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REGIONAL POLICY

EVOLUTION OF
CONTEMPORARY CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY:
LEGACY AND INNOVATION

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A B S T R A C T

The paper discusses the conceptual foundations of China's international policy. It traces the phases of establishment and evolution of the PRC's foreign policy agenda under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. A note is made of the fact that in the early 1990s the taoguang yanghui strategic principle (stay in the shadows, keep a low profile, avoid being in the forefront) determined the foreign policy agenda of the PRC in the period of reforms and openness, associated with the implementation of "four modernizations" and "the open-door policy." The legacy of the foreign policy agenda is examined, with emphasis on concepts of a peaceful development path, protection of essential interests, and the soft power poli-

cy. The third generation of PRC leaders had proposed the "new security system doctrine," which carried over to the next generation's policy, where PCR security was considered directly dependent on the peaceful development principles. The issue of developing harmonious diplomacy as the foundation of the PRC's soft power emerged. The foreign policy was not meant to be limited to passive support of external conditions favorable to Chinese reforms, but aimed to actively counteract the U.S. and other states in their attempts to thwart the rise of China. Western researchers refer to this policy as "the global prevention of external threats." The concepts of "China's peaceful rise" and "China expanding beyond its borders" were based on the idea of development models' variability, support of global stability and the creation of conditions for "universal prosperity," which is, first and foremost, in the best interests of developing countries. According to Xi Jinping, strengthening and develop-

ment of relations with developing countries is the initial and the final points of PRC's foreign policy.

The paper notes the distinctive features of the foreign policy pursued by the "fifth generation" of PRC leaders, their proposals on creating a new model of international relations, which is based on mutually rewarding cooperation. The practical realization of this agenda took shape in China's design and implementation of a far-reaching strategy called One Belt, One Road, which integrates major geopolitical infrastructural projects, namely, Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It has been observed that the basic premise of contemporary foreign policy is China's eagerness to share its success with other countries, particularly with China's regional neighbors. One of the seminal principles, namely, cooperation, has to be implemented on the basis of positive interaction, mutual rewards, and collective benefits.

Introduction

Deng Xiaoping's modernization concept, which comprised the notion of an independent and self-reliant foreign policy, has for a long time remained at the core of China's foreign policy doctrine, aiming principally for China's accelerated economic development. The *taoguang yanghui* strategic principle (*stay in the shadows, keep a low profile, avoid being in the forefront*), proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s, has determined PRC's foreign policy agenda during the period of reforms and openness, which was associated with the implementation of "four modernizations" and "the open-door policy." In the early 2000s, this agenda was augmented by the globalization of economy, protection of private property rights and gradual political liberalization, the establishment of a new model of relations with the international community, especially with the U.S. and the EU, on the basis of threat globalization and security interest principles. An open economic policy is implemented in the PRC, and territorial openness, or the development of regions with preferential foreign investment terms, is an integral part of it. Meanwhile, the *taoguang yanghui* principle in foreign policy has gradually begun to cause antagonism in military and expert circles. According to a number of Chinese experts, China can now easily come out of the shadows, propose its initiatives to the world and challenge the international leadership of the U.S. Many Chinese military experts have begun talking about the obsoleteness of the conflict avoidance and maneuvering approach. Their suggestion is not to be

afraid of the conflicts, not to avoid them, but, on the contrary, to adopt a tough assertive stance, since today China is able to retaliate against any enemy.

Subsequent PRC leaders offered their own concepts, which exacerbated and efficiently developed Deng Xiaoping's fundamental principles. In particular, the "third generation" of Chinese leaders, headed by Jiang Zemin, has founded its policy on the new security system doctrine, which was sustained in the political agenda adopted by the fourth generation of PRC leaders. Hu Jintao suggested that PCR security is directly dependent on peaceful development principles. In April 2006, in his address at Yale University Hu Jintao had for the first time attempted to integrate the harmonious values of the Chinese tradition, PRC's contemporary objectives and the country's foreign policy. Meanwhile, the PRC leader emphasized that China had always valued social harmony and will continue to counteract the attempts "to impose values and civilizational structure on other countries." Experts have taken this statement as the beginning of a hardline confrontation with the U.S. and its "hard power" of promulgation of its values.[1]

An important postulate at the core of the PRC's focus on the country's transformation into one of the world's political and economic centers is the idea of integrated state power. It is based on the concept that in the modern world a state's power and its influence on the international arena is determined not merely by its military potential, but also by the level of economic, sociocultural and scientific and technological development, as well as a measured foreign policy agenda. Chinese experts consider the relative shift of emphasis to a competition in aggregate state power to be the distinctive feature of the new world order formation. This power is defined as the integrated indicator of the country's economic, political, military, scientific and technical potential, which comprises an aggregate of factors that determine a country's ability to develop, counteract challenges, external pressure and disintegration processes, assert its value system, etc.[2]

In the late 1990s, PRC leaders have made adjustments to the country's foreign policy. From that time on we can speak of the formation of Beijing's foreign policy strategy as an integrated complex of measures that aim to implement global good neighborliness. Priority of domestic development objectives was previously emphasized by PRC. In the late 1990s, the foreign and domestic political aspects have leveled off in significance. Foreign policy was supposed not only to passively support external conditions favorable for Chinese reforms, but also actively counteract the U.S. or other countries in their attempts to thwart the rise of China. Western researchers refer to this policy as the global prevention of external threats.[3] This policy was examined not only in a military and political context, but in the process of structuring the international system and changing China's place in it.

Chinese scientists have begun to use an entirely new ideologeme, which is directly related to the foreign policy sphere, namely, *China expanding beyond its borders*. Its introduction to the current political lexicon is linked to the anticipated increase of China's international economic and political competitiveness and a rise in its global and regional activity.[4]

Researchers draw attention to the numerous examples of China's growing influence in Southeast Asia, where Beijing sends its best diplomats and a significant amount of economic aid. The poorest countries in the region, such as Cambodia, Laos or Myanmar, have received hundreds of millions, and sometimes even billions of dollars over the course of several years. In order to raise the efficiency of its economic assistance, Beijing created an agency within the Chinese government, which is responsible for development assistance. The agency experts successfully coordinate their

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[1] See: *Renmin ribao*, 26 April, 2006.

[2] See: M. Krupianko, L. Areshidze, "Novaia rasstanovka sil v Vostochnoi Azii: znachenie dlia interesov bezopasnosti Rossii," *Vostok*, No. 6, 2003, p. 27.

[3] See: A. Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *The China Quarterly*, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864.

[4] See: "The Decisions of the 16th Congress of the CPC," *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1, 2003.

projects with China's specific foreign policy objectives. For instance, the Chinese government generously finances internships and language training for the members of state authorities and nongovernmental organizations of Indochina and the Asia-Pacific Region.

Beijing has attained impressive results by practicing soft power in Southeast Asia over the last decade. As high-level officials from small and medium-sized member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) admit, their governments are always sensitive to China's opinion when making decisions at ASEAN negotiations. This occurs regardless of the fact that one of ASEAN's chief aims is to reduce the influence of great powers, including China, in Southeast Asia.[5]

After Hu Jintao's administration took office, new accents emerged in the work on establishing the image of China. Increasingly more often Chinese ideologists turn to the concept of soft power (*ruan shili*) introduced by the American scientist Joseph Nye,[6] which implies the utilization of non-material power resources of cultural and political ideals for the purpose of influencing the behavior of people in other countries, unlike the hard power exerted by weapons or money. The transformation of this concept, borrowed from American political science, into a component of official party policy occurred at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China, where an appeal sounded in Hu Jintao's Report to "increase the cultural soft power of the state."[7] One of the sources of PRC's soft power should be harmonious diplomacy based on the ideas of diverse development patterns, maintenance of global stability, and creating the conditions for universal prosperity, which is, first and foremost, in the best interests of developing countries. Concepts of China's peaceful rise (*zhongguo jueqi*) and construction of a harmonious world (*jianshe hexie shijie*), adopted by the Hu-Wen tandem, have produced generally positive results,[8] however, just prior to the 18th CPC Congress the tandem's foreign policy was criticized. Moreover, critical remarks sounded both in the Western media and Chinese dissidents' blogs, and in party periodicals. For instance, the article penned by Deng Yuwen, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Xuesi shibao,* published by the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, referred to the foreign policy agenda of fourth-generation leaders as "fire-fighting and aimed at maintaining stability." He believed that the key problem was in the inability to take advantage of the opportunities that the major shifts in the international situation afforded, and the fact that, as a result, the proposed international order alteration concepts were not implemented. All in all, this led to the passivity of Chinese diplomacy, which "only had goals and principles, but lacked strategic planning and a defined agenda." The root of these problems may be traced to the adherence to Deng Xiaoping's concept of staying in the shadows and trying to remain invisible (*taoguang yanghui)*, which not only led to the worsening of China's position on the international arena, but also significantly shattered its citizens' trust.[9]

The *methodology* of foreign policy research is based on a multifactorial analysis of global and regional political events and specific elements of foreign policy structure, in which three models of foreign policy analysis are distinguished:

    I   — classic, where it emerges as the result of conscious, goal-oriented, rational choice-best activity of the actor (entire states, governments and/or their leaders);

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[5] See: J. Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, p. 224.

[6] See: J. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004.

[7] Quoted from: D.A. Zhirnov, *Rossia i Kitai v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh*, MGIMO (U), Moscow, 2002, p. 33.

[8] For more details, see: K.L. Syroezhkin, *Nasledie tandema "Hu-Wen" i "piatoe pokolenie" kitaiskikh rukovoditelei*, KISI under the President of RK, Almaty, 2013.

[9] See: Deng Yuwen, "The Hu-Wen Political Heritage," *Caijing*, No. 22, September 2012, available at [http://www.magazine.caijing.com.cn/] (in Chinese).

II — the impression of foreign policy as a result of a complex of organizational actions and processes;

III — foreign policy as a result of political bargaining held by state agencies and their leaders, which occurs within the government, as well as in its relations with lobbyists.

These models reflect the evolution of relevant theoretical thought, and reveal a new dimension in foreign policy analysis.

Research Findings

Aspects of Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Agenda

The growing power of China and its foreign policy ambitions, the rise of Han nationalism in the context of the shifts in the international climate and the exacerbation of the situation in the South China Sea, as well as the development tendencies in the domestic socioeconomic and political environment, required not only a new development strategy to be elaborated, but new foreign policy priorities to be set.

Although fifth-generation leaders did not dismiss their predecessors' best foreign policy practices, leaving them in their repertoire, they proposed both new foreign policy approaches and an entirely new position for China on the international arena. The new approach was defined by Xi Jinping as early as in January 2013. He made several meaningful proposals in his address at the third collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC, which was devoted to foreign policy issues.

- The first thing he emphasized was the need to subordinate China's foreign policy to its internal development interests. These are the attainment of the goals of the "two centenaries,"[10] proposed at the 18th Congress of the CPC, and the fulfillment of the Chinese dream—the great revival of the Chinese nation. In order to attain these goals, China needs peace to provide the conditions for its internal development.

- The second point he underscored was that while China will continue to follow the path of peaceful development, it will never relinquish its lawful rights, or sacrifice the country's essential interests. No state should count on China trading in its key interests, or "swallowing the bitter fruit that infringes on the China's sovereignty, security and the interests of development."[11]

- The third basic principle of the fifth-generation leaders' foreign policy is China's eagerness to share its success with other countries, especially with China's regional neighbors. One of the fundamental postulates is that cooperation should be implemented on the basis of positive interaction, mutual rewards and joint benefits.

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[10] The first aim is to establish a well-rounded, moderately prosperous society by 2021 (100th anniversary of the CPC). The second aim is to create a rich, prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmoniously modernized socialist state by 2049 (100th anniversary of PRC), and the attaining the great Chinese national revival over the course of the 21st century.

[11] See: "To Conduct Domestic and Foreign Policy Planning More Better and in a Uniform Way, To Strengthen the Foundation for Pursuing Peaceful Development" (28 January, 2013), in: Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*, Foreign Languages Press, China, 2014; Idem, "To Conduct Domestic and Foreign Policy Planning More Better and in a Uniform Way, To Strengthen the Foundation for Pursuing Peaceful Development," *Xinhua Wang*, 29 January, 2013, available at [http://cpc.people.com.cn/] (in Chinese).

■   In the fourth place, China believes that there is no universal development model or a uniform development path in the world. That's why the following should become the foundation of its relations with other countries:

— respecting the rights of each Party to make an independent choice of its social structure and development path;

— respecting every country's approach to the advancement of economic and social development;

— establishing confidence in the strategic agenda of the other Party;

— supporting each other in essential issues that arouse the other Party's concerns.

Finally, considering the fact that the international security system is in the midst of a crisis, and the international institutes designed to ensure security are practically dysfunctional, China is proposing a new security system that stipulates universality and equality for all. According to fifth-generation leaders, "no country should lay claim to the monopoly of regional security-related affairs to the disadvantage of other countries' lawful rights and interests."[12]

These are the general principles of the new Chinese diplomacy. However, relations with different groups of countries and in each direction of China's foreign policy activity have their special features. In his 27 June, 2013 address at the second World Peace Forum at the Tsinghua University the Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi, specified seven directions of China's foreign policy work:

(1) building a new type of rapport between great powers;

(2) creation of a peaceful and stable environment with neighboring countries;

(3) establishing rapport with developing countries on the basis of the notions of fairness and incentives;

(4) furthering reform and openness policy;

(5) active participation in resolving international and regional problems, formation of a new world order;

(6) asserting objectives and principles of the U.N. Charter and recognized statutory norms of international law;

(7) protection of legal rights of Chinese citizens abroad.[13]

In November 2014, Xi Jinping took the stage at the Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC on international operations, the first such conference since 2006. In his address, he noted that the basic international trends remained the same as in the 1980s—multi-polarity, economic globalization, peace and development, the need to reform the international system, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Chinese leader had also emphasized that China "is at a critical stage in accomplishing a great national revival," in the course of which the interdependence between China and other countries became particularly strong. He also stated that China's increased power should

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[12] See: Wang Yi, "China Appeals to the Southern Pacific States to Share Trust, Common Interests, and Mutually Rewarding Cooperation," *Renmin ribao*, 24 November, 2014 (in Chinese); "Keep Up with the Time, Promote Peaceful Development on the Planet," 23 March, 2013, in: Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*; "Kommentarii: Kitai gotov delitsia blagami svoego ekonomicheskogo razvitia s sosednimi stranami," Xinhua Agency, 3 November, 2013, available at [http://www.russian.xinhuanet.com/].

[13] See: Wang Yi, "A Search for a Diplomatic Approach with the Chinese Characteristics of a Great Country," *Guojiwentiyanjiu*, No. 4, 2013, pp. 1-7 (in Chinese).

become an element of its new foreign policy.[14] According to Xi Jinping, sustaining and furthering rapport with developing countries is the initial and the final point of Chinese foreign policy. For instance, in his address at the U.N. Headquarters in New York (26 September, 2015) the Chinese leader stated that South-South cooperation is a model of interaction characterized by solidarity and mutual assistance.[15]

The Chinese leader placed particular emphasis on the need for a consistent expansion of the role that U.N. and the U.N. Security Council hold in ensuring peace, for which purpose he proposed to strengthen the enforcement component along with the political and diplomatic vector of the organization's work. To that end, Xi Jinping revealed China's decision to establish a China-U.N. Peace and Development Foundation, pledging $1 billion for U.N. needs. In addition, China decided to join the new U.N. peacekeeping mechanism, and create a specialized military unit comprising 8,000 people which could be used for U.N. peacekeeping purposes when necessary.[16]

In his first address at the annual U.N. General Assembly debates (28 September, 2015), Xi Jinping has called to create a new model of international relations based on mutually rewarding cooperation. Having noted that the U.N. Charter objectives have not been attained yet, Xi Jinping appealed to aim more efforts at attaining peace and development in the 21st century: "We have to confirm our commitment to the goals and principles of the U.N. Charter, establish a new type of international relations, which is founded on mutually rewarding communications and create a 'common fate community' for all humankind."[17] On 17 January, 2017, Xi Jinping participated in the opening of the annual session of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and delivered the keynote address entitled *Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth*.

- First of all, Xi Jinping underscored that economic globalization gave a powerful impulse to global economy. Simultaneously, globalization had brought new problems, but simple shift of the blame for the troubles that afflict the world will not assist in their resolution. According to Xi Jinping's opinion, we have to adapt and direct economic globalization, eliminate its negative factors and strive for it to become beneficial to countries and people.[18] Xi Jinping appealed to world leaders not to reject globalization, but to reformat it since, according to him, countries need to be treated more equally in the process.[19]

- Secondly, the Chinese leader remarked that after 38 years of reforms and openness China has already become the second largest economy in the world, and has attained great results. Additionally, Xi Jinping noted that China's development is an opportunity for the world. China does not merely benefit from economic globalization, but also makes an outstanding contribution to this process.

- In the third place, Xi Jinping stated that since the One Belt, One Road initiative was proposed, it was supported by over 100 countries and international organizations. Over 40 countries and international organizations have signed cooperation agreements with China. The amount of

[14] Quoted from: M.Yu. Korostikov, "Dinamika vneshnei politiki KNR cherez prizmu natsionalnykh interesov," *Comparative Politics. Russia*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2016, available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2016-7-4(25)-108-126].

[15] See: "Xi Jinping podcherknul vazhnost sotrudnichestva Yug-Yug," 27 September, 2015, available at [http://russian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0927/c31520-8956033.html].

[16] See: "Kitai neuklonno podderzhivaet mirotvorcheskie operatsii OON i zashchishchaet mir vo vsem mire," 13 September, 2015, available at [http://russian.people.com.cn/n/2015/0930/c31521-8957217.html].

