Nur Omarov, Ph.D. (Political Science), working on a doctorate at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

International Relations and Security in the 21st Century

Today it is impossible to correctly describe the present state of international relations and predict their future without a careful analysis of security-related problems as an inalienable part of the world political scene. This is amply confirmed by the fact that all discussions on security problems are breaking the bounds of traditional ideas and encompassing an ever-wider area, which in turn is assuming an independent or even central role in these discussions. This is quite natural: the list of threats generated by the realities of the globalizing world and the transitional state of international relations is growing.

In the 1990s, it included uneven regional development, depleting natural resources, environmental pollution, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflicts, transnational organized crime, and international terrorism. Today we are aware of a shift from “blatant” military threats to “subdued,” mainly humanitarian, ones which are spreading to and infiltrating more than one state. This is confirmed by the growing terrorist threat felt everywhere, which is rooted, in part, in the growing economic and social inequality.

Interdependence, the key term of globalization, changes the traditional nation-state’s internal and external contexts, which is leading in turn to corresponding changes in the international security sphere. As a result the security threats are changing, while the structures designed to regulate international relations and security (the U.N., OSCE, NATO, etc.) are being undermined and weakened. Indeed, they have already demonstrated their impotence in the face of new, non-military threats and their inability to handle the crises in Yugoslavia, and the Northern and Southern Caucasus. Today we should ask ourselves whether these structures can be adapted in any way to the dramatically changing world.

It is equally important to ponder over the future of international relations and their role in setting up a system of international security. Discussions in recent years have testified that the present ideas about the future of international relations have not yet produced a definite answer to this question. This has happened for several reasons. Analysts and experts proceed from a varied range of methodological and theoretical approaches; states and blocs pursue interests that are difficult to harmonize. At the same time, the majority of academics and politicians agree that globalization cannot be stopped and that the world will continue to develop in this direction. This raises a question about the most probable systems of international relations and their impact on all the entities involved in them.

The above led me to conclude that the key features of the future world security system are taking shape in “strategic indeterminacy.”1 The term aptly describes the state the system of international relations was in at the beginning of the 1990s and means that the global security system will remain in a state of “strategic indeterminacy” for an indefinitely long transition period. While immediately after the Cold War the world had to promptly and painlessly, if possible, re-adjust to the universal values and formulate a generally acceptable answer to the new challenges and threats, today a concerted approach to the world problems remains formally recognized while the variety of positions and approaches is growing.2

Logically, the 21st century is described as “the century of global alternative,” all others (such as “the APR century”) being secondary and limited. This description is an objective one since there is no doubt that in the age of globalization international relations are dominated by a multitude of alternative development scenarios. At the same time, I am convinced that this definition offers a clear understanding of the dynamics, nature, and trends of transformation in international relations in the new century and makes an analysis possible.

The experience of the last decade of the 20th century shows that international relations are still at the crossroads of a unipolar and a multipolar world, negative and positive scenarios of global developments, Euro-Atlanticism and its Asian alternative, neo-liberalism and “power of the fist.” Similar processes can be observed in the security sphere; they are rooted in the dynamic, or fluid state of international relations. One would like to ask: What will prevail—cooperative or corporate security; a multisided or one-sided approach to the world security priorities; security of isolated communities or much more just (yet much harder to achieve) genuine global security? Today it is harder to answer this question than it was in the early 1990s when the theory of international relations was dominated by the romantic notion of a conflict-free and just world ruled by an abstract global government.

How long will the transition stage last? Today we can say that the world is unlikely to make a prompt and painless choice of development model. The widening gap between the North and the South, the egotistic desire of the rich minority to preserve the status quo as long as possible and to enjoy the advantages created by globalization will hardly be hailed by the countries that have found themselves by the wayside. There is no doubt that the politics of the world leaders imposed on the rest of the world community will be readjusted by its deprived members, protests of anti-globalists, and by terror as the extreme manifestation of discontent.

