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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS**Journal of Social and Political Studies****Volume 18****Issue 1****2017****IN THIS ISSUE:****REGIONAL POLICY**

- Asia Korzhengulova,
Lyudmila Shkvarya,
Maria Melanyina.** THE EU-RUSSIA CONCEPTUAL INTERACTION
IN THE EURASIAN SPACE
IN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN SANCTIONS..... 7
- Markos Troulis.** THE CAUCASUS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
FROM THE SOVIET REPUBLICS
TO A CRUCIAL BUFFER ZONE..... 14
- Ahmed Mehboob.** INDIA-PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN ECONOMIC
COOPERATION: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION..... 24
- Alla Karabulatova,
Leonid Kim.** KAZAKHSTAN-SAUDI ARABIA:
FOREIGN POLICY CONTACTS AND INTERACTION
IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS..... 33
- Sergey Ryazantsev,
Igor Bogdanov,
Valentina Dobrokhleb,
Artyom Lukyanets.** MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES
TO RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES
IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION FORMAT 39

ENERGY AND RESOURCE POLICY

- Sergey Zhiltsov.** THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF
THE CASPIAN SEA: GEOPOLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CASPIAN STATES
AND HYDROCARBON RESOURCES..... 50

- Gulnar Askeeva,
Bagysh Gabdulina,
Elena Nechaeva,
Janar Smakova.* TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION
IN CENTRAL ASIA AND REGIONAL SECURITY..... 64

POLITICS TODAY

- Kadyrzhan Smagulov,
Kulimkoz Santaeva,
Erzhan Bulanov,
Natalya Yem.* CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN BETWEEN STRATEGY-2030
AND STRATEGY-2050..... 76
- Ali Salgiriev,
Maret Betilmerzaeva,
Abdulla Akhtaev,
Vakha Gaziev.* DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS:
REGIONAL ASPECT 85

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

- Lyudmila Shkvarya,
Irina Karabulatova,
Vasily Rusakovich,
Abdulla Rapiev.* THE IMPACT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION AND
THE EAEU ON THE SMALL AND MEDIUM BUSINESS
IN KAZAKHSTAN 93
- Zhanna Golodova,
Lyudmila Shkvarya,
Natalia Bondarchuk,
Ekaterina Kolosova.* THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY
IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION 100

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

- Moldir Seidina,
Irina Karabulatova,
Zinaida Polivara,
Anastasia Zinchenko.* A PUBLICIST DISCOURSE OF THE ISLAMIC
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE CENTRAL FEDERAL
DISTRICT OF RUSSIA AND
THE ISSUE OF TOLERANCE..... 109
- Irina Karabulatova.* THE ISLAMIC FACTOR AND
THE POLITICAL PROCESSES IN TAJIKISTAN 118
- Maret Betilmerzaeva,
Abdula Akhtaev,
Bastani Sadulaev,
Ali Salgiriev.* RELIGION AND STATE:
INTERACTION AND SOCIOCULTURAL
TRANSFORMATIONS
(THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC CASE STUDY) 124

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in the next three issues will discuss:***

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Religion in the Sociopolitical Context***
- ***Central Eurasia: Integration Processes***

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- footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author's name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19;
- quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English;
- the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion;
- the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

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REGIONAL POLICY

**THE EU-RUSSIA CONCEPTUAL INTERACTION
IN THE EURASIAN SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF
WESTERN SANCTIONS**

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A B S T R A C T

For over twenty-five years Russia's foreign policy has been shaping and still shapes the architecture of international relations in the post-Soviet territory; its projects, as mechanisms of cooperation, were changing under the pressure of Western political and economic sanctions.¹ At the same time, the impulses that urged Russian leaders to act in this area, were taking place inside and outside this territory. The process is still ongoing, yet a careful investigation of its twenty-five year history reveals the factors behind the changed dynamics, forms and results at each successive stage. Russia's foreign policy was impacted, to different degrees, by both the international climate and situation inside the country.

As the state power grew stronger, Russia's economy was growing less vulnerable and more sustainable than before. The extensive discussion of Russia's strategy and tactics, as well as diverse mechanisms of in-

teraction in the post-Soviet space, adds relevance to the subject of the present article. We have also discussed certain projects of cooperation in the post-Soviet space against the background of the gradually intensifying competition between Moscow and Brussels for privileged positions in and integration with the post-Soviet Eurasian countries.

The events that have been unfolding in Ukraine since the first half of 2014 (the inclusion of Crimea in Russia and the separatist movement in the eastern part of the country), and their obvious repercussions became the starting point of considerable changes in the geopolitical map of the western part of the post-Soviet territory and opened a new stage in Russia's foreign policy. Today, the substantive content of this stage remains vague, which means that any comprehensive analysis of its impact on Russia's foreign policies would be premature. It is clear, however, that, in the context of Western sanctions, this situation challenges Russia and the countries that the competing sides want to draw into their integration models.

¹ See: L.V. Shkvarya, V.I. Rusakovich, D.V. Lebedeva, "Rossia-Iran: razvitie sotrudnichestva v usloviakh sanktsiy," *Upravlenie ekonomicheskimi sistemami: elektronnyy nauchnyy zhurnal*, No. 11 (71), 2014, p. 43.

KEYWORDS: *integration, sanctions, post-Soviet territory, the European Union, Russia, Eurasia.*

Introduction

Russia's political and psychological perception of the former Soviet Union republics is responsible for the evolution of its conceptual approaches to the post-Soviet states. After 2000, officials in Russia started talking about the Eurasian space, normally in connection with certain structures (EurAsEC/EAEU, CES). In search of rhetoric that might unite these states together, Moscow has been gradually moving away from Soviet terminology. The number of institutional cooperation structures mentioned in official documents was steadily growing, while the same cooperation projects (or, rather, the terms that defined them) were proposed several times (the Customs Union, the Economic Union), their realization, however, depending on the exigency of external factors.

In the post-Soviet space, the Russian leaders are operating at several institutional contextual levels: within the broad format of the CIS and in several narrower structures (the Customs Union, EurAsEC/EAEU and CSTO) and keep the de facto frozen Union State of Belarus and Russia alive. Much was done,

prior to 2014, to involve Moldova and Ukraine, as common neighbors with the EU, in more sustainable bilateral relations. After 2014, however, Ukraine performed a U-turn that left Russia with no choice but to completely revise its Ukrainian policies. Brussels responded with anti-Russian sanctions.

The leaders of Russia perceive integration as an objective process, one of the trends in the international relations.² In Europe, the first scholarly publications practically coincided with the very first day of the official functioning of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. In 2010-2011, their number was relatively small and the works themselves were mainly nothing more than concise descriptions of the Eurasian Customs Union and the way it functioned. Since 1 January, 2012, when members of the Customs Union of EurAsEC founded the Common Economic Space (CES), the European academic community began showing a lot more interest in the prospects of the new structure and its viability.³ Integration is understood as the “drawing closer” of these countries in many directions and aspects.⁴

In the Russian projects for institutions meant to unite the post-Soviet countries, there is a lack of a valuable component, which could have served as the linchpin of integration. What Moscow offers in order to achieve that goal is to invite its partners to unite on the basis of common interests. As perceived by Moscow, the Commonwealth is no longer a “new confederation” (as it was seen by those who set it up) but a united search for common interests and allies. Today, the CIS is a forum of countries seeking ad hoc mechanisms and decisions.

The instruments, applied to closest neighbors, are mainly negative, such as the withholding of privileges (cheap resources, supplies of armaments, political support); they are fairly effective when applied to economically weak countries that partly depend on Russia (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine) or the countries with strong and practically uncontrolled central authority (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).⁵ The efficiency of such instruments is short-lived: after a while, the targeted states start seeking contacts with the EU, another integration center that relies on positive instruments in its foreign policies.

The post-Soviet space is not just a priority objective for Russia’s foreign policies; it is an element of its interaction with other international participants: the EU and the U.S. primarily. Indeed, Russia’s weaker political position in relation to the post-Soviet states does little to enhance its international image and position.

Methods and Materials

Theoretical elaborations of the issue of integration in the Russian⁶ and foreign⁷ literature are based on different approaches and interpretations of the term “integration.”

² See: N.E. Kamal, M.A. Almulla, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, *The Arab East and Russia: Current Transformations of Multinational Corporations*, ed. by G. Osipov, ISPR RAS, Moscow, 2016, p. 138.

³ See: L. Shkvarya, O. Grigorenko, A. Strygin, V. Rusakovich, S. Shilina, “The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Asian Technology Markets (India and China),” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 2, Vol. 17, 2016, pp. 103-113.

⁴ See: I.N. Chuev, T.M. Panchenko, V.S. Novikov, O.A. Konnova, N.G. Iraeva, I.S. Karabulatova, “Innovation and Integrated Structures of the Innovations in Modern Russia,” *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 239-244.

⁵ See: L.V. Shkvarya, V.I. Rusakovich, D.V. Lebedeva, “Vneshneekonomicheskie sviazi Respubliki Tadzhikistan s gosudarstvami Azii: sovremennye tendentsii,” *Upravlenie ekonomicheskimi sistemami: elektronny nauchny zhurnal*, No. 6 (78), 2015, p. 12.

⁶ See: Yu. Nikitina, “Ot integratsii k regionalizmu: evoliutsia teorii regionalnogo mezhgosudarstvennogo sotrudnichestva,” *Vestnik MGIMO—Universitet*, No. 6 (15), 2010, pp. 134-140.

⁷ See: R. Dragneva, K. Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?” *CHATHAM HOUSE*, 2012; N.E. Kamal, M.A. Almulla, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, op. cit.

Empirical materials, likewise, supply a lot of information about the integration processes unfolding in the world.⁸ Considering that different theories of integration are based on common precepts and the fact that Moscow's integration projects are based on Western experience, we prefer to interpret integration as a process dominated by the principle of supra-nationality. This process requires supra-national institutions assuming a part of the competencies of sovereign states; we have identified the development stages of these institutions and revealed that Moscow looks toward the European Union as the model of integration.⁹

Integration, as understood by the Russian leaders and presented in official statements and official foreign policy documents, is the "drawing closer" of interested countries that adhere to common norms in various spheres.¹⁰

This differs greatly from the theoretical approaches, therefore, the authors rely on the more general term of "drawing closer" rather than "integration" when discussing Russia's approaches to the post-Soviet space.

The main sources used in this article can be divided into four groups:

- (1) Official documents of the Russian Federation that shape its foreign policy: the foreign policy and national security concepts, strategies and military doctrines;
- (2) International agreements, treaties, declarations, decisions based on multilateral talks;
- (3) Speeches by the top Russian officials, as well as statements and commentaries by the RF Foreign Ministry and its official representatives;
- (4) Interviews with experts conducted by the authors in order to identify their opinions regarding their views about the changes in the Russian official foreign policy.

Methodologically, our work is based on comparative and retrospective analysis of the approaches of the Russian foreign policy community toward assessing the post-Soviet space. This analysis has helped to identify the specifics of foreign policy concepts at different stages of their development and demonstrated how they interact with the ongoing processes elsewhere in the world.

The discussion of the foreign policy approaches is based on the analysis of official documents, speeches by Russia's diplomats and the most significant media publications. At the level of scientific methodology, we relied on theoretical methods of analysis and synthesis, abstraction, induction and deduction.

Results

The Eastern Partnership policy of the European Union vis-à-vis the integration vector in Ukraine's development, as well as the normative competition between the two integrative projects led to the Ukrainian crisis and armed conflict in the region. In 2014-2015, the number of publications by the European expert community dealing with Eurasian integration has increased; all of them highly negative, critical of the Eurasian project and skeptical about its future. It has become obvious, however, that the Ukrainian developments took the EU by surprise and that the Eurasian Economic Union started functioning. Also, the inefficiency of the European economic sanctions forced the European Union to admit that, despite the flood of critical comments and the fact that before 2014 the

⁸ See: L. Shkvarya, O. Grigorenko, A. Strygin, V. Rusakovich, S. Shilina, *op. cit.*

⁹ See: I.N. Chuev, T.M. Panchenko, V.S. Novikov, O.A. Konnova, N.G. Iraeva, I.S. Karabulatova, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ See: T.V. Bordachev, "Nichego podobnogo na postsovetском prostranstve ne bylo," available at [<http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Nichego-podobnogo-na-postsovetском-prostranstve-ne-bylo-17257>], 3 December, 2016.

EU had completely ignored the EurAsEC, it should acknowledge the necessity of cooperating with the new structure.

The Ukrainian crisis had accelerated the corresponding changes in the EU policies; it prompted the first official political statements about cooperation with the EAEU and a possibility of creating a free trade area between them. It turned out that, for all practical purposes, the EU could no longer continue lobbying its interests in the Eastern Partnership countries without taking into account the interests of the EAEU members. The EU has become aware that it should change its views toward the post-Soviet space and, in particular, its policy regarding the Eurasian integration.

Table 1

**Content Analysis of Publications
on Interaction between the EU and EurAsEC/EAEU**

Publications	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of publications	8	7	6	14	31	28
Neutral publications	7	4	2	1	0	7
Positive publications	1	2	4	9	2	0
Negative publications	0	1	0	4	29	21
Share of biased publications in the total number of publications, %	87.5	57.1	66.7	64.3	93.5	75
Share of publications in any specific period in the total share of publications, %	8.5	7.4	6.4	14.9	33	29.8
Total number of publications						94

The U.K., Baltic countries, Poland, Rumania and Sweden are opposed to the drawing closer of the EU and the EAEU because of Russia's prevailing influence in the latter. Nevertheless, the positions of Poland, Rumania and Sweden are milder than those of their Baltic neighbors. In recent years, Poland and Rumania have greatly politicized their trade and economic relations with Russia and damaged their business interests there: the Poles and Rumanians lost more than others because of the EU-imposed anti-Russian sanctions. This explains why, despite the Ukrainian crisis and no warm feelings toward Russia, they are actively developing cooperation with Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.¹¹ It seems that this barrier can be removed by the concerted diplomatic efforts of Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan—members of the EAEU.

The common history is gradually losing its hitherto dominant significance in the integration processes of the region. According to the majority of Russian experts, starting in the mid-2000s, the fabric of the post-Soviet territory began showing signs of rifts, signifying that the previously single and united geopolitical area is eroding. The European post-Soviet countries prefer economic and political contacts with the European Union, Russia and the United States, while the Central Asian countries look toward Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. Russia's partners in the Eurasian Economic Union (primarily Kazakhstan) have become objects of close attention of special services of the West and Saudi Arabia.

¹¹ See: "Mnogoletniaia diskriminatsia rossiyskogo biznesa v Polshe vozvrashchaetsia bumerangom," TPP- INFORM. ru: Official site of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry [http://www.tpp-inform.ru/analytic_journal/5521.html], 12 October, 2016.

Table 2

**Scholarly Articles and
Publications by European Experts on EurAsEC/EAEU**

Type of source	Internet
Type of communication	Scholarly articles, publications
Sides involved	Sent by European researchers
Volume of information	Not fewer than two pages
Units of analysis (calculation)	Eurasian project, Eurasian integration, Eurasian Union, Customs Union, EurAsEC/EAEU
Frequency of provided information	Not less than once a year

Russia and its efforts to set up a common economic space is not the only dilemma for the U.K.-U.S. alliance. There is China and its increasingly energetic activities in the region, where the Islamic factor is one of the potentially restraining forces. The widely spread and very active religion-based protest sentiments among the Uyghur diaspora is a very convenient instrument for containing Beijing's ambitions in Kazakhstan, while the West actively, but not obviously, supports the Uyghur community of Kazakhstan. In the future, the Islamic factor that is gathering weight in Kazakhstan might be exported to China to burden it with a very serious problem.

This makes Islamization of Kazakhstan one of the priorities for Saudi Arabia and the Anglo-American alliance. The ideological and investing expansion in Kazakhstan is actively unfolding: the Islamic, American and European banks, NGOs and tempting investment projects are but a tip of the iceberg of a diverse, impressive project of geopolitical changes.

In these conditions, the draft of a Eurasian Union is likely to fail. Only effective, large scale measures of propaganda, application of economic and sociopolitical initiatives afford a realistic chance to prevent the implementation of a negative scenario.

Discussion

There are no commonly accepted approaches for classification of regional economic agreements. Here are several of them. According to the WTO classification, there are three types of integration agreements: the free trade area, customs union and an economic integration agreement. The OECD identifies four forms of regional economic integration: a free trade area, customs union, common market and economic union. Western and Russian experts, however, prefer the classification offered by Béla Balassa in the Preface to his *Theory of Economic Integration*, first published in 1961: "In the course of the discussion, distinction will also be made between various forms of integration, such as a free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union, and total integration."¹²

Experts invariably point to the obvious heterogeneity of the "new independent states," which means that Russia should treat each of them separately.¹³ There is an opinion that local alliances and

¹² B. Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, Routledge, 2011, p. ix.

¹³ See: A. Nikitin, V. Petrovskiy, "Kontury obnovlennoy vneshney politiki Rossii: materialy diskussii po Kontseptsii vneshney politiki RF, provedennoy Pravleniem RAPN," *Obozrevatel*, No. 9/10, 2004; K. Gajiev, *Geopolitika*, Iurite, Moscow, 2011, p. 420.

regional (Caucasian, European and Central Asian) strategies, geared toward selected spheres of cooperation, are much more preferable. Some of the experts prefer to analyze each of the regions separately, with due consideration given to the specific nature of Russia's interests in each of them that requires individual approaches.¹⁴

In Russian science, the conceptualization of space is much more detailed.¹⁵ The connotation of the term "post-Soviet space" frequently refers to the analysis of problems, associated with a completed historical period, while the "CIS countries" and "Eurasia" concepts reflect the processes unfolding nowadays in international relations. The analysis of the terms has allowed us to conclude that the newly independent states and the CIS countries are the most appropriate terms to be used in the studies of international processes and the states' integrative efforts. We should also consider the kinds of discourses in which these terms are used.

The color revolutions have also demonstrated that the social and economic spheres in individual countries, as well as within the frameworks of multilateral cooperation, required more and a much closer attention.

Vladimir Petrovskiy is convinced that bolstering the humanitarian component is the condition, guaranteeing not only the survival of the CIS as such, but also the development of integrative processes in political and economic areas of the post-Soviet space.¹⁶

Conclusion

The jurisdictional basis accepted by the European and Eurasian unions was formulated within the requirements of the WTO, the organizational structures and working mechanisms of the two unions being very similar. They ensure the necessary impetus needed to create a free trade area between these integrative structures. There are enough shared economic and political reasons to build up an integrative symbiotic relationship between the EU and EAEU, supported by their members, as well as their supranational structures (EC and EEC). This provides an added incentive for the two unions to integrate.

Today, the problems of WTO membership for Kazakhstan and Belarus, the mandate for official talks with EEC on the EU-EAEU free trade area and technical barriers inside the latter can be described as the toughest barriers on the road toward the European-Eurasian integration in the classical form of a free trade area. In fact, its realization is fraught with certain economic risks for the EAEU members; they can be removed, however, by a mechanism of redistribution of advantages between the members and even between their economic branches. The risks may be compensated by the ad-

¹⁴ See: D. Trenin, "Rossia i novaia Vostochnaia Evropa," POLIT.RU, 22 April, 2010, available at [<http://polit.ru/article/2010/04/22/trenin/>], 15 December, 2016; A. Zagorskiy, "Traditsionnye interesy bezopasnosti Rossii na Kavkaze i v Tsentralnoy Azii," in: *Bezopasnost Rossii: XXI vek*, Prava cheloveka, Moscow, 2000; "Tsentralnaia Azia kak regionalnaia podsystema mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy," in: A.D. Voskresenskiy, *Vostok-Zapad. Regionalnye podsystemy i regionalnye problemy*, MGIMO (U), ROSSPEN, Moscow, 2002; K.P. Borishpolets, "Ekonomicheskoe vzaimodeystvie Rossii so stranami Tsentralnoy Azii," in: *Yuzhny flang SNG. Tsentralnaia Azia-Kaspiy-Kavkaz: Vozmozhnosti i vyzovy dlia Rossii*, ed. by M.M. Narinskiy, A.V. Makgin, MGIMO (U), Logos, Moscow, 2003; B. Akhmetova, I. Karabulatova, P. Dudin, Zh. Dorzhiev, "Tension around the Problem of the South China Sea as a Factor of Geopolitical Confrontation and Transformation of the Present World Order," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 49-58; A. Shadzhe, I. Karabulatova, R. Khunagov, Z. Zhade, "Ethnopolitical Influence in Regulating National Security in Border Territories of the Countries in the Caucasian-Caspian Region," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 66-75.

¹⁵ See: M. Petrakov, "O kontseptsii dalneishego razvitiia SNG," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 8, 2009, pp. 40-52.

¹⁶ See: V. Petrovskiy, "Gumanitarnoe napravlenie postsovetsoi integratsii," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 3, 2006, pp. 121-128.

vantages, created by settling the fairly complicated political conflicts that so far remain in the absence of interaction between the sides.

Therefore, to sum up the above, we should assess the long-term results of this integration agreement before approaching the EU-EAEU free trade area issue and we should abandon the logic of the relationship between the EU and Russia that concentrates on relative advantages rather than guaranteed ones, offered in the long-term perspective by the tenets of the no-risk game. In this way, both sides will be able to abandon their short-term approaches in order to concentrate on the advantages offered by the long-term cooperation, otherwise the so far fragile relationship stands no chance of becoming not only an alternative to the failed relationship between the EU and Russia but its continuation.

Today, the members of both alliances, Russia and the EU countries, primarily, should not miss the unique chance to begin at the beginning and abandon the logic of the previous years' "zero sum game." It will be no exaggeration to describe this as an option of historic importance: the sides can either use the objective possibility and work together toward a zone of economic and political stability or remain in the zone of confrontational rationalizing of the last few years that might deepen the crisis and create new dividing lines on the European continent.

THE CAUCASUS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: FROM THE SOVIET REPUBLICS TO A CRUCIAL BUFFER ZONE

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ABSTRACT

The Caucasus has attracted the interest of the neighboring powers in the post-Cold War era due to its geopolitical and geo-economic significance, as well as these powers' deep-rooted affiliations with the peoples of the Caucasus. The current paper focuses on Russia's and Turkey's historical objectives in the region, how these objectives were met during the last 25 years and the debate behind the use of historical narratives as instruments of soft power.

Both Moscow and Ankara felt the need for legitimizing their presence in the Southern Caucasus, where three new independent states were established after the Cold War. On the one hand, already since 1994, Moscow has been regarding the ex-Soviet republics as its "near abroad" protected by its "nuclear umbrella." On the other hand, Turkey has never stopped to be a presence in the region under the cloak of soft power means. These means are based on the exploitation of Turkish or Islamic identity and the result-

ing relationships, being vigorously cultivated both by Ankara itself and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—such as Fethullah Gülen’s Organization, which has been active until recently. The purpose of this kind of ideological construct is to strengthen Islamic and Turkish influence in the countries that are involved in the search for a new post-Soviet identity, free from the protectorate of Moscow.

The correlation and blending of hard and soft power are analyzed; a number of findings are made at different levels in the context of long-term historical narratives and the desire of the participants to assert their respective geopolitical roles. The efforts of Russia and Turkey resulted in “ideological battle” around

the issue of historical ties of each of the countries with the newly created states.

For this reason, the core of the research is aimed at examining Russia’s and Turkey’s grand strategies with regard to the Southern Caucasus, as well as whether and how they are influenced by historical narratives. Accordingly, we are trying to examine how the rhetoric of both countries is transformed into one of the components of their power or, in other words, how it is included in the set of their strategic instruments. To this end, the author applies the multi-level theoretical analysis to the situation in the region and tries to clarify the relevant typology of historical narratives and strategic objectives of the two countries.

KEYWORDS: *the Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, international relations theory, geopolitics, geo-economics, strategic studies, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia.*

Introduction

This paper attempts to identify and analyze the significance of important phenomena, able to reinforce or undermine the grand strategies of Russia and Turkey in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. The analysis is based on bibliographical research, primarily relying on the records of historically documented policies, as well as on the comparison of data on the balance of hard power of the two countries and the description of corresponding threats to each other. Following the method of process tracing,¹ the cause-effect link will be presented, allowing to reach a set of conclusions regarding the connection of contemporary grand strategies to discourses of the past. This process will be aided by clarifying the historical role of the main actors, their traditional geopolitical positioning and how this relates to their present tactics. In other words, history will serve as a guide for an analysis based on international relations precepts and strategic theory and aimed at arriving at specific conclusions concerning great powers’ actions and small states’ security dilemmas. In addition, post-Cold War comprehensive research regarding the Caucasus and Central Asia makes the paper a data-rich case study, since the ready availability of primary and secondary sources is crucial for analyzing cause-and-effect relationships.

To this end, the author is first attempting to answer the question of how contemporary grand strategies invite new versions of the narrative of the past. The other question, closely related to the first, is how history influences current strategies in light of Russian and Turkish past strategic objectives, i.e. of Russia’s efforts to reach warm seas vs. its containment by Turkey.

¹ See: St. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1997, p. 64.

At this point it would be appropriate to ask questions about how and to what extent new renditions of a historical narrative are able to legitimize current strategic decisions; how important is a historical narrative in addressing internal problems of a state; how a start of the review of a historical narrative is determined by the available systemic opportunities; in which circumstances does the adoption of revised versions of a historical narrative develops into the formation of a substantive political objective and its integration into a corresponding strategy.

The paper does not provide comprehensive answers to these questions. The analysis is macro-historical and focuses on the overall tendencies of strategic behavior. This is due to the underlying impossibility of precisely predicting human behavior and, respectively, the limited usefulness of the analysis of specific events—in contrast to the analysis of general trends in the development of a political situation. Within the framework of the positivist understanding of science, it is considered that human behavior does not yield to quantitative measurement and, although the generalized description of behavior helps to understand and to conceptually comprehend relations inside polity and among polities, the behavioral constituent cannot be mechanically summarized with the remaining components of power and elements of strategic behavior by expressing it mathematically according to the standards of methodology and epistemology.

At this point, some remarks should be made concerning the historical significance of the Caucasus placed at the epicenter of irreconcilable tensions and conflicts of Central Eurasia. Zbigniew Brzezinski called this supercontinent “the grand chessboard,”² while Sir Halford Mackinder summarized its importance as follows: “Who controls Eastern Europe commands the Heartland; who controls the Heartland commands the World-Island (Eurasia and Africa.—*Ed.*); who controls the World-Island commands the world.”³ Statements of this kind emphasize the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and demonstrate the link between the geopolitical position of the Caucasus and the apparent role of the countries of this region. Hence the objective significance of the Caucasus across time and space.⁴

The region is highly important geopolitically and geo-economically mainly due to the enormous amounts of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea and the real or potential importance of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia as transition countries.

Another observation concerns the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and the end of the bipolar system, which is an extremely vivid example of the major redistribution of power and large systemic changes. On the one hand, this factor is closely related to the rise of hegemonic aspirations of several entities of international policy, seeking to increase their power and expand the sphere of influence. On the other, due to this factor, the strategic behavior of Turkey deserves an analysis: from 1991 on, its strategy obviously becomes aligned with the previously mentioned new systemic opportunities. In addition, distinct fragments of the analytical chain of cause-and-effect relationships demonstrate a wide dispersion of values within the given situation: the behavior of the entities in the study period varies very widely. So, a few months before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey had avoided entering into any diplomatic relations whatsoever with the republics of the Soviet Union. Turgut Özal, when asked in 1990 about the instability in Soviet Azerbaijan, argued that this was an internal problem of the U.S.S.R. and that Turkey “was concerned solely with its own internal problems.”⁵

² Zb. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1998.

³ H. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1919, p. 104.

⁴ For a detailed reasoning of the current case study choice, see: St. Van Evera, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-88.

⁵ M. Aydin, “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2004, pp. 3.

However, in the aftermath of the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, Turkey was the first country to recognize the new states establishing, at the same time, international institutions, asserting itself in the role of a mediator between the republics of the former U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world. And last but not least, the context and background of this case study largely coincide with acute political problems of our time. Due to the existence of the same structural framework, the permanence of the balance of power in the region and similar vital interests of the entities, particularly their interest in the production and transport of hydrocarbons, the political and strategic interests of the parties remain constant. In addition, both Russia and Turkey are faced with internal problems and conflicts, and the country's strength and power rhetoric can help to break out of their domestic political deadlocks.

The Strategic Transition

The situation described above explains the importance of analyzing the state of affairs in the Caucasus, its states' transition from the Soviet regime to Westernization and the changing interests of the neighboring Russia and Turkey. In the post-Cold War era, the Southern Caucasus has been transformed into a buffer zone of major significance. The end of the Soviet-era republics has been followed by instability and claims by neighboring powers, such as Russia and Turkey.

What is important in the case of the Southern Caucasus is that, in the post-Cold War era, there was a transition from Moscow's dominance to a new reality of self-determination and state independence. Thus, the Caucasian landmass ceased to be regarded in terms of "republics" ruled by Moscow. The establishment of the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan replaced this situation.

At least in the very beginning, these states were extremely weak and eager to be integrated into the international community nearly ready for any quid pro quo arrangement. This was exactly the basis and the starting point for Turkey to get more vigorously involved and for Russia to get essentially re-involved in order to keep its Soviet-era strategic position. On the one hand, Turkey saw it as a strategic opportunity or an "opportunity window" for expanding its influence in a region considered to be affiliated with it historically and in some cases, either religiously or ethnically. In addition, in a broader sense, the Caucasus could represent the bridge toward Central Asia, where another systemic transition was taking place in the meantime. On the other hand, Russia enjoyed a long tradition of its presence in the Greater Caspian region.

The questions of Moscow's strategic leverage in the Black Sea; the Caspian energy resources; the geographic proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and the presence of influential actors such as Iran; a specific position of the Caucasian states, situated at the crossroads between Islam and Christianity have further demonstrated the significance of the Caucasus not only for the leadership of Russia and Turkey, but also for the stability in the wider region. The role of the Southern Caucasus, its recognition as the region of major geo-economic importance and its status as the geographical axis, coupled with the desire to exercise sufficient strategic control, have also been reflected in the U.S. global and regional priorities.

Due to these two countries' grand strategies, the Southern Caucasus falls under Martin Wight's definition of a buffer zone or a power vacuum in the sense that it is "occupied by one or more weaker powers between two or more stronger powers."⁶ In this sense, in the post-Cold War Southern

⁶ M. Wight, *Power Politics*, Leicester University Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1978, p. 160.

Caucasus, a specific balance of power was established among international and regional actors and surely, between Russia and Turkey, which were directly involved in the region. Accordingly, the definition of Wight was expanded in such a way as to reflect the potential role of these weaker countries naming them “trimmers,” “neutrals” or “satellites” with a strong likelihood of becoming protectorates. Therefore, these states are doomed to adopt and follow passive foreign policy wholly dependent on the results of the stronger powers’ competition. Pragmatically, this balance of power meant that a potential predominance of either of them was nearly unthinkable without paying an exorbitant price. However, this does not mean that the interested powers would give up this “opportunity window.”

Wight amplifies his definition, emphasizing that in the case of a buffer zone where a power vacuum has been established, “Each strong power will generally have a vital interest in preventing the other from controlling the buffer zone, and will pursue this interest in one of two ways, according to its strength. It will seek either to maintain the buffer zone as neutral and independent, or to establish its own control, which may lead in the long run to its annexing the buffer zone and converting it into a frontier province. Buffer states may therefore be roughly divided into ‘trimmers,’ ‘neutrals’ and ‘satellites.’ Trimmers are states whose policy is prudently to play off their mighty neighbors against one another; the most famous of European trimmers was the Duchy of Savoy, which earned thereby first a kingdom and then the hegemony of United Italy... Neutrals are the states without an active foreign policy at all; their hope is to lie low and escape notice. Satellites are states whose foreign policy is controlled by another power. If the weaker state has formally conceded this control by a treaty, so that in law as well as in fact it has surrendered a measure of its sovereignty, it is known as a protectorate.”⁷

Defining the region as a buffer zone leads to the question of Russia’s and Turkey’s interests, claims, aims, and objectives. On the one hand, already since 1994, Moscow has declared the ex-Soviet republics’ status as its “near abroad” (*blizhneye zarubezhye*) protected by its “nuclear umbrella.” Russia considers the balance of power in the post-Soviet area as vital for its survival and its status as one of the centers of the international system. Without a solid option for the projection of power and influence in the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, Belarus, and Ukraine—keeping in mind that the Baltic States (i.e. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) had already distanced themselves from their Soviet past—the Russian Federation would succumb to the status of a middle power.

In the aftermath of the U.S.S.R.’s demise, two schools of thought came into being in Russia with regard to its future orientation.⁸

- The first favored the country’s pro-Atlantic orientation and the adoption of the Western model of governance. This was favored by Europeanized elites dedicated to the Western rule of law and the overall tenets of a market economy. Often perceiving Russia as a European (Western) country, such elites supported Moscow’s integration into relevant institutions and international organizations.
- The second school identified Russia’s future with maintaining its predominance in the ex-Soviet geographical zone and it was summarized as “Eurasianism.”

Essentially, Eurasianism refers to the four inter-linked strategic aims:

- “1) to underscore Russia’s “physical” identity as the country that has the borders and interests in both Europe and Asia;
- (2) to justify the necessity of conducting a balanced foreign policy that does not privilege the relationship with the West at the expense of the Eastern dimension;

⁷ M. Wight, op. cit.

⁸ See: N. Nassibli, “Azerbaijan: Policy Priorities towards the Caspian Sea,” in: *The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security*, ed. by Sh. Akiner, Routledge Curzon, London, 2004, p. 141.

- (3) to interpret the multicultural and multiethnic nature of Russia's "Eurasian" identity to justify the country's membership in various international organizations (such as the Organization of Islamic Conference);
- (4) and, most important, to rationalize Russia's right to be a Great Power (*velikaya derzhava*) with the corresponding geopolitical role in global and regional affairs.⁹

Inside the Russian bureaucracy, this intra-elite conflict culminated in a kind of convergence of positions: conflicting elites agreed on a common understanding of the national interest of Russia and the objectives of its policy. Despite the differences among the elite, the bureaucracy is still functioning relatively conflict-free, as all parties agree to recognize the priority of preserving the status of Russia as the great power. Therefore, although the members of the two schools of thought simultaneously participated in Yeltsin's government, the Russian grand strategy was implemented consistently and continuously. It is quite remarkable that none other than Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's pro-Atlantic foreign minister of the beginning of the 1990s, during the Stockholm meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) spoke in favor of establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and he was the first to use the term "near abroad."¹⁰ Thus, Russia's prerogatives in the Caucasus were not questioned, and the Russian leadership continued regarding the region as its own backyard.

In Turkey, there also existed two approaches to assessing the role of the country in the post-Soviet space.¹¹ Some analysts saw the strategic imperative for Turkey in establishing close ties with the post-Soviet states as an alternative to its former pro-Western orientation.¹² They saw this politically nascent region as a "shelter" for Turkey in case of Western pressure against it, as well as a reliable and valuable alternative provided Turkish national interests were no longer served by its identification with the West. In that case, even with the change in orientation, the country's role and significance would increase due to its entrance into the Caucasian sub-system. However, other analysts saw the post-Cold War redistribution of power as an opportunity for an additional and not mutually exclusive strategic choice for Turkey. In this regard, Turkey could become a linchpin between the East and the West and it is exactly this role that could increase its strategic leverage in the eyes of its Western allies and especially the U.S. and simultaneously provide a boost for its efforts to access the European Union. Paul Henze eloquently referred to the opportunities opening before Turkey on the "big" post-Soviet space not as "contradictory or competitive," but as "complementary."¹³ Consequently, Turkey's capability, as well as its identity, history and the character of religious orientation would readily allow a "two-pronged" strategic orientation.

Post-Transitional Initiatives and Historical Legacies

As already noted, in 1994 Moscow finally responded to ambitious actions by Turkey in the Caucasus with resistance from a position of hard power, proclaiming the doctrine of "near abroad"

⁹ I. Torbakov, "Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations," *The Jamestown Foundation*, Occasional Paper, October, 2007, p. 12.

¹⁰ See: N. Nassibli, op. cit.

¹¹ See: W. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp. 193-194.

¹² See: G. Fuller, I. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 73-74.

¹³ Quoted from: W. Hale, op. cit., p. 194.

and declaring the existence of a “nuclear umbrella.” However, Turkey did not leave the region, using the means of soft power. These means had their basis identified with common affiliations to both the Turkic and Islamic world. The cultivation of these perceptions was employed directly by Ankara or by nongovernmental organizations, such as the network of Fethullah Gülen. Fethullah Gülen’s efforts focused on educational programs and institutions. During the renaissance of the Turkish-Azeri relations in the 1990s, for instance, added to the one school and two universities of the Turkish World Research Institute in Azerbaijan, eleven schools and one university were built by the Community of Fethullah Gülen.¹⁴ These conceptual ideological constructs were designed to reinforce Islamic-Turkish influence in the countries, which were eager to look for a post-Soviet self-identification far from Moscow’s patronage. In addition, a major Turkish interest was to keep Russia as far as possible from the Caucasus. This was not reasoned only by the post-Cold War “opportunity window” but, also, by Turkey’s concern about its own survival.

During the past Cold War decades, the Caucasus was Russia’s frontier province, allowing it to question the status of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and that of the Bosphorus itself. In the post-Cold War environment, the Turkish territorial integrity was never questioned. However, the change in the balance of power in the greater region, as a consequence of the U.S.S.R.’s demise, changed the Turkish interests and priorities and, consequently, the country’s initiatives. Russia’s successful deterrence strategy of 1994 was insufficient to keep Turkey out of the region, which it considered “Turkic” and included it into its own net of the Pan-Turkic discourse. Having established the “Turkic Summits,” Turkey tried to integrate the region under its aegis as a regional hegemon. The Turkic Summits did not become an official international organization until October 2009, when Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan established the “Turkic Council” (Türk Keneşi) or Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi).

Turgut Özal was the first to conceive of such a cooperative scheme, hosting the first one in Ankara in 1992, while his successor, Süleyman Demirel, continued the same policy, participating in relevant meetings in 1994, 1995 and 1996. The next Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, also participated in the Summit of 2001.¹⁵ However, the importance of these summits steadily declined. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated revealingly the following: “The residents of this particular region do not have the luxury of just sitting back and being spectators of the world stage... Either we will be the subject of world politics, or the object... A Turkish Commonwealth would enable us to play a more active and efficient role in international forums, protect the interests of our people and contribute to peace and stability in our region.”¹⁶

Furthermore, in 1992, Turkey established the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı—TİKA). Affiliated with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TİKA focused on issues of educational, intercultural and technical cooperation, mediating between private funds and state bureaucracy. Essentially, TİKA was the means toward the creation of links between the national identities of the newly established states and “mother Turkey’s” identity. In line with this, there were several initiatives, such as the abolition of the Cyrillic alphabet and the adoption of the Latin one in June 1992.¹⁷ One year earlier, in 1991, Turkey and the U.S.S.R. signed

¹⁴ See: B. Aras, “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, p. 50.

