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REGIONAL POLICY

THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND THE POLICY OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES

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A B S T R A C T

Historically, the Southern Caucasus has been the zone of Russia's special interests. Here passed the trade routes and economic interests intertwined. For centuries, Russia has been conducting an active policy in the region.

The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. led to a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the Southern Caucasus. The new independent states—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—began to formulate and implement their own independent foreign policies, based primarily on national interests. Consequently, having obtained independence, they had to rebuild relations with Russia for whom, in turn, the Southern Caucasus continued to have great geopolitical, economic, military and political importance. The affiliations between Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, developed throughout history, continued to be a factor in their relationships.

At different stages in the recent past, Russian foreign policy in the Southern Caucasus employed a variety of approaches due to another factor: political fragmentation of the countries of the region, which does not constitute a singular, coherent geopolitical unit. The internal political processes in the South Caucasian countries developed differently. They faced complex economic and social problems, plagued by the inter-state and intra-state contradictions: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts. Russia was actively involved in conflict resolutions.

Russian policy has taken into account the complexity, faced by the countries of the region in the formation of their national statehood, ensuring sovereignty of their respective territories, and the development of for-

ign policy. Russia had no choice but to consider the region's complex commercial, economic and geopolitical interests, the expansion of cooperation in the energy field between the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the largest energy companies, and the increasing interest of the Western states in the region's resource potential. These factors have fueled a clash of competing geopolitical projects in the Southern Caucasus, which has manifested itself since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The approaches of Russia to and its interaction with the countries of the Southern Caucasus were influenced to a great extent by the active policy of the United States, EU, and, in the last decade, China. They have consistently promoted their interests in the countries of the region, using available opportunities to strengthen their influence in the South Caucasian countries.

An important factor in determining Russian policy in the Southern Caucasus is the issue of energy: the questions of production and transportation of hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region. Azerbaijan is one of the oil and gas producing states of the Caspian region, supplying Turkey and the European countries. Georgia acts as a key partner of Baku and the Western countries, delivering Azerbaijani hydrocarbons through its territory.

In recent years, the vectors of foreign policies of the South Caucasian countries vary more and more. Armenia's joining the Eurasian Economic Union took place during increased cooperation between Georgia and NATO. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains unresolved. These and other factors should be taken into account if Russia is to realize its policy in the Southern Caucasus.

KEYWORDS: Southern Caucasus, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, conflicts, pipelines.

Introduction

The modern Russian policy in the Southern Caucasus has evolved after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. But the large impact, which affected the regional policy of Russia, was engendered by the political processes that took place in the former republics at the end of the 1980s. It so happened that the positions of the political forces that favored the secession from the U.S.S.R. and assumed the anti-Russian attitude have become more pronounced. Especially rigid was the position, adhered to by the Georgian elite, which favored the rapprochement of Georgia with the Western countries. The situation in Azerbaijan, which also favored the expansion of cooperation with the Western states, was complicated as well.

Russia had to take into account the balance of power, which developed in the countries of the Southern Caucasus. With respect to each of the states of the region, Russia worked out singular approaches, since after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region of the Southern Caucasus represented a geographical notion and did not constitute, either economically or politically, a cohesive, united entity.¹

In Georgia and Azerbaijan, the political forces that came to power adopted particularly hard stances toward Russia, speaking for the severance of any relations with Russia and the expansion of cooperation with Turkey and the Western countries. The most problematic partner in the region was Georgia. Its President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, adopted a course of severance of relations with Russia, which had to take into account Georgian nationalism, used by the elites of the country to solve domestic problems.²

Russian Policy: Formative Stage

In the beginning of the 1990s, Russian policy was evolving amid conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and was aimed at ensuring regional security. Despite the deterioration of relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia was providing a key influence on the situation in the region. This was related to the participation of Russia in the settlement of Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Russia played a crucial role in the resolution of conflicts in the Southern Caucasus (South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh). With the active participation of the Russian Federation, the Dagomys Agreements were signed on South Ossetia (1992) and Moscow Agreements on Abkhazia (1994). Russian involvement also helped to accomplish the creation of a regulatory negotiating protocol for the settlement of conflicts. In addition, Russia played a crucial role in ending the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh became a major factor in the formulation and subsequent follow-up in the implementation of foreign and internal policies of Azerbaijan and Armenia and was used by the ruling elites of these countries for the consolidation of the electorate. However, the active participation of the Russian Federation did not change the position of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which sought political and economic support from the Western countries. It was during the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze that the foreign policy and foreign economic inclination of Georgia became clearly discernible in its orientation toward the West.³

¹ See: I. Menagaroshvili, "Tri osnovnye problemy regiona: vzgliad iz Gruzii," in: *Yuzhnyi Kavkaz-2006. Osnovnyye tendentsii, ugrozy i riski*, ed. by G. Novikova, Amrots Group, Erevan, 2007, p. 62.

² See: M. Kirchanov, "Russia as a Subject of the Ideology of Georgian Nationalism," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 150-157.

³ See: *Gruzia: problemy i perspektivy razvitiia*, in two vols., Vol. 1, ed. by E.M. Kozhokin, RISI, Moscow, 2001, p. 185.

Russia attempted to minimize the weakening of its economic positions in the region, which happened in consequence of the disintegrated economic ties after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and also as a result of the reorientation in foreign economic relationships. Thus, Russia's relations with Azerbaijan after the proclamation of the latter's independence were being achieved in difficult circumstances. Similar situation was observed with respect to Georgia, where a significant drop in GDP occurred. This was due to the economic policy of the government of Georgia and the ongoing territorial conflict.⁴

In addition, there was the effect of the weakening economic and technological systems, payment links, and the reduction in production capacities in the countries of the region. The new independent states were looking for new partners with a view to changing the geography for the supplies of their products.⁵ Even before his return to Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze signed a protocol on the strategic concept of economic revival of Georgia with the Brock Group company. The document provided for the reconstruction of the ports of Poti and Batumi, increasing the throughput capacity of the international airport in Batumi, expansion of the network for oil storage, etc.

At the same time, Russia, despite the weakening of its positions, maintained close economic relations with all of the countries of the Southern Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, Lukoil, an oil company, was very active, participating in the development of oil and gas wells. Gas deliveries were being carried out, and there was cooperation in the banking industry. Russia was exporting automobiles, equipment and metal products, while Azerbaijan reciprocated with food products. However, Russia was conceding to the rapidly expanding cooperation between the countries of the region and the Western states, while Russian participation in investment projects was modest in scope.⁶

The attention of Russia to the countries of the Southern Caucasus did not focus on only economic factors. Russia sought to strengthen its political and military stature, including the keeping and maintenance of military bases in the countries of the Southern Caucasus. Furthermore, in the beginning of the 1990s, Russia and Azerbaijan participated in the sectioning of the Caspian flotilla. Of great importance were the oil and gas resources of the region, particularly in Azerbaijan, as well as the geographical location of the countries of the region, through which passed the pathways for linking the Black Sea and Caspian regions. The policy of Russia was aimed at slowing down the development of the Caspian fields of Azerbaijan, using negotiating tactics for determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Russia had to take into account the policy of the Western countries and Turkey, which, after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., have intensified their policies in the countries of the Southern Caucasus. Turkey's task was that of strengthening its positions in the region, relying primarily on the ethnically close Azerbaijan.⁷ Ankara sought to employ new approaches to the countries of the Southern Caucasus, using elements of historical homogeneity, participating in the search for a compromise in the efforts to find a solution for regional conflicts.⁸ The development of commercial, economic and investment activities were priorities of Turkish policy, to which were added additional interests in oil and gas, delivered from Azerbaijan via Georgia. However, the policy of Russia, which, after a short period once again drew attention to the region and its problems, prevented Ankara from establishing close ties with the countries of the Southern Caucasus.⁹

⁴ See: L.M. Grigoriev, M.R. Salikhov, *GUAM—15 let spustia*, REGNUM, Moscow, 2007, 200 pp.

⁵ See: E.M. Ivanov, "Ekonomicheskie otnosheniia Gruzii s Rossiei," in: *Gruzia: problemy i perspektivy razvitiia*, Vol. 1, pp. 175-200.

⁶ See: *Rossia i Zakavkazie: realii nezavisimosti i novoe partnerstvo*, ed. by R.M. Avakov, A.G. Lisov, IMEMO RAS, Finstatinform, Moscow, 2000, p. 180.

⁷ See: *Strany SNG v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii*, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, 2008, p. 145.

⁸ See: V.B. Belov, A.A. Yazkova, "Regionalnoe izmerenie Bolshoi Evropy," in: *Bolshaia Evropa. Idei, realnost, perspektivy*, ed. by Al.A. Gromyko, V.P. Fedorov, Ves mir, Moscow, 2014, pp. 619-637.

⁹ See: Z. Chotoev, "On Turkey's Possible Involvement in Strengthening Central Asian Security," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 4 (28), 2004, pp. 135-139.

Great attention to the region was also paid by the EU. To advance its interests in the region, the EU had proposed a number of infrastructure projects. The most comprehensive program of concerted action by the European Union in the southern zone of the former U.S.S.R. was presented in the Program TRANsport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACEKA), which was published in May 1993. It was developed by the EU Commission with the participation of the ministers of trade and transportation of the countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The program was aimed at expanding economic and political influence in the region, the diversification of transportation routes for the hydrocarbon resources.¹⁰

The new independent states of the Southern Caucasus were the focus of the geopolitical interests of the United States. The American administration wanted to take advantage of the favorable extant circumstances to weaken Russia with its lack of coherent, comprehensive Transcaucasian policies in order to displace its main geopolitical competitor.¹¹ The U.S. policy was aimed at the expansion of, first of all, cooperation on the issues of energy with the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the strengthening of its political contacts with them.

In general, the United States and the majority of the member countries of the European Union attached greater importance to their political and not economic interests in the Southern Caucasus. And only after the signing of the “contract of the century” between the oil companies of the West and Azerbaijan in September 1994, the importance gradually shifted to energy interests.¹² The increasing attention to the hydrocarbon resources of Azerbaijan was linked to the increased competition between Russia and the Western countries for the selection of transportation routes for future deliveries of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian region.¹³ The more so that Azerbaijan had rich natural resources and occupied a vital geopolitical position. Russia was interested in the supply of hydrocarbon resources through its own territory. In turn, the EU and U.S. offered new projects with the pipelines going west. To implement this task the American administration proposed some key provisions of the United States’ policy in the region, which placed an emphasis on creating new energy corridors by-passing Russia.

The aggravation of relations with certain countries of the Southern Caucasus had a detrimental effect on Russian policy in the region.¹⁴ In Georgia, there remained an anti-Russian sentiment. In the period of Eduard Shevardnadze’ leadership, the foreign policy of the country focused on increased cooperation with the Western countries. Azerbaijan, making the efforts to develop its own oil and gas sources, significantly expanded interaction with the Western countries, while at the same time limiting its cooperation with Russia.

Russia was opposed to the increasing influence of NATO in the region. After obtaining their independence, Azerbaijan and Georgia started on a course of enhancing cooperation with the Alliance. In 1992, Georgia joined the NATO-run North Atlantic Cooperation Council and, in 1994, joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program. Concurrently, Tbilisi strengthened its relations with the EU and U.S. Georgia occupied a special place in the policy of the U.S. in the Southern Caucasus.¹⁵

¹⁰ See: *Evropeiskie strany SNG: mesto v “Bolshoi Evrope”*, ed. by V. Grabovski, A.V. Malgin, M.M. Narinskiy, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, Moscow, 2005, 308 pp.

¹¹ See: *Rossia i Zakavkazie: realii nezavisimosti i novoe partnerstvo*, p. 33.

¹² See: *Praktika federalizma. Poiski alternativ dlia Gruzii i Abkhazii*, ed. by B. Coppieters, B Dargiashvili, N. Akaba, *Ves mir*, Moscow, 1999, pp. 28-29.

¹³ See: I. Guseinova, “Europe’s Enlargement and the Southern Caucasus,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 4 (28), 2004, pp. 39-45.

¹⁴ See: E.M. Ivanov, “Rol Rossii vo vneshnei torgovle Azerbaidzhana,” in: *Nezavisimy Azerbaidzhan: novye orientiry*, in two vols., Vol. 2, Moscow, 2000, pp. 7-20.

¹⁵ See: *EvrAsia v poiskakh identichnosti*, ed. by S.P. Glinkina, L.Z. Zevin, Nestor-Istoria, Moscow, St. Petersburg, 2011, p. 145.

Armenia, although having established relations with NATO, remained a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Domestic internal political processes in the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the strengthening of the positions of the Western states forced Russia to search for new mechanisms of interaction with the countries of the region. All the more so, since the Southern Caucasus is located directly at the southern borders of the Russian Federation, which had the effect of increased vigilance on the part of Russian leadership toward the region.

Russia tried to strengthen its regional influence through Armenia, which had remained a strategic partner of Moscow in the Southern Caucasus. In the meantime, Armenia pursued an ambiguous foreign policy course, maintaining close contacts with Russia, while at the same time, since the 1990s, increasing cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. Such a course found support with the Western countries. The main task of the United States was the maintenance of pro-western sentiments among the Armenian ruling elite and the withdrawal of Armenia from the Russian sphere of influence.¹⁶

Southern Caucasus and the Influence of the Western Countries

In the mid-1990s, the rivalry between Russia and the Western countries for the influence in the region increased. To a large extent, this factor provoked the struggle for the selection of routes for the export of hydrocarbon resources, which were expected to be obtained from the Caspian region. Azerbaijan was viewed by the U.S. and EU as an alternative source of hydrocarbon resources. Georgia was expected to become a conduit for future routes of the pipelines. These factors determined the direction of the external policy of these countries, which were under political and diplomatic pressure from the West.

The intensification of the policy of the Western countries was occurring against the background of reduced capacity of Russia to influence the external and internal policies of the countries of the Southern Caucasus. These changes were clearly grasped by the Western countries. In February 1997, the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, visited the countries of the Southern Caucasus. The purpose of the visit was to promote the expansion of contacts with the countries of the region that have demonstrated readiness to amplify cooperation with the Western states. The essential partners for Georgia became Turkey and the U.S., with whom Tbilisi cultivated contacts in the fields of defense and security.¹⁷

Just as vigorous a policy was pursued by the United States, which gradually formulated the tasks of its foreign policy in the Southern Caucasus, paying increased attention to the region. In 1997, the U.S. administration announced that the Southern Caucasus was a region vitally important politically and economically for the United States, declaring its member states strategic partners of Washington.¹⁸

¹⁶ See: M.T. Laumulin, F.T. Kukeeva, *Vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiya B. Obamy i politika SShA na postsovetskom prostranstve*, KazNU, Almaty, 2012, 122 pp.

¹⁷ See: K.P. Marabian, "Politika Gruzii po obespecheniiu natsionalnoi bezopasnosti," *Fundamentalnye i prikladnye issledovaniia v sovremennom mire*, No. 11, 2015, pp. 91-97.

¹⁸ See: M. Gusaev, "Russia and the U.S. in the Southern Caucasus: Future Partners or Future Rivals," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1 (19), 2003, pp. 94-101.

The U.S. policy in the region was aimed at weakening its ties with Russia, the expansion of commercial opportunities for American companies, assisting, on the terms profitable for the American side, in resolving regional conflicts, further development of the new pipeline routes, designed to strengthen the involvement of the countries of the Southern Caucasus in the European energy security.

Russia was set against the expansion of military-political contacts of the Alliance with the countries of the region, deeming it a threat to its interests. But the real levers to influence the policies of the leadership of the countries of the Southern Caucasus were absent. These were effects of pronounced discrepancies between the positions of Russia, on the one hand, and Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, regarding the resolution of conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. It was evidenced by the increased interest on the part of Azerbaijan and Georgia both in developing a positive discourse at the regional level and enlisting the support of the U.S. and EU which, in the second half of the 1990s, intensified their policies in the Southern Caucasus. Especially since the Western states used a wide array of tools for the reorientation of foreign policies of the countries of the Southern Caucasus. One of the most ambitious projects can be considered the association, created in 1997, with the political support of the U.S., by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM). The intended purpose of the Organization was that it should become an alternative to Russian integration projects and the basis of the future route for the export of Azerbaijani resources to Europe and ensure multilateral cooperation of the countries of the post-Soviet space without the participation of the Russian Federation. This organization was aimed at weakening Russian influence in the Black Sea-Caspian region and the Southern Caucasus. However, the countries comprising GUAM practically did not have developed reciprocal economic relations. In the end, lacking economic support, the association was not able to mature.

In 1998, Azerbaijan and Georgia became members of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Increased attention to multilateral organizations, aimed at the development of economic and energy cooperation, was motivated by the interest of Azerbaijan and Georgia to attract additional attention of the Western countries in order to enlist their support in achieving further alienation from Russia's patronage. Although the Russian relations with the countries of the Southern Caucasus were carried out within the context of the BSEC,¹⁹ it had, nevertheless, little impact on the position of the Russian Federation.

In the implementation of its policy, Russia did consider the current complex political and economic relations between the countries of the region. For Armenia, the role of Georgia was of paramount importance for the development of the economic relations of Erevan with the outside world. At the same time, Tbilisi maintained close economic and political contacts with Azerbaijan, which strengthened in the 1990s. This has contributed to their joint participation in projects, having to do with export of Caspian hydrocarbon resources to external markets.

An active policy of the U.S. with respect to the states of the Southern Caucasus led Washington to de facto invade the scope of the vital Russian interests. Such a development was due to the weakening of the political affiliation and economic links between the countries of the region and Russia. These countries did not consider the Russian Federation to be a priority foreign partner. The reduction of the Russian influence found its reflection in the increased political dependence of the countries of the region on the Western states. The end result of the increased attention of the U.S., EU and Turkey to the region was the decline in cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Southern Caucasus.²⁰

¹⁹ See: A.V. Vilovatykh, A.V. Rogovaia, "Bezopasnost Rossii i voenno-politicheskie protsessy v Kavkazskom regione," *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, No. 3, 2015, pp. 85-93.

²⁰ See: A.R. Sitokhova, "Energeticheskaia politika Rossii na Yuzhnom Kavkaze," *Intellektualny potentsial XXI veka: stupeni poznania*, No. 19, 2013, p. 35.

The Influence of Energy Flows on the Region

Since the end of the 1990s, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been amplifying cooperation with the Western countries and readjusting their policies in the post-Soviet space. In 1999, Georgia withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty and in the same year entered the Council of Europe. Azerbaijan chose cooperation with Western gas companies on energy development. However, unlike Georgia, the leadership of Azerbaijan has sought to normalize relations with Russia. The positive trends in bilateral relations were invigorated in 2001, when, during the visit to Azerbaijan by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, the Baku Declaration was signed.²¹ And, although this document did not change the overall thrust of the Azerbaijani foreign policy, however, it enhanced the stature of Russia and positively affected regional security.

Azerbaijan and Georgia have been actively supporting the pipeline projects proposed by the Western countries. Of particular importance were the oil pipelines Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, which were regarded by the U.S. and EU as important tools in the strengthening of their positions in the region. Their planning and subsequent construction has become one of the main tasks of the U.S. and EU interests. In addition, starting in 2002, the EU has been proposing the implementation of the Nabucco project, aimed at the formation of a new energy corridor, bypassing Russia. One of the sources for its function had to be the hydrocarbon resources of Azerbaijan.

An important role the Western countries and companies had assigned to Georgia, whose authorities were consistently pursuing a course of widening cooperation with the U.S. and EU. The Western countries saw Georgia playing a key role in the conveyance of oil and gas to external markets. The country's role was defined by its transit capacity:²² through Georgian territory passed the routes for transporting hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian region. The participation of Georgia enabled to realize a number of pipeline projects, aimed at reducing the impact of Russia's influence in the Caspian region and the Southern Caucasus. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines were built. These projects were aided by the active investment policy of Turkey and relied on the support of the Western countries.

The struggle for selection of transportation routes for hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region has exacerbated the geopolitical competition in the region. This factor contributed to the strengthening of the dissociation of the countries of the region and led to the weakening of their relations with Russia. The Western countries' role had a strong impact on the positions of the countries of the Southern Caucasus on the issue of formulating their energy policies. One example was the pipeline coming from Azerbaijan in the western direction. The Southern Caucasus has become the hub of geopolitical interests for many countries of the world.²³

The coming to power of Saakashvili in Georgia in 2003 has led to further deterioration of relations with Russia. It is worth mentioning that, prior to 2006, Russia was in fact the only supplier of natural gas and electricity to Georgia. Despite the economic dependence on Russia, Saakashvili initiated the revision of Georgian foreign policy. A new page was opened in relations between NATO and Georgia, which in 2003 adopted the first plan of individual partnership with NATO.

²¹ See: O.V. Shabelnikova, "Osnovnye priority vneshnei politiki Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki: 1991-2015 gg.," in: *Vneshniaia politika novykh nezavisimyykh gosudarstv*, A collection, ed. by B.A. Shmelev, IE RAS, Moscow, 2015, p. 103.

²² See: Z.Z. Bakhturidze, *Vneshniaia politika Gruzii (1991-2014): kliucheveye orientiry i partnery*, Avrora, St. Petersburg, 2015, p. 6.

²³ See: K.S. Gadzhiev, *Geopoliticheskie gorizonty Rossii: kontury novogo miroporiadka*, Ekonomika, Moscow, 2011, p. 415.

No less difficult were the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, which still had a stake in the development of deposits of hydrocarbon resources, using foreign oil and gas companies, and in the building of infrastructure capable of exporting oil and gas to foreign markets. Projects have been developed for using international transport corridors, designed to facilitate the integration of the countries of the Southern Caucasus into the spheres of influence of the Western countries. As a consequence, the reorientation in the foreign policy of Georgia and Azerbaijan toward the Western countries brought with it a decline in the level of their economic cooperation with Russia. In 2004, the EU became the main trading partner of each South Caucasian country. In subsequent years, the trend continued. Thus, Georgia reduced dependence on the supply of hydrocarbon resources from Russia after 2006, when the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was launched. The reconstruction of the Inguri Hydroelectric Power Plant has allowed reducing the dependence on the supply of electricity from Russia during summer periods. As a result, in 2007, 32 percent of the trade turnover of Georgia, 41 percent of Armenia, 28.5 percent of Azerbaijan went to the EU.²⁴

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Western countries and Turkey began to significantly influence the guidance of administering the directions for the development of the region and the elaboration and implementation of the external policy of Azerbaijan, Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Armenia. The countries of the Southern Caucasus played diverse roles in the promotion of the interests of the West. Azerbaijan was considered to be one of the alternative sources of hydrocarbon raw materials for the European countries. Georgia was given the role of a geopolitical resources' hub, since through its territory were routed oil and gas pipelines for the supply of hydrocarbons from the Caspian region. Armenia was kept out of many infrastructural projects due to the fact that its political elite played both ends against the middle, so to speak, by endeavoring to cooperate with the Western countries while preserving the status quo with Russia.

The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had a negative impact on the situation in the Southern Caucasus in general and Russian policy in particular. It intensified the foreign policy of Georgia, reinforcing its pro-western orientation. Georgia and the United States signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership in January 2009, which expanded interaction among countries in the area of security. In addition, the major challenge, as announced by Georgia, was the pursuit of rapprochement with the West, which was described in the Concept for the Security of Georgia, adopted at the end of 2011. The document emphasized that the dominant priority is to achieve the European and Euro-Atlantic integration.²⁵

In 2009, the EU initiated the Eastern Partnership program designed for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the countries of the Southern Caucasus. By using financial assistance programs, European countries expected to have an impact on the post-Soviet countries, including the South Caucasian states.

Against the backdrop of a complex intertwining of the interests of the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the Western countries, Russia has sought to conduct a balanced foreign policy with all the states in the region. Russia was able to normalize the relations with Azerbaijan, improving trade indicators and developing humanitarian cooperation. After 2012, there was a change for the better in Russian relations with Georgia, when the political party, the Georgian Dream, won parliamentary elections and also after the presidential elections of 2013. But by then, the foreign orientation of Georgia had already been formed and focused on the expansion of cooperation with NATO and the Western countries. Nevertheless, the question of further normalization of relations with Georgia remains one of the major foreign policy issues for Russia in the Southern Caucasus.

²⁴ See: F. Huseinov, "Yuzhny Kavkaz vo vneshnei politike Evrosouiza," *Analytic (Kazakhstan)*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 38-42.

²⁵ See: B.A. Shmelev, M.E. Simon, "Vlianie vnutripoliticheskikh protsessov na vneshniuiu politiku novykh nezavisimyykh gosudarstv," in: *Novye nezavisimyye gosudarstva v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh*, Institute of Economics, RAS, Part 1, No. 4, 2012, p. 83.

The Southern Caucasus Remains in the Focus of Russian Policy

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, in the Southern Caucasus, a new geopolitical situation began to take shape. It was predicated on economic and political processes, taking place in the region: a complex economic situation, the absence of political stability, unfulfilled hopes for considerably increasing the output of hydrocarbon resources and finding a solution to socioeconomic problems. This increased the interest of the Southern Caucasus in the restoration of trade and economic relations with Russia. In turn, Russian efforts were aimed at the restoration of its influence in the Southern Caucasus and prevention of the countries of the region from joining NATO.

Russia was conducting an active foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, which relied on significant financial resources, accumulated in the period of high oil prices. This enabled Russia to initiate integration projects, which were aimed at consolidation of the countries of the post-Soviet space. First of all, it concerned the Customs Union and, later, the Eurasian Economic Union.

The integration projects, initiated by the Russian Federation, caused concern of the U.S. and EU, who did not weaken the efforts to expand their presence in the Southern Caucasus. The issues regarding energy cooperation, political consultations, cooperation mechanisms of NATO's policy began to be used by the Western countries with respect to Georgia and Azerbaijan more vigorously.

Russia continued to take into account the preservation of different foreign policy orientations of the countries of the Southern Caucasus. After obtaining their independence, Georgia and Azerbaijan started implementing foreign policy, which was aimed at increasing political and economic cooperation with the Western countries. The foreign policy course of Georgia was aimed at the expansion of cooperation with NATO and the strengthening of relations with the European countries. However, with the coming to power of President Margvelashvili, in November 2013, the foreign policy of Russia has intensified. This was facilitated by a more balanced policy of the new Georgian authorities, which, together with the Euro-Atlantic policy, began to advocate the normalization of relations with Russia.

In contrast to Georgia and Azerbaijan, which focused on the expansion of the cooperation with the EU and U.S., the foreign policy of Armenia remained controversial. On the one hand, Armenia was a member of the CSTO. On the other hand, it continued limited cooperation with NATO within the context of the program of individual partnership. The country has sought to develop relations with the European countries and the United States and at the same time to maintain the high level of interaction with Russia, considering the Russian state as a strategic partner. This situation remained the same until 2013, when in the course of the visit to Russia, in September 2013, the President of Armenia stated the readiness of the country to join the Customs Union. By this statement Armenia made a sharp foreign policy change and actually refused from the initialing of the Association Agreement with the EU.²⁶

In 2014, the geopolitical situation in the Southern Caucasus underwent profound changes. Georgia signed an agreement of association and chose a course for the deepening of the relations with the EU, while Armenia, having rejected Euro-integration, began to exercise foreign policy that focused on developing cooperation with the republics of the former U.S.S.R. Russian relations with the Western countries were changing. This was caused by the events in Ukraine at the turn of 2014, which culminated in the coup d'état and the Crimean peninsula joining the Russian Federation. The position of Russia with respect to Crimea and the Ukrainian events, and the course of the Russian leadership to consolidate a number of post-Soviet countries by engaging the Eurasian Economic Union, were

²⁶ See: K.A. Vardan, "Vneshnepoliticheskiy vybor Armenii: politika obespecheniya maksimalnoi bezopasnosti," in: *Vneshniaia politika novykh nezavisimyykh gosudarstv*, pp. 149-150.

regarded by the Western countries negatively. At the same time, a new balance of power emerged in the region.

Despite the pressure from the U.S. and EU, Russia did not renounce plans for the consolidation of the post-Soviet countries and implementation of integration projects. In 2014, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed a Treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which, in 2015, was joined by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia.

Armenia views its joining the Eurasian Economic Union in the context of complex problems, which Erevan is unable to solve independently. First of all, the preservation of the complex relations with Azerbaijan provided Erevan with the impetus to continue its cooperation with Russia. Moreover, Armenia was having severe economic difficulties. The expansion of interaction within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union allowed Armenia to count on help in solving its main problems. All the more so that Russia plays an important role in ensuring energy security and Russian companies are represented in almost all the sectors of the Armenian economy. In turn, the U.S. and EU are interested in weakening the Russian-Armenian relations, which would create a “sanitary” zone formed by the countries of the Southern Caucasus. Its formation is aimed at creating the conditions for smooth transportation of energy resources from the Caspian region and, on the other hand, should become the barrier to the proliferation of Russian interests.

Conclusion

The policy of the Russian Federation to consolidate a number of post-Soviet countries, including those located in the Southern Caucasus, is feared by the countries outside the region. The efforts of the Western states focus on destabilizing the Eurasian Economic Union, weakening interaction between its members, the use of difficulties, faced by the members of the EAEU during the period of decline in world economy and fall in the prices of the hydrocarbon raw materials. However, Russia takes consistent steps to increase cooperation with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, bearing in mind the interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan in preserving its status as a mediator.

The problems of the Southern Caucasus and the goals of Russian policy are reflected in the concept of the Russian foreign policy, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 30 November, 2016. It states that Russian priorities include “providing assistance in establishing the Republic of Abkhazia and Republic of South Ossetia as modern democratic states, strengthening their international positions, ensuring reliable security and socio-economic rehabilitation.” In addition, Russia “stands in favor of normalization of relations with Georgia in those areas, in which Georgia is ready to participate, taking into account political realities prevailing in Transcaucasia.”

The acute problems that exist in the region, contradictions between its member countries and the policies of the states outside of the region do not give reason to believe that Russia will increase its presence in the Southern Caucasus. The more so that the motivation of Russia in the Southern Caucasus is not a comprehensive geopolitical strategy but a response to changing circumstances.²⁷ To this end Russia is being impelled by maintaining the level of cooperation with the countries of the Southern Caucasus, defragmentation of the region, as well as the policies of the Western states, interested in reducing Russian influence in the area.

²⁷ See: S.M. Markedonov, “Kavkaz—region povyshennogo riska,” in: *Konflikty na postsovetском prostranstve: perspektivy uregulirovaniya i rol Rossii*, RSMD, Moscow, 2016, p. 31.

THE PLACE OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING OF RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT

To resolve the conflict-prone situation in the post-Soviet space and to be able to predict its further development, it is important to study the evolution of policies and political technologies used by Russia in respect to the post-Soviet countries. The general problem of technologies and practices of political influence in the foreign policy planning of modern Russia deserves public attention. In the twenty-first century, political communication, as well as the functions of political leaders, have undergone fundamental changes. In the middle of the second decade of the new century, communication in politics was, for the most part, a slow, one-sided process, mostly involving exchange of information. With the development of the mass media, citizens started receiving more and more opportunities for monitoring the actions of politicians, up until the mass media engaged in the competitive struggle for the interpretation of events. In some states, this struggle has started since the middle of the twentieth century, in others it is only escalating. In the electronic information era, each action of politicians potentially becomes the object of discussion for many segments of the population, in connection with which foreign policy planning is undergoing significant transformations. On

the one hand, the society receives an opportunity to control the actions of political leaders, to assess their actions through the media and to influence political decisions. On the other hand, in addition to the main responsibilities of a political leader in running a country, the task emerges, which is no less important,—managing information. In connection with this there appears a new type of foreign policy planning—a rhetorical one. If previously, a sensible and deliberative discourse in interaction with the elite was typical of the institutional leader, and his most important skills were the knowledge of the bureaucracy and the ability to make reasoned decisions, then for the “rhetorical” leader, the ability to persuade comes to the fore, and power is partly based on the popular image and people’s support. The loss of control over information flow can lead to a gradual loss of control over the state, and hence shift the center of political power. This fully applies to Russia, including the processes of its foreign policy planning in the post-Soviet space and the implementation of the plans already developed. International environment and the internal situation in Russia influence foreign policy to varying degrees. Thus, the stronger became the state power, and more stable, and less vul-

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nerable its economy, the weaker grew the influence of the country's internal situation on the adoption of foreign policy decisions. The publication's relevancy lies in considering cooperative projects in the post-Soviet space during the period of increased com-

petition between Moscow and Brussels for the privileged cooperation and integration with the Central Asian countries. The situation is a challenge for both the current policy of the Russian Federation and the stability in the countries of the post-Soviet world.

KEYWORDS: *foreign policy, political science, political discourse, Russia, post-Soviet space, strategies and political technology.*

Introduction

The Russian foreign policy is largely reactive. Its formulation is the consequence of responding to developments in international and domestic environments. Official documents noted and acknowledged the factual validity, without forming a strategy to address the problems or new approaches, and only provided assessment of a current situation. After the year 2000, Russian policy has become more proactive. The consequences of events of the first half of 2014 in Ukraine (inclusion of Crimea in the Russian Federation, the separatist movement in the east of the country) became the starting point for the changes in the geopolitical map of the western part of the post-Soviet space. This gives reason to believe that the year 2014 was the beginning of a new phase in foreign policy. In addition, the elections in the U.S., EU countries, and a number of post-Soviet states, as well as the exit of Great Britain from the EU and war in Syria also became new defining points in planning the current foreign policy of Russia¹. However, at this time, the content of this new phase is not clear, and it is still premature to analyze its reflection in the Russian foreign policy in an integrated, comprehensive manner.

Russia has begun to show new foreign policy initiatives for the long-term². Official Moscow, including the Moscow elite, feels the need for democratization, strong property rights, and impartial courts. However, there is evidence of electoral polarization or asymmetry, similar to the situation, which existed in the U.S.S.R. The regional elites of the conditional "East," which were not in evidence until recently, have consolidated and are relegated to carrying the burden of support for the authorities. Putin is the President of the provinces, unlike Yeltsin. Putin is the President of geographical, as well as social provinces. "Capital" cities offer significantly less support, and in 2018, this will remain unchanged. Today, the situation is frighteningly reminiscent of the Soviet Union on the eve of collapse, when elites from the Eastern republics, accustomed to receiving money from Moscow, advocated the status quo, while the Europeanized west understood that it is impossible to proceed further in that way and that there need to be radical changes. Moscow then introduced new approaches to the integration and security, it initiated new forms of cooperation and presented projects for bailing out its immediate neighbors from the economic crisis.

¹ See: A. Ivakhnik, "Geert Wilders—gollandskiy Trump. Predvybornaia rasstanovka v Niderlandakh," available at [<http://politcom.ru/22113.html>], 2 March, 2017; I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

² See: A. Ivakhnik, "Dmitrii Oreshkin: 'Dolgosrochnym rezultatom prezidentskikh vyborov budet narastanie razdrzhenia i apatii, a mozhet byt, dazhe i agressii'," available at [<http://politcom.ru/22148.html>], 5 March, 2017.

For the Russian society, 2016 became the year of depression and fatigue. The euphoria of 2014 was a thing of the past. In 2015, there came a feeling of tangible disappointment about the ability to effectively use Western sanctions to stimulate economic growth by using protectionist policies (so-called “contra-sanctions”). The rise in the agro-industrial sector is due to the deterioration in the quality of products, whereas the overall rate of industrial growth is sufficient only for transition from recession to stagnation. It has become apparent that the “bounce” in oil prices will not occur in the near future and reliance on economic convergence with China is becoming all the more problematic—China is perceived not only as a partner, but also as a potential threat.

The whole of the 2016 has passed in the atmosphere of depressing tendencies, growth of fatigue in society and political apathy. At the same time, the United Russia party was able to win decisively in parliamentary elections, and Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. gave hope for the discharge of tensions in foreign relations. All of this together significantly affects the defense planning of the Russian Federation.