[17] See: "Predsedatel KNR predlozhil novuiu model mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," 29 September, 2015, available at [http://russian.news.cn/2015-09/29/c_134671129.htm].

[18] See: "Xi Jinping prinial uchastie v otkrytii ezhegodnoi sessii VE F v Davose i vystupil s osnovnym dokladom," available at [http://russian.people.com.cn/n3/2017/0118/c31520-9168307.html].

[19] See: "Xi Jinping zashchitil v Davose svobodnuiu torgovliu ," 20 January, 2017, available at [https://artpodgotovka.news/si-czinpin-zashhitil-v-davose-svobodnu/].

Chinese investments in the countries along the One Belt, One Road route has exceeded $50 billion. Thus, the One Belt, One Road initiative was proposed by China, but its results benefit the entire world.

■   In the fourth place, Xi Jinping noted that large states should adhere to the principles of non-belligerence, non-confrontation, mutual respect and mutually rewarding cooperation, with large countries treating small countries as equals and placing fairness above their own interests.

These ideas were also articulated by the Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi, at the 53rd Munich Security Conference.

First of all, Wang Yi stated that the world is facing numerous conflicts because of the departure from the key U.N. Charter objectives. If all the countries adhere to the main objectives and principles of the U.N. Charter, it is entirely possible to achieve peaceful conflict resolution, avoid conflicts and confrontations, and implement cooperation and mutual rewards on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Multilateralism is an efficient means to sustain peace, promote development and regulate global challenges.

Secondly, Wang Yi underscored that the states should not be categorized as large or small ones, and that they are all equal. At the same time, large countries have greater resources and opportunities. They are responsible for playing a greater role in ensuring peace and security in the world and making a greater contribution to the humankind's development and progress.[20] For instance, China has already become the world's second economy, the global leader in manufacturing and one of the principal trading states, and the country's leaders believe that China will, to the best of its abilities, take on greater international responsibilities and duties.

Conceptual Approaches to Cooperation with Neighboring Countries

The new policy in regard to neighboring countries emerged in late 2013. In early September, Xi Jinping toured four Central Asian countries, proposing the idea of establishing a Silk Road Economic Belt in his address in Astana. In early October, he visited Malaysia and Indonesia, articulating the idea of constructing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. On 24 October, a meeting regarding diplomatic approaches to neighboring countries took place in Beijing, where new key points were highlighted in China's foreign policy agenda in respect to its neighbors.[21] All of the preceding foreign policy initiatives were united by the One Belt, One Road *(yi dai yi lu)* concept, and were included in the repertoire of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the entire propaganda machine. Today this notion may be considered representative of the PRC's new geopolitical concept. Although the meeting was classified (which is a strange fact), certain theses articulated there became public knowledge.

The *strategic objectives* of diplomacy with neighboring countries:

— serving the purposes of "two centenaries" and the realization of the Chinese dream of the great Chinese national revival;

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[20] See: "Glava MID KNR prinial uchastie v Miunkhenskoi konferentsii po bezopasnosti," 18 February, 2017, available at [http://russian.people.com.cn/n3/2017/0218/c31520-9179614.html].

[21] See: *Renmin ribao*, 26 October, 2013; Following the Concept of 'Amity, Sincerity, Mutual Benefit and Inclusion' in Diplomatic Relations with Neighboring Countries," (24 October, 2013), in: Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China.*

— comprehensive development of relations with neighboring countries, strengthening of good neighborliness and friendship, expanding mutually rewarding cooperation;

— maintenance and utilization of important strategic opportunities for the development of China, protection of state sovereignty, security and prospective development;

— exerting efforts to create more amicable political relations between China and neighboring countries, along with stronger economic ties, enhancement of security-related cooperation, closer cultural exchange.

In order for this work to be implemented, there are two common interests to pursue—domestic and international. The domestic concern is to attain the "two centenaries", and realize the Chinese dream of a great national revival, and the international—to achieve favorable external conditions for reforms, development and stability in China, protect state sovereignty, security and prospective development, maintain peace and stability in the entire world and promote joint development.

The *main focus* in developing diplomatic relations with neighboring countries is to adhere to "a benevolent attitude towards neighbors, and treat them as partners," insist on good "neighborliness, maintaining good relationships with neighboring countries and the attainment of joint prosperity," which embody the concept of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusion" (*qin, cheng, hui, rong*).

The four hieroglyphs that describe this policy have a rich semantic palette, and their interpretation is associated with the conceptual heritage of ancient China.

Amity (*qin*) also means "affinity." In Confucian culture the highest extent of love for one's parents became the foundation of the universal virtue of humaneness (*ren*) when a person transposes the feeling of *qin* onto all people and the entire universe. The inclusion of *amity/affinity* among the key guidelines in China's relations with its neighbors corresponds to the internal logic of a traditional culture, which insists on continual expansion of *qin* beyond one's own clan and kingdom.

Sincerity (*cheng*) in Chinese tradition is inseparable from trust (*xin*), which became one of the moral pillars of classic Confucianism. In foreign policy, this idea reflects the endeavor to adopt a sincere approach in relations with neighbors in hopes of earning their trust.

Mutual benefit (*hui*) in traditional culture was synonymous with mercy and benevolence afforded by the ruler to his people. In response, the moral duty of the people was loyalty to the ruler.

Inclusion (*rong*) in ancient Chinese thought pointed to the ability of a wise man to respect the diversity of things, regardless of the differences between them. This idea corresponds to contemporary Chinese politics, which claims the value of different civilizations and cultures.[22]

The *basic objectives* of diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries are as follows:

— maintaining good neighborliness and friendship, and continually provide mutual assistance when need arises;

— emphasize equality and respect feelings; meet more often and visit each other; underscore the things that win people's sympathy and warm their hearts; strive for the neighboring countries to act towards China in a friendlier and more amicable manner, express greater support and approval, which would increase the powers of rapprochement, effect and influence;

— act wholeheartedly towards neighboring countries, find more friends and partners;

— maintain cooperation in compliance with the mutual reward principle, create more close-knit common interest networks and raise the integration of both sides' interests to a greater level,

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[22] See: M. Titarenko, A. Lomanov, "Politicheskie i kulturnye aspekty strategii stanovlenia Kitaia kak velikoi derzhavy," *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 2015, pp. 25-26.

so that adjoining countries receive greater rewards from the development of China, and China receive profit and assistance from joint development of neighboring countries;

— advocate inclusion in relations with neighboring countries, strengthening joint development in the Asia-Pacific Region, adopt a more open and active approach towards promoting regional cooperation;

— use comparative advantages efficiently, determine the points of strategic alignment that may promote mutually rewarding cooperation with neighboring countries, take active part in regional economic cooperation;

— unify the efforts of all states concerned for the speedy creation of an integrated infrastructure, which would allow to interact efficiently in the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road;

— continually strengthen regional cooperation in the financial sphere, actively prepare for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, improve the regional financial security network;

— accelerate the development of border region openness, intensify these regions' mutually rewarding cooperation with adjoining countries;

— promote cooperation in the regional security sphere; strive for maintaining peace and stability in neighboring countries; adhere to the new security concept that is based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual rewards, equality and coordination;

— comprehensively promote cultural exchanges, strengthen friendly ties in tourism, science and education, cooperation between neighboring regions;

— create the conditions for the expansion of China's soft power influence, "integrating the essence of the Chinese dream with the desire of the people of neighboring countries for a better, prosperous life and with prospects of regional growth, striving for the seed of the collective faith notion to take root in the soil of the neighboring countries that it falls on."

Although most of the above-mentioned theses are not new, their emergence as priorities in the relations with neighboring countries is the first of its kind, which reveals China's desire to take its relations with neighboring countries to a new level.

Secondly, the following priorities in this agenda are newly established and deserve certain attention:

— the emphasis on the need to attain mutual rewards, common success and joint development;

— the focus on amity, sincerity, mutual rewards and inclusion;

— emphasis on the creation of a "common fate community" and "common interest community" with the neighboring countries;

— peaceful diplomacy as the main vector in the diplomatic relations between China and neighboring countries;

— new security concept proposal, which is based on the principles of comprehensiveness, universality and cooperation;

— initiative to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

Although all of the above-mentioned theses sound very appealing, they do not allow to definitively dismiss the concerns in regard to Chinese expansion.

C o n c l u s i o n s

- The above review demonstrates that Xi Jinping has significantly shifted the emphases in Chinese foreign policy. Although the basic thesis on China "continuing to follow the path of peaceful development" is still in place, it has, however, been substantially supplemented with a statement that China "will never relinquish its lawful rights or sacrifice the key interests of the country." This means that fifth-generation leaders have set course for China's more active involvement in international affairs and are oriented towards a tougher foreign policy, although with a greater emphasis on soft power. The five years that elapsed have brought many testaments to this fact, and not merely in the South China Sea area.

- Secondly, the strategic objective of China's foreign policy is the attainment of "two centenaries" and great Chinese national revival. This means that, just as before, China's foreign policy is entirely subordinated to its domestic policy. All China's actions on the international arena are taken with one single goal—to create favorable international conditions for the implementation of domestic policy goals and establishing a positive image of China.

- In the third place, although Chinese diplomacy does not have any geographic limitations, it focuses primarily on working with neighboring countries. The basic diplomatic premise in relation to adjoining countries is approaching them as friends and partners, in order to provide them with a sense of security and assist in their development. In any case, that's the thesis declared by the present leaders of the Communist Party of China and People's Republic of China.

- The fourth essentially new foreign policy premise introduced by fifth-generation leaders states that China "is willing to share its economic development successes," neighboring countries should derive profits from China's development and China should receive benefits and support from developing jointly with neighboring countries. In order to attain this goal, China is proposing to accelerate the creation of free trade areas with neighbors, expand trade and investments, and create a new pattern of regional economic integration. The initiative to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt is proposed as the model for the Central Asian region.

- In the fifth place, China is beginning to assert itself not just as a regional, but as "a responsible world power," concerned with the alteration of the current "game rules" on the international arena and proposing its own vision of these rules. The security concept proposed by China is based on the principles of universality, integration, interaction and stability, and is merely the first step in this direction. China's objective in regard to the neighboring countries (and in regard to the rest of the world) is the creation of "global humanity with a common fate."

For us all of the above means that we should learn to utilize China's interest in the region for the benefit of socioeconomic development of the countries in the region. Fears and phobias are not productive. On the one hand, it is essential to be aware of the fact that there are no alternatives to cooperation with China under specific historical circumstances. It does, however, need to be established on a mutually rewarding foundation and serve the purpose of strengthening the countries in the region. On the other hand, it is clear that while strong China is a challenge, a weak, disintegrating China is a threat whose scale cannot be overstated.

CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES: METHODS AND CONSEQUENCES

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A B S T R A C T

The article discusses the notion and the methods of Chinese-style globalization as exemplified in the case of the Central Asian countries. Forms of PRC's economic influence on the countries in the region are highlighted. They include investments, financing the real sector of economy, developing trade infrastructure, and establishing a network of Chinese trade communities as a stronghold and point of migrants' economic penetration into Central Asian countries. Labor migration and the establishment of Chinese migrant networks play a special role in Chinese-style globalization. A close relationship has been revealed between Chinese investments and migration, they are usually practically simultaneous with each other and are mutually dependent in the contemporary economic environment. The tendency towards an increasingly greater consolidation of PRC's position in the Central Asian region is observed.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In recent years, China has transformed into one of the authoritative geopolitical actors in international relations. Two decades ago China placed the greatest emphasis on political and economic expansion abroad. As a result, China has acquired the status of a key player on the international arena, and no international issue is currently resolved without its participation.

As its foreign political and economic expansion advanced, China began to actively utilize a tool denoted as *soft power*. The idea of relying on soft power in foreign policy was officially proclaimed at the 17th PRC Communist Party Congress in 2007. The Chairman of the Communist party of the PRC Hu Jintao noted that culture as an element of soft power has become the most important factor in Chinese globalization.

This idea is implemented in various ways, including the establishment of the Confucius institute network all over the world, including the Republic of Tajikistan, with the aim of promoting Chinese culture and Chinese language.[1] In addition, China had formed a special approach to establishing friendly rapport, namely, an *integrated friendly attack*, i.e. promoting a given country's sustainable development via accessing its potential and the national labor, goods and services markets. Chinese goods and laborers have become common in adjoining countries, as a result of the expansion of PRC's foreign economic influence and geopolitical power.

China's economic breakthrough has established the conditions for its significant strengthening on the international arena. The PRC became one of the leaders in a number of international organizations, such as the U.N., WTO, World Bank, IMF, IOM, as well as in global and regional programs and forums (i.e., SCO, ASEAN, APEC, BRICS, etc.). Membership in these political organizations allows China not only to resolve political issues, but also to promote its economic interests. The mi-

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[1] See: 杜尚别塔吉克国立大学孔子中心 (The Confucius Center under the Tajik National University in Dushanbe), available at [http://tjkzxy.tj.chinesecio.com/ru], 20 November, 2017.

gration of Chinese population as a manifestation of soft power abroad plays a rather significant role in China's increased importance on the international arena.

Chinese-Style Globalization as a New Vector

Let's point out that globalization is a term loaded with economic, political, demographic, geographical and cultural aspects, which is characterized by a substantial flow of monetary funds, goods, population and labor resources. All of these streams cross national borders quite freely and actively influence the development of neighboring states. Chinese-style globalization is a reality and is unique to the contemporary world. Let's describe several important tendencies present in this phenomenon.[2]

- First of all, China is the only world civilization that emerged in the Neolithic period and continues to exist through our times. Meanwhile, not merely the span of its existence is fundamentally important, rather, it is the stability and consistency of its cultural tradition. It has never been interrupted, including the times of external expansion.

- Secondly, large-scale migration is characteristic not only of contemporary China of the globalization times, but has been typical of the Chinese nation historically. China's entire historic development path comprises dynastic periods, which are characterized by major territorial migration due to objective social and economic reasons.

- Thirdly, an important characteristic of Chinese-style globalization is its peaceful nature. Chinese civilization has barely ever utilized military methods for the purpose of expanding its living space or of forced enrichment. It is not inherently characteristic of the Chinese nation to conquer territory with aggressive methods. On the contrary, their methods were peaceful, mild and gradual. External wars waged in different Chinese imperial periods were of a defensive nature, aiming to ensure the protection of its state interests' vital aspects rather than to annex new lands and territories.

- Fourthly, the peculiarity of Chinese globalization is in the presence and purposeful establishment of the so-called strongholds, or Chinese communities abroad (*huaqiao*). These are bases of sorts, tools for implementing economic policy abroad. *Huaqiao* (華僑—*hua*—China, *qiao*—emigrant) are Chinese migrants living abroad. Both people living abroad temporarily, as well as the descendants of earlier emigrants who became citizens of their respective countries can be referred to as huaqiao. Chinese communities serve as strongholds abroad, providing significant support to traditionalism and promoting migrants' adaptation to a new lifestyle and commercial activities in the receiving countries. Huaqiao communities retain close economic ties with China both at the state and private levels, regime changes in China notwithstanding.

In 2014, China was the fourth in the world in the number of outgoing emigrants.[3] According to international migration statistics, 60 million people of Chinese descent are living outside China. In 2016, approximately 1 million Chinese migrant workers were temporarily employed abroad. World Bank estimates that China is the second largest receiver of remittances from its own migrant citizens

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[2] See: S.V. Ryazantsev, "Globalizatsia po-kitaiski: investitsii, migratsia, diaspora," *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy*, Vol. 10, No. 30, 2012, pp. 20-41.

[3] See: Luo Wangshu, "China to Benefit from International Migration: Experts," available at [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ china/2015-04/24/content_20531237.htm], 20 November, 2017.

abroad, with $62.9 trillion.[4] It stands to mention that the PRC is increasingly more active in the global migration processes—not only are the Chinese emigrating, but foreigners are also eagerly coming to China. For instance, in 2016, 52.7 million foreign citizens crossed Chinese borders, while in 2015, 663,600 foreign citizens held work permits with over a 6-month validity term. Aside from external migration, significant internal migration, which has started with the launch of economic reforms, is characteristic of China. According to the China's National Bureau of Statistics, as many as 269 million internal labor migrants have moved from the rural regions to the growing cities.[5]

In response to the population's growing mobility, the Chinese government is implementing measures to increase national border control, cultivating labor migration policy regulation and expanding cooperation with international organizations. In particular, Chinese authorities promote organized labor emigration, attempt to prevent illegal migration and the related contraband and human trafficking. For example, in the first half of 2016, China sent 562,000 people to work abroad under a special national program, which amounts to a 6% growth over the preceding year. In 2007, an IOM office was established in Beijing with the aim to provide technical assistance in the sphere of migration control. IOM is currently promoting migration regulation tools under the program of technical assistance to PRC government.

IOM subdivides the overseas Chinese into two categories.

■ The first comprises those who

(a) had a permanent residence status in their country of residence for two years, and had resided there for at least 18 months;

(b) those without a permanent residence status, but with a permanent legal status for five years, de facto living in the country for at least 30 months over the course of five years.

■ The second includes former Chinese citizens who had previously acquired foreign citizenship.

Migration and settlement of the Chinese abroad is stipulated by several factors, including geopolitical, socioeconomic, demographic and geographic. We've examined their classification in a preceding paper.[6]

Economic Influence of the PRC on the Central Asian Countries

Central Asia has always been the primary crossroads of trade routes from China to Europe, India and the Middle East. The Great Silk Road was not merely a goods transportation route, it also served as an important migration bridge, which promoted the spread of religions and cultures of different peoples. Great empires, such as Britain, China and Russia, have regularly fought to acquire control over Central Asian and Xinjiang territories. These confrontations led to the partition of the Central Asian lands between great empires, which provoked forced mass migration. However, even in the most difficult of times neither trade, nor commercial or economy-driven migration stopped.