¹⁵ See: M.B. Olcott, *Central Asia’s Second Chance*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2005, p. 73.

¹⁶ M. Katik, “Turkic Summit to Explore Commonwealth Possibility,” *Eurasianet*, 16 March, 2016, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111506.shtml].

¹⁷ See: K. Kirişçi, “New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior,” in: *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, ed. by Ç. Balım et al., Brill, New York, 1995, p. 16.

the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which “became the model for similar arrangements with the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.”¹⁸ These treaties supported a practice in line with the determination of maximizing Turkey’s economic leverage within the post-Soviet territory. The Turkish presence in the region was evidenced by investments in construction and banking sectors, and augmented by its expansion into the spheres of culture and education. With regard to Azerbaijan, for instance, “in addition to the influx of Turkish press and books,” television and radio programs began to rebroadcast after the country’s independence “on a scale that began to affect colloquial Azeri.”¹⁹ Turkish universities persistently continued to award scholarships to students from the former U.S.S.R. and donate equipment to the relatively newly established republics.

The same view of the cultivation of cultural affiliations guided the creation in 1994 of the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY), aimed at strengthening relations with former Soviet republics at various levels. The Organization institutionalized regular meetings of the ministers of culture of these countries aimed at further integration in the field of education and culture.²⁰ This integration was to facilitate the liberation of the Caucasian states from Moscow’s control and the influence of the Russian national identity, reinforced by the presence in the territory of these countries of a significant ratio of the Russian population.

In 1990, one year before the Caucasian states’ declaration of independence, six percent of Azerbaijan’s population was of Russian origin.²¹ In contrast with the Central Asian states, this percentage should not have caused serious concerns and was manageable, but still important. In Kazakhstan, the Russian minority represented thirty-eight percent of the total population, in Kyrgyzstan twenty-two percent, in Turkmenistan ten percent and in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan eight percent each.²²

For its part, Russia declared its long historical ties to the peoples of Transcaucasia and beyond. The Caucasus is considered its strategic backyard but, also, a region where Russian people and culture occupy a privileged position. For instance, in Georgia, Moscow funded an extensive program of mass media influence, creating Sputnik—a news agency affiliated with the media group Russia Today (RT)—in November 2014, which is indicative in and of itself.²³ Russian soft power policies included the promotion of Russia and its labor market as the “land of opportunity” for the poor unemployed citizens of the Caucasian states. Russo-Turkish policies in the Caucasus—and the soft policies are surely included—are conceptualized in terms of the centuries-long friction between the two peripheral powers. In these terms, any rhetoric relating to pan-theories is constrained by the scope of national interest. In Fouad Ajami’s words: “Civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations. States avert their gaze from blood ties when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so. We remain in a world of self-help. The solitude of states continues... The phenomenon we have dubbed Islamic Fundamentalism is less a sign of resurgence than of panic, bewilderment, and guilt that the border with ‘the other’ has been crossed.”²⁴

¹⁸ T. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan’s Triangular Relationship: The Land between Russia, Turkey and Iran,” in: *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, ed. by A. Banuazizi, M. Weiner, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, p. 127.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ See: G. Turan, İ. Turan, İ. Bal, “Turkey’s Relations with the Turkic Republics,” in: *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, ed. by İ. Bal, Brown Walker Press, Boca Raton, 2004, p. 306.

²¹ See: H. Malik, “New Relationships between Central and Southwest Asia and Pakistan’s Regional Politics,” in: *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, ed. by H. Malik, Macmillan Press, London, 1994, p. 268.

²² See: Ibidem.

²³ See: S. Kapanadze, “Russia’s Soft Power in Georgia—A Carnivorous Plant in Action,” *The Different Faces of “Soft Power”*: *The Baltic States and Eastern Neighborhood between Russia and the EU*, ed. by T. Rostoks, A. Spruds, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 2015, p. 175.

²⁴ Quoted from: A. Balci, “The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, p. 98.

Joseph Nye, referring to soft power, says: “An important way to gain international support is to have cultural and political values and foreign policies that other countries see as legitimate and having moral authority.”²⁵ Thus, in the modern world, soft power strategies represent the amalgam of aims and objectives identified with power politics and long-term pursuits. In the case of Russia, it is about its historical desire to reach the “warm waters” of the Mediterranean. That could connect Russia with international trade routes and, specifically, the transfer of oil, raw materials and any other goods from the East to the West. Accordingly, Turkey’s geopolitical positioning has been identified with Russia’s historical inclination and the Western powers’ need to deter it and balance Moscow’s influence in South Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Minor Asia, the Middle East and beyond. Thus, the Ottoman Empire and then Turkey always formed patron-client relationships with Western powers—and mainly the United Kingdom and the United States—in the sense that these were basically informal relationships between unequal partners and from such relationships, mutual gains were derived.²⁶

Therefore, post-transitional initiatives of Russia and Turkey are best explained if we consider them in the long-term strategic perspective (and retrospect) and take into account the desire for justification of claims based on the old narratives. On the one hand, “Pan-Slavism, developed in Russia by Nicholas Danilevsky and Rostislav Fadeyev, involved the application of Slavophil philosophy to foreign affairs calling for the expansion of a kingdom to unite Orthodox Christian Slavs under a single empire.”²⁷ Let us note, however, that this viewpoint does not apply to the Caucasus.

Obviously, such a viewpoint could not survive during the communist regime in Soviet Russia and the U.S.S.R. Such a concept as “world revolution” was ignored by Joseph Stalin, but not because of his accepting the older czarist Pan-Slavic concepts. Stalin and his successors followed an interventionist grand strategy but without legitimizing it by Marxist “class conflict.”

With the beginning of the transition from the elimination of collectivism to return, throughout the former Soviet Union, to the legacy of the New Times in the form of emerging Nations-States, established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s protection of its traditional interests took the form of a return to the discourse based on the idea of concern for the protection of its national interests in its own—as it seemed then—periphery. The Caucasian region was no exception; it has historically been considered by Russia as a frontier outpost within a province and a path to “warm seas” and, consequently, as the springboard in its efforts to expand Russia’s role in the world.

On the other hand, Pan-Turkism had similar aspirations in its historical mission to counter-balance the Russian influence. Pan-Turkism, being an irredentist ideology, calls for the unification of populations as one indivisible entity, “with evident signs of both cultural ties (language, history, and customs) and material bonds (blood, race). The term ‘Turk’ referred to all those of Turkic origin, i.e. the Tatars, Azeris, Kirghiz, Yakuts and others.”²⁸

Therefore, either concretely or hypothetically, Pan-Turkism includes all the people living in or out of the former Ottoman borders and consequently, in or out of the borders of the modern Turkish state. In the same framework, it is worth mentioning that another pan-theory, i.e. Pan-Turanism, has aimed to the unification of populations in the broader Central Eurasia on the basis of mythological roots and thus undefined borders. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that Pan-

²⁵ Quoted from: W. Yanushi, D. L. McConnell, “Introduction,” in: *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*, ed. by W. Yanushi, D. L. McConnell, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2008, p. xvii.

²⁶ For a definition of patron-client relations, see: M. Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, Frank Cass, London, 1990, pp. 132-133.

²⁷ Sh. Cross, “Russia and NATO toward the 21st Century: Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo,” *NATO Academic Affairs 1999-2001*, NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Award Final Report, August, 2001, pp. 10-11.

²⁸ J.M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, Hurst & Company, London, 1981, p. 43.

Turanism has been identified with peoples and states beyond the Caucasus, such as Finland, Hungary, and Estonia.²⁹

Soft power policies have offered, in Nye's words, a cultural and political framework for legitimizing and giving "moral authority" to Russia's and Turkey's grand strategies. This is crucial because the two countries need to justify their strategic decisions in the eyes of the public, their allies and the peoples of the Caucasian states. Thus, they would use soft power in their efforts to impose their strategies on their voters and bureaucracies, attract—economic or diplomatic—aid from their allies and limit the cost of their efforts to maximize power. This last point is the core of the soft power logic. As far as coercion and imposition characterize the use of power in international politics, soft power comes to moderate the consequences of using power "to apply one's capabilities in an attempt to change someone else's behavior in certain ways."³⁰

The use of power presupposes cost, and soft power balances the excessive military expenditures and possible material and human losses. Most importantly, soft power cultivates the conditions for achieving specific strategic aims without destabilizing own alliances and provoking counter-balancing reflections.

Conclusion

The article describes and analyzes the conditions in which the Southern Caucasus experienced a transitional period in the era following the end of the Cold War. The main research question is how the modern "Grand Strategies" of Russia and Turkey are linked to the past in light of a historic debate, references, and associations. Further, the general context of the clash of the strategic objectives is looked at, which Russia and Turkey have found themselves confronting: such as Russia's efforts to reach the warm sea and Turkey's containment role. Conceptually, the analysis of such objectives is dated back to Sir Halford Mackinder's assumptions on Heartland³¹ and Nicholas Spykman's respective analyses of the Rimland,³² as well as their influence on Great Powers' grand strategies and especially, the United Kingdom's naval strategy. A broader analysis of this chain of thought from Mackinder to Spykman and the empirical evidence results in a conclusion that the Western Powers aim at preventing any monopolization of power in Central Eurasia. However, if this is not feasible as it happened in the case of the U.S.S.R., then the peripheral powers, circumventing the Heartland, have to contain and deter that power to access the trade routes between the East and the West in the name of their Western allies-partners-patrons. This was exactly the correlation of interests before, during and after the Cold War and this has explained Turkey's geopolitical role in all these periods even from the Ottoman era.

Historically, the Caucasus has been the geographical axis of Russo-Turkish conflict. In this framework, the Cold War era stability, secured by the U.S.S.R.'s predominance, was followed by geopolitical fluidity seen, for instance, in Nagorno-Karabakh. The direct reach of Moscow ceased and this has been an ideal "opportunity window" for the neighboring country of Turkey, inclined to use its own strong historical, linguistic, religious and ethnic affiliations with the peoples and states of the region. Through specific policies and the bipolar strategic partnerships between Russia and Armenia, as well as Turkey and Azerbaijan, both Moscow and Ankara have rendered the Southern Caucasus into a core area of power politics. This transition from the Soviet republics, meaning the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus in the Soviet sovereignty, to the status of a buffer zone of major importance,

²⁹ See: *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading MA, 1979, p. 191.

³¹ See: H. Mackinder, *op. cit.*

³² See: N.J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, Brace & Company, Harcourt, 1944.

has defined the distribution of power between the two geostrategic players, as well as their aims, objectives, and interests. Finally, it is absolutely in line with historical narratives related to Russian and Turkish strategies, since these were built on the basis of balancing each other's influence mainly in the Caucasus and beyond.

INDIA-PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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A B S T R A C T

The paper stands on the premise that interstate acrimony following jingoistic nationalism has turned India, Pakistan and Afghanistan into mutual enemies, who continue to subordinate their national developmental policies to the security complexes, which has exacerbated their mutual hatred to the point beyond repair. It also presents a testable preposition that such a predicament can be countered by globalization optimism, to which interstate cooperation, soft borders and contacts between

people are the prerequisites. Such objectives can be realized only through regional and economic integration, whose concept and implementation have worked successfully in Europe and have been extensively debated by many theorists from security, economic, scientific and cultural perspectives. Apart from theoretical and historical studies, the paper is based on the inputs, gathered from various organizations and influential stakeholders during my recent field trip to Pakistan.

KEYWORDS: *India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, region, cooperation, low politics.*

Regional Cooperation: A Concept

Before the 1940s, the concept of regional integration was not popular. It is believed to be a post-war development. Regional integration was conceptualized when the New International Economic

Order (NIEO)¹ failed to implement its “program of action.”² This program, however, attached an even greater importance to the development of regional and interregional cooperation among developing countries. The concept of regional integration was discussed in detail by eminent scholars throughout the world, as well as state and non-state actors of the underdeveloped and developing countries giving due consideration to efforts undertaken by NIEO at the institutional level and independent action of individual developing countries. From the perspective of developing countries, regional cooperation signifies the formation of a unified community for their economic development purposes. On the other hand, among the same developing countries the idea of Collective Self-Reliance, as a concept,³ emerged at both regional and subregional levels based on technical and greater economic cooperation. Beginning with the Non-Aligned movement’s Lusaka summit⁴ it remained the main theme and agenda for various Non-Alignment Conferences ever since. It should be noted that the concept of Collective Self-Reliance has neither been nor is regarded as a substitute for redefining and restructuring the prevalent economic order, but has been viewed as the most appropriate alternative for developing countries to come out of their worsening global economic situation. Thus, it can be said that the Collective Self-Reliance concept ensures national self-reliance for countries in individual capacity, as well as the means for ensuring cooperation among the underdeveloped countries. But, nevertheless, it is only an auxiliary means in relation to comprehensive regional communications on a constant basis: in fact, if a group of countries expands to greater sizes, then collaboration between them, by sheer necessity, becomes very selective. Thus, the concept of Collective Self-Reliance plays a vital role in regional cooperation among developing countries.

To improve the standard of living among the people of developing countries and to restructure the existing relations between the developed and developing countries, political elites of the third world and other stakeholders have to agree on a program, capable of transforming intentions (“Collective Self-Reliance”) into a joint policy (“Strategy”). To transform “Collective Self-Reliance” into a strategy, the Seventh NAM Summit, held in New Delhi from 7 to 11 March, 1993, stated that there is a possibility of cooperation at subregional, regional and international levels. The participants of the

¹ New International Economic Order: The origin of the concept can be traced from the mid-1970s. It constitutes a framework for eliminating the prevalent anarchy in the international economic system, with all its features which are being utilized by developed countries for their vested interests and for continuing their neocolonial rule over the underdeveloped countries. It also stands for making the international system equitable, rational, fairer and just by adopting the code of conduct of the industrialized countries and by accepting the due rights of the underdeveloped countries (see: A. Heywood, *Global Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom, 2011, p. 464).

² Program of Action: It was a special U.N. General Assembly session held on 1 May, 1974, in which the following problems which developing countries were facing were raised and discussed: (i) The imbalance of trade between the developed and developing/underdeveloped countries; (ii) The reform of the International Monetary System, which used to give undue preferences to the Industrialized countries; (iii) The creation of the environment, which would provide help for developing countries in consolidating the efforts of the International community for setting up the industries in developing countries; (iv) The support for the agendas of different organizations and seeking Cooperation from the international community in formulating the code of conduct at the international level for the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge dealing with research from developed to developing countries, etc. (see: *Ibid.*, p. 194).

³ Concept of Collective Self-Reliance: The third world countries had an objective to move from underdeveloped to developed status, and for this they employed the NIEO as a tool and made the concept of Collective Self-Reliance a major theme of various conferences of the NIEO. Later on, the NIEO defined it as a capability of satisfying the basic requirements of the people, particularly in the context of the third world countries. The developing countries believed that this alone can ensure their equal and effective participation in international relations (see: K. Gopal, *Geopolitical Relations and Regional Cooperation: A Study of South Asia*, Trans Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1996, p. 10).

⁴ Lusaka summit: In 1970, the Non-Aligned countries held their third summit in Lusaka (Zambia), attended by 54 countries, other than the 9, who acted as observers. The summit emphasized that the Non-Aligned countries are able to make use of their influence and collective wisdom to utilize the balance of power as a tool for strengthening the roots of international peace and cooperation. It also advocated the requirement for accelerating the decolonization process and economic cooperation among the Non-Aligned countries (see: *Ibid.*, p. 11).

summit acknowledged that the capabilities of the members in the process are complementary and do contribute to the overall pursuit of the common goal. In addition, an equally important task is to transform “Collective Self-Reliance” from a political rhetoric of mere declaration of intentions to an action-oriented strategy for redefining and reshaping the dominance and dependence relationships within the local, national, regional and international systems. To make it possible, it requires cooperation among and between the small and larger units in a given arrangement, based on comprehensive understanding, coordination, adjustment and concessions.

At the above-mentioned subregional, regional and international levels, there are different sets of participants, playing their roles. For example, at the subregional level, national decision-making centers are considered to be the primary actors, who deal with mutually antagonistic domestic pressure groups. At the regional level, it is the national governments, who have to agree, coordinate and cooperate on a joint action program. Finally, at the international level, governments of underdeveloped countries play a critical role, since they have to coordinate their economic and political aspirations in a challenging environment with the developed countries. And while at the national level the actors own efficient and effective tools to implement an action program, at the global level, the underdeveloped countries are most importantly concerned with the difficult task of coordinating their negotiation strategy with the industrialized countries in order to have a common platform and agenda. However, at the regional level the case is different, as cooperation within the regional context means the adoption of the Give and Take policy among sovereign governments, where the participants do not normally impose their decisions forcefully on their respective partners. In the regional context, in contrast to the global or subregional levels, every vested participant is exposed to pressures from within its own society and from developed countries as well.

Thus, it can be concluded that regional cooperation should ensure greater understanding of the problems and difficulties of each participant, the strengthening of trust and confidence in each other and providing mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technological and scientific spheres.⁵

Efforts to Consolidate Regional Integration

After World War II, international relations began exhibiting the urge of the nation-states to ensure peace, well-being and security not only between the states, but also among individual citizens. This realization became the base of regionalism or regional integration. Therefore, the roots of regional cohesion lay in the sensing of the national policy-makers that there are certain goals and common interests shared by the nation-states in a specific “region”⁶ and that these interests could be promoted effectively and most efficiently by maintaining a close and long-term cooperation within the regional framework. However, this balance or close cooperation is dependent upon diverse interests. To address these interests a number of regional organizations were formed since the 1940s.⁷

⁵ K. Gopal, op. cit., pp. 8-11.

⁶ Region: According to Benedict Anderson and other international theorists, the region, like the nation, is an “imagined community.” They are of the opinion that regions have been constructed politically and socially. Having a political and social bases, they are capable of being reshaped and redefined, with the passage of time both extent and purpose of cooperation change, as a new member joins and the existing member leaves (see: A. Heywood, op. cit., p. 482; also see: B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1983).

⁷ Regional organizations: For example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Pact, which collapsed in the 1990s, European Union, the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), Arab League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and many other were formed for the fulfillment of different objectives of member nation-states.

Scholars differ with regard to the definition of a “region.” Palmer and Parkins, referring to international relations, state: “a region is invariably an area embracing the territories of three or more states. These states are bound together by the ties of common interests, as well as geography. They are not necessarily contiguous or even in the same continent.”⁸ Usually, regions are made up of nation-states, sharing various things in common, such as, for example, political interests, common institutions and common racial roots. When such nation-states come close to establishing an association or organization at the regional level to attain particular objectives, regional integration or arrangement is formed. However, it is not a requirement that a state, joining such regional organizations, should be a part of the same geographical area. The factors, which influence the forging of a bond, are common interests.⁹ Generally, regional integration is a process, by which geographical regions become important economic and political units and, later on, serve as the fountainhead for cooperation and recognition or as a possible identity of the region.¹⁰ On conceptual and geographical basis, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan form a region. However, prior to discussing the problems and prospects of the constituents’ interdependence, it is imperative to formulate a theoretical framework for the better understanding of the process.

Functionalist scholars, led by the Hungarian political economist, David Mitrany, maintain that the division of political systems is actually the source of conflict among the nations; these can be transcended by searching out the areas of mutual interests and by creating a working web of international institutions, handled by technical elites. Furthermore, the nature of social and economic problems in the contemporary era is so complex that they cannot be solved individually by any single nation. Hence, it is of an immediate concern to identify common international, social and economic problems and to establish a global organization to handle such problems. In place of the League of Nations or any other organization, he argued for the creation of functionally particular and specific organizations, which would be capable of focusing on a single international problem and strive for its immediate and swift resolution. Once people in different countries learn about these new institutions and will begin experiencing the benefits and opportunities that such organizations offer, as well as tangible results of their work, the appreciation and acceptance of new organizations, built on functional grounds, designed to solve a variety of other diverse problems will accrue automatically. As a result, there will be created expanding circles of economic and social integration. Thus, functionalism advocates cooperation by means of “low politics,”¹¹ leading to greater political cooperation among nation-states in the long run. On the other hand, the neo-functionalists, led by Ernst Haas, in his book *The Unification of Europe*,¹² take integration as the process, through which political actors of distinct national settings are motivated to shift their expectations, loyalties and their political activities toward a larger common center. In this context, political parties, pressure groups, national and regional elites and supranational institutions become key players behind the integration process. The neo-functionalists also advocate “low politics” as the starting point with which functional cooperation should begin and attempt to prove that economic, social and political problems are inseparable in the long run, and that the bond between politics and economics plays an enormously important role in the integration process. Finally, the neo-functionalists’ concept of “integration” is both a process and an

⁸ N.D. Palmar, H.C. Parkins, *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, A. I. T. B. S. Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 1997, p. 559.

⁹ See: P. Ghosh, *International Relations*, Learning Private Limited, Delhi, 2013, pp. 205-242.

¹⁰ See: A. Heywood, op. cit., pp. 480-506.

¹¹ Low Politics: According to Functionalists, it means cooperation between technical, social and economic sectors, which will effectively generate greater political cooperation among the countries in the long run (see: D. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, Quadrangle, Chicago, 1966).

¹² Ernst Bernard Haas defines Integration at length in his book, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, 1958.

outcome. They accentuate the cooperative decision-making process as the core of the concept of integration.¹³

The inter-governmentalist school of thought strongly advocates that states are the primary players in the regional cooperation process. To them, the regional integration process means bargaining among state heads in a region. Nation-states in a region always look for balance of their national interests with a regional integration objective.¹⁴ While the communication or transactionalistic model of regional integration, developed by Karl W. Deutsch, considers integration as the continuous process of international transactions, which will ultimately lead to development of the integrated socio-political system. For him integration is “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long time,’ dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”¹⁵ The basic idea of the entire concept of Deutsch is the need to form a political community, in order to avoid violence and to thus maximize the prospect for peace and prosperity among nation-states. By creating a political community, people will be able to abandon their narrow parochial orientations, traditional concepts of international relations, which revolve around state sovereignty only, and be able to build an organization to promote peace and prosperity. Thus, due to the constant nature of international transactions and the use of the means of communication, a social structure is created, uniting the elite and masses and inculcating in them a sense of belonging to a single community. Accordingly, the success of integration depends entirely on the “sense of community” of nation-states.¹⁶

Eventually, regional integration takes on a variety of forms, depending on the areas in which neighboring nation-states choose to cooperate. Therefore, many types of regional integration can be identified, but the important ones are listed below.

(A) Economic Integration: Machlup¹⁷ referred to economic integration as the division of labor. It involves the free movement of goods and discrimination or nondiscrimination in the treatment of factors of production and goods. Pelkmans¹⁸ argues that integration denotes both a process and the state of affairs. He also associates integration with the formation of a coalition of previously isolated national economies. Machlup, however, associates it with the gradual removal of economic boundaries between two or more nation-states.

According to R.C. Hine (1994), economic integration is a global phenomenon that affects all nation-states in the world. It is stimulated by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade liberalization, and is boosted by international agencies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Multinational Corporation (MNC). By eliminating economic frontiers, nation-states link up their economies under specific integration schemes that eventually establish cooperation and coordination between them. Béla Balassa¹⁹ differentiates various degrees or stages of economic integration, such as a free trade area, customs union, common

¹³ See: K.C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, Routledge, Abingdon/USA/Canada, 2008, pp. 4-8.

¹⁴ See: Ibid., pp. 4-19.

¹⁵ Peaceful Change: To Deutsch, it means resolution of social problems, usually through nonviolent means and by institutionalized procedures (see: K.W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957, p. 5).

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Fritz Machlup is an Austrian-American economist who writes in detail about economic integration in his book *A History of Thought on Economic Integration*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977.

¹⁸ Jacques Pelkmans also defines economic integration in his book *Market Integration in the European Community*, Springer, USA, 1984.

¹⁹ Béla Balassa, a Hungarian economist, gives details about the economic integration in his book *Theory of Economic Integration*, Routledge, USA/London, 2013.

market, economic union and complete economic integration. In a free trade area, the parties retain their own rules and restrictions in their dealing with countries, which are not members, but in their trade with each other the tariff barriers are not used. In this situation, goods from the outside of a free trade area may enter a member state, in which the installed customs barriers are high, through another country of the same area where the tariffs are lower.

A customs union is somewhat similar to a free trade area but differs slightly in its relations with the non-member countries. The participating countries of a union are obliged to undertake a unified policy on external trade and, accordingly, establish common customs tariffs in trade with states outside the union. Therefore, within the territory of a union, the movement of goods, regardless of their country of origin, is not constrained by any customs tariffs or quotas. A common market, like a customs union, aims to attain a higher form of economic integration, as both limitations on trade and movements of factors of production are eliminated across national boundaries. The movement of factors of production inside the common market is free but outside the common market their movement is regulated by national rules or general precepts of an association or a combination of the two. Finally, the economic union is a common market that removes restrictions on both the movement of factors of production and trade with a high level of harmonization of the relevant economic policies of various nations. It amalgamates fiscal and monetary policies, which are entirely controlled by central authority. Single currency and monetary policy is another attribute of the economic union. Economic policies are intentionally matched, so that member countries become effectively nations of one region. However, ultimate economic integration is the extreme level of economic integration, where all member countries or participants become a single nation in a complete sense, wherein a supra-national authority controls common policies of the member states and has full sovereignty over member nation-states in real terms, as its decisions are binding for them.²⁰

(B) Political Integration: Direct and indirect references of political integration stem from the neo-functional school of thought. This type of integration seems to have some complexities, as nation-states, before integrating themselves with the neighboring countries, view their interests through the prism of their foreign policy's compatibility with national interests. Political integration, as a concept, has been defined differently by different theorists; some are of the opinion that it is only a condition, while others treat it as a process. Karl W. Deutsch refers to it as "the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence."²¹ The main theme of political integration is a "security-community."²² Political integration may be achieved in either pluralistic²³ or amalgamated²⁴ security-communities. However, integration is attained in both only when the states concerned surcease the use of violent means against each other. For Ernst Haas, "Political Integration is the process, where-

²⁰ See: J.P.C. Bento, *Economic Integration, International Trade and the Role of Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of Portuguese Manufacturing*, LIT Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp. 1-4.

²¹ Quoted from: L.N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford University Press, California, 1963, p. 4.

²² Security-Community: A group of people, which with the passage of time has become integrated. Within a definite territory they have attained a sense of community or institutions strong and widespread enough to assure peaceful changes among its population for ages (see: *Ibid.*, p. 5).

²³ Pluralistic Security-Community: It exists when nation-states hold back the legal independence of separate governments and also maintain their separate national identities (see: *Ibid.*, p. 6).

²⁴ Amalgamated Security-Community: It means a formal merger of two previously independent units into a single larger unit with a unique government after merger. The best example which suits to amalgamated security-community is the United States (see: *Ibid.*, p. 8).

by political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-states. The end result of the process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones."²⁵

After defining the concept of political integration, political scientists performed a huge amount of work to identify conditions in which political integration is possible. Thus, along with the various other political scientists, Deutsch identified background factors or environmental conditions of the essence for amalgamated or pluralistic security-community: Compatible value systems, mutually responsive elites, adequate communication channels, a commitment to a new way of life and the existence of a core area. Likewise, Haas calls for a pluralistic social structure, a high level of economic and industrial development and a modicum of ideological homogeneity.²⁶

(C) Security Integration: Literally, the security integration means cooperation of nation-states, in order to protect themselves from their enemies, both neighboring and distant. So, the concept of regional integration supports and gives rise to the "security-community" concept, provided by Karl Deutsch. His concept of security-community applies here in two ways.

- First, regional organizations try to involve their members in the framework of peace through cooperation, which results in a deeper level of integration and interdependence, primarily in the economic sphere, thus ultimately making war between the member nation-states unimaginable. For example, the formation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or European Economic Community (EEC) in 1952 and 1958, respectively, were designed to preclude France and Germany from future wars.
- The other factor behind the motivation for regional cooperation among the member states is to protect themselves from a common external enemy. Integration of Europe, which began in 1951 and was successfully completed in 1993, was regarded as the tool for safeguarding the region from the expansion of communism, the state ideology of the U.S.S.R.²⁷

The states, which entered or are entering into regional trade agreements may either increase regional trade and investment or create dissent among the member states. Usually, by coming to terms, member states develop a culture of cooperation, friendly environment and methodology, with which they are able to address important issues of their common interests. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) actually ameliorate the intraregional security, intraregional trade, mutual trust and finally, avoid the threats of war and minimize tensions among the member states.²⁸

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as a Region

After studying the available literature on the problems of the South Asian Region, it becomes necessary to thoroughly understand the intricate political conundrums of India, Pakistan, and Af-

²⁵ E.B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Revised ed., University of Notre Dame Press, July 2004, p. 12.

²⁶ See: L.N. Lindberg, op. cit., pp. 1-13.

²⁷ See: A. Heywood, op. cit., pp. 482-483.

²⁸ See: L.K.-van Niekerk, "Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages, and Lessons of Experience," pp.1-12, available at [http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-concepts_May2005.pdf] and [http://www.sarpn.org/rpp/human_security.php?search=true], 25 February, 2016.

ghanistan. Only then it would be possible to consider the cooperation among the three countries in real terms. The fundamental question to be addressed is whether the conflict between them has a chance of being resolved at the regional level or not. First, it is quite obvious that all three countries, from the inception of their independence, were at loggerheads, while India and Pakistan fought many wars on different issues, and are living in a fragile nuclear deterrence environment. Violence, whether perpetrated through Hindu revivalism, Islamic fundamentalism or an uncompromising Kashmiri identity, cast ominous shadows over the region in general. The post-independence period has been evidenced by a long enumeration of claims, counterclaims, allegations and counter allegations over disputed territories and distribution of natural resources. Decolonization of the subcontinent sown the seeds of conflict in the region from the very beginning and hardly provided an opportunity for intelligentsia of the region to work out solutions for peace and regional cooperation. On the world stage, people question their Governments on good governance issues, the observance of human rights, and often democracy. Meanwhile, the escalation of violence is usually due to external intervention by the nonstate participants and an open access to the region. The conflicts around Kashmir and within Afghanistan's borders keep the SAARC region in a state of instability/uncertainty, which erodes the good will between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Therefore, concentrating on de-escalation and, subsequently, preventing conflicts will have to remain very high on the priority list for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and their citizens as well. Furthermore, conflicts in the region, most importantly between India and Pakistan, seem difficult but not insoluble, provided all the actors in the region show enough maturity, develop trust, focus on nonpolitical issues and understand how conflicts disturb the peace and development of the region. For this, the three countries should rely on different Regional Cooperation Models and abandon the idea that conflicts have deep roots in the region. When the three countries understand how important they are for each other and how the opportunity to rely on the ability to resist general threats together is beneficial for their economies and for their development as a whole, this understanding will become a reliable basis for the initiatives on developing collaboration. And, therefore, the probability of joint operations for the mutual general benefits will make it possible to raise the level of collaboration in the region and will motivate the countries to together resist challenges and threats, which subject will be discussed below.²⁹

Challenges and Prospects

The South Asia as a region is plunged into the state of chaos by the international political and nonpolitical actors, who are reluctant to make the region compatible to other prosperous regional associations, like the European Union. Security of the region is in serious doubt, since almost all of the South Asian countries, especially India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are the victims of terrorism, which is growing around the world in general and in the region in particular. Afghanistan is being considered the breeding ground of terrorism, which poses a threat to international peace and endangers the sovereign status of India and Pakistan. To counter the possible emerging threats and situations of grave nature after the complete withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan, the policy-makers and influential stakeholders of Pakistan and India should develop a joint strategy for the improvement of Afghan economy and security. Afghan stakeholders should also understand that without the aid and assistance of Pakistan and India, Afghanistan cannot withstand the threats, posed by the extremist ideology infesting its social order. Also, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India can face the challenge by the exchange

²⁹ See: P. Lyon, *Conflict between India and Pakistan. An Encyclopedia*, ABC-CLIO Publications, California, 2008, pp. ix-xiv.

of information among their intelligence services, like the Khadamat-e Aetela'at-e Dawlati (KHAD/ KhAd) of Afghanistan, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. As long as there remains instability in Afghanistan, jolts to India and Pakistan's national economies are to be expected. Stability in Afghanistan is imperative for Pakistan and India to reach out to Central Asia for energy and other economic gains as well. Their political and economic presence in Afghanistan would be advantageous for trade and security. Control over natural resources of Central Asia through legitimate means would serve the interests of Pakistan and India, provided Afghanistan realizes that giving them access into and throughout Afghanistan is advantageous for the Afghan government and its people as well.

Religion, linguistic affinity, culture, and ethnic affiliations at times become a source of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These common traits were always used as tools for chaos, confusion, anarchy, lawlessness, disorder and hatred against each other by some state and nonstate actors of both of the countries with the national and regional boundaries. Both Nawaz Sharif and Ashraf Ghani governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, could use the similarity of traits for healthy and favorable relations between the two countries. In addition, by maintaining strong social base and people to people contacts, state actors would be ready to fight against their common problems, such as the challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, abysmal lack of basic life necessities of the people, inadequate health facilities, unjust distribution of economic gains across different sections of society, especially poignant among the already marginalized sections of society. Stability in Afghanistan and cooperating with it is important for both India and Pakistan because of its spillover effect on the whole region. To prevent this, both countries should develop a joint professional program for Afghan youth, thereby protecting the young people, especially in rural areas, from the trap of extremism, and preventing the country from slipping into civil war.

Other aspects of collaboration on which the three countries ought to work together are arresting the efforts of illicit trade and alleviate the deficit of their water requirements. Both India and Pakistan lack the adequate water supply, which hits their agricultural and other requirements. In Central and South Asia we have two important water sources: the Amu Darya and Indus rivers, and both water sources have been maintained poorly so far because of antiquated irrigation systems. However, common understanding and increased cooperation could make it possible to provide a substitute water source, for example, the Kabul river to cater to India and Pakistan's agricultural requirements. It is important to mention here that the conflicting postures of Pakistan and India make it unlikely, as Pakistan's increasing agricultural needs and the rising population of India are the factors, which create an obstacle to the water sharing agreements. However, there is a way out of this situation: the formulation of a new agreement, which is not restricted by the framework of the current treaty (the Indus Waters Treaty) on the waters of the Indus, covering all the developmental problems of the territory of the Indus basin in its entirety, which would significantly strengthen and expand the likelihood for cooperation. The participation of the U.S. and European Union in this agreement would help to minimize the lack of trust between the two countries.

Keeping in mind the nature and historical relations between India-Pakistan and Afghanistan, the cooperation among the trio could be achieved in the spheres of cultural and educational exchanges, trade, tourism, etc. This would significantly improve the atmosphere for promoting contacts between people and help create a sense of unity regardless of the nature of their political systems and ideological differences. Therefore, the cooperation will significantly empower them to counter terrorism and the divisive tendencies in the region.

KAZAKHSTAN-SAUDI ARABIA: FOREIGN POLICY CONTACTS AND INTERACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS

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ABSTRACT

The second decade of the twenty-first century is demonstrating an unprecedented scope of foreign economic activities (international economic operations) in which TNCs act as traders (merchants), investors, promoters of latest technologies that invigorate international labor migration. They are responsible, to a great extent, for the dynamics, structure and level of competitiveness in the world market of goods and services, international movement of capital and transfer of technologies (knowledge). There is a group of oil-rich states among the independent states in the Persian Gulf region that scored considerable economic victories. In the last few decades, unfolding globalization, widening economic ties and the emerging new parameters of international relations have moved the Gulf

monarchies (that own 43.9% of the world's proven oil reserves and 15.5% of natural gas resources) from the region's periphery to the center of world economics and Middle Eastern politics. The Middle East is an object rather than a subject of geopolitics. The West remains convinced that despite its rich fuel resources, the Muslim world is unable to create an efficient economic model, while the local people are not interested in business. This is not true: the Arabic Middle East has performed a fantastic leap into the future that disproved the Western stereotypes. Today, Saudi Arabia invests into many countries of the world, its interests stretching far and wide outside the Middle East: in particular, it is drawing closer to Kazakhstan with inevitable readjustments of both countries' foreign policy priorities.

KEYWORDS: *Middle Eastern policies, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, foreign policy, investments, soft power, Islamic banking.*

Introduction

The Middle East is a unique region very different in many respects from the other regions of the world. Its geopolitical location at the crossroads of three parts of the world (Europe, Asia and Africa) has no rivals in any other place on the globe. This explains why nearly all world powers tried, at one point or another, to establish control over it as a zone of their “vitally important interests”: in the 18th-19th centuries, these were Great Britain and Turkey, replaced in the twentieth century by France, Germany, the U.S., the Soviet Union and the same Great Britain. The country that controlled the Middle East also controlled the eastern part of the Mediterranean and the western part of the Indian Ocean.

The Middle East is the cradle of two world religions—Christianity and Islam—and, therefore, two world cultures. The huge oil reserves discovered in the last few decades added a lot of weight to its geopolitical consequence. From the scientific point of view, an analysis of the Middle Eastern political balance of power is highly important: indeed, the region consists of countries with very different levels of the development of production facilities, economic potential, social organization, culture and the nature of political regimes.

From time to time, tensions rise, the situation becomes dangerously explosive turning the Middle East into a conflict zone. It should be said that over the last fifty years, the Middle East has seen more armed conflicts than any other region in the world. Libya, Iran and Iraq were accused of supporting international terrorism and human rights violations.¹ Washington’s allies (Egypt and Saudi Arabia)² with more or less similar records were never accused of Islamic fundamentalism and of conspiring with terrorists.

Today, the Middle East demonstrates certain integration trends, since the Arabs are the predominant ethnic group in the region and Islam the dominant religion. This means that despite different political regimes many countries have similar political, economic, social and military-strategic interests that serve as the cornerstones of numerous interstate regional associations. Despite numerous problems, integration is gaining momentum; in favorable conditions it can develop into a sustainable process.

In the very short historical period, a group of countries, united into a subregional Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf,³ has transformed into a very active entity of international relations at the subregional, Arabic and Islamic levels and become an important financial donor of Western countries and the biggest importer of Western weapons and high technologies. There is every reason to believe that the shortage of the world fuel reserves will add even more importance to the above-mentioned countries.

Methods and Materials

Today, political science has actualized the cognitive interest in individual aspects of interaction between religion and political processes in contemporary society. Those who study these aspects have to cope with methodological problems caused by the absence of theoretical constructs and cognitive

¹ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, “Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

² See: K. Tokaev, *Vneshniaia politika Kazakhstana v usloviakh globalizatsii*, Elorda, Almaty, 2000, p. 547.

³ The Council unites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain.

apparatus indispensable for an adequate interpretation of the processes created by politicization of religion and the religious dimension of politics.⁴

The work was done within the framework of post-nonclassical metaparadigm of political studies based on the synthesis of the principles and provisions of classical and nonclassical sciences. To address the scientific and research tasks related to the studies of religious expansion and politicization of religion, we used the principles and methods of classical political science, oriented toward the studies of political processes as a supra-individual political reality.