We can expect that new blocs and alliances will come to the fore with regional and global development strategies of their own. The growing ambitions of the most successful integration alliances (the European Union) and individual states (China, for example) to pursue policies different from those imposed by the “only world superpower” (together with the stronger positions of new actors represented by international organizations and NGOs) have caused collisions and recurring confidence crises. The highly divergent opinions about the Iraqi crisis displayed inside the bloc of Western states, which have long been knit together by common interests and prolonged partnership, illustrate the above. Which side will the passive majority of the international community choose? The answer will depend on the newly formed international combinations and configurations of the most influential and active states.

It should be added that the “century of global alternative” as an independent idea can describe not only the prospects for the future world order, but also adequately assess the organization and development of a new security expanse in post-Soviet Eurasia.

Formation of the New Security Expanse

Today the states and the world in general are facing transnational and transborder threats. After departing from the traditional, “militarist” understanding of security the world now needs a wider conception that stems from multisided involvement and universal decisions. We cannot but entirely agree with what Kyrgyzstan President Akaev said in November 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE summit: “International terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, and illegal trade in arms not only threaten the security and stability of states. They may destroy these states.”3

The above makes the question of creating a global “security landscape”4 based on regional systems or regional security landscapes an important one. It is equally important to understand whether it can justify the hopes the “old” and “new” participants in international relations have pinned on it.

Eurasia, which at the turn of the 21st century found itself for objective reasons in the center of world politics, is especially interesting in this respect. The “geopolitical vacuum” left by the Soviet Union developed into a “security vacuum” that affected the Eurasian states and nations. In the latter half of the 1990s, the expanse was rapidly filled with various regional and sub-regional entities very different in “weight” and “size.” Certain states outside the region were also drawn into the project. Many of these new entities claim regional leadership and a monopoly in the Eurasian security system. This suggests that late in the 20th and early in the 21st century Eurasia and post-Soviet Central Asia (as its inalienable part) became a patchwork of variegated approaches at different levels to the common security problems.5

This phenomenon stems from two synchronous and mutually connected processes. On the one hand, the post-Soviet Eurasian states joined the already existing global and regional security structures (the U.N., OSCE, NATO, etc.); on the other, qualitatively new alliances were formed: the Collective Security Treaty Organization; the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the SCO, and GUUAM.

When analyzing these processes through the prism of cooperation among the world powers in Eurasia, it must be pointed out that each of them has its own ideas about the roads leading to security in Eurasia and the methods for ensuring it based on their long-term national interests. They can be described as independent “projects” actively realized with the help of the tools available to them. The projects clearly identified the dominants that determined the centripetal and centrifugal trends in the globalized world, revealed in the need for a consolidated response to the common security threats and in the disuniting urge obvious in the world powers’ actions to seek domination and limit the influence of third countries.

For example, Russia’s “post-imperial” project aims at restoring influence in post-Soviet Eurasia in order to use the re-united local states as an instrument for influencing America’s global policies. After taking into account the present realities, Russia is obviously steering toward a new model of relations in which the sides’ interests are more or less equally respected.

The American “neo-imperial” project aims at filling the “geopolitical vacuum” in Eurasia and creating a new Washington-dominated global context. To achieve this the American administration plans to encircle Russia and China with political regimes economically and financially dependent on the U.S. The extended “living expanse” in Eurasia will contribute to U.S. global domination.

The American designs, however, are opposed by China’s “assimilation” project born by a combination of the present global realities and the desire of the political elite (rooted in historical traditions) to restore the country’s influence in the “lost territories.” And although this implies Central Asia and Russia’s Far East, Beijing is obviously displeased with Washington’s increasing influence in Eurasia as a whole.

The project based on the EU members’ intention to set up similar integrated regions in Central Asia and the Caucasus arouses a lot of interest. Little by little the EU leaders are overcoming the centrifugal trends of recent times and, together with the local states, are looking for the most acceptable integration alternatives. European policies are playing a stabilizing role in the CIS countries in general and promoting “a new détente” among Russia, China, and the United States. The European Union betrays no hegemonic designs; there are no historically rooted negative associations among the local people, therefore its geopolitical and geostrategic plans in Eurasia translated into concrete political steps are not rejected in the same way as happens with other actors.