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[4] See: "Migration and Remittances Data," available at [http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data], 10 December, 2017.

[5] See: "China, International Organization for Migration," available at [https://www.iom.int/countries/china], 20 November, 2017.

[6] See: S. Ryazantsev, A. Ter-Akopov, E. Pismennaia, A. Lukyanova, "Diasporas as Informal Tools for Regulating Migration in the Eurasian Economic Union," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 35-42.

In the Soviet period, the Central Asian region belonged to the U.S.S.R. as constituent republics. Their population was relatively sedentary and, due to administrative restrictions, did not travel extensively through the U.S.S.R. territory. There were, of course, educational and economic migration, but, generally speaking, the migration mobility of Central Asian republics' population was low. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation changed—migration mobility grew dramatically. On the one hand, propelling factors (civil wars, economic crises, social instability) present in the new states drove migration processes, while on the other hand, the more successful development of Russia and Kazakhstan became the attracting factors. The role of economic and labor migration from Central Asian states grew rapidly. Currently Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the key labor force donors for the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Three to four million people, or 10-16 percent of the economically active population of the region, are annually engaged in labor emigration from the Central Asian states.[7]

In the beginning of the 21st century the migration processes in Central Asia began to be increasingly stronger influenced by PRC's growing economic and geopolitical role.[8] China began investing efforts in creating and reinforcing regional cooperation with the five newly independent states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

China's relationship with the Central Asian states began with the signing of territorial agreements. In 1992, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded a settlement on the resolution of territorial disputes. Subsequently, as the "Shanghai Five," these five countries and Uzbekistan officially created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.

China's foreign policy in regard to Central Asia does not openly declare its desire to compete with Russia's influence in the region. On the one hand, China needs the support of Russia, its pursuit of a multipolar world and the counteraction it provides to one-sided Western influence. On the other hand, Russia also realizes that without China's participation the economic and political situation in Central Asia will not remain stable. That is why Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia are complementary, and are far from being a zero-sum game.[9] Meanwhile, it is apparent that China's growing power is leading to its growing economic and demographic influence in neighboring regions, including Central Asia. In 2016, the population of China constituted 1.4 billion people, which a priori makes China a demographic giant and a major migration donor. In the context of the national "Go beyond" project, Chinese migration along with investments is becoming not merely a demographic trend, but a mechanism of influence on adjoining states. In recent years, Central Asian states have been particularly sensitive to this approach. Chinese investments and Chinese migration have become practically simultaneous processes. These processes stimulated the Chinese penetration of Central Asian markets.

China is also one of the leading investment donor countries. The rate and the volume of Chinese investments in the Central Asian region have increased after the U.S.S.R. was dismantled. Having replaced the Russian Federation as Central Asia's key trade and economic partner, China had invested colossal funds in the region. For instance, China is currently the principal creditor of the Republic of Tajikistan, with a $1.2 billion share, which is over one half of Tajikistan's external debt.[10] The amount of long-term loans in Kazakhstan constitutes $18.9 billion, in Turkmenistan—$750 mil-

[7] See: S.V. Ryazantsev, I.Ia. Bogdanov, M.N. Khramova, "Prognozirovanie migratsii v kontekste formirovania vneshnei migratsionnoi politiki Rossii," *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Series 1, *Ekonomika i pravo*, No. 1, 2017, pp. 5-12.

[8] See: I. Karabulatova, S. Ryazantsev, R. Manshin, Z. Vazirov, "Chinese Migration to the Customs Union Countries and Regional Security," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2017, pp. 57-65.

[9] See: S. Ryazantsev, *"Kazakhstan Today: Migration—Trends and Regulation Approaches," Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 70-79.

[10] See: "Gosudarstvenny vneshnii dolg Respubliki Tadzhikistan," 2016, available at [http://minfin.tj/index.php?do=static&page=gosdolg#vdolg], 20 November, 2017.

lion, in Uzbekistan—$167 million; the volume of direct investments in Kazakhstan amounts to $13.3 billion, in Turkmenistan—$1.4 billion, in Uzbekistan—$195 million; the amount of acquired assets in Kazakhstan equals $620 million, and in Turkmenistan—$200 million, which reveals China's significant interest in the region and its willingness to direct a substantial share of proprietary capital there.[11] China's investments promote the development of Central Asian countries.

China's Influence on the Economy of Tajikistan: Tendencies and Consequences

Republic of Tajikistan adjoins China, it is experiencing the influence of its great neighbor, and the influence has been growing increasingly stronger in recent times.

Diplomatic relations between the states were formalized by a corresponding agreement, signed on 4 January, 1992 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan in Dushanbe. In 2007, during the visit of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan to the PRC, a Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the two countries was signed. The treaty is of a long-term nature and is intended for a 25-year term with the right of renewal for subsequent five-year periods. Trade and economic connections were minimal in 1992-1997 due to the civil war in Tajikistan. In 1996, the trade turnover between the two countries constituted merely $11.7 million, including $7.6 million in exports from China to Tajikistan.[12] In 2016, the trade turnover volume approached $885 million,[13] however, mutual trade seemed like a one-way street benefitting China. An indubitable confirmation is provided by the fact that numerous Chinese shopping centers were constructed in Tajikistan, and, as a result, the market was saturated with goods manufactured in China.

In addition, China is also investing in the industrial, power, agrarian, construction, communication, transportation segments of the Tajik economy, and is increasing its influence on it. Investments in Tajikistan are followed by an influx of labor migrants, since practically all of the concluded contracts entail the principal condition of using Chinese laborers—construction of facilities and roads is conducted by Chinese companies that engage Chinese workers. This reflects the clearly elaborated and distinctly balanced state policy of the PRC.

According to the Migration Department of the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Tajikistan, the number of Chinese labor migrants is growing. In 2016, their number increased by 30%, reaching 6,500 people. Chinese workers in Tajikistan are mostly engaged in construction projects, they work at plants, field deposits and in agriculture. There are foreign worker quotas, and the Republic of Tajikistan allocated a quota of 8,000 jobs for foreign labor migrants in 2016, including 4,460 allotted for Chinese workers.[14] It was almost certainly migration from China that forced the Tajik authorities to create a migration department for keeping migration records and regulating the flow of migrants. Currently, however, the department is mostly engaged in recording the existing migration flow from China and distributing quotas, rather than actively forming or controlling migration flow from China. The flow of investments and loans from the PRC to Tajikistan is a real regulator of Chinese migration.

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[11] See: UNCTAD data, available at [http://unctad.org/fdistatistics], 20 November, 2017.
[12] See: R.K. Almimov, *Tadzhikistzn i Kitai: kursom strategicheskogo partnerstva*, Ves mir Publishers, Moscow, 2014, p. 127.
[13] See: "Macroeconomic indices of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2016," available at [http://minfin.tj/index.php?do=static&page=macro], 1 December, 2017.
[14] Information supplied at the authors' request by the Migration Service of the Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment of the Republic of Tajikistan on 4 September, 2017.

Another important process is emerging in the Tajik economy, namely, the surge in the number of Chinese-owned assets. Chinese businessmen currently own numerous industrial facilities and trading companies, co-own joint enterprises, lease hundreds of thousands of ha of agricultural lands. Over 100 Chinese companies operate in various segments of Tajik economy. Over the course of the last six years, the amount of total Chinese investments in the economy of Tajikistan has approached the $500 million mark. The leader among joint enterprises is the Tajik-Chinese gold mining enterprise Zarafshon, which invested over $60 million in the national economy in 2013 alone.[15]

Tajikistan had transferred a part of the Pamir highlands, rich in mineral deposits, to China in compensation of its external debt to Beijing. Meanwhile, as early as in the Soviet period Tajik scientists found that precisely the part of the Eastern Pamir that was transferred to China possesses substantial reserves of 17 kinds of extractable resources (precious stones, rare minerals, uranium, etc.). Additionally, the PRC had bought the lead and zinc mineral deposit field Zarnisori Shimoli in the Match district of the Sogd Region. According to the agreement, the PRC is to undertake the financing of the entire project in the amount of $200 million up to 2018. Over the course of four years, a Chinese company will develop and begin the construction of two facilities—a complex ore processing plant at Zarnisori Shimoli with an annual capacity of 2 million tons of ore, and a metallurgical plant with an annual capacity of 20 thousand tons of lead.

Over 10,000 Chinese and Tajik workers are engaged in the construction of the Tajik segment of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The number of such workers is regulated by bilateral intergovernmental agreements. Owing to Chinese investments, an ore mining and processing plant Pokrud was launched in the Ramit gorge. It is important to note that 205 of the 715 factory workers are Chinese citizens.

Chinese farmers were allotted approximately 2,000 ha in the Murgab district of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, as well as in the Kumsangir (now Jaihun) and Bokhtar districts of the Khatlon Region. Recently, Tajikistan had transferred approximately 500 ha in Yavan, Abdurahmon Jomi and Jaloliddin Rumi districts for a term of 49 years to Qiniang Yinghai public company. According to the official report of the Tajik Ministry of Agriculture the land is being transferred for the development of the agrarian sector,[16] but these decisions are often met with antagonism and a lack of understanding from the local population.

On 31 August, 2016, on the eve of a national holiday, the 25th anniversary of state independence of the Republic of Tajikistan, President E. Rakhmon inaugurated the first phase of the Juntai-Dangara Sin-Silu Textil textile production complex in the Dangarin district of the Khatlon Region. This facility became the largest in Tajikistan in the number of jobs created, and one of the most significant production facilities in terms of industrial development in the years of the country's independence. The plant comprises four manufacturing phases, including spinning, textile, painting and sewing. The total annual capacity of the plant amounts to 52 thousand tons of cotton fiber and 150 million sq m of cotton fabric. When the plant is launched at full capacity, over 6,000 people will be provided with jobs (80%—local population, 20%—Chinese citizens). The factory is being constructed in conjunction with investors and experts from China. With the aim of providing the production facility with local materials, including high-quality cotton, over 14,500 ha of land has been allotted by the Government of Tajikistan in accordance with the complex construction plan. This land will be used for planting cotton with the objective of providing the plant with materials.[17]

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[15] See: "Tadzhikistan-Kitai: kliuchevoe partnerstvo," available at [http://news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/politics/ 20140725/tadzhikistan-kitai-klyuchevoe-partnerstvo], 20 December, 2017.

[16] Information supplied at the authors' request by the Republic of Tajikistan's Ministry of Agriculture on 5 September, 2017.

[17] Official site of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan [http://www.president.tj/ru/node/12901], 25 November, 2017.

Meanwhile, it is a well-known fact that tillage technologies implemented by Chinese farmers violate local biological homeostasis and environmental conditions. Massive utilization of vast amounts of chemical fertilizers pollutes the soil and suppresses the vital functions of the soil flora and fauna.

As a result, the soil becomes unfit for use. This is the reason why the development of Chinese agriculture takes a significant toll on Tajikistan.

C o n c l u s i o n

The development of the Chinese-Tajik economic relations and the increase in trade turnover led to an increase of the migrant flow of Chinese workers to Tajikistan.

China is conducting a clear-cut economic policy towards Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries, linking the provision of loans and investments to an increased engagement of Chinese migrant workers. In turn, Chinese migrants become the consumers and distributors of Chinese goods in Central Asian countries, which allows China to conduct a gradual expansion on regional consumer markets.

In fact, we are currently observing a process sanctioned by the Chinese authorities, which aims to expand the economic influence of the PRC in the regions through consumer markets and labor migration.

This is also confirmed by the existence of a large number of migration assistance firms that help Chinese citizens with relocation to Central Asian countries. Surveys among the Chinese labor migrants in Tajikistan demonstrate that many have previously visited Tajikistan, and lived there for over a year.

This reveals that Chinese migration follows the trade minority model: the increase in the number of Chinese migrants is occurring simultaneously with the expansion of Chinese market outlets. Two distinct examples of this model's implementation are the two major shopping markets in Dushanbe, namely, Korvon and Hitoy Bozor.

Chinese markets serve as the pillars of economic expansion to new spaces, structuring Chinese communities and, as the ultimate result, intensifying China's influence on Central Asian countries. Let us emphasize that the significant presence of Chinese communities in neighboring countries not only assists China in dispensing with the excess of population and labor resources and providing its citizens with employment, but also promotes the expansion of its economic footprint and market outlets, creates favorable conditions for the export of Chinese goods, as well as allows to gain access to raw materials in the adjoining regions.

SECURITY STRATEGY AS A FACTOR IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

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A B S T R A C T

The paper discusses the issues and methods of international relations objective accomplishment by contemporary states, which strive for interstate cooperation based on the principles of collaboration, equality and trust, using various instruments of foreign policy influence. Interdisciplinary research that involves the extensive use of systems analysis is currently being conducted in the course of studying security issues.

The issue of a state's sustainable development is linked inseparably to the issue of security and is one of the potentially efficient concepts for supporting the stability of the international relations system.

KEYWORDS: *national security, neorealism, globalism, regionalism, constructivism, sustainable development concept.*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Ensuring national security and protection of national interests in international relations is one of the strategic issues for a modern state in elaborating its foreign policy. This is the way in which state sovereignty is expressed and realized, implying its right to act independently on the international arena and determine its foreign policy in its best interests.

There are security threats in the modern world that are related to targeted influence on the economic and military potential, social development, information sphere and other spheres of a state's activities.

The evolution of Kazakhstan's security policy as a long-term program that promotes state and national interests is contingent on the implementation of strategic national priorities that involve executing innovative transformation, preserving territorial integrity and state sovereignty. In the context of world crisis, the objective of reinforcing national and regional security becomes a priority, since there are increased threats of sociopolitical destabilization and growing difficulties in the realization of people's constitutional rights and freedoms.

In the face of new challenges, internal and external threats to the political stability of the Kazakhstan society, it seems appropriate to examine political interactions between different actors in the political process, who construe threats to both security and the mechanisms of its maintenance differently. This affects the elaboration of political strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the context of the changing geopolitical and social sphere.

Under new geopolitical circumstances, characterized by tangible shifts in world order, the examination of problems of international security, information security, cybersecurity, illegal migration, climate change, sustainable development, along with a number of other security issues is becoming particularly poignant. A deep and multidimensional analysis of issues in national, regional and international security in their intrinsic association with the political strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is required.

In turn, implementation of national interests is considered a priority, an essential part of the security system formation concept. The detection of significant sociopolitical challenges, threats and risks of both traditional and non-traditional nature is a categorical imperative of efficient modern policy, which is treated as an opportunity and capacity to manage conflicting interaction in a context of restrictions.

An integrated analysis of mechanisms that ensure national and regional safety includes an investigation of apparent and latent processes that create additional threats connected to activities of various subjects with divergent objectives.

Different approaches used for the examination of a phenomenon as significant as security mutually enrich each other and create an opportunity for an integrative scientific paradigm, the key to which may be the different levels of politological analysis: macropolitics, micropolitics, behaviorism, ethno-methodology and discourse analysis, allowing to refer to a poly-paradigm politological analysis of a society's sociopolitical security.

1. The Concept of Security in the Context of International Relations in the 21st Century

Since the emergence of states, political thought has examined expressions of various threats, dangers, everything that harms the state or is capable of disturbing the stability of a political system. Danger is characterized by a condition where a possibility of damage to the system emerges. In the

deliberation on the evolution of the concept of security one can trace the expansion of an understanding of security from a narrow idea of political security to national security, once again separating the concepts of state and national security.

For instance, Hobbes had already underscored that the main objective of the state is "maintaining the good of the people," while its main goal is primarily "maintaining security," since before states emerged, society was plagued by "the war of all against all."[1] John Locke wrote that the state "is bound to govern by established standing laws... And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people."[2]

Up to this day the term "security" has not been defined clearly, but, as a rule, security was taken to mean a certain relative level of protection from external forms of aggression.[3] However, from the 1980s on, a new understanding of state security has been emerging. An expanded interpretation has come to succeed the traditional concept. Besides the military and political segments, security should also encompass the economic, environmental, social, cultural, informational, and other elements of security.[4]

Thus, the modern thought expands the interpretation of this concept in several directions—from national security towards the security of certain groups and individuals; from national security towards the security of the entire world system; from exclusively military security towards political, economic, social, environmental varieties, etc.

An example of an expanded interpretation of the concept of security is served by the definition of security for the 21st century proposed by the United Nations in 1994: "Human security is not just the security of a state, it is the security of a nation; it is not just the security attained as a result of possessing weapons, it is the security attained as a result of development. It is not just state security, it is the security of each person in their home and in the workplace; it is not just the protection from conflicts between states, it is protection from conflicts between peoples."[5]

The basis for the development of human society and simultaneously for its destabilization is provided by the contradiction between a person's subjective expectations and objective socioeconomic conditions. This contradiction gives rise to a universal threat to the individual, family and society. R. Yanovskiy notes that "potential conflict due to this contradiction contains the threat of world politics becoming increasingly more uncontrollable, thus generating a huge political,"[6] as well as other types of chaos.

2. National Security as the Fundamental Principle of Modern Statehood

With the existing variability of security types, national security holds the leading position in the political agenda of any country. The significance of a specific type of national security is determined by objective factors:

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[1] Th. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Penguin Books, 1968 (First Published 1651), Ch. XIII.

[2] J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, in ten volumes, Vol. V, W. Sharpe and Son, London, 1823, p. 161, available at [http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3025pdf/Locke.pdf].

