the Hazaras scattered across the country and having no borders with other countries can hardly hope to acquire autonomy. This probably explains why in the 1970s they tried to buy lands in the west, in the Farah province bordering on Iran. The local Pashtoons and Tajiks prevented this for ethnic, religious, and political reasons.18
What urged the Hazaras to defend the federation idea together with other ethnic groups? At first glance an answer is clear: they are an ethnic and religious minority. The true reason should be sought much deeper: as Shi‘a they are supported by Shi‘a outside their country, by Iran in the first place. The anti-Pashtoon opposition was formed in Iran in the mid-1980s. There is an opinion that it was religion that brought together Hazaras and foreign Shi‘a. This became the opposition’s weakest point that reduced its efforts to naught: the Hazaras came to be regarded as a vehicle of political ideas imposed from outside. V. Spolnikov has written that this restricted “the opposition’s potentials in power struggle in Afghanistan to the limits of an ethnic and religious minority that cannot claim power in the entire country.”19
By the early 1990s the foreign forces had learned to exploit this limiting factor to set up a legal federal structure (through a new constitution). In his article “Afghanistan: Federalism?” Muhammad Inam Waq says that between 1992 and 1997 the Hezbi-Wahdati-Islami party (The Islamic Unity Party) of the Hazaras together with the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIMA) headed by an Afghan Uzbek Abdurashid Doustum formulated the Basic Law of the Federal Structure of Afghanistan under which the country had to be divided into four autonomous republics: the Republic of Hazarajat Autonomous Region with the center in Karman; the Republic of the Western Autonomous Region with the center in Herat; the Republic of the Northern Autonomous Region with the center in Mazar-i-Sharif, and the Republic of the Southern Autonomous Region with the center in Kandahar.20
Pashtoons cannot accept these plans. Here is what Afghan political figure Dr. Usman Rustar Taraqi had to say in an interview to the Dawat newspaper: “Federalism is a large-scale complicity designed to divide Afghanistan in a legal way, through constitution. It betrayed foreign interference through anti-Afghan national elements on their pay.”21
In an effort to avoid accusations of anti-Afghan activities certain Hazara leaders now working in Hamid Karzai’s government introduced certain corrections into the federation project. In an interview to the same Dawat newspaper Minister of Planning Mohammad Muhaqiq pointed out that he supported an idea that is in the middle between strong central power and a federal state. It means that he supports central power with highly decentralized powers. “Let the government be a central one, yet in the provinces their responsible representatives should have adequate powers,” said he.22
This shows that the Hazara minority is prepared to talk and to accept compromises and that it will not insist on a federation in the future.
Abdurashid Doustum’s National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan that controls a large part of the north and Mazar-i-Sharif is the only military-political structure that can profit from the country’s federalization. Not being the most numerous among the ethnic minorities, the Uzbeks exerted considerable social and cultural influence on other ethnoses. Abdurauf Khpelwak who studied the ethno-confessional structure of the Afghan society in the 1960s-1970s pointed out that population mobility was negligent. “As a result people are not only ignorant of customs, traditions, habits, and languages of other peoples; they never saw there neighbors and centers of their own province,”23 wrote the Afghan researcher and added that this explained why ethnoses and peoples of Afghanistan failed to understand each other well, which “crippled social and cultural integration.” 24
This is why the ethnic issue was never widely discussed in the country either by the press or the academic community. The Pashtoon leaders at the helm insisted on the “single Afghan nation” idea. One cannot deny that the monarchy allowed ethnic minorities to contribute to state administration. Muhammad Inam Waq says, for example, that between 1964 and 1973, until the anti-monarchist coup, the Pashtoons filled 56.1 percent of all state posts, Tajiks, 33 percent; Sayyids, 3.3 percent, other Sunni ethnoses, 5.5 percent; Shi‘a, 2.2 percent.25
This, however, failed to prevent wide-scale political involvement of small and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the clergy; population of Afghan Turkestan greatly contributed to the process. According to Kh. Khashimbekov, by the late 1960s and early 1970s nearly all major political movements, including the extreme right and extreme left ones and Islamic traditionalists and fundamentalists, opened their branches up in the north. “One should say that the politically active Uzbek groups set up not a single party or movement to defend either special economic or special political interests of the Uzbeks, their tongue and their culture.” Khashimbekov has pointed out that in the north political parties and organizations were set up according to social rather than ethnosocial principles.26 It was the principle of social justice that developed ethnic awareness among the peoples of Afghanistan, and Afghan Uzbeks in the first place. One should bear in mind that the northern provinces border on the Central Asian republics, and on Uzbekistan among them. This geographic fact greatly influenced all local people. Early in the 1980s Western researchers wrote that ethnic integration there was based on the culture and language of the Afghan Uzbeks. Academics from Soviet Uzbekistan refused to accept this: R. Rashidov, for example, believed that D. Montgomery was wrong when he had written that because of the Pashtoon oppression the Uzbeks of Northern Afghanistan “will tend toward Soviet Uzbekistan as a ‘defender’ of Uzbek interests.”27