It is expected that each of the above projects will ensure security of the corresponding states and the countries involved in them. This is nothing more than a theory—in practice most of the small Eurasian countries remain outside the security zone. The gap between their security problems and the true motives behind any of these organizations “erodes security” and discredits these structures in the eyes of the world community. The above has demonstrated that the world giants inevitably prefer their selfish interests to the security problems of the small Eurasian countries. The situation around the Caspian-Caucasian energy basin is the best illustration of the above. Most of the small states must take into account a multitude of circumstances caused by their destitution, dependence on foreign factors, and the burden of the past that weighs heavily on their present and future. When forced to make a choice or look for alternatives they have to agree on compromises, “multi-vectoral diplomacy,” and involvement in blocs and alliances.

As a result, nearly all Eurasian countries participate in several, either horizontal or vertical, security structures; they tend to establish horizontal ties in the organizations representing their interests at the regional level. This differs from the blocs of the olden days with their mainly vertically arranged connections. To a great extent, this new situation reproduces the current global realities with several centers of power, each of which wishes to extend its sphere of influence. The resultant “global network of states” is reproduced in a much more complicated organization of global and regional expanses through structures based on a fairly involved indirect intertwining of horizontal and vertical ties between states and international organizations and among the latter. Indeed, in post-Soviet Eurasia there are several international organizations with superimposed boundaries and “responsibility zones”—a sure sign that in the mid-1990s a new security system emerged based on multifarious cooperation among entities of international relations realized at different levels. According to its organizational principles and the relationships inside it, this security system can be called an “associative” one.6 It is a new organizational system of the Eurasian expanse taking shape here after the Cold War. Based on the principles of cooperative and collective security, the “associative” system makes it possible to describe in detail the state, mechanisms, and nature of cooperation of various security structures at the regional (sub-regional) and global levels. This approach is conducive to an analysis of actions of all relevant security subjects/objects (small, medium, and large states and international organizations) actively involved in setting up new structures and mechanisms of Eurasian security.

To correctly understand its regularities we should recognize that the system is a transitional type that includes both elements of a new global society (interdependence, rejection of conflicts in favor of compromises, active involvement of international organizations) and the relicts of the old bipolar system (the “friend or foe” opposition that provokes confrontation). To a great extent it is this combination that is responsible for the system’s spontaneous emergence born by its natural trend toward self-organization in the fundamentally new security expanse, in which numerous varied foreign influences clash.

When describing the main facts behind the “associative” security system we should point to the following.

In 1992-1994 the post-Soviet Eurasian states joined the U.N. and CSCE/OSCE, and became actively involved in their work. This was the first step along the road toward universally recognized global and regional security structures. The majority of the new independent states were guided by security considerations and the need to integrate into the world community. For their part, the U.N. and OSCE leaders were prepared to integrate these countries in order to prevent uncontrolled conflicts and mass violence across the post-Soviet expanse. As a second step, the majority of the post-Soviet states became actively involved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the EU and NATO structures (the Partnership for Peace program and the Euroatlantic Partnership Council) and participated in creating a European security expanse based on more or less similar tasks and principles assigned to each of the participants. Turkmenistan was the only exception: it opted for a positive neutrality policy officially confirmed by a U.N. General Assembly decision of 12 December, 1995.

The CIS was set up in 1991 in a similar way: at the initial stage the new structure had to reduce the conflict potential and formulate the new “rules of the game” in the relationships among the post-Soviet republics. A Collective Security Treaty signed in May 1992 was the second step, cooperation within which significantly changed over time. In April 1999, three CIS states discontinued their membership because of its low efficiency. In 2002-2003, a new regional structure appeared—the Collective Security Treaty Organization—with a fairly complex and ramified structure that included the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces and an air base in Central Asia. According to the heads of member state, this organization was based on the principles of maintaining collective security within the CIS and was not hostile to any outside state.

The Shanghai Five set up in April 1996 is another security structure with a unique mechanism in post-Soviet Eurasia, which opened the way toward fundamentally new relationships between China and the bordering post-Soviet states.7 This structure further increased its influence in the security sphere in the region when it was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (on 15 June, 2001 Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five) and the SCO Declaration was signed (on 7 June, 2002). The format of its activity was extended to include certain economic issues, a fact that speaks of the organization’s positive integration potential.