Methods and Materials

The theoretical development of the question of integration in literature, both Russian and foreign, is based on different approaches and interpretation of the given term. The empirical material is also available to furnish information on integration processes in the world.

On the subject of a discourse on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space, the works of such Russian authors as N.K. Arbatova, E.G. Baranovskiy, N.N. Vladislavleva, R.T. Muhaev, V.B. Kniazhinskiy, and Yu. Nikitin³ are of interest. Bearing in mind the general conceptual provisions of different theories on integration, as well as the fact that the integration projects of Moscow are focused on Western European experience, the present publication views integration as a process, in which the principle of supranationality implies the creation of a supranational institute and the transfer to it a part of the state’s competencies. The orientation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is geared toward the expected result. The former orientation toward the EU, as a model of integration, has been proven to be unproductive. Integration, in the understanding of the Russian leadership, as it is presented in the statements of Russian officials and in official foreign policy documents, is the process of “convergence” of countries, interested in the adoption of common standards in different spheres.

Results

The growing influence of the Internet in the information process and active development of currently virtually unregulated social networks complicate the task of administering the information flow in the planning of foreign policy. In these conditions, the only possible way to remain the main regulator of interpreting events is the use of political rhetoric of electronic-information society. Thus,

³ See: *Evropeiskiy soiuz i regionalnye konflikty*, ed. by N.K. Arbatova, M.N. Kokeev, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2011, 143 pp.; E.G. Baranovskiy, N.N. Vladislavleva, *Metody analiza mezhdunarodnykh konfliktov*, Nauchnaia kniga, Moscow, 2002, 240 pp.; R.T. Mukhaev, *Geopolitika*, Yuniti-Dana, Moscow, 2010, 839 pp.; V.B. Kniazhinskiy, V.M. Potapov, N.Yu. Dubinina, et al., *Zapadnoevropeiskaia integratsia: proekty i realnost*, ed. by V.B. Kniazhinskiy, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, Moscow, 1986, 205 pp.; Yu. Nikitina, “Ot integratsii k regionalizmu: evoliutsia teorii regionalnogo mezhgosudarstvennogo sotrudnichestva,” *Vestnik MGIMO-Universitet*, No. 6 (15), 2010, pp. 134-139.

the legitimacy of a politician, as well as the existing political regime itself, largely depend on political communication and discursive strategies in a crisis.

The evolution of conceptual approaches of Russian policy regarding the post-Soviet countries has its roots in political and psychological perception of Moscow in regards to the former Union republics. After 2000, in official statements, there appeared definitions of Eurasian space and Eurasia, applied in the context of certain structures of cooperation (EurAsEC [Eurasian Economic Community], CES [Common Economic Space]). In the process of finding a discourse, capable of re-connecting states, the leadership in Moscow was gradually abandoning Soviet terminology. The official documents refer to a growing number of institutional structures of cooperation. In the Russian policy, the same cooperation projects (more precisely, the terms defining these structures) have been approached several times (Customs Union, the Economic Union), but only implemented depending on the extent to which this has been facilitated by external factors.

The Russian leadership in the post-Soviet space acts in several institutional directions: the wide format of the CIS, some narrower organizations (Customs Union, EurAsEC and CSTO), and supports the existence of the de facto frozen Union state of Belarus and Russia. At the same time, efforts were made to establish bilateral relations with a view to engage in their projects the “Common Neighbors”—Moldova and Ukraine. These attempts can be recorded up until 2013-2014. At present, the situation is changed and the rhetoric and policy in respect to those states is also changed, especially regarding Ukraine; new emphasis is being used in the discourse concerning Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

Among the tools of foreign policy, applied to the “near abroad countries,” the negative ones are dominant: refusal of providing privileges in the form of cheap resources, transfers of military equipment, political support, etc. These tools are effective in relations with countries that have weak economies and are partly dependent on Russia (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine) and with countries with a strong central authority and the lack of institutions for its control (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). However, they are effective only in the short term, after which the states begin to gravitate to another integration center—the EU, which uses positive foreign policy tools that we are observing in the situation with Ukraine, partly in Belarus; meantime, Kazakhstan is leaning more and more toward the countries of the Persian Gulf, Azerbaijan—toward Turkey. These trends cannot but disturb Russia. A new twist was the development of relations between the Russian Federation and nascent government of Kyrgyzstan, which decided to orient itself toward Russia⁴. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit, in early March, to the three Central Asian republics in order to seek a solution to a whole set of issues: economic, cultural, humanitarian, and, mainly, the one related to security.

The situation in Crimea and the East of Ukraine began to develop as a single scenario, however, at some point the expected implementation of the “Crimean scenario” for DNR and LNR was suspended. The post-Soviet area is not only the priority of Russian foreign policy, but a part of the tactic in respect to other international actors, such as the EU and U.S. For Russia, the implementation of its interests in the post-Soviet realm is directly linked to its position in the international arena. The deterioration of political positions in the post-Soviet countries is perceived as detrimental to the international stature of the Russian Federation.

Problems of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the post-Soviet space are reduced to inertia due to the lack of both new dynamic impulses and political will on both sides for their solution. The big role is played by misperceptions and mistrust of each other, formed during the Cold War.

⁴ See: “U Putina v Tsentralnoi Azii vse ‘skhvacheno’,” Rosbalt, 3 March, 2017, available at [<http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2017/03/03/1596033.html>], 5 March, 2017.

The vulnerability of Russia to the initiated sanctions is understandable in that the liberal paradigm predicted the exploitation of the model of consumption of the finished Western products, technologies and services in lieu of the influx of petrodollars entering the country's economy. This policy predetermined the increased level of dependency on external agents. Therefore, the sanctions, on the one hand, indicated the severe level of dependence on the Western world and inherent vulnerability of the state. On the other hand, they could have provided the potential chance for the consolidation of society and enhancement of sovereignty.

Table 1

**The Index of Developmental Goals and Architecture of the Policy
for Increasing the Sovereignty of Russia**

Target Setting	Measures to Implement
Self-sufficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —production of means of production; —production of consumption goods; —innovative products; —investments in the real sector of the economy.
Social stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —growth of real incomes of the population; —low inflation; —stability of the national currency rate; —lack of social stratification, equitable redistribution of resources; —security of accumulated savings in the banking system; —social policy: transparency of pension payments and insurance.
The adequacy of investments in the economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —public investment in major infrastructure projects aimed at the development of the country; —foreign investment only in the priority industry and limits on rent income; —private investment through the availability of credit; —waiver of storage of Russian foreign exchange reserves in securities of the Western countries.
Stability of the financial system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —the Bank of Russia must not be conductor of the will of the IMF; —the main task of the Central Bank is to conduct monetary policy, stimulating economic growth in the country; —the Central Bank provides stability of the Russian ruble; —the Bank of Russia serves the interests of the national security of Russia and not the interests of the foreign state; —adopting measures to prevent capital outflows.
The security of banking operations and Russian assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —the growth of gold in the structure of the international reserves; —the investment of reserves and international reserves in the real sector of the Russian economy; —development of own payment cards as an alternative to the two largest players—Visa and MasterCard;

Table 1 (continued)

Target Setting	Measures to Implement
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —the use of national system in internal settlements to replace services of SWIFT; —expansion of the use of the ruble in international settlements.
Diversification of foreign trade activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —changing the structure of exports in favor of the science-intensive production, machines and equipment; —expansion of trading partners base interested in Russian science-intensive exports; —abandoning the model of a susceptible state, in which Russia serves the interests of the foreign capital or foreign consumer (China's example).

This was precisely the set of measures, which should have been implemented in the country to counter the external agents and reduce desovereignization. In other words, the sanctions became a chance for Russia, not the verdict. In the new version of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, the statement on the desire of Russia to work on liberalization of the visa regime with the U.S., which was contained in the document of 2013, is no longer there.⁵

In the published document it is also stated that Russia is categorically against “attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of States with the aim of unconstitutional change of regime using both soft power (in particular, media) and terrorist and extremist groups.”

Discussion

The array of studies, which address the problems of political influence of global and regional actors on the post-Soviet political process, is large enough.⁶ Although the study of many of the authors had a contractual character, they made a significant contribution to the examination of specific political characteristics of such important regional developments as the Russian-Ukrainian, Kazakhstan-Chinese, Russian-Belorussian, Russian-Tajik relations and attitudes, the Chechen campaign, etc.

Among the Russian authors, it is worthwhile to note works, in which the subject of research was the periodization of development of the post-Soviet regional system and the integration processes within it. Among them are the works of L.B. Vardomskiy, R.S. Grinberg,⁷ L.S. Kosikova,⁸ A.V. Mal-

⁵ See: *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, available at [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/2542248], 4 March, 2017.

⁶ See: A. Shadzhe, I. Karabulatova, R. Khunagov, Z. Zhade, “Ethnopolitical Influence in Regulating National Security in Border Territories of the Countries in the Caucasian-Caspian Region,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 66-75.

⁷ See: R. Grinberg, L. Vardomskiy, *Desiat let posle raspada SSSR: nekotorye rezultaty i perspektivy evoliutsii prostranstva SNG*, The Ekspertiza Round Table Report *Post-Soviet Space: Ten Years Later* at the Conference organized by the Gorbachev Foundation, 6 September, 2001, available at [http://www.gorby.ru/activity/conference/show_77/view_26373/].

⁸ See: L. Kosikova, *Integratsionnye proekty Rossii na postsovietskom prostranstve: idei i praktika*, Report to the Academic Council of the Department of World Economy and Political Research, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2008, 66 pp.; idem, “Region SNG na novom etape razvitiya i problemy strategii i politiki Rosssii,” in: *Postsovietskoe prostranstvo: realii i perspektivy*, ed. by B. Shmelev, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2009, pp. 115-142.

gin. This question was addressed by M. Weber, T. Parsons, D. Colas, M.V. Ilyin, A.Yu. Melvil, A.I. Soloviev, S.Yu. Chumikova, A.V. Skiperskikh, E.V. Reutov, T. van Leeuwen.⁹ Problems of crisis situations in politics and society were investigated by G.G. Pocheptsov E.Yu. Kanaeva, I.V. Mkrumova, I.S. Karabulatova, W. Benoit, J.B. Thompson.¹⁰

The term “post-Soviet space” is applicable as an umbrella concept for countries that share the common history of coexistence within a single state.¹¹ However, this territory is no longer a geopolitical monolith—there have been significant schisms. The concept of space indicates a presence of some significant homogeneity among the states of the given territories, but the post-Soviet area becomes more and more heterogeneous with the passage of time.

T.A. Alekseeva, considering the foreign political processes of the countries of the post-Soviet world, notes their similarity in the communication process with the Russian Federation.¹² The uncertainty and incoherence¹³ are the dominant features of their foreign policies. Uncertainty generates instability and distrust of neighbors, resulting in tension and regional conflicts.

Conclusion

In the Russian foreign policy, the goals and objectives, reserved for the post-Soviet countries, have remained practically unchanged for almost 25 years: to build close relationships, assert its own influence and not allow the extraneous presence of third parties in the area. Evolved were some policy emphases: the terms that define the post-Soviet space, institutions, and spheres of cooperation. The evidence of the extreme importance for the Kremlin of the Asian question is the fact that last year Putin twice visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and hosted the Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen presidents. There were also many meetings of a multilateral format. Moreover, elections are coming to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and Russia is extremely interested in the “adequacy” of the new or old-new power in these republics. Today, it is more productive to create local alliances and develop strategies in the regional areas—the Caucasus, Europe and Central Asia—taking into account

⁹ See: D. Colas, *Sociologie politique*, Presses Universitaires de France, 2006; A.Yu. Melvil, *et al.*, *Politologia*, A Textbook, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Prospekt Publishers, Moscow, 2013; A.I. Soloviev, *Politologia: politicheskaya teoriya, politicheskie tekhnologii*, A Textbook, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2000; S.Yu. Chumikova, *Politicheskaya kommunikatsiya kak resurs legitimnosti zakonodatelnoi vlasti sub’ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Abstract of the thesis on political science, Moscow, 2007; A.V. Skiperskikh, “Legitimsiya vlasti v teoreticheskikh postroeniakh rossiiskogo i zarubezhnogo politicheskogo diskursa,” *Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, No. 8 (4), 2007; T. van Leeuwen, “Legitimation in Discourse and Communication,” *Discourse and Communication*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007.

¹⁰ See: G.G. Pocheptsov, *Propaganda i kontrapropaganda*, Tsentr Publishers, Moscow, 2004; E.Yu. Kanaeva, “Institut vlasti v sovremennoy obshchestve: problemy legitimatsii i delegitimatitsii (‘krisisa legitimnosti’) vlasti,” *Vestnik Universiteta (Gosudarstvennyy universitet upravleniya)*, No. 4, 2012; M.Yu. Milovanova, “Sotsialnye resursy grazhdanskogo protesta v sovremennoy Rossii,” *Obshchestvo: politika, ekonomika, pravo*, No. 3, 2012; I. Mkrumova, I. Karabulatova, A. Zinchenko, “Political Extremism of the Youth as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Post-Soviet Electronic Information Society,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 79-87; W.L. Benoit, *Accounts, Excuses, and Apologia: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies*, State University of N.Y. Press, Albany, 1995; J.B. Thompson, *Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000.

¹¹ See: V. Egorov, “Postsovietskoe prostranstvo kak predmet nauchnogo osmysleniya,” *Obozrevatel*, No. 9, 2011, p. 55.

¹² See: T.A. Alekseeva, A.A. Kazantsev, *Vneshnepoliticheskii protsess. Sravnitelnyy analiz*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2012, p. 16.

¹³ See: G. Osipov, I. Karabulatova, G. Shafranov-Kutsev, L. Kononova, B. Akhmetova, E. Loskutova, G. Niyazova, “Ethnic Trauma and its Echo in Today’s Mental Picture of the World among the Peoples of the Post-Soviet States: An Interethnic Conflicting Discourse Unfolding in Russia’s Ethnolinguistic Information Region,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 87-94.

the chosen sphere of interaction. The pronounced heterogeneity of the post-Soviet states requires Russia to create an individual policy for each and every one of them. Among Russian interests in the foreign policy planning there are: a clause for providing security in order to prevent any military and political confrontation; the dynamic stability of development of the international political and economic situation; as well as the intensification of communication channels with the post-Soviet states and the growth of economic presence in the non-energy areas of the countries of the region.

The analysis of the content of foreign policy planning in the context of globalization made it possible to determine the role of foreign policy planning as a tool for the retention of political power and providing the environment for stimulating the effectiveness of the mechanism for ensuring national security.

ENERGY AND RESOURCE POLICY

POTENTIAL CHANGE IN RUSSIA'S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL GAS MARKET AS THE OPTIMIZATION OF THE LOCAL ENERGY SECURITY MODEL

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A B S T R A C T

Today, ensuring energy security is one of the key tasks for every state, whether it is a net exporter, net importer or a transit country. With regard to the EU countries, the declaration of energy security as the priority issue of energy policy is largely due to low endowments of their own reserves of hydrocarbon resources and hence a high dependence on the suppliers of energy resources. As it happens, the EU's own natural gas production is able to supply only 35% of the aggregate demand, with the rest being provided by Russia, Norway, Algeria and Qatar. Since about a third of the total volume of gas imports comes from Russia,¹ it creates a de facto dominant position of the Russian Federation in the EU gas market. The study of the transportation aspect of energy security of the EU has become a particularly relevant subject since the escalation of the political crisis in Ukraine in 2014-2016. In the current circumstances, there remain uncertainties regard-

ing the prospects of the Russian gas deliveries to the EU countries through the territory of Ukraine and, in consequence, the question of transportation, as a component of the gas market, has become one of the most important on the agenda of the EU on the subject of cooperation with Russia. The problem of energy security becomes even more acute due to the actions of energy companies of the exporting countries, seeking to obtain access to the gas end-user and attempting to acquire equity shares in companies, involved in transportation and sales. These attempts are met with resistance on the part of the supranational agencies of the EU, which is reflected in the adoption of relevant legislative acts. The prospects for maintaining gas exports from Russia are significantly influenced by the vigorous actions of the EU countries on the implementation of energy-efficient technologies and the wider use of renewable sources of energy. Thus, the analysis of potential changes in the strategy of the EU countries in the context of contemporary trends for strengthening the energy security in the gas market is particularly important for improving the export strategy of Russia in this market.

¹ See: "BP Statistical Review of World Energy," June 2014 // BP, available at [http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/excel/Energy-Economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-Statistical_Review_of_world_energy_2014_workbook.xlsx].

KEYWORDS: *the fuel and energy complex, energy security, gas industry, export of energy resources.*

Introduction

The uneven distribution of the world's energy resources has long been the cause of many geopolitical conflicts and still remains the determinant factor of energy policies for many countries.²

There is no universally accepted definition of the concept of energy security: the meaning varies, depending on the level of economic development of a country, its geographical location, the

² See: B. Akhmetova, I. Karabulatova, P. Dudin, Zh. Dorzhiev, "Tension around the Problem of the South China Sea as a Factor of Geopolitical Confrontation and Transformation of the Present World Order," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 49-58; A. Shadzhe, I. Karabulatova, R. Khunagov, Z. Zhade, "Ethnopolitical Influence in Regulating National Security in Border Territories of the Countries in the Caucasian-Caspian Region," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 66-75.

availability of fuel and energy resources, political system, and commercial, economic and political relations with other states.³

The understanding of energy security of a specific state or region is determined to a large extent by the specific position of its fuel and energy resources in the world market, the situation in the domestic market, as well as the correlation between the vulnerability of energy system and the disruption of energy supplies. Russia simultaneously acts as a major exporter, a transit country, and the largest consumer of energy. Accordingly, its position involves ensuring energy security, which requires equal division of risks between all the participants in the energy chain, while taking into account the interests of energy-producing countries.

It should be noted that in the given work, the energy security is regarded primarily on the scale of a region (country, group of countries). The issues of security of energy facilities (mining, transport, energy generating and other equipment) do not constitute a part of the current study.

Methods and Materials

The essential theoretical foundations of the study were based on the scientific works of Russian and foreign scholars on various aspects of the development of the global power engineering in general and gas markets in particular, as well as the works on relevant issues of interaction between Russia and the EU countries in the gas sector in the current conditions of the European gas market.

As a methodological basis of the study, the authors used a combination of the methods of systems analysis and synthesis, analogies and comparisons of economic phenomena and processes, organizing and compiling statistical data, as well as modern methods of economico-mathematical modeling. The long-term forecast for the development of this market is projected up to the year 2030.

Information and empirical basis of the study was provided by the data from international energy organizations (the International Energy Agency, the Energy Charter Secretariat, the International Gas Union, etc.); research centers and institutes (Energy Research Institute of the RAS (Russian Academy of Sciences), Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS, Cambridge Energy Research Associates, etc.); regulatory and legal acts and statistical information of national and supranational bodies of legislative and executive branches of power and their structural subdivisions (the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, European Commission of the EU, etc.); economic forecasts and public development programs in the field of energy; press publications on industry topics, as well as official information of the largest companies of the world oil and gas sector (BP PLC, Statoil ASA, OAO Gazprom, NC Rosneft, etc.).

The proposed method of evaluation of energy security is based on the optimization of the target function and reflects a well-founded presentation on the status of the structure of energy sources in the future. The target function is based on the indicator (optimization criterion), developed on the basis of existing quantitative methods of evaluating energy security, i.e. the method of levelized risk adjusted cost of gas. The economico-mathematical model, created on the basis of this method, allows to calculate the balance of sources of gas supply, providing the optimal level of economically sound regional energy security for the gas market in the long term (until 2030). Economic viability of

³ See: M.S. Golovina, "Energeticheskaia bezopasnost—aspekty, printsipy, opredelenia," *Nadezhnost i bezopasnost energetiki*, No. 1 (20), 2013, pp. 12-17; *Energetika i geopolitika*, ed. by V.V. Kostyuk, A.A. Makarov, Russian Academy of Sciences, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2011, p. 92.

the indicator is determined by the possibility of calculating the purchase cost of gas and cost of appropriate infrastructure development of gas supply, while its minimization allows for deducing the optimal level of energy security.

Results

On the basis of the results of the computing experiment for defining the optimal level of energy security on the market of the EU gas, using three scenarios of development of the key parameters for gas market, the potential (optimal) structure of gas sources portfolio for the EU is determined, and forward-looking indicators of volumes of gas exports from Russia to the EU are calculated. According to the calculations, a significant increase in the share of liquefied natural gas is anticipated in the total amount of imports by the EU countries—from 18% in 2012, to 47-62% by 2030, depending on the scenario, mainly due to an increase in exports by Qatar and Norway. By retaining the current export strategy, in two of the three scenarios, both Russia's share in the gas market of the EU and the absolute volumes of supplies may be reduced by the year 2030, compared to the year 2012 (by 26% and 66%, or to 82 and 38 bcm, respectively).

Based on the comparative analysis of the existing routes for gas conveyance to the EU with respect to key aspects of the transport component of energy security (technological, economic and political) and the results of the calculations of the economic-mathematical model, the expediency of the current Russian strategy for the development of routes for gas delivery to the EU, as alternative to the transit through Ukraine, is confirmed. Gas deliveries, utilizing the gas transmission system of Ukraine, according to all three scenarios of comparative analysis, contain the highest inherent risk. According to the calculations by the authors, it would be better to abandon gas transit through the territory of Ukraine in 2018-2019, in favor of alternative, less risky routes.

It should be noted that the calculated model structure of the sources of yearly supplies of gas to the EU does not represent a prognosis of real volumes of transfers: these volumes are affected by many factors, including unpredictable conditions, such as terms of contracts, political events, etc. The calculated structure reflects a fundamentally sound, from the point of view of optimization of the level of the energy security of the EU, procurement volumes of gas and their distribution to sources, i.e. the parameters, which the EU will seek, but not necessarily fully attain.

Calculation of the LRACOG (Levelized Risk Adjusted Cost of Gas) parameter involves the quantification of the value of the parameter on the basis of a corresponding function—depending on the variables considered in the parameter. As variables in the model, the shares of gas from different sources are examined:

- domestic production in the EU;
- gas imports by pipelines from various exporting countries;
- liquefied natural gas imports from various exporting countries.

There is proof for the relevance of developing new directions for Russian gas exports outside the EU countries and the need to increase the volumes of production and sales of LNG. In all the scenarios, the existing objective for the preservation of the share of the European gas market in aggregate exports may not be attainable and its inevitable reduction should be offset by the growth of gas sales to other regions. It is evident that in the case of the deterioration of the situation on the EU gas market and growth of competition between the existing and possible new suppliers (the countries of the Middle East, the Caspian Sea region, the U.S., etc.), it may be appropriate to refrain from future construction of some of the planned gas pipelines. Also, the proactive change in the arrangements for

the contractual agreements and pricing, corresponding to the expectations of the EU, in exchange for higher volumes of deliveries of Russian gas and admittance of Russian companies to the European projects and assets for storage, transportation, distribution and marketing of natural gas may be required. Proven and justified is the usefulness of supply of LNG from Russia to the EU.

Discussion

In most modern scientific works on the issues of energy security, the main emphasis is placed on the study of the vulnerability of energy supplies (mostly oil and gas) and its influence on the price and physical accessibility of fuel for importing countries, as well as on the dependence of their economic well-being on exporters of fuel and energy resources. At a global level, energy security is to be considered as a “sound balance between energy supply and demand serving the purpose of facilitating sustainable economic and social development for both importers and exporters.”⁴

Table 1

**Definition of the Energy Security Concept
in the Public Documents of Russia, the U.S. and EU**

Country	Source	Definition of the Energy Security Concept
Russia	National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020	The stable supply of sufficient standard quality sources of energy; the effective use of energy resources by increasing the competitiveness of domestic producers; the prevention of possible fuel-energy resource deficits; the creation of strategic stocks of fuel, reserve capacities and standard equipment; and ensuring the stable functioning of the system of energy and fuel provision.
Russia	Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030	The country's security, that of its citizens, society, state and economy from the threats to reliable supply of fuel and energy.
Russia	Russia's Draft Energy Security Doctrine	National energy security (in the broad sense) is part of the national security of the country, dependent on the energy factor, as well as the quantity (volume), quality (cost-effectiveness and reliability) and constructiveness (organization) of energy deliveries to the consumers. Energy security is provided and determined by resource sufficiency, economic availability, environmental admissibility and technological acceptability of balanced distribution to ensure the demand and supply of energy resources.
U.S.	The Congressional Budget Office Report*	The ability of U.S. households and businesses to accommodate disruptions of supply in energy markets... Households and businesses are “energy secure” with respect to a particular source of energy if a disruption in the supply of that source would create only limited additional costs.

⁴ F. Proedrou, *EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector: Evolving Dynamics, Policy Dilemmas and Prospects*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p. 4.

Table 1 (continued)

Country	Source	Definition of the Energy Security Concept
U.S.	The Congress of the United States	The future, when economically affordable energy is securely produced in excessive amounts with little impact on the environment and regardless of the will of the hostile nations.
U.S.	The Department of Defense of the United States	The capacity to avoid adverse impact of energy disruptions caused either by natural, accidental or intentional events affecting energy and utility supply and distribution systems.
EU	The EU European Commission Communication Green Paper—Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply (2000)	The uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers [the population and industry].

* The report is presented to the head of the Committee of the United States Senate on Energy and Natural Resources on a regular basis. The Congressional Budget Office is a subsidiary body of the Congress of the United States, responsible for the consideration of the state budget draft, submitted to the approval of the legislative authority. Its responsibilities include the provision of the Congress with information and analytical data on financial and budgetary matters, independently of the executive branch and the Office of Management and Budget. Established in 1974 by the Law on the State Budget.

Sources: Compiled by the authors from data: *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020, Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 12 May, 2009, No. 537*, Security Council of the Russian Federation, Section 4, Art 60, 2009, available at [<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>]; *Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 13 November, 2009. No. 1715-r*, Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2009, p. 13, available at [<http://minenergo.gov.ru/aboutminen/energostrategy/Strategiya/Energostrategiya-2030.doc>]; *Russia's Draft Energy Security Doctrine (conceptual statement)*, Laboratory "Energy Initiative", 2011, p. 1, available at [www.labenin.z4.ru/Docs/en_bezop_project.doc]; *Energy Security in the United States*, Congressional Budget Office, 2012, p. 9, available at [<http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/05-09-EnergySecurity.pdf>]; J. Kessels, S. Bakker, B. Wetzelaer, *Energy Security and the Role of Coal*, IEA Clean Coal Centre, London, 2008, p. 12; D. Kleber, "The U.S. Department of Defense: Valuing Energy Security," *Journal of Energy Security*, June 2009, available at [http://ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=22&Itemid=345]; *Green Paper — Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply — European Green Paper*, European Commission, 2000, p. 4, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf].

Some of the works on energy security are dedicated to the impact of the vulnerability of international energy trade on the economic component of energy security of the countries exporting energy resources. For example, in the study of A.F. Alhaji,⁵ the main emphasis is placed on the economic aspects of the certainty of demand on the part of the importers of energy resources, as well as

⁵ See: A.F. Alhaji, "What is Energy Security?" *Energy Politics*, Vol. IV, 2008, pp. 62-82.

on the influence of social and political factors. Terry Karl, Ian Bannon, Paul Collier⁶ explore the validity of the theory of the “paradox of plenty”⁷ for exporting countries.

As far as the interpretation of the concept of energy security by international organizations (see Table 1 on p. 30) is concerned, in many ways it is determined by the geopolitical and economic interests of the countries within a particular organization, as well as the objectives of the activities of the organizations themselves. At the same time, most of them are in agreement on the fundamental issues of the importance of a stable export and import flows, economic accessibility of energy, technological development of power engineering and environmental responsibility of the industry. In the documents, formulating the modern concept of energy security of the EU, the explicit definition of energy security is missing, but it is indirectly presented in the form of a list of current priorities in the regional energy security: “Establishment of a competitive, low carbon economy, which allows for reducing energy imports.”⁸

In connection with the polysemy of the concept of energy security, its quantitative assessment is also a complex and mixed task. In general, the method of evaluating the energy security depends on how the term “energy security” and its relevant elements are defined, on the goals and tasks of the quantification, the input data and their specification, and on critical assumptions of the methods used and available information necessary for their implementation.

Conclusion

The threats to energy security at the level of a country or region depend, to a large extent, on the existing energy system, existing trends in its transformation, on the prevalence of the type of fuel used for generating electricity, transportation and industry. These factors largely determine the existing system of energy supplies, the value of the operating costs, and possible depth of the impact from external influences.

In the case of an excess, from the point of view of demand, throughput capacity of all the existing and planned gas pipelines from the exporting country, these pipelines, as the calculations show, will be filled in the following order:

- (1) existing direct routes;
- (2) direct routes under construction;
- (3) existing transit routes with a low country risk;
- (4) transit routes under construction with a low country risk;
- (5) existing transit routes with a high country risk;
- (6) transit routes under construction with a high country risk.

⁶ See: T.L. Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and the Petro-States*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1997, 343 pp.; *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*, ed. by I. Bannon, P. Collier, World Bank, Washington, DC., 2003, 429 pp., available at [<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15047/282450Natural0resources0violent0conflict.pdf?sequence=1>]; P. Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about It*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, 211 pp.

⁷ The paradox of plenty is a phenomenon in the economy, associated with the fact that countries with significant natural resources are, as is often considered, economically less developed than countries with small stocks or with no stocks of energy resources.

⁸ “European Energy Security Strategy,” in: *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council*, Brussels, 2014, p. 3 [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf].

The calculation of the potential shares of the sources of gas supply in the total procurement of gas for the EU does not take into account the amounts recorded in the long-term contracts, which have already been signed between exporting countries and the countries of the EU.

- First, the aim of the model is an objective evaluation of a possible EU action on the basis of the optimal, economically justified, level of energy security in the long term, which may not meet all the requirements of the existing contracts. In addition, as the interaction of the EU countries with foreign partners in the gas market shows, the concluded agreements may be revised regularly.
- Second, this information often represents a commercial secret that makes it impossible to allow for qualifying constraints.

Thus, the share of the sources of gas supply, calculated by the given model up to the year 2030, does not represent forecasted volumes of rigorously planned supplies, but an assessment of the potential of the EU strategy for optimization, focusing on energy security and economic feasibility of parity in the choice of suppliers for the gas market of the EU.

The conducted analysis of the prerequisites for the formulation of the concept of energy security of the EU has led to the following understanding of the threats to energy security of the European Union, establishing a modern concept of energy security of the region:

- high level of import dependence on oil and gas. Dependence on oil is approximately 87% and gas—66%.⁹ In accordance with the projections of the European Commission,¹⁰ these indicators will increase, but the main concern is with the complex political situation in key countries, which export and transport fuel resources;
- vigorous actions on the part of foreign suppliers of certain types of energy seeking to obtain access to the markets of end-users;
- high level of competition for energy with rapidly developing countries, mainly with India and China;
- high prices of energy resources with positive dynamics of growth;
- political instability in a number of exporting and transit countries;
- the complexity of solutions to environmental issues in the region and the achievement of desired objectives in crisis conditions.

At the current stage of development of the world energy, specifically the geopolitical and not the geological factor assumes growing importance in view of the political instability in many of the key exporting regions and transit countries, particularly in Ukraine, because of the political crisis of 2014, as well as in a number of countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

⁹ See: *EU Energy in Figures—Statistical Pocketbook 2014*, European Commission, Brussels, 2014, p. 26, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2014_pocketbook.pdf].

¹⁰ See: *EU Energy Trends to 2030*, European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 31, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/trends_2030/doc/trends_to_2030_update_2009.pdf].

HYDROCARBON RESOURCES AS AN OBJECT OF GEOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST

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ABSTRACT

Hydrocarbon resources today are a highly mythologized and increasingly politicized issue: the growing stream of contradictory information creates an ambiguous conflict-prone discourse in global geopolitics, increasing the potential for conflict in international relations. Throughout world history, the main purpose of the state has been to expand its territory in order to solve economic problems and ensure secu-

rity, notably by subordinating one people to another or annexing adjacent territory. Researchers have come to the conclusion that, from a geopolitical perspective, the essence of interstate relations is a never-ending struggle between global centers of power for the possession of geographic space.¹ To-

¹ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov,

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day, we can say that geopolitics has not only become a system of knowledge about control over space, but has also turned into a real tool for reformatting the world. The collapse of the bipolar geopolitical model of the world has not made the world more stable or secure. The relatively stable geopolitical structure with two world poles has given way to a period of permanent instability due to the desire of the Western powers to establish a new world order distinguished by strong unipolarity and an attempt by a certain group of industrial countries to impose their will on

other states and nations. Since hydrocarbon resources are unevenly distributed around the globe, they are not only one of the main items in world trade, but also the main object of geopolitical wars. An understanding of the nature of the current geopolitical confrontation and the emergence of new forms make it necessary to study their content, identify their patterns, and assess the impact of today's geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West on the world order as a whole. However, the fight for hydrocarbon resources, the spread of nuclear weapons, and the creation of aerospace forces with corresponding changes in the nature and forms of modern warfare give food for thought about the evolution of the inward and outward signs of geopolitical confrontation.

M. Vykhristyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

KEYWORDS: *hydrocarbon resources, Russia, Western countries, United States, Eurasia, energy resources, global leadership, geopolitical threat.*

Introduction

The very emergence of geopolitics is closely associated with the idea of an organic relationship between territory and the state: the state is seen as an organism, and politics as a struggle for the living space of that organism. Space is the main political force of any country. Consequently, geographic space is the main source of the state's power and strength that enables it to prosper. Now that the Russian Federation is under geopolitical pressure from Western countries, the state's geoenergy strategy is constructed not on the basis of Western forecasts about the future of global energy, but based on the geopolitical goals and objectives of transnational capital, which uses hydrocarbon resources as a tool for establishing a "new world order."

Energy resources became a geopolitical factor only at the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the quantitative and qualitative increase in the energy needs of industrial society brought into focus exclusive (in terms of territory and area of application) energy resources: first there were certain grades of coal (especially coking coal) and then oil, which is distributed very unevenly around the world (land and water).² This exclusivity almost immediately gave rise to commercial monopolies and subsequently led to the emergence of states controlling world oil markets.

Geopolitical theories for the most part have tried to justify territorial expansion and a striving for global hegemony, providing the basis for the political ideology of states.³ Undoubtedly, the An-

² See: V.V. Kostyuk, A.A. Makarov, T.A. Mitrova, "Energetika i geopolitika," *Vestnik RFFI*, No. 4 (76), 2012, pp. 31-41.

³ See: G. Osipov, I. Karabulatova, G. Shafranov-Kutsev, L. Kononova, B. Akhmetova, E. Loskutova, G. Niyazova, "Ethnic Trauma and Its Echo in Today's Mental Picture of the World among the Peoples of the Post-Soviet States: An Inter-

glo-American school has always sought to play the leading role in global geopolitics.⁴ A distinctive feature of Anglo-American geopolitics is a fight for world domination, which has become a driving force behind the global geopolitical struggle.

The importance of oil and gas for the development of humanity is so great that today we can restate Halford Mackinder's classic formula as follows: "Who controls hydrocarbon resources, their processing and transportation routes controls the world." For more than a hundred years now, Western countries have been systematically monopolizing access to the world's hydrocarbon resources in order to gain control over geopolitical spaces and to have new levers for controlling global processes. The West seeks to extend its monopoly rights not only to hydrocarbon deposits all over the world, but also to technologies for oil refining and for the production of liquefied natural gas, trade in petroleum products, and the main transportation routes.