Meanwhile, ethnocultural domination of the Uzbeks in the north was objectively justified. By the early 1990s the Uzbek S.S.R. was the only Uzbek state in the contemporary world. It was rich in raw materials, was economically most developed in Central Asia; national literature, art, social thought, science and technology were flourishing in it. It was the most important link between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; its specialists contributed to many socioeconomic projects across the country and in the Uzbek-populated north. The two areas shared an electronic media expanse: radio and TV programs from Soviet Uzbekistan reached Northern Afghanistan; many Afghan Uzbeks studied in Tashkent. All this increased the prestige of Uzbekistan, the status of Uzbek culture and language in the northern Afghan provinces. The Afghan Uzbeks were scattered far and wide in the north. According to Muhammad Inam Waq, Uzbeks are living in nine northeastern provinces of Afghanistan: Badgis, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Samangan, Juzjan, Balkh, Takhar, and Faryab. Badgis has the smallest Uzbek population (2 percent of the total); Faryab, the largest (52 percent). Thirteen percent of the Afghan Uzbeks are living along the border with Uzbekistan; 87 percent, in the provinces bordering on Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
This shows that Uzbeks, like all other ethnic minorities, do not dominate in any border province, yet their influence on the local people is much greater. It increased still more in January 1965 when the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was set up. From the very first day of its existence it concentrated on a democratic approach to the ethnic issue. Later, this caused squabbles in the party and split it into factions and branches. In 1968, a Revolutionary Organization of Afghanistan (ROA) was created. It described its main task as “Democratic resolution of the ethnic question by setting up a federation of autonomous ethnically homogeneous provinces.”28
Having come to power in 1978 the PDPA tried to fulfill certain of the national minorities’ requirements in education and culture. For the first time in the country’s history ethnic areas received primary education in the Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluchi tongues supported by corresponding textbooks. More and more people became literate; more newspapers in the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Baluchi appeared.
The PDPA acting in the conditions of a swelling civil war failed to study and take account of all sides of ethnosocial relations in society that was clearly moving toward closer social and cultural integration into the Afghan nation. This should have been taken into account, too.
The downfall of the Najibullah’s regime stopped these processes; Afghanistan lost its independence de facto while the Pashtoons were removed from the top echelons of power. Khashimbekov has the following to say on this score: “These events contributed to an even greater political involvement of the Uzbeks of the Northern Afghanistan and increased their ethnic self-awareness. This speeded up and deepened these processes.”29
Disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of independent Uzbekistan in 1991 made Afghan Uzbeks even more active politically. The steps the Uzbek leaders took to strengthen independence of the newly formed republic allowed Afghan researchers to describe the Uzbeks as “a developed ethnic and politically active force in Central Asia.”30 This can be applied to the Afghan Uzbeks as well who, in an effort to get rid of Pashtoon domination, were seeking support in Tashkent. In 1992, the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan met in Mazar-i-Sharif for its constituent congress under chairmanship of Afghan Uzbek Abdurashid Doustum. Speaking at the congress he said, in particular: “Time has come for all peoples of Afghanistan to become equal. We want to resolve the nationalities question in our country through a federation.”31 The federation idea was entered into all basic documents of NIMA; they are clearly anti-Pashtoon and speak about a “chauvinistic government pursuing a course in the interests of tribes and clans,” etc.32
At first the leaders of Uzbekistan refrained from openly declaring their position on the federation idea; they were insisting on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem with participation of all interested sides within a 6 + 2 group (six neighbors of Afghanistan plus the U.S. and Russia). Yet the Taliban fell under the blows of the counter-terrorist operation organized by the United States and its allies in 2001; the ethnopolitical balance in the country changed once more. Despite the fact that Pashtoon Hamid Karzai was appointed head of the cabinet while another Pashtoon, deposed king Muhammad Zahir Shah, was titled “the father of the nation,” the Pashtoons were deprived of their main function, that of a military-political cornerstone of Afghanistan. According to the Institute of Democratization of Afghanistan, there are no Pashtoons or Hazaras among the top military leaders; 90 percent of them (10 men), including Defense Minister Muhammad Kasym Fahim, are Tajiks. There are merely 6.8 percent Pashtoons in other detachments of the Defense Ministry as against 75 percent of Tajiks and about 1 percent of Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristanis.33
When talking to journalists on 12 December, 2002 in the parliament of Uzbekistan, President Karimov said that the federal structure was best suited for Afghanistan as a form of relationships between the center and the fringes.34
One can say that the unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and the Pashtoons’ continued role as the state-forming ethnos are the key to peace in the country and to its stronger economic and political system. After the downfall of Najibullah’s regime the way various forces inside Afghanistan and outside it treat the issue makes it possible to guess what their true intentions about the future of the country are. Indeed, one cannot insist on the country’s unity and favor the federation idea at the same time. Even without profound knowledge of Afghanistan’s past and present one can easily understand that a society torn apart by ethnic and military-political contradictions cannot become a civilized federation system. The country should first strengthen itself, restore law and order on its territory, heal its economy and allow those of the political forces that insist on federalization to demonstrate how they can protect the interests of ethnic minorities without the use of force. Everybody knows that setting up an autonomous unit is merely the first step on the road toward prosperity rather than to fulfilled dreams of a handful of ambitious men.