The constantly growing role of economic factors in the security conceptions (including the internal stability and sustainability of the states) has made the EurAsEC (1994, 2001) and the CACO (1994, 2002) fundamentally new sub-regional security structures. Emerging as integration organizations with purely economic goals, they gradually took on the tasks of fighting organized crime, international terrorism, and religious extremism. Their aim is Eurasian stability and security.

In recent years the Conference on Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia has been moving to the fore. It was set up on the initiative of the leaders of Kazakhstan formulated in 1992. Today it is addressing practical issues—a fact amply confirmed by its summit held on 3-4 June, 2002 in Almaty.

GUUAM (1997) has undertaken the task of creating a security system in the Black Sea-Caspian Basin as an alternative to the one supported by the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan, after leaving the Collective Security Treaty to join GUUAM, suspended its membership in this structure in 2002. The GUUAM leaders insist that the United States does not influence their organization, yet their regular meetings with American military and political leaders raise doubts about their sincerity.

The Central Asian states and Azerbaijan are actively involved in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and the Council of Heads of Turkic-Speaking States, all three organizations striving within their competence to oppose the most glaring security threats. They are very important as political and consultative forums through which some of the post-Soviet states have successfully integrated into the Islamic world. Significantly, in October 2003 Russian President Putin participated as an observer in the OIC summit in Malaysia.

Late in 2001 armed forces of the international antiterrorist coalition (IAC) composed of the military of some of the NATO countries appeared in Central Asia. According to numerous official statements they concentrated on the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan and on greater security and stability in the adjacent countries. All assessments of this fact aside, I can say that the deployment of U.S.-led military forces caused serious and long-term geopolitical shifts in Eurasia. We cannot ignore that the aims and tasks of the antiterrorist coalition coincide (even if formally) with the long-term security problems in post-Soviet Eurasia. This created an unprecedented situation: in Kyrgyzstan the air base used by the America-led antiterrorist coalition is operating in close proximity with the air component of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces8 composed mainly of Russian military.

The combination of the main regional and sub-regional structures described above created “intersecting” systems as part of the global security landscape, offering additional guarantees to the countries involved in them. The “superimposed” structures with highly flexible degrees of involvement testify that early in the new century Eurasia switched from the rigid bloc system of the past based on the “friend or foe” principle to a more pragmatic and flexible international security model. It allows the countries involved to respond to changes and threats promptly and adequately. This system can be described as an “associative” system—its main element being the direct (or indirect) involvement of big and small states in many different organizations, especially where their interests are concerned. Together these organizations form a “security association” of different countries and alliances.9

By bringing together the majority of the states (illustrated above in relation to post-Soviet Eurasia), the “security association” has created an absolutely new framework of relationships designed to overcome possible conflict potential by means of multilateral consultations, a “multi-layered” security system at the regional and global levels. As a result, and despite the different approaches evident in this sphere, Eurasia is gradually moving toward a relatively homogenous security expanse kept together by the majority’s shared desire to achieve conflict-free and mutually advantageous development by using the mechanisms of the “associative system.” This arrangement is especially favorable for the small states doomed to the defensive development strategy on the global scene. Within all sorts of structures, however, they enjoy a more or less equal partnership with the great powers, and are given a chance to realize their national interests and actively oppose new challenges and threats by collectively exploiting the partnership potential.

As a result the Central Asian republics can easily move beyond regional boundaries and territorial alliances (the Central Asian Cooperation Organization and the CIS) to become actively involved in the global security processes. They can use the accumulated potential of preventing conflicts and averting threats on a wider scale. This is especially important for the post-Soviet states that are still carrying out political and economic reforms. Kyrgyzstan, for example, can work simultaneously in such different organizations as the OIC and NATO to ensure security in the Asian and European foreign policy sectors.

The system is highly flexible—this is another of its advantages. It can alter its configuration and respond to new challenges. It is just as important that the most urgent problems of economic and social development as a basis of stability at home and conflict-free development form part of the traditional security agenda. This is especially important today when domestic threats are obviously more pronounced than outside challenges. The “compensatory” function of the “associative” system is equally important. On the one hand, it is realized through the active involvement of certain world powers in addressing security problems, which deprives any one of them of absolute domination in Eurasia. As a result, they have to coordinate their interests at the regional and global levels. On the other, this reduces to the minimum the threat of dictatorship and hegemony of any of the world powers to which the small states are exposed; this also creates a leeway when selecting the best possible foreign policy strategy.

