GEORGIAN-ARMENIAN RELATIONS: BETWEEN OLD AND NEW
Asbed Kotchikian, Ph.D. candidate, Boston University; visiting lecturer, Wheaton College (Wheaton, Illinois, U.S.A.)
The Caucasus has historically been well known for its lush vegetation, fierce warriors and the hospitality of its people. However, in the past several centuries, history has not treated the region well. It has become a battleground between empires and been ravaged with both inter- and intra-state wars. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Caucasus have tried to follow their own models of development and paths toward asserting their independence and identity. Despite cultural and historic similarities, Georgia and Armenia have opted to pursue different, and sometimes opposing, tracks in terms of foreign policy orientations and juxtaposed relations with neighboring states.
This article is an attempt to evaluate Georgian-Armenian relations and sketch the general parameters in which both countries operate and interact with each other, as well as domestic, historical and strategic factors that influence their view of themselves and others.
Georgian-Armenian Historical Relations at a Glance
The relations between the two nations predate the relations between the two states and extend to historical times.1 Throughout the centuries, both nations have had cordial relations and at some points in their history even formed united kingdoms under the leadership of Georgian or Armenian kings. One of the first instances of such cooperation was in the late fifth century A.D., when Georgian King Vakhtang Gorgasali (Gorgosal) revolted against his Persian overlords with the help of an Armenian feudal family, the Mamikonians.2 Although the revolt was eventually subdued, it was one of the first instances of both confronting a common threat or enemy. Over the next several centuries, closer ties developed between the two countries, which resulted in the ascension of the same noble family, the Bagratuni (Bagrationi in Georgian), to the thrones of the two countries.3 The Bagratuni dynasty ruled Georgia until 1801, long after its Armenian counterpart lost power in 1045.
Both countries had their share of domination and occupation by foreign empires, starting with the Roman and the Persian, all the way to the Arab, Ottoman, and Russian. However, Georgia’s geographic location outside of the main routes between East and West gave it an opportunity to develop its statehood with fewer interruptions, resulting in an independent Georgian kingdom that lasted until the early 19th century. It is because of this advantage that Georgian rulers such as David II the Builder and Queen Tamar were able to establish a relatively stable kingdom in Georgia and northern Armenia.
Many Armenians settled in Georgia, especially in the south of the country, in what is known today as Javakheti (Javakhk, in Armenian). These settlements were initiated either by Armenians themselves, who were trying to escape their war-torn lands, or by Georgian monarchs, who needed the labor force of the Armenians as well as their skills as merchants to strengthen their kingdoms. Moreover, Armenian soldiers served in the Georgian armies in various capacities and levels of command and became an integral part of the Georgian Kingdom.4
Armenians established a mass presence in the southern districts of Georgia, in particular, in the 19th century. Until the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829, most of the Armenians in Georgia lived in the capital, Tbilisi (Tiflis). When the southern parts of Georgia came under Russian rule, many Armenians migrated from the Ottoman Empire and settled in the districts of Meskheti and Javakheti, forming at first a plurality, then a majority, of the population in those districts. The overwhelming majority of the Armenian settlers in Javakheti today trace their roots to Erzerum, which they left after the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war.5
After the Russian occupation of Georgia, the Georgian landed aristocracy started to lose its influence. Either through planned Russian policies or because of the changing nature of power, which became more dependent on capital rather than land, Armenian merchants and artisans began to occupy the middle and upper classes of the Georgian society.6 This social “restructuring” could be considered the basis of modern Georgian-Armenian rivalry. For some scholars and Caucasus specialists, the Georgian-Armenian rivalry can be explained by the fact that Georgians (whether aristocrat or peasant) resented the concentration of capital in the hands of Armenians, and as a result social grievances and rivalries developed between the two nations. This rivalry was reinforced by ethnic boundaries, leading to inter-ethnic distrust and the creation of stereotypes.7 The rivalry was also reinforced by the growing sense of nationalism in both groups, especially in the late nineteenth century, and by the fact that Armenians constituted a plurality in Georgia’s capital that remained unchallenged until the early 20th century.8
Inter-Nation Relations in an Inter-State Context
With the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Russian Empire collapsed and component nations declared independence. Both Georgia and Armenia officially declared independent republics within days of each other, in May 1918, and the relations between the two peoples entered a new phase within the context of international and regional politics.