Afghan researchers point out that federalization, or, rather, disintegration of the country is going on. Prominent Afghan academic Dr. Muhammad Hasan Qakar said in his interview to the Dawat newspaper: “It seems that Afghanistan is following the road of federalization. The governors, or at least some of them, are ruling their provinces independently. Abdurashid Doustum controls several provinces.” Dr. Qakar added that the central government has neither strength nor possibilities to fulfill its own decisions and control the entire territory.35
It seems that Afghanistan should follow an example supplied by its neighbor Uzbekistan. Its leaders cut short all ethnic and political squabbles, established law and order and offered a slogan: From a Strong State to a Strong Civil Society.
It seems that Afghanistan should first strengthen the state exhausted by many years of war, gather all its strength to restore economy and common spiritual values. It will profit from this together with its neighbors. Unstable Afghanistan that survives on drugs is a serious threat to international security. If divided among its ethnic groups, it may turn into a seat of religious, ethnic, and political extremism. There is no doubt that Tajiks will always tend to Tajikistan, Uzbeks, to Uzbekistan, Turkmens, to Turkmenistan. This will create numerous problems both for Afghanistan and for these countries. We should never forget that the polyethnic and polyconfessional composition breeds numerous contradictions that can be removed solely by economic, political, and social measures. Ethnically divided Afghanistan offers a bad example for any of its neighbors; it is not yet ready to embrace federalism. This question should be resolved in a different domestic and foreign situation.
1 See: Mify narodov mira, Vol. 2, Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Moscow, p. 184.
2 K. Storai, Zhebsapokhana, Peshawar, 2000, p. 74 (in Pashto).
3 See: Istoria vooruzhennykh sil Afghanistana, Moscow, 1985, p. 29.
4 See: Ibid., p. 35.
5 See: Istoria Afghanistana, Moscow, 1982, p. 174.
6 See: Istoria vooruzhennykh sil Afghanistana, p. 50.
7 See: Afghanistan, Moscow, 1989, p. 119.
8 See: Ibid., p. 120.
9 See: Istoria Afghanistana, p. 179.
10 See: Dawat (a monthly published in Pashto and Dari in Norway), No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 22.
11 Ibid., p. 22.
13 For example, Kh. Khashimbekov quotes A.E. Snesarev when he writes that in 1921 there were about 800 thou Uzbeks in Afghanistan (see: Kh. Khashimbekov, Uzbeki Severnogo Afghanistana, Moscow, 1994, p. 13).
14 Kh. Khashimbekov, op. cit., p. 12.
15 See: Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 43.
16 See: Ibid., p. 43.
17 See: Ibid., pp. 47-48.
18 See: Ibid., p. 47.
19 V.N. Spolnikov, Afghanskaia islamskaia oppozitsia, Moscow, 1990, pp. 109-110.
20 See: Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 42.
21 See: Ibid., p. 13.
22 Ibid., p. 16.
23 Ariana (Kabul), No. 3-4, 1986-1987, p. 95 (in Pashto and Dari).
24 Ibid., p. 96.
25 See: Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 42.
26 See: Kh. Khashimbekov, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
27 R.T. Rashidov, “Natsional’naia politika Afghanistana v osveshchenii burzhuaznykh politologov,” in: Respublika Afghanistan: opyt i tendentsii razvitia, Tashkent, 1990, p. 34.
28 Kh. Khashimbekov, op. cit., p. 35.
29 Ibid., p. 39.
30 Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 47.
31 Kh. Khashimbekov, op. cit., p. 39.
32 Ibid., pp. 44-46.
33 See: Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 30.
34 Broadcasting in Pashto of the Tashkent World Radio on 13 December, 2002.
35 See: Dawat, No. 144-145, December 2002, p. 8.