Certain factors deeply rooted in the bipolar past do not allow the “associative” system to fully reveal its positive potential. There are countries that are still entertaining their ambition to claim “monopoly governance” and to curb the influence of other world powers. As a result the small states are exposed to greater pressure—an obvious and negative factor—and are turned from subjects of international politics into objects of variegated foreign influence. In this context some of the states regard the regional and sub-regional security mechanisms as an instrument of unilateral geostrategic domination in Eurasia. The process is especially acute because the countries trying to transfer from authoritarianism to democratic values are weak and depend on foreign influence. The great powers, which proceed from the primacy of their national interests, provoke other Eurasian states into emulating them. In Central Asia we are witnessing how Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are competing for domination. From time to time the regional giants deem it necessary to instruct the weaker states which countries they should select as allies—this is another negative factor born by the Cold War approaches. It contradicts accelerating globalization as an objectively conditioned path of development.

The “associative” security system is a fairly “loose” structure: there are several centers of power and coexistence of several structures in it. Another important factor is that the Eurasian regions and sub-regions (Central Asia and the Caucasus) have not yet developed into political and economic entities able to independently identify themselves in the system of international relations. This is why the “associative security system” can only be conditionally described as a system in the strict sense of the word. This term, however, can be applied to this system to describe it as a new means and form of organization of spatial security in post-Soviet Eurasia based on the gradually increasing importance of the principles of cooperative and corporate security in the relations between states and international organizations.

In order to function successfully, the “associative” security system should use new adequate and mutually acceptable terminology so that all those involved in the dialog can understand their partners and be understood by them: “mutual responsibility,” “devotion to common values,” etc. Recent years have shown that the inability and ineptitude of the Eurasian states to find mutually acceptable solutions in the course of the discussions are the main obstacles to successful and mutually advantageous cooperation.

These faults, however, cannot destroy the system’s high positive charge and the fact that it is providing the world community with a chance to consciously participate in ensuring long-term security and stability in post-Soviet Eurasia. This is conditioned by the functional content of the gradually emerging regional security landscapes: they will have to become “open” entities and include, along with internal security guarantees, mechanisms for extending them to outside environments. This will make it possible to transfer to a new security formula designed for the different entities of international relations and to lay a foundation for their concerted efforts to oppose the threats to the global community.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Even though the terms and descriptions offered above are debatable, there is no doubt that the dramatic changes in international relations give rise to new approaches to international security.

This is convincingly confirmed by the developments in post-Soviet Eurasia in which the great powers and respected international organizations are involved. This imposes certain responsibilities on them and calls for a coordinated and balanced approach to the small countries, which are weak for objective and subjective reasons.10

The first attempts of the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and the OSCE (with the financial support of the EU and the United States) to fight transnational organized crime and international terrorism in Central Asia11 should be transformed into an anti-crisis strategy12 by supplementing it with economic and social measures. This kind of strategy cannot be created and successfully realized if the regional countries and the states with special interests in the region (Russia, China, India, etc.) are not involved. In fact, their participation has been prepared by their contribution to the “associative” security system. This strategy should then be extrapolated to the entire Eurasian expanse so as to create a wider security zone for the subjects/objects of security in their contemporary, extended interpretation: man, society, state. A new security formula should dominate relations between post-Soviet Eurasia and its partners. It can be described as “security for a state rooted in internal stability and sustainable economic growth within multisided partnerships. It will be extended beyond the limits of the state in order to protect the national interests of its allies.” This formula should guide these countries in their contacts with the global community as a whole and help them prevent the threats to their security, rather than eliminate their consequences as is happening today.