[3] See: O.A. Kolobova, *Zapad: novye izmereniia natsionalnoi i mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti*, NNGU, Nizhniy Novgorod, 1997, p. 7.

[4] See: A. Vavilov, "Ekologicheskaia bezopasnost i ustoichivoe razvitie Rossii," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 8, 2002, p. 86.

[5] Quoted from: R.G. Yanovskiy, *Globalnye izmeneniia i sotsialnaia bezopasnost*, Akademia, Moscow, 1999, p. 15.

[6] Ibid., p. 16.

(1) the extent to which it is required by individuals, social groups, societies, states, the world community for the purpose of maintaining and developing themselves, as well as vital facilities and values;

(2) growing vulnerability of people and vital facilities, unless efforts are invested in its reinforcement;

(3) existence of a wide range of extreme threats that this security system should counter.[7]

Every state has national interests and aims to implement them. These interests may coincide or contradict each other, leading to conflict and competition among countries on the international arena. But it is difficult to argue with the conclusion that deems the main objective of any strategy to be invariable for any entity of international relations—it is the maintenance of the security of the individual, society and the state.[8]

Problematizing the concept of national security, Barry Buzan discusses its internal contradictions, where national security is set against individual security. The author points out the paradoxical nature of the modern state, which, on the one hand, aims to maintain the security of individuals, and not allow them to slip into a "natural state."[9] On the other hand, since it "claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,*"[10] the state becomes a threat to the individual.

Barry Buzan also notes that national states are not exclusive or unconditional actors, citing military political blocs, international organizations, etc. as an example. It is becoming an apparent fact that national security, on the other hand, is juxtaposed to international security.

By the early 1980s, it became extremely difficult to describe the concept of national security in terms of a number of processes that occur inside and outside of the state. During that period, the perception of the world order and the system of values associated with the preceding structures is altered. "Globalization has become a very powerful metaphor for the sense that the world is becoming increasingly integrated and interconnected. The prevailing image of globalization is one of a global flood of money, people, images, values, and ideas, overflowing the old system of national barriers that sought to preserve state autonomy and control. Indeed, globalization has been increasingly seen as the most important external influence on both the character of societies and dominant patterns of governance."[11]

Acknowledgement of globalization processes, extreme interdependence of states, the "spill-over effect," as well as the emergence of supra-national executive structures have placed the familiar concepts of national sovereignty, national interests and national borders in more complicated relationships than they were previously engaged in.[12]

Certain states today have included issues of global nature in their national security strategy, such as reinforcing global security in the health care sphere, shaping a global economic order, counteracting climate change, etc.[13]

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[7] See: V. Serebriannikov, "Politicheskaia bezopasnost," *Svobodnaia mysl*, No. 1, 1997, p. 19.

[8] See: S.S. Antiushin, "'Bezopasnost' i 'natsionalnaia bezopasnost' v sovremennom politologicheskom diskurse," *Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znaniia*, No. 6, 2011, pp. 21-24.

[9] B. Buzan, *People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1983.

[10] M. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in: *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Transl. and edited by H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pp. 77-128.

[11] A. Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 196.

[12] See: D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton, *Global Transformations, Politics, Economics and Culture*, Blackwell Publisher, Cambridge, 1999, p. 9.

[13] See: *National Security Strategy of USA-2015*, available at [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf].

Simultaneously, the Copenhagen school of security research managed to propose a fundamentally new approach to the security phenomenon, as well as to develop a set of instruments for studying the processes that came to be called securitization. The phenomenon of security began to be examined very extensively, and security research was no longer confined to the international relations context.

3. The Concept of National Security in the Context of Main International Relations Theories

The unfolding global processes require reflection from the stance of new analytical approaches, which are capable of ensuring the conceptualization of formation mechanisms of new structures within the international relations system, which go beyond the state-centric approach framework.

In the last decade of the 20th century, four major theoretical directions have emerged and still retain their influence in researching the issue of security in international relations, namely, neorealism, globalism, regionalism and constructivism.[14]

3.1. National Security from the Neorealism Standpoint

Neorealism is marked by the state-centric approach and the priority of the concept of superpower polarization in the international relations system, specifically the ideas of bipolarity, unipolarity, and other polarity combinations of the world order structure. The logic of the neorealist security theories is based on an understanding of the international security structure that legitimizes the idea of changes in the power correlation structure in the post-Cold War period globalization context.

The priority of global-level political analysis remains undisputable for neorealism. The range of the researched changes is limited by this level's framework. This is reflected in the aggregate of these theories' conceptual tools, which is restricted by the choice between the concepts of unipolarity and multipolarity. Operationalization of the security concept on two levels, both systemic and state, is characteristic of neorealism, wherein the systemic level is the conclusive one for all of the definitions developed within this theoretical direction.

The underlying premises of the neorealist research on security of the early 21st century are the ideas of:

— the prospects of decreasing the world community's attention to human rights issues;

— the growing tendency towards increasing the legitimacy level of actions aimed against world terrorism;

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[14] For more details, see: V.N. Lukin, T.V. Musienko, "Traditsionnye i novye paradigmy bezopasnosti: sravnitelny analiz," available at [http://credonew.ru/content/view/589/31//].

—the reinforced role of the state and national policy in fortification of national borders and territories, as well as measures on maintaining national security, expanding the state partici- pation in controlling various types of activities;

—various behavior models for the U.S. as the only superpower that determines the interna- tional political agenda in the context of its own security risk management strategy.

Three principal problems are top-priority for the modern neorealist studies of international rela- tions and risks linked to international terrorism: the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and the threat of their utilization by terrorist groups; the risk of implementing military methods in resolving the issue of maintaining security from any types of threats; civilizational conflict, whose outlines are determined by the principal patterns of cultural differentiation.

3.2. Globalism and National Security: A New Approach to Familiar Concepts

The second vector of international politics security research is represented by globalization theories. In international relations theories globalism is the antithesis of the neorealist theories and of the concept that assigns a static character to the international politics system structure.

The methodological basis for globalization theories is primarily provided by both cultural and political/economic approaches. Globalist security theories are characterized by the concept of deter- ritorialization of world politics as a basic premise. In this regard, there is a certain conceptual affinity between the liberal and Marxist versions of globalist theories, which are equally focused on the grow- ing role of economic and transnational integration, thus the decreasing significance of territoriality and the role of the state in the world political sphere.

According to the globalist theories' logic, the state and the state power system are no longer priority subjects for the political analysis of world politics. Accordingly, the activities of non-state- affiliated actors and structures should also be included in the political analysis sphere. Proceeding from the thesis of the complicated interrelation between the state and non-state actors and systems coexisting in world politics, the need for an integrated approach is postulated, an approach that would move beyond the state-centric approach to analyzing security problems and international ter- rorism risks.

The substantiation of the independent role that transnational formations (corporations, non-state social and political organizations, on the one hand, and intergovernmental/international organizations and regimes, on the other) hold in world politics is the key idea of globalist theories.

Studies conducted in the globalist theory context focus on the problem of the influence that the networks, that form the interactive structure of diverse world policy actors at different levels, have on the reconsideration of the territorial sovereignty principle as the foundation of the international relations system. In globalist theories, unlike neorealist theories, the state is interpreted as merely an element of these networks, which does not always fulfill network control functions. Globalist theories proclaim the growing influence of network structures, which exert a certain pressure and impact on the state, rather than the influence of the state itself.

Appraising the nature of the connection between globalization and security, the proponents of globalism substantiate the idea that the issue of security in the modern world is growing more com- plicated under the influence of globalization. This is accompanied by the simultaneous weakening of the state's role in ensuring security, along with the depletion of efficient control mechanisms and implementation of corresponding strategies. In this light, globalists are proposing a thesis of a great-

er efficiency of political strategies that stipulate state cooperation in the security sphere, particularly at the regional level.

Special attention is paid by the proponents of this approach to the analysis of the globalization mechanisms in general, as well as its particular aspects, such as financial globalization, liberalization of international economic activities and trade.

The sphere of globalist research of international relations' security risks is shaped by the following issues: economic security and the instability of the liberal international economic order; the threat to economic security and the stability of the liberal international economic order posed by transnational organized crime.

3.3. Regionalism as an Attempt to Reconceptualize World Order

The third vector in the international relations theory is represented by the regionalist theoretical perspective. Regionalist security theories proceed from two theoretical assumptions.

- The first rests on the idea of reducing the confrontation between superpowers and the new characteristic of contemporary world politics, which is linked to the modification of the structure of political interests and the majority of countries' loss of interest in the struggle for global domination.

- The second comprises the interpretation of the post-Cold War international relations structure as characterized by the domination of national interests in assuring the maintenance of the state's dynamic development, which promotes non-participation in military campaigns and strategic confrontation in conflict zones.

This standpoint suggests an objective of revising military and political relations in a way that leaves no possibility of interference in the superpowers' internal affairs.

Thus, the regionalist tradition in the interpretation of security is distinguished by the emphasis on the basic premise, which contains the postulate of the significance of regional security dynamics as an element of the entire world security system.

Regionalism is characterized by both neorealism and globalism. Concurrently, regionalism is marked by a regional, rather than global, level of political analysis. Specifically, it is regionalism that represents the segment of international relations theory that offers truly constructive prerequisites for the formation of a complex approach, which would combine the most constructive ideas and technologies of different approaches.

Meanwhile, differentiation remains the leading trend in the development of the modern system of theoretical knowledge of international relations' security issues in the context of globalization. Regionalism, which is the promising vector of theoretical integration with the greatest potential and, possessing the greatest innovative potential in this regard, still competes with both neorealism and globalism on a number of counts.

The divergence between regionalism and neorealism is determined by the persistent conservatism of neorealist theories, which usually target single-level technologies and political analysis schemes, limited to the traditional choice in favor of the systemic level of analysis, consideration of the state as the leading actor in world politics, the preference for purely military political aspects of research and a materialistic interpretation of the events and processes under consideration.

However, mutual corrections exist in the context of both directions of political analysis of international security. In a number of cases neorealists tend to admit that the systemic level does not consistently dominate, and is not unique in the political analysis of security under modern conditions. Regionalists, in turn, include the global level in their multi-level schemes more and more often, in addition to the specific settlement, regional, and inter-regional level.

The dissociation between regionalism and globalism in the international relations theory is less apparent, and not as clearly structured as the divergence between the positions of regionalism and neorealism.

In reality, these discrepancies are more of a proclaimed nature than of a fundamental one. The new wing of modern globalism tends to stem from the idea of dialectic unity of territoriality and deterritorialization.

In fact, both globalists and regionalists tend to agree on a common position in understanding deterritorialization, with regard to the reality of this global trend, on the one hand, and agreeing with the fact that territoriality remains a seminal factor in the dynamics of numerous processes in economic and political sectors of global development, as well as the related security issues, on the other. It is the regional approach that has a more developed empirical and theoretical basis today, which ensures the correct understanding and the reliability of political analysis of the international security dynamics in a contemporary context.

3.4. Constructivism: A Distinctive Outlook on the International Arena and its Participants

Constructivism is the fourth direction that has gained a foothold in the modern theory of international relations. The constructivist approach leaves the traditional problems beyond the scope of political analysis, such as choosing the level of analysis, selecting a particular type of units for the political analysis of security. Researching the behavior of social and political entities emerges as a priority for constructivism.

The advantage offered by constructivism is in its ability to discern and recognize discourses that determine the conceptual basis of organized terrorism and counterterrorism, and the specific implications particular to these discourses, which determine the functioning and the structure of the international relations security system.

One of the seminal issues in the political analysis of security is the identification of the motives of aggression, primarily those linked to religious terrorism. Specifically, constructivist models of political analysis contain the schemes and technologies required for resolving these challenges.

4. National Security as a Priority of Kazakhstan's Domestic and Foreign Policy

In his Address to the Nation of Kazakhstan on 31 January, 2017 "The Third Modernization of Kazakhstan: Global Competitiveness" the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Naz-

arbayev had stated: "In the context of growing competitiveness and the absence of stability in the world, the value of the Strategy-2050 that I proposed to the people in 2012 is increasing. We have managed to foresee the upcoming challenges. Thanks to the Nurly Zhol economic policy and the National Plan "100 specific steps," we are going through the primary phase of the complicated global transformation with dignity. The situation in the world is changing dynamically. This is the new global reality, and we have to accept it.

"...The state of security is becoming a benchmark of a strong and viable country. The humankind has currently encountered the growth of terrorism. The issues of purging the financing of destructive forces and connections to foreign terrorist organizations are becoming seminal.

"It is crucial to conduct preventive measures in regard to the religious extremist propaganda, including that conducted via the Internet and social media. It is crucial to shape a zero-tolerance approach to any actions associated with radical expressions, especially in the sphere of religious relations within the society. Fighting cybercrime is acquiring greater relevance."[15]

The realization of the intrinsic connection between development and security has led to the formulation of a premise on the possibility of ensuring security via sustainable development.

The transition to sustainable development presumes the ensuring of security in all regards, and total security, as it was noted above, is also implemented by way of sustainable development. Such a close association between the country-wide and world security, on the one hand, and sustainable development on the other, determines the peculiarities of subsequent human existence. All means of exploring the future, including prognostic, futurological, systemic, noospheric, and other approaches that establish the security issue details, should be utilized as the methodological basis of such a perspective.

The growing global interdependence of the world and the diversification of the concept of security have clearly illustrated the need for joint sustainable development and cooperative coexistence of all the world regions.

Today the concept of sustainable development emerged as the logical result of the scientific and socioeconomic development that commenced dynamically in the 1970s, when the issues of limited natural resources, as well as of pollution of environment, which is the foundation of life, economic and any other human activity, were greatly emphasized.

This process was launched by the theory of "the limits to growth,"[16] proposed by U.S. scientists (D. Meadows *et al.*) in the early 1970s, which suggests that if the current tendencies of world population growth, the increase in industrial production, and, as a result, the exponential growth of environmental pollution and the depletion of the planet's natural potential remain in place, a so-called "global catastrophe"[17] will occur.

The emergence of the concept itself had come a long way—from Vladimir Vernadskiy's teaching on the noosphere in the 1920s-1930s and the Roman club reports in the 1970s-1980s to specific events under U.N. auspices. Several milestones may be designated in the formation of the sustainable development concept, which occurred within the structure of the United Nations under the auspices of UNESCO, UNEP and UNECOSOC, namely, the first intergovernmental Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972), and the subsequent conferences in Rio de Janeiro (1982, 1992) and, finally, in Johannesburg (2002).

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[15] The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev's Address to the Nation of Kazakhstan, 31 January, 2017 "The Third Modernization of Kazakhstan: Global Competitiveness," available at [www.strategy2050.kz].

[16] D.H. Meadows, J. Randers, D.L. Meadows & W.W. Behrens, *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*, Universe Books, 1972.

[17] N. Bostrom, M.M. Cirkovic & M.J. Rees, *Global Catastrophic Risks*, Oxford University Press, 2011.

The seminal role in the primary establishment of the sustainable development concept was played by the June 1972 Stockholm U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, whose decisions were of historic importance for all humankind. That was the first time when measures on resolving environmental deterioration issues were integrated in the government-level agenda.

The emergence of the term "sustainable development" on the international arena is linked to the name of the Prime Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland, who, in her report "Our Common Future,"[18] which was presented to the U.N. Commission on Environment in 1987, defined sustainable development as such development whereby contemporary needs are satisfied, while the ability of future generations to satisfy their needs is not compromised.

The economic, social and environmental factors form the foundation of the tri-pronged concept of sustainable development.

Thus, we can conclude that the concept of sustainable development in general and its isolated elements are currently inseparable from the concept of security. Moreover, sustainable development of the contemporary international community is the basis of the contemporary international relations system.

In the modern world, when the new world order is still being formed, we view conflicts as the reflection of the volatility of the development of certain international relations' entities. The danger of this process is in that the crisis events stemming from unsustainable development easily transfer over from the national to the regional level, and possess the potential to destabilize the entire global security system.

These tendencies are the most apparent at the regional level, and the Central Asian region is not an exception. Sustainable development of this area has seminal importance due to deficient environment, which includes the water resources' shortage problem, trans-border rivers, as well as the Aral Sea basin, the recovery of which requires several decades.

The social and economic development is complicated by the non-uniform level of development throughout the region, as well as the proximity of Afghanistan, which is unstable on many levels. Drug trafficking to Russia and Europe via the Central Asian countries remains one of the main threats.

We believe that no external forces or efforts would have been able to provoke a new revolution here, with all its consequences, had the socioeconomic situation in the country been stable and sustainable.[19]

The shift in value paradigms, on both personal and social levels, seems to be crucial in the attainment of sustainable development. Ensuring sustainable development requires not only new technologies and investments, but, first and foremost, social innovations, a shift in priorities and civilization development goals, the readiness to reject immediate profit for the sake of future generations.[20]

Kazakhstan is currently intensively implementing its new economic policy Nurly Zhol, the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, as well as a modernization of the social consciousness. An active foreign policy, which focuses its efforts on the search for amity and interests that coincide with other countries' and is based on bilateral and multilateral mutually beneficial partner relations, is essential in promoting the sustainable development priorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

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[18] *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, U.N., 1987.

[19] See: L.F. Delovarova, "Ustoichivoe razvitie i bezopasnost: vozmozhnye vyzovy dlia Tsentralnoi Azii," *Vestnik KazNu*, No. 2, 2010, pp. 15-17.

[20] See: E. Sinitsyna, "Kontseptsiia ustoichivogo razvitia," available at [http://www.cloudwatcher.ru/analytics/2/view/72/].