From the beginning, Georgia-Armenia inter-state relations were tense. In December 1918, they engaged each other in a brief war over the mostly Armenian-populated border regions of Akhalkalaki and Lori.9 It was only through the interference of the British Expeditionary Force in the Caucasus that the two parties agreed to a ceasefire and arbitration to resolve their dispute.
Independent inter-state relations between the two countries did not last long. Deserted by the West, both republics had to once again accept Russian, albeit Soviet, control. For the next seventy or so years, both republics were merely administrative units in a larger, multiethnic empire; the central authority in Moscow dictated the terms of interaction between the two countries.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Armenia regained their suspended independence. However, relations between the two countries also continued from where they had been left off before Sovietization—i.e., mutual mistrust and rivalry. Such a pattern in relations may be explained by the fact that both are small countries that are competing for recognition and attempting to assert their identity in an uncertain and ever-volatile world order.
The development of the two republics followed different, if not contradictory, paths. On the one hand, Georgia was ravaged with civil wars and separatist movements (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) on its own land. Armenia, on the other hand, was free of any domestic conflict (save for the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan, which could be considered as an external conflict).10 In October 1990, the election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia as President of the independent Georgian Republic raised the level of anxiety among most of the non-Georgians living in the Republic. This anxiety was in large part the result of Gamsakhurdia’s ultra-nationalist rhetoric and his vision of creating a Georgia for the Georgians.11 In the case of the Armenians the anti-Gamsakhurdia anxiety even escalated to an armed conflict in the southern district of Ninotsminda in 1990.12 With the ousting of Gamsakhurdia and the coming to power of Eduard Shevardnadze, the anti-minority sentiments were checked and the inter-ethnic tension, at least in the case of the Armenian-populated southern districts of Georgia, was calmed.
On the other hand, Armenia had a more stable transition and development. The Republic was able to escape the fate of its northern neighbor largely because of Armenia’s homogeneity. 13 However, Armenia also had its share of ethnic warfare, in Nagorno-Karabakh, with neighboring Azerbaijan. Although the Armenian official government line was that the Karabakh conflict was one between Azerbaijan and the people of Karabakh (the vast majority of whom were Armenians), the spillover from the conflict cost Armenia dearly. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed a blockade with devastating impact on the Armenia’s economy.14
The Roots of Contention between Georgia and Armenia
Post-independence Georgian-Armenian relations have been full of tension and rivalry. Within the context of international law, and specifically concerning the apparent contradictions between the right to national self-determination and territorial integrity, each country stands in different camps. We can see a duality concerning geopolitical alliances as well. Whereas Georgia pursues an aggressively pro-Western policy, Armenia has chosen the Russian orbit. These are domains in which the two Caucasian countries seem to be on a head-on collision course; however, a middle ground for coexistence exists.
Some of the main points of the Georgian-Armenian rivalry are outlined below.
Javakheti, or Javakhk
The main cause of discomfort for Georgia and Armenia is the issue of Georgia’s southern districts populated mostly by Armenians. The historical name of the region is Meskheti-Javakheti; however, it is better known now as Samtskhe-Javakheti. Since independence, Georgia has been divided into new administrative units and divisions creating six new districts there, the population of each consisting of varying proportions of ethnic Armenians, who still constitute a majority.15
As noted earlier, the nationalist rhetoric of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia made the non-Georgian minorities wary of the central government’s attempts at Georgianization; however, with the coming of Eduard Shevardnadze to power, tensions were decreased. The main issues concerning the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti became their economic and social conditions.
Unlike other autonomous regions of Georgia, such as Abkhazia (Abkhazeti), Adzharia or South Ossetia, Javakheti had not had a special administrative status in Soviet or independent Georgia. However, along with Abkhazia and Adzharia, Javakheti was host to the Russian military, in the form of military bases in those regions. The decommissioning of Russian military bases in Georgia has been a contested issue between the two governments. For Georgians, the continued presence of Russian troops in separatist (Abkhazia) or potentially separatist (Samtskhe-Javakheti) areas is a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and an expression of Russian support for Georgia’s separatist minorities.16 On the other hand, from a local Armenian perspective, the Russian base in Akhalkalaki is a major source of income for the local population, especially considering that the region has no factories or industrial production.