The alternative is a grim one: further alienation of the Eurasian states and mounting crises. We have already learned that it is precisely crisis phenomena that breed international terrorism and Islamic radicalism, which threaten not only individual ethnic and social entities, but also the international system of states. The possibility of this has been confirmed by the U.S.’s desire to become the “only world superpower” and to deal with the problems the world is facing single-handedly. This has already created contradictions between Washington and its European partners and caused the world community to sort of ostracize the U.S. As paradoxical as it may be, this is becoming clearly obvious: America and its policies, intended as the cornerstone of long-term global security, are no longer popular. The U.S. leaders are inclined to use force as their foreign policy instrument. This revives the pattern of international relations aptly described by Thucydides in the fifth century B.C. as “the strong do what they will; the weak suffer what they must,” the principle Hobbes put into words as “the war of all against all” and the priority of the great power state interest.13 It seems that to achieve a global and regional balance of interests as the key to worldwide stability, the United States should change the priorities of its considerable economic and innovation potential.

The current choice between cooperative or corporate security, prosperity for the majority or for the isolated “golden billion,” has found its practical embodiment in the painful process of organizing a fundamentally new security expanse in Eurasia. It is being born amid the contradictory trends toward alliances and conflicts, compromises and domination of one single country, common interests and the limited interests of certain states. The nations must make their choice in the next few decades. Will the “global project” based on a consolidated and balanced approach, and cooperation among different security communities within the “associative” security system triumph over isolated and highly divergent projects pursued by individual players on the international scene?

1 N. Omarov, Na puti k global’noy bezopasnosti: Tsentral’naia Azia posle 11 sentiabria 2001 goda, Tsentr OBSE v Bishkeke, Bishkek, 2002, p. 25.
2 See: Ibid., p. 26.
3 “Vystuplenie glavy kyrgyzskoy delegatsii Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki A. Akaeva na sammite OBSE v Stambule, Turtsia (18-19 noiabria 1999 g.),” Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 November, 1999.
4 The term “global security landscape” as one of the forms of the “security community” was offered by B. Boene, W. von Bredov, and C. Dandsker in their article published in: Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis, ed. by Juergen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, LIT Verlag in Hamburg and Transaction Publishers in the U.S., 2000.
5 See: N.M. Omarov, Gumanitarnye aspekty bezopasnosti Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki v XXI veke: vyzovy i otvety, Bishkek, 2001, p. 46.
6 N. Omarov, “‘Assotsiativnaia’ sistema bezopasnosti kak novaia model’ organizatsii evraziyskogo prostranstva v nachale XXI veka,” in: NATO i Tsentral’naia Azia: regional’naia i natsional’naia bezopasnost’ i strategicheskoe partnerstvo, ed. by T.A. Kozhamkulova et al., Almaty, 2003, pp. 25-34.
7 See: Cha Yishan, “Mekhanizm ‘Shankhayskoy piaterki’ i strategicheskoe vzaimodeystvie Kitaia i Rossii,” in: Kitay v mirovoi politike, ed. by A.D. Voskresenskiy, Moscow, 2001, p. 340.
8 The decision to deploy the air component of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces in the town of Kant was adopted in June 2002. On 23 September, 2003 during the Moscow visit of Kyrgyzstan President Akaev to Moscow a relevant official agreement was signed. The air base was officially opened on 23 October, 2003 during President Putin’s visit to Kyrgyzstan.
9 See: N.M. Omarov, Gumanitarnye aspekty bezopasnosti Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki v XXI veke: vyzovy i otvety, p. 48.
10 They are their limited resources, which give them little clout on the world arena, and the current transitional stage of their history.
11 The program of action adopted by the Bishkek International Conference “Strengthening Security and Stability in Central Asia: Intensified Concerted Efforts in the Antiterrorist Struggle” organized by the UNODCCP and OSCE on 13-14 December, 2001 in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) []
12 It can be presented in concise form as a conception of “security through sustainable national development” that will take into account the great powers’ desire to maintain stability in the region and to see the local states developing thanks to their own resources, and the regional states’ desire to successfully complete the reforms and dynamically integrate into the world community.
13 V.M. Kulagin, “Mir v XXI veke: mnogopoliusniy balans sil ili global’niy Pax Democratica?” in: Gipoteza “demokraticheskogo mira” v kontekste alternativ mirovogo razvitia (see: Polis, No. 1, 2000, p. 24).

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