C o n c l u s i o n s

By the beginning of the 21st century, the quest to define security and its main reference point has become rather complicated. On the one hand, due to the dramatic expansion of the concept of security and its emergence as an essentially questionable concept—an open-type notion, whose meaning is constantly contested by various types of discourses. On the other hand, this difficulty is contained in the existence of various types of actors, who are attempting to implement security, thus, to form the reference point for security in different ways. Determining the domain of security today within the rigid disciplinary, sectoral or methodological framework is hardly possible, while the threats that emerge as significant to the contemporary actors are shifting too quickly.

The image of security today may be described, first and foremost, as the struggle of various resources grouped around different cases, the main goal of which is the possibility of their securitization. Another definition may be that of the opposition between different actors in the struggle for a legitimate opportunity to conduct their security policy, which grants the authorities the power to determine a certain case as a significant threat.

This order of things, on the one hand, complicates the picture, but, on the other hand, allows to see the concept of security dynamically—to observe how and by whom it is formed, as it acquires varying semantic meanings.[21]

While a scientific solution of the problem allows to determine the essence and the content of the concept of security, the review and analysis of security as a structural element of complex social systems allows to identify the conditions of their functioning.[22] The priority of any country on the contemporary international arena is the implementation of its foreign policy goals, which are based on its national interests.

Although in the contemporary framework military resources are still the main criterion of a country's status, an increasingly greater number of countries is attempting to influence each other with "soft power"—primarily informational and diplomatic resources.[23]

A solution lies in the implementation of common sustainable development principles and the elaboration of different versions for various countries and regions. An urgent need has emerged to prepare long-term strategic programs for simultaneous integrated resolution of demographic problems, settlement policies, state structure, and harmonization of economic activities with the environment.

The concept and the criteria of sustainable development, aimed at establishing harmonious relations between modern civilization and nature, have been thoroughly elaborated by the international scientific community.

Serious theoretical and practical developments in this area do exist, but the isolated efforts have to be integrated. Another, apparently more difficult, problem is to convince the political and economic elite of the need to switch to new development schemes. However, this is also possible, since the dividends from long-term stability outweigh instantaneous benefits and success. Today the ideology and the sustainable development practices are becoming the only alternatives to national and

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[21] For more details, see: A.N. Yurin, "K poniatiiu bezopasnost: kto i kak opredeliaet ugrozu segodnia?" available at [http://regional-dialogue.com/ru/security/].

[22] See: E.P. Litvinov, "Bezopasnost kak filosofskaia kategoriia," *Prostranstvo i vremia*, On-line Miscellany, No. 7 (1), 2014, pp. 68-71.

[23] See: S.S. Gamidov, "Problemy i puti realizatsii vneshnepoliticheskikh zadach v sovremennoi sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," *Privolzhskii nauchnyi vestnik*, No. 11 (39), 2014, pp. 130-131.

religious radicalism, as well as to socioeconomic models inherited by Central Asian countries from the Soviet epoch.[24]

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[24] See: A. Niyazi, "Konflikty v Tsentralnoi Azii i na Kavkaze kak proiavlenie sistemnykh krizisov 'novogo pokoleniia'," available at [https://www.neweurasia.info/archive/2001/top5/03_28_282.htm].

POLITICS TODAY

SHAPING NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES: RESULTS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

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ABSTRACT

National identities, considered a guarantee of successful development, were among the priorities for the five newly independent states that emerged in the territory of what used to be the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan—the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The process began when the Soviet Union still existed: the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan adopted laws on language that allowed the Central Asian elites to pass decisions related to the languages used by titular nations. In the post-Soviet years the language policy moved to the fore as one of the key aspects of the gradually emerging national identities treated with special attention at the state level.

No matter how similar the processes were, no matter how close the cultures and traditions, each of the Central Asian countries chose its own road, fine-tuned to the specifics of their domestic contexts and the interests of the elites in power. The processes unfolded in full compliance with social continuity, traditions, culture and national languages that survived under Soviet rule. The republics, however, had to take into account the national minorities, including the Russian-speaking populations, in all post-Soviet republics.

Inherited from Soviet times, the Russian language was dominant in all of the Central Asian republics, and even preserved much of its influence in the newly independent post-Soviet Central Asian states. This means that they should have opted for a relatively balanced language policy up to and including the continual stage-by-stage contraction of the spheres in which Russian was predominantly used. For obvious reasons they could not push aside their trade and economic relations with Russia and ignore the role of the Soviet cultural and educational heritage. This cushioned the political effects of the Soviet Union's disintegration, partially limited the role of nationalist parties in the newly independent states and helped preserve their educational potential.

Shaping national identities in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries was not a smooth, let alone easy, process: societies were far from homogenous, while the regions found it hard to agree to more or less reasonable compromises. This became especially apparent in Kyrgyzstan, which was divided into the southern and northern parts; in Kazakhstan, where the local society was divided into zhuzes; in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where clans carried a lot of political weight. Thus the elites in power in all of the Central Asian states had no choice but to take into account very different or even clashing interests of informal groups and clans, and tune their policies accordingly. This means that the road towards national identities was far from simple: it meandered between contradictory trends and interests. This also explains the centuries-old mechanism of governance, namely, regional-clan approaches to various problems, which was in place in all of the Central Asian countries, functioning outside the party and state structures. While paying lip service to Communist ideology, leaders of the Central Asian republics invariably took the clan balance of power into account.

From the very first days of independence, the Central Asian leaders remained loyal to the conceptual approach to national identities: they concentrated on historical heritage, culture, traditions and national language, the key element of national identity.

Despite the fairly long history of their independence, the problem of national identity remains prominent in all of the Central Asian countries. It is intertwined with the problem of the emergence of statehood and development of political systems and the radical geopolitical shifts occurring against the background of mounting economic prob-

lems. This cannot but affect the situation in the Central Asian countries in which the pro- | *cess of shaping national identities has not yet been completed.*

Introduction

The events of the late 1980s-end of 1991 have a significant effect on the future of the Central Asian republics. In an effort to acquire more political weight and influence, the elites stepped up their activities. At that time the role of the Russian language was never questioned—it dominated education and culture and remained the language of inter-national communication, even though wider spheres of application of the titular nations' languages were also discussed.

This resulted from and reflected the long-standing relationship first between the Central Asian khanates and the Russian Empire and later, in Soviet times, between the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and the federal center, on the other. Having established control over vast territories, the Russian Empire confirmed its domination through a wider use of Russian, among other things. The Soviet Union moved in the same direction towards a supra-national Soviet identity, while the Russian language bound together all ethnic groups.

In the 1930s-1940s, industrialization of the Central Asian republics attracted Russian-speaking migrants who, in fact, made modernization possible, and widened the sphere of use of the Russian language in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

In the Soviet Union the Russian language dominated the social and public spheres. It played a key role in shaping the Soviet identity in a unified state; the knowledge of Russian was an important element of a successful career in the party and state structures. On the whole, it was within the Soviet Union that the Central Asian republics instituted state structures and achieved an economic breakthrough by creating an industrial economic sector. They perfected their methods of governance and endeavored to establish their national statehoods.

First Steps towards Independence

The political processes in Central Asia were gaining momentum while the Soviet Union was still in existence. In the late 1980s, fairly active national movements emerged in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, reflecting the desire of the Central Asian elites to gain greater independence within the Soviet Union. Under the pressure of the political changes happening in the federal center, the republican leaders had no choice but to adjust to the kaleidoscope and learn to meander in order to remain in power. A tactical alliance between the party and bureaucratic elite, on the one hand, and the leaders of nationalist movements, on the other, was used by those in power to put pressure on

Moscow. In the Central Asian republics the slogans of democratization and economic and political change served as a smokescreen behind which the struggle between clans for power and control over republics' property mounted.

Moscow slackened the reins, which meant that the power within the Soviet system had to be redistributed. The institute of presidency was introduced in the Central Asian republics in order to consolidate their positions in the relationship with the federal center and the power of local elites. In some of the republics (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan may serve as pertinent examples) presidents were elected by the Supreme Soviets as evidence of informal agreements between the main political forces. Other republics (i.e., Turkmenistan) elected their presidents by popular vote while still a part of the Soviet Union. In both cases, however, the presidents were concerned, first and foremost, about the opposition, which had to be kept in check. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the opposition parties were removed from the political scene. Having accomplished this, the Central Asian republics could move towards cardinal decisions related to national identity.

The crisis mounting in the U.S.S.R. allowed the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan to exploit the situation with the aim of raising the status of titular languages through republican laws. In 1989-1990, new laws on language were passed: in 1989—in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; in 1990—in Turkmenistan. The titular nations' languages acquired the status of state languages, while the status of Russian was lowered—in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan it was defined as the language of inter-ethnic communication—but its role was still great.

In April 1990, the federal center responded with the Law on Languages of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R. in which Russian was defined as the official language of the Soviet Union.[1] This occurred too late—the law could not and did not affect the desire of all republics to raise the status of their titular languages.

Language Policy:
First Results

The first phase of new language policies in the Central Asian countries began in 1991 when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were moving towards higher statuses of their national tongues much faster than their neighbors. In the 1992 Constitution of Turkmenistan, Turkmen was defined as the state language. In 1993, the republican leaders decided to readjust the already complex language policy with a decree on trilingual education (in Turkmen, English and Russian). In real life, however, the power elites remained determined to promote the Turkmen tongue and to squeeze Russian out of the republic. The volume of teaching conducted in Russian and national minorities' languages was gradually contracting; street signs were replaced, and all the officials were expected to master Turkmen.

Uzbekistan was also active in the language sphere: it relied on historical heritage, the period of Central Asian khanates and paid particular attention to the ancient origins of Uzbek civilization. This justified the policy that aimed for the accelerated introduction of Uzbek as the state language to be used in all power structures. Uzbek language classes were organized, the secondary schools curricu-

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[1] See: M.A. Arutiunova, "Yazykovaia politika i status russkogo iazyka v SSSR i gosudarstvakh postsovetskogo prostranstva," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta,* Series *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i mirovaia politika*, No. 1, 2012, pp. 155-178.

lum was radically changed, traditional festivals and other cultural events became much more frequent. For obvious reasons, the Russian language issue was absent from the 1992 Constitution and the preceding Law on Language. The road, however, was a bumpy one: making Uzbek the state language obligatory for all officials was an unattainable goal.

These problems did not discourage the Central Asian elites: inspired by the idea of national states they never abandoned or revised their approaches to nation-building. National identities seemed like a sufficient explanation and justification of new foreign policy vectors and new value systems that replaced the communist ideology. It was expected that language, education, culture and history would add appeal to the new ideas that the elites tried to plant in the minds of common people in the form of new axiological landmarks, revised history and reinterpreted historical facts. Each of the post-Soviet states was consistently creating its "true" pre-Soviet history by raising folklore to the status of official history and adopting national flags and symbols.[2] National resurrection was treated as an all-important goal; new national histories were constructed to suit the political tasks of the new post-Soviet elites that relied on pre-Soviet history. A consistent language policy was an inevitable companion of active manipulations with historical facts designed to awaken national self-awareness and confirm national specifics.

No matter how persistent, the efforts to accelerate the process of building national states, and to shape what was considered adequate national elites ran against the problems created by the region's economic ties with post-Soviet countries, kinship ties and the absence of nationalist forces that relied on considerable financial support and a sustainable electorate. Central Asian societies were disunited, meanwhile, as could well be expected, the clan system and ethnic and religious disagreements survived. National integrity was destabilized by national and religious conflicts, separatism and even wars between states.[3] Central Asian elites persisted in their efforts to plant new ideas and values and to transform their polyethnic and multi-confessional populations into nations.[4] This policy can be aptly described as one aimed at "ethnic revival" designed to bring members of the titular nation to the fore in all spheres of life.[5]

Titular nations and national languages (perceived as one of the symbols of state independency and national identity) remained in the center of attention. It turned out, however, that in the complicated political situations that prevailed in all countries, it was difficult to find alternatives to Communist ideology and the Russian language. The elites were locked in a power struggle, while the convoluted social and economic problems were pushed aside. The newly-independent Central Asian countries were confronted with the impossibly low level of command of national languages. The majority of the republics' populations (in which members of titular nations prevailed) preferred Russian as the language of everyday communication. Central Asian elites took shape in the Soviet Union, where the Russian language was a consolidating factor, the role of which was never doubted. This explains why the elaboration of language policies in the Central Asian states proved to be a daunting task and why it turned out to be next to impossible to use national languages in everyday communication as readily as expected. The language reform stalled because Russian was widely used in all countries. Their elites limited themselves to replacing geographic names and the names of territorial-administrative units inherited from the Soviet Union, while family names regained their historical originals.

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[2] See: M. Laruelle, "Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoy Azii," *Pro et Contra,* No. 1, 2013, pp. 16-20.

[3] See: E.T. Seylekhanov, *Politicheskaia sistema Respubliki Kazakhstan: opyt razvitia i perspektivy,* KISI at the President of the RK, Almaty, 2009, p. 62.

[4] See: R.K. Kadyrzhanov, *Etnokulturny simvolizm i natsionalnaia identichnost Kazakhstana*, ed. by Z.K. Shaukenova, Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies KN MON RK, Almaty, 2014, 168 pp.

[5] See: M.V. Starchak, "Obrazovanie na russkom iazyke v gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoy Azii-chlenakh SNG: problemy i puti reshenia," *Problemy natsionalnoy strategii,* No. 3, 2010, pp. 52-65.

The Russian language, a part of the Soviet heritage, widely used in all spheres of social life in the post-Soviet states, was one of the stumbling blocks on the road towards national identity. Central Asian elites wanted to rely on traditions and mechanisms of power inherited from the pre-Soviet past, the most important of them being informal agreements, an indispensable element in the countries divided into regions and societies divided into clans. Deeply rooted in the region's past, these elements survived the Soviet Union. Under Soviet power, however, clan disagreements remained suppressed: the federal center spared no effort to maintain a balance between rivaling clans and severely suppressed all attempts at independence. The newly-independent Central Asian states were all too eager to demonstrate that they had detached themselves from the Soviet past, and that their regimes differed from the Soviet regime. Greater attention to national identities up to and including the efforts to develop the titular national language were intended as a departure from everything Soviet.

The language policy in these states was the central element of shaping national identities, its tasks and paces determined by the political elites in power; their attitude to the national and minorities' languages.

The language policy in all Central Asian countries was highly politicized; passions flew high, a sure sign of a highly complicated situation. This means that the political elites had no choice but to take the views and opinions of the highly heterogeneous societies into account. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan the outflow of the Russian-speaking population, frightened by the widely popularized ideas of national distinctions, strongly affected the pace of the introduction of language policies.[6] Their elites had no choice but to adjust their policy to a degree to support the Russian language in these republics.

New Identity:
Reliance on Titular Nations

Confronted with or even challenged by these problems, Central Asian elites did not change their approach: they remained convinced that statehood and identity could and should be built on titular nations as the foundation. These ideas were further developed in the constitutions and laws related to language policies.

The post-Soviet Central Asian countries selected one of the two roads leading to the target aim: Uzbekistan pushed aside the interests of national minorities and opted for Latinization via the law of September 1993 (the process was expected to be completed by 2000). Later on the implementation period was extended to 2005, but the process has yet to be completed. In December 1995, Uzbekistan adopted a new version of the same law, which confirmed the status of Uzbek as the state language. Three years later, in 1998, the law was annulled. The Russian language reappeared in official documents, which was quite logical: the political elite knew Russian better than their native languages.

Turkmenistan followed a more or less similar course. In April 1993, the president signed the decree on Latinization, which defined 1996 as the deadline; subsequently the cutoff date was pushed to 2000. The process was not completed by either the earlier or later date. The intensified Turkmenization limited the role of the Russian language: having gained independence, "Turkmenistan ac-

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[6] See: *Natsionalnye istorii na postsovetskom prostranstve-II,* ed by F. Bomsdorf, G. Bordiugov, The Friedrich Naumann Foundation AIRO-XXI, Moscow, 2009, 372 c.

corded a de facto higher status to its titular population, ethnic Turkmen, and adopted policies and practices that promoted its specific interests."[7]

In both countries it was expected that the Latin script would limit the cultural and educational impact of their Soviet past and legitimize the positions of the new elite. In plain words, it meant that Latinization would tighten the elite's grip on power.

Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with their multinational populations exerted more caution. They preferred to implement their language policies step by step. In August 1995, the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted its Constitution, wherein Art 7 stated that Kazakh was the state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan and that "in the state organizations and local government bodies Russian is officially used on an equal basis with Kazakh."

In Kazakhstan, all definitions of national identity clearly point to the Kazakh ethnicity as the core of the state and to its special responsibility for the processes unfolding in the country and language policy in particular. Republican leaders never abandoned their efforts to find the mechanisms by which the role of the Russian language could be taken into account. In 1995, the republic established the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, which convened to address numerous issues, including language.

The Concept of the Formation of State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in 1996 claimed the Kazakh idea to be the cornerstone of Kazakhstan's identity.[8] This document specified the aims of state policy in the language sphere and created conditions for the further development of Kazakh as the state language.[9] Later, in July 1997 the country adopted the Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which dealt with the function of different languages in the country and endowed Russian with a special status. This means that the country's leaders tried to preserve the role of the Russian language, while moving the national tongue to the fore.

The 1994 Constitution of Tajikistan defined Tajik as the state language and pushed Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication aside. In 1997, the language situation in the republic was further elaborated in the Program of the Government of Tajikistan for the Development of the State and Other Languages in the State Territory of the Republic of Tajikistan.

All in all, despite the deliberately demonstrative trend to take into account the multinational composition and avoid any discriminatory measures against the Russian language, it was pushed to the margins. The reforms in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan reflected the desire of the elites to assert and confirm their national identities.