The Armenians of Javakheti also feel that the central authorities in Tbilisi are following a policy of intentionally keeping the area poor and isolated from the rest of the country. Although there is no conclusive evidence to prove or disprove this claim,17 the fact is that outside of Tbilisi, and with the exception of some major resorts, no region in Georgia has a proper communication or transportation infrastructure. For its part, the Armenian government has attempted to diffuse the tension in the region by offering the transfer of electricity from Armenia to the local grids as well as providing cultural and educational material for the region’s Armenian schools.18
The possibility that Javakheti might become another Nagorno-Karabakh will remain in check as long as both the Georgian and Armenian governments continue to take steps in the right direction. For Georgia that means more attention and consideration for the economic, social and cultural needs of its Armenian citizens, whereas for Armenia that means curbing nationalist sentiments in the public and political spheres and assisting the Javakheti region while respecting Georgia’s sovereignty.
Armenians in Abkhazia
Abkhazia has constituted the most serious problem facing independent Georgia. In 1979, Abkhazia’s population breakdown was 43 percent Georgian, 17 percent Abkhaz, 16 percent Russian and 15 percent Armenian.19 At the beginning of the end of the U.S.S.R., the Abkhazians demanded that their Autonomous Republic cede from Georgia and be integrated into Russia; however, when the Georgian government overrode that demand, the dispute quickly developed into an armed conflict during which the Abkhaz population was able to take control of the Autonomous Republic and initiated a mass exodus of the Georgian population.20
The Armenian population of Abkhazia chose to remain and was integrated into the political process of the separatist Abkhaz republic.21 For Georgians, especially the refugees from Abkhazia, anti-Armenian sentiments have been reinforced because of what they interpret as Armenian support of separatist Abkhazia.
Setting aside, for a moment, the issue of the Armenian community in Abkhazia, the Armenian government’s interest in the breakaway republic is high because of the Soviet-era rail link that connects Armenia with Russia and passes through the “Independent Republic of Abkhazia.” The economic and transport significance of this railway is tremendous, because it can provide Armenia with a rail link to the Black Sea and hence decrease transportation charges. However, if one looks at this issue within the context of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, especially considering that war sentiments are simply too high between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, the reopening of this rail link anytime soon is not conceivable. Another reason for Georgia not to be enthusiastic about this link is the possibility that it might enable the Russian army to transport personnel through Georgian territory. This issue has been on the agenda between Armenia and Georgia for several years now, and in the latest visit of Armenian President Robert Kocharian to Tbilisi for talks with his Georgian counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze (now ex-Georgian President), the issue was brought up again but made not headway.22
One of major crises that the countries faced over Abkhazia was in October 2000, when an official Armenian foreign ministry delegation visited the breakaway republic to have talks with Abkhaz officials concerning the condition of over 70,000 Armenians still living there.23 The visit raised concerns in Georgia and became a diplomatic row between the two countries when Georgian government officials and parliamentarians claimed that they were not notified of the visit, whereas the Armenian side asserted that it had notified Tbilisi about the visit.24
Geopolitical Realities vs. the Burden of History
After independence, both Georgia and Armenia pursued an active policy of independence, relying on regional and international powers. From the start, it was apparent that both countries were moving in different directions. Whereas Georgia abruptly severed its relations with Russia and pursued a pro-West, anti-Russia policy, Armenia’s foreign policy orientation was more balanced, while it remained in the Russian orbit.25
The anti-Russian policies of Georgia’s first President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, were disastrous for the country. Russia countered by indirectly supporting the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as leverage to force Georgia into remaining in the Russian sphere of influence.26 It was only when Eduard Shevardnadze came to power and agreed to make Georgia a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that Russian policy shifted toward a more cooperative one.27
The Russian strategic interests in the Caucasus (both north and south) have led to the creation of a view in Georgia that it is a protector of Armenia in the latter’s war against Azerbaijan and that it also attempts to weaken the Georgian statehood by supporting the various separatist movements there.28 This view of Armenians as Russia’s pawns has helped create an atmosphere of mistrust between Georgia and Armenia based mostly on the premise that Armenia is a fifth column for the Russians in the region.