Results

Distorted and unacceptable identification of Islam as a world religion with international terrorism that relies on radical Islamist rhetoric is widespread in the international media and promotes religious disunity. The Arab tradition, as well as the process of shaping the Arabic statehood, is closely connected with the religious context. As the region's leading religious and political doctrine, Islam played a great role in consolidating Arabic tribes and, later, regulating Arab society.

The Islamic banking system should be governed by the cannons of the Shari'a. Unlike the traditional crediting institutions that charge interest, the Islamic banks work according to the takaful principle—mutual insurance.⁵ Today, Islamic banking successfully competes with conventional banking. Some of the British banks opened counters of Islamic banking making London the capital of Islamic banking. Islamic banking is rapidly gaining popularity in the world's credit market: today it is practiced in over 75 countries, many of them non-Muslim.⁶

The concept of project investment is the best method associated with risk sharing and equity participation. Banks do not earn interest; they study a potential customer and his business plan, analyze the risks and share them with the client.⁷

Kazakhstan is one of the post-Soviet countries best suited for Islamic banking, while in the conditions of anti-Russian sanctions the majority of Russian businessmen can rely on tax-free service when doing business in Kazakhstan, since the two countries are the strongest partners within the Customs Union.⁸

Islamic economics can be described in different ways: as an economic policy based on the Koran and Sunnah (Sayf al-din Taj ad-din); as a social science that studies economic problems through the prism of Islamic values (M.A. Mannan); as a behavior model of a Muslim in a typical Muslim society (S.N.H. Naqvi); as knowledge and the use of bans and prescriptions of the Shari'a designed

⁴ See: N.E. Kamal, M.A. Almulla, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, *The Arab East and Russia: Current Transformations of Multinational Corporations*, ed. by G. Osipov, ISPR RAS, Moscow, 2016, p. 138.

⁵ See: R. Bekkin, *Islamskie finansovye instituty i instrumenty v musulmanskikh i nemusulmanskikh stranakh: osobennosti i perspektivy razvitiia*, Author's abstract of Doctorate Thesis, 08.00.14, Institute of Africa, 2009, p. 368. (Takaful is a form of mutual insurance based on the principles of cooperative risk sharing, mutual responsibility, mutual protection, and solidarity among groups of participants.)

⁶ See: G. Osipov, A. Karabulatova, I. Karabulatova, "Mezhdunarodnye korporatsii' s ispolzovaniem islamskogo bankinga kak otlichitelnaia cherta sovremennoy globalizatsii," *Nauchnoe obozrenie, Series 2, Humanitarian Sciences*, No. 5, 2015, pp. 5-12.

⁷ See: M.K. Lewis, M.K. Hasan, *Handbook of Islamic Banking, and Islamic Finance*, The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Edward Elgar, 2007.

⁸ See: "Kazakhstan Offers Russian Businesses that Invest into the Non-Raw Material Sector Considerable Tax Privileges—Masimov," Karavan media, available in Russian at [<http://www.caravan.kz/news/kazakhstan-predlagaet-dlya-rossijskogo-biznesa-sushhestvennye-nalogovye-igoty-pri-investirovanii-v-predpriyatiya-nesyrevogogo-sektora-masimov-244145/>], 17 December, 2016; "It is Planned to Introduce Tax Privileges for the Users of Subsurface Resources," available in Russian at [<http://kzinform.com/ru/news/20160926/42933.html>], 16 December, 2016.

to avert injustices that might be engendered in the process of acquisition and use of material resources (Hasan uz-Zaman), etc.

Table 1

**Fundraising by Banks of Kazakhstan
in the Market of Islamic Interbank Capital**

Date	Recipient Bank in Kazakhstan	Islamic Donor Bank	Description
2005-2006	Turan-Alem Bank	Calyon Bank/Abu-Dhabi Islamic Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$50 million
2006-2008		Calyon Bank/Abu-Dhabi Islamic Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$200 million
2007-2009		Abu-Dhabi Islamic Bank/CIMB Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$250 million
2009		Islamic Development Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$100 million
2006-2007	Bank Tsentrkredit	Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank/Commercial Bank of Qatar/Boubyan Bank/Dubai Bank PJSC/Habib Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$38 million
2007-2009	Alyans Bank	Calyon Bank/Abu-Dhabi Islamic Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$150 million
2009	Khalyk Bank	Islamic Development Bank	Raised funds to total the sum of \$100 million

Saudi businessmen will more actively invest in the economy of Kazakhstan. During the official visit of the President of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbaev, to Saudi Arabia in October 2016, all priority trends of bilateral cooperation were further invigorated. The President of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) that had already invested \$1 billion 300 million in the economy of Kazakhstan, was one of the first to meet the President of Kazakhstan; the bank intends to invest two more billion in the next two years: reconstruction of the roads in Kazakhstan, agriculture and water supply were discussed as priorities.⁹ Over ten agreements, amounting to the total sum of over 60 billion tenge in the areas of energetics, mining, agriculture and trade, were signed during the visit (the poultry farm in the South Kazakhstan Region and food factory in the Akmola Region among them). Today, there exist 17 enterprises with Saudi participation functioning in Kazakhstan.

At a meeting with representatives of the Saudi business, the TOP members of the kingdom's entrepreneur community, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbaev talked about the advantages of investments in the economy of Kazakhstan to raise the level of mutual trade turnover that in 2015 was \$16.3 million, nothing to write home about. The level of investments was another matter: between 2005 and 2015, the Saudi business invested \$85 million in Kazakhstan's economy, not to count tens of millions of dollars in the form of grants. The heads of the Amiantit Group, that specialized in water engineering and pipe rolling, expressed their gratitude for the highly favorable investment climate in Kazakhstan and expressed their conviction that the partnership would continue.

⁹ See: R. Ramazanov, E. Kanapiyauly, Kh. Omarkulov, A. Omargaliev, "Podrobnosti ofitsialnogo vizita N. Nazarbaeva v Saudovskuyu Araviyu," available at [<http://24.kz/ru/news/top-news/item/145111-podrobnosti-ofitsialnogo-vizita-v-saudovskuyu-araviyu>], 17 December, 2016.

The sides agreed to compile a roadmap, set up a bilateral intergovernmental commission, and workgroups by industry, in order to achieve even better results and to set up a joint investment fund to finance common projects in Kazakhstan. The President, Mr. Nazarbaev, invited the Saudi partners to join investment-innovation projects and the Nurlı zhol program. Saudi Arabia is ready to participate in EXPO-2017 in Astana, where it would present its innovations in energy production.

The President of Kazakhstan also met the King of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. The leaders of the two countries discussed the main trends of cooperation and prospects of deeper contacts in trade, economic, political, cultural and humanitarian spheres.¹⁰ The sides agreed that there is a great potential and noticeable progress in different spheres of interaction, including agriculture.

The President of Kazakhstan met the Speaker of the Saudi Shura Council, Mr. Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh, to discuss a common external policy. The sides agreed that the relationship should be raised to a new level. President Nazarbaev expressed his conviction that the agreements would be realized. In his turn, Mr. Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Sheikh assured the President of Kazakhstan that his country would spare no effort to consolidate its relations with Kazakhstan.

The following newly concluded agreements will play a big role in the development of Kazakhstan:

- Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Extradition of Convicted Persons;
- Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Extradition of Persons;
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Cooperation in the Sphere of Using Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes;
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Cooperation in Agriculture.

As far as this visit was concerned, the Russian Muslim sites specifically pointed to its religious component and stressed the humanitarian nature of Islamic economics and politics.¹¹

Discussion

Today, the political science is especially interested in the genesis of the political aspects in religion (Georges Balandier and Alexey Bardakov);¹² politicization of religion (Gabriel Almond, Hannah Arendt, Madeleine Albright, Vittorio Strada, Samuel Huntington);¹³ the role of religion in the

¹⁰ See: "Nursultan Nazarbaev pribyl s ofitsialnym vizitom v Saudovskuyu Araviyu," available at [http://bnews.kz/ru/news/politika/President/nursultan_nazarbaev_pribil_s_ofitsialnim_vizitom_v_saudovskuu_araviu-2016_10_25-1294385], 16 December, 2016.

¹¹ See: "Nazarbaev nazval visit v Saudovskuyu Araviyu poleznym," available at [http://www.time-namaz.ru/news_islam-9501-nazarbaev_nazval_vizit_v_saudovskuyu_araviyu_poleznym_html], 12 December, 2016.

¹² See: G. Balandier, *Political Anthropology*, Pelican, 1972; A.I. Bardakov, *Vlast v formakh organizatsii zhiznedielnosti obshchestva*, Author's abstract of a Doctorate Thesis, Volgograd, 2007.

¹³ See: G. Almond, *The Culture: Political Altitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980; H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Schocken, New York, 2004; M. Albright, *The Mighty and the Al-*

political process (Ivan Gobozov, Alexander Ignatenko, Rafik Mukhametshin, Vladimir Ustyantsev);¹⁴ the nature of interaction between the political process and religion (Jean Baudrillard, Richard Rorty, John Rawls, Kenneth D. Wald, Jürgen Habermas);¹⁵ religion and the contemporary democratic process (Jeffrey Stout);¹⁶ Islam and contemporary democracy (Fareed Zakaria, Marlene Laruelle, Alexey Malashenko);¹⁷ religious expansion in the world of politics (Robert Bartlett, Lev Gumilev, Victor Makarenko, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee);¹⁸ the forms of the religious space (Igor Arzumanov, Pierre Bourdieu, Gilles Kepel, James P. Calvet);¹⁹ impact of globalization on politicization of religion (Ulrich Beck, Svetlana Pogorelskaya, Alain Touraine, Emmanuel Todd, Olga Trofimova, Michèle Tribalat, Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Samed Samedov).²⁰

It should be noted that in his *Milestones*, Mr. Sayyid Qutb, the founder of the ideology of Islamism, insisted that jihad, unleashed to establish the “divine power” on earth, would go on forever. He went even further to conclude that jihad was inherent in Islam. His ideas are a very strange concept of permanent jihad based on material power that had gone through “very different development stages and discovered highly effective methods for each of them.”²¹ He referred not only and not so much to “defensive jihad” as to the offensive jihad that relied on force. This concentration on the use of force was caused by the fact that Islam lived (and is living) in the environment of a new Jahiliyyah

mighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs, HarperCollins, 2006; V. Strada, “Razmyshleniia o politicheskikh religiakh XX veka,” in: *Religiia i politika v XX veke: materialy vtorogo kollokviuma Rossia i Italia*, Institute of World History, RAS, Moscow, 2005; S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968.

¹⁴ See: I. Gobozov, *Filosofia politiki*, Teis, Moscow, 1998; A. Ignatenko, *Islam i politika*, Collection of articles, Institute of Religion and Politics, Moscow, 2004; R. Mukhametshin, “Stanovlenie kofessionalnoy politiki v Rossii: opyt Tatarstana,” *Politicheskaya ekspertiza*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010; V. Ustyantsev, “Antropologiya riska: kontseptualnye osnovaniia,” in: *Obshchestvo riska i chelovek: ontologicheskii i tsemnostny aspekti*, Nauka Publishers, Saratov, 2006.

¹⁵ See: J. Baudrillard, *L’Echange Symbolique et la Mort*, GALLIMARD, 1976; R. Rorty, *Religion as a Conversation—Stopper. Philosophy and Social Hope*, Penguin Books, London, 1999; J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994; “Separation and Interaction: Religion and Politics in the United States: An Interview with Kenneth D. Wald,” *Electronic Journal of the U.S. Information Agency*, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1997, available at [<http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/society/ijse0397/tocsv.htm>]; J. Habermas, “Religiia, parvo i politika: politicheskaya spravedlivost v multikulturnom Mir-Obshchestve,” *Polis*, No. 2, 2010 (see also: J. Habermas, “Religion, Law and Politics: On Political Justice in a Multicultural World Society,” available at [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ad4hjAEphV8>]).

¹⁶ See: J. Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, Princeton University Press, 2004.

¹⁷ See: F. Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2003; M. Laruelle, “Prinadlezhnost k islamu kak politicheskii kriterii: politizatsia dukhovnykh upravlenii i sozdanie musulmanskikh partii,” in: *Islam, identichnost i politika v postsovetskom prostranstve*, Master Layn, Kazan, 2005; A. Malashenko, *Islamskaia alternativa i islamskii proekt*, Ves mir, Moscow, 2006.

¹⁸ See: R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change. 950-1350*, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 1993; L. Gumilev, *Geografiia etnosa v istoricheskii period*, Ayris-Press, Moscow, 2002; V. Makarenko, “Fanatizm i tolerantnost: dialektika bibleysko-tserkovnykh istokov,” *Politicheskaya kontseptologiya*, No. 4, 2011; O. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Oxford University Press, 1991; A. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, Oxford University Press, 1948.

¹⁹ See: I. Arzumanov, *Transformatsiia prostranstva religioznoy kultury Baykalskogo regiona v transaziatskom kontekste: XX-XXI vv.*, Author’s abstract of Doctorate Thesis, Moscow, 2008, available at [<http://www.disserscat.com/content/transformatsiya-prostranstva-religioznoi-kultury-baikalskogo-regiona-v-transaziatskom-kontek>], 15 December, 2016; P. Bourdieu, *Sotsialnoe prostranstvo: polia i praktiki*, Aletaya, St. Petersburg, 2007; G. Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002; J. Calvet, *Islamism: A Documentary and Reference Guide*, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2008.

²⁰ See: U. Beck, *What Is Globalization?* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999; S. Pogorelskaya, “Musulmane v Germanii: spetsifika integratsii,” *Aktualnye problemy Evropy*, No. 1, 2008; D. Pipes, “Explains ‘Islamism,’” *The Minaret*, September, 2000; O. Trofimova, “Musulmane i islam v Zapadnoy Evrope,” *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 10, 2009; S. Huntington, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Society*, New York, 1976; E. Todd, *Le destin des immigrants (Assimilation et ségrégation dans les démocraties occidentales)*, Seuil, Paris, 1994; S.A. Samedov, *Islam v politike: ideologiya i praktika*, Ekon-Inform, Moscow, 2009.

²¹ S. Qutb, “Jihaad in the Cause of God,” in: *Milestones*, 2nd ed., Transl. by S. Badruhan Hasan, International Islamic Publishers Ltd., M.A. Karachi, Pakistan, 1988, pp. 107-142.

(ignorance of divine guidance); the reference is to all non-Islamic societies that are actively opposing the realization of the Islamic vision.

Conclusion

Islam is dominated by the idea of vicariate, according to which the wealth of this world belongs to Allah, while man is merely an administrator, who arranges the resources, including the intellectual ones, entrusted to him. In this case, we are talking about the relationships between man and God. There is an opinion that the term “Islamic” somewhat narrows the sphere of application of the Islamic economic model in non-Muslim societies. In fact, Islam does not insist that economics or politics should be defined as Islamic; they should be addressed to mankind. Saudi Arabia, the country that has faced and is still facing numerous problems and that has managed to outdistance many other countries in social and economic aspects, is building up its influence in the post-Soviet countries. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the world community entered a qualitatively new stage of political development, marked by the disintegration of the bipolar system and the mounting number of regional conflicts, multipolarity that is growing more obvious and accelerating globalization that mark not only the end of the Cold War but also the transformation of the world order as a whole.

MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES TO RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION FORMAT

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ABSTRACT

This article examines migration from Central Asian countries to Russia and Kazakhstan in the context of integration processes within the EAEU. There exist large and stable migration corridors between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and Russia and Kazakhstan, on the other. Migration from these countries to Russia and Kazakhstan, which is second in scale only to migration from Mexico to the United States, has serious political, social, economic, and demographic impacts both on the migrants' native countries and on the countries they come to. People seeking

work abroad make up the bulk of this human stream.

However, labor migration becomes intertwined with, or transformed into, other forms of cross-border movements such as moving abroad for permanent residence or for marrying a foreign citizen. Quite often, going to Russia or Kazakhstan to work ends up in permanent residence in one of those countries. Many workers from Central Asia have become citizens of Russia or Kazakhstan, which means that they have become successfully integrated into the societies of the two countries.

KEYWORDS: *migration, Central Asia, Russia, Kazakhstan, EAEU, interaction, policies.*

Migration in the Context of EAEU Integration Processes

Migration, primarily labor migration, has become a form of mutual economic and political integration of former Soviet republics, facilitating the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The member nations' total population is 183 million. Nationals of the EAEU member states—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia—need no visas to cross the borders between any of them. Nor do nationals of any of them need permission to work in any of the other

four countries. The EAEU's member countries constitute an area with free movements of goods, services, capital, and labor, and with coordinated or uniform economic policies.

There exist large and stable migration corridors between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, on the one hand, and Russia and Kazakhstan, on the other. Central Asians who go to Russia or Kazakhstan to work number up to 4.2 million, accounting for 16% of the above-mentioned countries' economically active population. This scale of migration has serious political, social, economic, and demographic effects both on the migrants' home countries and on the countries they come to. In 2013, earnings that Central Asian workers sent back home from Russia reached \$13.5 billion. Although end-of-2015 statistics showed remittances to have dropped because of the depreciation of the ruble and 30% outflow of foreign labor from Russia, labor migration remains an important source of income for most of the Central Asian countries. According to the World Bank, in 2015 the world's top countries that were recipients of recorded remittances in terms of shares of gross domestic product were Tajikistan (it ranked first—47%) and Kyrgyzstan (it ranked third—29%).

Central Asians coming to Russia have been acquiring Russian citizenship on a wide scale, and this is apparently an indication of a desire to integrate into Russian society. Unfortunately, Russian law is not too consistent in granting citizenship to Central Asians. Liberal rules, for example for Kyrgyz or Tajik nationals, have been revised and made more restrictive. Restrictions put into force in 2002 and 2010 resulted in a lot fewer Central Asians receiving Russian passports.

Key Factors in Migration from Central Asia to Russia and Kazakhstan

Economic factors. There are typical sets of outmigration-stimulating factors in the Central Asian countries, including declining production, low wages, high unemployment, and poverty. Russia, on the other hand, is a country with a diversified economy, high demand for labor in many industries and regions, and wages and a quality of life higher than those in the Central Asian countries. All this has given rise to a large-scale Eurasian migration subsystem whose nucleus are Russia and Kazakhstan as destinations for migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Demographic factors. Russia's population as a whole has been aging since the 1990s and its working-age population decreasing in this period. This causes shortages of labor with consequent strong competition among employers and stimulates the inflow of foreign labor. The Central Asian countries, Russia's main source of foreign workers, present an opposite demographic picture. Their working-age population is projected to increase by 2050—by 6.4 million in Uzbekistan, by 2.8 million in Tajikistan, and by 600,000 in Kyrgyzstan.

Cultural and historical factors. Today's Eurasian migration subsystem has its roots in Soviet-era social and economic ties between the Central Asian countries, on the one hand, and Russia and Kazakhstan, on the other, and on the continuing wide-scale use of Russian as the main language of communication between nationals of countries that were republics of the Soviet Union. Central Asians who plan to go abroad to work usually choose Russia as their destination. Knowing the Russian language and understanding the Russian mentality means a better chance of finding a job. The majority of Central Asian job seekers who come to Russia find work through social networks or family contacts or private intermediaries. Unfortunately, private recruitment agencies and state job centers play an insignificant role in the employment of foreign nationals.

Infrastructural and geographical factors. Though located in the heart of Eurasia, the Central Asian countries have much better transportation links to Russia and Kazakhstan than to China, the Middle East, or Western Europe. Russia can be reached from Central Asia and Transcaucasia by rail,

car, sea, or air. Increasingly frequent flights in recent years have given a boost to labor migration into Russia. Many airlines have launched direct flights not only to Moscow but also to other large Russian cities. Air tickets are comparatively inexpensive, and there are loan programs in Central Asian countries for flights to Russia.

Political factors. In the 1990s and early 2000s, ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers living in Central Asian and Transcaucasian countries have been emigrating to Russia for a range of reasons, including civil wars, local nationalism in the 1990s, ethnic conflicts, restrictions on the use of the Russian language, and obstacles to career progress in 2000-2010.

On the other hand, former Soviet republics have been rapidly building up political and economic ties. The EAEU founding treaty, which was signed on 29 May, 2014, and put into force on 1 January, 2015, offers significant opportunities to nationals of EAEU member states.

A citizen of an EAEU member state needs no visa to enter any member country or permission to work there. Nationals of EAEU member states may stay in Russia for a maximum of 30 days without having their temporary residence registered, while other aliens entering Russia for temporary stay are to register within seven business days of arrival. Nationals of EAEU member states who come to Russia are also allowed to spend up to 90 days looking for work.

Nationals of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova need no entry visas for Russia either. However, a Tajik national must register within 15 and a national of Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, or Moldova within seven business days of arrival. After registration, they may look for work for a maximum of 30 days but they need a work permit, although one of a preferential type as distinct from regular work permits needed by nationals of all other countries. The similar system of preferential work permits exists in Kazakhstan.

Russia has a three-level system of regulations on the use of foreign labor (see Table 1).

Table 1

**Regulations on Employment of Aliens
in the Russian Federation Depending on Their Nationality
(as of 1 December, 2016)**

Nationality	Documents Needed for Entering Russia	Type of Work Permit	Necessary Procedures
EAEU member states— Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan	Passport and migration card	None needed	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Registration at temporary residential address within 30 business days of arrival in Russia; 2. Contract with employer to be signed within 90 days of entering Russia; 3. Notification of Federal Migration Service (FMS) by employer about signature/ severance of contract with foreign national within 3 business days of signature/ severance date
Former Soviet republics whose nationals need no entry visas for Russia— Azerbaijan,	Passport and migration card	Preferential permit	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Registration at temporary residential address within 15 business days of entering Russia for Tajik nationals and within 7 business days for nationals of the other states; 2. Acquisition of work permit within 30 days of entering Russia;

Table 1 (continued)

Nationality	Documents Needed for Entering Russia	Type of Work Permit	Necessary Procedures
Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan			3. Notification of FMS by employer about signature/severance of contract with migrant within 3 business days of signature/severance date
States whose nationals need entry visas for Russia—ex-Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Turkmenistan, and other countries	Passport, visa, and migration card	Regular permit	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Acquisition by employer of employment permission; 2. Registration of alien at temporary residential address within 7 business days of arrival in Russia; 3. Acquisition by alien of work permit within 30 days of entering Russia; 4. Notification of FMS by employer about signature/severance of employment contract within 3 business days of signature/severance date

The Scale and Trends of Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the Context of Mutual Integration of EAEU Member Countries

Russia is today the main destination in Eurasia for nationals of Central Asian countries who are planning to work abroad. Statistics in Table 2 represent the scale of migration into Russia.

Seekers of temporary jobs make up the bulk of Central Asian migrants arriving in Russia. They were employed on a large scale in Russia in the nineties as the country was short of labor. Labor migration into Russia peaked in the 2000s. Today Russia is still attractive for people in Central Asia, some other Asian, some Eastern European countries, and Transcaucasian countries who are planning to work abroad.

Official statistics on numbers of foreign nationals who come to Russia to work are based on recorded numbers of work permits issued by the FMS. In 2014, the FMS issued a total of 3,690 thousand permits—2,387 thousand preferential and 1,303 thousand regular ones. However, because of the recent financial and economic crisis, only 1,887 thousand permits were issued—1,710 thousand preferential and 177,000 regular ones (see Fig. 1 on p. 46). Between January and July 2015, 1,406 thousand permits were issued—1,265 thousand preferential and 141,000 regular ones.¹

¹ See: Data on migration in the Russian Federation for seven months of 2015, available at [<http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/details/159274/>], 3.12.2016.

Table 2

**Scale and Structure of Migration from Central Asia to Russia
(numbers of people)¹**

Purpose of Migration	Total Number of Migrants	Migrants from Central Asia
PERMANENT RESIDENCE		
Migrants who arrived	482,241 ²	257,473 ³
Increase in no. of migrants who arrived	295,859 ⁴	164,704 ⁵
Recipients of permanent or temporary residence permits	435,802	
Recipients of citizenship	157,791	96,950 ⁶
Ethnic Russian immigrants	106,319	
Refugees	124 ⁷	9 ⁸
TEMPORARY RESIDENCE		
Migrants who arrived	17,281,971	
Registered migrants	8,393,655	
Total no. of aliens in Russian territory	11,072,255	
LABOR MIGRATION		
Recipients of preferential permits for employment by individuals	2,386,641	915,814 ⁹
Recipients of permits for employment by legal entities	1,303,258	723,388 ¹⁰
Including permit recipients who were highly qualified professionals	31,101	722
EDUCATIONAL MIGRATION		
Aliens already receiving higher education in Russia	164,800 ¹¹	44,700 ¹²
Aliens admitted to Russian higher education institutions	46,800 ¹³	
UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION		
Deported migrants	139,034	
Persons banned from entering Russia	675,950	
Undocumented migrant workers	5,000,000-6,000,000 ¹⁴	

¹ See: Data of the Russian Federal Migration Service for the year 2014, available at [<http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/details/110975/>], 10.12.2016.

² See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2013, available at [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat25747300_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#], 15.12.2016.

³ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2013, available at [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#], 8.12.2016.

Table 2 (continued)

- ⁴ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2013, available at [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#], 10.12.2016.
- ⁵ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2013, available at [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#], 12.12.2016.
- ⁶ See: International Migration Outlook 2013, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2013, p. 411, available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-en], 18.12.2016.
- ⁷ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2012, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_107/Main.htm], 11.12.2016.
- ⁸ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the year 2013, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_107/Main.htm], 10.12.2016.
- ⁹ The Federal Migration Service says that in 2013 it issued 1,117,833 preferential work permits for employment by individuals. This number included 915,814 permits issued to nationals of the five Central Asian countries. These statistics have not yet been published officially and have been made available to the Federal State Statistics Service to be included in the collection *Trud i zanyatost v Rossii, 2015* (Labor and Employment in Russia, 2015).
- ¹⁰ The Federal Migration Service says that in 2013 it issued 1,111,494 regular work permits for employment by legal entities. This number included 723,388 permits issued to nationals of the five Central Asian countries. These statistics have not yet been published officially and have been made available to the Federal State Statistics Service to be included in the collection *Trud i zanyatost v Rossii, 2015* (Labor and Employment in Russia, 2015).
- ¹¹ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the 2012/2013 academic year, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/b13_13/lssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/07-57.htm], 10.12.2016.
- ¹² See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the 2012/2013 academic year, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/b13_13/lssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/07-57.htm], 2.12.2016.
- ¹³ See: Data of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service for the 2012/2013 academic year, available at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/b13_13/lssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/07-57.htm], 10.12.2016.
- ¹⁴ See: S.V. Ryazantsev, E.E. Pismennaia, M.F. Tkachenko, "Formirovanie Tsentralnoaziatskogo segmenta Evraziiskoi migratsionnoi podsystemy," *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy*, No. 34, 2013, p. 47.

Russia receives its foreign labor from various countries but the Central Asian states are a source of a steadily increasing inflow of migrant workers. In 2015, the majority of foreigners who came to Russia to look for work were nationals of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, China, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan (see Fig. 2).


All these countries have been stable sources of labor for Russia since the nineties. The list has practically remained unchanged since then, but there have been changes to ratios between the two types of work permits issued by the FMS to nationals of some of those states. Since 2015, nationals of Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan have been eligible for preferential permits. Nationals of states that were not republics of the Soviet Union may only receive regular permits. Nationals of the EAEU member states of Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan need no work permits in Russia.

Obviously, the actual number of foreign workers in Russia is much larger than the number of work permits issued by the FMS. For instance, there is a major gap between the number of work permits issued in 2014 and the number of foreign nationals registered at their residential addresses in Russia (see Fig. 3).

The territorial distribution of the foreign workforce in Russia is uneven, with 43% of migrants working in the Central Federal District. The city and region of Moscow accumulate about one third of migrants working in Russia.

Figure 1

**Work Permits Issued to Aliens
in Russia between 1994 and 2015
(thousands)**



In terms of occupations of foreign workers, Russia can be divided into five principal groups of regions.

The majority of migrants in, for instance, the regions of Smolensk, Yaroslavl, Rostov, Samara, and Krasnodar, work in *construction*. The city and region of Moscow can be put in the same category, although there quite many foreign nationals are employed in various other sectors. Many of the regions in this group have experienced a construction boom at one time or another, when they wanted cheap labor and attracted migrants.

In another group of regions, among them Kaliningrad and Kaluga, most foreign workers are employed in *transportation*, usually driving buses or trolleybuses.


A third group of territories cover most of central and northwestern Russia and include the regions of Novosibirsk and Trans-Baikal. There it is *industry* and *transportation* that bring together the majority of migrant workers.

Jobs in *retail and services* are the main occupation of migrants in a fourth group – mainly the regions of Bryansk, Oryol, Saratov, Penza, Stavropol, Altai, Primorye, and the Ural area.

Agriculture and *forestry* are the sectors that use most of the foreign labor in the fifth group of regions, chiefly Karelia, Kalmykia, Novgorod, Volgograd, Astrakhan, Kirov, Omsk, Amur, Krasnoyarsk, and Khabarovsk. Migrants there are hired by farmers or lumbering companies or rent land to do their own farming.

Figure 2


Holders of Work Permits in Russia in 2015
(numbers of people)



Source: Data obtained from the FMS in response to an official request.

Figure 3

**Numbers of FMS-Issued Work Permits and Numbers of Foreign Workers Registered
at Russian Residential Addresses, 2014
(thousands)**



Migration Policies in the Context of Mutual Integration of EAEU Member Countries

Economic integration is one of the main aspects of strategic interaction in the EAEU format among Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. It is also the basis for labor migration within the Union. Russia and Kazakhstan are recipients and the other three states the native countries of migrant workers. Labor migration is a form of social and economic interaction between former Soviet republics and facilitates their mutual integration. The liberalization of trade between EAEU member countries is a catalyst for economic integration, which, in turn, stimulates migration. However, the EAEU does not have a coordinated policy on labor migration. Each member country has regulations on migration that are intended to serve its own ends. Some of the countries try to have as many people as possible work abroad so that a lot of money comes home as remittances, and at best such countries defend the rights of their fellow citizens abroad. But remittances that come in are in no way used to stimulate the economies of those nations.

On the other hand, Russia and Kazakhstan try to attract cheap labor but time and again limit its inflows and raise quality standards for it. However, due to the large-scale exploitation of migrant

workers, the widespread illicit issue of work permits and employment quotas, and the lack of clear information on how much foreign labor is needed, the recipient countries often make politicized moves and impose restrictions that are not always logical, consistent, or understandable. The logic of integration within the EAEU suggests that the five countries need a common labor market that is regulated under agreements. Migration may be one of the forms of regulation of this market.

In seeking more effective use of migrant labor within the EAEU, a proposal has been put forward for having different forms of regulating it for at least two groups of industries, those engaging in tradable lines of business and those specializing in non-tradable business.

In tradable sectors, indirect regulation through trade and investment is suggested. Today Russia, because of its dependence on agricultural imports, pursues a policy that stimulates job creation in, for example, the European Union, Turkey, or Israel. At the same time, the majority of foreign nationals who illegally work in agriculture in Russia and Kazakhstan come from Central Asia. It can be expected that, if more Russian capital is invested in the agriculture of the Central Asian countries, and that, if efficient use is made of such investments, the flow of illegal labor into Russia and Kazakhstan will decrease.

Foreign labor in non-tradable sectors such as construction, transportation, utilities, and retail, should be put under direct legal regulation as these industries will apparently need foreign labor for a long time. Today productivity in such sectors both in Russia and Kazakhstan is low—employers prefer to use the cheap labor of undocumented migrants than to invest in advanced technology.

The following measures may be suggested:

- First, each recipient country, Russia and Kazakhstan, should determine the total size of the workforce it needs.
- Second, the two countries should calculate what proportion of jobs they can fill with their domestic resources, including the unemployed, students, pensioners, and domestic migrants, and how much foreign labor they need.
- Third, they should identify their migration policy priorities in the context of political and economic integration in the EAEU format and sign agreements on labor migration.

ENERGY AND RESOURCE POLICY

**THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF
THE CASPIAN SEA:
GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
THE CASPIAN STATES AND
HYDROCARBON RESOURCES**

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ABSTRACT

The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the achieved independence of the former Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) have led to a change in the geopolitical situation in the Caspian region. Five entities of the international law appeared on the shores of the Caspian.¹ Almost immediately, there emerged a problem of defining the status of the Caspian Sea.

¹ R.F. Mamedov, *Mezhdunarodno-pravovoi status Kaspiiskogo moria: vchera, segodnia, zavtra*, Azerneshr, Baku, 2006, pp. 36-39.

Russo-Persian and Soviet-Iranian agreements, in spite of the centuries-old history, did not determine the international legal status of the Caspian Sea and, therefore, did not regulate questions of subsoil resources' utilization. The need for regulating the development of mining in the Caspian region was absent during the period of the U.S.S.R. since all of the Caspian Soviet republics were subjects to its unified code of laws. Furthermore, in contrast to the 19th century, when the output of the Caspian region's oil fields had an impact on the world oil market,

in the 20th century, the center of oil production began to shift to other regions of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the interest in the Caspian region and its hydrocarbon resources was sharply reduced.

The question of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea arose immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was caused by discrepancies in the national interests of the states of the Caspian region, as well as the lack of legal measures that would be adhered to by all the countries of the region and which could serve as the basis for determining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. The New Independent states (NIS) of the Caspian region were not parties to the previous treaties, which did not meet their political and economic aspirations.

The discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the Caspian Sea had posed not only a question of the definition of its international status, but also the question of how to divide the Caspian natural resources. The earlier Russo-Persian (and subsequently Soviet-Iranian) treaties were con-

cerned only with issues of regulating navigation and fishing and did not affect the questions of exploration, extraction, and transportation of crude oil and natural gas by installing pipelines on the bottom of the Caspian Sea, etc. Not having any historical commitments, the new Caspian countries—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—began to pursue a unilateral policy, in which their national interests prevailed.²

Despite the divergent positions, the Caspian countries managed to achieve bilateral and tripartite agreements on the legal status of the part of the Caspian Sea. This gave precedence for creating legal means for further development of oil and gas fields on the Caspian Sea shelf. Within the five-sided format of negotiations, the countries of the region are continuing negotiations, planning to sign the Convention on the international legal status of the Caspian Sea in 2017.

² P.V. Savaskov, "Pravovoi rezhim Kaspiiskogo moria," in: *Iuzhnyi flang SNG. Tsentralnaia Azia-Kaspii-Kavkaz: vozmozhnosti i vyzovy dlia Rossii*, ed. by M.M. Narinskiy, A.V. Malgin, MGIMO, Logos, Moscow, 2003, pp. 147-162.

KEYWORDS: Caspian Sea, Caspian region, international legal status, hydrocarbon resources, Caspian states.

Introduction

For more than 340 years since the signing of the first treaty between Russia and Persia, bilateral treaties governed the legal climate of the Caspian Sea region. At first, the Russian Empire established certain obligations with Persia, secondly, the Soviet Union with Persia, and from 1935 onwards, the U.S.S.R. with Iran.³

Russia established itself on the shores of the Caspian Sea in the early 18th century, after the successful military Persian (Caspian) campaign of Peter the Great, in an effort to pave the way across the sea to Central Asia and India. The result of the campaign became *the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1723 (the Persian Treaty)*, according to which Russia promised military aid to the Shah of Persia.⁴ To Russia went the coastal territories of Persia with the cities of Baku, Derbent, and the provinces of

³ Yu.E. Fedorov, *Pravovoi status Kaspiiskogo moria*, Moscow, 1996, p. 36.

⁴ A.B. Shirokorad, *Kaspii—russkoe ozero. Velikii Volzhskii put. Bolshaia neft i bolshaia politika*, AST, Moscow, 2007, p. 77.

Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. Persia lost the rights to navigation on the Caspian Sea, while Russia began to build its fleet there, in the city of Astrakhan. Persia did not ratify the Treaty.

In the year of 1732, the Russian Empress, Anna Ioannovna, signed *the Treaty of Rasht on Demarcation and Transfer of Some Territories to Ensure Freedom of Commerce and Navigation on the Caspian Sea and the Rivers Arax and Kura*. According to the Treaty, Russia withdrew its troops and returned to Persia the territories on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, acquired during the Russo-Persian campaign of 1722-1723 (provinces of Astrabad, Gilan, and Mazandaran). In return, Russia received the right to free trade and transit in Persia. In 1735, Russia and Persia concluded *the Ganja Treaty of "Eternal Union."* To Persia went Baku and Derbent. In 1813, *the Gulistan Peace Treaty* was signed, putting an end to the Russo-Persian war of 1804-1813. Under the terms of the Treaty, Persia reiterated its abandonment of authority over Georgia, Daghestan and North Azerbaijani khanates. Russia received the exclusive right to keep a military fleet in the Caspian Sea (Art 5). Russian and Persian merchants were permitted to trade freely in the territory of both countries. On the Caspian Sea, the freedom of the Merchant Navy was proclaimed.

In 1828, *the Turkmenchay Treaty* ended the Russo-Persian war of 1826-1828. The Treaty extended the territorial border of Russia, strengthened its military-strategic and economic position in the Caspian Sea, secured the admittance of Northern Azerbaijan and Eastern Armenia to Russia. Of great importance for Russia was the eighth article of the Treaty, which established navigation rules for sailing Russian and Persian vessels on the Caspian Sea. Russia again acquired the exclusive right to rule—to maintain a Navy on the Caspian Sea, by committing itself to protect the Persian coast from attacks by the Turkmens. The exclusive right of Russia to sail military vessels on the Caspian Sea made it Russia's internal body of water and led to commercial-political consequences, allowing merchant shipping to be regulated among other things.

In Turkmenchay, a Trade Agreement was also signed, consisting of nine articles. It gave Russian merchants the rights to trade freely and permitted acquisition of real estate throughout Persia. The Agreement became the foundation on which relations between Russia and Persia, up to the formation of the U.S.S.R., were built.

After the October Revolution of 1917 and the formation of the Soviet Union at the end of 1922, a period of re-examination of the previous treaties began. On 26 February, 1921, *a Treaty between the Russian Socialist Federative Republic and Persia* was signed, which established the principles of equality as the basis for bilateral relations between the two states (concerning the rules of navigation and fishing rights).

In 1927, the U.S.S.R. and Persia concluded *the Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality*, confirming the Soviet-Persian treaty of 1921. In 1931, the Convention on Settlement, Commerce and Navigation between the Soviet Union and Persia was signed. The document, together with the rules relating to legal issues affecting citizens in the territory of the contracting states, as well as the issues of trade relations, contained provisions regarding shipping and fisheries on the Caspian Sea and reaffirmed the provisions of the Treaty of 1921. The Treaty codified the special status of the Caspian Sea-commercial ships: they were granted the national port-of-entry regime when registering in ports, during stay and when exiting.