Methods and Materials

The empirical basis for our study was provided by official statistical sources. According to the statistical handbook *Russia in Figures 2015*, prepared and published by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Russian Federation ranks second in the world in terms of "crude oil (including gas condensate), natural and associated gas." In 2014, according to Enerdata,⁵ Russia maintained its position in the world (second place) in the production of both crude oil and natural gas, being out-ranked only by Saudi Arabia and the United States, respectively.⁶ Russia's position among the world's major energy-producing countries is confirmed by the International Energy Agency (IEA), particularly in its statistical yearbook for 2014.⁷

The theoretical basis for our analysis was provided by the ideas and conclusions of Russian and foreign researchers reflecting on the importance of hydrocarbon reserves in current geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the West. Methodologically, the study is based on the use of the institutional, comparative, and structural-functional methods. We have also used the tenets of modern geopolitics, the history and theory of international relations, world economics, and conflict theory.

Results

Today, developed countries consume up to 80% of all natural resources produced in the world, while emerging countries like China, India and Brazil need more and more energy every year for sustainable economic development. The narrowing gap between energy consumption levels in developed and emerging countries intensifies the struggle for global hydrocarbon resources. At present, the world's major countries are divided into exporters and importers of oil, gas and petroleum products.

ethnic Conflicting Discourse Unfolding in Russia's Ethnolinguistic Information Space," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 87-94.

⁴ See: D. Stokes, S. Raphael, *Global Energy Security and American Hegemony*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2010, 280 pp.

⁵ An information and consulting company that conducts studies related, in particular, to the development of the international energy industry.

⁶ See: *Global Energy Statistical Yearbook*, available at [<https://yearbook.enerdata.ru/>], 5 December, 2016.


⁷ See: *Key World Energy Statistics 2014*, available at [<http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2014.pdf>], 5 December, 2016.

Most hydrocarbon exporters (countries of the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and the Caspian Region) are heavily dependent on oil revenues and are thus interested in maintaining stability in the resource market for budget purposes. Importers (European countries, India, China, Japan, and others) are interested in stable supplies of resources, which are crucial to their security and economic development. Energy security has become a key component of the national security of any state. The tasks of maintaining such security at the regional and global levels, ensuring regular supplies to meet the growing demand for energy, and maintaining influence and control over oil-producing regions are a matter of priority for most countries in the world.

Given the strategic importance of the Middle East for the global energy market, any turmoil in the region has a serious effect on world energy prices. The Middle East accounts for 33.1% of global oil production, while its share together with that of the Arab countries of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan) is as high as 37.7%.

Figure 1

“Hydrocarbon” Interests in Syria as a Source of Geopolitical Conflict



In terms of natural gas production, the Middle East ranks third after North America, Eastern Europe and the CIS. The region's share is 17.2%, and with the addition of North Africa this share is 22.1%. Russia's involvement in the oil redistribution process in Syria strengthens support for sanctions among Western politicians.⁸

OAO Rosneft Oil Company is the leader of Russia's oil industry and the world's largest public oil and gas company. It is on the list of Russian strategic enterprises. The company's core activities include prospecting and exploration of hydrocarbon deposits, hydrocarbon production and processing, and sale of oil, gas and petroleum products both in Russia and abroad.

The company supplies crude oil to refineries (and also uses its own significant capacity to process hydrocarbons). The remaining oil is sold in Russia or exported to other countries under long- and short-term contracts, including contracts awarded through competitive tendering.⁹ Oil is exported to CIS countries, to Northwestern, Eastern and Central Europe, to Mediterranean and other Far Abroad countries, and to countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, including China.

Thus, most of the world's nation-states are interested in maintaining a stable and predictable situation in global hydrocarbon markets.

The only party not interested in this is transnational financial capital led by the United States and Western Europe, because ever since the emergence of the oil and gas industry it has reaped big returns from manipulation of hydrocarbon resources. In the 21st century, the world energy market, which has always been the most monopolized one, has turned into a market for financial speculation. The daily turnover of futures contracts traded on the biggest oil exchanges is several times larger than global oil production. According to some estimates, the share of speculative capital in this area is more than 70%. Researchers have come to the conclusion that the world oil market has nothing to do with the concepts of supply and demand. In the opinion of Ali Kadri, an expert on the Middle East, the oil-dollar standard (the bond tying oil to the dollar) makes it possible to siphon off liquidity from other states, strengthen the dollar, and bolster U.S. imperial rents. As a result, the oil-dollar standard furthers U.S. imperialist conquest, while military operations help to shift the debt burden to other states. Oil prices are managed to preserve U.S. imperial stature, and the U.S. uses the threat of devaluation and debt deflation to extort holders of U.S. debt and keep them under control.¹⁰ Thus, the paradox of this situation is that both oil-producing and oil-importing states themselves finance, through financial mechanisms established in the world oil market, the implementation of the U.S. geopolitical strategy, including military operations against their own countries.

The purpose of this strategy is clearly reflected in a conversation between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. Brzezinski said that the United States was "embroiled" on a very wide front in a part of the world that could be drawn "by two intersecting lines, one from west to east going from the Sinai to India and China, and one from north to south, from Russia's southern frontier down to the Indian Ocean. And then if you draw a circle around that, there's about six hundred million people there. It's a very troubled area, full of ethnic, religious, territorial, and social conflicts." According to his logic, stability in the region could be achieved only if America was "prepared to pursue the imperial mission to the extreme at whatever cost." As Scowcroft put it, "We said, we have all this power. While we have it, we should use it to remake the world, starting with the Middle East, this very

⁸ See: A. Kuptsova, "Sanktsionnyi va-bank: Rossiya vynuzhdaet Zapad podniat stavki," available at [<https://www.obozrevatel.com/abroad/07291-sanktsionnyj-va-bank-rossiya-vynuzhdaet-zapad-podnyat-stavki.htm>], 6 March, 2017; "Rossia i Kitai zablokirovali priniatie rezolutsii Sovbeza OON, sodержashchei sanktsii protiv Sirii," 28 February, 2017, available at [<http://overallnews.ru/i/7143643>], 4 March, 2017.

⁹ See: N.P. Konovalenko, "Globalny rynek uglevodorodnykh resursov: mesto na niom rossiiskikh kompani neftegazovogo kompleksa," available at [<http://journal-discussion.ru/publication.php?id=1393>], 4 March, 2017.

¹⁰ See: A. Kadri, "Volatile Oil Prices: The Geopolitics of Speculation: Oil-Price Makers and Takers," *Global Research*, 15 April, 2012, available at [<http://www.globalresearch.ca/volatile-oil-prices-the-geopolitics-of-speculation-oil-price-makers-and-takers/30314>], 5 March, 2017.

troubled area.” The U.S. strategy, said Brzezinski, “in effect postulated that the only way to have stability in the Middle East is to destabilize it.”¹¹

Eurasia remains an arena of struggle for world domination. The United States follows a policy designed to subordinate a huge area that stretches from the southern regions of Siberia to India, gradually gaining control over Eurasian states and increasing its military presence in the area. Today, the Russian-American conflict in the territory of Syria, driven by the country’s hydrocarbon resources, attracts the greatest attention. The “war” of Russian and U.S. hydrocarbon interests in the territory of Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet countries is less manifest or, rather, more covert. According to Yuri Shafranik, former energy minister of Russia, only Russia’s oil expansion in the CIS will enable it to partner rather than compete with oil producers from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.¹² It is obvious that once the global financial elite gains control of the Eurasian states, it will have full power over the global political process. This causes serious concern among many analysts.¹³ In a globalized world, humanitarian ties between different actors are developing rapidly. At the same time, cooperation in the humanitarian field is being politicized, real-life relations and processes in this field are distorted, and the conflictogenic potential of contradictions is increasing. In the opinion of present-day researchers, the cultural-civilizational environment and the spiritual sphere are becoming the main geopolitical battleground in the 21st century.¹⁴ The mass protest action against corruption that took place in many Russian cities at the end of March 2017 is indicative in this respect. Alexei Navalny, founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, after publishing a large-scale investigation featuring Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, organized protest rallies against corruption across the country.¹⁵ According to the estimates of a number of mass media and the European Parliament,¹⁶ these were the largest protests in Russia since the street rallies of 2011-2013, with a record number of detainees.¹⁷ This action is interesting in the context of our study in that it clearly demonstrates the corruptness of the current authorities and their connection with Russian hydrocarbon capital in the person of Alisher Usmanov. Many Russian researchers see the destruction or absorption of world civilizations, an alteration of their essence as one of the main tasks of the West and financial elites.¹⁸ At the same time, Russian capital is left out of focus, although, in our view, it has the same nature, determined by profit seeking.¹⁹

¹¹ Zb. Brzezinski, B. Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, Basic Books, New York, 2009.

¹² See: Yu. Shafranik, Neftianaia ekspansia v SNG, available at [<http://shafranik.ru/publikatsii/-neftyanaya-ekspansiya-v-sng>], 9 April, 2017.

¹³ See: S.M. Smagulova, “Neftegazovye kompanii Respubliki Kazakhstan i ikh vneshneekonomicheskie sviazi (monograph),” Kompania Sputnik+, Moscow, 2005, 135 pp.

¹⁴ See: I.S. Karabulatova, F.S. Sayfulina, “Mytholinguistic Interpretation of Sacral Toponym Astana in Sociocultural Practice of the Siberian Tatars,” *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2015, pp. 303-310; H. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, April 1904, pp. 298-321.

¹⁵ See: “Navalnyi prizval vsekh rossian vyiti na mitingi v podderzhku korruptsiionnogo rassledovania protiv Medvedeva,” available at [<https://www.newsru.com/russia/14mar2017/navalny.html>], 4 April, 2017.

¹⁶ See: D. Filipov, “Russian Police Arrest Anti-Corruption Leader Navalny, Hundreds More in Nationwide Rallies,” *Washington Post*, 26 March, 2017, available at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-police-arrest-protesters-at-nationwide-anti-corruption-rallies/2017/03/26/11208e46-10a1-11e7-aa57-2ca1b05c41b8_story.html?utm_term=.bb2415c186aa], 12 April, 2017; R. Dobrokhotov, “Russia’s New Protest Generation,” *Aljazeera*, 29 March, 2017, available at [<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/russia-protest-generation-170329113346416.html>], 9 April, 2017.

¹⁷ See: P. Khimshiashvili, “Evroparlament prizval nemedlenno osvobodit Alekseia Navalnogo,” RBC, available at [<http://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/04/2017/58e5fa709a79471ed63835bb?from=newsfeed>], 11 April, 2017.

¹⁸ See: L.G. Ivashov, “Rossia v kontekste vyzovov XXI veka,” available at [<http://topwar.ru/10962-leonid-ivashov-mir-v-hhi-veke.html>], 21 February, 2017; T.A. Ostrovskaya, I.S. Karabulatova, Z.R. Khachmafova, S.A. Lyaucheva, G.V. Osipov, “The Discourse of the Russian Elite in the Era of ‘Liquid’ Modernity as a Problem of Ethnic, Social and Cultural Security,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, S4, 2015, pp. 147-154.

¹⁹ See: “FBK opublikoval samoie masshtabnoie rassledovanie—ob usadbakh, iakhtakh i vinogradnikakh, kotorye iakoby prinadlezhat premieru Medvedevu,” available at [<https://www.newsru.com/russia/02mar2017/dimon.html>], 10 April, 2017.

Hydrocarbon wars are closely associated with the global policy of the leading states in the political arena. Today, according to the Strategic Plan of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency for 2012-2017, the policy of Iran, Russia and China is the main threat to U.S. security. Experts note that by mid-2016 the confrontation between the U.S. and China entered an acute phase.²⁰ U.S. participation in the Syrian conflict shows the special attention being paid by the ruling circles of the United States to nation-states capable of using conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cyber wars to challenge the U.S. or influence regional policy. After the U.S. strike on a Syrian airbase, Donald Trump received incredible support in the U.S. The use of force was lauded even by media leaning toward the Democratic Party, which until then had been slinging mud at the president.²¹ Washington is trying to refute the assumption often made in both Western Europe and Asia, including China (as well as in Russia), that the United States seems to be losing its global role. This new line of demonstrative conduct allows us to predict a worsening of relations between Russia and Western countries on key issues of economics and world politics, including in the context of hydrocarbons.

Discussion

In the opinion of N.A. Nartov, the geopolitical aspect of hydrocarbon policy emerged at a time when the world as a single whole was divided between the main opposing centers, while the new division of the world is, in effect, a redivision of what has already been divided, that is, a transition from one owner to another, and not from ownerlessness to owners.²² The current geopolitical conflict in Syria obviously has a hidden “hydrocarbon” agenda.

For example, Russia is making a powerful effort to regain the status of a great power in Asia and achieve success in selling hydrocarbons to China, Japan and South Korea. Consequently, hydrocarbon policy has been tied to defense and security and, for example, defense of energy projects has become a major mission for the navy. But Russia is encountering difficulties. In the Arctic, its new frontier for exploration and development of energy resources, much of which will probably go to East Asia, Russia faces Chinese political challenges.²³ As a result, it is obliged to rely ever more exclusively on China in developing the Far East and exporting hydrocarbons.²⁴ Such heavy dependence on China undermines its energy aspirations in East Asia.

Today, a geopolitical confrontation similar to the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the first half of the 20th century is being modeled. China acts as a continental power, while the main antagonists—the United States and Russia—are naval powers, but having strong political, economic and military ties with the continent, which is also reflected in the confrontation over hydrocarbons.²⁵

²⁰ See: “Ekonomicheskoe protivopostoianie SShA i Kitaya perekhodit v ostruiu fazu,” available at [<http://geo-politica.info/ekonomicheskoe-protivostoyanie-ssha-i-kitaya-perekhodit-v-ostruyu-fazu.html>], 11 April, 2017.

²¹ See: “Siria, Iran, Severnaya Koreia? Gde zhdet ocherednogo metania ‘Tomagavkov’,” available at [http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/siriya_iran_severnaya_koreya_gde_zhdet_ocherednogo_metaniya_tomagavkov?utm_source=aifrelated&utm_medium=click&utm_campaign=aifrelated], 11 April, 2017.

²² See: N.A. Nartov, *Geopolitika*, Textbook, MGLU, Moscow, 2010, 647 pp.

²³ See: St. Blank, Y. Kim, “Why Is Russian Energy Policy Failing in Asia?” *Pacific Focus*, Vol. 26, Issue 3, December 2011, pp. 405-427.

²⁴ See: I. Karabulatova, S. Ryazantsev, R. Manshin, Z. Vazirov, “Chinese Migration to the Customs Union Countries and Regional Security,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2017, pp. 57-65.

²⁵ See: B. Akhmetova, I. Karabulatova, P. Dudin, Zh. Dorzhiev, “Tension around the Problem of the South China Sea as a Factor of Geopolitical Confrontation and Transformation of the Present World Order,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 49-58.

Debra Johnson analyzes issues of hydrocarbon policy and energy supply security from the perspective of the EU-Russian energy relationship in the context of competing foreign energy policy paradigms. She draws the conclusion that the overall energy relationship between the EU and Russia can be best explained through a framework of mutual interest: the EU is dependent on Russian hydrocarbons, but Russia is also becoming increasingly dependent on European markets.²⁶

At the present stage of development, especially in the early 21st century, geopolitical theories are undergoing significant changes, whose main purpose is to justify the need not to conquer or develop new territories, but rather to gain control over possible spaces not only on a regional, but also on a planetary scale.

Conclusion

Today, a special role in implementing the concept of global governance is assigned to hydrocarbon resources, which have become one of the main objects of geopolitical confrontation, an important factor of global geopolitics. Through control over resources, it is possible to govern entire countries and civilizations: Europe, China, India, East Asia, Russia, and the rest of the world. Obviously, the United States is not interested in an integrated Eurasia capable of addressing current political and economic challenges, which is why it is doing its utmost to eliminate the main potential competitors such as China, Russia and Europe, and the key task of its policy is to slow down the economic and military development of these states. Most Eurasian countries are now divided into hydrocarbon importers, whose economies are totally dependent on imports of hydrocarbons, and exporters, whose economies are totally dependent on exports of these resources. In this situation, ensuring control over hydrocarbon transportation routes is the best way to ensure control over the economies of Eurasian states. In fact, access to energy resources becomes the main tool of political pressure and, obviously, the main instrument in implementing the strategic task of eliminating these competitor states.

By destabilizing the situation in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East and implementing the Greater Middle East project, the U.S. gets an opportunity to significantly limit access for European states, China and other emerging Asian countries to hydrocarbon resources. A specific feature of the policy being pursued in the Greater Middle East is to fuel religious and ethnic strife, with the result that states fall apart into smaller entities, more or less stable public administration systems are destroyed, and countries are plunged into chaos. It is safe to say that the United States, as the main advocate of the interests of transnational capital, creates artificial conflicts and contradictions between oil and gas importers and exporters in order to establish international control over global hydrocarbon resources and transportation routes. Hydrocarbons are turning into a perfect tool for playing states and civilizations off against each other, which helps to capture geostrategic bridgeheads around the world.

²⁶ See: D. Johnson, "EU-Russian Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?" *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 40, Issue 2, Spring, 2005, pp. 256-277.

MIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

**ENDEMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
ETHNOCULTURAL INTEGRATION OF
THE NORTH CAUCASIANS
IN MODERN FRANCE**

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ABSTRACT

In the 1990s-2010s, a considerable number of people from the Northern Caucasus emigrated from Russia to Europe, mainly Chechens, mostly for political (Chechen wars) and economic reasons. The article is devoted to the specifics of their ethnocultural integration in modern France. The work is done on the basis of materials obtained by the author's own ethnographic field research conducted in 2015-2016, and is the first trial in the development of the

given scientific direction. Examined are: getting work in the new country, learning the language, attitudes regarding French laws, culture and society, formation of the Turkish and North Caucasian people's milieu in France.

Examined are the changes in the cultural life-supporting functions and socionormative (weddings and burials) traditions. With regard to the North Caucasian migrants of the first post-Soviet wave it is possible to

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speaking of the process of adaptation, whereas their children can already be partly viewed as undergoing assimilation, in any case, some typical characteristics are obvious.

KEYWORDS: *the Northern Caucasus, Islam, folk traditions, France, laws, family, emigration, the French language, the Russian language, Turkish Circassians.*

Introduction

In the 1990s-2010s, the emigration from Russia to Europe involved a significant number of North Caucasians, mainly Chechens, generally for political (Chechen wars) and economic reasons. In the given article, prepared on the basis of materials, collected by personally conducted ethnographic field studies, we will look at the special features of integration of the people of the North Caucasian diaspora into the modern French society. The proposed work is the first trial in the development of this particular scientific direction.¹

The age of migrants. The contemporary North Caucasian diaspora includes three groups of migrants:

- first, young men aged 25 to 35 years,
- second, young families, which frequently come with small children, less frequently with adolescents,
- third, women with children—widows of those who lost their lives in the course of the Chechen wars.

The North Caucasian elderly, who could pass on people's traditions, are virtually absent: it is a rare family which lives with older relatives. As a rule, parents of emigrants remain in their home country or have already died (or were killed). Young emigrants, arriving in France, actively bear children (even if they have already come with children), therefore, to date, many North Caucasians were already born in France. The social situation of immigrants is diverse.

Marriages. Generally, young men and women consummate marriages with representatives of their own nationality (if one comes to France unmarried). The search for brides and grooms is quite a complex task and an important part of life for the North Caucasian immigrants. The Internet is often used for this purpose, or brides are brought from the Homeland.² Sometimes the people of the Northern Caucasus find spouses among the Turkish Circassians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians—the descendants of those who voluntarily resettled in or were exiled to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th-the beginning of the 20th centuries and are currently residing in France.³ There are French-North Caucasian marriages as well: Chechen women marrying Frenchmen and Adighe men marrying French women.⁴

¹ See: I.L. Babich, "Sotsiokulturnye i politiko-pravovye aspekty adaptatsii kavkazskikh musulman v sovremennoi Evrope," *Sotsiodinamika*, No. 1, 2015.

² The author's field materials, 2015 (further—FM, 2015).

³ See: V.O. Bobrovnikov, I.L. Babich, "Mukhadzhirstvo i russkaia kolonizatsiia," in: *Severnyi Kavkaz v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii*, Moscow, 2007, pp. 155-182.

⁴ The author's field materials, 2016 (further—FM, 2016).

Mastering the French Language. The Preservation of the Russian and National Languages

One of the main components of the adaptation to life in another country for an immigrant is learning that country's language. Most of the North Caucasian migrants coming to France do not speak French. We are aware of only isolated cases of the proficiency in the French language by representatives of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus. For the majority of the North Caucasian immigrants the study of the French language is one of the priorities. For all immigrants in France there are French language courses available that are enthusiastically attended by the North Caucasian immigrants. As was told by one Kabardian woman, who had received a higher education in Russia, she immediately realized that language can be mastered faster if one gets a job. She did everything possible to obtain it. And learned the language perfectly. She began to understand spoken language just after two months. She says: "For me, knowledge of the language provides the feeling of comfort,"⁵ that is, the North Caucasians are well aware of the role and value of knowing the French language. However, there are immigrants with poor knowledge of the French language, who, as a rule, do not work or study.

The age of immigrants is one of the factors that are essential to the successful learning of a new language. The easiest adoption of a new language is accomplished by children of 4 to 5 years old, while the most difficult seems to be by adolescents. The adaptation of children, indeed, starts at 5 years—the age, when all children born in France must start attending school. By Russian standards, this age belongs in the last stages of a kindergarten, but in France it has the designation of a school and, although the attendance in a French kindergarten is not mandatory, the school attendance is compulsory. In this primary school, children are taught the French language, mathematics, etc. As soon as the children start to attend the French school, they quickly get immersed in the language: after a few years, siblings start communicating in French. Sometimes parents have to seek help from their children to resolve issues with the French authorities in the French language.⁶ Children of immigrants successfully graduate from French schools, choose universities to obtain higher education. As a rule, by the time they are 16-17 years old, they know several languages and for them language barriers do not exist. Much of this depends on the willingness of the parents to provide their children with a good education.⁷ For example, an adolescent girl from an Adighe family from Kabarda knows six languages: Kabardian, Russian, French, English, German, and Spanish. She arrived in France when she was four years old. In the city of Baksan (Kabardino-Balkaria), she went to the nursery when she was not even two months old. The family all spoke Kabardian, and she learned the language. In a nursery and kindergarten Russian was spoken, and she mastered it as well. In a French kindergarten and school, she mastered the French language. Other languages are also taught in schools. Currently, this girl is studying at the University of Strasbourg.

Another example. Two children of the Chechen woman, M., are receiving higher education in France. Chechen N., having learnt the French language thanks to his mother, who was a teacher of the French language in Russia, received an excellent education in Paris, having graduated from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (also called "Sciences Po"). As told by French teachers, the North Caucasians are currently attending universities in Brittany, Toulouse, Normandy. Among them there

⁵ FM, 2015.

⁶ See: A. Chleimikov, *Les particularités de la société traditionnelle tchétchène. Identité tchétchène. Master d'Ethnologie*, Nanter, 2008 (manuscript).

⁷ FM, 2015; FM, 2016.

are many Chechens, including girls. But many North Caucasians, after finishing school, do not continue their studies.⁸

Here is another example: A Chechen family with four children. The oldest boy, Yu., immediately began to work: to repair roads together with Portuguese crew. Subsequently, he received his higher education in France and became an architect. Interesting is the fate of one other Chechen boy, A. When he lived with his parents in a hostel for refugees, it was visited by an elderly Frenchman. He spoke with adolescents, taught them the French language. The boy began to communicate with him. The man had a beneficial influence on him: A. graduated from the French school with distinction and is currently a graduate student in a Medical Institute.

Note that the Russian language performs multiple functions and remains a valuable and important attribute in the life of the French emigration.

- First, all the North Caucasian immigrants in France watch Russian television in Russian.
- Second, for communicating, representatives of the middle-aged generation of the North Caucasians use the Russian language.
- Third, at home, within a family and with relatives, the North Caucasians often speak their native language, but sometimes Russian also.

For example, the Chechens speak the Chechen language, but frequently may be unable to read or write it.⁹ Therefore, many far-sighted North Caucasian families in France try to teach their children not only their native and French languages, but also Russian, considering that, since the Northern Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation, and the Russian language is the state language in Russia, it is necessary to be proficient in it as well. A respondent said to us: “If you go to Russia, it is not possible to accomplish anything with only the Kabardian language.”¹⁰ Sometimes, the North Caucasian parents in France enroll their children in “Russian” schools, i.e. in schools where Russian is taught as a foreign language. For example, a Frenchwoman—teacher of the Russian language in the prestigious Orsay (suburb of Paris) lyceum said that Orsay is home to a scientific community and a Lyceum, in which 170 pupils are taught the Russian language: among them there are a number of Chechens.¹¹

Public Organizations of the North Caucasians

In France, most North Caucasians live their lives in the customary way, not getting involved in politics. But there are also those, for whom political activity has become an integral part of their life. In 1999, the Committee of Chechnia (Comité Tchetchenie), a human rights organization (of an anti-Russian orientation), was established in France. On the site of the Organization (in French), the purpose of its activities is described as follows: “The Committee, created in Paris in October 1999, has set for itself the objective of mobilizing public opinion to push the French Government and international organizations to take measures to end the war in Chechnia and to participate in the reconstruction of the Republic.” The Committee holds monthly meetings in Paris, in the International Center of Culture of the Amnesty International organization. The Committee is engaged in organizing

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ FM, 2016.

¹⁰ FM, 2015.

¹¹ FM, 2016.

various events dedicated to the Chechen culture. Currently, the main goal of the Committee is to render assistance to Chechen refugees arriving in France.¹²

Since its inception in 2014, the cultural and educational center Bart of the French Association of Vainakh People (Ayndi Akhmadovich Magomadov, President), has been pursuing its main goal of promoting cohesion and solidarity among Vainakhs living in France.¹³ The priority areas in the activities of the Center are the establishment of the national schools, courses in the French language, national crafts, providing legal assistance to new refugees, assistance in finding work, organization of funerals back home. In France, there also exists a Franco-Chechen organization, named Serlo (in Chechen it means “light”), whose aim is to “show the European public that not all Chechens are ‘sinister Islamists’.” It is composed of 11 persons (six Chechens and five French). The Association organizes poetry, dance, art, and music workshops for the North Caucasian emigrants. There are other national associations in France, for example, the Ossetian Association (established in 1982, Paris), headed by Lora Janaeva, Franco-Ingush Association of the Lorraine Region (France), headed by Isa Bokov, Ingush Cultural Center (Provence-Alps-Azure Coast) headed by Savarbek Khamat-khanov, etc. The Associations seeks to unite their people in France, maintain their culture, language, and identity.

Getting Work as a Way to Adapt to Life in France

It seems that the mechanisms of adaptation of the North Caucasians in France are different, that there is no single criterion by which it can be argued that one immigrant was able to “adapt,” while the other did not. Ways to adapt are very diverse. But, of course, the important, if not determining factor of adaptation, after learning the French language, is to get a steady employment in the new country. It is worth mentioning that there are exceptional situations, when the North Caucasians acquire interesting professions in France. Chechen N., who graduated from the Institute of Political Studies, works in a French Bank.¹⁴ Ingush woman N. defended her doctoral thesis in the field of Philology, and works in the Mitterrand National Library. Many Ingush, who received higher education in Russia or in France, have prestigious jobs: oculist, educational officer, head instructor in a judo dojo, a deputy member of the local Parliament in Lorraine (Miriam Sagrafena), chef in Cannes, housing manager in Lorraine. These are cases where the North Caucasian intelligentsia reveals its potential in France.

Those who emigrate and apply for French citizenship, begin to live in France, receive government assistance, and attend the French language courses. That is why at first not all of the immigrants look for work. Sometimes this “idleness” gets prolonged. In principle, the allowance obtained from the French authorities provides sufficient means to live on, especially if a family has many children—the government doles out assistance for each child. And that is how some Chechen families live. In the meantime, we communicated with Chechen, Ossetian, Ingush and Adighe immigrants who were eager to work, were distressed if there was no work and tried their utmost to get it. As aptly said by one respondent: “If you want to adapt to living in France, it is essential to work. *Work is a way of adaptation.*” At first, all refugees get help finding work from social workers of the Refugees and

¹² See: A. Chleynikov, op. cit.; L. Vinatier, *Tchéchènes : une diaspora en guerre*, Pétra, Paris, 2013.

¹³ [<http://bart-tchetchene.fr/>].

¹⁴ FM, 2016.

Migration Service. Many North Caucasians got jobs thanks to this service.¹⁵ Later, immigrants get assistance from various other social services, such as the Employment Service, for example.

Certainly, the North Caucasian immigrants themselves are aware that it is better to work for a French company, but it doesn't always work out. For example, for the Adighe it is easier to find work with the Turkish Circassians, of whom there are many in France. In general, the Turkish Circassians willingly employ the Adighe from the Northern Caucasus, although the North Caucasians do see differences between a Turkish and French companies: the latter is better, because the French comply with the laws, including labor regulations.

Modern North Caucasians often work in "garages" (in Russia, they are called car services),¹⁶ sometimes buying such garages to hold in private ownership. North Caucasians willingly work in construction and repair businesses. Typical of the North Caucasian peoples is the entrepreneurial streak, which they exercise even as immigrants. Even in France they try to establish a business. One Chechen woman, Zh., owns a company for the manufacture of tourist souvenirs. Russian and Turkish North Caucasians often run restaurants; an Abkhaz woman, D.D., has been running a Turkish restaurant for 17 years already.¹⁷

Adaptation of the North Caucasians and the French Laws

Adaptation to living in a different country is, first and foremost, contingent on the recognition of that country's laws. This is true with respect to France, where the law is many centuries old and is the cornerstone of the government. Emigrants almost immediately are faced with French laws when they prepare their documents for obtaining a residence permits or attempt to obtain work. This is a fairly complex process for a newcomer wishing to start a life in France.¹⁸ So, the main factor for the North Caucasian emigrants wishing to assimilate is the desire to respect the laws of the country. However, at present, France itself is experiencing the changing of citizens' attitudes toward the laws, with the credibility of the state and authorities largely weakened. An important factor is that the North Caucasians, living in the Northern Caucasus, have not been brought up to respect the law as such, since the people in the region, despite the Soviet power, mostly continued to live under the *adat* (common) law, legal customs, regulating many aspects of their lives. Among the members of the North Caucasian community there are a few who obtain subsistence in violation of the laws, for example, by illegally renting the social housing, which is provided by the French State, and live on that money without working anywhere officially. For them no legal adaptation is even feasible. Others, however, abide by the laws, realize that, unlike the Northern Caucasus (and the whole of Russia, in general), in France one can live relying on the laws alone, without seeking influential connections and resorting to corruption.¹⁹ Nevertheless, life in Europe lends itself to opportunities for committing certain crimes, which in Russia are harder to perpetrate. For example, in Europe homes are easier to access and therefore easier to rob, etc. Also, laws are being gradually undermined by the efforts of Muslims in France, who are trying to legitimize certain rules of the *Shari'a*.

¹⁵ FM, 2015; FM, 2016.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ FM, 2015.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

French Environment, French Culture, French Lifestyle

Often, migrants like France, but don't like the French and their way of life. "France is beautiful, the French are terrible"—this is, unfortunately, the sentiment expressed by expatriates from all over the world. The problem of the renunciation of the French way of life partly exists for all immigrants, including the North Caucasians.

What does it mean to live a French life? It means to go to restaurants, visit the French, have them pay a visit, have a "taste for the French lifestyle" (i.e. enjoy French food, communicate and speak the French language). The French have a penchant for elevating aesthetics and are, therefore, given to the inclination of deprecating and criticizing objects, thoughts, architecture, etc. which, in their opinion, lack in aesthetics. The famous *savoir vivre* and *art de vivre*, considered to be typical of the French character, are certainly not without cause: leisure, its planning and discussion of this topic is an integral and important part of every French man or woman.²⁰

One of the important criteria of adaptation for the North Caucasians to life in France is having French friends or, at least, acquaintances, i.e. the presence of French "milieu." It is not so easy to accomplish. With all its affability, the French society is "stratified" and in many ways "closed." In the process of adaptation, of course, a great role belongs to obtaining employment in a French company, as well as the psychological make up of a person applying for work (extraverts are, of course, more amenable to establishing contacts than the introverts). Note that the process of assimilation for the North Caucasians into the French society is in many ways similar to that established for all migrants, including Russians.²¹

Do the North Caucasians accept the French lifestyle? Some more so, some less. There are Chechens, who visit restaurants or cafes to meet with acquaintances or friends.²² As was told to us, at first it was hard to accept the French custom of eating at set times: lunch from 12 to 14, dinner from 19 to 21.²³

Note that there is a difference between being familiar with the French culture and the adaptation to it. To adapt, an emigrant is certainly not obligated to have an implicit knowledge of the French culture, just some rudimentary understanding in order to maintain a conversation. A typical conversation with the French revolves around children, cars, jobs, and politics. The French possesses a good quality—curiosity. They are sincerely interested in the lives of others, always inquiring the North Caucasians about their life, culture, traditions, food, etc., request to show photos. For immigrants, this creates a favorable psychological climate. The French are characterized by civility, which is also a part of the North Caucasian etiquette.

The emigrants from the Northern Caucasus get acquainted with the French Alps, downhill skiing, bicycling, using swimming pools, etc.,—not a popular time spending back home. Group sports (or simply an active lifestyle) is not considered an important factor in the lives of the North Caucasians at all. This, of course, is the influence of the French society. The French, according to the North Caucasians, are dynamic people and the mountaineers try not to be outdone.²⁴

Travel is not a significant component of the North Caucasian people, and therefore, when the emigrants from the Northern Caucasus are beginning to live in France, partly due to financial con-

²⁰ FM, 2016.

²¹ FM, 2015.

²² See: A. Chleynikov, op. cit.; FM, 2015.

²³ FM, 2015.

²⁴ Ibidem.

straints (life on the dole does not afford travel) and to peculiar character of their mentality they do not travel. And this is one of the important differences between the French and the North Caucasians. The French love to travel: the proximity of interesting places of Europe allows them to arrange travel lasting two days. Gradually, the North Caucasians start to imitate this feature of lifestyle. Here is how one respondent described her change in attitude toward travel: “When I went to work on Monday, my French colleagues asked what I have been doing during the weekend. I answered, ‘washed clothes, cleaned the apartment, washed windows.’ My French colleagues were surprised: they spent weekends traveling and on Monday talked about it at work. And I had nothing to tell! This has influenced my attitude. I also started to go out with my family on weekends. One of the motives for my trips was the desire to tell about them Monday at work and show photos.”²⁵

In the French and North Caucasian cultures there is a marked difference, regarding the freedom and status of women, including the divorced ones. Thanks to the French freedoms, a divorced woman in France does not feel flawed, as is the case in the Northern Caucasus, where the divorce, as a rule, is unheard of. In France, women are free, can divorce and live independently and this is perceived as normal.²⁶ This feature of the French life allows many North Caucasian women to improve their status within a family and society.

All Russians, including the North Caucasians, loved and continue to love the French Cinema, but now, in France, there is a predominance of American movies.²⁷ In the past twenty years, there has been a growing trend of Americanization of the French culture: the emergence of a network of American restaurants, format of television programming (for example, the French news programs first run news from the U.S., and only then from European countries and France).

In view of the emigrants, the majority of French holidays are religious (Christian) or political-historical holidays (for example, the well-known holiday on 14 July—the Bastille Day).²⁸ In general, European Muslims respect the French culture, values and religion. Partly, it does affect them, for example, in Muslim families parents also give their children gifts on Catholic Christmas. For them it is not, of course, a holiday, but a tribute to the French traditions. In turn, the French also strive to be responsive to the needs of Muslims. The French State in many ways shows consideration for the complexities of the adaptation of migrants to the Christian country, for example, one of the main holidays—the Christian Christmas and the New Year. Before, everywhere was written “Noel”—“Christmas”, and now “Fin d’anne” is frequently written—“The end of the year”, so that the Muslims do not feel disadvantaged.²⁹

Cultural Differences of France and the Northern Caucasus

The North Caucasian immigrants perceive France as a country of the sun, clean streets, cordial people in the streets, “unrealistically” comfortable life (transportation, services); enjoy the floating smell of croissants and coffee, loquacious murmur of French conversation. In the opinion of the North Caucasian migrants “generally, in the Caucasus, as well as in Russia, it is not customary to smile at strangers. In France, smiling is the minimum, a necessary accompaniment to the oral communication.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Ibidem.