For its part, the first Armenian President, Levon Ter-Petrossian, tried to break away from the Russian orbit although in a subtle and less-than-direct way.29 Here, again, the Russian factor in inter-nation conflicts became apparent; since Russian troops were present on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh and could easily shift the balance in any direction they saw fit to exert pressure on either Armenia or Azerbaijan. After the resignation of President Ter-Petrossian and the election of President Kocharian, Armenia’s foreign policy came to possess a more-fully pro-Russian, some would say unconditionally pro-Russian, orientation, including the economic realm and resulting in the dependence of Armenia on Russia.30
Both countries’ relations with and attitudes toward Russia have historical roots and can be explained by the burden of history that the two countries carry. Thus, for Georgia, relations with Russia, especially in the last two centuries, have been full of grievances—starting with the Russian annexation of the last Georgian kingdom31 down to the discriminatory policies that Russia exercised toward the Georgians.32 On the other hand, Armenians have historically viewed Russia as a savior. The Armenians have considered themselves a Christian nation in a sea of Muslims, and during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries Russian armies were greeted as liberators as they conquered and annexed Armenian-populated lands (historic Armenia) from both the Ottoman and the Persian Empires, thus providing considerably safer and more secure conditions for the Armenians.33
As for the relations of Georgia and Armenia with their other influential neighbor Turkey, a dichotomy is also apparent. Turkey represents a link to the West for Georgia, which tries to counterbalance the influence of its northern neighbor Russia by forging close relations and cooperation agreements with as many western institutions and governments as possible.34 From a Turkish point of view, Georgia is also considered an indispensable link connecting Turkey with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. With the planned construction of pipelines transferring the Azerbaijani Caspian oil to Turkey through Georgia, Georgia’s importance becomes even more profound.35
For Armenians, Turkey remains a genocidal power, which if left unchecked would overrun Armenia and commit atrocities against the Armenian population.36 What is worse, in their conflict with Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians regard the Turkic Azerbaijanis as Turks, and the conflict a continuation of their historical struggle with Turkey.37 The Armenian government has repeatedly expressed concerns about the development of Georgian-Turkish relations and perceives Georgian-Turkish military relations as an attempt to further isolate Armenia.38
Which Way Now?
It is apparent that Georgia and Armenia have different, if not contradictory, foreign and domestic policy priorities. In a multi-ethnic region already ravaged by war and regional rivalries, the possibility exists that Georgian-Armenian relations could turn sour and Armenia and Georgia could face another Karabakh syndrome in southern Georgia.
Both countries need to break away from their historical experiences and regard the other’s priorities not as politics directed against the other but as a culmination of centuries of prejudices as well as different geopolitical interpretations.
Georgia needs to understand the Diaspora factor in Armenia’s policies. During the Soviet Union, Armenians living in Georgia constituted an internal (within the U.S.S.R.) Diasporan community; however, with independence, the Georgian-Armenian community was transformed into the Diasporan community nearest to Armenia, from which it expected cultural and moral support to maintain community institutions. The Armenians in Abkhazia and Javakheti are Georgian citizens and should be treated as such, rather than viewed as spies or traitors. For Georgia, the challenge is to maintain a balanced and complimentary policy to appease all its neighbors; in fact, Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasus that has normal diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors. To be a link among the countries of the region is a potential asset for Georgia.
For its part, Armenia needs to be supportive of the Georgian government’s attempts to extend its authority to the various parts of the war-torn republic. Demands for autonomy for the Armenians in Javakheti could become, and are interpreted by Georgians as being, a call for secessionism after the Abkhaz model. The Armenian government has shown much tact in dealing with this issue, and bilateral agreements have provided venues for the Armenian government to provide social, economic, cultural and educational assistance to Armenians in Georgia. These steps have decreased some of the pressure on Tbilisi and made it possible for the two governments to keep open lines of communication between them.