Unilaterally, the Soviet Union, on the basis of the order of the NKVD of 9 January, 1935, On the Implementation of the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea, adopted for the border the perimeter limits "connecting exit points of the fringe villages" Ghassan-Kuli (Turkmenia) and Astara (Azerbaijan), the so-called Ghassan-Kuli line. It should be noted that for many years neither the Soviet Union nor Iran ever brought up the subject of setting boundaries in the Caspian Sea and the delineation of its territorial waters. Then, on 27 August, 1935, *a Treaty on the Establishment of Commerce and Navigation between the U.S.S.R. and Iran* was signed, which was the first ever to create a 10-mile coastal zone. It was again emphasized that the Caspian Sea may only be used by the vessels of the

U.S.S.R. and Iran exclusively. However, the Treaty lacked clear provisions on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea, which created difficulties in guarding the borders.

The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Iran was signed in 1940. It practically replaced the Treaty of 27 August, 1935. Under its provisions, all aspects of the use of the sea and its resources were the exclusive right of the coastal states, i.e. the similar provisions of the Convention on Settlement, Commerce and Navigation were confirmed. As a result, just the two treaties (of 1921 and 1940) determined the Caspian Sea's legal regime until the disintegration of the Soviet Union.⁵

Political Orientation of the Caspian States

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Caspian coastal states in the Caspian region increased. The sovereign states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were formed in the Caspian Sea region, implementing their own, independent policies.

Russia lost its right to the exclusive use, together with Iran, of the Caspian Sea, its "status-quo" of the earlier (U.S.S.R.-Iran) times, even though in legal terms, Russia relied on the principle of continuity of Russian statehood. According to this principle, the Russian Empire, Russian Republic, R.S.F.S.R., the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation—are one and the same entity involved in inter-state relations, one and the same entity of the international law, which continues to exercise the rights and discharge obligations arising from its international treaties. Russia's position was also determined by the fact that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, as member states of the CIS, confirmed its legal succession with respect to the status of the Caspian Sea in the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December, 1991, whereby "the Commonwealth Member states ensure the observance of international obligations resulting from treaties and commitments incurred by the U.S.S.R."⁶

At the very beginning of the "legal marathon," in 1991, Russia raised the question of preservation of the biological resources of the Caspian Sea, primarily its unique sturgeon species, and the signing of an Agreement on the management of the biological resources of the region, based on the existing statutory laws regarding the legal regime of the Caspian Sea and envisaging unrestricted fishing in its waters. The Russian position, based on the rules of international law, was contrary to the interests of the new coastal countries and the West's oil capital, which saw in it the desire to retain a formerly enjoyed influence while preventing other countries from participating in the development of the area's natural resources. Russia's position did not find support with the Caspian countries, for which the exploration of oil resources became a vital matter of their economic development. Thus, the approach of Azerbaijan to the solution of the problem of defining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea was largely predetermined by the development of the oil and natural gas industry in this republic. From the 1960s on, more than half of the oil of the republic was extracted from marine deposits with the main oil reserves contained in the seabed. Accordingly, Azerbaijan was interested in obtaining the maximally reliable legal guarantees for the development of its marine energy resources.⁷

⁵ R. Mamedov, "International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in its Historical Development," *Turkish Yearbook*, Vol. XXX, 2000, p. 128.

⁶ Quoted from: I.S. Zonn, *Kaspii: illiuzii i realnost*, Moscow, 1999, p. 467.

⁷ S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, A.M. Ushkov, *Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo regiona*, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, Moscow, 2003, pp. 84-87.

In 1992, Azerbaijan began to prepare its own version of the draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. It noted that the Caspian Sea is an international borderline lake, which must be divided, in accordance with the customary mapping of international lakes, into five parts (sectors), and each coastal state has the right of sovereignty over the relevant sector of the Caspian Sea. With that, Azerbaijan assumed that it was not bound by any international obligations regarding its existing status.

This position reflected the geopolitical processes unfolding in the Caspian region from the beginning of the 1990s. The advent of foreign oil companies and favorable forecasts for oil and gas deposits increased interest on the part of major oil and gas companies, and Western countries had a strong impact on the position of Azerbaijan in its approaches concerning the definition of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea.

In the beginning of 1992, at the Conference of the Caspian States, Iran initiated the preparation of a Treaty on Cooperation in the Caspian Sea and the establishment of an organization capable of tackling all issues of development of the Caspian Sea and its resources. In Russia, this proposal was met with caution because it was perceived as Iran's intention to pressure Russia on the issue of the Caspian Sea.

Iran originally stood for the condominium principle, i.e. the joint use of the sea and its resources by all five of the Caspian states. Such an approach by Tehran stemmed from the premise that if the sectional division of the sea was applied, Iran's share would have accounted for the smallest part of the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea. However, the principle of the condominium was unacceptable to the other Caspian states and had no chance of ratification. Therefore, in addition to this "perfect" version, Iran developed a fallback plan: to agree to section off the Caspian Sea—20% of the water area and seabed each. However, the conundrum remained in that it was difficult to determine exactly how to divide the Caspian Sea into "equal shares."

The Iranian leadership maintained, albeit with reservations, the principle of joint ownership of the natural resources of the Caspian Sea. In contrast to the Russian position, which did not allow any exceptions in this matter, the Iranian approach was more flexible.

The negotiations on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea began in 1992 and were aimed at the convergence of national biases of the Caspian countries. All this time, Russia did not abandon attempts to find a compromise on the Caspian's status. In 1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced Caspian to be a "landlocked sea" with a 10-mile wide zone of territorial waters for the coastal states. The objective was but one—to create an adequate international legal framework for the activities on the Caspian Sea, and that was one of the main factors ensuring energy security in the region. It was assumed that the future Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea will also preserve the Soviet-Iranian treaties.

Of all the Caspian countries, the position of Turkmenistan turned out to be the most flexible. Turkmenistan initially considered the Caspian Sea to be an interior body of water-lake, to which neither the categories of marine law nor the separation into national sectors applied. Such a position was consistent with the provisions of the undated Soviet-Iranian treaties on the status of the Caspian Sea of 1921 and 1940.

In 1993, Turkmenistan was the first of all the Caspian countries, which, having adopted the Law on the State Border, established, in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the Sea, its territorial sea area with a width of 12 nautical miles and the exclusive economic zone, thereby extending its coastal jurisdiction over a vast territory of the Caspian Sea. Two years later, Turkmenistan agreed with the position of the Russian Federation that "neither the seabed nor the surface of the Caspian Sea can be divided." This position was reaffirmed in the Turkmenistan-Iranian Communiqué, where it was stated that the "exploitation of the resources of the Caspian Sea is not possible before determining its legal regime" and "foreign states are not allowed to interfere in the problems of the Caspian region."

In 1993, Kazakhstan maintained the position that the option “Borderline Lake” and “Open Sea” for the Caspian Sea is unacceptable, placing it in the category of the “Landlocked Sea.” Kazakhstan proposed the use of Arts 122 and 123 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, while retaining the closed sea status for third countries and by abandoning the condominium principle.

In 1994, Kazakhstan introduced the coastal states to its draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, in which it was regarded as a Closed Inland Sea. In this case, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, a state border is to be set to the breadth of the territorial sea, as well as the limits of the exclusive economic zone for each state. In the same year, the President of Kazakhstan issued a Decree on International Consortium for the assessment of oil and gas reserve capacity of the Kazakhstan sector of the Caspian Sea. In addition, Kazakhstan proposed an initiative on the sectioning of the Caspian seabed, leaving the body of water for the common use.

In 1993 and 1994, Russia and Iran rejected the possibility of nationalizing the deposits in the central part of the sea and insisted on joint production and sales of crude oil. In 1994, at the meeting of the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, the Russian side actively promoted the idea of local cooperation in the Caspian region. However, the situation of resolving the question of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea was greatly influenced by data on the presence of significant reserves of hydrocarbon resources. Azerbaijan, stirred by information on the fantastic deposits, insisted on full change in the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Generally, in the first half of the 1990s, Russia’s and Iran’s approaches to defining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea were similar, with Iran taking a more ambivalent position. After gaining 10% participation share in the project for the development of the Azerbaijani oil fields of Shah Deniz, Iran recognized de facto the division of the Caspian Sea by national territorial waters. Only the exclusion of the Iranian side from the project under the pressure from the United States prevented further changes in the approaches of Iran regarding the international legal status of the Caspian Sea.⁸

The Role of Hydrocarbon Resources

The beginning of a new phase in the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea can be considered 20 September, 1994, when Azerbaijan signed the contract with major foreign oil companies for the development of oil fields on the shelf of the Caspian Sea (the so-called “contract of the century”). If, prior to the signing, the question of the status of the Caspian Sea had remained purely theoretical, after the signing of the contracts with the oil companies and press releases on deposits of hydrocarbons it acquired the geopolitical significance.

After signing the contract, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent to the U.N. General Assembly a special document on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which read: “...unilateral action in respect of the Caspian Sea is unlawful and will not be recognized by the Russian Federation, which reserves the right to take such measures as it deems necessary and whenever it deems appropriate, to restore the legal order and overcome the consequences of unilateral actions.”⁹ However, the stance of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the recognition of the resources of the Caspian Sea as objects for collective utilization (condominium principle), as well as appeals for joint development of the

⁸ S.V. Vinogradov, “Toward Regional Cooperation in the Caspian: A Legal Perspective,” in: *Scientific, Environmental, and Political Issues in the Circum-Caspian Region*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 53-68.

⁹ See the document *The Position of the Russian Federation on the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea* sent to the U.N. on 6 October, 1994.

resources of the Caspian Sea, remained largely ignored. The desire for independence, upholding the sovereignty, reliance on their own mineral resources and hope for rapid enrichment served as guidance for the states of the Caspian region.

In the period of 1994-1995, the representatives of the Caspian countries gathered for a final resolution of the issue. In accordance with the protocol of the first meeting of the heads of the legal departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Caspian states concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which passed in Tehran in June 1995, the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea included questions of navigation, development and utilization of biological resources, questions of environment, the use of mineral resources, determination of the limits of sovereign rights and jurisdictions. At this meeting, representatives of the Caspian states agreed to establish a permanent negotiating machinery to proceed with work on status determination.

At the same time, Azerbaijan, with the support of international oil companies, carried out exploratory work of deposits in its territorial waters of the Caspian. Moreover, in the new edition of its Constitution, adopted in 1995, Azerbaijan declared that the integral parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are its internal waters, its section of the Caspian Sea (lake), and the airspace above it (Art 12).

The information about the hydrocarbon resources served as the main incentive for the accelerated acceptance of the above-mentioned article into its Constitution. Even before securing in the Constitution "its own part of the Caspian Sea," the Azerbaijani side stated that those who are trying to impede cooperation of the republic with the western oil companies are the ones raising the question of jurisdiction in the Caspian Sea. In accordance with this line, Azerbaijan noted that the Caspian Sea is a border lake and should be administered accordingly, i.e. be divided into five sectors, in each of which one of the countries would be an undisputed sovereign.

After the adoption of the Constitution, Azerbaijan continued the course, aimed at legitimizing its unilateral activities of exploration and development of oil fields in the Caspian Sea. In March 1996, the Azerbaijani side stated: "The essence of our position on the status of the Caspian Sea is that the Caspian Sea (lake) falls under the definition of an international border lake as a water pool, lacking a natural connection with the World Ocean and landlocked by the territory of two or more states. Therefore, the basis for the approach to the definition of the status of the Caspian Sea may be based on the generally accepted precepts of international law, customary international law and the local international contract practices governing the status of lakes."¹⁰

The policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan evolved under the influence of the geopolitical changes that occurred in the region in the first half of the 1990s and was strongly biased by the projected plans for oil extraction. Kazakhstan advocated independent utilization of hydrocarbon resources, although its claim to "its own" sector was not as demonstrative as that of Azerbaijan, for example. This position was reinforced when joint ventures with western companies exploring the Kazakhstan shelf produced encouraging results. At the same time, Kazakhstan noted that the common interests of all member states of the Caspian region and the preservation of its ecosystem should be taken into account. In the mid-1990s, Kazakhstan based its position on the assertion that the Caspian Sea must be divided into relevant zones (territorial zones) under the sovereignty of the coastal states and coastal states should have the sovereign right to explore, develop, conserve and use biological and mineral natural resources of the water, the seabed and the subsoil of the Caspian Sea.¹¹

The processes of determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea and exploring and developing its natural resources by member countries continued to proceed in different directions. In cases of contested areas with deposits of oil and gas that created conditions for the emergence of conflicting

¹⁰ Yu.E. Fedorov, op. cit.

¹¹ *Speech of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan V. Gazzatov at the International Seminar "The Caspian Oil and International Security,"* Moscow, 5-6 March, 1996, p. 11.

situations, the Caspian countries continued to negotiate. Furthermore, the precipitate actions of Azerbaijan to consolidate its claims in the Constitution exacerbated the situation in the legal field, to a certain extent redefining the options for maneuver in negotiations.

Iran repeatedly announced that it continued to consider the Caspian Sea the “Largest Lake in the world”, which was “the common heritage” of all of the five coastal states. In this connection, Iran believed it necessary to continue concerted actions among all of the Caspian countries. Iran insisted that for the solution to the problem of using biological resources and protecting the lake’s environment the sovereign legislation of each of the five countries must be recognized and respected by all of the other states. The Iranian authorities believed that the development of the resources of the sea should be carried out on a parity basis, regardless of the size of the national sectors of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, the boundaries of these sectors need to be reviewed in connection with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and emergence of new Caspian countries.

In 1996, the inflexible position of Tehran did not prevent Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran to sign a tripartite memorandum of the intention to establish Russo-Turkmenistan-Iranian Oil Company “in order to explore and develop oil and gas deposits in the coastal zones of the three states.”¹² In turn, a concordant position of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were agreed upon in September 1996, in a special statement by the presidents of the two countries on the principles for the determination of the status of the Caspian Sea, cooperation in its waters and on the continental shelf.

In the second half of the 1990s, Turkmenistan was to adhere to the same position as those of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: it chose the sectional division of the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan believed that in connection with the practical steps associated with the development of the hydrocarbon resources of the sea, the concept of the condominium lost its merit.¹³ The change in Turkmenistan’s policy toward the sectioning of the Caspian Sea was due to the fact that the effective development of hydrocarbon resources was in many ways tied to its delivery to world markets, while the equitable common use of water body was perceived to possibly adversely affect the laying of pipelines, consequently slowing the development of the resource deposits and negatively influencing investment climate in the area.

The New Russian Proposals

In view of the convergence of policies of the new coastal states on the question of the division of the Caspian, in 1996, Russia put forward a compromise proposal on new principles for the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia was willing to accept the jurisdiction of each Caspian state not only in coastal zones with a width of up to 45 miles but also regarding those fields outside the zones, where the oil production had already been underway or should commence shortly. It was announced that Russia consented to the expansion of the Caspian countries’ zones of coastal fishing from 10 to 20 miles. Support was expressed for the proposal of establishing a regional organization on cooperation in the Caspian Sea, as well as the willingness was stated to recognize, as the ultimate goal of the Caspian states, the full demilitarization of the Caspian Sea region. However, the initiatives were not supported by the Caspian countries, which necessitated once again to look for a compromising option.

The increasing influence of Western oil companies and the beginning of the active development of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian coastal countries forced Russia to intensify its activities. In June

¹² S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, A.M. Ushkov, op. cit.

¹³ *Neft i gaz i Kaspiia*, No. 2-3, 1999, p. 93.

1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry established the Working Group on the Caspian Sea, which was charged with the preparation of proposals concerning the Russian Federation's position on the legal status and regime of the Caspian Sea, the exploitation of its biological and mineral resources, as well as the transportation of Caspian oil.

In October 1996, the five Caspian states conducted negotiations at the level of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The result was the establishment of a negotiating machinery—the Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) at the level of Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Caspian coastal states working on the regular basis for the elaboration of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. It is from this moment on that the rapprochement of policies of the Caspian states began.

In May 1997, Almaty held the first meeting of the AWG. Its results were more than modest. Because of the lack of progress in the five-sided format, it was suggested to transfer the discussion of this issue to the auspices of bilateral meetings.

In 1997, the presidents of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in the Joint Statement on Cooperation of the Caspian States on the Use of the Caspian Sea reaffirmed the principle of consensus. The parties expressed the conviction that the joint exploitation of natural resources of the Caspian Sea is in their mutual interests and reaffirmed the right of each other to work on the development of mineral and biological resources of the Caspian Sea within the scope of the respective experience and capabilities of the parties.

Another compromise by Russia was the proposal on the delimitation of the seabed between the neighboring and opposite-lying Caspian states along the modified median line in order to exercise sovereign rights to subsoil, while keeping the greater part of the water body and its surface available for common use. The seabed should have been delineated not based on territory (territorial jurisdiction), but according to prospective structures and deposits (resource jurisdiction), i.e. the Caspian's seabed was not to be determined by states' borders. This version of the proposal was of interest for Kazakhstan. The position of Russia was reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the RF and Kazakhstan, which was made in January 1998. It stated: "Reaching consensus is to be founded on the conditions of just and equitable division of the Caspian seabed with retention of the general use of water surface, including the guarantee of freedom of navigation, compliance with the authorized standards of fishing and environmental protection." Thus, Russia agreed that the seabed of the Caspian Sea was to be divided among the Caspian states. In July 1998, *an Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Seabed Division of the Northern Caspian for Exercise of Sovereign Rights to Mineral Resource Utilization* was signed. Art 1 of the Agreement states that "the Northern Caspian seabed and its subsoil resources, leaving the water surface in common use, including free navigation, agreed fishing quotas and environmental protection, are divided among the Parties along the median line, modified on the principle of justice and upon agreement of the Parties."¹⁴ The median line used for the delimitation of the water spaces between the states with opposite-lying and neighboring shores, is a line, each point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the shores of these states. The modified median line includes all the areas, which are not equally spaced from the coasts of the parties and are determined by taking into account the islands and geological structures, as well as other special circumstances and diverse geological expenditures incurred.

Art 2 of the Agreement noted that "the Parties exercise their sovereign rights in relation to exploration, development, and management of the seabed and interior resources of the Northern Caspian within their seabed sections to a delineation line."¹⁵

The approaches of Russia and Kazakhstan reflected the significant geopolitical changes that had occurred in the Caspian region. It had become clear that the rigid commitment to previous positions

¹⁴ Quoted from: *The Caspian Sea Environment*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 250-251.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

and orientation only on the U.S.S.R.-Iran treaties without the search for new forms of cooperation could lead to the isolation of Russia and limit its participation in many regional processes. In order to bring the negotiating process out of the deadlock, it was necessary to offer compromising options. At the same time, an uncompromising Russian requirement remained regarding the preservation of the water body for the common use by the Caspian states. Russia stressed that the sea bottom is not to be a delimited territory but mapped according to the presence of prospective structures and deposits, i.e. state borders do not apply under water.¹⁶

Russo-Kazakh agreements influenced the position of Turkmenistan, which, from 1998, came to favor the sectional division of the Caspian Sea. In the middle of 1999, Turkmenistan confirmed its position with respect to the determination of the status of the Caspian Sea, insisting that the development of its national sector, which was an integral part and auspicious economic base for the state, was becoming an ever more important and acute issue daily. The complete and comprehensive integration of the Turkmenistan's sector of the Caspian Sea into the system of a national economy should become the eventual result of resolving this problem. The same task became the responsibility of the activities of the National Service for the Development of the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea, mandated by the President of Turkmenistan. The decree for its establishment was signed in August 1999. It was entrusted with tasks such as a detailed, integrated study, research and advancement of the country's strategic region; development and implementation of state programs for development and management of natural resources of the Turkmenistan's sector of the Caspian Sea; formation of regulatory and legal framework for enhancing the Caspian coast; and development of its natural resources. Thus, Turkmenistan confirmed its position on sectioning the Caspian Sea into sectors.

Russia's Increased Attention toward the Caspian

The change of political leadership in Russia in 2000, when the Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, won the presidential election, led to a more vigorous Russian policy in the Caspian region. At a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF), held in April 2000, decisions were made that defined the main directions of the Russian policy in the Caspian. A simplified version for the development of contested oilfields in the Caspian Sea was proposed, applying the principle of joint exploitation of resources or "50/50." According to the Russian proposals, "the State, claiming a disputed oil field, but not yet utilizing it, compensates half the costs incurred by a neighbor, who has already invested in it."¹⁷

In the middle of 2000, Russia attempted once more to resolve the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Together with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Russia proceeded to work on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea.

Russia's approaches in trying to resolve the international legal status of the Caspian Sea had a positive effect on the disposition of the Caspian states. In 2000, Turkmenistan's Government began to move away from its rigid stance of dividing the seabed, water column and sea surface of the Caspian Sea into national sectors. Turkmenistan acceded to the viewpoint of the countries that proposed to divide the Caspian Sea by the median line principle. The change in the position of Turkmenistan's policy was determined by the geopolitical situation in the region. It became obvious that a rigid adherence to the previous approach did not meet the interests of Turkmenistan and was a barrier to attracting foreign investments for oil and natural gas deposits' utilization.

¹⁶ *Vestnik Kaspiia*, No. 3, 2000, pp. 11-14.

¹⁷ A. Dubnov, "Kaliuzhny vviazalsia v igru s irantsami," *Vremia novostei*, 3 August, 2000, available at [https://www.neweurasia.info/archive/2000/econom/08_03_mn3.htm].

Azerbaijan's position also began to change after the signing of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Seabed Division of the Northern Caspian for Exercise of Sovereign Rights to Mineral Resource Utilization. As a result, in January 2001, in Baku, a *Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijan Republic on the Principles of Cooperation in the Caspian Sea* was signed. The statement suggested that the first stage was to involve delineating the Caspian seabed between adjacent and opposite-lying states into sectors/zones, based on the principle of the median line, delineated with the account of the equidistant points and modified by an agreement of the parties. The universally recognized principles of international law and the practices established in the Caspian were also to be taken into account. The essence of the agreement can be described by the following formula: "Seabed—divided, water body—common." "The Parties agreed that each coastal state in the sector/zone, formed as a result of such delimitation, would exercise exclusive rights in relation to mineral resources and other lawful economic activities on the seabed."¹⁸ Compared to the Russia-Kazakhstan Declaration, this new formulation used the term "sector/zone" and the added parameter of "other lawful economic activities on the seabed."¹⁹

In November 2001, in Moscow, *the Agreement* was signed between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Republic on the Delimitation of the Caspian Seabed between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Azerbaijan Republic. It stipulated: "The Caspian seabed and the subsoil thereof are to be divided between the Parties along the median line, which is delineated on the basis of equal distance from the original base points on the coastline and the islands." Thus, at the end of 2001, three out of five coastal states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) took the unified position on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea, according to the formula "Seabed—divided, water body—common."

Toward the Multiparty Agreement

The fact that the Caspian countries sought to find a solution to the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea was evidenced by the increased number and frequency of meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at the level of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Caspian States for the Elaboration of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. These meetings paved the way for conducting *the First Summit of Caspian Sea States*, which was held on 23-24 April, 2002, in Ashgabad. Because of Iran's position, which did not intend to compromise on the mechanism of reservoir delineation and insisted on dividing the Caspian Sea into five equal sectors, the outcome of the Summit did not produce definitive results. The main outcome of the Summit was the oral statement by the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, that the five leaders of the Caspian coastal states were prepared to continue meeting in the future.

While the countries sought the decision on a multilateral basis, some of the Caspian states sought to reach agreement on a bilateral level. In May 2002, in Moscow, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan signed a *Protocol to the Bilateral Agreement of July 6, 1998, between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Seabed Division of the Northern Caspian for Exercise of Sovereign Rights to Mineral Resource Utilization*. According to the protocol, the structure of the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaia) came under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Central and Khvalynskoe oil fields— under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The protocol set the geographical coordinates of the Russia-Kazakhstan maritime boundary in the northern part of

¹⁸ *The Caspian Sea Environment*, p. 253.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

the Caspian Sea. It was emphasized that the hydrocarbon resources located at the junction of these zones would be developed jointly, on the principle of “50/50.” As a result, Kazakhstan resolved for itself the issue of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea, which allowed it to proceed with further processing of hydrocarbon resources.

Consequently, the “principle of resource division” was implemented. The aforementioned agreement was followed by the signing of *the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijan Republic on the Delimitation of the Adjacent Seabed Sectors of the Caspian Sea* in September 2002, which actually completed the sectioning of the Caspian Sea in its northern part.

By the end of 2002, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had reached a consensus on the Caspian Sea division on the principle of delineating borders only on the bottom and leaving the water surface of the sea for common use. This convergence was achieved because of a compromise approach of the three countries. Azerbaijan stopped insisting on the partitioning of the Caspian Sea into sectors, though not abandoning the idea, and Russia softened its approach by agreeing to establish borders for resource deposit areas. The Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that “bilateral cooperation is a critical element of interaction between coastal countries not only on land but also the sea. It needs appropriate legal instrumentation. New legal tools are developed for those activities in the Caspian Sea, which the Soviet-Iranian treaties did not embrace.”²⁰

On 14 May, 2003, in Almaty, a *Tripartite Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Azerbaijan Republic, and the Republic of Kazakhstan on a Junction Point of Lines Dividing the Neighboring Parts of the Caspian Seabed* was signed. Henceforth, the extraction of mineral resources of the seabed in the Northern Caspian was based on the international legal framework. The agreement divided 64% of the Caspian Sea (Kazakhstan—27%, Russia—19%, Azerbaijan—18%).

In spite of the tripartite agreement between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, the Caspian states continued multilateral negotiations aimed at elaborating the content of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The meetings allowed bringing closer the positions of the Caspian states on the wording of the final document. At the 20th anniversary meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, noted that most of the articles and terms of the Convention had already been provisionally agreed, and named the remaining issues that required trade-offs. They were “the division of the Caspian Sea and its southern seabed, the scope of military activities, the conditions of transit, and the installation of the trans-Caspian pipelines.” With regard to the Caspian Sea, Russia proposed to establish a national zone for each Caspian nation 15 miles wide. Outside of this zone, all the waters of the sea would have been relegated for common use by all of the states (in the Soviet-Iranian treaties the fishing zone did not exceed 10 nautical miles). The Russian side also proposed to include in the Convention a formula for maintaining a stable balance of the parties’ weapons and the implementation of military construction within reasonable sufficiency.”²¹

In 2007, the *Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* noted that Russia’s approach to the issue of delimitation of the Caspian Sea is contingent on the understanding that the task of protecting the environment and conservation of biological resources can be effectively dealt with if most of the sea remains in common use by the Caspian states.

In October 2007, in Tehran, *the Second Summit of the Heads of the Caspian States* was held. It laid the foundations for the continuation of the negotiating process for defining the Caspian Sea international legal status and gave impetus to determining the legal regime and the width of the national maritime zones, as well as solving military activities issues and the problems of transiting to the World Ocean. The ratified Summit’s Declaration emphasized, “the negotiating process on the

²⁰ *Vestnik Kaspia*, No. 2, 2002, pp. 5-8.

²¹ I.S. Zonn, S.S. Zhiltsov, *Novy Kaspii. Geografia, ekonomika, politika*, Vostok-Zapad, Moscow, 2008, 544 pp.

legal status of the Caspian Sea is conducted in the spirit of mutual respect, reciprocal understanding and equality, universally recognized principles of international law, and in an atmosphere of civilized discussion.” The parties also noted the need to actively continue these negotiations.

In November 2010, *the Third Summit of the Heads of the Caspian States* was held, which confirmed its intention to complete the work on the Convention. During the summit, *the Agreement on Cooperation in Security Sphere in the Caspian Sea* was signed, which was of paramount importance for the Russian Federation, since it contained the fundamental precept, according to which the security of the Caspian Sea is a matter of concern for the coastal countries only.

On 29 September, 2014, in Astrakhan, *the Fourth Summit of the Heads of the Caspian States* took place, which, to a large extent, can be considered a breakthrough. According to the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, one of the main results was the significant progress in the preparation of a Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. This gave reason to believe that the countries would come to the signing of the Convention in the nearest future. In addition, the Russian President stated that the talks had resulted in a clear formulation of terminology on the delimitation of water areas, seabed, mineral resources, the regime of navigation and fishing. The significant provision was the one that designated most of the Caspian Sea for the common use by the parties.²²

Although the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was not signed, a political statement was made at the Summit, establishing the basic principles of the Convention. In the document, the parties noted the likelihood of reaching a consensus on the legal status of the Caspian Sea in the following two years. During this time, the differences on the very core issue related to sectioning of the Caspian’s sea shelf, containing deposits of oil and gas, had to be resolved since no progress on the issue had been reached.

In the course of the Summit, the Presidents of the Caspian states spoke in favor of the expansion of regional cooperation, the possibility of creation of the free trade area. In addition, the signed memorandum contained the consensus on the delimitation of the waters. Each state obtained the right to exclusive harvesting of bio-resources to a distance of up to 25 nautical miles from its shores. The remainder of the water was designated for common use.

The sides reaffirmed the principle of “no presence” in the Caspian Sea of armed forces of other than the coastal states. In addition, it was agreed to intensify cooperation based on the Framework Agreement on Security in the Caspian Sea and to strengthen the interaction between the respective border guard services.²³

The Presidents of the Caspian countries agreed to finalize the Convention on the International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea within the next two years. The primary causes for the differences in approaches to the sectioning of the sea shelf continued to be the presence of crude oil and natural gas deposits that it contained.²⁴

In 2015, the countries continued to follow the foreign policies developed previously, adjusting them to respond to emerging issues in national economies. The Russian policy was based on the well-known, established approaches. In May 2015, Astrakhan held a visiting session of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation on the Caspian issues. During the meeting, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigory Karasin, reiterated that the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea could be adopted only after reaching a consensus among all of the five states having access to the Caspian Sea. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the Caspian Sea aimed at further implementation of projects involving the development of oil fields. The company Lukoil planned to invest a significant amount

²² S.A. Mikheev, A.E. Chebotarev, G.S. Kovalev, “Problemy regiona nakanune IV Kaspiiskogo sammita,” *Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva*, No. 2, 2014, pp. 31-69.

²³ K. Latukhina, “More mira,” *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, 30 September, 2014, p. 2.

²⁴ S.S. Zhiltsov, *Politika Rossii v Kaspiiskom regione*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 240 pp.

of capital in the Filanovskiy oil field and build new platforms. From 2015 on, the Russian company intended to focus mainly on extracting oil, which is more profitable compared to gas.

Concurrently, Russia sought to resolve contentious issues relating to the development of hydrocarbon fields located in the central part of the Caspian Sea. In October 2015, during the Russian President's visit to Kazakhstan, a Protocol, amending the Protocol of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on Seabed Division of the Northern Caspian (6 July, 1998), was signed. The signed document defined the conditions for the joint development of the Central oil and gas complex. According to Vladimir Putin, "we (Russia and Kazakhstan.—S.Z.) have big plans for the joint oil production in the Caspian Sea."²⁵ The protocol allowed the Russian government to issue a license for the exploration and production of oil and gas of the Central field on the Caspian Sea shelf, which was opened in May 2008.²⁶

Conclusion

For a quarter of a century, the Caspian countries have been trying to solve the problem of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. By the mid-2016, there were 46 meetings conducted of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the elaboration of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Sea, and the heads of the Caspian states held four summits on the subject. Despite such efforts, the countries of the region have not yet been able to develop common approaches to these political and legal problems. However, the negotiating process has been bringing the positions of the states of the Caspian region closer together.

At the end of the 1990s, Russia proposed a compromise to the step-by-step solution of the problem of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. This made it possible to untangle the negotiating process, in which the countries of the region dead-ended, and it deterred the Caspian countries from one-sided actions, i.e. extracting the hydrocarbon resources in "their own" sectors, and from the construction of export pipelines on the bottom of the sea. As a consequence, the trilateral and bilateral agreements reached by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, and later by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have created a solid foundation for the normalization of relations, which had a positive impact on the situation in the region.

The main challenge for the Caspian countries remains to define the international legal status of the Caspian Sea in the five-sided format. To achieve this goal, four summits of the heads of the Caspian coastal states were conducted, as well as meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group were held.

The signing of the Convention on the International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea will create a legal framework for further cooperation between the countries of the region and eliminate the causes of the differences related to the development and export of hydrocarbon resources to foreign markets.

²⁵ I. Lis, "Effekt integratsii," *Delovoi Kazakhstan*, 23 October, 2015, p. 2.

²⁶ M. Sergeev, "Putin i Nazarbaev soglasovali uslovia geologorazvedki na Kasprii," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 16 October, 2015, p. 4.

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND REGIONAL SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

This is an attempt to answer the question about the growing water deficit in Central Asia, its impact on regional security, and the ways and means of ensuring it.

The authors have analyzed the contemporary state of regional water resources;

investigated the conceptual approaches to the studies of water cooperation; analyzed the contradictions between the Central Asian countries caused by the transboundary management of water resources; and outlined approaches to potentially efficient management of regional water resources.

KEYWORDS: *Central Asian region, water resources, transboundary water cooperation, regional security, water-related conflicts.*

Introduction

As close neighbors, the Central Asian countries are connected by common history, culture and identical economies, while the common water resources inevitably stir up disagreements. According to experts, Central Asia is one of the regions of our planet that are moving toward great water-related contradictions. Today the region is affected by the agrarian and urban water crisis.¹ Due to the post-Soviet economic, demographic and political realities, all big international rivers cause or effect international disagreements.

This fully applies to the region's two biggest rivers that empty into the Aral Sea—the Syr Darya (that runs from Kyrgyzstan and crosses Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and the Amu Darya (that begins in Tajikistan and reaches the sea via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). This means that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control the rivers' sources; hence, there exist severe political disagreements between their own needs for water and those of the downstream riparians. Agriculture of the downstream countries needs much more water, while the economically weaker upstream republics are seeking wider control to get more water for power generation and their own agriculture.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, these problems attracted a lot of attention of the academic community. Much has been done by Arjen Hoekstra and Ashok Chapagain,² Marc Zeitoun³ and Stephen C. McCaffrey⁴ to clarify the problem. The main researches of Frederick Frey,⁵ Miriam Lowi,⁶ Sergey Zhiltsov and Igor Zonn,⁷ Waltina Scheumann and Manuel Schiffler,⁸ Nurit Kliot,⁹ Anabelle Houdret, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius,¹⁰ have concentrated on determining the causes of international water-related conflicts.

Claudia W. Sadoff,¹¹ Joachim Blatter,¹² Meredith Giordano,¹³ Ines Dombrowsky,¹⁴ Jesse Hamner¹⁵ and other scholars have written a lot about international water cooperation. Anybody wishing to

¹ See: M. Augustin, "Agrarian and Urban Water Crisis in Central Asia: Responses and Potential Scenarios of Evolution," *Idées pour le débat*, No. 6, 2016, pp. 3-22.

² See: A.Y. Hoekstra, A.K. Chapagain, "Water Footprints of Nations: Water Use by People as a Function of Their Consumption Pattern," *Water Resources Management*, No. 1, 2012, pp. 35-48.

³ See: M. Zeitoun, "Applying Hegemony and Power Theory to Transboundary Water Analysis," *Water Policy*, No. 10, 2012, pp. 3-12.

⁴ See: S.C. McCaffrey, "Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised," *The Natural Resources Journal*, No. 6, 1996, pp. 549-590.

⁵ See: F.W. Frey, "The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation over International River Basins," *Water International*, No. 1, 1993, pp. 54-68.

⁶ See: M.R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

⁷ See: S. Zhiltsov, I. Zonn, "Bitva za vodu," *Index bezopanosti*, No. 8 (86), 2013, pp. 49-62.

⁸ See: W. Scheumann, M. Schiffler, *Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation*, Springer, Berlin, 1998.

⁹ See: N. Kliot, *Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East*, Routledge, 2011.

¹⁰ See: A. Houdret, A. Kramer, A. Carius, *The Water Security Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for Development Cooperation*, GTZ, 2010.

¹¹ See: C.W. Sadoff, "Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers," *Water Policy*, No. 5, 2012, pp. 389-403.

¹² See: J. Blatter, *Reflections on Water: New Approaches to Transboundary Conflicts and Cooperation*, MIT Press, 2011.

¹³ See: M.A. Giordano, "Sharing Waters: Post-Rio International Water Management," *Natural Resources Forum*, No. 2, 2013, pp. 163-171.

¹⁴ See: I. Dombrowsky, "Integration in the Management of International Waters: Economic Perspectives on a Global Policy Discourse," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, No. 4, 2008, pp. 455-477.

¹⁵ See: J.H. Hamner, *Until the Well is Dry: International Conflict and Cooperation over Scarce Water Resources*, Emory University, 2015.

analyze any of the water basins should take into account what has already been written about regional problems and the water problems in Central Asia, particularly by Nurgazy Mamataliev,¹⁶ Ksenia Borishpolets,¹⁷ Stanislav Chernyavsky,¹⁸ Azhdar Kurtov,¹⁹ David Smith²⁰ and others.

It should be said that certain aspects of water cooperation in Central Asia remain pending despite a large number of relevant scholarly publications.

This article is an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the Central Asian water problem, its political and economic aspects and the extent to which the use of water resources as a regional problem affects regional security.

To achieve this we have

- (1) assessed the current state of the region's water resources;
- (2) revealed the theoretical substantiations and conceptual approaches to the studies of water cooperation in the region;
- (3) analyzed the contradictions between the Central Asian countries, caused by transboundary management of water resources of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya rivers;
- (4) identified the set of joint measures needed to achieve efficient management of regional water resources through integration for the sake of regional security.

We relied on a set of mutually complementary theoretical methods of studies, systems approach and the theory of international relations within which we have selected the method of aggregate data, viz. analysis of official documents, and the problem-logical method of data analysis.

Assessment of the Current State of Central Asian Water Resources

Central Asia is a vast region of 3,882,000 sq. km. with the population of over 55 million that covers the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The density of the river network is about 2 m to 1 sq. km. The climate of the valley and the scanty rainfall that evaporates quickly interfere with the runoff generation. The surface runoff is negligible, which explains why there are no rivers with permanent runoff in the region's valley part. The much more frequent precipitation in the mountainous areas considerably increases the runoff. There the density of the river network is 600 m by 1 sq. km.

Two big river basins—the Syr Darya in the north and the Amu Darya in the south—belong to the Aral Sea basin. The Zaravshan River, a former tributary of the Amu Darya, runs between them.

The sources of the Syr Darya River (2,500 km long) are found in the Tien Shan Mountains, to the south of the Pamirs. Fed by melting glaciers, it runs from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan via Tajikistan and then empties into the Aral Sea via Kazakhstan. This means that the three downstream republics

¹⁶ See: N.P. Mamataliev, "Problemy transgranichnogo rukovodstva Chu-Talas," available at [<http://www.eecca-water.net/file/mamataliev-present-kiev12.pdf>].

¹⁷ See: K.P. Borishpolets, "Vodno-energeticheskie problemy Tsentralnoy Azii i sravnitelnye vozmozhnosti EvrAzES i ShOS v dele ikh resheniia," *Vestnik MGIMO*, No. 2, 2011, pp. 31-37.


¹⁸ See: S.I. Chernyavsky, "Rossiyskie prioritety v Tsentralnoy Azii," in: *Tsentralnaia Azia: aktualnye aktsenty mezh-dunarodnogo sotrudnichestva*, MGIMO, Moscow, 2010.