In visitors it elicits a feeling of joy. After having lived for a time in this country, there appears a feeling of appreciation for of pervasive beauty and aestheticism.” The immigrants also like the French “thoroughness,” which, however, in some situations, subsequently appears as a flaw and source of annoyance with the French.³⁰ After a difficult, in many respects, life in Russia, life in France seems very easy and comfortable, engendering a feeling of security and the importance of human life. The North Caucasians readily accept the inherent French aestheticism, which manifests itself in all things, and especially in architecture. For many of the North Caucasian emigrants the cultural component of a lifestyle is important. In France, culture commands a great deal of attention.³¹

Nevertheless, the life in France is different from the life of the Northern Caucasus in almost every aspect: the infrastructure, place that a family occupies in one’s life, perception of one’s role and place in the life of a community and the country. The French are socially active and often participate in strikes or rallies. The population of the Northern Caucasus is very inert socially.³²

North Caucasian immigrants see a substantial difference between theirs and French culture, way of life, and the foundations of morality. For example, the French freedom³³ is manifested in all areas of their everyday lives, including home. The North Caucasians have traits, such as an etiquette of restraint, the cult of self-control in both men and women, respect for elders, hospitality, sense of “shoulder.”³⁴ In France, faced with the emancipated behavior of the French, the North Caucasians feel uncomfortable.

The French society lacks the tradition, characteristic of the North Caucasian culture—that of respect for the elderly and veneration of one’s parents. The French have no dichotomy of “senior-junior.” The North Caucasian immigrants at the outset of their residence in France offer their seats to the elderly in transport, but then begin to see that they do not need to do so: people get offended, perceive it as humiliation.³⁵

In the French culture there is no concept of *shame* as it exists in the culture of the North Caucasian people (*емыкы* in Kabardian).³⁶ The families of the North Caucasian migrants, where parents are strict with their children, see the difference. Brought up in the spirit of the North Caucasian culture, the children of migrants are surprised by the characteristics of the relationships between their French friends/girlfriends with their parents. French teens often talk with their parents quite sharply. In the North Caucasus this is still impossible.³⁷

The North Caucasian migrants noted that only some French people support family values. Many in France have no need for relatives: brothers and sisters may not see each other for years. French families do not have a lot of children. Many live without children and don’t want to have them.³⁸ For the North Caucasian mentality that seems strange, because for the peoples of the Northern Caucasus kinship and family values are very important, and the significance of this is preserved in emigration. Children, growing up in the West and arriving later in the Northern Caucasus, see the difference between the treatment of relatives in the land of their ancestors and in France.

In the opinion of the North Caucasian emigrants, one can have French acquaintances, but making friends with them is difficult: they often don’t understand the problems of the North Caucasian migrants. For example, a respondent said that when her father passed away, she requested a 10-day

³⁰ FM, 2016.

³¹ Ibidem.

³² Ibidem.

³³ FM, 2015.

³⁴ FM, 2016.

³⁵ FM, 2015.

³⁶ FM, 2016.

³⁷ FM, 2015; FM, 2016.

³⁸ FM, 2015.

leave, whereas in France one gets 3 days in similar situation. Her request was granted, however, nobody understood why she needs so much time. Or another instance: if a person is hospitalized, in the North Caucasus he does get visits from lots of people, even if these visits are not warranted. In France, however, it is not customary: if the situation is not serious enough, the person does not get visitors.³⁹

Many respondents, whom we have been able to interview, expressed a desire to communicate with the French. Certainly, it is not easy to make friends with them. The North Caucasian children of the first wave of emigrants, attending French schools, are beginning to talk and even make friends with the French children.⁴⁰ For example, the girls of one Adighe family have French friends, who come to visit them at their home. There are children's holidays, to which the French reciprocally invite the Adighe girls.⁴¹ One respondent, a Chechen, said that he has French friends, with whom he had studied at a university in France, as well as friends from former and current jobs. The French and the North Caucasians have different approaches toward treating guests: the French are frugal, while the North Caucasians are more cordial and love to feed and entertain their guests.

In France, neighbors virtually do not communicate between themselves, do not even greet each other. It is difficult for the North Caucasians to fathom, since at home, in a village or aul, each resident knows everybody and greets everyone.⁴² It is difficult for the North Caucasians to accept the glibness of the French people, the French are not sincere and open enough. Unconditional positive regard for friends and family, a sincere attempt at understanding, which is the norm in the Northern Caucasus (and, maybe, in Russia in general) is not common in France. All relationships have "a compulsory rational component, even in relationships between spouses, parents and children, etc." Strange for the North Caucasians are the monetary relations in the French families. The North Caucasians are shocked by stories that parents lend money at interest to their children. They are bewildered when they see that a husband and wife pay separately at a restaurant. In the Northern Caucasus it is unthinkable.⁴³

In the Northern Caucasus there exists a *home cult*. People constantly modify, decorate their homes: this is at the level of a "mass competition." In France, with its numerous private cozy houses, the North Caucasians feel at home. And if they are able to afford it, they try to live in their own house, "on earth."⁴⁴

There are also instances when the North Caucasian traditions get introduced to the French. For example, there is no tradition of toasting during a French feast, it is a custom imported by the North Caucasians and the French like it. Emigrants also practice the tradition of presenting colleagues with gifts, for example, in celebrating a birth, which is not customary for the French either.⁴⁵

The Turkish "North Caucasians," the Role of the Turkish Environment for the North Caucasians in France

In France there is a rather large "Circassian" diaspora, which appeared in the 1960s-1970s: it is made up of the Turkish Adighe (they are often called Circassians), Abkhazians, the Ossetians, whose

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ FM, 2015; FM, 2016.

⁴¹ FM, 2015.

⁴² Ibidem.

⁴³ FM, 2016.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ FM, 2015.

ancestors emigrated from the regions of the Northern Caucasus during the Caucasian War. The Turkish diaspora in France is well organized, it has its own Associations (e.g., *Association Culturelle des Franco-Caucasiens du Nord*, Villerbanne, formerly known as the Association of the French Circassians, 2004-2013). The Association conducts an extensive cultural program, in particular, the concerts of the Caucasian dances performed by a dance group from Istanbul (*Itüfak—groupe de danse Nord-Caucasien de l'Univ. d'Istanbul*). There are also political events, such as the Circassian Genocide Memorial Day 21 May, 1864 (*Les Caucasiens commémorent à Lyon le 21 mai 1864*). The Turkish Circassians also created a pan-European organization, the *Federation of European Circassians* with an office in Berlin. It conducts meetings for the European Circassians.

The inclusion of the North Caucasian emigrants from Russia in the Turkish-Circassian environment could significantly ease their adaptation in France. But in reality this is not happening. Of course, there are contacts among them, but they are negligible. More active contacts are precluded for a number of reasons.

- First, although the Turkish emigrants “adapted” quite nicely to life in France, in reality they are practically not assimilated: live separately, are not “open” to the French life, people and culture.
- Second, the Turkish North Caucasians have, to a large extent, become Turkishized and are more similar to the Turkish Circassians than to the representatives of the Russian Northern Caucasus. The Turkish Circassians in Turkey itself often marry Turkish women and become Turkishized permanently. Most of the “Turkish” Circassian culture in France represents the culture of the Turkish Circassians, which is not similar to Kabardian. Holidays and weddings of the Turkish Circassians are markedly different from those in the Northern Caucasus. As a result, the North Caucasians perceive them as “foreign.”⁴⁶ If the Russian North Caucasians want to adapt to the French life, the contacts with the Turkish diaspora only slow down this process.
- Third, in France, the “Turkish Circassians” imply not only the Adighe, but also Ossetians and Abkhazians. Their common language is Turkish, with only a few of them speaking French. Some of the older Turkish Circassians know the Adighe language.⁴⁷ In Lyon, there lived one older Turkish Circassian, who knew the Kabardian language well. Previously in Istanbul he was the chief of police. In Lyon the man searched out some Russian Kabardians and tried to help them. In Lyon, there is a Turkish diaspora in which there are many Circassians (approximately 200 persons).⁴⁸ In the old part of the city, there is a hotel which is owned by a Turkish Circassian from the clan of Kardanovs. He was a child when he arrived in France and has been living in the city for more than 40 years. For a time, he had a construction company, which employed several Kabardians from Russia.⁴⁹ He speaks fluent Turkish and French, but not Kabardian. It is interesting that the emigrants from Kabarda suggested that one of the Turkish centers organize the teaching of the Adighe language, but the management of the Center did not support this initiative.
- Fourth, the Turkish “North Caucasian” diaspora in France has no sense of solidarity: the Circassians and Abkhazians from Turkey communicate between themselves, but not with the Turkish Chechens. The Chechens even in Turkey segregate themselves.⁵⁰ It is the same in France.

⁴⁶ FM, 2015.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ FM, 2016.

⁴⁹ FM, 2015.

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

The Turkish Circassians gather in their cultural centers every Saturday, have dances dressed in national costumes to indigenous national music, hold concerts in Turkish and French, prepare native foods. The Turkish centers invite to their activities by disseminating information through acquaintances and publishing it on the web. Although the North Caucasian Adighes rarely attend these events, yet a peculiar social interweaving between the lives of the Turkish Circassians and Russian Circassians does occur in France.⁵¹ However, the North Caucasian immigrants attend major events, for example, they all came to the wedding of the above-mentioned Turkish Kabardian, Kardanov, in Lyon. The opening of a Russian Kabardian restaurant was attended by the Turkish North Caucasians.⁵² Although the Russian Chechens do not attend such centers, when one of the Chechens had problems, they appealed for help there and all the North Caucasian and Turkish diasporas raised funds for him.

The North Caucasian Environment in France

Modern gadgets and social networks in many ways “lighten” the difficulties of emigrants living in another country: there is the phone, web, etc., by which one can always communicate with fellow countrymen in their homeland. Therefore, the present migrants can be assessed as emigrants of a new type—“emigrants of the Internet era.”⁵³ They are interested in political and cultural news from their homeland in the Northern Caucasus. There are many North Caucasian sites, for example, Adighe (Circassian), which the migrants frequently visit. It is true that the second generation of these migrants—children, already find it difficult to use these sites, as they tend to be in the Adighe language. Of course, social networks do not replace live communication. So, on the one hand, the North Caucasian emigrants are eager to visit native lands to which they bring children born in France, and, on the other, try to find a North Caucasian environment in a new country. Modern immigrants bring their relatives to France. But by and large, the North Caucasians are not easily enticed to travel and seldom visit France. Often, even brothers and sisters have not visited their relatives in France.⁵⁴ Of course, sophisticated real and virtual conditions create a completely different psychological climate and atmosphere in which the current migrants live: the pain of the loss of their homeland is somewhat dulled.

On the whole, there is no North Caucasian milieu in France:

- first, it is divided into several segments; and
- second it is delineated along Muslim and, conditionally, “traditional” (ethnic) lines.⁵⁵

Nowadays, there is a division in the diaspora between practicing Muslims (regardless of ethnicity) and ethnic Muslims (the rest of the North Caucasians). For example, one young man from a large Adighe family (30-40 people) became a practicing Muslim and almost ceased to communicate with his relatives and ethnic countrymen and joined a Muslim chapter, which counts many Chechens among its members. It should also be mentioned that even abroad, the emigrants from the Northern Caucasus place a great deal of value on their family ties. If several related families emigrate to France, they try to live in the same city to be able to maintain close communications.

⁵¹ Ibidem.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ FM, 2016.

⁵⁴ FM, 2015.

⁵⁵ See: I.L. Babich, “Sovremenoe islamskoe dvizhenie v Kabardino-Balkarii,” in: *Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoi Kabardino-Balkarii*, Moscow, 2003.

The first step in creating the North Caucasian environment is in the form of accommodations in a hostel for refugees, where they are lodged by the French authorities. It is here that they develop first long term affiliations “with their own.” Many remain friends for years. Kabardian woman B. said: “When we arrived, we lived a long time in the dorm with all the North Caucasian refugees and initially were dealing with everyone: Kumyks, Chechens, Armenians, Georgians and now, when we began to live separately, we lost the connection with many, for example, with the Chechens and Georgians, but preserved it with Kumyks and Armenians.”⁵⁶

Mainly, the North Caucasian environment consists of two segments of communication: the first is made up of people from the Northwestern and Central Caucasus, the second—the people from the Eastern Caucasus. The first segment includes the Kalmyks as well, who gravitate to the North Caucasians.⁵⁷ Both segments loosely overlap each other. In exile, the Adighe are friendly with Balkars, Abkhazians, Armenians, but have little contact with the Chechens. Typically, the ethnic groups of the North Caucasian migrants in France merge on the basis of nationality, for example, the Adighes conduct pan-Adighe events that attract Adighes from all over France. Normally, these activities serve as venues for finding spouses for the Adighe young people.⁵⁸ These events help acquainting all the Adighe residing in France, for example, the Kabardian emigrants will certainly know all of the Kabardians from other cities. The North Caucasians will gladly interact with Armenians, of whom there are very many in France, including those who came from Armenia. Armenians work as cobblers and tailors, trade in jewelry, and own laundries. The North Caucasians attend their weddings, christenings, etc.⁵⁹

The Islamization of the Chechen emigrants, in many ways, isolates them from the rest of the North Caucasians, who are not so close to Islam, as well as the French. The Chechens, accepting Islam, stop drinking alcohol altogether, while the rest of the North Caucasians do imbibe a little. The Chechens are characterized by a sense of community. The Chechens from all the French cities try to attend large Chechen activities. Once a Chechen wedding was held in Paris: the groom was from London and the bride—from Paris. It brought the Chechens together from all corners of Europe. Although the Chechens predominantly socialize within their ethnic diaspora, they do have acquaintances among the North Caucasians, Russians, French, Africans, the South Americans, etc.⁶⁰ Many Chechens live in France with the sense of being there temporarily. They believe that “they do not need to adapt, since they will be going back to Chechnia” (and indeed, many leave).⁶¹ An Abkhazian lady, D., says: “We consider the Lyon Chechens to be strangers. For example, it is known that some of them here have several wives. For us, this is alien, barbaric.”⁶² In the meantime, if someone dies, the funeral and the wake are conducted with all of the North Caucasians in attendance.⁶³

The Culture of Life-Support

In France, the North Caucasians do not wear either national, traditional or Islamic clothing, and rather enjoy European.⁶⁴ North Caucasian girls and women, being practicing Muslims, do not always

⁵⁶ FM, 2015.

⁵⁷ Ibidem.

⁵⁸ FM, 2015.

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

⁶⁰ See: A. Chleinikov, op. cit.

⁶¹ FM, 2015.

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ Ibidem.

⁶⁴ Ibidem.

carry headscarves. Wearing a headscarf in France is not an unequivocal sign of the level of a woman's Islamization.

Traditional food is an important attribute in preserving the indigenous cultural roots in immigration: the North Caucasian migrants often remain committed to the national traditional cuisine. At home, women prepare meals familiar from childhood, usually on weekends and holidays.⁶⁵ During the Kurban Bayram (Eid up-Adha) celebration, the Adighe emigrants prepare a national traditional dish—Ashryk—made up of five cereals (white corn, pearl barley, ground wheat, rice, millet), three kinds of beans, meat jerky, preserved from a previous holiday. They distribute the meat among all of the North Caucasian Muslims (formerly raw, currently—most often cooked). The great diversity of national dishes is observed at Chechen weddings (at the weddings of other North Caucasian migrants the majority of dishes are European).

Socionormative Culture

North Caucasian migrants live in conventional dwellings, the interiors of which are nothing special. The main factor regulating the ethnocultural security function in emigration is behavioral culture: even in emigration the North Caucasians retain mountain traditions. Their home lives are filled with both ethnic and Islamic components. At home they listen to the North Caucasian music (for example, the Circassians enjoy listening to Cherim Nakhushev, a well-known performer), watch Russian variety shows and Russian television.⁶⁶ Dances are an important attribute of ethnic identity in the emigration. Holidays are always celebrated by dancing. For example, the Chechens have always celebrated the so-called “positive” (a positive decision on the status of political refugee). During such holiday meetings everyone dances: young girls and boys, men and women. The girls' shoulders may be bare, mature women tie their hair.⁶⁷ Small children are often taught the national dances. It is an important part of the education of the younger generation—the children of the North Caucasian migrants.⁶⁸

Inherent traditions of hospitality and mutual assistance are kept alive among the North Caucasian emigration. As in the Northern Caucasus, for any hard work, such as construction, or moving a family to another place of residence, etc., relatives and acquaintances are convened to render assistance. More often it applies to immediate family members, but there are cases when complete strangers help in difficult circumstances. For example, one Chechen lady, A., lodged two unfamiliar Chechen women in her small room, who had nowhere to live.⁶⁹

Retained are many of the traditions, associated with children, for example, the Adighe families still practice the tradition of determining a profession for a child based on what object he chooses. To do this in front of a child of 4-5 years old various items are placed. The Adighe believe that the first object the child will choose will be linked to his profession. A North Caucasus emigrant observes the tradition of respect for elders on the street or when communicating with the elderly, including at work, in society and within a family. For example, if a Hall, where there is dancing, is visited by older people, everyone rises.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ FM, 2016.

⁶⁶ FM, 2015.

⁶⁷ See: A. Chleinikov, *op. cit.*

⁶⁸ FM, 2015.

⁶⁹ A. Chleinikov, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ A. Chleinikov, *op. cit.*; FM, 2016.

Wedding and Burial Traditions, and Islam

The North Caucasian Muslims, even in France, perform *nikah*: they go to a Mullah's home or he comes to a groom and bride. The North Caucasians rarely sign their marriage at City Hall. The North Caucasian weddings in France only partly reproduce the peculiar ethnic traditions of the North Caucasians. Usually weddings take place in a restaurant, there is practically no national component (except for cooking individual dishes).⁷¹ In the West, the Chechen weddings are the most interesting. A wedding for the North Caucasian migrants, particularly Chechens, is one of the major events of their lives in France. For such activities from 300 up to 500 persons get invited—people come from all over the country. A large room is leased for the event. Dishes for the wedding are prepared by themselves. The Chechen immigrants have mostly traditional feasts, including weddings, in the North Caucasian style. They call such festivities *Lovzar*. Other North Caucasians rarely attend Chechen weddings. Usually they watch them on European sites with “nostalgia.”⁷² For example, the Chechens saved tradition of the bride's entry into new house (for this, ram's skins are spread, the groom addresses the eldest of the family of the bride and asks them to forgive his taking away the bride, the groom and bride make a “mock” escape, etc.). During the wedding, the bride and her friend stand in a corner of the room.

The groom is not present at the wedding. Chechen weddings in France observe traditional segregation of tables for women and men. For other North Caucasians this is a thing of the past. Each table has its own tamada (master of ceremonies) (other North Caucasians have only one master of ceremonies for all tables),⁷³ retained is the role of the “dance toastmaster,” who, using a wand, chooses those who will dance the next dance.⁷⁴ Dishes for Chechen weddings in France are ethnic: *zhizhig galnash, rice pilaf, tortillas with cheese, meat...*⁷⁵ Also, Salade Olivier, manti, sweet treats—*Halva*, sweet rice are on the table. Prepared also are quite sophisticated dishes: *Kurze* (a kind of ravioli), *gnocchi* (pasta, prepared manually). Sometimes Chechen artists from Chechnia or from European cities (from Strasbourg, for example) come to large Chechen weddings.

Currently, if someone from the Northern Caucasus dies in France, relatives and all the North Caucasian emigrants raise funds in order to send the body home. More often the people are buried back at home, not in France⁷⁶ If, nevertheless, the funeral and the wake are held in France, all the North Caucasians, regardless of ethnicity, try to attend.⁷⁷ The North Caucasians conduct wakes (40 days, six months, year), for which the Kabardians, for example, prepare a ritual dish, *lakumy* (crumpets) They carry it into the homes of seven families—North Caucasian migrants. When Muslims eat these crumpets, they recite a prayer for the deceased (*thajtu* in Chechen). The French, even neighbors, do not get *lakumy*: they will not understand, and, of course, will not be able to recite the prayer.

Conclusion

What is adaptation? There are many definitions of the process on which we will not dwell in this article, except to note that, certainly, adaptation and assimilation are separate phenomena and

⁷¹ FM, 2015.

⁷² Ibidem.

⁷³ FM, 2016.

⁷⁴ FM, 2015.

⁷⁵ FM, 2016.

⁷⁶ FM, 2015.

⁷⁷ Ibidem.

should be distinguished. To adapt the following criteria are significant: respect for the French laws, French culture, people and the French way of life. Assimilation is characterized by *the sharing with the French their culture and religion* and *changing the religious and ethnic identity*. Twenty years ago, the French authorities, politicians (mainly, “left”) and the French in general were sure that immigrants would gradually assimilate, accepting the French values, culture and religion. Currently the “extreme right” is certain that emigrants must assimilate. In reality, however, this is not happening. The North Caucasian emigrants of the first wave of the post-Soviet Russia may still be regarded exclusively as adapting, however, with regard to their children, a partial process of assimilation is ongoing, anyway, some of its features are clearly evident.

Note that the presence or absence of individual components of the French life in the lifestyle of the North Caucasians in France is not indicative of the lack of successful adaptation. It seems to us that the ways to adapt for the North Caucasians may be diverse.

The formation of a number of cultural environments (societies) helps the North Caucasians to adapt in modern France. The primary one is the Turkish environment which is composed of the Turkish “North Caucasians,” whose ancestors left Russia and settled in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th-the beginning of the 20th centuries. Second is the Islamic environment, consisting of various groups of Muslims, who had emigrated to the country from the countries of the Islamic East, and which has existed in France for the past 30 to 40 years.⁷⁸

On the whole, the North Caucasian emigrants are ready to integrate into the French life, which requires about 10 years of residence in the country.⁷⁹ In the culture of life-support and in the socio-normative culture we observe a combination of invariant and innovative elements. The least prone to innovation has proved to be the traditional system of nutrition, the most vulnerable—ritual culture associated with family and social life.

⁷⁸ See: I.V. Ponkin, *Islam vo Frantsii*, Moscow, 2005.

⁷⁹ FM, 2015.

CHINESE MIGRATION TO THE CUSTOMS UNION COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

In the last few years, migration, as a phenomenon of the globalizing world, has become more active and much more prominent in all spheres of social life. It has gained even more prominence in the context of the geopolitical changes to become a global phenomenon.

This is true of labor migration from China to the countries of the Customs Union, unfolding in the context of the global financial and economic crisis.

Chinese migration can be described as one of the important factors that affect the social, economic and, probably, demographic development of these countries in the long-term perspective. Here we have proceeded from the fact that the demographic situation and main migration processes are the important elements of everyday life and politics of contemporary China, the impact of which is not limited to China, the development of its neighbors being af-

ected as well.¹ In the future, these processes will become some of the factors to be considered in the relationship between China and its closest neighbors. Today, the steady growth of Chinese uncontrolled migration is responsible for the worsening standards of living in the host countries; it exacerbates the problems created by the equally steady growth of protest sentiments among the local population. To downplay the negative effects of Chinese migration and the protest sentiments it stirs up, China and Kazakhstan, fully aware of mutual synergy of their economics and mainly identical interests in the world, adopted a joint Strategy of Cooperation for the 21st Century that outlined the main directions of

¹ See: B. Akhmetova, I. Karabulatova, P. Dudin, Zh. Dorzhiev, "Tension around the Problem of the South China Sea as a Factor of Geopolitical Confrontation and Transformation of the Present World Order," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 49-58.

their strategic partnership. It was for the first time that the top officials discussed the problem of Chinese workforce illegally brought into Kazakhstan by Chinese oil and gas companies, working in the Aktobe Region in Western Kazakhstan, and the mass protests stirred up by these practices. Today, migration can be described as one of the main factors that directly affect economy, culture, na-

tionality policy, ethnic and international relations. Migration can no longer be described as a socioeconomic phenomenon—it is gradually acquiring political dimensions. This means that to maintain national and regional security, the interconnections between the political processes and migration, and the nature and directions of their interaction should be carefully studied and understood.

KEYWORDS: migration, the Customs Union, China, geopolitics, regional security.

Introduction

Today, the countries of the Customs Union are living in a new migration reality, shaped by the fast increase of cross-border migrants. Migration flows from the “near abroad” are being actively formed, while the number of migrants from the “far abroad” is steadily growing. The response of political scientists and the local people can, at best, be described as highly ambiguous.² The far from simple situation in the countries of the Eurasian Customs Union (Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Belarus) explains the increasing scholarly interest in Chinese migration and special attention being paid to the current problems of social, cultural, demographic and economic security engendered by the presence of Chinese migrants in these countries.³ In 2012, the ratio of the Chinese to local people in Belarus was 1 to 14. This means that by 2012 the republic had already officially accepted about 700 thousand Chinese.⁴ In the last fifteen years, the number of registered citizens of the People’s Republic of China in Kazakhstan has increased by more than a factor of seven.⁵

Today, it has become abundantly clear that the qualitative parameters of Chinese migration should receive no less attention than its quantitative descriptions.⁶ On the strength of his studies of the Chinese migration and adaptation, Victor Dyatlov asserts that the Chinese “commercial minorities” are functioning in Irkutsk.⁷ This finding is highly important for a correct understanding of the development of migration processes today and in the future. The highly complicated cross-border

² See: “Reydy za migrantami iz stran Tamozhennogo soiuza,” 8 October, 2016, available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nO48xhHVX20], 21 February, 2017.

³ See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, “Kitayskaia migratsiia v Kazakhstane: sovremennye tendentsii i perspektivy,” *Analytic*, No. 6, 2007, pp. 33-45; Wang Shuchun, Wan Qingsong, “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the EEU—Rivals or Partners?” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 7-16; R. Abdullo, “Tajikistan-China: Twenty-Five Years of Direct Relations,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 16, Issue 3-4, 2015, pp. 93-107.

⁴ See: “Belorussiiu koloniziruiut kitaytsy?” available at [http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2012/12/17/1072381.html], 20 February, 2017.

⁵ See: S. Kozhirova, “Kitayskaia migratsiia i Kazakhstan,” *Kazakhstan Spekr*, No. 1 (75), 2016, pp. 43-62.

⁶ See: I.M. Gabdrifkov, I.S. Karabulatova, L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, “Ethnoconfessional Factor in Social Adaptation of Migrant Workers in the Muslim Regions of Russia,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Supplement 4, 2015, pp. 213-223.

⁷ V.I. Dyatlov, “Trudovye migratsii i protsess formirovaniia diaspor v sovremennoy Rossii,” in: *Trudovaia migratsiia v SNG: sotsialnye i ekonomicheskie efekty*, Tsentri izucheniia problem vyzhdennoy migratsii v SNG, Moscow, 2003, pp. 227-232.

migration processes of our days have already made actual the problems of adaptation of migrants, the factors of their interaction with host societies and conflicting situations.⁸ In his works, Sergey Ryazantsev has pointed to the growing role of the Chinese migration to Kazakhstan.⁹ It should be said that the problems of regional and national security in Central Asia are mainly determined by the demographic situation in China, as well as the nature and intensity of Chinese migration.

Methods and Materials

The place of a “regional bloc” in the system of national security is similar to the place of the “state regional politics” in the system of state politics. In this context, security is defined as an extent to which the vitally important interests of society and of each of its members are protected against internal and external threats and as an extent to which man and the environment are protected against excessive dangers. Today, a state is putting a lot of effort to stabilize social, economic and political development not only at the macro- but also at the regional level. The varied negative consequences of the already obvious and expected crises in the countries of the Customs Union are present in the form of the conditions of the “here and now” at the regional level.

The main regional problems can be concisely described as follows:

- the regions, in which crises may endanger security, should be identified;
- the crisis situations, caused by climatic conditions, industrial, institutional, territorial, ethnographic and other regional specifics should be studied and analyzed.

In recent times, the media of the Eurasian Customs Union member states have been writing a lot about China’s aggressive economic policies. On the one hand, economic aggression is acutely felt in Kazakhstan, the Customs Union members, Central Asia and the Middle East.¹⁰ Chinese presence is very obvious in the some of the Gulf countries as well.

In our theoretical studies, we relied on the classical theories of social processes: the theory, formulated by Pitirim Sorokin, that looks at migrations as a horizontal social mobility of the two types: mobility of voluntary migration and mobility under the pressure of structural changes (industrialization and demographic factors), and also the neoclassical economic theory of Michael Todaro that concentrates on the attraction-repulsion theory and the factors at the macrolevel of migrations. We have also relied on a set of general and specific methods, used by political science, and on the systems and analytical approaches, which allowed us to substantiate the interaction between the migration processes and national security problems.

Our resource base included official statistics, normative legal documents, related to problems of migration and employment of alien workforce, analytical materials of the Department of the Migration Police of the Ministries of the Interior of the Customs Union members, the U.N. methodological recommendations, related to the statistics of international migrations, and the media materials, dealing with Chinese migration.

⁸ See: S. Ryazantsev, R. Manshin, “Special Features of the Adaptation of Migrant Workers from Asian Countries in the Russian Economy,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 95-103.

⁹ See: S. Ryazantsev, “Kazakhstan Today: Migration—Trends and Regulation Approaches,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 69-79; A.E. Eroyan, E.P. Kolpak, S.F. Litvinova, N.P. Gusakov, S.V. Ryazantsev, “Spatial-Economic and Geopolitical Interests of Russia, the USA and China in Central Asia: Competition, Coincidence of Wants and Strategies in a Changing World,” *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, Issue 6, 2016, pp. 197-201.

¹⁰ See: S. Ryazantsev, Ya. Hungmei, *Kitayskaia migratsiia v Rossiiu: tendentsii, posledstviia i podkhody k regulirovaniu*, Ekonomicheskoe obrazovanie, Moscow, 2010, p. 72.


The empirical basis consists of the results of the sampling inquiry polls among Chinese migrants (more than 600 people), carried out in 2014-2017 in Astana and Almaty, Moscow, Mytishchi, Dolgoprudniy, and Minsk. In 2014, 96 migrants were polled; in 2017, 204 (126 in Astana, 184 in Almaty, 118 in Minsk and 192 in Moscow and its closest regions). The polls relied on high quality methods: inquiries and informal interviews.

Results

China possesses a huge migration potential that, in the context of the current market changes, results in internal migration and a fairly big migration outflow from the country. Today, people from the absolute majority of provinces and big cities, which are under direct administration of the central government, live in Almaty and Astana. Kazakhstan attracts migrants from the economically developed parts of China (Beijing and Shanghai) and from the regions of traditional migrations (Fujian and Guangdong) to other countries of the world; the eastern part of China (Jiangsu and Anhui) too is losing a great deal of its population. The directions of migrant flows are also affected by the geographical closeness to the territorial and administrative units (XUAR, Urumqi); migrant flows to Kazakhstan begin in the fairly distant regions, such as Guangzhou and Dalian.

Figure 1

The Regions of Origin of
the Chinese Migrants Arriving in the Countries of
the Customs Union, %



The business spheres are divided among groups of migrants from the same cities, provinces or districts. This is especially obvious among the migrants from Guangzhou and Nantong (a city in the Jiangsu province).

The former control wholesale fruit and vegetable trade, while the latter are known to dominate the construction business (most of the Nantong migrants work on construction sites in Astana). These alliances allow the Chinese to rely on the traditional forms of control in individual businesses.

The new trend in the development of agricultural lands in the Far East is causing certain tension (that the media so far ignore) in the context of regional migration. According to the recently issued decree of the President of the Russian Federation, any citizen of the Russian Federation can get, free of charge and once in a lifetime, 1 hectare of land (this can be done also in the name of wife or children).¹¹ By February 2017, more than 36 thousand applications have been lodged.¹² Today, China and Southeast Asia are developing into the center of attraction in the Far East. This means that if Russia wants to preserve its historical and political identity, it should apply its energies to the Far East. The country needs a well-thought out project for its state and national future. Our opinion polls revealed that the Chinese willingly marry Russian women in the Far East; this familiar trend, however, has acquired a new dimension in the context of the “presidential hectare.” Today, not infrequently, Chinese marry Russian women who live in the Far East, become citizens of the Russian Federation, fairly soon the wife dies and an “inconsolable widower” is free to bring his Chinese family, that was patiently waiting for the “happy end,” to Russia. This has become a dangerously frequent occurrence in population centers of the Far East; thus far it has caused only a subdued discontent among the locals. It should be mentioned that the “presidential hectares” have been distributed since 1 February, 2017; one can expect a growth of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Far East. The “quiet” Chinese immigration expansion is not a novelty; it is an obvious and well organized process.¹³

It should be said that in China, the social and economic dynamics are much more susceptible to political factors and individual leaders than in the countries of the West. Historical traditions make Chinese society much more malleable: the Chinese obey their bosses, they are hard-working, their tastes are plain and they have little respect for individual human lives.¹⁴ The demographic potential of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese habit of spreading across the world¹⁵ make China’s demographic onslaught on the countries of the Customs Union, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, fairly dangerous.

Discussion

V. Gelbras, S. Ryazantsev, V. Portyakov and A. Larin have written a lot about the Chinese migration as a problem that should not be treated lightly.¹⁶ Vilya Gelbras, in particular, relied on the

¹¹ See: “Kto vozmet zemliu na Dalnem Vostoke,” available at [http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2016/05/160503_5floor_far_east_land_law], 22 February, 2017.

¹² See: “Voprosy po polucheniiu dalnevostochnogo gektara, tarif i nalogi,” available at [https://informatio.ru/news/realty/voprosy_po_polucheniyu_dalnevost/], 23 February, 2017.

¹³ See: O. Glazunov, “Kitayskaia razvedka,” available at [http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.php/1020380/Glazunov_-_Kitayskaya_razvedka.html], 23 February, 2017.

¹⁴ See: I.S. Karabulatova, “Russkiy iazyk v Rossiysko-kitayskom prigranichie kak sterzhen obshchey lingvontalnoy bazy narodov-kontakterov,” in: *Migratsionnye protsessy v ATR: istoria, sovremennost, praktika vzaimodeystviia i regulirovaniia*, Collection of Articles of the International Scientific-Practical Conference, 1-12 November, 2015, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, 2015, pp. 219-222.

¹⁵ See: S.V. Ryzantsev, R.B. Manshin, Nguen Kan Tuoang, “Srvnitelnyy analiz vietnamskoy i kitayskoy migratsii v Rossiiu,” *Migratsionnoe pravo*, No. 1, 2013, p. 27.

¹⁶ See: V.G. Gelbras, *Rossia v usloviakh globalnoy kitayskoy migratsii*, Muravei, Moscow, 2004, 203 pp.; V.Ya. Portyakov, “Rossiyskiy vektor v globalnoy kitayskoy migratsii,” *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 2, 2006, pp. 12-25; A.G. Larin, *Kitaysy v Rossii vchera i segodnia*, Muravei, Moscow, 2003, 223 pp.

opinion polls of members of the Chinese communities that arrived from the same Chinese regions to conclude that there was no “Chinese expansion.” Alexander Larin relied on valuable information to look at the role of the Chinese diaspora in international relations; he has also analyzed the normative and legal basis of China’s migration policy. Sergey Ryazantsev looks at Chinese migration in light of the rivalry between the migration flows from other Asian countries (Vietnam and Central Asia, primarily) and speaks of the need to specify Russia’s migration policies in the context of its national interests.¹⁷ Another group of works in the context of the “regional” approach is represented by what V. Larin, V. Dyatlov, V. Datsyshen, and A. Alexeyev have written on the issue.¹⁸ They presented and analyzed a vast body of information about the phenomenon of the Chinese migration, the problem of migration and the impact of the Chinese diaspora on the host society, Russian-Chinese trade and economic relationships, the integration of the Russian Far East into the world economy, and foreign policy problems and Russia’s state security in the context of the Chinese migration.