Finally, Georgia and Armenia need to realize that although they stand on different sides of many issues and regard the roles of various countries in the region differently, they can nevertheless forge close and cordial relations. Georgian-Armenian cooperation based on mutual respect and an understanding of each other’s priorities could be a catalyst for regional stability and the basis for solving many of the ethnic conflicts and separatist movements in the South Caucasus. The challenge for both countries is to look beyond the obvious and transcend nationalist fervor that could easily hold both countries hostage and further destabilize the region.
1 Some of the sources dealing with the ancient and medieval history of the region with emphasis on the two nations are: W. Allen, A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1971; D.M. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832, Columbia University Press, New York, 1957; D.M. Lang, Ch. Burney, The Peoples of the Hills: Ancient Ararat and Caucasus, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972; D.M. Lang, Ch.J. Walker, The Armenians, Minority Rights Group, London, 1987; R.G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994; Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, ed. by R.G. Suny, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996; C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 1963; Ch.J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990.
2 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., p. 23; W. Allen, op. cit., p. 77.
3 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
4 See: C. Toumanoff, op. cit., p. 83; R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 41, 46; S. Jones, “Georgian-Armenian Relations in 1918 to 1920 and 1991 to 1994: A Comparison,” in: Transcaucasia..., p. 443.
5 See: S. Jones, op. cit., pp. 444-445; B. Baranowski, K. Baranowski, Historia Gruzii, Wroclaw, 1987, pp. 170-173; Y.D. Anchabadze, N.P. Volkova, The Old Tbilisi, the City and its Dwellers in the 19th Century, Moscow, 1990, p. 33 as quoted by V. Guretski, “The Question of Javakheti,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998.
6 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 63, 86-95, 115-121, 139-145 passim.
7 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 118-119; S. Jones, op. cit., pp. 446-448.
8 Suny talks extensively about the Armenian presence in Tbilisi and the ethnic tension surrounding it in: R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 86-95, 116-121, 139-140, 153.
9 See: R.G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, Vol. 1, The First Year, 1918-1919, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 66-78; F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921, Philosophical Library, New York, 1951, pp. 174-183.
10 For an appraisal of both Georgian and Armenian attempts in state building after independence, see: S. Jones, “Georgia: A Failed Democratic Revolution,” and N. Dudwick, “Armenia: The Nation Awakens,” in: Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, ed. by I. Bremmer and R. Taras, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1993, pp. 261-287 and 288-310, respectively. See also: S. Jones, “Georgia: The Trauma of Statehood,” and N. Dudwick, “Armenia: Paradise Lost?” in: New States, New Politics: Building Post-Soviet Nation, ed. by I. Bremmer and R. Taras, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1997, pp. 505-546 and 471-504, respectively.
11 For an overview of Gamsakhurdia’s views on non-Georgian nationalities in Georgia, see: S. Jones, “Populism in Georgia: The Gamsakhurdia Phenomenon,” in: Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, ed. by D. Schwartz and R. Panossian, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1994, pp. 127-149.
12 See: S. Jones, “Revolutions in Revolutions Within Revolutions: Minorities in the Georgian Republic,” in: The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the U.S.S.R., ed. by Z. Gitelman, Macmillan, London, 1992, p. 91.
13 Statistics vary on the exact number of Armenians in Armenia but estimates are between 92% to 97%. The current minorities in Armenia include Russians, Yezidis and Kurds.
14 For detailed accounts on the conflict see: A Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA, 1992; L. Chorbajian, P. Donabedian, Cl. Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geo-Politics of Nagorno-Karabagh, Zed Books, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1994; The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From Secession to Republic, ed. by L. Chorbajian, Palgrave, New York, 2001; M.P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998; The Karabagh File, ed. by G. Libaridian, The Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research & Documentation, Cambridge, MA, 1988; Th. de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York, 2003; Armenia and Karabagh: The Struggle for Unity, ed. by Ch.J. Walker, Minority Rights Publications, London, UK, 1991.
15 Javakheti is divided into two districts: Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda; Meskheti or Samtskhe region has four districts: Adigeni, Aspindza, Akhaltsikhe, and Borjomi.