¹⁹ See: A.A. Kurtov, "Vodnye resursy kak prichina konfliktov v Tsentralnoy Azii," *Svobodnaia mysl*, No. 3-4, 2013, pp. 16-39.

²⁰ See: D.R. Smith, "Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post-Soviet Central Asia," *Post-Soviet Geography*, No. 6, 2015, pp. 351-370.

Figure 1

Map of Central Asia



(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are the main users of the water resources of the Syr Darya basin. The biggest users of water for irrigation, in 2015 they used 83 percent of the basin's runoff for their own needs. In 2015, Uzbekistan used for its own purposes 52 percent of the total flow; the figure for Turkmenistan was 20 percent.²¹ It should be said that about 75.2 percent of the total runoff of the Syr Darya is formed in the territory of Kyrgyzstan; about 15.2 percent, in the territory of Uzbekistan, 6.9 percent in Kazakhstan and 2.7 percent, in Tajikistan. The river's average runoff is 37 cu km.

The Amu Darya River is one of the region's biggest: it is 2,540 km long with the basin of 309 thousand sq. km. In the mid-flow it receives three big tributaries—Kafirnigan, Surhan Darya and Sherabad—that flow into it on the right side and the Kunduz River on the left. The Amu Darya is fed mainly by melted waters, which explains the biggest water consumption in summers and the smallest in January-February. This is highly favorable for irrigation; a considerable part of the river's runoff in the valley is lost through evaporation, infiltration and irrigation between the city of Atamurat (before 1999 Kerki) and Nukus.

The main runoff of the Amu Darya (about 74 percent) is formed in Tajikistan. The river flows along the Afghan-Uzbek border, crosses Turkmenistan, returns to the territory of Uzbekistan and

²¹ See: B. Mosello, "Water in Central Asia: A Prospect of Conflict or Cooperation?," *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, No. 19, 2008, pp. 151-174.

empties into the Aral Sea. About 13.9 percent of its runoff is formed in Afghanistan and Iran, about 8.5 percent, in the territory of Uzbekistan.

The total average annual runoff of all rivers into the Aral Sea basin is 116 cu km: 79.4 cu km of the Amu Darya runoff and 36.6 cu km of the Syr Darya runoff.

Today, there are 100 storage reservoirs and 24,000 km of irrigation canals.

Table 1 shows the volumes of used water that differ greatly from country to country.

Table 1

**Dynamics of Water Requirement
in the Central Asian Countries (cu km a year)**

Country	Years	Branches of Economics						Total
		Potable Water Supply	Agricultural Water Supply	Industrial Water Supply	Fisheries	Irrigated Agriculture	Other	
Kazakhstan	2005	0.080	0.07	0.75	0.065	9.5	0.21	10
	2015	0.140	0.1	0.12	0.15	9.5	0.5	10.51
	2025	0.160	0.12	0.29	0.17	7.45	0.5	92.9
Kyrgyzstan	2005	0.080	0.09	0.15	0.03	5.54	0.01	5.9
	2015	0.1	0.11	0.2	0.04	6.02	0.03	6.5
	2025	0.140	0.15	0.3	0.05	6.8	0.06	7.5
Tajikistan	2005	0.5	0.75	0.65	0.1	11.9	0.4	14.3
	2015	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.15	13.15	0.3	16
	2025	1	1.1	1	0.2	14.5	0.2	18
Turkmenistan	2005	0.37	0.19	0.75	0.025	18	—	19.34
	2015	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.03	20	—	21.53
	2025	0.47	0.25	1.1	0.04	17.65	—	19.51
Uzbekistan	2005	2.65	1.39	1.35	1.05	56.56	—	63
	2015	2.7	1.4	1.39	1.32	52.4	—	59.2
	2025	5.85	1.63	1.46	2.24	48.02	—	59.2
Total in the Aral Sea basin	2005	3.68	2.490	2.975	1.27	101.5	0.62	112.54
	2015	4.04	2.71	3.41	1.69	101.07	0.83	113.8
	2025	7.62	3.25	4.15	2.7	94.42	0.76	112.9

S o u r c e: United Nations Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA), available at [<http://www.unece.org/speca/wer.html>].

The water resources of Central Asia are formed mainly in Tajikistan: there are 11 used storage reservoirs with the useful volume from 5 million cu m to 10.5 cu km; total water surface of 706.7 sq. km and the total capacity of 15.7 cu km. This amounts to 13.6 percent of the average long-term runoff of the rivers of the Aral Sea basin. Upon completion, the Rogun water storage

reservoir behind the Rogun Dam, the upper reservoir of the Vakhsh Cascade system, will bring this share to 25 percent.

To open up all irrigable lands (the total area of 835.3 thousand hectares), improve water supply and develop other economic sectors the region needs 21 more storage reservoirs to bring the useful volume of all the reservoirs to 34.4 cu km. In this way, 27.1 cu km will be added to the useful volume by 2050.²² The Amu Darya basin offers the main potential for water storage. Indeed, more than ten dam sites can be built on the Panj River for water storage facilities of hydroelectric power plants, their total volume being 38.05 cu km.

The issue of water resources and their use remains one of the main problems in the relationships between the Central Asian states. It has a long history; in the Soviet Union water use and management of the entire complex of irrigation facilities in the region were regulated within a single system, while the problems were promptly resolved at the state level. Independence plunged all the states into a water distribution crisis caused by the fact that only two states (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) have the necessary water resources. This means that they should supply water to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the downstream riparians of the two biggest Central Asian rivers.²³ Water and the use of water resources have become one of the most important items on the region's political agenda.

Conceptual Approaches to the Studies of Regional Water Cooperation

Frederick Frey explained the specifics of interaction between the states in regards to the water issues by the unique nature of water resources: "...water is the most vital human resource. It also is scarce, maldistributed and often shared internationally."²⁴

We should take into account the very special value of water and the fact that it has no substitutes. In extreme situations (drought, chemical poisoning of drinking water, the lower water level in the season of irrigation) its value skyrockets. Thomas Naff agrees with the above: scarcity makes water a symbolic, poisonous, aggregated, meaningful, very complicated issue with a zero-sum; it is related to power and prestige, stirs up conflicts that are hard to resolve.²⁵

In 2002, the United Nations registered the human right to water as a recommended international legal norm.²⁶ On 28 July, 2010, the U.N. GA officially recognized "the human right to water as indispensable for leading a life in human dignity" and specified: "Where such action is based on a person's failure to pay for water their capacity to pay must be taken into account. Under no circumstances shall an individual be deprived of the minimum essential level of water."

The human right to water access, the place of the water factor in ensuring national security and transboundary regulation of water resources are determined by the concepts of state policy in the sphere of managing water resources, international trade in hydroscopic products and control over the runoff of international rivers.

²² See: B. Mosello, op. cit.

²³ See, for instance: D. Bernard, *Societies in Transition*, UNICEF, Almaty, 2011.

²⁴ F.W. Frey, op. cit.

²⁵ See: T. Naff, "Sources of Political Conflict in the Persian Gulf: The Water Factor," in: *Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security*, ed. by G. Kemp, J.G. Stein, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.

²⁶ See: *General Comment No. 15. The Human Right to Water adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of United Nations Organization*, November 2002, available at [www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml].

Back in the 1990s, the studies of regional water cooperation led to narrow specialized concepts: common-pool resources,²⁷ global governance theory,²⁸ epistemological concepts,²⁹ etc., designed to find the best possible method of settling international disagreements on the water issue. However, all the concepts, in one form or another, suggested delegating a part of sovereign powers to supranational structures, referring to the successful examples of European cooperation in the management of the Danube and Rhine rivers. All attempts to apply European experience in Central Asia or any other region invariably failed.

In small quantities trade in water increases interdependence of the states involved; bigger supplies are fraught with one-sided dependence and might threaten national security. This fully applies to trade in physical and virtual water and might lead to efficient intensive, rather than extensive, use of water at the national and international levels. The establishment and implementation of such a policy is considered in the context of the concept of environmental security, formulated by Jessica Matthews in 1989.³⁰

Over time, her idea gradually developed into the concept of sustainable biosphere needed for man's adequate existence and the two complementing approaches: the "green revolution"³¹ (further exploitation of natural resources by upgrading the efficiency of renewable resources) and the "planetary boundaries,"³² designed to arrive at the best possible account of the short- and long-term development indices through the prism of food and water security, as a priority.³³

The "virtual water" concept, formulated by John Anthony Allan,³⁴ and the "water footprints" of Arjen Hoekstra and Ashok Chapagain³⁵ stand apart from a fairly big number of all sorts of concepts,—they allow us to identify the water component in international trade and use it as an instrument of conflict settlement and tension reduction in water-deficit regions. The virtual water concept was suggested by the statistics of water consumption and the fact that the greater part of the water is not used directly but is a production resource. The authors of this concept define this resource as the amount of water used to produce food or other products.³⁶ Accordingly, the water-deficit countries can and should buy hydrospheric products from the countries, in which the relative value of water is lower; this will let them achieve maximum efficiency in the distribution and use of water resources.

Transboundary Water Cooperation in the Regional Security System

Today, transboundary water cooperation figures prominently in the context of Central Asian integration. According to prominent Tajik political scientist, Amirkul Azimov, exacerbated water-

²⁷ See: E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

²⁸ See: O.N. Barabanov, *Globalnoe upravlenie*, MGIMO Press, Moscow, 2011.

²⁹ See: H. Bressers, L.J. O'Toole, L.M.W. Akkermans, J.J. Richardson, "Networks for Water Policy: A Comparative Perspective," *Environmental Politics*, No. 3 (4), 1994.

³⁰ See: J.T. Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 2, 1989.

³¹ O. De Schutter, "The New Green Revolution: How Twenty-First-Century Science Can Feed the World," *Solutions*, No. 2 (4), 2011, pp. 33-44.

³² J. Rockström, W. Steffen, K. Noone *et al.*, "Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity," *Ecology and Society*, No. 2, 2009.

³³ See: M. Falkenmark, J. Rockström, *Balancing Water for Humans and Nature: The New Approach in Ecohydrology*, Routledge, New York, 2014.

³⁴ See: J.A. Allan, "The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy," *The Arab Studies Journal*, No. 2 (1), 2002, pp. 160-164.

³⁵ See: A.Y. Hoekstra, A.K. Chapagain, *op. cit.*

³⁶ See: J.A. Allan, *Fortunately There are Substitutes for Water Otherwise Our Hydro-Political Futures Would Be Impossible*, ODA, London, 1993.

related contradictions are caused by the inability of the upstream (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) to resolve conflicts of interest that flared up as soon as these countries got their independence. This can lead to serious confrontations, up to and including armed clashes.

The regional countries are demonstrating much more diplomatic activity, which means that the problem of water use strongly affects regional politics and, what is more important, regional security. This is further confirmed by the frantic efforts of international organizations to resolve the transboundary water-related crisis. USAID officials, for example, describe water scarcity as a serious potential for an even greater crisis in the region.³⁷

In Tokyo, the U.N. set up an international center for the studies of water-related problems in Central Asia that started functioning in December 1995. The UNDP initiated diversified dialog on the water problems of the Central Asian countries.³⁸

From the very first days of independence the Central Asian riparians have been trying to settle the water problem in their relationships. In February 1992, the five republics signed an Agreement on Management, Use and Protection of Transboundary Water Resources.

On 4 January, 1993, the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) was created in Tashkent to promote joint efforts and projects designed to save the Aral Sea, taking into account the interests of all of the Central Asian states.³⁹

Later, in 1998, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a water-energy agreement on the Syr Darya. Several bilateral agreements were concluded between 1998 and 2004. The unprecedentedly cold winter of 2007/2008 caused the deepest water and energy crisis⁴⁰ that revealed the inefficiency of the previously concluded agreements.

According to the expert community, the agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan on the use of waters of the rivers Chu and Talas, signed in 2000, was the only efficient attempt at regulating the transboundary water resources between the upstream and downstream countries.⁴¹ Under the terms of the agreement, Kazakhstan should compensate Kyrgyzstan for what the republic spends on the maintenance of its water infrastructure in accordance with the amount of water it uses. The efforts to apply the same instrument to the dialog between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have failed so far.

Transboundary Water-Related Regional Security Risks

The intention of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the two upstream states, to complete the projects of the two hydropower plants—the Rogun and Kambarata— inherited from Soviet times, exacerbated the contradictions between the upstream and downstream Central Asian countries. To be efficient, they would need billions of cubic meters of water of the rivers Vakhsh and Naryn in their reservoir pools. Tajikistan has already completed the two small hydropower plants (Sangtuda-1 and Sangtu-

³⁷ See: *The Program of Specific Actions to Improve the Environmental Situation in the Aral Sea Basin (ASBP)*, Tajikistan, 2013.

³⁸ See: *Dialogue on Effective Water Governance*, UNDP, Japan, 2012.

³⁹ See: R.W. Ferguson, *The Devil and the Disappearing Sea: A True Story about the Aral Sea Catastrophe*, Raincoast Books, Vancouver, 2013.

⁴⁰ See: B. Libert, E. Orolbaev, Yu. Steklov, “Water and Energy Crisis in Central Asia,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2012, pp. 9-20.

⁴¹ See: N.P. Mamataliev, op. cit.

da-2). During the summers, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan cannot get enough water to irrigate their cotton and rice fields and are dead set against building big hydropower plants.

On the other hand, these countries use the available water irrationally, while their irrigation systems need upgrading and reconstruction. The former President of Tajikistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, said at one time that his country was losing up to 10 bcm of water every year.⁴²

In the opinion of many scholars, the scarcity of water resources is caused by the growing population of the Central Asian countries, the rates being one of the world's highest and increasing.⁴³

The water-related problem is further exacerbated by the still undeveloped international legislation related to the use of waters of transboundary rivers. An efficient water use system—reconstructed irrigation systems, canals, pumping stations, etc.—requires a lot of money and big investments.

Table 2 offers a SWOP analysis of the specific features of transboundary water cooperation, its debatable issues and threats that might end in so-called “water wars.”

Table 2

SWOT Analysis of Transboundary Water Cooperation in Central Asia

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>Several international agreements on transboundary cooperation.</p> <p>Support of the international community (the U.N., ADB, EBRD, SDC, WB, GTZ, etc).</p> <p>Monitoring of the quality of water resources and hydrological regime of Central Asia.</p>	<p>The five post-Soviet states in Central Asia divided the hitherto homogenous hydropower system.</p> <p>The fairly complicated hierarchy and the partly doubling functions of departments in the Central Asian states related to the management and protection of water resources.</p> <p>The system of management of water resources mainly based on the administrative-territorial division.</p> <p>Involvement of the private sector (up to and including supplies of safe potable water) is so far inadequately developed at the interstate level.</p> <p>Inadequate methodological support for the introduction of the internationally recognized standards.</p> <p>The downstream countries reject the format of buying water in the form of quota payments, while the upstream countries are trying to move away from the water-energy barter.</p> <p>Nothing is done to arrive at joint monitoring by the neighboring states (sampling, duplicates of tests, comparison of results of the analyses) on the transboundary rivers and bodies of water.</p>
Opportunities	Threats
<p>Smooth transfer to systemic management within the hydrological basins, rather than administrative-territorial division.</p>	<p>Inadequate cooperation with parallel programs of neighboring states fraught with an inefficient use of allocated resources.</p>

⁴² See: Official site of the President of Turkmenistan [www.turkmenistan.gov.tm].

⁴³ See: NICI: “By the Year 2050, Population Strength in Central Asia will Reach the Figure of 96 Million,” available in Russian at [<http://www.news-asia.ru/view/ks/society/9040>].

Table 2 (continued)

Opportunities	Threats
<p>Reforms of the legal framework and institutional structures of administering water resources.</p> <p>Cooperation with specialists of different departments and organizations (lawmaking, meetings of experts and technical specialists, training).</p> <p>Switch to the distribution of water according to needs, differentiation of water-related tariffs according to specific conditions of each Central Asian country.</p> <p>Intention of the downstream countries to increase their water independence by practicing new water-saving technologies, drop irrigation and developing underground water horizons.</p> <p>The upstream countries' desire to develop construction technologies of small and medium hydropower plants.</p> <p>External contractors are invited to realize big projects.</p> <p>Development of trade in virtual water through hydropower engineering (for the upstream countries), food and cotton (for the downstream countries).</p> <p>Comprehensive approach to the problems of export-import of power generated by the regional hydropower plants.</p>	<p>Inadequate regional cooperation that might lead to inadequate water resources needed to carry out the already announced strategic reforms in adjacent branches, agriculture being one of the examples.</p> <p>Rejection of flexible mechanisms of financial and economic stimulation instead of the current total subsidies as leading to water-supply problems in agriculture.</p> <p>One-sided decisions on how the water resources of the basin should be used.</p> <p>State of emergency at hydroelectric power plants that might cause water and power collapse in the region if the neighboring states prefer not to render assistance.</p> <p>Construction of hydropower plants in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.</p>

It should be said that so far the Central Asian countries have not arrived at common approaches to the water problem and have not yet set up an efficient supra-national structure intended to deal with the water conflict.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in better economic situations and have bigger populations than their neighbors, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan profit from their much more advantageous geographic location.⁴⁴ Today, confrontation between Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the other, can be described as the region's acutest water-related conflict⁴⁵ constantly heated up by Tashkent's ambitious desire to become the region's leader⁴⁶ thwarted by the policies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

The economy of Kazakhstan depends on agriculture to a much lesser extent than that of its neighbors, while the Irtysh River that runs across its territory partly solves its water-related problems. As for Turkmenistan, it has significant revenues from exports of hydrocarbons, has the smallest population of all the republics in the region and is less dependent on water runoff regulation.

⁴⁴ See: K. Wegerich, "Hydro-Hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin," *Water Policy*, No. 2, 2008, pp. 71-88.

⁴⁵ See: K.P. Borishpolets, op. cit.

⁴⁶ See: S. Smirnov, "Razorvat, nelzia ostavit," *Ekspert Kazakhstan*, No. 46 (237), 2009.

This looks like a dead end. The problem is further exacerbated by the very different interests of the countries when it comes to the distribution of the region's water resources in the absence of efficient international legal mechanisms of joint regulation of transboundary waters.

How to Prevent Water Conflicts in Central Asia

Today, the Central Asian countries cannot reach a consensus on the joint use of the region's transboundary water resources and the way of the use of the storage reservoirs that can and should be optimized. Overall, the contradictions at the political level are stirred up by the questions: who should manage water resources and how should water be distributed to balance out the interests of all countries?

Today, the regional agenda is dominated by the task to arrive at short- and long-term common strategies of regional water-related cooperation.

The fundamental measures should be taken to prevent water conflicts in the region. The Central Asian countries should:

- specify the legal irrigation-related norms. To overcome the water crisis the local countries should identify, on the basis of interstate agreements, the sizes of expanded cultivated areas and be ready to reduce them if needed;
- rely on scientific recommendations related to the management of water resources, take practical measures to save water resources and upgrade the irrigation infrastructure and canals;
- move away from the idea of huge hydro technical projects;
- discuss the problem with countries from other regions and international organizations;
- practice a multisided approach to the water problems;
- take all the necessary measures to prevent a crisis of water use.

The water problem might develop either into a serious security threat or show the road toward good-neighborly relations and peace in the region. This means that the international commission on the water problems can help reduce tension in all spheres of everyday life in the region's states and that the region needs new structures to address the water problems—an Interstate Council on the use of the potentials of transboundary rivers, etc.

External factors are as important as internal factors when it comes to settling the region's water problems: other states and influential international organizations should help disentangle the contradictions between the Central Asian states. Today, their leaders are very much concerned with the fact that many recommendations of the World Bank designed to help the Central Asian states achieve sustainable development remain unrealized. This should not discourage international institutions and organizations: they should work hard to bring closer the positions of the region's states on transboundary water cooperation.

Conclusion

In the last twenty years Central Asia has been living under the pressure of the grave consequences of decentralization of the systems that were set up as integrated and mutually complementing. Under the Soviet rule, the water system in Central Asia was rationally organized. The dams of

the hydropower plants made it possible to provide bigger amounts of water required during irrigation periods. In winter, when the upstream republics (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) needed additional electric power, they received it from other regions thanks to the single energy system. The downfall of the Soviet Union not merely destroyed the system: it stirred up conflicts of interest among the Central Asian states that might develop into full-scale “water wars.”

Today, the Central Asian countries have not abandoned their efforts to settle the water crisis through bilateral, tripartite and five-sided agreements and agreements with third countries. They are concluded, first, because the huge water and energy resources, if used efficiently, might promote economic development of the entire region. Second, the two upstream states (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) have monopolized the right to use the huge hydropower resources as they see it fit. Third, there are no developed mechanisms of the use of hydropower resources by independent Central Asian countries, which explains the nagging problems in interstate relationships: scarcity of water to be used in agriculture, lack of legal instruments of settling water problems of the transboundary rivers in the first place, etc.

For the reasons enumerated above, water resources, as the basic component of agricultural development, acquired strategic importance. On the other hand, the local states have no other options but cooperation and coordination of efforts designed to finally set up a unified system of water use, based on the rational use of water resources to which practice all five states should adhere.

POLITICS TODAY

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN BETWEEN STRATEGY-2030 AND STRATEGY-2050

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ABSTRACT

The authors have supplied their quantitative content analysis of the Addresses of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan delivered between the adoption of the two documents: Strategy-2030 (1997) and Strategy-2050 (2012). The basis for the research was the analysis of the fifteen Presidential Addresses, identifying political priorities of the state. The research led to con-

clude that under the same President, strategic priorities of state policies remain the same irrespective of internal and external contexts. Another conclusion is that the President was and remains the main initiator of reforms and modernization in the political, social and economic arenas; this means that the form of governance in Kazakhstan may be described as super-presidential.

KEYWORDS: *Addresses of the President, Kazakhstan, content analysis, development strategies.*

Introduction

Here we will analyze the annual Addresses of the President of the RK, Nursultan Nazarbaev, made between 1998 and 2012, that is, in the period when Strategy-2030 and Strategy-2050 were being adopted. Today, it is highly important to trace the priorities of the country's development and the way they changed from one Address to another; it is highly interesting, since all of them were delivered by the same president and, therefore, revealed the dynamics of the country's state policies during these fifteen years.

Research Methodology

We have relied on the following scholarly methods: content analysis, historical and comparative analysis, and systemic approach. The basic method used was the quantitative content analysis of the selected (most frequently mentioned) words in the Addresses of the President of the RK, Nursultan Nazarbaev, to the people of Kazakhstan. The yearly Addresses, delivered between 1998 and 2012, were selected as objects of research.

To analyze the quantitative index of nouns, adjectives and derivatives of certain pronouns, we turned to the functional utilities of the QDA Miner and WordStat programs. The keywords of similar meanings were combined into groups.

We limited our analysis to those words/groups of words that were mentioned in all of the annual Presidential Addresses we have studied at least 45 times with an average frequency of one word in any of the Addresses being repeated not less than three times.

The Main Part of Our Studies

According to Art 40 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, “the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the head of state, its highest official determining the main directions of domestic and foreign policies of the state and representing Kazakhstan within the country and in international relations.”¹ Art 44 of the Fundamental Law states: “The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall annually address the people of Kazakhstan with a message on the state of the country and main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”² This means that the annual Addresses determine the main directions of the country’s domestic and foreign policies for the next year and the mid-term ahead.

Nursultan Nazarbaev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the KazSSR (appointed in 1989 when the republic was still a part of the Soviet Union) remained the top official (President) throughout the entire period of independence. Starting in 1997, he has been delivering annual Addresses to the people.

Table 1

Presidential Addresses for 1998-2012

Year	Titles of the Presidential Addresses
1998	Democratization of Society, Economic and Political Reform in the New Century
1999	The Country's Stability and Security in the New Century
2000	To Free, Effective and Secure Society
2001	On the Situation in the Country and the Main Trends of Domestic and Foreign Policies for the Year 2002
2002	On the Main Trends of Domestic and Foreign Policies for 2003
2003	The Main Trends of Domestic and Foreign Policies in 2004
2004	Toward Competitive Kazakhstan, Competitive Economics, and Competitive Nation
2005	Kazakhstan on the Road to Accelerated Economic, Social and Political Modernization
2006	The Strategy of Joining the World's 50 Most Competitive Countries. Kazakhstan on the Threshold of a New Expansion in Development
2007	New Kazakhstan in the New World
2008	Increase in the Wellbeing of Citizens of Kazakhstan as the Main Aim of State Politics
2009	Through the Crisis to Renovation and Development
2010	A New Decade-New Economic Growth-New Chances for Kazakhstan
2011	Let Us Build the Future Together!
2012	Social and Economic Modernization as the Main Development Vector of Kazakhstan

¹ [<http://www.asianparliament.org/uploads/Country/Members/Kazakhstan/KazakhstanConstitution.pdf>].

² Ibidem.

The words “democratization” and “political reform” were used by the President in his 1998 Address, and were later, in 2005, replaced with a more neutral “political modernization.” It should be said that the word “reform” suggests more cardinal changes than those implied by the term “modernization”, which means gradual, not radical changes in and readjustments of the selected course.

The titles of the Addresses of 1999 and 2000 contain the words “security” and “secure,” prompted by the threat of an invasion by terrorist groups from Afghanistan. In 2001-2003 the Addresses did not focus on any specific problems. The titles of the 2004, 2006-2012 Addresses concentrate on the economic component, while the political aspect was not mentioned at all. The Addresses of the 2008 and 2012 pay a lot of attention to the social sphere.


The word “new” and its derivatives were most frequently used in the Addresses of 1999, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010 probably because people associated it with possible renovation measures and changes for the better. Let us also consider that the present political elite and the President’s closest circle had lived in the Soviet Union and watched it crumble down and finally disappear partly due to political and economic stagnation. This explains why the head of state frequently uses the word “new” to plant hopes in people’s minds for a better future and progress in their quality of life. This word can be found in each and every Address: on the whole, it was mentioned 139 times.

It should be said that amid economic and political problems, the President tends to avoid words with negative connotations so as not to destabilize the existing situation.

On the whole, the analyzed annual Addresses contain 71,264 words; the analyzed words were used 4,422 times or 6.2% of the total number of words in the analyzed Addresses.

Figure 1

The Number of Words
in Presidential Addresses by Year



It should be said that only 10 words were used in each of the fifteen Addresses at least once: infrastructure, new, society, security, future, economics, we, stability, state, development.

We have established that the most frequently used words (in descending order) in the annual Presidential Addresses were: development, 501 times; state, 480 times; government, 328 times; economics, 292 times; I, 184 times; democracy, 174 times; we, 157 times; education, 150 times; infrastructure, 142 times; new, 139 times; business, 135 times; society, 121 times; parliament, 116 times;

Table 2

**The Greatest Number of the Most Frequently Used Words
in the President's Annual Addresses**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
I	41	0	9	5	13	13	10	27	6	11	7	8	9	16	9
Parliament	32	0	6	6	6	11	5	16	2	12	6	2	4	3	5
Future	16	5	9	1	1	1	5	6	1	2	2	3	7	1	2
President	10	1	1	2	3	2	2	7	3	5	4	0	3	4	3
Society	12	2	24	10	5	8	4	13	12	16	4	4	4	1	2
Security	3	12	26	8	2	2	3	5	13	10	8	4	13	1	4
Innovation	0	1	0	0	0	10	7	6	2	10	1	0	7	7	10
Housing	0	0	0	2	1	0	38	8	7	14	9	3	13	6	1
Agriculture	0	0	1	2	5	2	6	0	0	5	5	4	5	5	6
Democracy	26	2	23	11	10	19	6	6	11	16	4	0	2	3	1
Reforms	8	0	4	6	1	3	5	6	6	7	7	1	5	1	0
State authorities	6	1	3	6	6	4	3	6	2	8	0	0	1	3	0
Stability	4	2	4	2	3	4	2	6	5	6	3	1	6	6	1
Business	3	0	2	4	4	2	7	16	6	21	14	5	15	11	8
Social	1	0	6	9	5	6	10	10	6	13	6	1	7	6	3
Development	3	1	8	19	17	36	56	40	80	127	23	18	34	20	19
State	27	9	26	24	28	36	52	55	43	70	35	19	21	15	20
Government	29	0	13	24	21	20	25	16	18	70	21	9	22	15	25
Economics	20	2	10	21	13	20	20	25	25	68	17	18	18	6	9
We	23	1	7	8	6	7	13	16	7	29	6	8	10	11	5
Education	4	0	1	3	3	2	22	13	21	33		1	12	19	16
Infrastructure	6	2	7	9	4	7	18	6	7	37	10	10	7	6	6
New	12	3	6	4	4	9	11	8	9	18	10	9	18	11	7
Growth	6	0	4	5	4	15	13	4	6	26	7	3	16	4	2
Competitiveness	3	0	2	3	0	3	23	5	14	39	5	2	7	2	1
Production	0	0	4	6	2	6	13	4	10	29	7	7	5	5	3
Responsibility	12	0	1	1	3	3	4	6	13	14	5	3	5	3	3
Modernization	0	0	2	2		2	5	8	9	14	6	4	5	8	10
Science	0	0	0	0	1	8	4	1	6	25	1	1	4	4	6
Technologies	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	7	23	4	0	4	0	4

Table 2 (continued)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Control	5	0	4	0	1	3	3	4	3	12	2	3	4	2	1
Crisis	6	1	3	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	28	5	0	3
Employment	2	0	0	3	0	1	6	0	2	2	2	15	4	6	6
People of Kazakhstan	3	1	0	1	0	3	5	9	6	5	1	5	4	11	4

growth, 115 times; security, 114 times; competitiveness, 109 times; housing, 102 times; production, 101 times; social, 100 times; responsibility, 76 times; modernization, 75 times; reforms, 63 times; future, 62 times; science, 61 times; innovations, 61 times; people of Kazakhstan, 58 times; state authorities, 58 times; stability, 55 times; technologies, 51 times; crisis, 50 times; president, 50 times; employment, 49 times; control, 47 times; agriculture, 46 times.

Conventionally, these words can be divided into the following groups:

Table 3

Conventional Division of the Most Frequently Used Words into Groups

Conventional Title of the Group	Typical Words	Total Frequency
POWER	I, president, state, government, control, parliament, state authorities	1,263 times
ECONOMICS	Economics, business, investments, infrastructure, competitiveness, production, agriculture, technologies, crisis, modernization	1,062 times
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS	Development, reform, future, new, growth	880 times
SOCIAL NEED	Social, housing, security, stability, employment, education, science	631 times
SOCIETY	We, people of Kazakhstan, society	336 times
DEMOCRATIC VALUES	Democracy, responsibility	250 times

Table 3 shows that the state—represented by the regime and governing structures—predominates. It is the state (bodies of power) that determines the development trend and the economic model, while the main requirements of any society and the development of democratic values are relegated to the margins. It seems that the words, which belonged to the last two categories, were frequently used merely to pay tribute and confirm the devotion of people in power to the ideals of democracy and the social state. This means that there is no civil society in Kazakhstan (as a society in transition) able to formulate its own initiatives and insist that people in power pay attention to and realize them. This also means that there are no platforms, which the ruling regime and other members of society can use to communicate with each other and exchange views and opinions.

The frequent use of pronouns “I” and “mine” says that Kazakhstan was and remains a super-presidential republic, in which the President, rather than the majority party in the parliament, sets the

Table 4

**The Most Frequently Used Words
in the President's Annual Addresses by Year**

1998	I—41	Parliament—32	Government—29	State—27	Democracy—26
1999	Security—12	State—9	Threat—5	Future—5	Central Asia—4
2000	State—26	Security—26	Society—24	Democracy—23	Government—13
2001	State—24	Government—24	Economics—21	Development—19	Democracy—11
2002	State—28	Government—21	Development—17	Economics—13	I—13
2003	Development—36	State—36	Government—20	Economics—20	Democracy—19
2004	Development—56	State—52	Housing—38	Government—25	Competitiveness—23
2005	State—55	Development—40	Democracy—40	I—27	Economics—25
2006	Development—80	State—43	Economics—25	Business—23	Education—21
2007	Development—127	State—70	Government—70	Economics—68	Competitiveness—39
2008	State—35	Development—23	Government—21	Economics—17	Business—14
2009	Crisis—28	State—19	Development—18	Economics—18	Employment—15
2010	Development—34	Government—22	State—21	New—18	Economics—18
2011	Development—20	Education—19	I—16	Government—15	State—15
2012	Government—25	State—20	Development—19	Education—16	Innovations—10

pace and determines the economic, social and political trends. Indeed, in his annual Addresses the President used the pronoun “I” 184 times vs. the pronoun “we” (used 157 times), and the word “parliament” (116 times).

The “I” group of words was most frequently used between 2002 and 2005 against the background of the republic’s impressive economic growth. It should be said that in the 2005 Address the President used the pronoun “I” 27 times. This is explained by the political reforms designed to widen democratization—wider powers for the parliament at the expense of the powers of the president—announced by the head of state. This is confirmed by the frequency of the words “democracy” (24 times), “reforms” (9 times), “power” (15 times) and “stability” (6 times) in the same Presidential Address. In addition, in December 2005, the country elected the President, which explains the most frequent use of pronoun “I”: Nazarbaev was talking about the successes achieved during his presidency. The “stable course” is one of his slogans; this means development without leaps and bounds and sudden unjustified changes. The slogan implicitly meant that the reforms would be realized from above; that is, they would be initiated by the President and carried out according to his wishes. This approach would ensure stability and continuity, something that the ruling elite also wants.

Table 3 demonstrates that economic terminology prevailed among the most frequently used words. This indirectly confirms that Nazarbaev was pursuing the policy “economics first, politics second.”

Table 4 shows that the words related to economics (economics, competitiveness, innovations and business) are among the five most frequently used words in the Presidential Addresses starting in 2001 (the year 2011 being the only exception). It was in 2007 that the problems of the country’s economic model, based on an industrial-innovational foundation, came to the fore; it was at the same time that the main factors conducive to greater economic competitiveness and joining the world’s 50 most competitive states became clearer. This task, formulated in 2006, was specified in the 2007 Address. It was expected that the processing and manufacturing industries, modernization of fixed assets, innovation of the production process and a more active business community would become the qualitative features of production activity in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the frequently used word “oil” demonstrated that the country’s economic growth was mostly based on fuel exports that ensured the flow of hard currency into the republic and its high general rating that, in turn, allowed Kazakhstan to borrow abroad.

Conclusion

The above reveals, firstly, that the state’s political priorities were changing from one Presidential Address to another delivered between Strategy-2030 and Strategy-2050; secondly, the number of subjects that received the President’s close attention increased. While in the earlier Addresses, he had used the fairly vague word “economics,” in his later Addresses the President selected more exact and much clearer terms “innovations” and “technologies.” Youth as the main subject that would realize the aims formulated by the President and as a population group, the problems of which should be treated as a priority, occupies one of the central places in Strategy-2050. This means that in this document, the state specified its aim of dealing with the problems clearly seen among the young people as those directly threatening the regime. These problems include the so-far inadequate quality of education and inadequate involvement of the young people in sciences, as well as employment; it should be noted that housing remains the most acute problem.

It should be said that in the period of the fast economic growth, declarations designed to promote the state power and the regime had predominated; little was said about the most urgent problems

and the ways they should be addressed. In 2000-2007, this was caused by the wrong conviction that the selected course was the right one and that the high oil prices would last forever. This policy failed, while the Presidential Addresses shrank from being long during the years of prosperity to shorter ones during crises. This means that people in power had to move away from “high sounding words” to “greater deeds.”

During the years of high oil prices, the state could insist that the chosen course was a correct one—economics first, politics second—yet the frequent economic crises (1998-2000, 2007-2009, 2014-2015) bared the truth: the country had not scored impressive victories in its economic development, while the time for political reforms (that might have triggered economic changes) had been lost. Consecutive devaluation of Kazakhstan’s national currency (tenge) in 2009 (by 25%), 2014 (18%) and 2015 (35%) demonstrated that the tenge depended, to a great extent, on oil prices that were the first to respond to the world crisis. The announced transfer of the state’s attention to processing and manufacturing industries proved to be a mere slogan, while the country’s economics was still geared to oil exports. According to CIA, the following sectors contributed to the GDP of Kazakhstan: agriculture, 4.9%; industry, 29.5%; services and trade, 65.6%.³ This means that during the years of independence, trade (due to the country’s closeness to China and its cheap products) and services were developing faster than other spheres of economy.

As far as the social sphere is concerned, the devalued tenge affected the common citizens, who had been saving money in national currency in hopes of buying housing. The fact that the national economics and trade depended on, to a great extent, the dollar, as well as frequent devaluations of the national currency, became a huge problem for those who wanted to buy housing (mainly young families).

It should be said that the words the President most frequently used in his Addresses resurface in Strategy-2030 and Strategy-2050. This means that under the same President the priorities do not change in the course of time.

Our content analysis revealed that the frequency of the words “reform” and “modernization” is closely associated with the President’s personal pronouns (“I”, “mine” and “myself”). This means that economic and political modernization (in his Addresses the President prefers “modernization” to “reforms”) is based only on the Presidential “say-so.” This also means that economic and political modernization is the prerogative of the head of state and that in the transitional period Kazakhstan has not become a civil society; that political parties and public organizations are weak and that there is no real opposition in the country. More than that: there exist no platforms, which the ruling regime and the populace could use to communicate with each other.

³ Official CIA site [<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>], 31 October, 2016.

DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: REGIONAL ASPECT

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ABSTRACT

The conflict potential that the Northern Caucasus had accrued throughout its history has made it a complicated and depressed region, a scene of confrontation of different political systems, diverse peoples and ethnic groups, seeking power and access to its resources.¹ In the absence of

political pluralism and freedom, poverty and social inequality provoke violence as an efficient mechanism of interaction. These conditions provide the background for the authors' discussion of various types of political

¹ See: M.M. Betilmerzaeva, "Severny Kavkaz na styke traditsionnoy i globalizatsionnoy kultur: strategii vzaimodeystviya," in: *Kavkaz: poisk modeley uskorennoy*

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violence, its nature and causes. They present specific examples of how power elites use violence and the methods to which they resort to profit from conflicts.

The authors have concentrated on political elites as the main factors responsible for decision-making in different spheres. As subjects of political violence, they rely on ethnopolitical, religious and economic slogans to be actively involved in the political processes unfolding in the region.

In the early 1990s, we witnessed an upsurge of what was presented as the "national consciousness" and which was, in fact, tension, conflicts and contradictions, stirred up by the North Caucasian political

and administrative elites. Moscow has no choice but to take into account their interests and their strategies, in order to keep them away from using mobilizing resources to ignite and fan conflicts. The regional elites habitually use political violence as one of the instruments of their strategy: uncompromising opposition to any political or religious polemic, the use of force when dealing with any issues, including economic, as well as repressions, violations of electoral process, etc.

The authors have concluded their discussion with concise recommendations on how to possibly prevent political violence in the region.