Language Policy:
No Compromises

In the early 21st century, the Central Asian countries arrived at a clear and unambiguous decision: a commitment solely to the interests of the titular nation. The pace of language reforms and the methods used varied from country to country, while the interests of social and political stability dictated caution in the language sphere.

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[7] A. Bohr, *Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,* The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatam House, 2016, p. 33.

[8] See: E.E. Omelchenko, "Protsessy natsiestroitelstva i formirovaniia identichnosti na postsovetskom prostranstve (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus)," *Kazakhstan-Spektr,* No. 1, 2010, pp. 30-43.

[9] See: *Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta RK ot 4.11.1996 No. 3186 "O kontseptsii iazykovoy politiki Respubliki Kazakhstan,"* available at [http://kazakhstan.news-city.info/docs/sistemsl/dok_pegtfo.htm], 5 December, 2017.

In 2000, speaking at the 7th Session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev had pointed out that Kazakh cultural affinity should be based on Kazakh culture; subsequently he emphasized the consolidating role of Kazakh ethnicity. In 2001, Kazakhstan adopted the State Program of Functioning and Development of Languages for 2001-2010 to gradually expand the sphere of Kazakh language usage and narrow down the public sphere of the Russian language. The republican leaders staked on the Kazakh language, something that those who wanted to consolidate Kazakh identity insisted on. The president of Kazakhstan, in particular, repeated that the knowledge of the titular tongue was critically important for the nation's cohesion.

The interests of the Russian-speaking population could not be ignored, either. The authorities tried to reduce tension through all sorts of initiatives. In October 2006, speaking at the 12th session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, the president formulated the idea of trilingualism, which he developed in his 2007 address "New Kazakhstan in a New World": "I propose to begin a step-by-step implementation of the 'The Unity of Three Languages' cultural project. Kazakhstan must be perceived by the world as a country with a highly educated population, which can use three languages." In 2012, he returned to the idea and pointed out: "We should treat the Russian language and Cyrillic writing in the same caring way as we do Kazakh."[10] On the whole, the lack of tension in the language sphere helped preserve stability and keep inter-national tensions in check.

Kyrgyzstan followed a more or less similar road. In 2000, it adopted the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Official Language of the Kyrgyz Republic, where Russian was defined as official. In 2001, this status was confirmed in the newly adopted Constitution. Later on in the same year the president issued a decree in regard to the Program of the Development of the State Language of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2000-2010, which was designed to develop the Kyrgyz language and ensure its more active use in all social spheres. In 2004, the republic adopted a new Law on the Official Language of the Kyrgyz Republic, which reconfirmed the status of Kyrgyz as the state language and of Russian as an official one. The 2007 Constitution confirmed both statuses.

Tajikistan adopted the Law on the State Language of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2009, according to which the Tajik language was to be used in official documents. This predetermined the key role of the titular ethnicity, while Russian was deprived of its status of the inter-ethnic communication language. Subsequently, in 2011, the amended law restored its status.

The Central Asian countries faced the challenging task of gradually promoting the titular nations' languages, while limiting the sphere where the Russian language, the greatest barrier on the road towards a stronger statehood, was used. Titular languages were perceived as unifying factors.

The process was a slow one, even though the states were doing their best to support their state languages. Other, non-titular, ethnic groups demonstrated no enthusiasm when it came to learning the languages of the titular Central Asian nations. This meant that the corresponding languages could not be regarded as the cornerstone of national identities. City dwellers who habitually used Russian in everyday communications showed no strong desire to learn the national languages.

It is even harder to impose shared values: members of other ethnic groups rejected them as alien to their identities. For obvious reasons, non-titular populations could not be integrated in the tribal-clan system, while the titular nations were, in fact, divided by all sorts of traditions into tribes, zhuzes and clans stamped with regional specifics.

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[10] [http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-state].

Political Process and
Identity

The political processes unfolding in Central Asia were highly contradictory since the institutes of power, the party system and the attempts to identify the roles and places of the opposition parties were developing under pressure from tribes and regional clans. This is explained by the powerful structures on which local societies represented by regional, tribal, clan and other traditional units relied for self-regulation, and which inevitably affected domestic and foreign policies.[11]

In an effort to resemble democratic states, the post-Soviet Central Asian countries elected their parliaments and presidents and followed the separation of powers principle only to discover that they were not yet ready to construct political systems according to Western patterns.[12] The local political elites used traditional methods of governance that relied on compromises between informal groups of influence. This was partly rooted in the Soviet system of state governance in Central Asia, which combined party and state with regional-clan approaches. Predictably, independence added a spark to the struggle between clans and groups of influence that unfolded behind the screen of negotiations regarding democratic changes. It was hardly a surprise that Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan between 1991 and 2016, took special and very active measures to neutralize the most powerful regional and ethnic clans.[13]

In practically all of the Central Asian countries the clans consented to no compromises; they were determined to redistribute power not among branches of government but between the key elite groups, which the republics inherited from the Soviet past, when they had been formed according to local traditions and historical specifics.[14] Central Asian clans are rooted in the region's past and culture. The tribal-clan and territorial division is essential to the region's countries and plays a key role in their political life. Not infrequently, candidates for political and economic posts are recommended by territorial units.[15]

Personified power and the reliance on one's own ethnic group, clan or region explain why local regimes became authoritarian after a while. The Supreme Soviets elected in Soviet times, when a different model and very different interests dominated the region, were replaced with the institute of presidency. From that time on, the president was seen as the key figure responsible for foreign policy, who also plays a great role in internal developments. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan worked hard to introduce and consolidate democratic institutions, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been infringing on the rights of their parliaments from the outset. For instance, in 1991 the Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet amended the law on the status of deputy under which any deputy could be deprived of his mandate for anti-constitutional actions and destabilization of social and political situation. Under the Constitution, Turkmenistan was a presidential republic in which the president was the head of the state and the executive branch. In 1992, when the Constitution and the reforms were drafted, Sapar-

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[11] See: A.D. Bogaturov, A.S. Dundich, V.G. Korgun, *et al.*, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentralnoy Azii: sobytia i dokumenty,* Aspekt-Press, Moscow, 2011, p. 19.

[12] See: S. Zhiltsov, "Political Processes in Central Asia: Peculiarities, Problems, Prospects," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1, Vol. 17, 2016, pp. 21-29.

[13] See: *Tsentralnaia Azia: 1991-2009,* Monograph, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI at the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2010, p. 199.

[14] See: R.Yu. Khadyrov, "Osobennosti politicheskoy sistemy Tadzhikistana," *Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva (Post-Soviet Issues),* No. 2, 2016, pp. 104-111.

[15] See: R.Yu. Khadyrov, "Rol klanov vo vnutrenney politike Tadzhikistana. Aktualnye problemy razvitia postsovetskogo prostranstva," *Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii (Moskva, 2 aprelia 2015 g.),* MGOU, Moscow, 2015, p. 124.

murat Niyazov, who headed the country between 1991 and 2006, pointed out that his country should not copy the state systems of other countries but should rely on the Turkmen history, traditions and experience.[16]

The relationships between authorities and the opposition were strongly affected by the fact that in the Central Asian countries the power was concentrated in the hands of the president. The so-called official opposition was impotent—it could not affect domestic or foreign policies. The democratic norms produced little or no effect on the political elites' actions on the domestic political scene: the democratic institutions and procedures existed side by side with the methods directly related to the mentality and history of the Central Asian countries.[17] This made the political struggle in Central Asia highly distinctive: it retreated from the public sphere to behind-the-scene arrangements. Cabinets were removed and snap parliamentary elections organized to strengthen the position of the president. On the whole, the Central Asian countries have not yet achieved continuity of supreme power.[18]

Consolidation of power in the hands of the president and the trend towards limiting the leeway of the opposition changed the relationships between authorities and nationalist movements, which by inertia from the 1980s demanded political and economic reforms.

The Central Asian countries that moved away from the Soviet experience encouraged clan and hierarchical approaches to state governance. Having outlived the Soviet Union, they became pronounced enough to determine the approach to the shaping of political systems for many decades to come. This process fully reflected the Central Asian peculiarities and relied on the region's long history. Indeed, Western democratic standards—the president, elections and the party system—have nothing in common with traditional Asian societies.[19] In addition, "the ideals, principles, and standards of developed societies, as well as anything resembling an authentic national doctrine, were replaced with imitations, a façade of democracy; promises of national plans to develop government language policy, history, and the culture of the people became merely decorative."[20]

In clan societies political and economic elites are intertwined, therefore, regional elites compete for political power that, as they are well aware, equals control over the economy.

The region's historical and cultural heritage strongly affected the ways, in which the political systems developed in each of the countries: the post-Soviet ideological vacuum was filled with mythologized history and historical heroes.[21] Having pushed the Communist ideology aside, local leaders armed themselves with the idea of a national state. The new political elites needed legitimate arguments to justify their pivot to a national state; they used history to push the origins of statehood deeper into antiquity in order to inflate national grandeur.[22]

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[16] See: K.P. Dudarev, "Postkommunisticheskiy avtoritarny rezhim," in: *Postsovetskaia Tsentralnaia Azia. Poteri i obretenia,* Vostochnaya literatura RAN, Moscow, 1998, p. 167.

[17] See: Kh.Kh. Khurramov, "Vzaimootnosheniia oppozitsii i vlastey v Tadzhikistane: istoria i sovremennost," *Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva (Post-Soviet Issues),* No. 2, 2016, pp. 112-116.

[18] See: *Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii,* ed. by A.A. Dynkin, V.G. Baranovskiy, IMEMO, Moscow, 2013, 150 pp.

[19] See: E. Luzanova, "Mezhdunarodny seminar 'Politicheskoe razvitie Tsentralnoy Azii i Tsentralnoy Evropy: skhodstvo, razlichiia, puti sotrudnichestva,'" *Tsentralnaia Azia,* No. 10, 1997.

[20] V. Tuleshov, "On the Question of the Formation and Development of Identity in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia Region," in: *Central Asia at 25: Looking Back, Moving Forward. A Collection of Essays from Central Asia,* Central Asia Program, Washington, D.C., 2017, pp. 32-35.

[21] See: M.A. Neymark, "Kultura kak resurs natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossii," in: *Sovremenny mir i geopolitika,* Kanon +, Moscow, 2015, pp. 158-175.

[22] See: R. Agaev, "TsAR: problemy evoliutsii politicheskikh system," in: *Tsentralnaia Aziia: geopolitika i ekonomika regiona,* Krasnaia zvezda, Moscow, 2010, p. 15.

The Constitutions that all Central Asian countries adopted in the early 1990s redistributed power in favor of the president and de facto deprived parliaments of independence. The region's most typical feature is indicative of the specifics of its political system: a state should be governed from the center, while political rivalry between government branches should be limited. Having pushed the parliaments to the back burner, the Central Asian countries adopted new constitutions that allotted wider or practically unlimited power to the presidents and limited powers of other government branches to the greatest extent.[23]

Convinced that the opposition posed a threat to their power, Central Asian presidents persistently pushed it out of the political sphere. In Kazakhstan, "peaceful coexistence" of authorities and the opposition survived till the mid-1990s; in Uzbekistan, authorities did not hesitate to push the opposition into an impossibly narrow framework to downplay its influence. Predictably, authoritarian trends in the Central Asian countries grew even stronger.

The checks and balances system, commonly implemented in the West, was not popular with the authoritarian Central Asian regimes that nevertheless carried out parliamentary elections and maintained a sham party system to create an illusion of democracy. Central Asia, however, remained as it really was: a region of politically passive population that close ranks with people in power and the elites, obviously unwilling to structure the political space. The archaic political system allowed tribal, clan and regional systems to move to the fore to defend their local interests through agreements reached behind the scenes and amid outbursts of clan rivalry. Political parties set up to demonstrate devotion to the principles of democracy, democratic reforms and changes in the political sphere were nothing more than a façade behind which the real mechanism of decision-making was functioning. Political parties were founded on the basis of regional or clan interests rather than ideological principles; this explains why the semblance of political struggle in these countries was not inspired by ideological disagreements, but by the clashing interests of different clans.

The president's extensive powers relied on historical traditions: the head of state was perceived as the national leader with unlimited powers. The extent of presidential powers differed from country to country, yet the trend remained the same. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan parliaments remained formally independent, while in the neighboring Central Asian countries they could not compete with the president's de facto unlimited powers.

Under the 1993 Constitution Kyrgyzstan became a parliamentary republic with the separation of powers that distinguished it from the rest of the Central Asian countries. In the first years of independence, the president was elected by popular vote, and acquired the widest possible powers as the guarantor of the country's unity. The Supreme Soviet was thus deprived of at least part of its power and political influence. Obviously determined to follow the path of Western democracies, Bishkek tried to prove that the parliamentary form of governance fully corresponded to the country's traditions.

However, the viability of the country divided into clans, tribes and regional groups was heavily tested by the parliamentary system, the fact amply confirmed by two coups d'état organized by regional leaders who wanted to acquire political and economic power at one blow. In 2010, the next coup created a faltering parliamentary-presidential form of government that pushed the state towards disintegration.[24]

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[23] See: D.E. Furman, "Evoliutsia politicheskikh system stran SNG," in: *Sredizemnomor'e-Chernomor'e-Kaspiy: mezhdu Bolshoy Evropoy i Bolshim Blizhnim Vostokom*, ed. by N.P. Shmelev, V.A. Guseynov, A.D. Yazkova, Grantisa, Moscow, 2006, p. 136.

[24] See: D.A. Aleksandrov, I.V. Ippolitov, S.D. Popov, "Miagkaya sila kak instrument amerikanskoy politiki v Tsentralnoy Azii," in: *Tsentralnaya Azia: problemy i perspektivy (vzgliad iz Rossii i Kitaia),* RISI, Moscow, 2013, p. 28.

In the absence of adequate legal mechanisms of cooperation between the governmental branches, the political systems where informal agreements and clan (rather than state) interests predominate become unsteady and therefore unable to oppose external and internal challenges. This deprives the state power structure of self-sufficiency: it becomes nothing more than the forums where sub-state groups of influence are struggling for their own security and monopoly over the state.[25]

Political processes unfolding in the Central Asian countries are strongly affected by the economic situation, in which the elites, unable to cope with urgent regional problems, are locked in fierce and gradually mounting rivalry for the very limited resources; the social situation burdened with unemployment is meanwhile deteriorating from bad to worse. This naturally affects the approaches that Central Asian elites undertake when trying to secure their power and ensure stability. Turkmenistan, in which rivaling groups are fairly active despite the apparently authoritarian regime, is the best example. The clan structure of Turkmen society has been preserved; today a new generation of clan leaders has joined or will soon join the fracas.[26]

The presidents of all the Central Asian states have no choice but to balance out the groups and clans to keep them in check and avoid encroachments on the ruling elite's positions. In the last twenty years, the political elites have lost some of their impact on domestic policy. So far, institutionalized relationships and the more developed formal mechanisms of power still share the spheres of politics and economics with informal relationships. Kyrgyzstan is one of the best examples: despite its parliamentary-presidential form of governance the president determines domestic and foreign policies. This was fully confirmed by the 2017 presidential elections.

Conclusion

Since the very first days of independence, the Central Asian states have been trying to limit the sphere of influence of the Russian language: the trend towards establishing national states began in the Soviet Union where it was restricted by the situation in the republics and their continued and complete dependence on Russia. This means that identity potential was and remains a resource of social development.[27]

The decisions passed by the legislative structures and a wider sphere of use of the titular languages did not manage to squeeze the Russian out of the educational sphere entirely. In fact, its continued use helped preserve the educational potential. The same fully applies to the social sphere in which Russian is used for communication. Concerted efforts to introduce the national languages of the CIS countries as state languages challenged the positions which the Russian language held in official record-keeping, education, culture and the media. Despite its objective role as the language of inter-national communication, Russian was lowered to the status of just one of the national minorities' languages with very limited spheres of use.[28]

The role of the Russian language was restored in 2016-2017, when Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan revived their trade, economic and political contacts with Russia, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakh-

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[25] See: *Tsentralnaia Azia i Kaspiysky region: riski, vyzovy, ugrozy: kollektivnaia monografia*, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI, Almaty, 2012, p. 79.

[26] See: Yu. Fedorov, "Turkmenia: vremia peremen?" *Indeks bezopasnosti,* No. 3-4, 2009, pp. 91-114.

[27] See: *Identichnost: lichnost, obshchestvo, politika. Entsiklopedicheskoe izdanie,* ed. by I.S. Semenenko, IMEMO RAN, Ves mir Publishers, Moscow, 2017, 992 pp.

[28] See: L. Khoperskaya, *Netitulnaia sudba: rossiiskie sootechestvenniki v Tsentralnoy Azii,* Moscow Human Rights Bureau, Moscow, Akademia, 2013, p. 58.

stan joined the Eurasian Economic Union. It remains essential in education and public life across the post-Soviet space.

The political situation in the Central Asian countries and their identities will be strongly affected by their decision to adopt the Latin script. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have been making great efforts to move in this direction, however, achieving no impressive results so far.

In 2017, Kazakhstan chose the same path. However, this long and expensive process does not guarantee a higher status for the titular language and may negatively affect the state's future. If the trend continues, the Kazakh language will be confronted with problems in state and educational organizations.[29]

In 2006, a special commission concluded that "Latinization could be carried out over a 15 to 20-year period... Supporters argued that Latinization would break down language barriers, diminish Russian influence and strengthen Kazakh identity."[30]

This means that the switch to the Latin script was designed for the country to remove itself as far away from Russia as possible. The Central Asian countries encountered two challenges in the transition period: to establish a state with structures adequate to the current tasks and challenges and to create a national identity.