Kazakhstan is presented mainly by the works of Konstantin Syroezhkin,¹⁹ who has offered a fairly detailed and factual history of the movements of Kazakhs and Uighurs to the territory of present-day Kazakhstan and identified the stages in migration waves. He was the first to discuss the nature and importance of the Chinese migration, to assess it and analyze its impact on the social and economic processes in Kazakhstan. More than that: he has analyzed the recent Chinese studies, related to cross-border relationships, China’s migration policies and the demographic potential of XUAR. The Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Fund of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan has issued an important monograph *Sovremenny Kitay: ekonomika, demografiya i vneshniaia politika* (Contemporary China: Economics, Demography and Foreign Policy).²⁰ E. Sadovskaya, N. Mustafaev, Zh. Kuanyshov have written a lot about the current migration processes in Kazakhstan against the background of Chinese migration.²¹

The works of Ronald Skeldon,²² who has written about the scope of Chinese migration to the West and the numerical strength of the Chinese migrants in the Western countries, deserve special mention. The author is convinced that the Chinese diaspora should not be treated as a single transnational unit, since its “behavior” depends, to a great extent, on the specifics of the host country. F. Laczko, G. Zhang, C. Pina-Guerassimoff and the authors of the works, published by the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies of the San Diego University of California and the Center for Economic

¹⁷ See: S. Ryazantsev, “Russia Needs a New Migration Policy,” *Russian Politics and Law*, Vol. 51, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 80-88; Idem, “The Lingual Integration of Migrants in Russia: Declarations and Realities,” *Life Science Journal*, Vol. 11, Issue SPEC, ISSUE 8, 2014, Article number 29, pp. 139-143; S. Ryazantsev, E. Pismennaya, “Demographic Development of Vietnam in the Context of the ‘Asian Vector’ of Russia’s Foreign Policy,” *Social Sciences* (Pakistan), Vol. 11, Issue 23, 2016, pp. 5643-5642.

¹⁸ See: V.I. Dyatlov, op. cit.; V.G. Datsyshen, “Gastarbaitery na Vostoke Rossii: masshtaby, iavleniia, perspektivy i problemy,” in: “*Most cherez Amur*”. *Vneshnie migratsii i migranty v Sibiri i na Dalnem Vostoke*, Collection of Materials of an International Research Seminar, Natalis, Moscow, Irkutsk, 2004, pp. 47-61; A. Alexeyev, “Ugrozhaet li Rossii kitayskaia migratsiia? (territorialnaia bezopasnost i mezhnatsionnye otnosheniia v Primorskom Krae),” *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 11, 2000, pp. 97-103.

¹⁹ See: K.L. Syroezhkin, *Mify i realnosti etnicheskogo separatizma v Kitae i bezopasnost Tsentralnoy Azii*, Dayj-press, Almaty, 2003, 736 pp.; Idem., *Problemy sovremennogo Kitaia i bezopasnost v Tsentralnoy Azii*, KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, 299 pp.

²⁰ See: *Sovremenny Kitay: ekonomika, demografiya i vneshniaia politika*, Institut mirovoy ekonomiki i politiki pri Fonde Pervogo Prezidenta RK, Tsentr po izucheniiu Kitaia pri IMEP, Almaty, 2007, 680 pp.

²¹ See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, op. cit.; N. Mustafaev, “Kitayskie immigranty v Kazakhstane: mify i realnost,” *Agentstvo politicheskikh novostey*, 22 July, 2002; Zh.I. Kuanyshov, “Gosudarstvenno-pravovoe regulirovanie migratsionnykh protsessov v Respublike Kazakhstan,” in: *Aktualnye problemy sovremennoy kazakhstanskoy politologii*, Materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference dedicated to the 80th birth anniversary of Professor T. Mustafin, al Farabi Kazakhstan National University, Almaty, 2008, pp. 48-60.

²² See: R. Skeldon, “Trends in International Migration in the Asia and Pacific Region,” *International Social Science Journal*, No. 165, 2000, pp. 369-382.

Research at Peking University, offer a lot of interesting information about the Chinese migrants in Europe.²³ Nikos Papastergiadis and Stephen Castles²⁴ have discussed the specifics of contemporary migrations. Chinese authors are mainly interested in inter-regional migration of the village population and the mounting numerical strength of the so-called “floating population,” as well as the need to somehow diminish the state control over migration.²⁵

Migrantophobia is one of the security problems: the myths of the “yellow threat” and the Chinese demographic expansion stir up resentments of the migrants and teach society to look at China as a national security threat. This does nothing good for the development of bilateral relations.

Chinese migration should not and cannot be banned: it should be controlled. The state should concentrate on the following administrative and legal aspects:

- protection of national economy from undesirable quantity of Chinese work migrants;
- flexible regulation of the number of Chinese labor migrants in Kazakhstan to remove the most painful problems in the sphere of their employment;
- rational use of the Chinese migrants in the economic and political interests of the Customs Union member states.

Conclusion

Migration networks and local ethnic communities challenge the ethnic, political, social and cultural security of the host countries; these networks might lead to conflicts with the host countries. The economic reforms in China intensified internal and external migrations.

Today, the potential of Chinese migration remains on the agenda; it might be formed in the Western territories of China recently included in the Great Western Development Strategy that added special importance to the main problems of the social, economic and migration situation in the People’s Republic of China. According to numerous analytical works, the Customs Union countries have already acquired a special migration milieu dominated by those who have spent from six to ten years in a country or who have returned to one and the same Customs Union member state no less than five times.

There are several main reasons behind the Chinese “pendulum migrations.”

- First, they come to the countries of the Customs Union on short-term commercial visas to start their own businesses. If they have to stay longer, they have to leave for China and come back, not infrequently on the same day.

²³ See: F. Laczko, “Europe Attracts More Migrants from China,” International Organization for Migration, 2003, available at [<http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/>]; G. Zhang, “Migration of Highly Skilled Chinese to Europe: Trend and Perspective,” *International Migration*, Vol. 41, Issue 3, September 2003; C. Pina-Guerassimoff, “Gender and Migration Networks: New Approaches to Research on Chinese Migration to France and Europe,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, May 2006, pp. 134-145; D. Kyle, Z. Liang, “Migration Merchants: Human Smuggling from Ecuador and China,” The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, *Working Paper 43*, October 2001; P. Pieke, “Chinese Globalization and Migration to Europe,” The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, *Working Paper 94*, March 2004.

²⁴ See: N. Papastergiadis, *The Turbulence of Migration. Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, 208 pp.; S. Castles, “Thirty Years of Research on Migration and Multicultural Societies,” in: *Globalization and Ethnicity: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*, ed. by S. Castles, Sage 2000, London, pp. 1-25.

²⁵ See: Z. Zhao, *Migration, Labour Market Flexibility and Wage Determination in China*, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing, 2004, 208 pp.; Xiang Biao, “Native Place, Migration and the Emergence of Peasant Enclaves in Beijing,” *China Quarterly*, London, No. 155, 1998, pp. 546-581.

- Second, they come to find jobs at enterprises and official or unofficial Chinese firms. Some of the migrants prefer to be registered as wagedworkers; an equally big number use commercial visas with no right to employment. These people have to leave a host country for a short period and come back.
- Third, Chinese marry women-citizens of a host country to acquire citizenship through a simplified procedure.

This means that all Chinese migrants are driven by economic considerations.

To reduce the possibility of conflicts, caused by migrations, host countries should identify the most optimal and efficient mechanisms of problem settling:

- adequate state policy and migration legislation; control realized by means of responsible state and law and order structures;
- gradual social, cultural, economic, political and legal adaptation and integration of migrants into the new conditions on strictly legal basis;
- creation of legal mechanism of control of the migrants' economic activities;
- studies of various processes in the sphere of migration, establishment of business contacts and consulting structures to help migrants become adjusted to the local community;
- the state structures should demand from the employers much more responsibility when it comes to the legal status of the foreigners in their employment; they should be advised to hire highly skilled workers.

POLITICS TODAY**INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERSONALISM:
INSTITUTE OF THE NATION'S LEADER
IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE****Nikolay BORISOV**

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ABSTRACT

In today's post-Soviet states of Central Asia, the political transformations have led to the traditionalization of political life and revival of conventional political institutions. It is noteworthy that the informal political institutions received a formal status in a number of states. The article deals with the formation and legislative regulation of the institute of the Nation's Leader in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, in terms of identifying the general and particular, reasons for the emergence of the institute, functioning results and the prospects for its de-

velopment. The main factor in the formalization of the institute of the Nation's Leader in the analyzed countries is the weakness of traditions of the national statehood and the low level of national identity, understood as a civil-political identity. The specificity of institutionalization of the institute of the Nation's Leader lies in the fact that the informal practice of a personalistic type of domination is transformed into political and legal institutions, while legislative norms govern the legal relations, connected with the status of a particular individual.

A high level of institutionalization of personalistic presidency is considered by the ruling elites of the analyzed countries as the main basis for political stability and sustainable legitimation of the political regimes. The implementation of the forthcoming transfer of power in these countries is likely to confirm these expectations.

KEYWORDS: *the Nation's Leader, personalism, sultanism, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, successor.*

Introduction

In today's post-Soviet states of Central Asia, political transformations have led to traditionalization of political life and the revival of conventional political institutions. It is noteworthy that the informal political institutions received a formal status in a number of states. In connection with that, of a particular research interest is the emergence of the institute of the Nation's Leader, which has evolved into different forms in Turkmenistan, under Saparmurat Niyazov; Kazakhstan, under Nursultan Nazarbaev, and Tajikistan, under Emomali Rakhmon. At first glance, the phrase "institutionalized personalism" itself is impossible, as the personalization of domination means *deinstitutionalization* of power. However, recently there has been a tendency to turn the personal domination into a kind of a political institution. In particular, in research literature, the concept of the "Institute of Succession"¹ has already been developed. If we understand political institutions as sustainable, recurring game rules, to which political actors adhere in their conduct, we should recognize that there is no insurmountable contradiction between the concepts of institution and personalism. It does not exist in the traditional Weberian concept of opposition between the traditional and rational-legal type of domination either: the traditional type can be rationalized and transformed into a formal institution, whereas, for example, a rational-legal type may be based on political tradition, adopted by electoral institutions of many countries.

The methodological basis for studying personalist regimes are the classic works of Max Weber and Juan Linz on sultanism. Max Weber noted that "patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, *sultanism*, tend to arise, whenever traditional domination develops an administration and military force, which are purely personal instruments of the master... Where domination ... operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called *sultanism*... The non-traditional element is not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists only in the extreme development of the ruler's discretion. It is this, which distinguishes it from every form of rational authority."² Based on this definition, Juan Linz developed a theory of sultanism, as one of the types of a nondemocratic regime, singling out as its main attributes the economic and political monism, lack of guiding ideology, highly arbitrary manipulation of symbols, extreme glorification of the ruler, irregular mobilization of citizens, and dynastic tendencies.³

Within the framework of this article, it is impossible to give a complete analysis of the neopatrimonial regimes of the Central Asian countries. The aim is to show the reasons for the emergence

¹ P.V. Panov, K.A. Sulimov, "Smena lidera i predely personalistskogo presidentsialisma: perspektivy varianta 'preemnik' v stranakh Zakavkazia i Tsentralnoi Azii," *Politicheskaya nauka*, No. 1, 2014, pp. 134-158; N.A. Borisov, "Stsenarii translyatsii vlasti na postsovet'skom prostranstve: vozmozhna li 'igra po pravilam'?", *Politika i obshchestvo*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 55-64.

² Quoted from: J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, London, 1996, p. 51.

³ See: *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

and specifics of the institute of the Nation's Leader, identifying the general and particular, and to show the normative regulation of the institute and its developmental prospects.

Turkmenistan: From Turkmenbashi to Arkadag

The first attempt to institutionalize the traditional form of domination was made in Turkmenistan.

After the adoption of the Constitution on 18 May, 1992, Saparmurat Niyazov made a decision on the early legitimation as President, in conditions of the then independent state. It is on 21 June, 1992, that the presidential elections were held. Same, as the first elections in 1990, they were unopposed. The law on the presidential elections failed to be adopted, so the procedure of candidates' nomination and registration was regulated by the Law on Implementation of the Constitution, according to which only the Supreme Council⁴ had the right to nominate the candidates. Saparmurat Niyazov received 99.5% of votes, and extended the mandate for the next five years⁵, which, according to the Constitution, was considered the first term in office.

On 1 October, 1993, the Mejlis session of Turkmenistan took a decision on awarding the President, Saparmurat Niyazov, the honorary title—Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (the Head of the Turkmen people of the entire world) and established the annual national holiday—Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's Birthday. Since that time, the last name, Niyazov, disappears from the official documents and media, the title "Turkmenbashi" replaces it.

On 28 December, 1999, at the session of Khalk Maslakhaty (People's Council), Saparmurat Niyazov was granted the right to remain the President for an unlimited term. The law was adopted, which stated: "To accord the popularly elected first President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov (Saparmurat Turkmenbashi), the exclusive right to exercise the powers as the head of state for an unlimited period of time."⁶ An amendment to the Constitution was passed, expunging the provision for prohibiting the same person to be President for more than two consecutive terms. Technically, it was not a decision of presidency for life, as it did not abolish the elections and enabled the President, at his discretion, to declare the end of the presidential term. In the official publications, the President, however, began to be referred to as "lifelong" or "indefinite."

In August 2002, Khalk Maslakhaty decided that there was a need to officially grant Saparmurat Niyazov the presidential term for life. However, Turkmenbashi stated: "After the first meeting, we consulted with the heads of delegations and decided to postpone the decision on the election of the President till 2008-2010. However, in case of necessity, we will return to it earlier."⁷

On 8 April, 2005, Niyazov took the initiative to hold a series of elections in Turkmenistan, declaring that "the elections to the Mejlis of Turkmenistan will be held in 2008, and, what is more, the powers of the new national Parliament will be extended. In 2009, at the meeting of the Khalk

⁴ See: *Law of Turkmenistan on Implementation of the Constitution of Turkmenistan of 18 May, 1992*, *Turkmenskaia iskra*, 19 May, 1992, p. 3.

⁵ See: "V Tsentralnoi komissii po vyboram i provedeniiu referendumov," *Turkmenskaia iskra*, 23 June, 1992, p. 1.

⁶ *Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on the Exclusive Powers of the First President of Turkmenistan of 28 December, 1999*, No. TKK-2, The Ministry of Justice of Turkmenistan: the official website, available at [http://minjust.gov.tm/ru/mmerkezi/doc_view.php?doc_id=586].

⁷ "Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, 'We Will Go Ahead, We Will Not Stop!'" *Neitralniy Turkmenistan*, 10 August, 2002, p. 1.

Maslakhaty, 3-4 candidates will be nominated for the Presidency; elections will be held in the same year and will conclude with establishing a new power hierarchy, built on a new democratic basis.”⁸

S. Niyazov was awarded the title the “Hero of Turkmenistan” and other top awards of the Republic.

Although the title of the “Leader of the Nation” has become the usual reference to Turkmenbashi in the official press, it was not formally cited in normative documents. The special status of the first President was not reflected in the Constitution and laws of the Republic either, except for the amendment concerning the removal of the presidential term limits. The law on the guarantees to the former president was not adopted either, which was understandable in view of the lifetime presidency term.

After Saparmurat Niyazov’s death, and Gurbanguly Berdymukammedov’s election as the President on 28 June, 2007, the Law on the President of Turkmenistan⁹ was adopted, which established state guarantees for President’s activities during the period in office, as well as after the resignation.

The oath of the newly elected President was amended by the phrase: “to direct all your inspiration in the name of the eternal triumph of the covenants of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi the Great, based on the inexhaustible spiritual heritage of the ancestors.”¹⁰

The law specified that in cases of impeachment, removal or other reasons, when the President is unable to fulfill his obligations until the election of a new President, his powers shall be transferred to another authorized person, in accordance with the procedure, established by the Constitution of Turkmenistan. The guarantees were made for the President of Turkmenistan, who stopped exercising his powers, and for his family members. The President and his family members, after his resignation, shall have retained the right to immunity.

The law contained no provisions about the possibility of the ex-President to take part in the activities of the government. Gurbanguly Berdymukammedov did not get the title of Turkmenbashi, or the Leader of the Nation, but the personalistic governance of Turkmenistan was retained. The new President was also awarded the title of the *Hero of Turkmenistan* and the *Gold Star* medal.

In October 2010, Gurbanguly Berdymukammedov was officially awarded the title of the *Arkadag*, which can be interpreted as a “patron,” “support.” The national writer, Gozel Shagulyeva, soon published, in the *Neutral Turkmenistan* newspaper, her poem with a new title for the President:

From the strong great roots
There appeared a powerful son.
He became the pride of our days,
Inspiration came back with him.

Many great miracles
Nice people have seen.
Glory to you, the will of Heaven!—
You gave us the Arkadag!

⁸ Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, “Based on the Independence Winning and Traditions of the People, To Go Ahead, To New Heights of Progress and Prosperity,” *Neitralniy Turkmenistan*, 8 April, 2005, p. 1.

⁹ See: *Law of Turkmenistan on the President of Turkmenistan of 28 June, 2007, No. 127-III*, the Legislation of the CIS countries, available at [http://base.spininform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=20724]; *Law of Turkmenistan on the President of Turkmenistan of 21 May, 2011, No. 192-IV* (as amended by the Laws of Turkmenistan of 10 January, 2012, No. 262-IV, of 16 February, 2012, No. 276-IV), the Legislation of the CIS countries, available at [http://base.spininform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=49683].

¹⁰ In 2011, in accordance with the new wording of the Law on the President this wording was withdrawn from the President’s oath.

Our motherland is in safe and strong hands.
Great victories bestow honor to the country.
And let our proud fame grow throughout the centuries,
How the Arkadag makes our eyes happy on his white fast horse.¹¹

The word *Arkadag*, as stated in the official press on the occasion of the President's birthday, "reflects a huge range of our kind and sincere feelings, our attitude to the head of the state as a highly humane man, protector and patron, the real leader of the nation, confidently and professionally leading the country toward progressive, and above all, necessary transformations."¹² A monument was sculpted to the second President. Celebrations to mark the re-election of Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov, as the President of the National Olympic Committee, were held under the slogan "Glory to Arkadag—Glory to the Heroes!"¹³

In addition, opportunities have been created for extending the President's powers: the upper age limit for a presidential candidate (70 years¹⁴) is abolished, the President's term of office is increased from 5 to 7 years¹⁵. The son of the President, Serdar Berdimukhammedov, having already held positions in the public service, in November 2016, became a member of the Parliament and, perhaps in the future, will become a presidential candidate.

Thus, although at the legislative level, the status of the President, as the Leader of the Nation, has not been determined, yet, its institutionalization into the political process, during Niyazov successor's term, has already occurred. Furthermore, since 2007, in the legal realm and in practice, the traces of Niyazov's personality cult have been consistently eradicated, while the status enhancement for Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov, as the sole Leader of the Nation, has been gradually and consistently established.

Kazakhstan: From the First President to Elbasy

In Kazakhstan, in 2000, a Constitutional Law on the First President of Kazakhstan was adopted, which defined the special status of the first President during the period of his performing the duties, as well as the period after his resignation¹⁶. The first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "because of his historic mission," was entitled to life-time prerogatives: to address the people; petition public authorities and officials with initiatives on major issues of nation-building; domestic and foreign policy and national security, which are subject to obligatory consideration by the relevant state authorities and officials; to speak to the Parliament and meetings of the Government of the Republic,

¹¹ G. Shagulyeva, "White Dove: poem," *Neitralniy Turkmenistan*, 18 May, 2011, p. 1.

¹² "As a Gift—Talent, Inspiration, All the Colors of the World! Gala Concert at the Palace Ruhiyet," *Neitralniy Turkmenistan*, 30 June, 2011, p. 4.

¹³ A. Chernyaev, "Sport—as a Lifestyle," *Neitralniy Turkmenistan*, 1 March, 2012, p. 7.

¹⁴ In 2017, Berdimukhammedov will be 60 years old.

¹⁵ See: *Constitution of Turkmenistan of 18 May, 1992, No. 691-XII* (as amended by the Constitutional laws of Turkmenistan of 27 December, 1995, No. 98-1, 29 December, 1999, No. TKK-3, 15 August, 2003, No. TKK-7, 25 October, 2005, 26 December, 2006, 26 September, 2008, 14 September, 2016), the Legislation of the CIS countries, available at [http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=2376].

¹⁶ See: *Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 20 July, 2000, No. 83-II*, Adilet, Information and Legal System of Normative Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/archive/docs/Z000000083_/20.07.2000].

to head the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, and to retain membership in the Constitutional Council and the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

It was decided that the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan has immunity and cannot be held responsible for actions, related to the implementation of his status, except in a case of treason. The law specified that at the birthplace of the first President, a museum of the First President of the Republic is to be established and his bust installed.

According to the adopted law, the order of the “The First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev,” and the State Prize of Peace and Progress of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan were established. Separate articles regulated the lifelong social security of the First President and his family members.

Thus, at the level of the constitutional law, the rights and privileges of one person, Nursultan Nazarbaev, were settled. The legislative regulations were aimed at ensuring the fact that even in the case of termination of authority, the First President will retain the right to take part in the political process. As his initiatives are subject to obligatory consideration and he is a member of the Constitutional Council and the Security Council, this participation determines his status as a major player in policy making.

Prior to signing the law, the Head of State appealed to the Constitutional Council with a request for its compliance with the Constitution. The Constitutional Council considered the request and adopted a decision on compliance with the Law on the First President, with the requirements of the Constitution. On 3 July, 2000, the Constitutional Council declared that the adopted law is in compliance with the Constitution, noting that “the experience of the state construction of new independent states, as well as countries with developed democracy, confirms the tendencies of the modern constitutionalism for ensuring political and social guarantees for the persons, who held the positions of the Heads of States and ceased to discharge their obligations.”¹⁷

In 2010, the Law on the First President was subjected to major adjustments.¹⁸ The First President received the title of the Leader of the Nation (in Kazakh version.—*Elbasy*). The law established that the restrictions on the right to be elected to the presidency shall not be applied to the Leader of the Nation. The law also determined that the First President shall not only have the right to act with initiatives himself, but all the developing initiatives within the main concerns of the domestic and foreign policy of the state shall be agreed to by the First President—the Leader of the Nation. Thus, the role of the first President, as the factual head of the state, even after termination of his powers, was finally made explicit.

The law was supplemented with an article about the creation of museums and installation of busts of the First President not only at the President’s homeland, but also in the capital.

Every year, on 1 December, Kazakhstan celebrates the Day of the First President, dedicated to the anniversary of the proclamation of independence, which coincides with the birthday of Nursultan Nazarbaev.

In November, 2016, the Parliament of Kazakhstan put forward a proposal to rename the capital of Kazakhstan the city of *Nursultan* or *Nazarbaev*. The Declaration of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was unanimously adopted by the Parliament on 23 November, 2016, noted in particular: “We offer to note the outstanding contribution to the

¹⁷ See: *Resolution of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 3 July, 2000, No. 16/2*, available at [<http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/S000000016>].

¹⁸ See: *Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Amendments and Supplements to Some Constitutional Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Improvement of Legislation in the Sphere of Activity of the First President of Kazakhstan—Leader of the Nation of 14 June, 2010, No. 289-IV*, available at [<http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z100000289>].

construction of our State by the First President of the State—the Leader of the Nation, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbaev, in the Constitution of the country, to reflect the Elbasy name in the name of the capital and other important objects of the country.”¹⁹ In contrast to the previous proposals for the capital renaming, the President did not categorically oppose the initiative, saying only that the issue requires substantial elaboration and discussion²⁰.

Nazarbaev’s children, especially his daughter, Dariga, played a prominent role in political life. Since 2012, she has been a member of the Majilis, the Chairman of the Social and Cultural Development Committee, then Deputy Chairman of the Majilis of the Parliament and head of the faction of the Nur Otan party, since 2015—the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, since 2016—Deputy of the Senate of the Parliament. In November 2016, Nursultan Nazarbaev stated that he would not transfer the power to his children, saying in his interview: “I do not think that it’s a matter for us. Our power transfer process is defined in the Constitution. I’m going to work till 2020. But in 2020 we will meet again.”²¹

Tajikistan: The Founder of Peace and National Unity

Attempts to institutionalize the title of the President of Tajikistan had been made previously, but were not regulated by law. They could be gleaned from the titles of books, published as study guides on modern history, *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Rescuer of the Nation* (1992-1995); *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Founder of Peace and National Unity* (1996-1999); *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Beginning of Creation Period* (2000-2003); *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Year Equal to Ages* (2004); *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Year of the World’s Culture* (2005); *Emomali Rakhmonov—The Year of Aryan Civilization* (2006).²²

In 2007, Rakhmonov, appealing for “the need to return to the cultural roots,” changed his surname to Rakhmon.

In December 2015, Tajikistan adopted the Law on the Leader of the Nation²³. In contrast to the Kazakhstan law, that of Tajikistan’s gives a more detailed definition for the status of the Nation’s Leader. The President of Tajikistan is awarded the title of the “Founder of Peace and National Unity—The Nation’s Leader.” He represents the “outstanding historical national personality, who made a significant contribution to the statehood system of sovereign Tajikistan, establishment of constitutional system, achievement of peace and national unity ... the President who made the worthy contribution to the creation of the sovereign, democratic, constitutional, secular and social state, and who prevented the collapse of the nation, the disappearance of the state, and relieved the people from

¹⁹ *The Declaration of Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan Official site, available at [<http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/news-details/id30041/1/1/>]; “Kazakhskiy parlament predlozhl pereimenovat Astanu v Nazarbaev,” *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, available at [<https://rg.ru/2016/11/23/kazahskij-parlament-predlozhl-pereimenovat-astanu-v-nazarbaev.html>].

²⁰ See: “Nazarbaev ne imeet otnoshenia k initsiative po pereimenovaniiu Astany,” News Agency REGNUM, available at [<https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2209443.html>].

²¹ E. Zapara, “Nazarbaev zaiavil, chto ne nimeren peredovat vlast po nasledstvu,” *Izvestia*, 24 November, 2016, p. 3.

²² See: R.S. Bobokhonov, “Sovetskie i postsovetskie modeli avtoritarizma v Tadzshikistane,” *Sovremennaiia nauka: aktualnye problemy teorii i praktiki*, Humanities Series, No. 9-10, 2012, pp. 3-8.

²³ See: *Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on the Founder of Peace and National Unity—the Leader of the Nation of 25 December, 2015, No. 1259*, National Center for Legislation under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, available at [http://www.mmk.tj/ru/library/ob_osnovatele...doc].

civil war, carried out the great fateful accomplishments in the political, social, economic, cultural and historical developments of the independent state of Tajikistan.”

The Leader of the Nation is the symbol of Tajik sovereign statehood longevity, peace and national unity, the guarantor of sustainable development and social stability of Tajikistan. Emomali Rakhmon is recognized as the leader, “due to the great and outstanding merits for the people of Tajikistan.”

The competence of the Nation’s Leader of Tajikistan is almost identical to that of the Nation’s Leader of Kazakhstan. It should be assumed that Tajikistan borrowed from Kazakhstan its laws’ formulation. The official notice of the Presidential Press and Information Office underlined that “such a status is characteristic of the developed and civilized societies, and it is observed today in America, Europe and former Soviet republics, in particular in the Republic of Kazakhstan.”²⁴

The Nation’s Leader is granted the right to appeal to the people, public authorities and officials on important issues within the political system, national security, domestic and foreign policy issues, his opinion is to be taken into account and considered obligatory for state bodies and public officials in reaching relevant decisions; participate and report on issues, discussed at the meetings of the Parliament, Government and Security Council; provide advice and recommendations in case of political, economic and social crisis and render assistance in its resolution. The first President is a lifelong member of the Parliament and the Chairman of the Civic Movement for the National Unity and Revival of Tajikistan. The important state and social issues, the key directions of domestic and foreign policy are subject to the approval by the Nation’s Leader. In accordance with the law, the Order “Leader of the Nation—Emomali Rakhmon,” and the state award the “Leader of the Nation—Emomali Rahmon” are hereby instituted.

The question of removing restrictions, concerning the first president’s term in office, was put to a referendum on 22 May, 2016, and was approved by 94.5 percent of the electorate, who took part in the voting, with the voters’ turnout exceeding 92 percent.²⁵ It is noteworthy that 40 other amendments were made to the Constitution as the result of the referendum, but the voting was of the “package” kind: one could either approve or disapprove all of the amendments in total. In addition, the amendments reduced the minimum age for presidential candidates from 35 to 30 years, allowing the eldest son of Emomali Rakhmon, the 29-year-old Rustam, to come forward in 2020 as a candidate for the Presidential post. At the same time, it was prohibited to form political parties on ethnic and religious basis (depriving the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan of its right to exist), as well as to finance the political parties from abroad.

The children of Emomali Rakhmon take an active part in the political life. Rustam Emomali Rakhmon is the head of the Agency for State Financial Control and Fighting Corruption, the 36-year-old eldest daughter, Ozoda Emomali Rakhmon, occupied the position of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in January 2016 was appointed the Head of the Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, thus, actually became the second most powerful person in the state²⁶, and in May, she was elected to the Majlisi Milli (National Council) of the Parliament of Tajikistan.

On 16 November, 2016, the Day of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, established in May 2016, was celebrated in Tajikistan for the first time.

This way, the deinstitutionalization of the institute of the President has occurred in Tajikistan, and as the result of this, the President started to be regarded not as a political institution, but exclu-

²⁴ *Signing of the Set of Laws*, The official website of the President of Tajikistan, available at [<http://www.president.tj/ru/node/10510>], 4 December, 2016.

²⁵ See: “Okonchatelnye itogi referendum a v Tadzshikistane oglasiat do 1 iyunia,” RIA Novosti: Russia Today, available at [<https://ria.ru/world/20160523/1438276177.html>], 4 December, 2016.

²⁶ See: *The Changes in Staff*, President of the Republic of Tajikistan official website, available at [<http://www.president.tj/ru/node/10690>], 4 December, 2016.

sively as a personality of Emomali Rakhmon at the informal, as well as the formal level. In this regard, we can make a conclusion that the deinstitutionalization of presidency in Tajikistan has acquired formal legal grounds. The rules are now working not for the presidency institute, but for the life duration of the individual.

Conclusion

As a result of the formation of the institute of the Nation's Leader and consolidation of rules, regarding the single person, in the cases under consideration are the deinstitutionalization of the presidential institute, and its transformation into a personal rule. That means that the institutionalization of personalism took place. Normative regulation of activities now is discharged not by the institute of the President, but by the one person occupying the office. Of utmost importance is also the removal of restrictions, exclusively applying to the first President, who is able to get elected for an unlimited number of times. It is noteworthy that the word "nation," in this context, is used, more likely, in a political sense (as the "civic nation"), although the citizens and a part of the political elite are still perceiving it as an ethnic term.

Similar in all three cases are the official titles, ascribed to the incumbent: cancellation of terms, limiting tenure; setting of social safety guarantees for the leader, who ceased to fulfill presidential duties; institution of state awards with the name, title and (or) the leader's surname, dynastic tendencies and a clear focus in the succession of presidential power and its transmission. At the same time, the children of the acting leaders will, more likely, act as successors, and the leaders themselves will retain their statures even after resignations. Typical is the attitude of the Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan's leaders toward main political parties (Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, headed by Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov,²⁷ the party Nur Otan, headed by Nursultan Nazarbaev, and the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, headed by Emomali Rakhmon).

Of much interest is the fact that in all three countries, celebrations are held, directly or indirectly devoted to the President. In Tajikistan, the Day of the First President is celebrated on 16 November, the day of Emomali Rakhmonov's accession to the office in 1994, in Kazakhstan the Day of the First President coincides with the birthday of Nursultan Nazarbaev, and in Turkmenistan, the Week of Culture is celebrated on 24-30 June and is timed to coincide with the birthday of Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov (29 June).

The difference in the status of the Nation's Leader regulation is observed, when comparing the competence of the leader after his resignation: while in Turkmenistan it is not fixed by law, in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan it is almost identical. The positions, which leaders will hold after their resignation from the post of the President, are different: in Turkmenistan, such a position is absent (and this, probably, may be attributable to the lifetime's presidency), in Kazakhstan, it is the position of the Constitutional Council Member and Member of the Security Council, in Tajikistan—a Member of the Parliament. All these positions will be occupied by the former presidents for their natural lives.

If Turkmenistan's political elite refuses to accept the concept of perpetual presidency, the concept of the Nation's Leader or Nationwide leader may be provided by the law.

The lack or weakness of traditions of statehood and the low level of national identity, perceived as civil and political identity, should be recognized as the main factor for the formalization of the institute of the Nation's Leader in the analyzed countries. These states possess strong regional, clannish and ethnic identities, and in Kazakhstan, there are also ethnic ones. In this situation, the institute of the Na-

²⁷ In 2013, Berdymukhammedov suspended his membership in the party.

tion's Leader acts as the most obvious way for the political elite to consolidate the nation. It is noted that a close parallel exists between strong national identities, civil societies, and national-democratic mobilization. A weak national identity directly facilitates the establishment of a sultanistic regime.²⁸

When the traditions of statehood and nation-building are weak, the solution can be found either in nationalism, often understood in the ethnic sense, or in the figure of the "father of the nation," who furthers "the creation" of national history. Under the conditions of the absence of the nation as a political community, the identity of the Nation's Leader, who, in this situation, is actually the "leader without nation," becomes the primary for the legitimization of a regime. The Central Asian countries have chosen exactly this way. In Kyrgyzstan, this path was invariably ill-fated, because of the severe sub-ethnic schisms, which prevented monism, and the attempts of the President, Askar Akaev, to establish the quasi-democratic regime, which resulted in the sharp and significant divergence of formal and informal institutions, and appeared to be the main reason for the collapse of the regime. In Uzbekistan, the Nation's Leader, in the person of Islam Karimov, existed, de facto, without being subjected to the legal formalization and ideological grounding.

In Azerbaijan, the concept of the "Nationwide Leader," not stipulated by law, but used in official documents, is applied to the President of 1993-2003, Heydar Aliev,²⁹ but has not been used yet in reference to the acting president. It is likely that the institute of the Nationwide Leader will receive the legislative support of Azerbaijan in the future as well.

The institute of the Nation's Leader was introduced in order to preserve the powers and influence of the president in office, regardless of his position after the resignation. In the case of the most probable "successor" scenario as the result of the transfer of powers to the next President, the retired leader will have not only de facto, but also de jure powers, which will allow him to determine the main directions of domestic and foreign policy, to influence the staffing and budgetary processes.

It is noteworthy that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan were relegated by us to the types of political regimes with a high level of institutionalization of the presidency and low level of democracy foundations³⁰.

Table

**Comparative Analysis of the Institute of the Nation's Leader
in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan**

Criteria / States	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Official title	Turkmenbashi (Niyazov), Arkadag (Berdimukhammedov)	First President, The Nation's Leader (Elbasy)	The Instigator of Peace and National Unity— The Nation's Leader
Date of establishment	1999 28.10.2010 (informally)	20.07.2000 (First President) 14.06.2010 (Elbasy)	25.12.2015

²⁸ See, for example: S.M. Eke, T. Kuzio, "Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000, p. 528.

²⁹ See, for example, the official biography: *National Leader Heydar Alirza oglu Aliev*, Official website of the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev, available at [<http://ru.president.az/azerbaijan/leader>], 4 December, 2016.

³⁰ See: N. Borisov, "The Institution of Presidency in the Central Asia Countries: Personalization vs. Institutionalization," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 57-65; N. Borisov, "Institutsionalizatsia instituta prezidentsva i perspektivy konsolidatsii politicheskikh rezhimov na postsovetском prostranstve," *Politiia*, No. 4, 2011, pp. 93-103.