KEYWORDS: *Russia, the Northern Caucasus, violence, political violence, conflictology, determinants, ethnopolitical elites, political process.*

Introduction

The ethnopolitical situation in the Northern Caucasus is habitually described as contradictory, erratic and conflicting, and determined by numerous political, social, economic and cultural dissonances. With the Soviet Union's disintegration, the national republics have acquired sovereignty, economic problems and the "historical memory," which changed political realities and triggered permutation within ethnic elites, separatism, etc. Political violence is used to seize and retain power, and to base it on archaization, ethno-centrism, cultural dissonance, identity crisis, poverty, and other factors.

We are living in a technogenic civilization, which, while improving the quality of everyday life, had created a lot of problems in some of the regions of the world.² The regional administrative-political elites are based on ethnicity, their members belonging to definite clans or ethnic groups. This means that conflicts have become frequent and inevitable, while their escalation threatens, to a great extent, the democratic process and political stability.

Terrorism is one of the main aspects of political violence in the region, in which terrorist and extremist organizations operate as integral parts of international terrorist network and as such, threaten the region with conflicts.³ This means that we should identify the reasons that force young peo-

² See: M.M. Betilmerzaeva, "Mesto i rol gumanitarnogo znanja i dukhovnoy bezopasnosti v kontekste multikulturalizma," in: *Sbornik materialov II Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (Grozny, 19 December, 2015)*, ALEF (IP Ovchinnikov M.A.), Makhachkala, 2015, pp. 74-82.

³ See: G.V. Volgushev, "Vooruzhennyye sily i sovremennyye vidy politicheskogo nasilia," *Nauchnye issledovaniya i razrabotki molodykh uchenykh*, No. 1, 2014, pp. 55-58; [<http://news.bcm.ru/topic/164>], 11 October, 2016.

ple to join terrorist organizations. It seems that driven by poverty and the lack of fairness in everyday life, they become easy prey for ideological brainwashing of extremist emissaries.⁴ In fact, rather than fighting the repercussions of terrorist acts and the separatist sentiments, the elites should concentrate on the social and economic factors in which terrorism and poverty are rooted.

In the last few years, Russia's geopolitical position has changed dramatically, its economics being weakened by the impact of sanctions initiated by the European Union, the U.S. and other countries, plummeting oil prices and international pressure directed at Russia. The budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation were likewise affected. The North Caucasian republics (80% of their budgets depending on subsidies from Moscow) lost a great deal of their incomes; this increased social and political tension and exacerbated the disagreements among the elite groups.

The Nature of Political Violence

According to Ozhegov's classical *Tolkovy slovar russkogo yazyka* (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language) violence is "the use of physical force against somebody; coercion and violation of personal immunity."⁵ We, on our side, tend to agree with the definition given by Svetlana Kuzina: "A method of institutionalization of social relations in the course of which individuals or groups of people rely on various means and methods of external coercion and manipulation to subjugate the consciousness, willpower, ability, productive forces, property and freedom of others to capture power, retain it and continue functioning."⁶ In other words, this means: violence used by state institutions to achieve political aims.

There are all sorts of factors (determinants) that stir up conflicts and escalate political violence, including political determinants (lack of rights and freedoms, power struggle, etc.), social (social differentiation, unemployment and dissatisfaction with one's own status), economic (property inequality, stratification and unfair distribution of benefits and resources), international and cultural factors (chauvinism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, anti-Semitism), etc.⁷

It would be useful to separate political legitimate violence and illegal coercion. Legitimate violence is the mechanism, which is used to persuade citizens to obey the legal demands of the authorities and observe the rules and norms of behavior. This is a voluntary submission, achieved by persuasion, authority, etc. Illegal coercion means suppression of civil and political freedoms, persecution of political opponents with the help of fabricated criminal cases, suppression of contrary opinions, unwarranted use of force by authorities, corporal punishment, etc.

As Neil Smelser pointed out, in democratic states the authorities are more or less tolerant of manifestations of protest, rallies or other forms of public criticism. In less democratic regimes, the

⁴ See: O.A. Kovrizhnykh, "Spravedlivost kak ideologicheskoe obosnovanie politicheskogo nasilia," *Vestnik Tambovskogo universiteta*, Seria: Gumanitarnye nauki, Vol. 20, No. 11 (151), 2015, pp. 170-176.

⁵ [<http://www.xn--80aacc4bir7b.xn>], 21 October, 2016.

⁶ S.I. Kuzina, *Politicheskoe nasilie: priroda, manifestirovanie i dinamika v globaliziruiushchemsya mire*, Author's synopsis of doctorate thesis, 23.00.02, Rostov on Don, 2010, p. 3; I.Yu. Zalyzin, "Ponyatie 'politicheskoe nasilie' v politologii i ugolovnom prave," *Probely v rossiiskom zakonodatelstve*, No. 1, 2014, pp. 166-169.

⁷ See: E.V. Pykhteeva, "Determinanty politicheskogo nasilia v sovremennoy Rossii," *Vestnik Omskogo universiteta*, No. 1 (63), 2012, pp. 331-339.

authorities treat criticism by journalists, activists or common people as a threat and firmly rebuff it.⁸ In the Northern Caucasus, the destructive model of conflict behavior prevails; it includes different forms of physical and psychological deterrents, designed to cause the greatest possible damage to an opponent. Destructive conflict behavior is typical of authoritarian and unstable political systems, in which violence is used to achieve desired results.

Political violence provokes negative responses: opposition and dissent, emotional protests and the desire to settle scores. In view of the very special cultural heritage of the North Caucasian peoples, public reprimands and reproaches, as well as applied forms of political violence are regarded as the worst of insults; they cause alienation and social deviations, especially acute among the younger generation.

The attitude of the electorate toward those in power is determined by the way the material benefits are distributed; the degree to which people are satisfied with their social roles, possibilities of self-organization, and their place in the hierarchy. Injustice by the regional elites, shady economics, the fact that the same people remain in power for a long time may stir up riots, public dissatisfaction and migration, etc. That is precisely why terrorist organizations are involved in charities; they patronize orphans, widows and the poorest social groups to open doors to political opportunities and access to institutions of state power. Having found no fairness in the society in which they live, young people turn to extremist organizations. The ethnic elites, for their part, do not seek consensus with their opponents and their critics.

It should be kept in mind that the Caucasus is a very complicated political entity, made of numerous ethnicities, clans and social groups. Moscow should tread carefully, since any rash act might start long conflicts and periods of opposition. The regional ethnic elites are fully aware of this and are skillfully manipulating their resource base to retain the status quo.

Political Violence and the Regional Political Elites

The ethnopolitical elites are one of the catalysts of political violence in the region. They are an important cog in the administrative wheel of the political process and an important factor that influences the regional and federal political transformations.

They function on the basis of personal loyalty to a leader, close kinship relations and common origins of one family, *teip*, etc. Incorporation and functioning are rooted in the patron-client system; new people are recruited to circulate within the same guilds. Protectionism in recruiting personnel and in distribution of posts is one of the typical features of the North Caucasian elites, together with the extremely closed nature of their circles and decision-making.

The structure of the regional ethnopolitical elite does not necessarily correspond to the structure of the bodies of state power. The political process is dominated by informal pressure groups, clans or cliques that close ranks around their leaders and control certain structures of state power or business. The clandestine power struggle and the efforts to seize power and spheres of influence from the rivals never end. The North Caucasian elite is driven by a group rather than national interests—a very typical feature of the clan system.

In the 1990s, when the power base was being changed in the Chechen Republic, the ethnic elites did not hesitate to use political violence. The coup that removed the administration of the republic

⁸ See: S.I. Kuzina, "Institutsionalizatsia politicheskogo nasilia," *Filosofia prava*, No. 3, 2009, pp. 48-51.

dredged up political adventurers, marginal groups and even lumpens. They set up the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in which abductions, slave trade, drug trafficking, illegal oil production, and trade in oil and oil products were common practices. Criminal and terrorist structures moved their criminal businesses outside the Republic.

Not infrequently, ethnic elites rely on stereotypes of autochthonous people as justification for seizing power. This happened in Chechnia where the elites exploited the political, economic, psychological and cultural specifics of the local society to remain in power and grow rich. Later, in 1999, the Russian-Chechen conflict spread into the mountainous part of Daghestan: terrorist units from Chechnia invaded the neighboring republic. Russia responded by bringing its armed forces into Chechnia to restore the “constitutional order.”

The Russian-Chechen conflict of 1994-2000 can be described as a tragedy for the republic’s civilian population. Chechnia and its capital, Grozny, were completely ruined. The social fabric and economic activity, infrastructure, agriculture and industry ceased to exist. The “democratically” elected authorities relied on the harsh forceful methods of Soviet-style totalitarianism to deal with civilian population. Some historians describe it as a war between people, who have been fighting against each other with unrestrained ferocity for centuries in an effort to capture the territory and destroy the opponent.⁹

High mortality, unemployment, famine, political and civil lawlessness, social apathy, anomie and military psychosis were the main elements of social life in Chechnia. All written and implicit human rights and freedoms were flagrantly violated: settlements were mercilessly bombed, people were deprived of gas and electricity, the military exterminated civilian population in huge numbers.

Property was changing hands; corrupt ethnic elites imagined that everything was permitted. As a result, the ruling elite ran into an irreversible conundrum. In 2004, for example, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia seven people were abducted and murdered in the country house of Ali Kaitov, the son in law of the then President of the Republic, Mustafa Badyev. Indignation spread far and wide among the common people, resulting in mass protest rallies, with enraged protesters capturing the republican White House. Society associated this crime with the President and his closest retinue. Only the interference of the Kremlin, which, by dispatching its representative, Dmitry Kozak, to stabilize the situation, prevented the escalation of the situation and avoided human casualties. Later, Badyev was appointed to head the republican pension fund, only to be removed after another financial audit.

On 13 October, 2005, illegal armed units attempted a coup in Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria).¹⁰ According to the Internet site Kavkazskiy uzel, “there were no fewer than 250 fighters who attacked the city. Thirty-five members of the security forces and 15 civilians were killed; 129 members of the security forces and 66 civilians were wounded. Ninety-five militants were killed in armed clashes.”¹¹ This attack was organized by Wahhabi clandestine organizations and was intended as a demonstration of Russia’s inability to control the Northern Caucasus. The organizers wanted to sow fear among the locals and create tension. Indeed, 250 fighters could hardly capture the city and remain in it; the separatists pursued other aims. These events demonstrated the highly explosive social and political situation in the region.

This is confirmed by the disagreements between the Chechen Republic and Republic of Ingushetia over the Sunzha District. In August 2012, members of law enforcement agencies of the two republics clashed in the village of Galashki. The Chechen side claimed to have liquidated a group of terrorists, while the authorities of the Republic of Ingushetia disagreed, by saying that there had been

⁹ See: *Chechnia: ot konflikta k stabilnosti*, Moscow, 2001.

¹⁰ See: Kh.G. Tkhatapsoev, “Nalchik 13 oktiabria kak vyzov sovremennoy Rossii,” *Nauchnaia mysl Kavkaza*, No. 2, 2006, pp. 24-33.

¹¹ Kavkazskiy uzel, available at [<http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/219748/>], 25 September, 2016.

an unprovoked explosion. These events were followed by a conflict in the Ingush village of Arshty. The people in power in both republics accused each other of provocations and of far from adequate efforts to fight the Wahhabis. The tension that had somewhat subsided on the eve of the Sochi Olympics was rekindled by the incident at a checkpoint on the administrative border between Chechnia and Ingushetia.¹²

Mutual accusations between the heads of Chechnia and Ingushetia became more or less common. On the recommendations of Alexander Khloponin, Plenipotentiary Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation to the North Caucasian Federal District, several regional workgroups studied the conflict over the Sunzha District of Ingushetia; the results were presented to the Federal center (Moscow). The response from Moscow was vague; later the heads of the two republics met with the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. Today, the conflict has been left to “smolder.”¹³

Recently, the clergy of the Republic of Ingushetia, who insisted that some of the Chechen theologians had moved away from the traditional Sufi Islam (the accusation denied by religious leaders in the Chechen Republic) stirred up confrontation between the religious elites of both republics. The leaders of both republics, however, seem to have been brought closer by that issue.

If the Federal administrative elites allow the situation to continue, a long latent conflict¹⁴ will become practically unavoidable. This might rekindle the old territorial disagreements between the leaders of Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the Prigorodny District, and even create another source of ethno-political tension.

This territorial conflict is purely political; it can be described as a clash between different styles of governance and methods of containing the separatists. Other North Caucasian regions, such as Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adyghea and the Stavropol Territory have to cope with problems of their own, nowhere as violent as in Chechnia and Ingushetia.

In the contemporary sociopolitical realities of their regions, the administrative-political elites use political violence to retain power and influence. Violence can be used to maintain law and order, to prevent complications and be utilized as one of the main instruments but not in every situation. This is very typical of authoritarian regimes.

The current elites of the North Caucasian republics were brought to power by a wave of national self-awareness, of “revolutions,” conflicts, separatist and extremist sentiments that had become obvious on the eve of the Soviet Union’s disintegration and in the first post-Soviet years. Radical and antagonistic, they prefer to use force. According to the opinion poll carried out in 2007 by the Russian Academy of Civil Service experts, the positions of people in power are determined by wealth, prestigious education, loyalty to a new political regime, etc.¹⁵ These trends cannot but cause concern among experts.¹⁶

The ways people are integrated into the ethno-political elites and the means and methods employed to retain power can be described as one of the most destructive factors that upsets the stability of the political system of the Northern Caucasus. This adds special importance to the sociological studies con-

¹² “Chechnia i Ingushetia: granitsa konflikta,” available at [http://www.antiterror.kz/ingushetiya/news_2014-10-24-19-15-46-927.html], 18 January, 2016.

¹³ [<http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya-column/vlast/114681-Chechnia-protiv-ingushetii-kolonialnyi-ugar>], 15 February, 2016.

¹⁴ See: M.M. Yusupov, “Tsennostno-funktsionalnye grani soglasiia v period konflikta,” *Konfliktologia*, No. 3, 2013, pp. 7-20.

¹⁵ See: A.R. Salgiriev, “Politicheskaia elita Rossii: osobennosti formirovaniia i razvitiia,” *Vestnik Adygeyskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, Seria 1: Regionovedenie, filosofia, istoria, sotsiologia, yurisprudentsia, politologia, kulturologia (Maykop), No. 2, 2012, pp. 253-256.

¹⁶ See: V.G. Ignatov, A.V. Ponedelkov, A.M. Starostin, *et al.*, *Rossiyskie elity v zerkale sotsiologii*, Informational and analytical materials, Rostov on Don, 2007, pp. 17-18.

ducted in the South of Russia. The question “Which are the shortest ways to the region’s political elite?” drew the following answers: contacts (71.1%), wealth and money (62.4%), membership in the right party (26.4%), personal achievements (12.0%), intellectual level (11.8%), undecided (7.7%), other answers (0.5%).¹⁷ The results point to the highly complicated nature of the political elites that are homogeneous and archaic. These descriptions of the system of power and the ways and means of its replenishment speak of a far from healthy political system, its closed nature and biases when it comes to decision-making. It is formed and functions in a shadow; its traditionalism builds up latent disagreements with the Federal authority and makes it harder to assess the real development level of the region.

When talking about different forms of political violence we should pay special attention to terrorism. According to the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation, “in January–October 2016, there were 1,937 registered crimes of terrorist nature (38.7%) and 1,251 crimes of extremist nature (11.2%).”¹⁸ This means that the number of crimes of terrorist and extremist nature is steadily rising. In the Northern Caucasus terrorism is rooted in religion and separatism, with Islam being a mobilizing and integrating factor.¹⁹ Every time the interests of the federal political and administrative elite clash with the interests of the local elites, Islamic propaganda starts talking about jihad. In fact, it is an instrument the elites present every time they want to achieve their political aims. It is particularly typical of Chechnia and Dagestan, where historically Islam has played a significant role in the ethnic consciousness of the mountain people.

The Federal center merely declares certain social and economic approaches designed to defuse or at least alleviate the ethnopolitical tension in the region. So far without much success. This is evidenced by the qualification roster of the choices of the heads of the republics and their repressions against those who disagree or are bold enough to think differently. Moscow has, in fact, moved away from dealing with the local problems and interfering in the republics’ political life: it has let the local elites to act as they see it fit. They, in turn, hastened to use this freedom to pursue their personal aims.²⁰

Conclusion

The local population is irritated by the corruption, authoritarianism and biased nature of the local elites and does not trust them. Moscow should respond to these sentiments; it should take all the necessary measures to create new elites in the Northern Caucasus and finally abandon the principle “subvention in exchange for loyalty.”²¹

All institutions of state power (courts of justice and law enforcement in the first place) should act efficiently if we want to move away from the methods and practices of political violence. It is no secret that the judicial system is highly corrupt and is operating under strong pressure from the ethnopolitical elites; this means that common people cannot fully realize their constitutional rights.

¹⁷ See: N.P. Gritsenko, “Osobennosti elitogeneza v politicheskom prostranstve regionov sovremennoy Rossii,” *Mir i politika. Mezhdunarodny politicheskij zhurnal*, 5 January, 2013, available at [<http://mir-politika.ru/3001-osobennosti-elitogeneza-vpoliticheskom-prostranstve-regionov-sovremennoy-rossii.html>]; M.A. Aligajeva, “Kriterii obnovenia politicheskoy elity v respublike Dagestan,” *Vlast*, No. 2, 2016, pp. 68-71.

¹⁸ “Sostoianie prestupnosti v Rossii za ianvar-oktiabr 2016 goda,” available at [https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/upload/site1/document_news/008/922/474/sb_1610.pdf], 30 November, 2016.

¹⁹ See: I.P. Dobaev, “Sovremenny terrorism na Severnom Kavkaze,” *Problemy natsionalnoy strategii*, No. 19, 2009, p. 78.

²⁰ See: A.R. Salgiriev, “Mekhanizmy formirovania politicheskikh elit v Chechenskoj Respublike,” *Globalny nauchny potentsial*, St. Petersburg, No. 17, 2012, pp. 82-85.

²¹ A.R. Salgiriev, “Elity v politicheskom prostranstve Yuga Rossii,” *Nauka i business: puti razvitiia* (Moscow), No. 9 (27), pp. 156-159.

There is no recipe for political stabilization in the region, yet we should strictly observe human rights and freedoms, wage an uncompromising struggle against corruption and allow the NGOs that protect human rights to operate freely. The authorities should demonstrate restraint when responding to signals from the grass-roots level, and carry out more balanced policies, designed to create conditions conducive to the development of democratic institutions.

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

THE IMPACT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE EAEU ON THE SMALL AND MEDIUM BUSINESS IN KAZAKHSTAN

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ABSTRACT

The Customs Union (CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are an effective mechanism for protecting the domestic market, because the member states of these organizations follow a coordinated foreign trade policy. Conditions are being created for the development of the non-primary sector in these countries so as to modernize, diversify and enhance the competitiveness of their economies. For the countries of the EAEU, whose members are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is highly relevant, especially considering the recession and Western economic sanctions against Russia, the largest EAEU economy.

At the same time, their development encounters significant difficulties. This article examines the current situation and development trends in Kazakhstan's small and medium business since the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010 and the Eurasian Economic Union on 1 January, 2015. It shows the areas of government support for SMEs and argues the need for the development of a common strategy to regulate small and medium business in the EAEU space. In the functioning of the Kazakhstan economy as part of the Customs Union and the EAEU, the authors have identified problems caused by inadequate interaction between business and government.

KEYWORDS: *Kazakhstan, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), small and medium business, Customs Union, SMEs.*

Introduction

The problem of enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium business is currently on the agenda of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a major factor of its integration into the common economic space. It is important to carry out full-scale legislative and administrative reform in the country in order to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and create a favorable investment climate.

At the interstate level, it is necessary to resolve issues in harmonizing national legislation and creating a level playing field for market actors. Among other things, it is necessary to optimize product certification procedures and amend Russian tax laws so as to abolish VAT on rail transportation.

At the national level, it is important to create a state agency to regulate SME activities, charged with the tasks of protecting the interests of entrepreneurs, strengthening relations between business and government, and helping SMEs to adapt to the new economic conditions.

The development of small and medium business is the foundation of any economy. Without a developed SME sector, it is difficult to talk about a stable economic situation in the country. That is why small and medium business came to be regarded as a key sector of the economy in Kazakhstan back in the early days of independence. In 2014, according to EU data, SMEs constituted 99.8% of all enterprises in the non-financial business sector of the EU-28, totaling 22.3 million enterprises. The EU has an average of 5 SMEs per sq km. In 2014, its SMEs employed almost 90 million persons (67% of all employees) and accounted for 58% of value added in the non-financial business sector.¹

¹ See: [<http://www.zakon.kz/4695650-vklad-msb-v-vvp-kazakhstana-za-2014-god.html>], 10 December, 2016.

In our opinion, the activity of SMEs in the European Union is one of the crucial factors driving integration in the EU-28.

Kazakhstan draws on the successful experience of developed countries, since the improvement of mechanisms for government support of small and medium business is a constant focus of attention for the country's leadership. In the developed countries, for example, large businesses are not contrasted with small and medium businesses. On the contrary, these countries foster the principle of cooperation between large, small and medium-sized enterprises, so that large associations do not inhibit the development of small or medium businesses: they complement each other, especially in areas such as innovation and specialization of production.

Small and medium business is a type of economic activity designed to make profit and produce a social effect through organization, development, production and sale of goods. Its essence is manifested in proactive, innovative and independent activity. The purpose of small and medium businesses is to earn profit and personal income from foresight and careful planning, on the one hand, and to make the most efficient use of the factors of production and unlock human creative potential, on the other.

The essence of small and medium business is revealed in greater depth through its main functions: innovation, resource, organization and motivation.²

As a phenomenon of economic life, small and medium business always develops in a specific socioeconomic and historical environment. That is why its continuous reproduction requires certain prerequisites.

Materials and Methods

For an analysis of the state and development of economic integration in the EAEU, it is important to analyze the state, dynamics and areas of activity of SMEs. The purpose of this investigation is to study Kazakhstan's SME sector, its dynamics since the 2000s, and the current state of this component of the national economy under regional economic integration as it enters a new stage of development.

In our study, we have used a comprehensive approach to analyze the export potential of SMEs based on national and regional information sources, monitoring of printed and electronic business and specialized publications, analytical reviews, and the materials of marketing and consulting firms for the period from 2005 to 2015. The key macroeconomic indicators for the EAEU countries were taken from UNCTAD sources in order to ensure their comparability in dollar terms.

The major limitations of the study were the lack in official statistics of a more or less realistic assessment of the export activities of SMEs in all CU/EAEU member countries, including Kazakhstan, and the differences in the legislation of the EAEU countries regarding SMEs. For example, the concept of "small or medium-sized enterprise" is still lacking in the Customs Code of the Russian Federation.

The foundations of the theory of development and the economic role of enterprise, including small-scale enterprise, were laid by Joseph Schumpeter. An analysis of the economic literature shows

² See: I.N. Chuev, T.M. Panchenko, V.S. Novikov, O.A. Konnova, N.G. Iraeva, I.S. Karabulatova, "Innovation and Integrated Structures of the Innovations in Modern Russia," *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 239-244; N.R. Saenko, A.A. Sozinova, I.S. Karabulatova, I.V. Akhmetov, O.V. Mamatelashvili, E.E. Pismennaya, "Research in Action Integrated Marketing Communications as the Elements of Information and Virtualization Market Relations," *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 267-272; O.A. Koryakovtseva, I.I. Doronina, T.M. Panchenko, I.S. Karabulatova, Z.M. Abdullina, "Research of Category «Motivation» as a Basic Tool of Personnel Management," *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 293-299.

that, from the perspective of the macro system (the state), researchers identify the following functions of SMEs:

- (a) competition (F. Hayek);
- (b) innovation (J. Schumpeter,³ P.F. Drucker,⁴ P. Koveos⁵);
- (c) job creation (D.L. Birch⁶); and
- (d) creation of the conditions for the emergence of the middle class (A. Aganbegyan and others⁷).

The latter is particularly important for emerging market countries (with a transition economy).

The object of investigation was the small and medium business sector in Kazakhstan, whose development over the last decade was analyzed in this study.

Results

In the process of implementation of the Concept of Transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Sustainable Development, the efficiency and stability of small enterprises, the establishment of new economic ties (including foreign economic ones) with their participation, and the intensification of their production and innovation activities are of particular importance.

According to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Private Enterprise (No. 124-III of 31 January, 2006), small businesses (enterprises) are individual entrepreneurs operating without the formation of a legal entity with an average annual number of employees not exceeding 50 persons, and legal entities engaged in private business with an average annual number of employees not exceeding 50 persons and an average annual value of assets not exceeding 60,000 times the monthly calculation index (MCI) set by the law on the republican budget for the corresponding fiscal year.⁸

Medium businesses (enterprises) are individual entrepreneurs operating without the formation of a legal entity with an average annual number of employees exceeding 50 persons, and legal entities engaged in private business with an average annual number of employees exceeding 50 but not exceeding 250 persons and an average annual value of assets not exceeding 325,000 times the monthly calculation index set by the law on the republican budget for the corresponding fiscal year (Para 7 of Art 6 of the Law).⁹

This definition exists in Kazakhstan's legislation since 2006, while small business enterprises began to appear back in the early 1990s, mainly by spinning off from state-owned parent enterprises. In 1991, these were mainly limited liability partnerships (LLPs). During the first half of 1991, many of them were reorganized into small businesses based on private equity ownership.¹⁰

³ See: J. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper & Row, New York, 1975.

⁴ See: P.F. Drucker, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles*, Pan Books, London, 1986.

⁵ See: P. Koveos, "Venture Entrepreneurship, Innovation Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth," *Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2004.

⁶ See: D.L. Birch, *Job Creation America. How Our Smallest Companies Put the Most People to Work*, Free Press, New York, 1987.

⁷ L.V. Shkvarya, "Tekhnologicheskie platformy kak predposylka ustoichivogo razvitiya stran SNG v postkrisisniy period," *Gorny informatsionno-analiticheskiy biulleten (nauchno-tekhnicheskii zhurnal)*, No. 4, 2011, pp. 374-378.

⁸ See: Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 124-III of 31 January, 2006, "On Private Enterprise," available at [<http://www.pavlodar.com/zakon/?dok=03264>], 10 December, 2016.

⁹ See: Ibidem.

¹⁰ See: A.K. Otshova, *Razvitie malogo biznesa v Respublike Kazakhstan*, Chelyabinsk, 2013, pp. 110-113.

According to statistics, as of 1 January, 1992, there were 6,445 small enterprises of all kinds in Kazakhstan (including 1,350 building organizations, 954 industrial enterprises, and 648 trade and catering enterprises). By 1 January, 1993, their number reached 12,690 (including 3,092 trade and catering enterprises, 1,978 building organizations, and 1,703 industrial enterprises).¹¹

Thus, one can say that the quantitative and qualitative recovery of this segment of Kazakhstan's national economy began precisely in that period with the support of the national government (programs in support of national entrepreneurs are being implemented since 1992), which particularly intensified in the 2000s.

As of 1 January, 2015, according to national statistics, as many as 1,655,980 SMEs were already registered in Kazakhstan (see Table 1).¹²

Table 1

Performance Indicators for Kazakhstan SMEs (2005-2014)

Registered SMEs, thousands	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
		743	840	938	1026	935	1,197	1,384	1,400	1,536
SME employees, thousands	1,876	1,952	2,121	2,153	2,297	2,631	2,427	2,555	2,636	2,810
Production of goods and services, millions of tenge	1,544	1,930	2,525	4,873	5,367	7,276	7,604	8,012	9,020	15,568
Estimated SME contribution to Kazakhstan's GDP, %	10.5	9.8	10.7	16.7	17.7	20.6	17.5	17.3	16.9	26.2
Source: Compiled using data from statistical yearbooks of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2015.										

As our analysis shows, in 2014 the number of registered SMEs increased by 7.8% (by 120 thousand in absolute terms), while the share of active SMEs increased by 5.5% to 1,324 thousand. In 2010-2014, the share of active SMEs in Kazakhstan varied within the limits of 55% to 61%.¹³

An analysis of data presented in Table 1 shows that in 2014 the number of people employed in the SME sector increased by 174 thousand to more than 2.8 million on 1 January, 2015; at the same time, the SME sector accounts for only 30% of Kazakhstan's total working population.

In 2014, the production of goods and services by SMEs increased to 15.6 million tenge, or 1.7 times from 2013 and 2.1 times from 2010 (the year of establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus). In addition, the contribution of the SME sector to the country's GDP has increased significantly (to 26.2% in 2014). Considering the insignificant increase in quantitative indicators (the total number of SMEs and their employees), such rapid growth makes it possible to speak about qualitative changes in the SME sector, particularly improved labor productivity and efficiency. This, in turn, is primarily a result of the implementation of the national strategy for the development of business as an engine of growth in this new economic area. As President Nursul-

¹¹ See: *Kratki statisticheskiy izhegodnik 1993*, State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 1993, p. 100.

¹² See: [<http://www.zakon.kz/4695650-vklad-msb-v-vvp-kazakhstana-za-2014-god.html>], 12 December, 2016.

¹³ See: *Maloie i sredneye predprinimatelstvo v Respublike Kazakhstan 2010-2014*, Statistical Yearbook, Committee on Statistics of the RK Ministry of National Economy, Astana, 2015, p. 43.

tan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan said in his 2014 Address to the Nation, “Kazakhstan’s Way 2050: Common Aim, Common Interests, Common Future,” the share of small and medium-sized businesses should double by 2030.¹⁴

On the other hand, our study shows that the quantitative and qualitative improvements in the performance of SMEs in Kazakhstan coincide with the formation and activity of the Customs Union and the EAEU (which has expanded the economic potential of the Customs Union) and are undoubtedly a consequence of their activities.

Discussion

For the group of countries with transition economies, the activity of SMEs is of particular importance because of the need to address the tasks of structural, innovation and social change. They have been studied in a number of research works published in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia¹⁵ and Latin America. Researchers note the growing role of SMEs in regional and global, as well as national, markets.¹⁶ “Globalizations together with the reduction in trade barriers and tariff due to regional economic integration and World Trade Organization (WTO), together with the development in information and communication technology provide the opportunity for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to expand their business into foreign market. Undoubtedly, SMEs play an increasingly active role in international markets in recent years and rapidly expanding their businesses to international markets, using international diversification as an important strategic option to achieve growth.”¹⁷

Thus, an important component of the role of SMEs in the national economy is that they promote the development of regional economic integration (the “micro level” of economic integration that forms through the creation of regional concerns, holding companies and joint ventures), on the one hand, and that they are an indicator of its state and dynamics, on the other. This means that sustainable development of SMEs, especially in the area of export-import operations, being a result of the creation of a free trade area (FTA) or a customs union (CU), may be evidence of the positive impact of integration processes in the region. For example, given objective resource and market constraints on development at the national level, SMEs can obtain additional resources and opportunities (particularly for the development of clusters) in the regional market as they are protected from third-country competition by a common customs tariff of the FTA and/or the CU. East European countries, among others, have had such experience, and this experience has proved to be very successful for the development of SMEs, in the opinion of D. Ionescu.¹⁸

¹⁴ See: Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev to the Nation, 17 January, 2014, available in Russian at [http://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/addresses_of_president/page_215750_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-17-yanvarya-2014-g], 10 December, 2016.

¹⁵ See: Th.H. Nguyen, Q. Alam, D. Prajogo, “Developing Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in a Transitional Economy—from Theory to Practice: An Operational Model for Vietnamese SMEs,” *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2008.

¹⁶ See: L. Shkvarya, O. Grigorenko, A. Strygin, V. Rusakovich, S. Shilina, “The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Asian Technology Markets (India and China),” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 103-113.

¹⁷ See: M.I. Masum, A. Fernandez, *Internationalization Process of SMEs: Strategies and Methods. Master Thesis in International Business and Entrepreneurship, School of Sustainable Development of Society and Technology, Mälardalen University, Sweden, 2008*; Nik Ab Halim Nik Abdullah, Shahrul Nizam Mohd Zain, “The Internationalization Theory and Malaysian Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs),” *International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, pp. 318-322.

¹⁸ See: D. Ionescu, “Cluster Development in Transition Countries: A Tool for Small Business Support,” *CEI Workshop on Clusters*, OECD, 2003, available at [<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/27/17940932.pdf>], 10 December, 2016.

Conclusion

The macroeconomic dynamics of the EAEU countries remains encouraging despite Western sanctions against the Russian economy and high turbulence in the world economic system.

Economic integration is of great importance to the EAEU countries as a mutually beneficial project promoting sustainable economic growth.¹⁹ The single market of the EAEU is extremely important to SMEs because of its combined economic characteristics (see Table 2).

Table 2

Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for the EAEU Countries (1 January, 2015)

	Russia	Kazakhstan	Belarus	Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	Total
Area, sq km	17,098,246	2,724,000	207,600	29,800	199,900	20,259,546
Population, thousands	143,429.4	17,371.62	9,500.422	3,006.154	5,843.617	179,151.2
Workforce, thousands	75,654.1	8,951.102	4,529.623	1,486.252	2,649.315	93,270.39
GDP, millions of dollars	1,865,328.0	205,417.7	76,126.91	10,878.26	7,267.87	2,157,751.0
GDP per capita, dollars	13,092.99	12,369.43	8,178.998	3,645.542	1,292.062	12,044.3
Exports, millions of dollars	497,764.0	78,237.8	36,392	1,519.3	1,649.9	615,563.0
Imports, millions of dollars	308,027.0	41,212.8	40,787.6	4,401.6	5,732.3	400,161.3
FDI inflows, millions of dollars	20,957.66	9,562.046	1,798.2	382.8	210.5121	32,911.26
Annual inflation, %	7.8	6.7	18.3	2.98	7.5	7.4

Source: Compiled using UNCTAD data.

As the partner countries integrate, SMEs can enter their markets more actively, while the market of each individual country, such as Kazakhstan, is limited by both the number of consumers and by their aggregate demand. In addition, national resources cannot fully provide SMEs with all the factors of production required to enhance national competitiveness.²⁰ At the same time, goods, services, capital and labor can move freely across the EAEU.

However, along with the opportunities offered by the regional market to the SMEs of EAEU member countries, there are also certain problems that require the attention of national governments. For Kazakhstan and its small and medium businesses, a major problem is increased competition from Russia's more competitive economic entities. One can also mention higher duties on some kinds of

¹⁹ See: L.V. Shkvarya, "Rossia v integratsionnykh protsessakh na postsovetском prostranstve," *Problemy sovremennoi ekonomiki*, No. 4, 2009, pp. 296-298.

²⁰ See: L.V. Skvarya, "Kontseptualnye osnovy innovatsionnogo predprinimatelstva," *Gornyi informatsionno-analiticheskii biulleten (nauchno-tehnicheskii zhurnal)*, No. 5, 2013, pp. 369-372.

goods, such as cars, in the EAEU, with negative consequences for consumers due to rising prices. And this in turn leads to an increase in social unrest and other ethnosocial deviations in the country.²¹

There are also some inconsistencies in standards (technical, financial and others), which makes it more difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to do business. Finally, the need to join the WTO for Belarus and to comply with WTO rules for Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which have already joined the organization, requires deliberate efforts by the EAEU member states and the Union as a whole to harmonize and enhance the integration process so as to develop and improve the efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises in both national and regional markets.

²¹ See: I. Karabulatova, I. Mkrtumova, Z. Polivara, B. Akhmetova, S. Galiullina, E. Loskutova, E. Abylkasymov, "Protest Behavior of Present-Day Russian Youth as Ethnosocial Deviation in an Ethnopolitical Conflict-Prone Situation," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 94-103.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION

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A B S T R A C T

Whereas the establishment of all previous alliances in the post-Soviet space was motivated by a desire for political union, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has focused on the economic component.¹ One of its goals has been defined as a transition to a coordinated and concerted economic policy, including fiscal and monetary policies. Some decisions in this area are already being taken. But in light of the global financial and economic crisis, central banks have had to pursue a looser monetary policy, while governments in all

EAEU countries have increased their influence on central bank decisions. There are differences in this respect: in some countries (Belarus and Russia), the primary objective of the central bank has not been identified at all and there is a multiplicity of objectives (see Table 1); in others, one and the same objective—the achievement of price stability—is defined as both the objective of the monetary authority and the goal of its monetary policy. In Belarus and Russia, price stability is regarded as a means of ensuring the stability of the national currency (the ruble). In order to coordinate the key elements of monetary policy across the EAEU, the authors suggest setting a primary objective for the central bank, vesting it with exclusive authority in the area of monetary policy, and increasing its real independence.

¹ See: O.A. Koryakovtseva, I.I. Doronina, T.M. Panchenko, I.S. Karabulatova, Z.M. Abdullina, "Research of Category 'Motivation' as a Basic Tool of Personnel Management," *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 293-299.

KEYWORDS: *Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), monetary policy, central bank, central bank independence, monetary policy instruments.*

Introduction

As integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) increases, its members are planning to coordinate the key elements of their monetary policies.² Although the documents of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the executive body of the EAEU, provide for the possibility of establishing a single monetary authority (similar to that of the EU countries) by 2020 with a transition to a single currency, we believe such a scenario is unlikely for a number of reasons.

- First, such a decision would mean a loss of sovereignty and independence in creating money, a prospect for which the member countries are still not ready.
- Second, emerging countries that mainly export raw materials (Kazakhstan and Russia) depend to a significant extent on external factors: world prices and changes in the terms of trade, which are beyond the control of the monetary authorities.
- Third, in order to coordinate certain elements of monetary policy, the member countries will have to harmonize their banking laws with regard to the objectives of the central bank

² See: I.N. Chuev, T.M. Panchenko, V.S. Novikov, O.A. Konnova, N.G. Iraeva, I.S. Karabulatova, "Innovation and Integrated Structures of the Innovations in Modern Russia," *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 1S, 2016, pp. 239-244.

and its monetary policy, as well as the powers of the monetary authority in its development and implementation.

- Fourth, the deep geopolitical and economic crisis and the dependence of the EAEU economies on the economy of Russia (in 2015, it accounted for 35% of imports in Armenia, 62% in Belarus, 42% in Kazakhstan, and 53% in Kyrgyzstan) have led to a significant worsening of the situation in the banking sector. For example, transfers from Russia to Armenia fell by 14% in 2015. Let us note that the Russian banking sector dominates in the EAEU with almost 92% of the latter's total bank assets.
- Fifth, the imbalances between countries in many economic indicators (structure and growth rate of the economy, external public debt, foreign exchange reserves, etc.), including significant differences in inflation rates (see Table 1), have not only persisted, but have further increased. In 2015, inflation rates in most countries not only failed to meet the criterion for sustainable development established by the Eurasian Economic Commission, but also differed widely: from 4.3% in Armenia to 13.6% in Kazakhstan. As a result, each member country failed to meet at least one of the sustainability criteria (Armenia formally met them all, but only because the debt of the monetary authorities was excluded from the category of public debt).