A weak economy and transformation strategies imposed by the West create an even bigger challenge.[31]

It turned out that staking solely on the language of the titular nation was insufficient. This is amply confirmed by the recent surge of interest in the studies of Russian. People in power in the Central Asian countries have tried to balance out Russian with the titular nations' languages. In fact, the political landscapes in all of them are dominated by clan rivalries that are much stronger than class inequality.

The clan nature was and remains a fairly serious obstacle on the road towards modern national states.[32] Thus all Central Asian countries today are facing the need to maintain formally equal statuses of all languages in order to avoid tension in this sphere and to improve the mechanisms of reinforcing the positions of the titular nations' languages. This is a big challenge and an absolute priority for all countries in Central Asia.

Different countries rely on different methods and choose different roads, meanwhile, exclusive reliance on the titular nations may cost them stability. Intra-state conflicts and ethnic clashes may become feasible. No wonder that the authorities focus on language policy as one of the instruments of constructing national identities.

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[29] See: *Regulirovanie etnopoliticheskoy konfliktnosti i podderzhka grazhdanskogo soglasia v usloviiakh kulturnogo raznoobrazia: modeli, podkhody, praktiki,* ed. by I.S. Semenenko, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2017, p. 82.

[30] B. Kellner-Heinkele, J.M. Landau, *Language Politics in Contemporary Central Asia: National and Ethnic Identity and the Soviet Legacy,* I.B.Tauris, 2011, p. 103.

[31] See: P. Linke, V. Naumkin, *Politicheskiy protsess v Tsentralnoy Azii: rezultaty, problemy, perspektivy,* IV RAN, Moscow, 2011, p. 368.

[32] See: D.B. Malysheva, "Paradoksy natsionalnoy idei i problemy stanovleniia gosudarstvennosti v postsovetskom prostranstve," *MEiMO,* No. 11, 1998, pp. 151-155.

SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN ELITES AS A CONFLICT POTENTIAL

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A B S T R A C T

T he authors have studied the main potentially conflicting factors of the regional ethnopolitical elites' actions in their respective regions, traced the emergence and development of these factors and sorted out the origins of conflicts and their escalation using the Northern Caucasus as an example. The region's economic backwardness, poverty, unemployment and social differentiation are considered the main source of potentially conflicting behavior. Much attention is paid to indirect indicators of the local population's standard of living.

Regional stability is threatened, first and foremost, by the local elite's clan and tribal organization principles and the mechanism of new member incorporation that excludes the majority of the local younger generation from adequate employment that would have helped them realize their educational and professional potentials. So far, the regional political system is developing as paternalist and traditionalist, and is replenished from the channels inaccessible to common people; this causes well-justified irritation and lowers the level of institutional trust. To remain in control of power distribution in clans and cliques, the regional elites relied and are still relying on the ethnic mobilization potential. The archaic replenishment mechanisms and the low quality of the ruling elites are responsible, to a great extent, for the region's depressive economies.

The authors have thoroughly described how those determined to remain in power invent myths and use them as a brainwashing instrument. People have not yet disentangled themselves from the web of traditional practices and pagan prejudices. This is confirmed by numerous examples of mythologization of public consciousness and speaks volumes of the fairly low educational and cultural levels of the local population.

In conclusion, the authors recommend blocking out conflict behavior for the sake of a smoothly functioning political system in the region. To achieve this goal, corruption should be finally curbed, while transparency should become an inalienable characteristic of elections and power institutions. The region needs more jobs in all economic sectors; its industry should be revived at a faster pace, while the tourist sector should become more attractive. The Northern Caucasus should be fully integrated into the common social and cultural space by tuning up interregional cooperation and working out a more balanced information policy designed to prevent all forms of discrimination, first and foremost, religious and ethnic.

The economic agenda cannot be addressed until all political tasks—security, uncompromising struggle against corruption in all spheres, including the judicial, nepotism, and strict observance of human and civil rights — have been resolved.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

All destructive and destabilizing factors behind conflicts and violence should be carefully studied. This is a task of huge practical importance. Much has already been written about the trends, tasks and methods of political governance in polyethnic regions. Such are the works dealing with regional

and ethnic factors behind the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus written by V. Avksentyev, V. Chernous, M. Savva, I. Dobaev, V. Akaev and others.[1] An in-depth analysis of the entities of political processes (in the Northern Caucasus they are the high-status ethnopolitical elites) is very important for applied political science.

On the whole, the mobilization potential of ethnopolitical elites that rely on political practices is very strong. In the Northern Caucasus the ethnic, teip and family clans as well as cliques of all sorts are especially powerful, which explains why the federal center prefers to move cautiously when dealing with political issues and take local traditions and customs into account. The ethnic elite, on their side, exploits this to haggle for greater budget subsidies and delineation of the spheres of influence.[2]

Armed with economic, political and ethnocultural resources, the elites strongly affect strategic decision-making and impose certain behavior norms (the rules of the game) on the main actors of political governance in the region. They have preserved the authoritarian traditions of the past and continue functioning as paternalist protectionist structures in line with the patron-client model. This cannot but affect ethnogenesis and stir up social conflicts.

Today, political scientists concentrate on identifying and analyzing the factors that may cause conflicts and the way they affect political processes. In this context it is especially important to analyze the mechanisms and specifics of political processes unfolding in the region that are, on the whole, responsible for destructive conflicts and social tension. All conflicts can be classified according to the disposition of the sides involved: the center-region vertical, inter-republic horizontal, the region-local vertical. In the North Caucasian Federal District (NCFD) the multisided and protracted clashes of interests and values can be subdivided into ethnopolitical, economic, socially stratified, political, religious and identity conflicts.[3]

The region owes its very high conflict potential to the huge amount of privately owned weapons, legal nihilism and the chain of inter-state and national conflicts (the Russian-Chechen conflict that has spread to the neighboring areas of Daghestan, as well as the Osset-Chechen events).

In the region where the state is merged with business, where the elites keep distinctly apart from common people, where common law predominates together with authoritarianism and corruption, old conflicts inevitably become even more pronounced while new problems appear.[4]

Social and Economic Factors behind the Causes of Conflicts

Economic backwardness, low incomes of the common people, social differentiation, poverty, unemployment and marginalization are the main obstacles on the road towards social integration.

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[1] See: V.A. Avksentyev, *Etnicheskaia konfliktologia: v poiskakh paradigmy,* Stavropol, 2001; V.M. Iurchenko, *Politika kak faktor regionalnoy konfliktnosti,* Krasnodar, 1997; V.V. Chernous, "Sovremennye geopoliticheskie faktory konfliktogennosti na iuge Rossii," in: *Faktory konfliktogennosti na Severnom Kavkaze,* Rostov on Don, 2005, pp. 237-247; V.A. Avksentyev, G.D. Gritsenko, A.V. Dmitriev, *Regionalnaia konfliktologia: kontsepty i rossiyskaia* praktika, ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, Corresponding Member, RAS, Alfa-M, Moscow, 2008; M.V. Savva, *Etnicheskiy status (Konfliktologicheskiy analiz sotsialnogo fenomena),* Krasnodar, 1997.

[2] See: A. Salgiriev, "The Northern Caucasus: Tribal-Clan Structure of the Political Elites as a Factor of Political Tension," *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* Vol. 17, No. 1, 2016, pp. 29-35.

[3] See: A.R. Salgiriev, *Politicheskie elity sovremennoy Rossii kak sub'ekt upravlenia politicheskimi protsessami (na materialakh respublik Severnogo Kavkaza)*, Ph.D. thesis, Kuban State University, Krasnodar, 2012, p. 18.

[4] See: P.Ia. Feldman, "Partikuliarizm interesov kak ugroza sotsialno-politicheskoy stabilnosti sovremennoy Rossii," *POISK: Politika. Obshchestvovedenie. Iskusstvo, Sotsiologoia. Kultura,* No. 4 (51), 2015, pp. 90-98.

Indeed, low incomes are clearly correlated with high social and political tension; they may stir up crime, extremism and even terrorism.

An average annual level of unemployment is presented in Tables 1 and 2.

T a b l e 1

**Dynamics of the Level of Registered Unemployment
(according to the RF Ministry for the Northern Caucasus) in 2015-2017**

	By 1 April, 2015		By 1 April, 2016		By 1 April, 2017	
	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %
RF as a whole	1,001.5	1.3	1,062.0	1.4	911.3	1.2
NCFD	**197.7**	**4.4**	**170.8**	**3.8**	**144.8**	**3.2**
RD	**27.6**	**2.1**	**28.4**	**2.2**	**27.3**	**2.0**
RI	33.6	15.9	29.7	13.3	24.9	10.8
KBR	9.1	2.1	9.4	2.2	8.9	2.1
KChR	4.3	1.9	4.4	2.0	3.9	1.8
RSO-A	9.3	2.8	8.8	2.7	9.0	2.8
ChR	98.1	15.5	74.6	12.1	57.2	9.2
Stavropol Territory	15.7	1.1	15.5	1.1	13.8	1.0

S o u r c e: Information about the realization of the state program of the Russian Federation "Razvitie Severo-Kavkazskogo Federalnogo Okruga" na period do 20125 goda i sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Severo-Kavkazskogo federalnogo okruga ianvar-mart 2017 goda, available at [http://www.minkavkaz.gov.ru/upload/iblock/7e5/ser_2017_invar_mart.pdf/].

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the level of unemployment in the North Caucasian Federal District was and remains high. According to the RF Ministry for the Northern Caucasus as of 1 April, 2017, the level of registered unemployment in the district constituted 3.2% against Russia's national average of 1.2%; the number of unemployed—144,800 in the Northern Caucasus and 911,300 in Russia. Calculated by the WTO methodology, the level of unemployment was 11.4% against Russia's national average of 5.6%; the number of unemployed—517,000 (Russia's national average is 4,207,900). This is the country's highest level of unemployment (2.67 times higher than Russia's national average); today, the level of unemployment is gradually decreasing.

A prohibitively large share of shadow economy (the workforce in it has already reached 40 to 60% of the total) is another potentially conflicting factor especially pronounced in the North-Eastern Caucasian republics.[5] According to the RF Federal Service of Statistics,[6] in 2015 the workforce in the

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[5] See: G.G. Matishov, L.V. Batiev, I.V. Pashchenko, I.V. Romanov, *Atlas sotsialno-politicheskikh problem, ugroz i riskov Yuga Rossii,* Vol. 5, Special issue, Moscow, 2011, p. 43.

[6] See: *Ekonomicheskaia aktivnost naselenia Rossii*, Official Site of the Federal State Statistics Service of RF, available at [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1139918584312], 14 August, 2017.

North Caucasian Federal District comprised 4,492,300, while the number of those employed in the non-formal economic sector was 1,882,600, that is, 45.6% of the total. This means that shadow economy (and small businesses) employs a considerable share of the able-bodied population and produces a sizeable amount of goods and agricultural products.

T a b l e 2

**Dynamics of the Level of Unemployment
(based on the WTO methodology) in 2015-2017**

	By 1 April, 2015		By 1 April, 2016		By 1 April, 2017	
	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %	Number of Unem-ployed, thou.	Level of Unemploy-ment, %
RF as a whole	4,360.0	5.7	4,474.6	5.9	4,207.9	5.6
NCD	509.9	11.4	526.3	11.7	517.0	11.4
RD	140.2	10.9	153.6	11.6	171.2	12.6
RI	66.8	30.0	71.4	31.0	65.9	27.1
KBR	51.6	12.2	48.7	11.3	49.5	11.7
KChR	30.2	14.1	27.4	12.4	31.5	15.9
RSO-A	34.5	10.4	40.4	12.9	42.2	12.9
ChR	107.3	17.6	103.0	16.6	88.8	14.3
Stavropol Territory	79.3	5.7	81.8	6.0	68.0	5.0

Those who analyze social and economic results pay particular attention to indirect indicators of the income level: the number and class of cars, value of housing, the number of illegal distilleries, heavy-duty trucks, etc. Business-class automobiles, such as Toyota Camry and Mercedes E-Class[7] dominate the secondary market in the North Caucasian Federal District. In other regions people prefer more affordable brands. On the other hand, the district trails behind where housing construction is concerned; this is probably explained by a low legal culture and legal nihilism: people prefer not to register their new housing (high corruption barriers being one of the reasons) so as not to pay taxes on it.

The region's social and political backwardness is explained by protectionism in economy, family and clan relationships in business and the practically undeveloped market. Distribution and redistribution of considerable financial and economic resources are controlled by ethnic elites; this further consolidates the very specific nature of the region's economy typical of African and Asian countries.[8]

Today, very much as before, the North Caucasian political elites are formed under pressure from ethnic and clan factors and, therefore, are strongly aware of their dependence on these factors. Hence the numerous conflicts among decision-makers. The latent and persistent nature of the principles on

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[7] See: "Inomarka biznes-klassa stala samym populiarnym avto s probegom na Kavkaze," RBK, available at [https://www.rbc.ru/business/03/02/2016/56b1c16c9a7947bf322feddb], 3 May, 2017.

[8] See: A.R. Salgiriev, "Etnopoliticheskiy protsess na Severnom Kavkaze: rol elit," *Teoria i praktika obshchestvennogo razvitia,* No. 3, 2012, pp. 242-244.

which the elites are formed—family, teip and tukum contacts—is primarily responsible for social differentiation, poverty and the archaic nature of social relationships, amidst which no favorable investment climate is possible. The social and cultural realities that go back many centuries reproduce and cultivate traditionalist attitudes and norms of social behavior:[9] local customs, mental attitudes and practices develop into political factors of their own right, strongly affecting market relationships and business climate.

Regional conflicts emerge and develop under the pressure of clashes of the local elites' interests. For example, massive protests were caused by the murder, on 11 October, 2004, of seven people in the country house of Ali Kaitov, a local parliament deputy and the son-in-law of the then President of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The federal center had no choice but to respond to the signal "from below" with arrests and trials. Today, the situation within the local elite remains tense.[10]

Right before our eyes ethnic clans are gradually developing into political, party, trade, economic, religious and territorial groups, while ethnic principles are gradually retreating under the pressure of the elite principles. The newly formed elites consolidate their positions by expanding their resource base.

Mythologizing Public Consciousness: North Caucasian Specifics

Identity crisis, social conflicts, the plummeting standard of living, the challenging geopolitical context in which Russia has found itself because of international sanctions and other problems have created the foundation on which myths (primarily political myths, a time-tested brainwashing instrument) flourish and gradually fill human minds.

Irina Krolivetskaia and Irina Ostapenko have identified two ways—spontaneous and organized—of mythologizing common people's consciousness.[11] Political elites deliberately use mythologization to achieve their political aims. People are inclined to accept myths as real; they are unable to rationally sort out their content. In this way new myths appear, while the old ones are accepted as true.

In the Northern Caucasus this process is well-organized: the ruling elites, which are clinging to the status quo and the rules of the game, are not strangers to creating political myths about the leader as the *chosen one*, allegedly endowed with charisma and other exceptional qualities. The groups that prefer to keep closer to the elite (*the court*, to borrow the term from Rostov sociologists) spare no effort to create and promote the image of an ideal ruler with the help of the media, adverts and PR technologies. Askar Kaybushev has correctly noted: "The general principle on which the mythology of the ruling elites is based states: what is good for the ruling elites at any given moment of history should be accepted by all and everyone as true."[12] The events that took place in Chechnia in the early 1990s are the best confirmation of the above. The highly agitated crowds that gathered in Grozny to protest, demand independence and carry out religious ceremonies were encouraged by the myth that

[9] See: M.M. Betilmerzaeva, *Mentalnost v kontekste kultury (filosofsko-kulturologichesky analiz),* Doctoral thesis, Southern Federal University, Rostov on Don, 2011.

[10] See: "Karachaevo-Cherkessia pod udarom," KChR Inform, available at [https://kchr-inform.ru/politika/karachaevo-cherkesiya-pod-udarom.html], 8 August, 2017.

[11] See: I.E. Krolivetskaia, I.A. Ostapenko, "Stikhiynoe i organizovannoe v protsesse mifologizatsii massovogo soznania sovremennogo rossiianina," *Nauchny almanakh,* No. 4-4 (18), 2016, pp. 128-131.

[12] A.D. Kaybushev, "Genezis politicheskoy mifologii praviashchey elity," *Kaspiyskiy region: politika, ekonomika, kultura,* No. 2, 2008, pp. 57-64.

if the federal center attacked, the republic would be protected by *ovliya* (saints) who would fly in the skies to down enemy aircraft with their sticks. There was also a myth of "*golden" taps*: the republic's rulers promised that after gaining independence each and every household would be supplied with taps through which people would extract gold (meaning oil in this case). Attracted by the prospect of easy enrichment and unable to separate truth from lies, people perished in the war.

In recent years, the ruling elites have doubled their efforts to create a positive or even ideal political system in the region by glorifying, among other things, the image of the federal political and administrative elite, which speaks of the political system as authoritarian.

Federal TV channels and printed media have been especially successful: logic and common sense are muffled by shouts, exchange of denigrating comments and demonization of the opposition. Political governance progresses from one event to another; public attention is detracted from the domestic agenda by events that are stirred up deliberately. Federal TV channels that discuss the Ukrainian and Syrian agenda on a daily basis are particularly successful—this type of political behavior will be probably pushed to the fore as the presidential elections in Russia will be drawing closer.

Ways to Stabilize Political Processes in the Macro-Region

In order to develop and use the mechanisms of stabilization of the political processes launched by the ethnopolitical elites, we should first address the political, national, social and economic objectives.