Table (continued)

Criteria / States	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Legal grounds	Absent	The founder of a new independent state of Kazakhstan, the Nation's Leader; ensured its unity and defense of the Constitution, the rights and freedoms of the man and citizen. Made a significant contribution to the development of the independent state of Kazakhstan as the democratic, secular, constitutional, and social state	Presents an outstanding historical national personality, made a significant contribution to the state foundation system of sovereign Tajikistan, to the establishment of a constitutional system, to the achievement of peace, national unity; made the worthy contribution to the creation of the sovereign, democratic, constitutional, secular, and social state; prevented the collapse of the nation and the disappearance of the state, and relieved the people from the civil war; carried out the great fateful decisions concerning the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical development of the independent state of Tajikistan
The right of the acting leader to be elected as the President	The number of terms is not limited	The number of terms is not limited	The number of terms is not limited
Competency after the resignation, formalized in the lawful way	Absent	The right to appeal to the people, public authorities and officials on important issues of political system, national security, domestic and foreign policy, consideration of which is obligatory for the state bodies and public officials; report on the issues discussed at the meetings of the Government. All the initiatives on the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the state, being elaborated, are subject to approval of the First President—the Nation's Leader	The right to appeal to the people, public authorities and officials on important issues of political system, national security, domestic and foreign policy, considered obligatory for state bodies and public officials in reaching relevant decisions; participate in and report on the issues discussed at the meetings of the Parliament, the Government, and the Security Council; provide advice and recommendations in case of political, economic and social crisis and render assistance in its decisions. The important

Table (continued)

Criteria / States	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
			state and social issues, key directions of domestic and foreign policy are subject to approval of the Nation's Leader
Positions, occupied after resignation, provided by the law	Not defined	Chairman of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan; member of the Constitutional Council; member of the Security Council	The lifelong member of the Parliament and Chairman of the Civic Movement for the National Unity and Revival of Tajikistan
Social guarantees after resignation	The right of immunity. State apartment and villa; public security; medical service; compulsory state insurance; monthly allowance; assistants	The right of immunity. Government communications, public security, rent-free apartment and villa passed to the ownership; personal car with drivers, free medical care and spa treatment, a monthly pension equal to 80% of the President's monthly remuneration; health and life insurance in the amount, equal to the annual official remuneration of the President	The right of immunity. Residential house with the right of ownership and state residence, official car, free medical and recreational service, a monthly pension amounting to 80% of monthly remuneration, life and health insurance, gratis, in the amount of the official annual remuneration of the incumbent
Social guarantees for the Leader's family members	The right of immunity. State apartment and villa; public security; medical service; state insurance; monthly allowance; assistants. For the family members of the late President—monthly allowance, equal to 20 times the minimal amount of state survivor's benefit, lifelong right for the use of the state villa, special means of communication, transport, medical service	State security, free medical care and spa treatment, official car; each member of the family is entitled to receive a monthly allowance in the amount equal to 10 times the minimal amount of the old-age pension	State security and inviolability of property
Awards with the Leader's name	Turkmenbashi Order; Order of the First President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi the Great	Order "The First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev," the State Prize of Peace and Progress of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan	Order "Leader of the Nation—Emomali Rakhmon," State Prize "Leader of the Nation—Emomali Rakhmon"

Table (continued)

Criteria / States	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Celebrations in honor of the President	"The Week of Culture" 24-30 June (day of the President's birth—29 June)	The First President's Day—1 December (the day of the President's birth—1 December)	The President's Day—16 November (the day of the President Rakhmonov's accession to office—16 November, 1994)
Dynastic tendencies and possible successors	Son, Serdar Berdymukhammedov,—the delegate of the Mejlis	Daughter, Dariga Nazarbaeva,—the delegate of the Senate (Parliament)	Son, Rustam Rakhmon, is the head of the Agency for the State Financial Control and Fighting Corruption; daughter, Ozoda Rakhmon, is the head of the Executive Office of the President of the Republic, delegate of the Majlisi Milli in the Parliament

Therefore, in exactly this type of regime, preconditions for the Nation's Leader institutionalization appear, which is confirmed once again by the political practice of the analyzed countries. Specificity of such institutionalization consists in the fact that the informal practices of domination, belonging to the personalistic type, are transformed into political and legal institutions, and that the legal rules regulate legal relationship, connected with the status of a particular person. The high level of institutionalization of personalistic presidency is considered by the ruling elites of the analyzed countries as the main base of political stability and sustainable legitimization of political regimes. The carrying out of the forthcoming power transfers in these countries is likely to confirm these expectations.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY PARTY LISTS IN KAZAKHSTAN IN 1999-2016: AN ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

In 2017, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, who has remained at the helm of power for twenty-five-odd years of the republic's independence, has initiated the next, fourth batch of constitutional amendments.

Very much like the amendments of 1998, 2007 and 2011, these amendments are presented to the nation as another step toward further democratization of the political system of Kazakhstan. The three previous initiatives consolidated presidential power; this time, according to the preliminary statement, about forty, mainly social and economic, functions of the president will be redistributed between the Government and the Parliament. Thus, in the period of economic crisis and uncertainty, the President will be ab-

solved of the responsibility for possible errors and failures of the country's economic policy. On the other hand, these amendments expand the points, related to the immunity of private property (one of the weakest points in the legal system and political construct of Kazakhstan). This probably means that the elite groups will have to learn the rules of the game and operate within certain limits, while the amendments can be interpreted as a step toward the transfer of supreme power.

In this article, we have analyzed the history of the parliamentary elections by party lists, since redistribution of authority between the branches of power will widen the possibilities of the Legislative Assembly of Kazakhstan.

KEYWORDS: *parliamentary elections, Kazakhstan, parties.*

Introduction

In January 2017, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, made a public statement on the redistribution of authority between the power branches to add efficiency to the system of governance.¹ It was suggested that the Parliament should play a greater role in forming the Government, in order to increase the Cabinet's accountability to the deputies. The President pointed out that "the party that wins the elections will play a great or even decisive role in forming the Government."

According to the 1995 Constitution, the legislative power in the Republic belongs to the Parliament that operates on the permanent basis and consists of the Majilis (the lower chamber) and Senate (the upper chamber). According to the 2007 Constitutional amendments, the lower chamber of the Parliament is elected by party lists; 9 deputies out of the total 107 are elected by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

In this regard, of particular relevance becomes the analysis of the previous parliamentary elections by party lists in Kazakhstan.

The 1999 and 2004 Elections

In October 1999, the Majilis was elected by a mixed-member proportional system; 10 out of 77 seats were reserved for the parties that ran in the national constituency and negotiated the 7% barrier. Ten political parties contested these 10 seats. The votes were distributed as follows: the Otan Republican Political Party won 30.89% of votes (4 seats);² Communist Party—17.75%, Agrarian Party—12.63% and Civic Party—11.23%. The last three got 2 seats each.

As the first experience of interparty competition, the 1999 elections did not clarify the advantages or disadvantages of the new electoral system. It should be said, however, that the parties which supported the existing authority (Otan, Agrarian and Civic parties) gained 54.75%, while the opposition Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK)—17.75%.

The parliamentary elections of 2004 were conducted according to the same scheme: 10 seats by party lists and 67 in single-member constituencies.

In the first years of the new millennium, practically all of the post-Soviet countries democratized their political systems. In 2001, the year that ended the first decade in the history of the newly independent states, people expected to discern the decade's first results and plans for the future. On the global scale, the early 2000s marked another progress toward democratization. In Kazakhstan, this was the period of fierce struggle for resources and spheres of influence between different elite groups.

In 2001, several members of the big business community and top officials founded the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) movement. As could be expected, the new movement, armed with a wide range of media resources, informed the public about its aims and widely popularized them. The authorities, however, did not hesitate to utilize harsh methods against the members: top officials lost their posts, while criminal cases were initiated against businessmen, which led to a schism in the ranks of the opposition. In March 2002, some of the former DCK founders left it to start

¹ See: Address of the President of the Kazakhstan Republic on Redistribution of Authority between Branches of Power, available at [http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/internal_political_affairs/in_speeches_and_addresses/obrashchenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-po-voprosam-pereraspredeleniya-polnomochii-mezhdu-vetyami-vlasti], 3 February, 2017.

² Here and elsewhere official data of the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and open sources of the Internet, related to the parliamentary elections, are given; information is limited to the shares of the votes cast in percent, the number of votes cast for this or that party is not taken into account.

a moderate party, called the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Ak Zhol; the DCK, supported by the opposition, became even more radical.³

The governing authorities were challenged with a real threat of an opposition in the Majilis and had to act promptly. In 2002, the Republic adopted a new law on political parties that replaced the 1996 law as “obsolete.”⁴ The new law established the minimum membership of 50,000 (instead of 3,000 in any part of the country under the previous law); under the new law, to be registered, a party should have acquired branches in all of the regions and big cities with the minimum membership of 700. In 2002, the courts got the right to liquidate any political party that missed parliamentary elections for ten years or two election campaigns.

According to Donnacha Ó Beacháin, the new law that tightened the rules of party activity was passed to help the authorities deal with the most acute problems. The ban on ethnic and religious parties deprived the opposition of the two potentially strong supporters. The republican Slavic movement, Lad, the party of Russian ethnicity (the strongest among the ethnic parties), could have challenged Nazarbaev’s efforts of national construction. The Islamic parties could have tried to destroy the Republic’s secular traditions and outwit the President, using their religion as a trump card.⁵

In 2002, only 7 out of the former 19 parties were successfully re-registered: Otan, the Civic Party, Agrarian Party, DPK Ak Zhol, the Communist Party, the Party of Patriots and the Peasant Social-Democratic Party Auyl. The CPC and DPK can be described as moderately oppositional, while the others were firmly on the side of the authorities.

In 2003 and 2004, Kazakhstan acquired more parties, the most important of the newcomers being the Asar Republican Party, headed by Nazarbaev’s daughter, Dariga; the Adilet Democratic Party of Kazakhstan and the Rukhaniyat, acting in unison with the authorities should be mentioned as well. The opposition camps were living amid widescale turmoil: DPK served as the foundation for the People’s Party “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan”; the Communists split into a more moderate Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK), while the radical wing remained in the CPK.

Twelve parties in all were ready to run for the Majilis. Later, on the eve of parliamentary elections, the Civic and Agrarian parties joined forces in the AIST bloc (Agrarian and Industrial Union of Workers). The opposition acquired a highly doubtful, from the point of view of electoral support, Election Bloc “Opposition People’s Union of the Communists and DPK.”

The elections by party lists took place on 19 September, 2004, with 56.40% turnout. Three parties and one bloc negotiated the 7% barrier: Otan, Ak Zhol, Asar, and AIST. “The effective number of electoral parties was 3.4, the effective number of parliamentary parties—2.1.”⁶

Gulnar Nasimova explained the low turnout by the fact that “in the first electoral campaigns, people were attracted by a real choice and the first experience of competitive elections. Later, the share of those who missed voting, was gradually increasing, since the citizens no longer believed that the elections would realize their expectations. Elections did not resolve the gradually accumulating problems; the choice no longer produced excitement and people started paying more attention to their other everyday problems.”⁷

It should be said that in Kazakhstan, there is no legally registered minimal turnout, which means that elections are recognized as legal, irrespective of the number of voters.

³ See: L. Karmazina, “Institutionalization of the Party System in Kazakhstan and Russia: A Comparative Analysis,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1 (55), 2009, pp. 115-126.

⁴ *Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Political Parties*, Official publication, Almaty, 2002.

⁵ See: D. Beachain, “Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan, September and October 2004,” *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2005, pp. 762-769.

⁶ “Electoralnye protsessy i osobennosti razvitiia politicheskikh partiy v Kazakhstane,” *Teoria i praktika obshchestvennogo razvitiia*, No. 3, 2011, pp. 230-234.

⁷ G. Nasimova, “Kazakhstanskiy opyt predotvrashcheniia konfliktov,” *Analitic*, No. 5, 2005, pp. 38-43.

The low turnout in big cities meant that those who lived in the countryside and ensured its domination in the Parliament brought Otan to the Majilis. This is indirectly confirmed by the results of electronic voting in those of the urban constituencies, where Otan got 42.7%.⁸ People in the countryside are mainly conformists.⁹ The high figures of support of the governing authorities in the villages are mainly produced by considerations of loyalty, based on the ethnic and cultural piety and respect for the people in power, and widespread expectations of patronage.¹⁰

The results were the following: Otan got 53 mandates (7 by party lists, 35 official, i.e. nominated by the congress of those, who ran in single-member constituencies, 11 self-nominated party members). The AIST bloc got 14 mandates (1 by the party lists, 10 official single-member candidates, 3 self-nominated candidates), Asar—4 mandates (1 by party lists, 3 official candidates, who ran in single-members constituencies). Ak Zhol—2 mandates (1 by party lists, 1 self-nominated candidate), Adilet—1 mandate (official candidate, who ran in a single-member constituency) and three deputies, who did not belong to any party.¹¹

The Kazakh sociologist, Sabit Zhusupov, wrote: “People of Kazakhstan have a specific feature: if the governing authorities are lagging behind social expectations of the very much needed legitimate changes in the social and economic spheres, the population switches its preferences from the authorities to a more adequate political force, represented by moderate opposition.”¹² This explains Ak Zhol’s second place in party lists.

No matter what, the moderate opposition got two seats, while the pro-presidential parties shared 72 seats. The absence of mass protests after the elections confirmed that,

- first, the opposition was unable and not ready to struggle for power and,
- second, the electorate was mainly indifferent.¹³

The Kazakh political scientist, Daniyar Ashimbaev, has pointed out: “This electoral cycle turned out to be a formal durability test for the ruling elite after the fairly stormy political conflicts of the 2000s ... and after the so-called ‘velvet’ revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.”¹⁴ It should be said that 51% of the respondents of the social poll, carried out after the elections, were neutral or negative in their attitudes toward the elections.¹⁵

The 2004 parliamentary elections revealed that,

- first, the authorities had adjusted the electoral laws to its own interests;
- second, judging by the level of absenteeism in the Kazakhstan society as a whole and of the emerging middle class in particular, the people distrusted the electoral system;
- third, most of the republic’s population was more concerned with their own private matters, rather than those of the public and state;

⁸ See: C. Zhusupov, “Kakoy parlament my poluchili, ili Razmyshleniia posle vyborov,” available at [expert.ru/kazakhstan/2004/19/19ka-kpol_57884/], 3 February, 2017.

⁹ See: E.Zh. Babakumarov, Yu.O. Bulukataev, K.E. Kuserbaev, *Kazakhstan segodnia: mir politicheskikh partiy*, Almaty, 1995, p. 54.

¹⁰ See: Z.K. Shaukenova, S.A. Kononov, B.I. Rakisheva, “Analiz sotsiologicheskoy informatsii itogov vybornykh kampaniy v Kazakhstane 2003-2008,” *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, No. 5, 2009, pp. 144-146.

¹¹ See: D. Ashimbaev, “Noviy Mazhilis: shtrikhi k portretu,” available at [http://www.nomad.su/?a=2-200410180125], 3 February, 2017.

¹² S. Zhusupov, op. cit.

¹³ See: “Electoralnye protsessy...,” pp. 230-234.

¹⁴ D. Ashimbaev, “Elektoralnye predpochteniia naseleniia Kazakhstana v period izbiratelnykh kampaniy 2004-2005 gg.,” available at [www.nomad.su/?a=2-200604040313], 3 February, 2017.

¹⁵ See: Ibidem.

- fourth, people did not want a regime change by force and demonstrated a high level of tolerance;
- fifth, a greater part of the electorate—agricultural regions and villagers in particular—sided with the authorities.

Elections of 2007-2016

At the end of the electoral period of 2004-2005, the government reached the main conclusion. The trend of strengthening the position of the moderates, in case of this being neglected by both Central and local authorities that are adhering to their old policy, will become more pronounced¹⁶. The authorities need to implement preventive measures, in particular, to unite all of the pro-presidential forces and form a dominant party, to sow disagreements in the ranks of the radical opposition, and win over moderate opposition.

The country's leaders replaced their temporary support of the Otan Party with permanent patronage: in July-December 2006, the President, Nazarbaev, initiated uniting the Asar, Civic and Agrarian parties under the Otan aegis.¹⁷ As a result, the country acquired the biggest party—the People's Democratic Party Nur Otan.

The divided Ak Zhol lost its more radically-minded members who set up their own opposition Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Nagyz Ak Zhol; the more moderate members of the Ak Zhol party established contacts with the governing authorities.

Having created the dominant party, the authorities concentrated on legislation in order to ensure cooperation between the new party and the state and on weakening the opposition. In May 2007, in particular, amendments and additions allowed the state to finance public alliances, including political parties. The Constitution lost the provision that obliged the President to suspend his membership in a political party for the entire period of his presidency. Today, the President Nazarbaev is the Chairman of Nur Otan. The provision about election blocs was excluded from the new election law: a heavy blow for the disunited radical opposition. To keep members of the opposition away from the Majilis, the single-mandate constituencies were abolished; all deputies were elected by party lists.

The number of seats in the Majilis was increased from 77 to 107; 98 deputies were elected by direct vote; 9 seats were allocated to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

On the one hand, the changes made the Nur Otan party a de facto part of the government and consolidated the president's influence in the Majilis, on the other, the lower chamber was dissolved. Early elections were carried out on 18 August, 2007.

Seven parties that ran for the parliament: Nur Otan, Auyl, the Party of Patriots and "Rukhaniyat" sided with the authorities; the moderate opposition represented by the DPK Ak Zhol and CPPK, and the radical opposition represented by the All-Nation Social-Democratic Party (ANSDP) with Nagyz Ak-Zhol as one of the members. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan refused to take part in the elections.

Nur Otan won by a large margin to form a one-party Majilis, all other parties remained outside. The ANSDP came second, with 4.54% (not enough to pass the 7% barrier), followed by Ak Zhol, a party of moderate opposition, with 3.09% and CPPK with 1.51%.

The victory of the party that had united the biggest pro-presidential parties and the one-party Majilis worsened, to the extent, the political indices of the Republic. Olga Khlopovskikh has written

¹⁶ See: S. Zhusupov, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ See: L. Karmazina, *op. cit.*

that “the 2007 elections set the Laakso and Taagepera index of the effective number of parties at the 1.27 level; the Juan Molinar index at 1.005. This means that there was no more or less noticeable shift toward a multiparty system.”¹⁸ These figures show that Kazakhstan has acquired a dominant party, based on the following values of indices of the effective number of parties: according to Cohen’s and Coppedge’s gradation—lower than 2; the Mainwaring and Scully gradation—below 1.8. The Juan Molinar index, below 1.1, means that a hegemon party dominates the political system.¹⁹

In 2007, the regions of oil extraction and metal-making (Atyrau, Mangistau and Karaganda) supported Nur Otan more actively than in 2004, which is explained by the local wages and salaries that, until 2007, had been growing along with the world oil and metal prices. The loyal media attributed the country’s fast economic growth to the President, Nazarbaev, while society associated Nur Otan with the President.

Agricultural regions and regions with predominantly agricultural population traditionally support pro-presidential forces mainly because TV is practically the only source of information, while the media channels available in these regions are controlled by the authorities. According to the public opinion polls, carried out by the Strategia Center for Social and Political Studies, the lowest level of knowledge about political activities of the Azat party and ANSDP was found among the villagers (55%) and people, engaged in the household activities (54%).²⁰

The voters in Almaty demonstrated a rather cool attitude to Nur Otan. Sociologist Gulmira Ilueova is convinced that “unlike villagers, people in Almaty are more critical—this is true of people living in any big city.”²¹

According to the May 2007 Constitutional amendments, the President appoints the prime minister after consultations with the parliamentary factions and after having obtained the assent from the parliamentary majority. The victory of Nur Otan made the reshuffling of the Cabinet unnecessary: the prime minister and the majority of ministers kept their posts.²²

The 2007 parliamentary elections suggest the following conclusions.

- First, Nur Otan reaped the absolute majority of votes of those, who came to the polling stations in the oil and metallurgical regions.
- Second, Kazakhstan acquired, for the first time, a party system with a hegemon party.
- Third, despite the favorable economic conditions of 2004-2007, people in big cities “voted with their feet.”
- Fourth, the ideology of stability and prosperity was successful in opposing the idea of urgently needed political reforms.

This means that the authorities ascribed the favorable context of the early 2000s, created by the high prices of the republic’s main exported items that ensured fast economic growth, to the policy of the President and the political system.

¹⁸ O. Khlopovskikh, “Parlamentskie vybory v Kazakhstane (15 January, 2012),” available at [<http://www.regional-science.ru>], 3 February, 2017.

¹⁹ See: A.Yu. Shishorina, Yu.O. Gayvoronskiy, “Vybory v zakonodatelnye sobraniia sub’ektov RF kak protsess formirovaniia partiynoy sistemy s dominantnoy partiei (na primere vyborov 13 marta 2011 g.),” available at [<https://www.hse.ru/data/2014/12/22/1302276038/Gaivoronskiy%20Dominant%20Party.pdf>], 3 February, 2017.

²⁰ See: *Partiynnye i elektoralnye predpodchteniia kazakhstantsev (noiabr 2009 g.)*, Report of the Strategia Center of Social and Political Studies based on the results of mass opinion polls and discussions in focus-groups (November 2009), available at [www.ofstrategy.kz], 3 February, 2017.

²¹ A. Ibraev, “Kazakhstan v razreze regionov,” Interview with the social scientist Gulmira Ilueova, available at [<http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201506010032>], 3 February, 2017.

²² See: R. Isaacs, “The Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan, August 2007,” *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2008, pp. 381-385.

The one-party Majilis, created by the 2007 parliamentary elections, presented the governing authorities with a difficult situation. On the one hand, in the eyes of the international community, this refuted the country leaders' rhetoric on democratic ideals. On the other, this constrained the space of political rivalry. The authorities tried and failed to solve the problem by setting up a Public Chamber as an advisory body, to which members of all political trends were invited.

The governing authorities had no choice but to loosen the legislative restrictions, yet they moved cautiously so as not to endanger the regime. In 2008, the Constitutional Law on Elections was amended to grant the party that came second (with the share of votes below the required 7%) after the winner (with the absolute majority of votes) the opportunity to send its deputies to the Majilis.²³ This meant that there would be at least two parties in the Majilis; it was a broad hint from the authorities that the other parties should expect less than 7% of the votes.

The Law on Political Parties received its share of amendments: the number of followers required for registration was lowered from 50 to 40 thousand; the number of followers at the regional level was lowered from 700 to 600. These were superficial changes, carried out on the threshold of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the OSCE that began in 2010.

It should be mentioned that the one-party Parliament, elected in 2007, was a true reflection of the party sector of pre-electoral times: the authorities had the initiative, while the opposition, having pushed aside the need to build up support of the masses, was trying to sort out its own problems.

Later, the governing authorities seized full control over the party sector. The initiative of the President, Nazarbaev, who insisted on a two-party Majilis, made it clear that the country needed a second dominant party. Russia was facing a similar problem in 2008, when the Kremlin administration compared the absence of a second strong party in the Duma with the need "to have another leg on which society could stand, when the first would have become stiff."²⁴ It should be said that in the period of party building in Russia, there appeared a classical triangle in the Duma: the Centrists (United Russia), the Left (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) and the Right (the LDPR), the latter two representing a systemic opposition.

The later events demonstrated that Kazakhstan had followed the same road to arrive at the classical variant. The authorities staked on the DPK Ak Zhol (seen as the Right) and CPPK (the Left) in a "chess game" combination.

- First, in 2011, a year before the parliamentary elections, the leaders of the DPK Ak Zhol were relieved. The party congress unanimously elected Azat Peruashev, head of the Atameken National Economic Chamber (in 1999-2006 he headed the Civic Party that later became one of the Nur Otan elements), to the chairmanship of Ak Zhol. A couple of days before that, the newly elected chairman had left Nur Otan, where he was one of the political council members. The party's previous Chairman, Alikhan Baymenov, was appointed, by a presidential decree, the Chairman of the Civil Service Agency.
- Second, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan was deliberately kept away from the elections, so that the CPPK could reap the votes of the left electorate. In 2011, the Communist Party was suspended for six months by a court decision; in 2012, suspension was extended to six more months to keep the party away from the 2012 elections.

²³ See: *Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan of 28 September, 1995*, available at [http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/konstitucionnyi-zakon-o-vyborah-v-respublike-kazahstan], 3 February, 2017.

²⁴ "Vtoraia partia vlasti poiavilas s podachi Surkova," available at [<https://lenta.ru/news/2006/08/16/party/>], 3 February, 2017.

In November 2011, the President, by his decree, dissolved the Majilis of the fourth convocation and specified the date of the early elections for 15 January, 2012.

It should be said that the opposition had learned the lesson of the 2007 elections and realized that in order to win, it should close the ranks. In 2008, it set up a Public Parliament of 30 parties and NGOs. In 2009, the opposition ANSDP, CPC, DPK Azat, and Alga! united to form a single party. Until 2011, however, nothing else was done, except the unification of ANSDP and Azat. It was decided that the opposition would run for Parliament under the aegis of ANSDP Azat on a single party list, with all the prominent opposition figures included.

Overall, seven parties ran: Nur Otan, PPK, Ak Zhol, ANSDP, CPPK, Auyl and Adilet.

The turnout of 75.45% across the country was higher than the 2007 figures of 10.89%; an increase was registered in all regions.

People explained their failure to vote by the time shortage (23%), their principles (15%) and low quality of elections (13%).²⁵ The share of those, who referred to their principles, was higher by 6% than in 2007.

The votes gained by the major parties (Nur Otan—80.99%; Ak Zhol—7.47%; CPPK—7.19%, ANSDP—1.68%) formed a three-party Majilis.

To allow three parties to squeeze into the Parliament, the authorities sacrificed a certain share of votes that could have been cast for Nur Otan.

Nur Otan, however, remained the favorite in the oil, metal-making and agricultural regions: Karaganda, 85.63%; Atyrau, 84.72%; Almaty, 84.02%. According to Olga Khlopovskikh, “these regions are very different where their social and economic characteristics are concerned and are found in the country’s different regions. The results look like a product of purposeful use of the administrative resource in these regions.”²⁶

As a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, Nur Otan lost a certain share of votes to Ak Zhol and CPPK; the ANSDP electoral base shrank for the same reason: the votes were divided between CPPK and Ak Zhol. Their electoral base in all the regions that became high enough to be elected to the Parliament, confirmed what had been said earlier: “In Kazakhstan, the regime is the main electoral engineer and political technologist.”²⁷

The elections created a classical political pattern: the Center occupied by Nur Otan with 83 seats; the Right represented by Ak Zhol with 8 seats; the Left represented by CPPK with 7 seats.²⁸ L. Karmazina pointed out that the combined representation of Ak Zhol and CPPK was not big enough to challenge the Nur Otan domination in the Majilis.²⁹

This means that the changes, introduced by the two more parties in the Majilis, were minimal.

After the 2012 elections, the party sector was narrowed down to the optimal size, as the authorities saw it: 3 parliamentary parties (Nur Otan, Ak Zhol and the CPPK) and three non-parliamentary parties (the ANSDP, Auyl, and Birlik; the Azat party remains practically inert).

Six political parties ran for the parliament in 2016: Nur Otan, Ak Zhol, CPPK, Auyl, ANSDP, and Birlik.

²⁵ See: Z. Shaukenova, V. Dunaev, *Ideologicheskoe konstruirovaniye v Respublike Kazakhstan: vekhi evoliutsii i traektorii razvitiya v kontekste strategii “Kazakhstan-2050”*, Monograph, Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies KN MON RK, Almaty, 2013, 438 pp.

²⁶ O. Khlopovskikh, op. cit.

²⁷ L.I. Karmazina, “Kazakhstan posle vyborov: sokhraneniye status quo,” in: *Sbornik trudov konferentsii Partii i vybory: vchera, segodnia i zavtra*, ed. by Yu.G. Korguniuk, G.M. Mikhaleva, KMK, Moscow, 2012, p. 62.

²⁸ See: *KISI Report concerning the Results of the Presidential Elections of 2015 in the Republic of Kazakhstan*, available at [www.kisi.kz], 3 February, 2017.

²⁹ L.I. Karmazina, “Kazakhstan posle vyborov...” p. 62.

Nur Otan won 82.2% (84 seats); Ak Zhol—7.18% (7 seats); CPPK—7.14% (7 seats).³⁰ This means that the pro-presidential party gained one more seat against the previous elections, while Ak Zhol lost one seat.

The 2016 election turnout (77.1%) was higher than the 2012 figure by 1.65%.

The 2016 elections changed practically nothing in the party sector.

Conclusion

Between 1999 and 2016, Kazakhstan saw five parliamentary elections; while in 1999 and 2004, the Parliament was only partially elected by party lists, since 2007 voting by party lists has been extended to 98 seats in the Majilis, 9 seats went to the candidates of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

Throughout the entire history of parliamentary elections by party lists, Otan/Nur Otan invariably carried the day. According to the Constitutional Law of 2007, the prime minister is appointed after discussions with the deputies. In the nine years that have elapsed since that time, the deputies never objected to presidential candidates.

In his address on the redistribution of authority between the branches of power, Nazarbaev pointed out that the party that won the majority in the Parliament would have enough power to form the Government that would resign after the new elections and would be accountable to the Majilis, not the President. Today, however, the situation remains far from the one described, since the President, as the Chairman of the ruling party, has enough power to form the Government.

³⁰ See: *Soobshchenie ob itogakh vneocherednykh vyborov deputatov Mazhilisa Parlamenta Respubliki Kazakhstan shestogo sozyva*, Appendix to the Decision of the Central Election Commission of the Kazakhstan Republic of 22 March, 2016, No. 30/126, available at [<http://www.election.kz/rus/news/messages/index.php?ID=3294>], 3 February, 2017.

TRADITIONAL VALUES AS A NATIONAL SECURITY FACTOR IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The authors have undertaken an in-depth investigation of traditional values as factors of national security of states in the age of globalization and the changes in the axiological system of society and value orientations of its members, caused by globalization. The authors relied on a wide spectrum of methodological and theoretical approaches, used in philosophy, political science, sociology and globalistics. In the context of the unfolding civilizational evolution, globalization can be described as a relatively recent and, at the same time, highest development stage of the familiar process of internationalization (transnationalization) of many aspects of social life. In the last thirty-odd years, globalization has been unfolding as cultural and axiological impacts of Westernization and expansion of Western values to non-Western countries. In many cases, the destroyed traditional values and traditional foundations of life activi-

ties are not replaced with adequate axiological principles of development and modernization. The branching off of contemporary culture into two directions (globalization and regionalization) can be felt at all levels and, according to the present authors, have already created two paradoxes—preservation of the cultural heritage and coexistence of cultures. In Russia, globalization is spreading the easiest in the sphere, affected by the motives and symbols of material consumption. The multiplying signs of inefficiency of state regulation in market economy and the widening gap between the rich and poor can be considered as another powerful impetus for the spread of globalization. On the other hand, the fact that the traditional values are gaining popularity is the most important evidence that in Russia globalization is negatively assessed. In the epoch of globalization, traditional values keep the flood of unification and homogenization within certain limits.

KEYWORDS: *globalization, unification, traditional values, homogenization.*

Introduction

The rapidly unfolding technological processes, stratification of social space and modernization of social relationships are the most obvious signs of the post-industrial epoch in which we all live today. The risk society has spread across the world and demands that the value orientations of lost security should be sought for and recovered at the global level.¹ This adds special importance to the

¹ See: U. Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Sage, London, 1992, 260 pp.

key questions about the place and role of traditional values in the globalizing world. As could be expected, this creates certain problems of institutionalization of the mechanisms of global security and their axiological-normative legitimation.

It takes any culture a long time to create its own system of values that determines its specifics and originality, as well as its ability to oppose sociocultural changes. The problem of values crops up when they come under the pressure of sociocultural transformations. The age of globalization is characterized by transformations, unfolding in all social spheres; this means that axiological dynamics is no exception: it is subjected to considerable transformations and modifications. It is highly important to study the role of traditional values in the life of society, since values are changed under the pressure of global processes, while the nature and meaning of these processes in society depend, to a great extent, on its value orientations. The problem of changes of traditional values that make society socially and culturally unique is fraught with a dilemma: either preserve the old values or adjust to new ones.

The authors have concentrated on the processes, related to the importance of traditional values as a factor of national security in the age of globalization and the changes in the axiological system of society, and value orientations of its members, caused by globalization. This calls for a discussion of a correlation between the values of multiculturalism and national values, the end of the “end of history” epoch, announced by Francis Fukuyama at one time, and a greater role of traditional values.

Methods and Materials

We selected the methodology that would make it possible to identify the specifics of traditional values as factors of national security in the epoch of globalization. To achieve this, we relied on a wide range of methodological and theoretical approaches used in philosophy, political science, sociology and globalistics, and a comprehensive inter-disciplinary approach—culturological, axiological, philosophic, sociological and the approaches used by political science.

Philosophical works of all ages—from Antiquity to our time—that created axiology as a special subject of the science of philosophy can be described as a vast theoretical and methodological basis of philosophic reflection on the values that proved to be singularly important for our studies. A more detailed analysis of the methodological basis can be found in several works, dealing with the development of axiology.² This theoretical-methodological heritage is highly important: it demonstrates a huge variety of the attempts at systematization, providing structure and explication of values that help define the axiological foundations as a social and cultural prerequisite of Russia’s security in the age of globalization.

We have relied on the fundamental epistemological principle of unity of the historical and the logical and used the formal logical methods of abstraction, formalization, systemic-structural analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, as well as the categories and laws of dialectical logic.

The method of historicism presents the object of study in retrospect, which helps understand our traditional values. In practice, it was used to establish levels of trust in traditional values and compare them.

To observe the principle of concreteness, we combined the variety of facts and processes with the need of further generalization. It is highly important, likewise, to compare statistical data and information of any other kind, since scientific generalizations are impossible without specific conclusions.

² See: V.V. Kotlyarova, A.M. Roudenko, M.M. Shubina, Y.A. Shestakov, “Explication of the Methodological Difficulties of Modern Axiology,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, p. 478.

Results

Global changes, unfolding in the contemporary world, have brought to the fore serious contradictions in all spheres of social life; they invigorated confrontation between the worldwide integration/disintegration trends. The sphere of culture, as highly varied and spiritually free, proved to be especially responsive to these contradictions: each cultural entity constructs its own spiritual world, consolidates its own authority as the key principle of the world outlook. As the cornerstone of primary importance for a social being, values, “as norms and ideals in the system of functioning social relationships, are important as purposeful regulators.”³ Deprived of its universal axiological system that relies on the supreme spiritual and moral absolutes, society becomes highly vulnerable to the threat of self-destruction.

Today, many scholars speak about the world’s spiritual crisis. According to Vladislav Kelle, globalization revealed the specific sides of the far from new problem of the correlation between the European and American cultures and the cultures of the rest of the (mainly developing) world. He pointed out that Western, mainly American culture, that contradicts the local traditional and spiritual cultures, penetrates these cultures together with the technologies these countries needed very much.⁴

Fredric Jameson, who criticized globalization as a “political strategy of late capitalism,” pointed to Americanization and deemed it necessary to add: “globalization means the export and import of culture” with export of cultural products of the United States to other countries occupying the central place. Acceptance of American cultural products by other countries is the central element of Americanization. For many years, America has been exporting its culture to many countries, which have become adapted to it. American culture is spreading everywhere and its direct impact distorts the ideas and values of national cultures. Cultural development of the United States is perceived as a pattern to be followed. In the course of time, countries are losing their identity to become an appendix to American society, while their national cultures gradually move into the past to become cultural heritage.⁵

In Russia, globalization is affecting the axiological orientations in the realm of motives and symbols of material consumption. In the 1990s, Russia’s population that for a long time had been living amid shortages and very limited choices and trailing behind the most developed countries, where the levels of consumption had been concerned, was mesmerized by opened economic borders and a strong demonstrative effect of foreign markets. In no time, new ideas about the meaning of life conquered the minds and spread to all strata of society. Moral landmarks and the aims of life were replaced with the pursuit of material wellbeing. The spiritual dimensions of life—love, religion, beauty and kindness—acquired quantitative attributes to become objects of consumption. The values of pragmatism, individualism and hedonism moved into education and science. It should be said that even the most confirmed preachers of Western liberalism, George Soros being one of them, perceive these phenomena as a threat to be fought against.⁶ Ardent desire to grow rich coupled with aggression, individualism and egoism gradually spread to become common features among common people, the fact regularly confirmed by all sorts of sociological polls.⁷ The market of goods and services stimu-

³ V.V. Kotlyarova, *Tsennosti: traditsii i aksiologicheskaya paradigma sovremennosti*, Monograph, GOU VPO YuRGUES, Shakhty, 2009, p. 16.