Table 1

**Analysis of Conformity with Sustainable Development Criteria
in EAEU Countries in 2015**

Countries	Annual Consolidated Budget Deficit, % of GDP		Public Sector Debt, % of GDP		Inflation Rate, %*	Projected Inflation Rate for 2016, %	
Armenia	≤3%	-2.9	≤ 50%	48.7	4.3	4.0 ± 2.0	
Belarus		1.5		37.8	12.0	12.0	
Kazakhstan		-2.7		22.1	9.3%	13.6	6.0-8.0
Kyrgyzstan		-7.7		68.1	8.1	9.8	
Russia		3.5		10.3	12.9	6.0	

* This parameter should not exceed the EAEU minimum by more than 5 percentage points, that is, considering the inflation rate in Armenia in 2015, it should not exceed 9.3%.

S o u r c e: Compiled using data from the Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS [<http://www.cisstat.com/>] and the Eurasian Economic Commission [<http://www.ereport.ru/stat.php?razdel=country> http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/finstat/Documents/finstat_2015.pdf], 15 December, 2016.

In addition, the EAEU countries use different targeting regimes, although prior to 2006 all of them used monetary targeting (targeting of monetary aggregates), with the money supply as an intermediate target, and the monetary base as an operational target. At the same time, the monetary authorities also occasionally resorted to exchange rate targeting (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan), in some periods actually using a mixed model in which exchange rate targets were combined with several monetary targets. Later on, the member countries began a gradual transition to inflation targeting (Armenia in 2006, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2015, and Belarus is planning to transition by 2020). Kyrgyzstan is

still undecided on whether to introduce inflation targeting. Although Kazakhstan and Russia have announced their transition to inflation targeting, this transition can be regarded as nominal due to the heavy dependence of their economies on world energy prices and the depreciation of their national currencies, which leads to rising prices for imported goods.

The periods covered by the Monetary Policy Guidelines developed in individual EAEU countries do not coincide either. Despite such differences in many economic indicators, one should note the “accidental” coincidence of similar actions by the central banks in the conduct of monetary policy: the lowering of reserve requirements in 2007-2009, the introduction of unsecured loans, etc. But due to the lack of a comprehensive approach to monetary policy in the crisis and post-crisis periods, its effectiveness has declined: the expected parameters of the money market have not been achieved, national currencies have depreciated, GDP and credit to the economy have declined, etc.

Methodology

The effectiveness of monetary policy is usually measured by indicators such as the growth rate of GDP, the money supply and monetization (normally, the monetization ratio should be 50% or higher, but in Russia it is much lower); the relationship between the growth rate of the money supply and GDP; the ratio of credit to GDP, and others.

Apart from that, some authors have argued the existence of certain patterns (“rules”) in the development of the money market in emerging economies:³

- 1) there is an inverse relationship between the growth rate of the money supply and the monetization ratio: as the rate of money creation increases, the monetization ratio usually decreases;
- 2) if the annual inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator is less than 20%, the monetization ratio usually tends to increase; if it is in the range of 20% to 40%, the monetization ratio fluctuates; and if the annual inflation rate is over 40%, the monetization ratio steadily decreases;
- 3) the dynamics of average annual growth rates of the monetization ratio are usually positive (i.e. have a positive impact on the national economy) if its growth rate exceeds the GDP growth rate by no more than 40% per year. In this case, the higher the level of monetization the higher is the rate of economic growth, the higher and more diversified is the demand for money, and the larger are the money flows redistributed to finance economic development. Otherwise, the dynamics of the monetization ratio may inhibit economic growth in the country, lead to excessive dependence on short-term non-resident investment, weaken the resource potential of the financial sector, and push up the price of money in the economy.

Results

A comparison of actual macroeconomic indicators with their expected values shows that in the pre-crisis period (to 2007) the actual values of most variables were generally consistent with the target values (see Table 2). In the following years, however, many of the achieved indicators worsened significantly compared to their expected values.⁴ For example, the inflation target for 2015 was

³ See: A. Illarionov, “Zakonomnosti mirovoi inflatsii,” *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 2, 1997, pp. 30-57.

⁴ See: Zh.G. Golodova, Yu.S. Ranchinskaya, “Analiz mer i rezultatov denezhno-kreditnoi politiki v stranakh Tamozhennogo soiuza v krizisnyi i post-krizisnyi periody,” *Natsionalnye interesy: priority i bezopasnost*, No. 42 (279), 2014, pp. 2-11.

achieved in Armenia and Belarus (in Kyrgyzstan, the actual figure was better than expected); the target for money supply growth was achieved in Kyrgyzstan, and for GDP growth in Armenia. In some periods, economic growth in Armenia, Belarus and Russia was negative.

Table 2

**Monetary Policy Parameters and
GDP Growth Rates in EAEU Countries (%)**

Countries	2007		2009		2015	
	plan	fact	plan	fact	plan	fact
<i>inflation rate</i>						
Armenia	4 ±1.5	6.6	4 ±1.5	3.4	4 ±1.5	3.7
Belarus	6.0-8.0	10.3	9.0-11.0	13.0	12.0	12.0
Kazakhstan	4.1-5.5	18.8	8.5-10.5	6.2	6.0-8.0	13.6
Kyrgyzstan	5.0-6.0	20.1	15.0	0.0	5.0-7.0	3.4
Russia	6.5-8.0	11.9	7.0-8.5	8.8	5.5-6.9	12.9
<i>growth rate of M2 money supply</i>						
Armenia	n/a	42.3	14.0-16.0	15.1	none	10.8
Belarus	25.0-29.0	25.0	32.0-40.0	-7.8	none	40.9
Kazakhstan	25.7	25.5	23.5	17.9	4.0	34.0
Kyrgyzstan	none	44.2	none	17.9	14.0-15.3	14.9
Russia	19.0-29.0	47.4	19.0-28.0	17.7	7.0-11.0	11.5
<i>monetization ratio</i>						
Armenia	none	22.0	none	25.9	none	36.9
Belarus	14.3-14.6	13.4	16.5	13.3	none	10.4
Kazakhstan	33.7	38.6	33.1	46.5	31.8	32.0
Kyrgyzstan	none	30.8	none	29.1	none	33.8
Russia	none	38.7	none	40.4	none	44.5
<i>GDP growth rate</i>						
Armenia	9.0	13.8	9.2	-14.4	1.6-2.6	3.0
Belarus	8.0-9.0	8.2	10.0-12.0	0.2	0.2-0.7	-3.9
Kazakhstan	9.6	8.7	0-6.3	1.2	1.5	1.2
Kyrgyzstan	n/a	8.2	6.0	2.3	4.8	3.5
Russia	5.0-6.4	8.5	5.7-6.7	-7.8	-0.7-0.6	-3.7
<i>Source:</i> Calculated and compiled using data from the ministries of finance and the central banks of the respective countries and from [http://knoema.ru/atlas].						

Another negative trend is that some member countries have reduced the number of indicators in the Monetary Policy Guidelines developed by their central banks for the coming period: Armenia and Belarus have stopped targeting money supply growth, and Belarus, the monetization ratio.

At the same time, the increase in the monetization ratio recorded in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia should be seen as a positive factor: it means that more of the necessary money is available in the economy and points to growing confidence in the national currency among economic actors. In Kazakhstan, however, the increase in monetization to 32% in 2015 was due in large part to a significant increase in the money supply caused by the revaluation of foreign currency deposits against the background of an economic slowdown. In other words, the situation of 2009, when the monetization ratio reached its highest level for the entire period of market transformation, is repeating itself to some extent.

As for credit to the economy, during the 2009-2010 financial and economic crisis its growth slowed due to an increase in the cost of credit in a more difficult funding situation, as well as to the more cautious policy of commercial banks. Moreover, there was a “credit crunch” in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by a credit expansion (see Table 3). In Kazakhstan, credit has not yet reached the pre-crisis level, and in Armenia and Russia the credit-to-GDP ratio declined in 2014 and 2015 (the credit slowdown continued in 2016), which is evidence of further recessionary trends in the economy.

Table 3

**Dynamics of Banking Sector Credit
in EAEU Countries in 2007-2015 (% of GDP)**

Years	Armenia	Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Kazakhstan	Russia
2007	13.5	35.1	15.6	56.5	36.3
2010	27.4	54.5	12.6	35.3	40.4
2014	42.7	40.3	19.8	31.8	57.2
2015	39.8	43.5	31.7*	37.7	54.7

* Data for the first nine months of 2015.

Source: Calculated and compiled by the authors using data from the official websites of the central banks of the EAEU countries; *Finansovyi sektor i izderzhki infliatsii v stranakh s perekhodnoi ekonomikoi* (The Financial Sector and Inflation Costs in Transition Countries) (Project of the Institute for the Economy in Transition), available at [http://www.iep.ru/files/text/usaid/fin_sec.pdf], 14 February, 2016.

In the crisis and post-crisis periods, the relationship between the growth rate of the money supply and monetization ratios in the EAEU countries was occasionally not confirmed (see Table 4) because the growth rate of broad money was accompanied by an increase in monetization: Armenia (2004-2007, 2011-2012, 2015), Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2012, 2015) and Russia (2006, 2012-2013). In Belarus (2006-2008, 2011-2012, 2015) and Kazakhstan (2006-2007, 2012-2013), money supply growth slowed with a simultaneous decline in monetization.

The relationship between the GDP deflator and the monetization ratio did not hold in Armenia (2008, 2012-2013), Belarus (2005-2007, 2012, 2015), Kazakhstan (2009-2011, 2013-2014), Kyrgyzstan (2010, 2013-2014) and Russia (2005-2011, 2014).

The inconsistencies with the above patterns (“rules”) are largely related to the greater vulnerability of the economies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, central bank policies designed to

stimulate the demand for money by lowering interest rates (Belarus) or credit crunches caused by the high share of bad loans in bank portfolios (Kazakhstan), which increased the imbalances in money and credit markets.⁵ At the same time, these imbalances are smaller in Armenia, which has targeted inflation for more than 10 years, and in Russia, which has a more developed monetary system.

Table 4

Money Market Parameters in EAEU Countries in 2005-2015 (annual average)

Countries	Years	Difference between Growth Rates of M and GDP	Growth Rate of GDP Deflator	Growth Rate of Monetization Ratio
Armenia	2005-2015	13.8	3.5	9.2
	2008-2015	11.2	3.3	7.3
	2011-2015	11.1	2.0	7.1
	2014-2015	6.3	1.8	4.3
Belarus	2005-2015	26.2	25.9	0.2
	2008-2015	22.1	30.5	-5.9
	2011-2015	29.2	40.4	-8.1
	2014-2015	8.2	17.1	-7.7
Kazakhstan	2005-2015	12.8	10.5	1.9
	2008-2015	11.2	7.6	-2.8
	2011-2015	6.3	5.4	-6.6
	2014-2015	8.9	1.1	-9.6
Kyrgyzstan	2005-2015	n/a	14.3	5.4
	2008-2015	10.2	9.2	2.0
	2011-2015	9.0	6.4	2.0
	2014-2015	5.3	-0.3	0.2
Russia	2005-2015	111.5	19.9	5.9
	2008-2015	109.7	13.9	2.5
	2011-2015	108.7	12.8	0.7
	2014-2015	107.5	5.2	0.4

Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the central banks and statistical agencies of the respective countries.

In recent years, the monetary authorities of some EAEU countries have adjusted their policies: transitioned from a currency band to a floating exchange rate with a switch to inflation targeting (Kazakhstan, Russia), abandoned regular currency interventions (all countries), introduced a key rate

⁵ See: Zh.G. Golodova, Yu.S. Ranchinskaya, "Tsentralnye banki stran Tamozhennogo soyuza: kriterii i podkhody k otsenke nezavisimosti," *Natsionalnye interesy: priority i bezopasnost*, No. 41 (278), 2014, pp. 2-13.

(Russia) or a base rate (Kazakhstan), etc. As a result, the trend toward the depreciation of national currencies continued. In 2014 and 2015, the most significant decline in the value of the national currency was recorded in Belarus and Kazakhstan (see Table 5), with the head of state of Kazakhstan explaining this by requests from businesses and exporters.⁶ But such depreciation leads to an increase in the raw material orientation of the economy, an outflow of capital from the country and a loss of confidence in the national currency, ultimately fueling inflation.

Table 5

“Peak” Depreciation of EAEU National Currencies against the U.S. Dollar* (%)

Years	Armenia	Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Kazakhstan	Russia
2009	23	30		23	
2011		2.8 times			
2014	15	24	20	18	73
2015		56	29	86	29
2009-2015	1.6 times	8.4 times	1.9 times	2.8 times	2.5 times

* Determined as the rate of increase in the value of the dollar for the period.
Source: Compiled based on reports of the central banks of the EAEU countries.

All of this highlights the need to enhance the independence of the monetary authorities in developing and implementing monetary policy.

Discussion

Central bank independence is regarded by many authors as a key condition for improving the effectiveness of monetary policy. In foreign practice, priority was initially given to political independence, which was interpreted in terms of relations between the central bank and the government (A. Alesina), the procedure of appointment and dismissal of the bank’s senior officials, the existence of a requirement for government participation in the governing bodies of the bank, etc.⁷ Later on, researchers began to consider two aspects of independence: political and economic (G. Debelle, V. Grilli, D. Masciandaro, G. Tabellini). Political independence was understood as the exclusive authority of the central bank to set the final goal of monetary policy; the appointment of central bank officials and the development of monetary policy without government participation; and the existence of legislation establishing the special status and powers of the central bank. Economic independence was characterized by the bank’s powers to choose the instruments of monetary policy and

⁶ See: N. Nazarbaev, “Nazarbaev prizyvayet privykat k trudnostiam,” available at [<https://ria.ru/economy/20150820/1197587134.html>], 11 September, 2016.

⁷ See: L.V. Shkvarya, A.V. Strygin, V.I. Rusakovich, “Geo-economic Factors of an Intensification Development of Laos in Association of Southeast Asian Nation Conditions,” *International Review of Management and Marketing*, Vol. 6, No. 6, 2016, pp. 121-125; A. Alesina, “Macroeconomics and Politics,” *Macroeconomics Annual*, MIT Press, 1988, pp. 13-52, available at [<http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10951.pdf>], 10 December, 2016; S.V. Ryazantsev, I.S. Karabulatova, R.V. Mashin, E.E. Pismennaya, S.Yu. Sivoplyasova, “Actual Problems of Human Trafficking in Illegal Immigration in the Russian Federation,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (S1), 2015, pp. 621-626.

determine the extent of government access to central bank credit.⁸ Some authors (S.C.W. Eijffinger and J. de Haan) saw the central bank's powers in determining the goals and instruments of monetary policy, as well as its operational independence, as the most important characteristics of central bank independence.⁹

In this context, one can well understand Andrei Makarov, head of the Committee on Budget and Taxes of the State Duma of Russia's Federal Assembly, who said that "even though the Central Bank is a megaregulator, not everything depends on the Central Bank. It is simply that not everything falls within its mandate, but the key factor is that this interaction should not be detrimental to the independence of the Central Bank. The Central Bank's independence is the instrument that makes it possible to conduct this work."¹⁰ But then Makarov said that "one cannot live in the world and be free from society," and this can be interpreted as a kind of recognition of the impossibility of the Central Bank's complete independence.

The second issue being discussed is whether the central bank should set the goal/objective of ensuring economic growth. Of all EAEU countries, only Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Russia have banking laws establishing that the policy conducted by the monetary authority should promote long-term economic growth (sustainable development). Precisely such an approach has been expressed by Sergei Glazyev, advisor to the Russian president. He notes that during an economic crisis the monetary authority should not set the narrow goal of reducing inflation, but should aim to stimulate economic growth, including through a reduction in the key rate to the level of the average rate of return in the real sector of the economy.¹¹ In this connection, we believe that the central bank's primary objective should be price stability, while the other objectives should not be in conflict with it.

Conclusion

A transition to coordination of monetary policy elements in the EAEU countries at the present stage of their development is impossible because of significant differences in inflation rates, monetization ratios, and other financial and economic parameters.

For a transition to monetary policy coordination, the EAEU countries should amend their banking legislation so as to identify the primary objective of monetary policy; enhance the independence of the central bank by giving it exclusive authority to develop and implement monetary policy; and build relationships with the government in matters of appointment and dismissal of central bank officials, approval of reports, etc.

⁸ See: G. Debelle, S. Fischer, "How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?" in: *Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers*, ed. by J.C. Fuhrer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Conference Series, No. 38, 1995, pp. 195-221; V. Grilli, D. Masciandaro, G. Tabellini, "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries," *Economic Policy: A European Forum*, No. 6, 1991, pp. 341-392.

⁹ See: S.C.W. Eijffinger, J. de Haan, "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," *Special Papers in International Economics*, No. 19, 1996, available at [http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Special_Papers/SP19.pdf], 20 November, 2016.

¹⁰ Report by Andrei Makarov is available at [<http://www.komitet-bn.km.duma.gov.ru/site.xp/053053051124052048048050.html>], 11 December, 2016.

¹¹ See: S. Glazyev, "Nevernym kursom idyote, tovarishchi," available at [<https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2016/09/16/10197203.shtml>], 8 December, 2016.

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

**A PUBLICIST DISCOURSE OF
THE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS OF
THE CENTRAL FEDERAL DISTRICT OF
RUSSIA AND THE ISSUE OF TOLERANCE**

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A B S T R A C T

Today, the publicist discourse is best described as a polyvariant space of an interaction of linguistic and non-linguistic factors that determine the use of words and styles and their functioning.¹ Special attention should be paid to the addressees as active interpreters of electronic and printed publicist texts and to the “conflicting text” concept interpreted in the context of negative realization of the usual-stylistic complex. The necessity of the problem discussed is determined by the new tasks related to the texts and recently formulated by contemporary science, since the traditional paradigm, based on the mode of obligation, has been replaced with a new, post-modernist one, based on the mode of possibility. This global change presupposes an interest in the contemporary publicist discourse of Islamic organizations in the context of confrontation of the Christian and Islamic worlds. Externally, the media have arrived at a new level of subjects and presentation; internally, they are functioning at a new linguistic level. Today, the mass media shook

off their former ideological and official biases and taboos on particular subjects, while information sources became more numerous and more varied. In the last few years, the world of the media has changed structurally and economically; it relies on different sources of funding and looks different. Digital newspapers and information agencies can be described as a new element, which is steadily widening its audiences; they are determined to finally outdo the TV, especially where the speed of the delivery of news is concerned. So far, neither the interested structures of state power nor the expert community have offered a more or less adequate concept of confessional politics. The subject of our studies is further made germane by the need to identify the mechanisms and technologies of politicization of Islam to offer new ways and means of ensuring social and state security. The authors who investigate the ways ethnoconfessional conflicts are effected concentrate on the institutional discourses and actors (the academic and political circles and the media) and tend to ignore the space of electronic mass media that publish online discussions of their readers, the de facto independent level of constructing social conflicts.

¹ See: T.V. Chernyshova, *Sovremenny publitsisticheskii diskurs (kommunikativno-stilisticheskii aspekt)*, Textbook, AltGY, Barnaul, 2003, p. 178.

KEYWORDS: *publicist discourse, Islamic organizations, social and political processes, conflictogenity, methods of manipulation.*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Today, information has become one of the most vital ingredients in human life. The transfer to the digital form of information reflects the objective trend of the new spiral of civilizational development based on new information and telecommunication technologies, new requirements and a new mode of life.² Contemporary society perceives information as an “instrument used to remove the vagueness of knowledge in those who receives information about the state of the object or an event.”³

² See: L.P. Pidoymo, E.V. Buturlakina, “Sushchnost kategoriy ‘informatsionnoe obshchestvo’, ‘informatsionnaia ekonomika’,” *Sovremennaiia ekonomika: problemy i resheniia*, No. 4 (4), 2010, pp. 112-118.

³ See: L.E. Varakin, *Globalnoe informatsionnoe obshchestvo: kriterii razvitiia i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie aspekty*, International Communication Academy, Moscow, 2001, p. 43.

The electronic information society is brimming with all types of information; this means that we need differentiated diagnostics of these texts and their legal and linguistic expert assessment. This applies to the Islamic texts as well.⁴

We believe that the contemporary publicist discourse of the Islamic orientation is a kind of “religious de-ritualized discourse regarded as a syncretic entity with the inclusion of structures of different discursive formations allocated to pragmatic and sociolinguistic grounds.”⁵

Obviously, the religious component in the minds of Russian Muslims will grow. It is equally obvious that the generalized linguistic personality creates text paradigms since any social activity is realized through the texts and discourse in the first place⁶ (as one of the features of post-modernist thinking). This means that public consciousness of a certain period manifests itself in “the paradigm of texts,” that is, it realizes itself through certain meaningful invariants,⁷ paraphrased in specific members of the mass media paradigm. Verbalized as texts, confirmed by video and audio units of the electronic media, the value orientations are presented as certain approved attitudes, through which the subjects either become aware of their axiological closeness or reject the declared values.

Methods and Materials

Moscow has become the administrative center of the Muslims of Russia and their activities. The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of European Russia (DUMER) and the central body—the Council of Muftis of Russia (CMR) were recently joined by the central structures of the Coordinating Center of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (KTsMSK) and the Central Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia (TsDUM), the central structures of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Asian Part of Russia (DUM AChR), the Spiritual Administration of the Association of the Mosques of Russia and all Muslim charities and human rights organizations working in Russia. The creation of the Council of the Muftis of Russia as a center that coordinates the activities of all spiritual administrations of the Muslims of Russia suites the interests of the country’s extremely multinational Muslim community: it helps to establish the best possible interaction with the state institutions responsible for a unified and coordinated policy in the religious sphere.

The biggest Islamic publishing houses—Badr, Ummah, Ansar and Medina—work in Moscow; many of the Muslim newspapers are likewise published in the capital. DUMER and the affiliated organizations create the main TV and radio programs, related to everyday life of the Muslims of Russia. We have also analyzed the materials that appear on the Internet: www.Islam.ru; www.info-islam.ru; <http://islam-today.ru/>; <http://www.whyislam.to/>; <http://goloslama.com/>, etc. The Golos Islama (Voice of Islam) site was liked by 54 thousand of Facebook users, while Islam.ru site has gathered 14,861 supporters and 14,619 subscribers; the Islam-today page has 283,813 subscribers.

Constructive and consistent analysis of several key aspects of political linguistic technologies and political language can be found in the works of V. Kostetsky (“political” approach),⁸ Um-

⁴ See: N.D. Golev, “Ob ob’ektivnosti i legitimnosti istochnikov lingvisticheskoy ekspertizy,” in: *Iurislingvistika-3. Problemy iurislingvisticheskoy ekspertizy. Mezhdvuzovskiy sbornik nauchnykh trudov*, AltGU, Barnaul, 2002, pp. 14-29.

⁵ See: E.S. Tembotova, “Konfessionalniy internet-diskurs: recevoy zhanr ‘voprosy sviashchennosluzhiteliu’,” Ph.D. Thesis in Philology, Nalchik, 2012, p. 3.

⁶ See: S.G. Kara-Murza, *Manipulatsia soznaniem*, Algoritm, EKSMO Publishers, Moscow, 2009, p. 19.

⁷ See: I.S. Karabulotova, “Sovremenny elektronno-informatsionny diskurs kak indikator etnopoliticheskoy bezopasnosti: mezhetnicheskaya tolerantnost vs etnokonfliktogennost v XXI veke,” *Nauchnoe obozrenie. Seria 2: Gumanitarnye nauki*, No. 2, 2016, pp. 3-14; I.S. Karabulotova, G.M. Rakisheva, A.B. Abibulaeva, “Transkulturniy konflikt kak etnosotsialnaia devyatsia sovremenogo mira v epokhu globalizatsii,” *Nauchnoe obozrenie. Seria 2: Gumanitarnye nauki*, No. 4, 2016, pp. 3-18.

⁸ See: V.E. Kostetsky, “Politicheskaya ideologiya kak forma obshchestvennogo soznaniia,” in: *Elementy teorii politiki*, Rostov University Press, Rostov-on-Don, 1991, pp. 205-218.

berto Eco (semantic approach),⁹ Elena Shestopal (psychological approach),¹⁰ Harold D. Lasswell (instrumentalist approach),¹¹ Ruth Wodak,¹² Marina Gavrilova¹³ and Anatoly Chudinov (cognitive approach).¹⁴ The systemic, behaviorist, sociological and psychological approaches are used for the purposes of linguistic politological analysis of the influence of Islam on the Muslims' political behavior. We have also relied on forecasting, modeling and the general scholarly methods of induction, generalization and analogy, as well as the methods of analysis and synthesis, to reveal the object of the study in the variety of its essential manifestations. We have used certain elements of retrospective, comparative, systemic and structural-functional analysis, as well as the institutional method when dealing with the Islamic organization as a component part of civil society of Russia in its interaction and cooperation with other organizations and institutions.

Results

Symbols, ideas, images, intellect, and knowledge have moved to the fore as the main objects of management in information society. Information is interpreted as knowledge in constant motion and turnover; its component parts are collected, stored, processed, transferred and used (or can be used) by the social system. The mass media (and particularly the Internet) are involved in the general information processes. The authors of all sorts of publications that appear in the media are aiming not only at cognition of objects of reality, but also at their axiological interpretation and correlation with the universal cultural values—legal, political, moral, religious, esthetical, ethical, and artistic.

The analyzed sites employ five main strategies normally used to protect the image of Islam: concession, justification, excuse, rejection/negation, and correction.

Concession includes an admission of negative repercussions, acceptance of responsibility for the act, expression of regret or remorse, apology and begging pardon.

Justification is a strategy that relies on explanation: responsibility for the action is not denied, yet its negative nature is rejected. There are seven types of justification:

- (1) minimization (downplaying the harm done or rejection of harm altogether);
- (2) self-realization;
- (3) attack, directed at the accuser;
- (4) differentiation (reference to similar acts of others that the audience finds much more damaging);
- (5) reference to supreme authority;
- (6) reference to the highest political, moral and religious values;
- (7) damping (minimizing the negative impression produced by certain actions or diminishing the audience's negative feelings by fanning positive emotions about the actor).

⁹ See: U. Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts*, Indiana University Press, 1979.

¹⁰ See: E.B. Shestopal, *Politicheskaia psikhologia*, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2007, p. 432.

¹¹ See: H.D. Lasswell, "The Language of Power," in: *Language of Politics*, Cambridge (Mass.), M.I.T. Press, 1965.

¹² See: R. Wodak, *Yazyk. Diskurs. Politika*, Transl. from the English and German, Peremena, Volgograd, 1997, p. 139.

¹³ See: M.V. Gavrilova, *Politicheskaia kommunikatsia XX veka*, Izdatelstvo Nevskogo Instituta yazyka i kultury, St. Petersburg, 2008, p. 94.

¹⁴ See: A.P. Chudinov, "Metaforicheskoe modelirovanie obraza Rossii v sovremennom agitatsionno-politicheskom diskurse," in: *Yazyk. Sistema. Lichnost*, Urals State Pedagogical University Press, Ekaterinburg, 2000, p. 346.

By excuse, we mean an explanation in which the accused admits that what was done was negative, wrong or misplaced, yet rejects full responsibility. The Islamic publicist discourse uses five types of excuses:

- (1) lack of control (the actor had not enough knowledge or information was unavailable);
- (2) intention (it was an accident yet the intentions were good);
- (3) redistribution of responsibility;
- (4) excuse by minimizing the actor's involvement;
- (5) capability.

As a rule, the strategy of rejection is based on statements that neither the unacceptable behavior nor the situation itself took place, which means that the reproaches are misplaced.

We illustrated the strategies of apology common in the Islamic political discourse with two analyses of a creolized text that appeared on the site Golos Islama.py, designed to restore the tarnished reputation. There is a very clear "friend/foe" delineation in the section that is called "The Way They Live." Those who construct reality on the site rely on the clearly attributed lexemes with negative connotations: "slaughter," "accomplices of the killers who sit in the Kremlin," "refugees," "brutal Assadites," etc. ("People all over the world are trying to help the victims of the Aleppo slaughter," 16 December, 2016.) In one breath the authors explain the demonstrative cruelty of ISIS and hold forth about the politics that ruin Syria; they use explanations based on exclusive norms that appeal to abstract justice, motives, morals, and aims, the reliability of which cannot be verified. To minimize the negative effect Ikramutdin Khan, the author, relied on the strategy of transcendence and damping and wrote about the supreme values. He tries to avoid responsibility with the help of the following strategies: minimization, uncontrollability, and the rhetoric of good intentions. He either ignored the points the world community relied on to accuse ISIS or merely denied his involvement in what caused these accusations. He tried to create a positive image of ISIS to plant an image of a hero, resolved to valiantly defend his hearth.¹⁵ The publicist discourse of Islamic issues is closely connected with the new types of creative consciousness, typical of the postmodernist cultural paradigm that pays a lot of attention to language as the source of new information about the world. Using the methods of post-modernist esthetics, the authors shift the accent from meaningful aspects to the text proper and the means of its own formation.¹⁶

To overcome delegitimization by international communities and neighboring states, the author relied on the following strategies: avoidance of responsibility by talking about provocations; excuses (up to and including attacks on the opponents and transcendence); and corrective actions. The ISIS cannot avoid responsibility, yet its apologists attempt to minimize the negative effect through the strategies of transcendence and attacks directed against the accusers. Political apology can affect the way the audience perceives negative events or behavior; it can neutralize negative emotions and push to the fore everything positive connected with the accused subject.¹⁷ In Islam, common faith is the only defining norm, according to which the community's political life can be organized and which is invariably pushed to the fore. It is the cornerstone of political integration, social solidarity, economic assistance, and spiritual brotherhood.

¹⁵ See: I. Khan, "Liudi mira pytaiutsia pomoch zhertvam rezni v Aleppo," 16 December, 2016 [<http://golosislama.com/news.php?id=30738>], 16 December 2016.

¹⁶ See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

¹⁷ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

Discussion

Much has been written on the subjects discussed above. The whole body of available literature can be divided into several groups that scrutinize, in one way or another, the mega-conceptual phenomenon of Islam. The main trends of scholarly investigation of the subject are the theory of social construction of reality (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann)¹⁸ and a small number of theories, related to the ways ethnic conflicts are effected, postulated by the works of John Lederach, Jason Miklian, Prem Misir, Vladimir Malakhov, Gennady Osipov, Oleg Khukhlaev and others.¹⁹

It is impossible to analyze the Islamic publicist discourse²⁰ outside the theory of discourse founded by members of French structuralism and post-structuralism (Algirdas Greimas, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and others).²¹ Teun Van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer and several others have done a lot in the area of practical implementation of the methods of discourse analysis. Foreign (Karen Leonhard, Matt McDonald, Steve McKenna, Victor Taki)²² and Russian (Natalya Ipatova, Petr Meylakhs, Tatyana Ryabova, Pavel Romanov, Veronika Shcheblanova, Elena Yarskaya-Smirnova, etc.)²³ authors used discourse analysis to study social objects.

Conclusion

From the very beginning, Islam was a social movement and an ideological foundation of a Muslim state.

¹⁸ See: P. Berger, Th. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Penguin Books, 1966.

¹⁹ See: J.P. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1995; J. Miklian, *Nepal's Terre Constructing an Ethnic Conflict*, Oslo PRJO Publications, 2009, p. 18; P. Misir, "The Social Construction of Race-Ethnic Conflict in Guyana," in: *Governance, Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution*, Kingston Ian Randle Publishers, 2007, pp. 214–230; V.S. Malakhov, "Simvolicheskoe proizvodstvo etnichnosti i konflikt," in: *Yazyk i etnicheskii konflikt*, Gendalf, Moscow, 2001, pp. 115-137; G. Osipov, I. Karabulatova, G. Shafranov-Kutsev, L. Kononova, B. Akhmetova, E. Loskutova, G. Niyazova, "Ethnic Trauma and its Echo in Today's Mental Picture of the World among the Peoples of the Post-Soviet States: An Interethnic Conflicting Discourse Unfolding in Russia's Ethnolinguistic Information Region," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 87-94; O.E. Khukhlaev, "Prichiny etnicheskogo konflikta: postroenie sotsialno-psikhologicheskoy tipologii," in: *Etnopsikhicheskie voprosy teorii i praktiki*, MGPPU, Moscow, 2006, pp. 52-67.

²⁰ See: M.F. Karamreza, "Voprosy bezopasnosti v kontekste traditsionnogo i sovremennogo islamskogo diskursa," in: *Voprosy politicheskoy nauki. Materialy II mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii (St. Petersburg, iyul 2016)*, Svoe izdatel'stvo, St. Petersburg, 2016, pp. 2-6.

²¹ A.J. Greimas, *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982; J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1997; G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Colombia University Press, New York, 1994.

²² See: K. Leonard, "American Muslim Politics: Discourses and Practices," *Ethnicities*, Vol. 3 (2), 2003, pp. 147-181; M. Donald, *Media-diskurs: analiz media-tekstov. Issledovanie media i kultury*, The Institute of Applied Psychology "Humanities Center," Moscow, 2013. 264 pp.; M. McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 1994, p. 136; V. Taki, "Between Polizeistaat and Cordon Sanitaire: Epidemics and Police Reform during Russian Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1828-1834," *Ab Imperio*, No. 4, 2008, pp. 75-112; S. McKenna, "A Critical Analysis of North American Business Leaders' Neocolonial Discourse: Global Fears and Local Consequences," *Organization*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2011, pp. 387-406; M. McDonald, "Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001," *International Relations*, Vol. 19, 2005, pp. 297-320.

²³ See: N.A. Ipatova, "Diskursivnaia model professionalnogo soobshchestva," *Zhurnal sotsiologii i sotsialnoy antropologii*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 2009, pp. 82-93; I.S. Karabulatova, P.V. Barsukov, I.V. Akhmetov, O.V. Mamatelashvili, F.F. Khizbulin, "Network Wars' as a New Type of Deviation Processes in the Modern Electronic and Information Society in the Context of Social and Economic Security," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (S3), 2015, pp. 150-159; P. Meylakhs, "Diskurs v presse i press diskursa—konstruirovaniye problemy narkotikov v peterburgskikh SMI," *Zhurnal sotsiologii i sotsialnoy antropologii*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 2004, pp. 135-151; T.B. Ryabova, "Politicheskii diskurs kak resurs 'sozdaniia gendera' v sovremennoy Rossii," *Lichnost. Kultura. Obshchestvo*, Vol. VIII, Issue 4 (32), 2006, pp. 307-320; P.V. Romanov, V.V. Shcheblanova, E.R. Yarskaya-Smirnova, "Zhenshchiny-terroristki v interpretativnykh modeliyakh rossiyskikh SMI (diskurs-analiz gazetnykh publikatsiy)," *Politicheskie issledovaniia*, No. 6, 2003, pp. 144-154.

Thus, the Islamic publicist discourse can be presented as a table:

Table 1

Islamic Publicist Discourse

Sub-Genres of Islamic Publicist Discourse	Strategies	Tactics	Communicative Personality Type in Islamic Publicist Discourse
Information	Informing	Detailing, differentiation, instruction, confirmation, specification	Informer, consultant, mentor, member of the clergy
Explanation	Informing	Explanation, advice, pointing to the prospects, pointing to a positive result, reference to the source of information, recommendation, recommendation-instruction, argumentative explanation, quotes from the Koran	Informer, consultant, mentor, member of the clergy
Reasoning	Informing	Logical reasoning, quotes from the Koran, false reasoning, inducing reflection, explanation, mistakes correction instruction, recommendation, obtaining intermediary conclusions, assumption, reliance on the Koran, illustration, information, pointing to the source of help, improvisation	Informer, consultant, mentor, member of the clergy, expert in the laws of the Shari'a
Consultation	Informing, imperative	Personality psychology consultation, reasoning, explanation, pointing to the means of settling the problem, summing up, quoting from a competent source, advice, inducement to act, looking for a cause of the problem, assessment, instructing, inducing reflection, inducing positive psychological mood, inducing religious practices, inducing decision-making, pointing to mistakes, reduction formula of psychological moods, agreement, analysis, advice-recommendation, professionally oriented consulting (medicine, pharmacology, finances, law), reliance on the provisions of the Shari'a, informing, recommending, pointing to the means and methods of problem settlement, pointing to positive perspectives, assumption, explanation, ban, inducing independent decisions, suggesting consultation with experts, improvisation	Personality psychology consultant, medical and pharmacological consultant, financial consultant, legal consultant, mentor, keeper of the laws of the Shari'a
Advice	Informing, manipulating	Informing, recommendation, logical reasoning, pointing to the means of goal scoring, pointing to a good perspective, reference to recommended	Mentor, consultant, expert in the laws of the Shari'a

Table 1 (continued)

Sub-Genres of Islamic Publicist Discourse	Strategies	Tactics	Communicative Personality Type in Islamic Publicist Discourse
		literature, instruction-recommendation, admission of the freedom of choice, assessment of the situation, advice, specification, identification of the cause, advice-recommendation, pointing to the source of information, advice-instruction, explanation, advice-opinion, expression of personal opinion, accentuating true values	
Recommendation	Informing, imperative	Inducing activity, accentuating values, reflection inducement, warning, assessment, recommendation, aim setting, reference to the Koran, quoting, pointing to the means of scoring the aim, quoting from competent sources, quoting from the Koran/Bible, reference to competent sources, establishing feed-back, monitoring of results	Informer, consultant, keeper of the Holy Writ (the laws of the Shari'a), expert in the Holy Writ, expert in the laws of the Shari'a
Decision-making	Imperative manipulating	Informing, recognition of the freedom of choice, refutation, pointing to incompetence, recommendation, warning, advice, encouraging decision-making, definition of preferences, registering the state of affairs, assessment, inducing reflection, reliance on common sense, reliance on religious values, admission of problem ambiguity, rejection of an unjustified advice, shifting responsibility	Mentor, consultant, manipulator, expert in the laws of the Shari'a
Assessment	Assessing, informing	Expression of personal opinion, reference to competent assessment, inducing reflection, axiological reasoning, polar assessments, double assessment	Mentor, consultant, manipulator, expert in the laws of the Shari'a
Opinion	Assessing, informing, consolidating, imperative	Expression of personal opinion, transfer of confessional position, confirmation by quotes from the Koran/Bible, appealing to competent opinion, presentation of canonical position, assessment, demonstration of incompetence, pointing to ambiguous position on the issue, reference to opinion of others, open address to competent people, inducing reflection and assessment, confirmation of information, replacement of personal	Mentor, consultant, manipulator, expert in the laws of the Shari'a, erudite

Table 1 (continued)

Sub-Genres of Islamic Publicist Discourse	Strategies	Tactics	Communicative Personality Type in Islamic Publicist Discourse
		opinion with canonical position, identification of erroneous position, explanation, identification, agreement, inducement to act, order, pointing to positive results	
Permission and ban	Imperative, emotionally expressive	Information, consolidation, permission, ban, permission under certain conditions, ban under certain condition, explanation based on canonical point of view, consultations, recommendation, order, pointing to positive results, advice, implicit explanation, reference to the source of information, explanation, instructing, soft order, assessment, directions, inducing independent decision-making, reference to precedent, freedom of choice	Expert in the laws of the Shari'a, expert in the fundamentals of religious practice and the laws of the Shari'a, consultant, mentor
Confrontation, ironic statements, ridicule, insult, reproach	Confrontational, oppositional	Irony, ridiculing, caustic remark, irritation, insults, stressing negative states, irritation, vague insults, feedback, refutation of false statements, ascertainment of incompetence, explanation, reproach, ascertainment of illicit judgment, reasoning, quoting from the Koran, establishment of the state of affairs, information, advice, violation of the status, refutation, logical reasoning, charge repudiation	Expert in the holy Writ and religious practice, expert in the laws of the Shari'a and religious practice, mentor, consultant
Interpretation of the Holy Texts	Interpreting	Defining, translation, interpretation	Interpreter of the Holy Writ, mentor

Unfortunately, today there are no adequate theoretical instruments in the printed and electronic media, needed to analyze the ways and means used to stir up ethnoconfessional conflicts.