16 For a detailed study and discussion on the Georgian-Russian relations concerning the latter’s military presence in Georgia, see: D. Darchiashvili, “The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes and Prospects,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997; O. Antonenko, “Assessment of the Potential Implications of Akhalkalaki Base Closure for the Stability in Southern Georgia,” in: Conflict Prevention Network Briefing Study, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Brussels, 2001.
17 Most of the Armenians in Georgia and nationalist parties in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora carry the banner of Armenians victimized by Georgians and demand drastic action. On the other hand, both the Georgian and Armenian governments are careful not to start another conflict in the region and agree that the central authorities in Tbilisi are addressing the issue of developing the area.
18 See: “Armenia Is Ready to Support Georgia,” Georgian Times News, 30 June, 2003.
19 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., p. 321.
20 For the history of the region see: G. Hewitt, The Abkhazians: A Handbook, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998. For an overview of the conflict in Abkhazia refer to: G. Nodia, “Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, 1997; B. Coppieters, G. Nodia, Y. Anchabadze, Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press, Brussels, 1998.
21 An Armenian military battalion named “Marshal Baghramian” was in operation during the initial years of the conflict. Eventually, in 1996, the battalion was disbanded. Subsequently, the main channel for Armenians in Abkhazia has been a charitable organization named “Krunk.”
22 See: T. Aslanikashvili, “Armenians Are Festive in Advance for Reopening of Railway,” Georgian Times News, 30 June, 2003.
23 Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS-CEP 2000-268.
24 For more detail, see: FBIS-CEP 2000-77, FBIS-CEP 2000-78, FBIS-CEP 2000-156, and FBIS-CEP 2000-260.
25 For an overview of the development of both countries’ foreign policy, see: Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by G. Bertsch, C, Craft, Routledge, New York, 1999; Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press, Brussels, 1996; The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by A. Dawisha, K. Dawisha, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1995; E. Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1999; Sh. Hunter, Transcaucasia in Transition: Nation Building or a New Empire? Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1994; S. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, England, 2001.
26 See: Sh. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
27 Ibid., pp. 129-130.
28 L. Alieva, “Reshaping Eurasia-Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post-Soviet South Caucasus,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, 2000, pp. 6-7.
29 See: S. Astourian, “From Ter-Petrossian to Kocharian Leadership Change in Armenia,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, 2000, pp. 2, 25-26.
30 Since the start of Kocharian’s presidency, Russia and Armenia have signed many treaties of cooperation, especially in the economic sphere. Most of these treaties actually consisted of selling off Armenian state enterprises to Russian companies in return for the elimination of debt that Armenia owed to Russia. This phenomenon made Armenia even more dependent on Russia by giving Russian influence over Armenia an economic dimension.
31 See: R.G. Suny, op. cit., pp. 63-66.
32 Ibid., pp. 91-93, 158, 180-181.
33 For further details on the historical relations between the Russians and both Georgians and Armenians see: W. Allen, op. cit.; D.M. Lang, op. cit.; D.M. Lang, Ch. Burney, op. cit.; D.M. Lang, Ch.J. Walker, op. cit.
34 One of the main spheres of cooperation between Georgia and Turkey is within the military. Georgia is part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and hopes to eventually become a full member of NATO. Within the PfP framework, Georgian army units have been commissioned to peacekeeping operations within the context of NATO and under Turkish military supervision.
35 About Turkey’s policies concerning the Caucasus within the context of oil transport see: M. Bishku, “Turkey, Ethnicity, and Oil in the Caucasus,” Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 2001, pp. 13-23; A. Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1999, pp. 92-113; C. Candar, G. Fuller, “Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 22-38.
36 See: R.G. Hovannisian, “Historical Memory and Foreign Relations: The Armenian Perspective,” in: The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1995, pp. 237-276.
37 See: N. Dudwick, “The Cultural Construction of Political Violence in Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 42, No. 4, July-August 1995, p. 19.
38 FBIS-CEP 2000-2, FBIS-CEP 2001-351, FBIS-CEP 2002-152 and FBIS-CEP 2002-268.