⁴ See: V.Zh. Kelle, “Protsesty globalizatsii i dinamika kultury,” available at [http://www.zpu-journal.ru/zpu/2005_1/Kelle/9.pdf].

⁵ See: F. Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic*, Chapter 17 “Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,” Verso, London, New York, 2009, pp. 435-455.

⁶ See: G. Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism, Open Society Endangered*, Public Affairs, 1998, 245 pp.

⁷ See: “Lichnoe blagopoluchie vs. velichie strany,” Press release, LEVADA-TSENTR, 14 December, 2016, available at [<http://www.levada.ru/2016/12/14/lichnoe-blagopoluchie-vs-velichie-strany/>].

lates the emergence of the media that plants all sorts of cultural practices and synthesizes them. As Herbert Marcuse wrote at one time, members of a consumer society become dependent on their craving for variety and enjoyment. "We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character or its irrationality, its productivity and efficiency, its capability to increase and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction."⁸

The gradually mounting inefficiency of state regulation of market economy became especially obvious in the early 1990s, to become another powerful channel, through which globalization challenged the axiological culture of Russian society. In the post-Soviet period, the value of economic freedom, one of the cornerstones of market economy, was discredited in the broadest circles of the Russian population. No wonder, many elements of the Western axiological structures, having been adopted by alien cultural environments, suffer extensive transformation to the extent that a lot of their contexts are lost. Freedom becomes unlimited permissiveness; free enterprise develops into the freedom of criminal activities amid widely spread corruption; democracy degenerates into arbitrary rule of state bureaucracy, operating behind the screen of quasi-democratic procedures.⁹

Neoliberal globalization has widened the gap between the rich and poor. There is nothing new in this, yet in Russia, this negative effect appeared at a much earlier stage than in other countries and, as could be expected, negatively affected the morals.¹⁰ The reason is obvious: globalization of axiological foundations destroys the axiological principles inherited from the past much faster than it creates new and higher, in the strict observance of the measurement of civilization, forms of public consciousness, which reflect the conditions of existence of mankind.¹¹

It seems that gradual reemergence of traditional values is the most important evidence that in Russia globalization is negatively perceived. Traditional values transfer from one generation to another historical social experience, accumulated in the form of patterns, norms, principles and ideas about what is the most precious in culture. According to VTsIOM, in 2016, the absolute majority of Russians were proud of the history of Russia (90%), its culture (88%), its strong army (90%) and science (82%); they were also proud of sports victories (75%) and Russia's international status (72%).¹²

Traditional values and corresponding behavior are reproduced practically unchanged in the course of several generations or, for a long time, within the frameworks of the same society—in the last few years people have been gradually recapturing their confidence in traditional values—from 72% in 2004 to 86% in 2016.¹³ Traditional values have survived and continue to exist as a firm foundation of social identity and national character. One generation after another perceives traditional values as the cornerstone of historical memory; they help people find their bearings in life and make decisions.

Introduction of alien cultural elements, values in particular, might cause conflicts. In his book *The Crash of Civilizations*, the American political scientist and sociologist, Samuel Huntington, described the dynamics of contemporary international relations and possible conflicts between the

⁸ H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Second edition, Beacon Press, 1991, p. 9.

⁹ See: V.V. Kotlyarova, *Dinamika tsennostey molodezhi Rossii v postsovetkiy period*, PhD thesis, Rostov State University, Rostov on Don, 2005, p. 87.

¹⁰ See: V.V. Kotlyarova, "Traditsionnye tsennosti v sovremennoy kulture," *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kulturologiia i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki*, No. 1 (5), 2010, pp. 84-86.

¹¹ See: A.M. Roudenko, V.V. Kotlyarova, M.M. Shubina, "Philosophical Analysis of the Values Influence of the Western World in the Socio-Cultural Space of Russia," *Paradigmata poznani*, No. 1, 2015, pp. 20-27.

¹² See: "Rodina—eto zvuchit gordo!" VTsIOM, Press release, No. 3201, 16 September, 2016, available at [<https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115866>].

¹³ See: V.V. Kotlyarova, *Dinamika tsennostey...*, p. 87; "Problemnyy fon strany: itogi goda," VTsIOM, Press release, No. 3277, 28 December, 2016, available at [<http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=116014>].

Western and non-Western countries. Having admitted that each civilization is unique and, having recognized the rights of each of them to self-determination, he never doubted that the Western values and morals were superior.¹⁴ The conflict between contemporary Western (hedonistic) and Eastern (traditionalist) cultures is one of the main reasons for alienation between nations. According to the polls carried out in 2016 by Chicago Council Survey and a series of polls, conducted by the Levada Center, only 23% of Russians think positively about Western values;¹⁵ the meager share of 8% wholeheartedly support them.¹⁶

Hence the question: Why does the gradually increasing number of politicians, public figures and scholars hold forth about the crisis of liberalism, about revived national preferences and stronger positions of traditional values amid the fast spreading of Western lifestyle and values and a lot of talk about a unified cultural space? It seems that deliberate unification is one of the greatest dangers of globalization: on the one hand, it allegedly facilitates communication and management of the global unified system, while on the other, however, it deprives mankind of the autonomous nature of its component parts and its variety, thus making the system highly vulnerable. It has become clear that the dominant neoliberal globalization (understood as Westernization in the cultural dimension) needs an alternative—the world is growing more and more tired of Western values.

In its 2011 report, the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, defined two major risks—rising income and wealth disparity inside countries and between them, as well as blunders of global management, caused by inadequacies of global institutions, agreements and networks. In a similar report, published two years later, WEF identified five most probable risks: severe income disparity, chronic fiscal imbalances, rising greenhouse gas emissions, water supply crises, mismanagement of population ageing. In 2017, WEF identified four groups of main risks: *environmental*, *socio-political*, *economic*, *technological* and the risks connected with globalization.¹⁷ Socio-political risks are perceived as much more important than the rest taken together. Anatoli Chubays put this in a nutshell: “The most precise formula that describes Davos of this year is the horror of a global political disaster.” The “horror” is caused by the transformation of the axiological systems that began after Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*, a crisis of liberalism and its basic values—democracy, globalization, multiculturalism and others. They are gradually replaced by opposing values: priority of national cultures, national identity, and national interests.

In conditions of globalization, traditional values prevent a flood of unification and homogenization that might negatively affect national communities and dilute national identities. Societies rely on traditional values to arrive at adequate strategic responses to civilizational challenges, to be involved in integration processes and be able to influence them in full conformity to their own national interests. This means that societies rely on their cultural identity not so much as to oppose globalized economics but to be actively involved in it. At all times, greatness and power of any state have been determined, to a great extent, by the level of morality and spirituality of its citizens. As is rightly registered in Point 8 of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation till 2020 “Values and models of development have become the subject of global competition.” This means that the value systems of states and peoples have become the main target of attacks, including mounting information

¹⁴ See: S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone Books, 1997, 357 pp.

¹⁵ See: “SShA i Rossia: otsustvie doveria i oshchushchenie bezopasnosti opredeliaiut otnoshenia stran,” Press release, LEVADA-TSENTR, 7 November, 2016, available at [http://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/USA_Russia_Levada_Chicago-2016_rus.pdf].

¹⁶ See: V.A. Anikin, “Krizis i natsionalnoe samosoznanie rossiiian,” *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia: Ekonomicheskie i sotsialnye peremeny*, No. 5, 2016, p. 207.

¹⁷ See: *World Economic Forum. Global Risks 2017*, available at [<https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017>].

pressure.¹⁸ Indeed, if the core of any axiological system crumbles, the country loses its uniqueness, while people start emulating behavior models initially alien to them. Today, any wrongly formulated axiological principles exercise a direct effect on national security of states. This means that there is a partial inversion of the movement of Abraham Maslow's models along the hierarchy of human needs toward a gradual increase in traditional values as the foundation of national security.¹⁹

The system of spiritual values and moral norms is one of the most important conditions of political and social stability, a sort of an "immune system" of social organism that protects it against all sorts of infectious diseases (violence, xenophobia, radical nationalism, separatism, moral permissiveness, etc.).²⁰ The highest values constitute the core of society's spiritual potential and the spiritual backbone of a personality that makes it stronger spiritually and morally, and strengthens the will-power to focus on defending national interests, protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian State.

Discussion

In the last decades of the twentieth century and later the peoples and their cultures were exposed to a strong world process now called globalization, the term first used by American sociologist Roland Robertson in 1985. The idea of globalization has been studied by social and humanitarian sciences for a long time now. At one time, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and Maximilian Weber wrote a lot about external ties and economic limitations that affect nation-states. The subject attracted even more attention at the turn of the 1970s: scholars and academics of different countries demonstrated that the promptly widening international trade and investments, an awareness of ecological interdependence and the increasingly strong impacts of multinational corporations would cause systemic shifts that would undermine the roles played by the nation-states.

Today, there is no commonly accepted concept of globalization; different societies and different scientific disciplines interpret the term in their own ways. It is defined, in particular, as a process of mutual drawing closer together of countries and their economic, political, cultural, technological, etc. integration. Anthony Giddens has pointed out that "globalization thus is a complex set of processes, not a single one. And these operate in a contradictory or oppositional fashion."²¹

According to Olga Zernetskaya, the approaches to globalization can be divided into two types: optimistic-utopian and critical. The followers of the former expect that the global processes unfolding in mass communication and cultural integration will resolve all contradictions of contemporary society. The followers of the latter argue that global processes create numerous problems, the main being mass culture that standardizes mass consciousness on the basis of cultural patterns created in the United States unacceptable for ethnic communities that have philosophical traditions and cultures of their own.²²

¹⁸ See: S.I. Samygin, A.M. Rudenko, V.V. Kotlyarova, "Istoriko-filosofskoe osmyslenie problemy informatsionnoy bezopasnosti," *Sotsium i vlast*, No. 2 (58), 2016, pp. 47-51.

¹⁹ See: V.V. Kotlyarova, *Chelovek i ego potrebnosti*, Teaching aid, ISOiP (branch) DGTU, Shakhty, Lik, Novocherkassk, 2016, p. 131.

²⁰ See: A. Rudenko, V. Kotlyarova, E. Polozhenkova, M. Shubina, Yu. Shestakov, G. Mogilevskaya, O. Sysoeva, "Religious Tolerance as a Factor of Spiritual Security in the South of Russia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 37-46.

²¹ A. Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*, Routledge, 2003, pp. 12-13.

²² See: O.V. Zernetskaya, *Globalnoe razvitiye sistem massovoy kommunikatsii i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, Prosveshchenie, Moscow, 2009, p. 351.

The attempts to move globalization into the sphere of cultural and philosophical reflection had begun before the term “globalization” was coined. Canadian sociologist of culture Marshall McLuhan is the central figure in this respect.²³ Russian theoreticians point to the weak points of his concept: technological determinism (technological evolution leading to social transformations in all societies irrespective of their types) and technological romanticism (conviction that the development and spread of “democratic” inventions in the sphere of information will lead to worldwide democratization).²⁴

The idea of cultural imperialism consistently supported by Edward Said is a theoretical foe of McLuhan and his ideas. Although Said never accepted the terms global culture, globalization and cultural globalization, in his opinion, cultural globalization is directly related to the worldwide cultural expansion of the West.²⁵ This smacks of political-economic determinism.

Thomas Friedman described 1989 as the final year of the Cold War that ushered in the contemporary epoch of globalization and pointed to its clearly outlined features. One of them is Integration that Friedman defined as network. He has avoided the categorical definitions of Fukuyama and his “end of history” verdict. Fukuyama is talking about the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final stage of governance. Friedman sides with the concept of glocalization (“I believe that most important filter is the ability to ‘glocalize’”) that envisages an attempt to combine the system of globalization and localization (development of national states and cultures). In fact, he concentrates on nation-states in the context of the globalization processes.²⁶

At one time, Gherman Diligenskiy, one of the leading Russian sociologists, pointed out that globalization, as a new means of coordinating the opposites, betrayed itself in the realm of culture and personality development and intensified the uniformity and variety of mankind. Intensified variety, however, does not destroy unity, since mechanisms and principles of correlation between different parts of the global whole are taking shape in the process.²⁷

It should be said that a greater part of the studies of the problem of interconnection between globalization and evolution of axiological principles failed to pay adequate attention to the latest global challenges, organically connected with the current social transformations.

Scholarly writings abound in lacunae of in-depth theoretical analysis of the ways the latest global challenges affect the changes of axiological orientations despite the fact that the traditions of these studies are rooted in the first reports of the Club of Rome in the early 1970s. As a highly varied phenomenon, globalization attracted attention of politicians and economists and also philosophers, sociologists, culturologists, writers, journalists, and members of all sorts of public movements. No wonder, assessments and forecasts are highly ambiguous and, in fact, very much in line with the contradictory nature of this phenomenon of epochal dimensions.

Conclusion

Globalization, as a principle of organization, functioning and development of the world, is described as a homogenous economic, socio-cultural and political super system. As a process, globalization intensifies interdependence of states, decreases their sovereignty, and generates interregional and

²³ See: M. McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, McGraw-Hill, 1964, 318 pp.

²⁴ See: *Rossia v dialoge kultur*, ed. by A.A. Guseynov, A.V. Smirnov, B.O. Nikolaichev, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2010, p. 48.

²⁵ See: E.W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. XXV.

²⁶ See: Th. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Understanding Globalization*, Picador, 2000, p. 295.

²⁷ See: G.G. Diligenskiy, “Globalizatsia v chelovecheskom izmerenii,” *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 7, 2002, pp. 4-15.

transcontinental flows that create global interconnections. This means that globalization is a qualitatively new independent and complex system of phenomena and relations. Globalization changes the world because human civilization acquires new spiritual patterns.

In the last thirty-odd years, the cultural and axiological impacts of globalization have been unfolding mainly in the form of Westernization and expansion of Western values to the non-Western countries. In many cases, this trigger negative axiological transformations, destruction of traditional foundations of life activities without offering new axiological foundations for development and modernization. Axiological matrices, shaped in different cultural and historical contexts, demonstrate survivability in qualitatively different cultural contexts; it should be said that the “cultural donors” are found at a fundamentally different stage of civilizational development than the recipient countries.

Globalization, as a new ideology and a new way of life in a cultural milieu, is based on a so-called planetary conscience, a product of Euroatlantic ideas of the world and the Westernized consumer morals. Today, the pendulum is moving in the opposite direction. Traditional ideas, norms, feelings, humanistic values, the ideas of justice, freedom and human rights make moral culture a part of the sphere of aims and interests of men. Traditions, independence and sovereignty have not lost their importance in the context of globalization. Traditional values are filled with a new content; they are gradually perceived as a social and political ideal of a nation that harmonizes, to the greatest extent, with its traditions, desires, cultural and psychological attitudes that ensure its further development. It should be said that today, the growth of traditionalism can be regarded as a program of revival of many nations and a sort of a project of national and state construction, as opposed to liberalization and globalization.

The question is: How can mankind overcome the “horror of Davos”; what should people do to achieve security in the world—move toward unification or preserve cultural variety in the context of global, economic, political and social shifts; should they maintain the dialog for the sake of development or concentrate on variety for security? No answer is evident so far.

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF THE YOUTH IN TAJIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN

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ABSTRACT

The political systems of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are complicated and heterogeneous public structures, undergoing difficult and contradictory processes of transformation of all basic institutions, norms and principles of relationships between themselves and society. Students play a crucial role in this process, which explains why the states want to offer the best possible conditions for the younger generation to help realize its potential in the interests of the state. This dictates changing the system designed to work with young people at all levels of power, as well as the mechanisms of governance. It was not by chance that the youth of these republics has been selected for the studies of political processes unfolding in these republics: young people are normally very critical of political education and training. Young people, due to the high educational level and sociopolitical activity and dynamic social behavior, will

replace, in the near future, the main productive and intellectual public force.

However, today there are no inadequately developed methodological approaches to the conceptualization of students as a social group and objects of social and political analysis, which means that we should carefully study the experience, problems and developmental issues in the process of transformation of contemporary post-Soviet society in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. All aspects of the content and manifestations of political orientations in the youth milieu are being actively discussed in academic writings. Yet, the phenomenon of political orientation—the problem of inner belonging to any specific social and political group, a correct understanding of its role in the life of the entire society, the means of forming ideas about oneself as a member of a definite social and political force—was and remains a challenge.

KEYWORDS: *contemporary youth, political orientation, identity, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan.*

Introduction

Political culture of youth can influence various aspects of a political process: its subjective and objective sides, the momentum of its development, the degree of conflict sentiments, etc. Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as contemporary post-Soviet states, demonstrate the transitory nature of their political systems and political processes. The ethnic and demographic structure of youth suggests that nation-states can be built on an ethnic foundation. Today, Islam is perceived as an inalienable indicator of ethnic self-determination in the age group of 15 to 31. The politicization of ethnicity in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is proceeding ahead of the creation of a political nation.

Scholarly interest in the subject is explained by the following:

- first, the problems of youth in the context of transformation of the Central Asian societies remain inadequately studied;
- second, contemporary political science pays little or no attention to the studies of youth at the micro-political level in the context of integration of young people into the social and political life of their countries.

Here we have studied youth as a specific group, which is characterized, on the one hand, by certain identities and self-determination and, on the other, demonstrates a pronounced protest behavior.¹ The political culture of youth, as a specific range of phenomena, strongly affects the political process, the dynamics of change in the context of state power and the state of the entities involved. It can be defined as a sum-total of political knowledge, ideas, concepts, convictions, traditions, values, collective ideas, patterns of political behavior, as well as models of political action that add order and meaning to the political process. In fact, the youth political culture can be represented as part of the common culture, on the one hand, and a certain synthesis of important political characteristics of youth, on the other. This highly complicated problem has not yet been studied in detail, while the problem of youth in the political structure of the Central Asian countries requires more attention. The above describes the subject of our studies as highly topical and important from the theoretical and practical points of view.

Indeed, today there are 38 higher education institutions in Tajikistan: 14 universities, 14 institutes, 1 conservatory, 4 higher education institutions at the ministries and power structures, 3 branches of educational institutions, operating in other countries, and 2 branches located inside the country, with the total student body of approximately 157,000, including 49,000 girls.² In Kazakhstan, there are 134 higher education institutions: 9 national universities, 31 state universities, 1 international education institution (jointly with Turkey), 17 corporate, 13 non-civil and 63 private higher education institutions.³ In Uzbekistan, professionally educated specialists are trained at 24 universities and 40 institutes. Thirty-three higher educational institutions are functioning at the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education; others are run by corresponding ministries. There are regional branches of higher educational institutions.⁴

Methods and Materials

The theoretical and methodological approaches to the studies of the place and role of young people in the social and political structure demand a continuous practical enhancement. The method-

¹ See: I. Karabulatova, I. Mkrtumova, Z. Polivara, B. Akhmetova, S. Galiullina, E. Loskutova, E. Abylkasymov, "Protest Behavior of Present-Day Russian Youth as Ethnosocial Deviation in an Ethnopolitical Conflict-Prone Situation," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 94-103; I. Mkrtumova, I. Karabulatova, A. Zinchenko, "Political Extremism of the Youth as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Post-Soviet Electronic Information Society," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 79-87.

² See: *Statistichesky sbornik sfery obrazovania Respubliki Tadzhikistan*, Dushanbe, 2014, pp. 235-238.

³ For the list of Kazakhstan's education institutions, see [http://edurk.kz/ru/349-spisok_vuzov_kazahstana.html], 1 February, 2017.

⁴ For the educational institutions of Uzbekistan, see [<http://univer.in/vuzy-respubliki-uzbekistan>], 1 February, 2017.

ology of the present research is based on the dialectical postulate of cooperation between social being and public consciousness, the interrelation of ideal, value-semantic aspects and motivation of the activity of a person; the recognition of an active and relatively independent role of ideas and public consciousness as a factor of social changes; an understanding that social and political orientations of an individual, as a representative of a definite social layer, and his attitude to society and the state at the macro-level are reflected in assessments of and positions on certain topical issues; the principles of dialectical logic and historicism, the unity of the historical and logical, the correlation of the general, particular and individual, the objectivity and concreteness of examination, as well as the notion of civilizational pluralism and multifold historical process.

Overall, our studies are based on the principle of ascendance from the abstract to the specific, viz. from the general theoretical and methodological foundation of the studies of political orientations to an analysis of empirical data of the political orientation of youth in Central Asia.

The empirical base consists of the materials of opinion polls carried out by the authors in 2014-2016 (opinion polls of young people in Astana, Kostanai, Tashkent, Taraz, and Dushanbe; over 3 thousand people polled), an analysis of documents of the bodies of state power and administration, statistical data, media publications, and an analysis of results of research studies by political scientists.

The scientific novelty of the work consists in introducing new empirical data and theoretical explanation of certain phenomena not yet discussed by those, who study social consciousness of youth, and forecasting probable ways and developmental trends of political preferences of young people and possible alternatives for social development in their current environment.

Results

A political end, which can be considered an anticipation of the results of political actions for the sake of which these actions are performed, influences the character of a political process. Political end is inseparable from the axiological system, that is, it should be rooted in axiological orientations. Traditional values, cultivated in a society, are an important component of the political culture of youth that largely determines the essential nature of a political process. As the result of the so-called riot of “lace panties” that took place in Kazakhstan in 2014,⁵ the protest behavior of the Kazakhstan youth escalated from a few and isolated acts to much more numerous protest actions in 2016 across the whole of the republic.

In the absence of axiological parameters, if the consensus, as the basis of democratic order, is not confirmed in the political system and the values (and, therefore, their diverse apologists) are antagonistic, we cannot expect a balanced behavior of our younger generations within a political process.⁶

Largely, political preferences of young people are formed by their socialization, which may be either state-controlled or given a free rein. In the post-Soviet period, political reforms destroyed many institutes of socialization, while the scope of the state’s informational rhetoric that has been influencing youth, was changed. For the youth of today in the Central Asian states, the system of reviving political values was destroyed. On the other hand, attempts were made to switch the system of values from the socialist state-controlled to the liberal capitalist-oriented one. The uncontrolled subjects of influence such as the street, television, Internet and other media moved into the place, previously

⁵ See: “Molodeiushchee litso kazakhstanskikh protestov,” available at [<http://rus.azattyq.org/a/almaty-week-and-protests-tenge-devaluation/25265768.html>], 22 February, 2017.

⁶ See: V.F. Penkov, *Politicheskaia kultura kak faktor razvitiia politicheskogo protsesssa v sovremnoy Rossii*, Ph.D. thesis 23.00.02; defended on 21.06.2002; approved 14.02.2002, Moscow, 2002. 381 pp. Bibliography, pp. 355-381. p. 93.

reserved by the state. Uncontrolled development of information technologies, used mainly by young people, has made it practically impossible to shape political values of the younger generation.⁷ No wonder the younger generation has become alienated; young people reject official policies and remain convinced that they cannot effect any changes by an active involvement in politics. At the same time, they become focused on individuality, initiative and entrepreneurship; learn to treat private interest as a priority, rely on their own abilities and regard wealth as an aim in life.⁸

Active members of youth movements have their own preferences related to their lifestyle, firm principles and certain personal qualities. This fully applies to the youth movement Kamolot and the New Youth Movement in Uzbekistan; the Alliance of the Students of Kazakhstan, Aybat movement and the Youth Branch of the Alga party in Kazakhstan, and the movement The Youth of Tajikistan for the Revival of Tajikistan in Tajikistan. Plans and values of the young activists are concentrated around three main concerns: profession, education and personal life. Activists want to work in the public and political spheres and structures of power; they are prepared to fill high posts as heads of organizations, deputies, ministers, etc. These aims are correlated with the desire to achieve a high status and enough money, to work for the country and help resolve urgent social problems. The members of the opposition movements are inclined to protests and struggle against the regime.⁹

The influence of the youth political culture on the objective side of the political process betrays itself in the creation of an array of problems, aims and trends of the political process. Young people inevitably bring their own ideas about a problem into the political sphere; formulate urgent issues for the politicians and insist on their solution.

Politicization of ethnicity among the young people stems from the following:

- (1) Increase in perceiving ethnicity as a political factor in the course of ethnic and national resurrection (national patriotism is construed as a political and ideological reference point, while the interrelation between ethnic identity and political priorities of the nation becomes stronger). Indeed, 52.3% of the Kazakh-speaking youth looks at themselves as national-patriots, while the share of national-patriots among the Russian-speaking Kazakh youth is 15.3%.
- (2) Social disappointment and growing radicalism as a form of seeking fairness, predicated on the still unregulated problems in the social sphere.
- (3) Ideological and religious expansion of religious extremism and terrorism from the countries with Islamic traditions.

In the minds of the young people, Islamic political education plants the philosophy and behavioral traits typical of people in a situation of irreconcilable differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

The student body of private educational institutions, located in the southern regions of the three countries, is composed mainly of young people who use native languages and rely on rural self-awareness. As a rule, they join all sorts of Islamic, non-traditional communities; one out of twelve is a Shi'ite.

Our studies revealed that the monikers "liberal" and "democrat" do not point to the real differences in the political bias of young people. This fully applies to the "socialists" and "communists" of the past, despite the fact that "communists" were in the minority and did not belong to the top ten of

⁷ See: I. Mkrtumova, A. Dosanova, I. Karabulatova, V. Nifontov, "The Use of Communication Technologies to Oppose Political-Religious Terrorism as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Contemporary Information-Digital Society," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 54-61.

⁸ See: E.A. Samsonova, *Politicheskie tsennosti rossiyskoy molodezhi v usloviakh sotsialno-politicheskikh transformatsiy 1990-kh godov*; author's synopsis of Ph.D. thesis, 23.00.02. Saratov, 2008. 24 pp.


⁹ See: I. Karabulatova, I. Mkrtumova, Z. Polivara, B. Akhmetova, S. Galiullina, E. Loskutova, E. Abylkasymov, op. cit.

the most frequently used ideological denominations; the same fully applies to “anarchists” and “an-archo-syndicalists”.

We have analyzed the gender preferences of young people and discovered that young men and women are predominantly attracted to liberal ideology. Nevertheless, there are significantly more men among socialists. “Male” ideologies also include nationalism and anarchism. Young women prefer communism and monarchism, and predominate among the “loyalists,” who support power.

Figure 1

Distribution of Political Orientations among Young People by Occupation



Interest in politics is directly related to age: older respondents are more inclined to discuss the political situation in the country. Students are less interested in politics than the working youth. Young specialists with higher education, engineers and technicians have the most pronounced interest in politics.

The ideologists of countercultures exaggerate the significance of unification and aimlessness of man’s life in contemporary society for their active protest. Being alienated from the world endows these people with an abiding sense of self-importance. Among the groups of youth countercultures, only the Hippies and Punks offered their own ideals of positive freedom and declared it to be of the highest value. They interpreted freedom as a permission to do anything one wants, go wherever and be open to new experiments. Freedom is not needed as such, but as a condition of personal growth, the external freedom as the path to internal freedom.

The subcultures of youth express, in a condensed form, the emancipatory demands of young people, who want to be free in their choices, self-determination and experimentation. Their slogans show that young people crave freedom, love and self-realization. Most of youth countercultures are

satisfied with displaying a challenging behavior and particular ways of spending their leisure. No matter how displeased, the adults tolerate this as a road, leading toward maturity.

Discussion

Today, there is no agreement in humanitarian sciences on the role of political orientations and their content. A. Zaynalabidova, V. Kasyanov, T. Plotnikova, M. Nesmelova, V. Chernous, V. Utenkov, T. Alekseenko and others have covered, fairly fully, the common problems of young people in the context of changing paradigms of values and the plurality of ways and methods of self-identification.¹⁰

Tatyana Pavlova deemed it necessary to point out that today, the social and cultural aspects, collective identity in the present political and historical context, and the ability of new social actors to offer alternative projects of social organization and new social institutions, have moved forward in contemporary society, in which the processes of individualization (that have spilled over into the sphere of collective action), which can be described as the most typical phenomena, together with the changes in the nature of politics and power, and saturation of everyday life with politics, when the struggle for domination in society is gradually moving into the sphere of culture and new contexts, have already found their place.¹¹ According to certain authors, American institutions are directly involved in democratic developments in Central Asian countries (in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in particular).¹²

As a rule, political culture of youth invigorates and speeds up political processes. Youth normally wants to change the realities, it is determined to fight inertia and stagnation and speed up social progress. The younger generation, its social functions and psychological specifics (rejection of compromises, lack of experience and psychological balance, keen awareness of social problems and unfairness) are responsible for much more vehement political conflicts. Certain social groups are prone to conflicts with society as a whole; their active opposition to society is labeled as “non-conformism” and “counterculture”.

Youth countercultures are the most radical varieties of youth subcultures, embraced by some teenagers and young men in the process of their socialization, as alternative systems of social and cultural norms and values. They can be described as indicators of the existing or emerging social and cultural trends.

Normally, members of all youth subcultures offer fairly abstract assessments of the world; being convinced that the world is far from perfect, they practically never ask “why?”; they prefer to ask “who is to blame?” and look for social conditions and forces, guilty of the current conditions of unfairness and injustice.

¹⁰ See: A.S. Zaynalabidova, V.V. Chernous, *Politicheskii ekstremizm i ego profilaktika u studencheskoy molodezhi Dona*, Rostov on Don, 2002; V.V. Kasyanov, *Politicheskaia sotsializatsia molodezhi v sovremennoy Rossii*, author's synopsis of doctorate thesis, Rostov on Don, 1999; M.Yu. Nesmelova, *Politicheskoe povedenie molodezhi v sovremnoy Rossii*, author's synopsis of Ph.D. thesis, Kazan, 1995; V. Plotnikova, *Politicheskoe povedenie v Rossii*, Rostov on Don, 2004; V.M. Utenkov, A.S. Zakalin, “O politicheskom soznanii studencheskoy molodezhi,” *Region: ekonomika i sotsiologiya*, 2003, No. 2; T.F. Alekseenko, *Protsess smeny sotsialnoy identichnosti rossiiskogo studenchestva*, author's synopsis of Ph.D. thesis, Rostov on Don, 2005.

¹¹ See: T.V. Pavlova, “Analyz sotsiokulturnogo i istoricheskogo konteksta sotsialnykh dvizheniy,” Abstract of the Report at the 3rd All-Russia Sociological Congress, available at [http://www.isras.ru/abstract_bank/1210250425.pdf], 7 February, 2016; Yu.V. Ivanova, V.A. Krikunova, “Tendentsii i mekhanizmy vozdeystviia molodezhnoy politicheskoy kultury na politicheskii protsess,” *Vestnik Zabaykalskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, No. 4, 2012, pp. 48-55.

¹² See: Yu. Komlyakova, “Democratization in Post-Soviet Central Asia: American Impact,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 120-129.

Conclusion

We have concluded, with a great degree of regret, that there is no agreement when it comes to interpretations of the hierarchy of axiological benchmarks of contemporary youth. This is regrettable, since the values (ideas, traditions and norms) underlie the attitudes of youth to political life and determine its internal preferences and priorities. As highly sustainable, they ensure homogeneity of ideas, cherished by an individual; conflicting values, on the other hand, shatter political attitudes and push an individual to a revision of his/her fundamental ideas. This explains why the subcultures of the younger generation are fragmented. This patchwork of ideas leads to corresponding behavior patterns, affecting the political picture of the world and political behavior of this social category.

The youth political culture affects the subjective side of the political process as well: it educates the present and future political figures, the future political cadres and future political elite. Political culture of youth supplies society with the most active, not to say passionate political figures for the simple reason that youth is the most energetic part of a country's population, brimming with creative designs and being strong enough to realize them. The young people have just approached the stage, at which they are expected to acquire orientations, interests and social roles. At this stage, it can be described as the most active group of a country's population.

This means that the liberal-democratic ideas are being gradually accepted as the most popular ideology among the young people. Our studies have revealed that the youth of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, irrespective of its social or regional description, demonstrates a bias toward the paternalist political culture and its own alienation from power. At the individual level, people expect that the state will give them all sorts of boons and help them; they fear ultimatums and suppression; they do not want to change the state of affairs. Therefore, the state should not move away from civil society, since there is no civil society without a state. The nature of their relationships is the main problem.

The year of the famous youth protests of 2015-2016 (in Almaty, Sary-Ozen, Khujand, the Jamoati Ansorullo actions, etc.) revealed that, despite fragmentation, a significant part of youth is ready to replenish the social base of opposition. In such a situation, the authorities ought to intensify the efforts, aimed at the creation of a culture of dialog, and not eschew relations with all of the participants in the political life of a state. It is only through dialog that the preservation of stability and progressive development of society may be attained.

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

**RELIGION:
POLITICAL FACTOR
IN THE MUSLIM REGIONS OF RUSSIA**

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ABSTRACT

Today, the religious factor has become a part of the political processes and as such a catalyst of stabilization/de-stabilization of political space. This means that to ensure social and state security, we should identify the mechanisms and technologies that add political dimensions to religion. For several decades, politically biased religious organizations and their destabilizing influence remained limited to certain regions of the world.

Today, radical Islamic movements threaten not only individual states and re-

gions, but also the world community as a whole. Islamic extremism is no longer a local problem—it has become a transnational phenomenon. In the last few years, Islamic radicalism has spread far and wide to certain regions of the CIS (I have in mind Central Asia) and Russia (the Northern Caucasus, the Volga Area and Siberia). For a long time the North Caucasian peoples have been taught to think that the national and religious factors were inseparable; they were united by their religion, while the confession that was taking shape on the na-

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tional soil imbibed local customs, traditions and rites.¹ Similar processes are unfolding among the Islamic peoples of Siberia and

the Volga Area.² This adds urgency to the subject discussed and makes it much more interesting.

¹ See: I. Karabulatova, "Ethnocultural Communication Systems in the Northern Caucasus and the Problem of Radical Islam," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 71-79.

² See: N.G. Khairullina, I.S. Karabulatova, M.F. Shvedova, K.K. Koyshe, "Tatars of Siberia: Religious Rebirth and Identity Problems," *Terra Sebus: Acta Musei Sabesiensis*, No. 7, 2015, pp. 565-583.

KEYWORDS: *Islam, political process, radicalism, Russia, Muslim regions.*

Introduction

Today, Islamic radicalism strongly affects the political processes unfolding in Russia, therefore, I have concentrated on the specifics of the impact of Islamism in Russia and the similarity/dissimilarity between the practices of multiculturalism in the Russian Federation and those in other countries. The phenomenon of radical Islam in Russia is the subject matter of the study.

As distinct from other world religions, Islam (and most of its trends) permeates all aspects of life and is orientated toward social and political problems. It is more than a model of the ideal "just and fair" society: it

- (1) directly points to violence as a means of achieving the desired ideal or its protection (the concept of jihad);³
- (2) offers a carefully substantiated doctrine of the Muslim state with a clearly outlined set of formal features,⁴ the most important being a Muslim ruler guided by the Muslim law.