By way of assessing the degree of specification of the subject as a whole, we can say that with adequate number of general theoretical and historical works there is a certain scarcity of analyses of the applied aspects of activities of Islamic organizations involved in the political process in the Russian Federation.

THE ISLAMIC FACTOR AND THE POLITICAL PROCESSES IN TAJIKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

The confessional factor, as part of the political process, can act as a powerful catalyst to either stabilize a political region or destroy it. This subject has acquired special importance since social and state security depends, among other things, on the correct identification of the mechanisms and technologies of politicization of religion.¹ In the present geopolitical context, the problem and role of the Islamic factor in international relations has acquired global importance. It affects not only the relationships between individual states and political processes unfolding in the world but also domestic policies of many states.² The Islamic factor plays a fairly contradictory role in interstate relationships for the simple reason that in the Islamic world, the economically developed countries exist in close proximity to their poor and dependent neighbors. In fact, the ways the Islamic factor is revealed in the political space of the latter depend, to

a great extent, on the policies pursued by the former.³ Indeed, assistance, extended to poorer countries, may consolidate the Islamic factor and its role in the relationships between these states; it may also negatively affect domestic modernization and the extent to which these countries are involved in globalization.

A greater religious impact on the legal norms and social institutions affects the state's international contacts. By the impact of the Islamic factor on international relations, we mean the varied impact on bilateral and multilateral international relations. Political Islam that plays an important role in the political processes unfolding in Islamic countries adds vigor to the Islamic factor: the transnational Islamic projects are based on and realized through the ideology of political Islam.⁴ In this context, the studies of the historical aspects of the Islamic factor have become signally relevant.

¹ See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhristyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92.

² See: A.V. Tonkonogov, "Soznanie, dukh, razum: gomogennost i geterogennost fenomenov," *Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znania*, No. 2, 2012, p. 60.

³ See: I. Himelfarb, N. Esipova, "Exploring the Patterns of Religious Observance in Post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 37-57.

⁴ See: G.V. Osipov, A.S. Karabulatova, I.S. Karabulatova, "Mezhdunarodnye korporatsii s ispolzovaniem islamskogo bankinga kak otlichitelnaia cherta sovremennoy globalizatsii," *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Seria 2: Gumanitarnye nauki, No. 5, 2015, pp. 5-12.

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KEYWORDS: *Islamic factor, intra-confessional communications, political processes, Tajikistan.*

Introduction

Today, religious expansion in the world of politics is developing into an important factor of social and political life. It has added religious dimension to the political processes in many countries and plays a destructive role by stirring up political-religious conflicts and even terrorism. These realities have added importance to the studies of individual aspects of religious impacts on international relations. On the whole, an analysis of the influences of the Islamic factor on international relations of any country is a very complicated and multisided task.

Today, the Islamic factor is moving to the fore in the relationships between Muslim countries. In their studies of the Islamic factor, the Central Asian academic community mainly relies on the concepts, elaborated abroad and, therefore, ill-suited to the Central Asian context.⁵ So far, the region's religious situation and religious problems have not acquired an adequate interpretation.

Methods and Materials

There are three concepts that fully reveal the political context of the methodological construct of the studies of Islam and the related political processes. The dualistic concept concentrates on different natural and institutional-functional essence of politics and religion. The religiously oriented concept points to the common basis of religion and politics:

- (1) politics and Islam, as social institutions, share the function of management and regulation of social relationships;
- (2) there are common phylogenetic prerequisites, clearly demonstrated by their universality, inclusion and functional usefulness.

Ideology serves as a connecting link between Islam and politics. The compromising concept points to the primacy of the state in the sphere of interaction between politics and religion. There is an opinion that Islam can be involved in politics only in an open, democratic, multicultural society, founded on constitutionalized principles of international law.

Our study is based on interstate acts, laws and normative documents, provisions and doctrines of religious books, public speeches of the leaders of Tajikistan and the neighboring states, as well as international treaties and materials from ministerial and departmental archives and materials, supplied by the press, related to various aspects of influence of the Islamic factor on the relationships of the

⁵ See: L. Garusova, "America's Counterterrorist Struggle: The Islamic Factor and the Regional Context," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 7-17; V. Abdukhamitov, U. Mansurov, H. Nasirov, A. Chorshanbiev, "Liability for Religious Extremism in the Criminal Legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan and in the Modern Law of Foreign States: A Comparative Study," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 46-54; I. Bobokulov, "The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Regional Security in Central Asia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 56-66.

Republic of Tajikistan with other states. The materials of the current archives of the Executive Structure of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan proved to be especially useful.⁶

We relied on the methods of systemic, comparative, logical and historical analysis and political studies to examine religious ideas and analyze their impact on social and political life, and the political processes unfolding in Tajikistan as a Muslim Central Asian country. The Islamic factor, as a set of elements and social institutions that affect the relationships both inside and outside the country, can be investigated in a narrow or a broad context. This means that the methods of studies may vary.

Discussion

So far, the academic community has failed to pay adequate attention to the role played by the Islamic factor, its importance and impact on the political processes unfolding in Tajikistan and its relationships with other Muslim countries.

As a term, the “Islamic factor” has not yet received a uniform interpretation: it is seen as a threat, a sign of instability for some and as a cornerstone of social, political and cultural life of Muslim societies for others. Alexey Malashenko has offered the following: “Normally, the Islamic factor is interpreted as Islamic impact on public consciousness and ideology. This is first. Second, various political forces, including those in power, never hesitate to use Islam. Finally, it is used by the forces that look at themselves as Islamic; they are determined to attain power in order to establish the kind of governmental authority, which conforms to their idea of Islam, that is, the ‘Islamic state’ and, ideally, the Caliphate.”⁷ In his article “On the Benefits of Confidence-Building between Islamists and Secularists,” Arne C. Seifert has written: “In this study, the concept of the ‘Islamic factor’ will be used as a ‘terminus technicus.’ The concept refers to Islam, political Islam, the Muslim population, as well as Islamic organizations, parties, movements, etc.”⁸

The above suggests that the Islamic factor is not only represented by Islamic organizations and movements but also by structures, connected to Islam. From this it follows that the Islamic factor is:

- (1) a wide concept that covers Islamic law, Islamic tradition, Islamic education, etc.;
- (2) a political-religious category used to describe the impacts of Islam on the objects important, to different degrees, for its functioning in the political processes in contemporary Muslim society;
- (3) elements, symbols and subjects of religion, rather than the religion as a whole.

⁶ See: T.N. Nazarov, *Tadjikistan: ekonomicheskij rost, integratsia i regionalnoe sotrudnichestvo*, UI MID RT, Dushanbe, 2004; L.Yu. Gusev, “Sovremennye napravlenia sotrudnichestva mezhdu Iranom i Tadjikistanom,” *Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*, 21 November, 2012; V.V. Dubovitskiy, “Natsionalnye interesy Tadjikistana v ramkakh persoiazychnogo mira,” *Tadjikistan i sovremenniy mir*, No. 2, 2003, pp. 65-67; A. Sattorzoda, *Aktualnye problemy vneshney politiki Tadjikistana (Mnogovektornost v deystvii)*, Devastich, Dushanbe, 2014; Z.Sh. Saidov, *Vneshniaia politika Respubliki Tadjikistan na sovremennom etape*, Devastich, Dushanbe, 2006; F. Umarov, “Tadjikistan: sotrudnichestvo s vedushchimi mezhdunarodnymi islamskimi organizatsiami,” *Rossia i musulmanskij mir. Nauchno-informatsionnyy buleten*, No. 10, 2008.

⁷ See: A. Malashenko, “Islamskiy faktor v Tsentralnoy Azii,” available at [<http://www.cainfo.ru/article/actual-interview/544/>], 1 December, 2016.

⁸ A. Seifert, “On the Benefits of Confidence-Building between Islamists and Secularists,” in: *From Confidence-Building Towards Co-operative Co-existence in the Near East*, Hrsg. von Jean-Nicolas Bitter, Frédérique Guérin, Delia Rahmanova-Schwarz und Arne C. Seifert, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp. 13-32.

We believe that the Islamic factor, as a social and political phenomenon, appeared over one thousand years ago with the creation of Islamic civilization, with multiple periods of its dissemination across the world.⁹ Much has been already written in Russia and abroad about the Islamic factor as a multidimensional phenomenon that actively affects the ways many problems are dealt with, including the relationship between Tajikistan and other countries, the domestic and international relationships as a whole.¹⁰ Russian scientists and foreign researchers (Vladimir Dontsov, Nikolay Zhdanov, Alexander Ignatenko, Alexey Malashenko, Dmitri Malyshev, Vitali Naumkin, Tursun Sultanov and others) have written about the characteristics and impacts of the Islamic factor on the relationships between the countries of the West and East.¹¹

The works of these and other authors pay particular attention to the definition of the Islamic factor, the content of this concept, specifics of its manifestations in relationships between different countries and their social, economic, cultural and political life.¹² Different authors define the Islamic factor differently. Naumkin and Dontsov, for example, offer fairly broad interpretations and include the entire system of management, policy and international relations.

Other authors are more interested in the impacts of a country's religious institutions and the international Islamic organizations on current political, social and economic processes. Both approaches are present in Muslim countries as well. The Islamic factor, however, functions differently in Muslim countries and the secular Islamic countries, each of them having its own specifics. This makes the positions of Zhdanov, Ignatenko and Dontsov¹³ much more justified. The researchers consider the connections of Tajikistan with the Islamic world, including the role of the Islamic factor in addressing the problems of interstate relations.¹⁴

Abdullo Rakhnamo, in turn, has assessed the correlation between Islam and national security, and looked at the constructive and destructive impacts of the religious factor on the national security of Tajikistan, a secular state.¹⁵ Special attention was paid to the studying of the approaches of the Sunni and Shi'a theology to the character of statehood and forms of power. Today, when the Sunni-

⁹ See: I.S. Karabulotova, F.S. Sayfulina, "Mytholinguistic Interpretation of Sacral Toponym Astana in Sociocultural Practice of the Siberian Tatars," *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2015, pp. 303-310.

¹⁰ See: N.S. Esenamanova, *Islam v Tsentralnoy Azii v usloviakh globalizatsii*, Author's synopsis of Ph.D. Thesis, Bishkek, 2004; A.M. Dairova, *Islamskiy faktor v politicheskikh protsessakh Kazakhstana*, Author's synopsis of Ph.D. Thesis, Moscow, 2006; V.N. Ushakov, *Politicheskii Islam v Tsentralnoy Azii: osnovnye faktory i perspektivy*, Author's synopsis of Ph.D. Thesis, Moscow, 2009; Z. Khukmishoev, *Rol islama v politicheskikh protsessakh obshchestva (na materialakh Tadjikistana)*, Ph.D. Thesis, Dushanbe, 2007; A. Nanaeva, *Dvizhenie islamskikh fundamentalistov v iuzhnom regione Tsentralnoy Azii (Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan)*, Author's synopsis of Ph.D. Thesis, Moscow, 2009; D. Usmon, *Islamskiy faktor v politicheskoy protsesse Rossii i Tadjikistana (sravnitelnyy analiz)*, Author's synopsis of Ph.D. Thesis, Moscow, 2008.

¹¹ See: V.V. Naumkin, *Islam i musulmane: kultura i politika*, Articles, essays and scholarly papers of different years, Moscow, 2009.

¹² See: I.M. Gabdrifkov, I.S. Karabulotova, L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, "Ethnoconfessional Factor in Social Adaptation of Migrant Workers in the Muslim Regions of Russia," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (S4), 2015, pp. 213-223; Sh.Iu. Akramov, S.V. Ryazantsev, I.S. Karabulotova, F.Sh. Akramov, "Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe sostoianie sovremennykh tadjikskikh semey: effekt sotsialno-demograficheskikh posledstviy trudovoy migratsii iz Tadjikistana v Rossii," in: *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie i gumanitarno-filosofskie problemy sovremennoy nauki*, Vol. 2, Nauchny mir, Moscow, Ufa, Rostov on Don, 2015, pp. 44-49.

¹³ See: N.V. Zhdanov, A.A. Ignatenko, *Islam na poroge XXI veka*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1989; A.A. Ignatenko, *Islam i politika*, Collection of articles, Institute of Religion and Politics, Moscow, 2004; V.E. Dontsov, *Islam v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh*, Diplomatic Yearbook, Nauchnaia kniga, Moscow, 1997.

¹⁴ See: L.V. Shkvaryya, V.I. Rusakovich, D.V. Lebedeva, "Vneshneekonomicheskie svyazi Respubliki Tadjikistan s gosudarstvami Azii: sovremennye tendentsii," *Upravlenie ekonomicheskimi sistemami: elektronnyy nauchnyy zhurnal*, No. 6 (78), 2015, p. 12.

¹⁵ See: A. Rakhnamo, *Religioznaia partiia i svetskoe gosudarstvo (Problemy deiatelnosti politicheskikh partiy religioznogo kharaktera v usloviakh svetskogo gosudarstva)*, Irfon, Dushanbe, 2008; idem, *Islam i natsionalnaia bezopasnost v Tadjikistane*, Irfon, Dushanbe, 2011.

Shi'a contradictions have reached their peak, this aspect of our studies seems to have become especially and thoroughly pertinent. What was written by Khomeini and what his followers write today, demonstrates that the Velayat-e faqih (supreme power) concept is a new interpretation of the Shi'a concept of state power and the place of the Muslim clergy in it.¹⁶

Russian researchers from other countries of the region have written a lot on the subject. The works by Malashenko, Naumkin, Ignatenko, Landa, Zhdanov, Sjukijainen, Polonskaia and others deserve special mention.¹⁷ In one of her recent books, the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, has offered an interesting observation of the place the religious factor occupies in foreign policy and diplomacy and pointed out that religion and politics are inseparable: "Religion is a powerful force, but its impact depends entirely on what it inspires people to do. The challenge for policy-makers is to harness the unifying potential of faith, while containing its capacity to divide."¹⁸ In plain words, this means that Islam can be either a constructive or a destructive factor.

Results

Between the first year of independence and the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan and later, while the National Reconciliation Commission was functioning, the impact of the Islamic factor became one of the active elements of political processes of Tajik society, including the emergence of a religious party in a secular state.

A massive youth movement has developed in Tajikistan, very much like other public movements were developing in other post-Soviet countries.¹⁹ In Tajikistan, young people are more or less indifferent to politics; the majority of youth organizations function in Dushanbe. In the years of independence, there has been no powerful youth movement aspiring to political significance for several reasons.

- First, as could be expected, the low level of political self-organization, alienation from power, typical of Tajik society in general, affected the political behavior of the younger generation.
- Second, there were no unifying and viable ideas, capable of attracting youth.

Today, the unfavorable social milieu has made religion highly attractive for a large, and steadily increasing, number of young people: in Tajikistan, there are more than eight mosques per 1,000 people, while religious preachers from Afghanistan, helped by the umma's extreme poverty, make Islamic radicals out of the local young men.²⁰ While many, primarily developed countries, are struggling with

¹⁶ See: Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini, *Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e faqih* (Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist), Amire Qabir, Tehran, 2000.

¹⁷ See: A. Malashenko, *Islamskaia alternativa i islamskiy proekt*, Moscow Carnegie Center, Ves mir, Moscow, 2006; V.V. Naumkin, op. cit.; L.R. Polonskaia, A.Kh. Vafa, *Vostok: idei i ideologii*, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1983; A. Ignatenko, op. cit.; R.G. Landa, *Politicheskii islam: predvaritelnye itogi*, Institute of the Middle East, Moscow, 2005; N.V. Zhdanov, *Islamskaia kontseptsiia miroporiadka*, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Moscow, 2003; L.R. Sjukijainen, "Islamskaia pravovaia mysl o globalizatsii i perspektivakh politicheskogo reformirovaniia musulmanskogo mira," *Politia*, No. 4 (47), 2007; L.R. Polonskaia, "Sovremennye musulmanskie ideynye techeniia," in: *Islam: problemy ideologii, prava, politiki i ekonomiki*, Collection of articles, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1985.

¹⁸ M. Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs*, Harper/Collins Publishers, 2006, p. 66.

¹⁹ See: I. Karabulatova, I. Mkrtumova, Z. Polivara, B. Akhmetova, S. Galiullina, E. Loskutova, E. Abylkasymov, "Protest Behavior of Present-Day Russian Youth as Ethnosocial Deviation in an Ethnopolitical Conflict-Prone Situation," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 94-103.

²⁰ See: "Islam v Tadjikistane: traditsionny ili radikalny?" available at [<https://avestiec.wordpress.com/2009/08/16/>], 4 December, 2016.

the problem of a rapidly aging population, 70 percent of the population of Tajikistan is under 30, the average age being 25 years, while 35 percent (2.7 million) are between 14 and 30 years of age.

According to the National Program of Social Development of the Youth in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2013-2015, 55 percent of the country's youth are unemployed, the figure radically different from the officially declared 2.5 percent. The country badly needs new jobs to prevent further radicalization of its younger generation. Most of the households are badly hit by the nationwide social and economic problems that make labor migration the only option available.²¹

Today, according to official information, about half a million of the republic's citizens work abroad; independent sources quote a figure of over 1 million. This means that every year a quarter or even half of the able-bodied males stay away from their country for several months or even do not come home for several years. Tajik labor migrants prefer Russia, even though the social context there leaves much to be desired, with local authorities' refusal to help and the presence of violence and xenophobia.

Today, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, which operates legally in the republic, is one of the obvious signs of the presence of the Islamic factor that distinguishes Tajikistan from the other post-Soviet states. Hizb ut-Tahrir, the organization, banned in the Russian Federation, and the highly ambiguous Salafia movement figure prominently on the republic's political arena. The religious party, legally operating in the secular country, can be described as a unique experience of the realization of the government project of peace and national accord in the country that is called *Vahdati milli*—National Unity. It should be noted that the international terrorist organizations, determined to set up a worldwide caliphate, proceed from the ideology of al-Qa'eda and radical Islam, an alternative to globalization. This means that, clad in ideological garbs and based on the traditional ideological stereotypes, the alternative is designed to set up a society, ruled by the Shari'a. It has lost the remnants of tolerance and became absolutely uncompromising, especially when dealing with the West.²² The reality is even more frightening: the radically-minded part of the Islamic world has chosen terror as its most efficient instrument.

Conclusion

Experts treat the "Islamic factor" as a non-traditional scholarly term and one of the most topical issues in political science, international relations and religious studies. No recent academic work, related to the problem of the Islamic factor, have offered an explicit conceptual definition: they stopped at the border of Tajikistan, one of the Central Asian states.

It should be noted that in each case, the term "Islamic factor" demonstrates certain specifics, caused by the political and economic development level of each particular country, its history, culture and the ethnopsychological characteristics of its people.

In the context of the new geopolitical realities, we should pay particular attention to the rivalry between the Islamic countries, each wishing to promote its own values and ideologies. This means that the democratic institutions should double their efforts to prevent infiltration of the most extremist trends that exploit the Islamic factor in their political and geopolitical interests.

²¹ See: S.V. Ryazantsev, E.E. Pismennaya, I.S. Karabulotova, Sh.Y. Akramov, "Transformation of Sexual and Matrimonial Behavior of Tajik Labor Migrants in Russia," *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 10, No. 20, 2014, pp. 174-183.

²² See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulotova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

**RELIGION AND STATE:
INTERACTION AND
SOCIOCULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS
(THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC CASE STUDY)**

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ABSTRACT

The authors discuss the phenomena of religion and state in the context of various models of their interaction: a tandem, in which they cooperate as social institutions, and the model, in which there is freedom of religion and a political and legal field of conflict resolution, in order to arrive

at the analysis of the problems created by the diversity of cultural and religious trends in the world today.

They rely on the sociological poll, taken in Chechnia and the Northern Caucasus as a whole to define the sources of religious information.

KEYWORDS: *religion, statehood, secularization, transformation, polarization, religious absolutism, religious relativism and religious dialog.*

Introduction

The subject of our studies is highly topical, since globalization, rejected or even opposed, has become a reality to be dealt with. In the past, when social, cultural and informational interactions were slow, it was possible to separate the processes unfolding in different parts of the globe within the traditional dilemmas: East vs. West, North vs. South, tradition vs. civilization, and man vs. woman. The list can be even longer. Today we are witnessing the futile attempts to squeeze the variety of postmodernity into the frameworks of the traditional or civilizational thinking. The shifted borders of contemporaneity have given a rise to a new “world of the worlds,” interpreted as the co-existing cultural and political communities that pursue identical interests and clash in the limiting spaces of these interests.¹

The world, in which we live, may be defined as globalized, multicultural, multiconfessional and, in the final analysis, pluralistic. According to the assessments supplied by the Stiftung Weltbevölkerung Fund, by 1 January, 2015, the world population (7,324,782,000 people) consisted of Europeans (about 10% of the total), people born or living in Africa (15%) and in Asia (60%). Eight out of ten people identify themselves with a religious confession or group.² About 2.2 billion (32% of the total Earth’s population) are Christians; 1.6 billion (23%) are Muslims; 1 billion (15%) are Hindu, 500 million (7%) are Buddhists, while 14 million (0.2%) are Jews.³ These figures speak of a much higher than before level of religiosity of the contemporary people.

We have identified the human endeavor as the object of our studies, and the present and future of religions as our subject.

We have also identified the aim of our studies as registering the social and philosophical aspects and prospects of religion in the contemporary global environment and analyzed the sources of religious information of the respondents, using the Chechen Republic as the case study.

To achieve tangible results we have addressed the following tasks:

- (1) to analyze the role of religion in social life at the turn of the twenty-first century;
- (2) to explicate the attitude to the sources of religious information in the Chechen Republic as compared with other North Caucasian republics.

We have offered the following theses for further discussion of the status and role of religion in the modern state:

- (a) the place of religion in social life, described as secularization, transformation and polarization;

¹ A. Salgiriev, “Elity v politicheskom prostranstve Iuga Rossii,” *Nauka i biznes: puti razvitiia*, No. 9 (27), 2013, pp. 156-159.

² “Stiftung Weltbevölkerung Fund: By 1 January, 2015 There Will Be Nearly 7.3 Billion People Living on Earth,” available in Russian at [<http://tass.ru/obschestvo/1668253>], 22 June, 2015.

³ “Sociologists Have Calculated the Number of the Faithful: A Third of Those Living on Earth are Christians, a Quarter are Muslims,” available in Russian at [http://zn.ua/SOCIETY/sotsiologi_podschitali_kolichestvo_veruyuschih_na_zemle_bolshe_vsego_hristian_i_musulman.html], 22 June, 2015.

- (b) interaction between religion and statehood as one of the two models:
 - (a) a tandem of religion and state as social institutions and
 - (b) freedom of religion and a political and legal field of conflict resolution;
- (c) there are three paradigms that reflect the religious picture of our days, shaped by the demands of religious identity: religious absolutism, religious relativism and religious dialog.

The question is: What are the sources of religious information and which of the paradigms is the most important for people living in the Chechen Republic?

Three Approaches to the Role of Religion in Contemporary Society

There are three hypotheses related to the role of religion at the turn of the twenty-first century: secularization, transformation and polarization (cultural rupture). On the one hand, secularization limits the role of religion in contemporary society and, on the other, it demonstrates a transfer to a secular social model based on rational norms. It should be said that many authors do not perceive it as a general social trend.

Other authors have reassessed the theory of secularization to arrive at the religious transformation hypothesis⁴ and pointed out that religion is gradually squeezed out of its intended space; this leads to religious and spiritual eclecticism rather than eliminating religion altogether.

Ronald Inglehart⁵ used the results of sociological analysis to presuppose that people turn to religion partly because they need social and economic security. Economic development in the Western European countries raised the security level and removed many of the limitations in life styles and, consequently, promoted secularization and created demographic problems. In the developed countries, religion and family are not an absolute necessity; they are deprived of their axiological status as a guarantor of social success. On the other hand, in the developing countries, where the economic and social spheres are evolving and where the security level is dangerously low, people seek protection in their devotion to God. No wonder, religion is important in these societies; this also explains population growth and stronger family values.

A combination of a diminishing role of religion and decreasing population in the developed countries, and population growth, coupled with the high religious fervor, in developing countries, suggests a conclusion that at the turn of the twenty-first century the world has become more devout than before. According to Ronald Inglehart, this has caused a rift between secular and religious societies and provoked a stiff opposition from religious regions, in which domination by secular values is considered to represent a threat.

Religion, as a unique spiritual phenomenon, plays a certain social function, the importance of which may change.

In the last decade, the attempts to find a consensus within the two models of religion and state interaction described above have become obvious. On the one hand, harmonization of inter-ethnic

⁴ K. Besecke, "Beyond Literalism: Reflexive Spirituality and Religious Meaning," in: N.T. Ammerman, *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 169-186, available at [https://books.google.ru/books?id=DBGjoeHc_ZEC&pg=PA169lpg=PA169&dq=besecke+2007+beyond+literalism&q=&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false], 21 June, 2015.

⁵ R. Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies," available at [<http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5981.html>].

and inter-religious relationships might eliminate traditional (including religious) foundations of culture. Cultural diversity is responsible for the meanings of national traditions. This layer of religion and state interaction contains many problems, related to the inherent intentions of certain religions to dominate the political and legal arenas.

In this case, the sovereign state can be defined as the guarantor of continued cultural and national diversity. The national idea and ideology reveal their meaning in the context of the revived rejection of monoreligiosity for the sake of secular values. Contemporaneity is highly varied; the world's spatial and temporal variety cannot and should not be treated lightly by theologians, philosophers, religious and state leaders. It remains to be seen, whether they accept the diversity (religious diversity included), created by pluralism in the religious and other contexts of social life. Overall, contemporary pluralism includes three elements:

- (1) variety of groups, based on similar origins, statuses, interests and convictions;
- (2) interaction between these groups within the same society;
- (3) peaceful interaction between these groups.

This pluralist picture is not necessarily found in all societies; there are societies with homogeneous political ideologies or dominant religions.

There are countries described as "Islamic" because there Islam is the dominant religion, yet globalization challenges societies and its members with numerous alternatives; modernity offers alternatives as an inevitable and inescapable component. By no means (the use of force included) people can be deprived of the possibility to obtain knowledge about various lifestyles. They should be free in their choices and allowed to be guided by their convictions rather than submitting to force. The situation, however, remains tense. Each religion has its own requirements and confronts man with divine and inalienable truth. Each religion outlines the limits to be taken into account by its followers.

People are expected to live in harmony with the values of their religion; this means that each and every religion is not free from political dimensions.⁶ This is also true of each and every man and society as a whole and is not limited to the lifestyle, defined by their faiths. This is related to their attitude to God, themselves and others. On the other hand, in contemporary society, tension is avoided if the lifestyle of individual members of society gears toward the multitude of its varied interests. Open societies of the present day rest on the variety of legally coexisting ideas, world outlooks and religions. In this case, variety is a positive feature, since there are no social norms that reject any deviation as alien.

Three Paradigms of the Religious-Philosophical Discourse

All exclusions from the way of life and all bans should be well-founded and justified. This causes tension that should be defused. The question is: How? There are three different paradigms within the current religious philosophical discourse, their definitions being chosen by those who write about them. Here we have chosen the following: religious absolutism, religious relativism and religious dialog.

⁶ A. Salgiriev, "The Northern Caucasus: Tribal-Clan Structure of the Political Elites as a Factor of Political Tension," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2016, pp. 29-35.

Religious absolutism recognizes the only and final truth—the truth of its own doctrine—and dismisses others as brimming with errors and heresies. As can be expected, it recognizes only the transfer of people to the true religion, it endorses the possibility of this transfer and, quite logically, condemns the transfer from the true religion to other religions and world outlooks as treason.

Religious relativism accepts that other religions contain their own truths, that none of the religions occupy the center of the religious universe and that all of them are planets rotating around the sun of the absolute truth. This means that none of them can claim the monopoly on truth and that all of them have equal rights to it. There are no mistakes in religion in general. Islam insists that the truth belongs to it yet, as an Abrahamic religion, it recognizes and respects the prophets who figure in the Old and New Testaments. The negative feelings multiplying around Islam are engendered by all sorts of trends, determined to stir up extreme feelings of their followers.

Religious dialog, in its turn, accepts the claims for the truth of all religions; it relies on the absolute confidence of those who support the truth of their own religions, yet does not exclude a possibility of understanding the divine vision of other religions. The sides in the dialog do not try to remove the differences between the religions—they are merely inclined to discover possible truths in the beliefs of others.

This dialog does not avoid the ambiguous or even challenging issues: it treats them in the spirit of mutual compassion and respect. It admits religious freedom and relies on it. This means that the religious dialog, as a model of communication, points to the road along which contemporary societies will settle the problems taking account of religious diversity. Having lived through a long and painful process of learning the truth, the European societies arrived at an understanding that tolerance should complement religious freedom and that these ideas should become the values on the global scale. Such tolerance should not be construed to mean that each provision is right and that all of them should be accepted. Tolerance does not mean indifference: it is an active personal position that requires the widest possible analysis and the deepest of reflections.⁷

General Description of the Level of Religiosity in Modern Society (the Chechen Republic Case Study)

Religion is one of the forms of spiritual culture, within which an individual finds the foundations of symbiotic interaction in the world vs. man system. Religiosity is a type of world outlook that reflects the specifics of faith and consciousness; it is a way faith manifests itself in everyday life as a method of interaction of a religious individual with the general social and cultural milieu. A large-scale investigation of the level of religiosity of the contemporary North Caucasian society was carried out by the North Caucasian research laboratories headed by Khasan Dzutsev.⁸ The religious context of contemporary Russia is threatened by the extremist feelings of definite groups of people inside and outside the country. It needs close attention at all levels of state power to ensure Russia's security and

⁷ M. Betilmerzaeva, "Tolerantnost i ksenofobia skvoz prizmu etnicheskoy mentalnosti," in: *Rossia: tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiia*, A yearbook, Issue 3, Part II, INION RAN, Moscow, 2008, pp. 156-158.

⁸ Kh. Dzutsev, Z. Atabieva, S. Biragova, M. Betilmerzaeva, A. Dibirova, Z. Sultygova, L. Tutaeva, A. Khugaeva, B. Khubiev, T. Uzdenov, *The Current State of Studies of Religious Extremism, Main Trends of Studies in World Science: Sociological Analysis. Program and Materials of Mass Public Opinion Poll in the North Caucasian Republics, June 2015*, A monograph, ISPI RAN, Moscow; IPTs SOGU, Vladikavkaz, 2016, 467 pp. (in Russian).

territorial integrity, encountered by the post-Soviet alternative models of regional political systems and ideologies, aimed at the titular nations' monopoly in the process of building up bodies of power in the North Caucasian republics.⁹

In the 1990s, amid the widespread political, economic and cultural crisis in Russia, the ethnonational regions were plunged into a struggle of various groups of titular nations for power and property under the aegis of national and religious self-determination. As soon as the Soviet identity collapsed, the ethnonational and religious identities were revived, together with the old sores and old grudges, pushing the unsolved problems of the past into the new century. This caused a lot of discontent in the local communities. Much has been written¹⁰ about Chechnia as one of the focal points of bloodshed in the destabilized country. Akhmat Kadyrov had the following to say about this: "We pushed the people to the brink of disaster by our militarist policies, our persistent refusal to march together with other peoples and by our clinging to the delusion that we were the chosen people."¹¹

The events unfolding in the region in the 1990s were caused by the hitherto unknown political and religious disagreements among the Chechens. Political disagreements were settled due to the smart and skillful policies of Akhmat Kadyrov, the first President of the Chechen Republic, in close cooperation with Vladimir Putin. Religious disagreements, on the other hand, took hold in the spiritual practices and greatly affected the most vulnerable population groups, the younger generation in the first place. Today, the programs of spiritual, moral and religious education, designed to stem the extremist trends and prevent their spread, are actively realized in the Republic.

We carried out the above-mentioned public opinion poll to identify the place of the religious ideology and world outlook in contemporary Chechen society and establish the religiosity level of the Republic's population.

We relied on the materials obtained to identify the degree to which the religious feelings and religious ideas of the Republic's population and the vector of their development may stir up or contain religious extremism in the Republic. Our poll produced important results and led to important conclusions.

Content of the poll: identification of the sources of religious information in the Chechen Republic and the Northern Caucasus as a whole.

1. Many of us rely on different sources of information about religious beliefs and other issues (see Table 1). How frequently does the population of your republic use such sources as radio, TV, compact discs, audio cassettes, MP3 players, discs, printed sources, social networks, etc. to obtain this information: frequently, from time to time, rarely or never?
2. To which extent does the Republic's population trust religious information, supplied by family members, acquaintances, friends, religious leaders, scholars, journalists, radio and TV anchors, political leaders?

Table 2 shows that the majority of the polled respondents trust their families rather than friends, acquaintances and religious leaders when it comes to religious information; this is a very good sign. At the same time, the fact that the journalists, radio and TV anchors and bloggers are seen by 35.4 % of the polled as unreliable sources of religious information gives food for thought.

⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁰ Sh. Gapurov, I. Baykhanov, U. Rassukhanov, "National Reconciliation in the Chechen Republic—a Great Achievement of Akhmat-Haji Kadyrov," in: *Peaceful Processes in the Caucasus (Fourth Kadyrov Readings). Collection of documents of the All-Russia scientific-practical conference with international participation dedicated to the 65th birth anniversary of First President of the Chechen Republic, Hero of Russia A.A. Kadyrov, Grozny, 8 September, 2016*, AN ChR Publishing House, Grozny, 2016, pp. 4-5 (in Russian).

¹¹ A. Kadyrov, *Vybor puti*, Grozny, 2005, p. 167 (see also: Sh. Gapurov, I. Baykhanov, U. Rassukhanov, op. cit., p. 4).

Table 1

Share of Respondents Who Rely on Different Sources of Religious Information, %

	Information Sources	Frequently	From Time to Time	Rarely	Never	Undecided	Refused to Answer
1.1.1.	Radio and TV	28.8	28.3	23.2	18.2	1.5	—
1.1.2.	Compact discs, audio cassettes, MP3 players, videos, DVDs	6.6	22.2	20.2	49.0	1.5	0.5
1.1.3.	Printed sources (journals, books, leaflets)	21.2	30.8	34.3	12.1	1.5	—
1.1.4.	SMS	11.6	24.7	20.2	41.4	0.5	1.5
1.1.5.	Social networks Facebook, Twitter, etc.	11.6	22.7	21.7	43.4	0.5	—
1.1.6.	Other Internet resources (blogs, sites, video-swapping sites)	15.7	21.2	20.7	40.9	1.5	—
1.1.7.	Religious services or group meetings	8.6	23.2	28.3	38.9	1.0	

Table 2

Share of Respondents Who Trust, to Different Degrees, People as Information Sources, %

	Information Sources	Most Unreliable	2	3	4	Most Reliable	Undecided	Refused to Answer
1.1.8.	Family members	6.1	6.1	9.1	16.2	61.6	0.5	0.5
1.1.9.	Acquaintances, friends	6.6	19.7	28.3	23.2	20.2	1.0	1.0
1.1.10.	Religious leaders	9.1	9.1	19.7	20.7	34.8	5.1	1.5
1.1.11.	Scholars	8.3	7.3	21.2	39.9	1.6	1.6	0.5
1.1.12.	Group/political/community leaders	28.8	18.7	14.6	14.6	19.2	3.0	1.0
1.1.13.	Journalists, radio and TV anchors, bloggers	35.4	14.6	16.2	13.1	15.7	3.0	2.0

3. Please indicate to which extent you agree/disagree with the following: “I depend on people, who closely follow what the media say about religion to understand what is important and what is trivial.”

It turned out that the polled respondents relied on their own opinion when dealing with religious issues: 49% of negative answers to the above statement (see Table 3).

Table 3

Share of Respondents Who Rely on the Opinion of People Who Follow the Media for their own Opinions about the Importance of Information, %

Agree	18.2
Neither agree nor disagree	21.7
Disagree	49.0
Undecided	7.6
Refused to answer	3.5

Table 4 demonstrates to which extent the North Caucasian nations accept radio and TV as sources of religious information. It turned out that the respondents in the Chechen Republic trust radio and TV to a much greater extent than their neighbors, while the respondents in Karachaevo-Cherkessia are least of all inclined to trust these information sources. However, the respondents, on average, are inclined to trust this information source.

Table 4

Share of Respondents Inclined to Trust Radio and TV by Different North Caucasian Ethnic Groups, %

	Nationality						
	Russians and Russian speakers	Kabardians and Balkars	Karachays and Circassians	Peoples of Daghestan	Ingushes	Ossets	Chechens
Often	20.6	26.7	10.6	17.9	16.5	25.6	28.8
From time to time	31.7	34.8	34.1	20.1	33.9	36.4	28.3
Rarely	29.4	25.2	40.9	33.5	28.0	23.3	23.2
Never	17.2	13.3	14.4	28.5	22.0	14.0	18.2
Undecided	1.1					0.8	1.5
Refused to answer							

Conclusion

The two models of interaction between religion and state demonstrate an active cooperation of the religious and state institutions in some countries, on the one hand, and, on the other, an absolutely independent functioning of religious and state institutions in the legal venues of other countries.

Globalization and radicalization of the religious institutes threaten cultural diversity. The tension, which is very obvious at the world level and in certain countries, can be removed only through a dialog between state and society within the legal domain. We should study the world outlook of a contemporary man and create a legal environment that needs a civil society to become real.

Our poll was intended to clarify the place of religious ideology in the world outlook of contemporary Chechen society and the level of religiosity of the Republic's population.

The poll's results led us to identify the extent of the religious feelings and principles of the Republic's population and their developmental vectors, and establish whether they can stir up or contain religious extremism in Chechnia.

The results of the public opinion poll suggested the following: among the Chechens, 28.8% believe radio and TV to be the most trusted sources of religious information (see Table 1), that is, slightly more than a quarter of the Republic's population. Only 6.6% turn to compact discs, audio cassettes, MP3 players, videos and DVDs in search of religious information, while 49.0% does not trust them at all. The majority of the polled turn, from time to time, to printed media, books and leaflets, while the social networks on the Internet (Facebook, Twitter) and other Internet resources (blogs, Internet sites and video-swapping sites) are not that popular. Strange as it may seem, only 40% of the respondents treated religious services and group meetings as the source of information.