It is no less important to note that in the final analysis, Islam presupposes unlimited territorial expansion. According to the concept of jihad, everything that is not related to the "territory of Islam" (dar al-islam) is (at least potentially) the "territory of war" (dar al-harb). Today, Muslim countries blame non-Islamic countries for being economic constraints. In Russia, the peoples of the Northern Caucasus still remember the national liberation wars. In fact, the "Islamic factor" has acquired more importance as connected with the memories of the nineteenth-century liberation war, led by Shamil, and the uprising of 1877.⁵ Today, this justifies extremist (terrorist) practices.

Confessional identity is realized through the Islamic cultural tradition, knowledge of the history of Islam, Arab language, foundations of Islamic theology, "fiqh," that is, at the level of Islamic religious education. According to the Committee for Religious Affairs of Daghestan, there are 17 Islamic universities with 43 branches, 113 madrasahs and 278 maktabas with a total number of 14,000 students in the republic. In the whole of the Southern Federal District of Russia there are 32 Islamic universities.

³ For the list of the NGOs in relation to which the court passed the enacted decision of liquidation or banning activities based on the Federal Law on Opposition to Extremist Activities, see [http://minjust.ru/nko/perechen_zapret], 23 February, 2017.

⁴ See: A. Malashenko, *Moy islam*, Rossiyskaia politicheskaja entsiklopedija, Moscow, 2010.

⁵ See: A. Malashenko, *Ramzan Kadyrov. Rossiyskiy politik kavkazskoy natsionalnosti*, Rossiyskaia politicheskaja entsiklopedija, Moscow, 2009.

Some of them are working as schools without licenses or registered teaching programs. The following factors contribute to the spread of Islamic radicalism in Russian society:

- (1) the problem of religious education;
- (2) social and economic factors;
- (3) emigration and immigration as political factors.

Experts use the term “re-Islamization” to define the processes, unfolding on the eve of the Soviet Union’s disintegration and in the first post-Soviet decade in the Russian Federation.⁶ The subject of this article requires clarification of the ways the Islamic community is organized in the territory of Russia. There is no united Muslim community: Muslims form two loosely connected Islamic communities: the North Caucasian and Tatar-Bashkir. Both are widely represented in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The fact of their more or less independent (territorially and mentally) existence should be taken into account by those, who study the processes of Islamization in Russia. The movement toward early Islam can be described as a response to the inability of the elites in Muslim countries to establish a legitimate social order within a viable political structure.

Methods and Materials

The concepts, elaborated by Karl Mannheim and Zygmunt Bauman, have been used as the methodological basis for the study of the phenomenon of religious radicalism as a form that crops up in political ideologies and political organizations. The organizational aspects of the phenomenon of politicization of religion were interpreted by J. Greenberg, R. Baron, D. North, J. March, and J. Olsen in the context of the general theories of organization and political institutionalization.

The present author has relied on the following scholarly methods of research: systems analysis, in which case the interrelated structural-functional approach and input/output analysis were used; comparative evaluation, based on the categories of similarity and dissimilarity to identify similar, identical or different characteristics of political institutions or processes. Also used were case studies as tools to identify patterns and to obtain the necessary synthesis, considerably enriching the theory of politics. Examined were historical characteristics: synchronous, which presuppose the studies of phenomena in their historical contexts; chronological, or the study of historical events in chronological order; and diachronic, focusing on periodization and historical parallels, historical modeling as applied to political science in general, political processes, technologies and institutions. In addition, the work involved using the systemic functional measurement; content analysis of documents; descriptive and correlational characteristics; and instruments of political estimation.

Various documents served as an empirical basis of politicalological scholarly studies have made it possible for the author to identify the main trends of politicization of religion and clericalization of politics. The extensive body of documentation material makes it possible to extend the estimation characteristics to an indefinite period.

Results

Politicization of Islam can be interpreted as acquiring a political status by the processes, phenomena and problems that had no political status. It was launched by the failure of the traditional

⁶ See: *Ibidem*.

methods of dealing with the problem, its high social consequence in the eyes of society and its artificial politicization. Indeed, politicization of Islam is a multifactorial and complex process, associated with using religious ideas for political purposes, justifying political actions and mobilization for non-religious purposes. Political Islam is highly popular in the ummah (a supra-national community with a common history), because of its varied functions (political, social, psychological, and economic) in the context of the Islamic world.

Over two thousand religious organizations in the Republic of Dagestan represent all confessions of Russia.⁷ While 64.1% of the polled describes themselves as religious people, only 38.7% observes religious rites and 25% does not observe them at all. At the same time, there are about 200 thousand deeply religious Muslims in the region. The results of the studies testify that the type of religiosity (or religious people) that predominates in Dagestan is not connected with regular religious practices. The attitude toward religion among the Dagestan ethnicities varies: 38% of Avars describe themselves as religious people; the same can be said about 20% of Darghinians; 14% of Kumyks; 10% of Lezghians; 4% of Laks, and 14% of other ethnicities. The share of Wahhabis and members of tariqats among the deeply religious Muslims is negligible—not more than 3 to 4%.

The extremist ideology of Wahhabism is spreading everywhere in the republic, whose geopolitical role has been changed. Independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in the Caucasus and the mounting political instability in Chechnia and other republics of the Northwestern Caucasus made Dagestan the key geopolitical entity in the south of Russia.

Wahhabism was mainly gaining popularity due to numerous internal factors: social and economic instability, unemployment, poverty, individual vulnerability, criminalization of different aspects of everyday life, degradation of morals and ethics, domination of the clan system in the Muslim North Caucasian regions, as well as Moscow's vague regional politics and a low regard for the spiritual status of the clergy. Re-Islamization is most prominent in the Northwestern regions, especially among the Avars, Darghinians (with the exception of Kaytags) and Kumyks and is much less prominent among the Lezghians, Laks, Tabasarans, Darghin-Kaytags.

Islam can be described as the main determinant of social awareness among the peoples of Dagestan and manifests itself in two ways:

- (1) widening and deepening religious convictions in those, who have familiarized themselves with the profound and existential sides of the faith and the Koran;
- (2) interest in the ritual side of Islam, caused by the revival of Islam in Dagestan.

Until 1991, there was no system of religious education in Dagestan; the clergy and teachers of Islam were trained at the Mir-Arab madrasah in Bukhara. In the first half of the 1990s, the educational system was chaotically restored, the process that the institutionalized clergy could not control. Today, Wahhabis are setting up a clandestine network in the regions with Muslim populations with money they get from other countries, together with instructions and orders. This is going on outside the North Caucasian republics as well: in the Stavropol Territory, Astrakhan and Volgograd regions, in Moscow and other big cities of the Russian Federation. In fact, conflicts might flare up in all the regions of European Russia where Muslims live in compact communities—in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Volga Area, Mordovia, Nizhniy Novgorod, etc. Today, a protracted court procedure against a Muslim community that bought the local House of Culture for religious purposes is going on in the Moscow Region. Local activists are adamant in their opposition to a Muslim cul-

⁷ See: "Komitet po delam religii Dagestana podvel itogi raboty za 2015 god," available at [<http://checheninfo.ru/75405-komitet-po-delam-religii-dagestana-podvel-itogi-za-2015-god.html>], 23 February, 2017.

tural center in the town of Elektrogorsk (Moscow Region); they have already lodged a collective petition with the law enforcement agencies.⁸ Muslim leaders have concentrated on the penitentiary system of Russia seen, according to Mufti Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin, as one of the main paths leading to genuine faith.⁹

Social and economic problems are no less important for the development of radical Islamism. The standard of living collapsed together with the Soviet Union. The demographic growth created land deficit in the mountain regions that forced people to find employment in towns and cities. No wonder, the Muslim regions of Russia (the Northern Caucasus, Siberia and the Volga Area) have acquired a huge number of young unemployed people, driven to Islam by inadequate spiritual teachers.

The “religious renaissance of the twenty-first century,” now underway, is a product of the efforts of the political elite to reorganize the political space to extract maximum profits, as well as of the liberation of the colonial world and the desire of the ethnic elites to re-channel the money flows and power resources in their favor. This made the opposition between the spaces-civilizations along the axis of meta-factors even more violent. Religion and the demographic changes, caused by migration processes, can be described as factors of conflicts.

Discussion

Much has been written and is being written to prove or disprove the impact of Islamic radicalism on the policies of the countries that have to cope with the problems of Islamism in their territories, namely, Germany, France and, of course, Russia. Numerous studies of the problem of interaction between cultures, religions, nationalities and ethnicities are carried out in the countries, where the problem of Islamism cannot be treated lightly. In Russia, in particular, it remains one of the main concerns: Islamic radicalism relies on a wide foundation for its development, while the state still finds it hard to cope with the problem. In the 1990s, the Islamic factor in the life of the Russian society was gradually coming to the fore; hence, a considerably bigger number of relevant published studies. There is no agreement about the main causes of Islamic fundamentalism. The following works, dealing with the process of politicization of the Islamic world and the Islamic factor in individual countries by Russian (V. Akhmedov, I. Gabdrarifkov and co-authors, M. Gusev, S. Grachev, O. Kolobov, V. Dontsov, I. Karabulatova, B. Koybaev, L. Sjukijainen, A. Malashenko, N. Mosaki, and others)¹⁰

⁸ See: “V Podmoskovie podaly v Prokuraturu protiv musulmanskogo tsentra,” available at [<https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=30795>], 22 February, 2017.

⁹ See: “Daufit Khamadishin: “Kogda osvobodzhaiushchiesya iz mest lisheniia svobody stanovitsia izgoem v obshchestve, put k vere neobratim,” 22 February, 2017 [<http://dumrf.ru/regions/event/11961>], 24 February, 2017.

¹⁰ See: V. Akhmedov, *Rol islamskogo faktora v obshchestvenno-politicheskom razvitii arabskikh stran Blizhnego Vostoka i ego evoliutsia v usloviakh siriyskogo vosstaniia (90-e gg. XX-nachalo XXI v.)*, Moscow, 2015; I.M. Gabdrarifkov, I.S. Karabulatova, L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, “Ethnoconfessional Factor in Social Adaptation of Migrant Workers in the Muslim Regions of Russia,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Supplement 4, 2015, pp. 213-223; S.I. Grachev, O.A. Kolobov, *Radikalnye techeniia islama: zarubezhny opyt protivodeystviia i ego ispolzovanie v Rossii*, NNGU Publishers, Nizhniy Novgorod, 2007; M.N. Gusev, “Islamskiy faktor vneshnepoliticheskogo vektora kursa stran Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii,” in: *Blizhniy Vostok i sovremennost*, Moscow, 2006; V.E. Dontsov, *Politicheskie protsessy i instituty v usloviakh preodoleniia natsionalnogo raskola: na primere Yemena*, Moscow, 1991; I. Karabulatova, op. cit.; B.G. Koybaev, *Blizhniy Vostok: informatsiia i regionalnaia bezopasnost*, St. Petersburg, 2002; A.V. Malashenko, “Islam i politika v gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoy Azii,” *Tsenralnaia Azia i Kavkaz*, No. 4 (5), 1999; N.Z. Mosaki, *Kurdistan i kurdskiy vopros v politike Zapada i Rossii (90-e gody XX v.-nachalo XXI v.)*, Moscow, 2011; L. Sjukijainen, “Islam vs. Islam. On Islamic Alternative to Extremism and Terrorism,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 3 (15), 2002.

and foreign authors (C. Valentine, C. Buchet, D. Novotný and co-authors, V. Hale, R. Spencer, W. Kilpatrick, L. Southern) deserve special mention.¹¹

Local journalists add a lot of tension to vehement disagreements between confessions.¹² From the very beginning, the cultural Islamic center, organized several years ago in Vostryakovo, outside Moscow, attracted and still attracts a lot of attention of special services and neighbors, as well as migrant workers; their presence in great and growing numbers has widened the gap between the local people and migrants.¹³ Members of the religious movements, banned in Russia, appeared in the Moscow Region; a group of religious fanatics that belonged to the criminal GTA group, operating under the guise of members of a terrorist jamaat, was engaged in killing drivers on the Don highway next to Domodedovo.

The Russian laws keep radical forces of all hues outside the political process and public politics: the parties, whose activities, ideologies or aims do not comply with the Federal Law on Political Parties, have no chances of being legally recognized.

At the same time, the revolution in the sphere of communications, as an element of globalization and the result of modernization, is a factor of social and political activities of the broadest layers of population, who are ready to defend their rights up to and including the right to profess any religion.

Conclusion

Islamic radicalism is not limited to Russia— acts of terror occur throughout the entire world. Some authors write about self-radicalization, which means that today there is no need for those of the young Europeans, who want to be converted to radical Islam and join terrorist organizations, to go to Muslim countries.¹⁴ The communication networks that have spread across the world have added special urgency to the so-called network wars¹⁵ that make the task of the law enforcement agencies much harder.

The obvious discrepancies between the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad and the highly negative realities of our days are not infrequently interpreted as stemming from moving away from

¹¹ See: C. Valentin, *La France, champ de bataille privilégié de l'islam politique*, Paris, 2017; "Christian Boucher protiv islamofobii," available at [<http://www.nb-info.ru/revolt/bushe1.htm>], 23 February, 2017; D. Novotný, A. Belhaj, M. Čejka, A. Savonová, J. Kužvart, "The Changing Security Situation in the Maghreb," available at [http://www.anatem.info/articles/securite_maghreb.pdf], 23 February, 2017; V. Hale, "Islam Academic: Migrants Want Eurabia, Globalists Using Migrants to Destroy the West," 14 August, 2016, available at [<http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/08/14/islam-academic-migrants-want-eurabia-globalists-using-migrants-to-destroy-the-west/>], 23 February, 2017; R. Spencer, *The Complete Infidel's Guide to Iran*, New York, 2016; W. Kilpatrick, *The Politically Incorrect Guide to Jihad (The Politically Incorrect Guides)*, New York, 2016; L. Southern, *Barbarians: How Baby Boomers, Immigration, and Islam Screwed My Generation*, New York, 2017.

¹² See: "Pravoslavnye Moskvy i Podmoskovia prosiat perepodchinit islamskie obshchiny Tsentralnoy Rossii muftiyu Tadjuddinu," available at [<http://www.pravoslavie.ru/24429.html>], 23 February, 2017; E. Sazhneva, "V islamskom tsentre pod Moskvoy iz zhenshchin izgoniaut dzhinnov," available at [<http://www.mk.ru/social/2016/10/27/v-islamskom-centre-pod-moskvoy-iz-zhenshchin-izgonyayut-dzhinnov.html>], 23 February, 2017.

¹³ See: I. M. Gabdrifkov, I.S. Karabulatova, L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, op. cit.

¹⁴ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

¹⁵ See: P.V. Barsukov, I.S. Karabulatova, S.V. Nekrasov, I.V. Akhmetov, O.V. Mamatelashvili, F.F. Khizbulin, "Transformatsia sotsialnogo povedeniya v kontekste sovremennykh politicheskikh krizisov nachala XXI v. kak rezultat etnopoliticheskogo diskursa 'setevykh voyn'," in: *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie i gumanitarno-filosofskie problemy sovremennoy nauki*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Ufa, Rostov on Don, 2015, pp. 60-70; G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, G.F. Shafranov-Kutsev, E.R. Kucheryavaya, S.D. Galiullina, L.R. Sadykova, "Problemy etnokontsionalnogo ekstremizma v Rossii kak otrazhenie deviatsonnykh protsessov v obshchestve," in: *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie i gumanitarno-filosofskie problemy sovremennoy nauki*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Ufa, Rostov on Don, 2015, pp. 8-17.

religious injunctions, moral degradation of society and abandonment of the traditional norms. "Postmodern" environment, mounting economic, social and political instability and the phenomenon of the "geopolitical chaos" have created a context, in which all sorts of religious factors can affect social life up to and including the problem of social fairness, political system and the system of power relations.¹⁶ This is closely connected with the idealization of the first ummah as a society, in which the egalitarian ideals of the lower classes (that suffered more than all other social groups because of the failures of social and economic reforms in the developing countries) were fully realized.

Overall, one can say that the specifics of Islam, as religion, played the main role in using it as the basis of the extremist ideology in Muslim countries. Due to this the optimal ideological forms that Islam has added to extremism can play a great, but probably not a decisive role in its spreading appeal.

The state should ensure security, hence measures are taken to restrain individual terrorists and terrorist organizations that have hoisted the banner of radical Islam. The laws adopted and applied in the Russian Federation are effective, albeit to a lesser degree than expected. Today, radical Muslims are kept outside the open political process: their parties and organizations are banned, while much is being done to stem the proliferation of the ideas of radical Islam.

Today, Russia wants to exclude Islamists from the political process by proliferating the traditional Islamic norms and values, police means and methods and even physical liquidation of Islamists. However, Islamism remains and will remain one of the biggest threats for many years to come.

¹⁶ See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF CONTEMPORARY RADICAL ISLAM IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EURASIAN CUSTOMS UNION

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ABSTRACT

By the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, extremist groups, operating in different countries and at the global level, have considerably extended their informational, tactical, strategic, ideological, political network, as well as resources and economic interaction, the process and the results of which have become especially obvious in the European Union and the Eurasian Customs Union member states. All sorts of terrorist and religious groups have mastered the skills of exploiting territorial conflicts across the post-Soviet space and the efforts in finding solutions to get out of the ethnic and confessional crisis. Radical Islam is ready and able to compete with the "classical" conservatism (paleoconservatism) and "new right" in turning to traditionalism, moralism and religious fundamentalism. It is not inferior to socialism in its egalitarianism and anti-bourgeois social and economic propaganda, and also to fascism (National Socialism) in totalitarianism and the willingness to sow destruction and death.¹ Islam has already become the "new alternative style" with a vast collection of discursive practices among the highly varied social groups not only in Muslim coun-

tries but in the Customs Union (CU) and the EU member states. Islam is gradually developing into a global radical anti-systemic ideology, filling the niche previously occupied by socialist ideology now in an ideological crisis. The Communist system was liquidated, the Communist ideology and the left-radical groups lost part of their appeal. The void was filled with religiously tinged political doctrines to let people express their dissatisfaction with the capitalist system. This added special importance to theoretical studies of a complex set of problems, related to the specifics of radical Islam, as we know it today. It is equally important to consider its pronounced impacts on the main components of the social and political systems of the EU and the CU and the possibilities to forecast, with a great deal of reliability, the trends in the direction of influence of Islamism, with due account for the forms of manifestation of radicalism at different levels of discursive practices. These problems should be addressed and resolved before proceeding to the task of ensuring efficient political governance and choosing the optimal trends of opposing these negative social and political phenomena. Studying the nature, types and forms of manifestations of radical Islam in the EU and CU is instrumental for inter-state structures and special services in preventing ethnic and social deviations.

¹ See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

KEYWORDS: *radical Islam, Customs Union, European Union, discursive practices, ethnic and social deviations.*

Introduction

In the course of history, Islam and its egalitarian ethos have acquired a fairly successful experience of ideological expansion of its discursive practices among wide social groups in different countries. Islamization of different population groups that had occupied the lower steps of the “ladder of prestige” began in the Middle Ages when Babur (born Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad) conquered India and set up the Timurid Empire of the Mughal dynasty. Members of the caste of untouchables found Islam highly attractive. The process is going on in India where lower castes embrace Islam, Buddhism or even Christianity, the caste of Mirasi (singers and dancers) that adopted Islam can serve as a relevant example.

Radical Western intellectuals, likewise, are tempted by Islam and its ideology. René Guénon, for example, arrived at Islamism via conservatism and traditionalism; Roger Garaudy moved away from Communism.² In any society, there are deviants, ready to abandon their religions for the sake of radical Islam.³ The criminal subculture and radical Islam share their rejection of the state, its laws and norms; they prefer to live either “by the rules of a criminal community” or by the Shari‘a. This engenders dialog, mutual respect and even partnership between the members of the criminal world and radical Islam.

In the early twentieth century, arrested Communists spread their ideas to criminals, with whom they shared prison cells. Today the criminal world willingly accepts the ideas of Islamism:⁴ in prisons, radicals (Communists or Islamists) are kept in the same cells with professional criminals and are respected for their ideas.

In Great Britain, with the Muslim population of slightly over 5%, Muslims comprise 13% of the prison population.⁵ Nearly a third of them became Muslims while in prison. The Muslim diaspora in Europe is building up its influence together with its growing numerical strength—today, it is 19 million-strong. In some countries, there are Islamic political parties and Muslim quarters in the big cities, closed to the non-Muslims (even the police).⁶

It took the Muslim diasporas in the EU and in the CU many decades to become that big, yet they recently joined politics at the country level and acquired their own parties. Until recently, they had been lobbying their interests through all sorts of political institutions. Most of European Muslims side with the left parties that support a liberal migration policy, social programs for the poorest groups and a “multicultural” environment.⁷ Today, it has become clear that this cooperation has been exhausted and that the West and East should start looking for new cooperation practices.

² See: R. Guénon, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, Sophia Perennis (publisher), 2001; R. Garaudy, *The Founding Myths of Modern Israel*, Institute for Historical Review, 2000.

³ See: I. Mkrtumova, I. Karabulatova, A. Zinchenko, “Political Extremism of the Youth as an Ethnosocial Deviation in the Post-Soviet Electronic Information Society,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 79-87; G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, “Matrimonialnye strategii v polittekhologiiakh IGIL,” *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Series 2, Humanitarian Sciences, No. 6, 2016, pp. 69-79.

⁴ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, “Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

⁵ See: “Tret zakliuchennykh-musulman Britanii priniali islam v tiurme,” available at [<http://www.islamnews.ru/news-24729.html>], 24 February, 2017.

⁶ See: “Riadam, no ne vmeste: Musulmane v Evrope vse bolshe obosobliaiutsia,” available at [<https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/01/12/politmuslims/>], 23 February, 2017; S. Kern, “Britain: Muslim Prison Population Up 200%,” available at [<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3913/uk-muslim-prison-population>], 24 February, 2017; R. Suleymenov, “Allah ego znaet. O srashchivanii musulmanskogo fundamentalizma i kriminala v Tatarstane,” *Slovo*, 12-25 December, 2014, p. 13.

⁷ See: T.R. Meshlok, *Musulmanskie menshinstva v stranakh Zapadnoy Evropy vo vtoroy polovine XX veka (na primere Frantsii i Germanii)*, KubGU, Krasnodar, 2007; G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, G.F. Shafranov-Kutsev, E.R. Kucheryavaya,

The bipolar system disintegrated leaving behind numerous obstacles in the relationships between states and cultures.⁸ Many Islam-related problems affect all sides of global life—from the relationships of the states to development of social consciousness.

Methods and Materials

We have tried to identify the causes and prerequisites of radical Islam, as we know it today, viz. the main factor of political processes, while relying on conclusions of foreign and Russian authors and on the media as a source base. The aims we have posed ourselves require

- (1) studies of the principles and methods of influence of radical Islam on the historical processes in the EU and CU countries;
- (2) discussion of contemporary radical Islam as a real political factor in the EU and CU member states;
- (3) an analysis of similarities/dissimilarities of radical Islam in the EU and CU member states, accounting for diverse factors.

There are no statistics, related to the numerical strength of Muslim structures: Islamic or pro-Islamic centers of statistics deliberately overstate the relevant figures, while the government structures deliberately understate them. This makes it difficult to arrive at more or less correct figures. Today, there are at least two Islamic political parties in Europe—The Party for the Renaissance and Union of Spain (PRUNE) and the Islam Democrats (the Netherlands), the party, which is highly active in The Hague, where it won several seats in the city council.

There are public movements with no tangible political impact, still hoping to acquire the status of parties. Such is the Finnish Islamic Party in Finland, the UCOII (Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche) in Italy, the Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) and the Justice and Development League in Germany. The fact that the latter is a clone of its Turkish namesake causes a lot of concern. The public is especially suspicious of the unfolding radicalization of Islam and the activities of certain organizations, working under the banner “In the name of Islam and for the sake of Islam.” It took terrorism that emerged at the heat of the Afghan conflict several decades to spread beyond the limits of the Muslim world to become one of the most obvious global security threats. Radical Islam should be studied, since, being a global phenomenon, it has certain local specifics, which makes regional or even country terrorism an object of scrutiny.

Our studies are based on the conceptual principles of political science, on systemic approach and the methodology, elaborated by prominent Russian and foreign scholars, used for comprehensive linguo-cognitive political research.

We have studied radical Islam as a homogenous system, the attributes of which appeared and have become more or less clarified in the course of the functioning of the state as an integral social and political mechanism and the milieu, in which extremist sentiments crop up. We used the struc-

S.D. Galiullina, L.R. Sadykova, “Problems of Ethno-Confessional Extremism in Russia as a Reflection of Deviation Processes in the Society,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 6, S. 3, 2016, pp. 95-103.

⁸ See: A.G. Kisilev, S.A. Shilina, *Upravlenchesky diskurs kak sotsialnaia kommunikativnaia tekhnologia v sisteme otnosheniy gosudarstva i sotsiuma*, Monograph, INFRA-M, Moscow, 2017, 120 pp.

tural-functional variant of systems analysis that orients the scholar toward the analysis of structural characteristics and identification of specifics of the system as a whole.

Results

The Islamist charities that support all Muslim prisoners, whether “political” or “criminal,” and supply them with all the necessities, are sometimes blamed for making radical Islam the norm in a deviant milieu. These organizations that function as NGOs accept money from all those who want to help the imprisoned Muslims and their families. They offer a sort of “spiritual consultations” and lessons on Islam from imams, who regularly visit prisons and who mainly represent radical Islamic movements.⁹ In the 1920s-1930s, there was the International Red Aid (MOPR) Organization that helped convicted and imprisoned revolutionaries. Today, Islamic radicals have mastered more effective radical discursive practices. Great Britain, very much concerned by the growth of radical Islamic sentiments among the prison population, is not alone. France, with its much harsher penitentiary system, likewise, does not like the massive Islamist propaganda and the growing number of newly converted Muslims behind bars. Indeed, having served their terms in prison, these highly radicalized people pour into the streets of European cities to affect the European society in many respects. Similar processes are going on in Russia (in the Volga Area, the Urals and Daghestan).¹⁰ The trends that are being spread in the criminal milieu are alien to the autochthonous Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation: they represent radical fundamentalist trends, practiced in other countries (Wahhabism, Salafism, Hizb ut-Tahrir, etc.).

The Islamists, put into Russian prisons for religious extremism and terrorist activities, are spreading their ideas among other inmates that were either uninterested in religion¹¹ or belonged to the traditional Hanafi madhab. These people create jamaats of inmates, many of whom are tempted by the ideology of radical Islam that forgives the crimes perpetrated before the conversion, while new crimes are exonerated as part of the jihad: this ideology justifies the crimes, committed against those who do not share it (the “wrong” Hanafi Muslims are not safe either).¹²

Outside the prison walls, members of organized criminal groups in Tatarstan and Daghestan have become active Wahhabis. In Kazan, for example, organized Salafi groups have painted their criminal activities with religious hues: they have transformed racketeering in the markets into collecting *zakah* from each “ethnic” Muslim in favor of the jamaat and the “brothers” in prisons or waging the holy war.

The non-Muslim traders are not safe either: the racketeers refer to the protection of the Christians and Jews as the “people of the Book” in the Islamic Caliphate to explain why today the “protected” should pay *jizyah* (per capita tax paid by non-Muslim subjects). It should be said that the number of ethnic Russian criminals, converted with the influence of their Islamist accomplices, is steadily growing and that not infrequently Russian Muslims are even more radical than their “brothers.”¹³

⁹ See: D. Lisnyanskaya, “Angliysky zakliuchenny XXI v.,” available at [<http://www.polosa.co.il/blog/34759>], 24 February, 2017.

¹⁰ See: R. Suleymenov, op. cit.; I. Karabulatova, “Ethnocultural Communication Systems in the Northern Caucasus and the Problem of Radical Islam,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 71-79.

¹¹ See: “Krugly stol ‘Radikalizm v sovremennom mire’,” *Vestnik Akademii ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti MVD Rossii*, No. 6, 2015.

¹² See: R. Suleymenov, “Tiuremny khalifat,” *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 February, 2013.

¹³ “Terrorist IGIL iz Rossii kaznil russkogo spetsnazovtisa na kameru,” available at [<http://rusjev.net/2015/12/03/terrorist-igil-iz-rossii-kaznil-russkogo-spetsnazovtisa-na-kameru/>], 24 February, 2017; “Kak verbuiut liudey, devushkek i iunoshey v

Most of universal Western ideologies are in crisis; today the void is filled with radical Islam that strongly affects social life in Europe and Russia. On 15 July, 2016, *Milliyet* referred to the Turkish special services to report that the Islamic State announced mobilization of fighters in Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Northern Caucasus and that the ISIS had already put together a group of 25 fighters to be moved to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Georgia and to Western Europe via Cyprus.¹⁴ The numerous Wahhabi groups operating in the Northern Caucasus (Islamic Jamaats, the Army of Islam, etc.) can be described as radical. Between 1 January and 5 February, 2017, over 11 thousand migrants and refugees crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe. According to the International Migration Organization, 85% of them landed in Italy, others in Greece.¹⁵ Wide dissemination of Islam has found fertile soil, particularly in an aberrant environment.

Discussion

The social and political changes, caused by the much stronger positions of Islam in the European Union, have attracted attention of many members of the academic community. The results of their studies can be divided into two groups

- (1) scholarly works, dealing with the social, epistemological and ontological manifestations of Islam and
- (2) studies of its political outcrops.

The authors of the first group discuss the problems, related to the positions of Muslims in secularized society, and offer all possible variants for the development of the “secular” or “European” trend in Islam.¹⁶ The authors of the second group discuss the compatibility of the political manifestations of Islam with the development of the European world and acute problems created by the already obvious and increasing radicalization of Islam.¹⁷ They write about the problems created by the growth of Islamic diaspora in the EU and CU, as related to the problem of integration and point to the cause and effect of confrontations in contemporary society.

In July 2016, leaders of several terrorist groups (banned in the Russian Federation), based in Syria, composed of people from the Northern Caucasus (Junud al-Sham, Ajanad al-Kavkaz), condemned the terrorist act in the airport of Istanbul. This probably means that they want to distance themselves from the Islamic State.¹⁸

IGIL, v Rossi i za rubezhom,” available at [<http://xn----7sbakauaucayksiop0b0af4c.xn--p1ai/obshhenie-i-kommunikacii/kak-verbuyut-lyudejj-devushek-i-yunoshejj-v-igil-v-rossii-i-za-rubezhom/>], 24 February, 2017; “Vykhodtsy s Kavkaza v riadakh IG (IGIL),” 21 February, 2017, available at [<http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/251513/>], 24 February, 2017.

¹⁴ See: “Milliyet: IG gotovitsia k otpravke boevikov s Kavkaza v Evropu,” available at [<http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/285868/>], 24 February, 2017.

¹⁵ See: “MOM: s nachala 2017 goda v Evropu pribylo bolee 11 tysiach migrantov,” available at [<http://overallnews.ru/i/6724088/>], 24 February, 2017.

¹⁶ See: B. Tibi, *Krieg der Zivilisationen. Politik und Religion zwischen Vernunft und Fundamentalismus*, Munich, 2002; T. Sh. Gilazov, I. S. Karabulatova, F. S. Sayfulina, Ch. M. Kurakova, G. M. Talipova, “Between the East and the West: Phenomenon of Tartar Literary Criticism in the Linguo-Cultural Aspect,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3, S 2, 2015, pp. 508-517.

¹⁷ See: S. Balic, “Islam für Europa: Neue Perspektiven einer alten Religion,” in: *Kölner Veröffentlichungen zur Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. 31, Cologne, 2001; T. Ramadan, “Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe?” in: *Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape*, ed. by Sh. T. Hunter, Washington, 2002; Yu. S. Netesova, *Islamistsky terrorizm v stranakh Evropeyskogo soiuza*, MGIMO, Moscow, 2012.

¹⁸ See: “Eksperty konstatirovali usilenie raskola sredi chechenskikh boevikov,” available at [<http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/285703/>], 24 February, 2017.

In Russia, the North Caucasian peoples have preserved the memory of their national liberation wars in legends, songs and other folklore genres. "Here, the rapid growth of the 'Islamic factor' is connected to the events of the national liberation war of the nineteenth century, led by Shamil, and the revolt of 1877."¹⁹ In Syria, four thousand citizens of Russia and about five thousand citizens of other CIS countries are fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State."²⁰

This memory is gathering more and more consequence as justification of extremist (terrorist) practices. In view of the international political realities of our days and the situation in Russia, we should try to forecast the trends of Islam's development. We should help Muslims adjust to the rapidly changing situation in Russia and become successful in the multi-confessional society.

The last decade has seen a multitude of books and articles, dealing with various aspects of the "global jihad," which could only be expected in view of the complicated nature of the new threat and disparate dimensions of radical Islam, as we know it today. The scholarly value of many of them, however, leaves much to be desired. The changes that have taken place in the religious life of the Muslims should be studied and critically assessed.

Conclusion

At the height of its cultural and religious revival, radical Islam is attracting new followers at a much faster pace than other religions. This is explained by its extreme moral demands; in fact, it is hardly possible to change the Muslim lifestyle by normative acts.

The relationships between secular society and the Muslim ummah (which is highly varied) should be based on tolerance. This excludes any attempts to adjust the cultural values of a minority to those of the majority and suggests that mutually profitable aspects should be developed. Rooted in Islamic ideology and its system, Muslim enthusiasm is closely connected with fatalism. Religious enthusiasm is especially emotional when dealing with non-Muslims. Religious fanaticism in Islam was developing under the pressure of its main provisions of belief in the afterlife, the Judgment Day, heaven and hell. Islam relies on dramatic methods to persuade its followers.²¹

The great and increasing number of Muslims in Europe has added weight to their faith and its role in domestic policies of European states; it has transformed the political spectrum of Western countries and created a new political identity, since the familiar images of political parties have changed. Europe has been confronted with a fact that is better described as a challenge: the Muslims, who refuse to obey the laws of the Shari'a because it brims with bans and norms unacceptable in secular society, betray Islam,²² while in a democratic state, with its constitutional principle of separation of church and state, violations of laws are punishable by law.

¹⁹ A. Malashenko, *Ramzan Kadyrov. Rossiyskiy politik kavkazskoy natsionalnosti*, Rossiyskaia politicheskaya entsiklopediya, Moscow, 2009.

²⁰ "Putin soobshchil, skolko rossiian voiet v riadakh IGIL," available at [<https://ru.tsn.ua/svit/putin-soobshchil-skolko-rossiyan-voyuyut-v-ryadah-ig-811140.html>], 24 February, 2017.

²¹ See: Yu.N. Grabilina (Yu.N. Ebzeeva), "Osobennosti dramaticheskoy dialogicheskoy rechi," in: *Nauchnye Trudy MPGU*, Humanitarian Sciences Series, Collection of Articles, Prometey, Moscow, 2000, pp. 327-329.

²² See: "Beschinstva migrantov v Germanii: opublikovany rezonansnye video," available at [<https://www.obozrevatel.com/abroad/96087-beschinstva-migrantov-v-germanii-opublikovanyi-rezonansnye-video.htm>], 24 February, 2017; "V Evrope stremitelno obostriaetsya situatsia iz-za naplyva migrantov," available at [<https://ru.tsn.ua/svit/v-evrope-stremitelno-obostryaetsya-situaciya-iz-za-naplyva-migrantov-492468.html>], 24 February, 2017; "Ya chertovski ustal: pismo politseyskogo o beschinstvakh migrantov v Shvetsii vyzvalo rezonans v Facebook," available at [<http://overallnews.ru/i/6786033>], 24 February, 2017.

In the highly secularized West European countries, Islam can be barely understood and accepted. This means that it is not institutionally legalized and that xenophobia is spreading among the Europeans. If realized, the demands of Muslims will inevitably change the social and political foundations of the EU and CU member states that are not yet quite ready to accept such changes.