The interests of the ethnopolitical elites should be constructively harmonized on the basis of the principles of democracy, secular nature of power, equality and prevention of oppression of any type. The elites should ensure sustainable functioning of the political system in the region and prevent, discontinue or settle conflicts at the earliest possible stage. To prevent separatism and extremism, traditional religious institutes, law enforcement structures and elements of people's diplomacy (sport organizations, councils of elders, youth, female and other structures) should be involved in the process.

To improve political guidance in the region, public organizations and NGOs should add their considerable integration potential to what social institutes and regional elites are doing in the traditionalist society. Western elites trust the reports supplied by independent public structures as a source of information on the basis of which sanctions have been introduced and which strongly affect economic cooperation and business contacts.

At the same time, life has taught us that consultative public councils and public chambers at the structures of state power, local self-administrations, human rights organizations and NGOs are an efficient component of interaction.

C o n c l u s i o n

The Northern Caucasus needs a new political elite comprising professionals and experts devoted to the cause entrusted to them. The federal center should help select the best candidates,

find the most suitable positions for them, organize their rotation, thus preventing corruption, nepotism, etc.[13]

The North Caucasian republics should be integrated in the country's social, cultural and political space,[14] live according to common rules and obey laws. We should maintain contacts with the younger generation through cultural events, academic exchanges, wide-scale explanatory efforts and invite Russian speakers to the macro-region. Authorities should uproot, without hesitation, all outcrops of nationalism, xenophobia, Caucasus-phobia and chauvinism. Patriotism and civil responsibility of those who live in the Northern Caucasus should be consolidated by the awareness that they belong to a unified country.[15]

The youth, which is the most socially active part of society, should trust the authorities and the state. To achieve this, the elites should create social lifts, move away from corruption and protectionism when it comes to promotion to higher posts. They should also shift from declarations to real achievements in real life: new jobs, more investments and a developed tourist sphere. In fact, the political aims—security,[16] transparent elections, a well-justified personnel policy, struggle against the corruption and the clan system, development of democratic institutions, discontinuation of pressure on independent media and on those who are of a different opinion—should be attained before the regional economic agenda is addressed.[17]

It is equally important to oppose religious radicalism, extremism and terrorism, engaging the clergy, the media and public organizations.[18] The elites should abandon their favorite genre of polished TV reports, rather, they should create conditions for an independent media; they should finally admit that power can and should be criticized for its failures in a constructive and well-justified way.

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[13] See: A.R. Salgiriev, "Mekhanizmy formirovania politicheskikh elit v Chechenskoy Respublike," *Globalny nauchny potentsial,* No. 17, 2012, pp. 82-85.

[14] See: M.M. Betilmerzaeva, *Etnicheskaia mentalnost v sisteme kultury,* Ph.D. thesis, Southern Federal University, Rostov on Don, 2005.

[15] See: M.D. Soltamuradov, *Sufizm v kulture narodov Severo-vostochnogo Kavkaza,* Author's synopsis of Ph.D. thesis, Rostov on Don, 2007.

[16] See: V. Iu. Gadaev, "Religioznaia bezopasnost v kontekste dukhovnoy bezopasnosti," *Teoria i praktika obshchestvennogo razvitia,* No. 10, 2014, pp. 13-16.

[17] See: A. Salgiriev, M. Betilmerzaeva, V. Gaziev, M. Soltamuradov, "Political Stratification within the Elites (A North Caucasian Case Study)," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 30-37.

[18] See: V. Akaev, "Sufiyskie bratstva i Vakhkhabity," *Azia i Afrika segodnia,* No. 6, 1998.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADDRESSES DELIVERED BY THE HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC OF INGUSHETIA YUNUS-BEK EVKUROV BEFORE THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY IN 2010-2017: PROSPECTS OF GROWTH AND OVERCOMING THREATS

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ABSTRACT

The texts of the Addresses of the Head of the Republic of Ingushetia to the People's Assembly in 2010-2017 are analyzed. This is the first attempt to examine the policy document from the viewpoint of political science. This document aims to formulate the policy course of the new regional leader and evaluate the successes and shortcomings of his own activities.

Special attention is afforded to the complexity of the social, political and economic situation in the Republic of Ingushetia due to military conflicts in neighboring regions. The tendencies that promoted the consolidation of society and a major shift in its condition are revealed. Comparative analysis allowed to expose the dominant ideas of these addresses and overcome the deeply rooted opinion regarding the immutable "instability constant."

The article heeds attention to the main factors that promote the upsurge of crisis events in society. In particular, the implementation of the stabilization policy was undermined by the quickly growing unemployment: in many of the region's republics with a low level of industrial development, the vast majority of able-bodied population is unemployed. This situation could have led to a number of problems, such as corruption, crime, etc. The issues of terrorism and kidnapping were of no less significance.

Practice revealed that a major breakdown of the stereotype regarding the regional leaders' inability to deal with the situation only occurred in the Republic of Ingushetia. It was associated with the assumption of office by the new President Yunus-Bek Evkurov in 2008.

The new Head of the Republic defined protection of human rights, improvement of the population's quality of life, a functioning civil society and a decrease in crime rate as priority issues. A great accomplishment of Evkurov is the overcoming of the crisis and a virtual absence of protest sentiment, explained by a notable growth of prosperity and an improvement in the service sphere, as well as the progress in the economic situation as a whole.

The policy document, namely, the annual Address of the Head of the Republic of Ingushetia, is used for the analysis of the situation in the region as one of the significant instruments of society's consolidation. The Address is an element of an open dialog with the people, which allows to publicly address the issues and priorities of state policy. Each document's preamble contains references to the principal facts, achievements, and central events of the current year. The role of federal state institutions in the attainment of the obtained results is mentioned. The President expounds his vision of the strategy of the republic's socioeconomic development and defines the primary goals for the executive and municipal authorities for the next year.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The period that began in the early 1990s was a time of crisis for North Caucasian republics in both socioeconomic and political respects. The efforts that the federal center exerted during that period, which aimed to resolve nationalities policy issues, turned out a failure, and the threats became increasingly more serious. The concept of state nationalities policy, in the process of renewal since 2000, also turned out to be less than effective. All the attempts to stimulate the potential growth were negated by the tens of thousands of refugees and forced migrants wandering in search of a refuge. A significant number of them, both from North Ossetia, and the Chechen Republic, concentrated in the recently established, weak Republic of Ingushetia.

This article is the first attempt to examine the policy document from the viewpoint of political science. This document aims to formulate the policy course of the new Head of the Republic and evaluate the successes and shortcomings of his own activities. Special attention is afforded to the complexity of the social, political and economic situation in the Republic of Ingushetia due to the military conflicts in neighboring regions. The tendencies that have promoted the consolidation of society and a major shift in its condition are revealed. Comparative analysis allowed to expose the dominant ideas of these addresses and overcome the deeply rooted opinion regarding the immutable "instability constant."

Since 2004 the Russian Ministry of Regional Development has been dealing with the ethnic relations in the region. The experience of establishing relations between ethnicities within the conflicting, and then the post-conflict territories of the three republics demonstrated the incompetence of the federal ministries as well as of the programs that they implemented. The reason comprised a number of factors that seemed impossible to surmount at the time. The problems were resolved to a certain extent by the efforts of the local elites, as the local community consolidated. It was only in the late 2000s that the federal center has given adequate consideration to the situation in the region. In 2009, the Russian President called the situation in the Northern Caucasus "...the most serious domestic political problem. Terrorist crimes against government officials, members of the clergy and law enforcement destabilize the situation and prevent normal economic and social development in the region. This problem is particularly acute in Ingushetia, where more than half of economically active population is unemployed." [1] In order to solve the indicated issues, the head of state initiated new

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[1] "Address Delivered by the Russian President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation," 12 November, 2009, available in Russian at [https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=325454], 5 February, 2018.

Federal Targeted Programs for the development of the south of Russia, in particular, the Republic of Ingushetia in 2010-2016.

The quickly growing unemployment rate interfered with the implementation of the stabilization policy in the social and economic sphere. In many republics, the number of the unemployed exceeded 60% of the able-bodied population. This situation could have led to a vast number of problems, particularly, an upsurge in corruption, crime, etc.

The next problem, which was just as significant, was the rise of terrorism and kidnapping. The influence of international terrorism was apparent as well.

Apparently, only a strong-willed leader with authority could deal with this situation. The popularity rating and efficiency indicators of the Russian regional leaders' work largely remain the same during the course of their time in office, and in the North Caucasian republics they remained low. Practice revealed that a major breakdown of the stereotype of the regional leaders' inability to deal with the situation only occurred in the Republic of Ingushetia. It was associated with the assumption of office in 2008 by the new President Yunus-Bek Evkurov,[2] a highly competent man with unique potential. Owing to his tough character, strong will and ability to plan he quickly adapted to his new position. The Head of the Republic prioritized the issues of human rights protection, civil society functioning, improvement of quality of life and lowering the crime rate. In a short period of time he had managed to overcome the crisis and mitigate the protest sentiments through a noticeable growth of prosperity, improvement of the quality of services to the population, and a general progress in the economic situation. In 2009-2010 alone, the rate of capital offences related to extremism, terrorism and banditry decreased by 40%, and of particularly grave crimes—by over 60%.

Characteristics of the President's Addresses as Political Documents

All of the positive tendencies of development of Ingushetia as a self-sufficient entity allow to analyze the annual Addresses of the Head of the Republic to the People's Assembly. The uniqueness of such addresses by the regional leader is in the utilization of this rather mundane form of political communication for self-assessment of the work that ensued over a specified period of time. In 2009, in the course of his Address to the Federal Assembly President Dmitry Medvedev proposed supplementing the charters and constitutions of the Russian Federation constituencies with articles on the annual report of the executive authority leaders to the local parliaments, as denoted in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.[3] The Republic of Ingushetia went even further, the regional leader essentially reports to the legislative authorities in his Addresses to the People's Assembly.

Numerous experts are involved in preparing this political document. Collectivity is its second unique characteristic. Its significance for the political (and, in the future, for the historical) science lies with the fact that the document allows to see the state's involvement in resolving the essential issues in the republic's development. In addition, it allows to see the persona of the Head of the Republic as a political leader, as well as his interaction with Russian political elites.

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[2] On 31 October, 2008, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia confirmed Yunus-Bek Evkurov as the President of Ingushetia upon the recommendation of the head of state. From 1 January, 2011 to 4 July, 2013 he was the Head of the Republic. On 8 September, 2013, the members of the People's Assembly elected Evkurov the Head of the Republic of Ingushetia.

[3] See: "Address Delivered by the Russian President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation," 12 November, 2009.

Its preparation is aligned with the consecutive order of the problems in question. The preamble of each document reflects the main facts, achievements and memorable events of the current year, which require special attention. The role of federal institutes in achieving the obtained results is underscored. The regional leader communicates his vision of the republic's social and economic development strategy and delineates the objectives for executive and municipal authorities for the next year. The dominant topics in all Addresses are economic growth, raising investment attractiveness, improvement of the population's quality of life, ensuring stability.

The first section contains the assessment of the achievements in the sphere of social and economic development, with an outline of problems regarding the economic base and production facilities.

The last, ninth, address of the Head of Ingushetia occurred on 31 January, 2017, and the next scheduled, tenth Address is expected to be delivered shortly.

It became a tradition to invite representatives of the Government, court system, municipal structures, federal and regional media, social and religious groups to the Address delivery, in addition to the members of the People's Assembly, the State Duma and the Council of the Federation.

Annual Addresses as Reflections of the Republic's Achievements and Problems

In his first Address the President of the Republic of Ingushetia stated: "We are taking all possible measures to create a higher-quality living environment for the people. These efforts are undertaken in a difficult context, but, despite the difficulties, we are consistently managing to move forward. I am grateful to everyone who is contributing their share to the renovation of our society."[4] The phrase "These efforts are undertaken in a difficult context" is essential here. The emotional component of the addresses has been shifting as positive results were obtained. Another dominant thesis here was that of ensuring the safety of the population.

According to the data of the National Monitoring Service and the Institute of Independent Political Studies, in 2010 Yunus-Bek Evkurov was among the three most informationally transparent regional leaders in Russia. His drive for the best results was successful—it was not for nothing that the media hailed him as an outstanding leader of a problematic region. The head of the republic had found a way out of the situation without resorting to extreme measures. The method of utilizing personal contacts, or the dialog with the people, for violence prevention, which he proposed and consecutively implemented, had brought significant results right away. In this case, it concerned not only the return of those who have left their families to peaceful life, but also the reconsideration of the cases of convicts who might have incriminated themselves under physical or other pressure. This was a serious blow to the bandits' ideology.

It is essential to mention the attention and participation afforded to the development and implementation of internal regional policy by the Administration of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasian District. In particular, a public chamber was established in the Republic at his initiative. Respected elders of the elders' council also play a significant role.

In 2010, the implementation of Federal Targeted Programs was launched in the Republic. These programs provided for the construction of 17 social and industrial-purpose facilities. The federal center participated in the development process in a very direct manner. According to the Head of the

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[4] "Republic of Ingushetia. Address Delivered by the President of the Republic of Ingushetia to the People's Assembly," available in Russian at [www.ingushetia.ru/m-news/archives/013718.shtml], 5 February, 2018.

Republic, this participation did not merely manifest in the financial contribution, but also in the clear indication of drawbacks. Owing to the FTP, the republic attained significant results, which it was unable to achieve in the time of the Soviet rule. Numerous significant issues have been resolved in the social sphere, high indicators have been achieved in the development of education, science, sports and health care.

In his last address to the People's Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Evkurov mentioned the following as the result of his nine years in office: "With the direct assistance of the federal center, the republic has managed to overcome the crisis periods of its development, shifting the main vector of the republican authorities' operations from providing security and law enforcement measures to the social and economic development of the region in all the key directions."[5]

"The Republic of Ingushetia had more than once become the arena for landmark meetings, conclusion of significant agreements that imply further development of the economy, sports and culture in the republic."[6]

In 2011, the idea of developing a civil society, the formation of a positive image of the republic and political work began to dominate.

In 2012, the Head of the Republic had indicated the most promising directions of the government's operations. Among the measures of prime importance were the following: raising the efficiency of federal and republican Federal Targeted Programs, arrange certain measures in the framework of the state program Development of the North Caucasian Federal District in the Period up to 2025, the renewal of the investment legislation, support and development of small-business infrastructure, modernization of the basic infrastructure of the real sector of the economy, etc. The principal proposal was to improve the region's investment attractiveness.

High indicator levels were attained due to the implementation of nine federal programs, which allowed to build and reconstruct approximately 50 facilities in 2012. Under only one of them, the Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Ingushetia for 2010-2016, 26 facilities were commissioned.

Yunus-Bek Evkurov delivered his fourth Address to the Parliament on 31 January, 2013. Comparative analysis demonstrates that the number of facilities commissioned under the 12 Federal Targeted Programs in the housing and social sphere, in the agricultural and industrial complexes and in the power industry increased by one-third in 2013 in comparison with the preceding year. The prospects of growth of the Republic of Ingushetia's economy in general, as well as the population's quality of life depended on efficiency of these programs' implementation. These measures allowed to create approximately four thousand jobs. In 2012, the level of regional subsidies lowered to 84% from 94% in 2009.

Significant results were achieved in counteracting terrorism and extremism, in decreasing the crime rate, including the very significant segment of fighting corruption. In general, 2013 was a successful year for Ingushetia both economically and politically. Much has been done to reinforce stability. In resolving the tasks of socioeconomic development, the objectives set forth in the May decrees of the President of the Russian Federation were used as the foundation.[7] The establishment of the Federal Ministry of the North Caucasian Affairs was not accidental either, and was determined by the

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[5] Kh. Targimov, "Ingushetia preodolela krizisnye periody," 31 January, 2017, available at [http://gazetaingush.ru/news/ingushetiya-preodolela-krizisnye-periody], 5 February, 2018.

[6] "Pobedy Ingushetii-2011," *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 29 November, 2011, available at [http://pravitelstvori.ru/news/detail.php?ID=3430], 4 February, 2018.

[7] May decrees—the provisional name granted by the media to the series of 11 decrees signed by Vladimir Putin on 7 May, 2012, on the day of his inauguration as the President of the Russian Federation, which contained 218 instructions to the Government of the Russian Federation to be executed in 2012-2020 (see [https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D1%83%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%8B], 8 February, 2018).

special circumstances in the Northern Caucasus. However, despite the equitable difficulties characteristic of the entire Northern Caucasus, the republic has for the second year in a row been included in the list of the twenty Russian regions that demonstrate the best dynamics with respect to the criteria set forth by the Ministry of Regional Development. It has become a leader in construction volumes, while the share of small and medium businesses in the economy constituted 40-60%.[8]

The 2013 Address differs significantly from the preceding ones. More long-range objectives were set, which was made possible by the updates in the investment legislation and the strong results attained in the preceding year. This Address was dominated by the topic of development of the tourist business, small and medium businesses, as well as interregional cooperation.

In his Address to the People's Assembly in 2014, the Head of the Republic informed that Ingushetia is one of the leaders among Russian constituencies in its proprietary revenue growth rate. Under the roadmap there was an unprecedented number of pre-school facilities designed and successfully commissioned in the republic—52 kindergartens with a total of 10,000 spots for children. Strategic priorities have been set in the spheres of health care and education, physical culture and sports. In 2009, there were 63,000 people officially registered as unemployed in the republic, and in 2014 this number decreased to 30,000. In part this decline was promoted by the implementation of the Federal Targeted Program Social and Economic Development of Ingushetia for 2010-2016, the republican program that aimed to lower tension in the labor market, as well as the program of assistance to small and medium business (up to 2018). Consistent coordination of the state authorities' activities on preventing extremism and improving the spiritual and moral education of the population with religious leaders and the community remains another priority for the government. The President of the Republic had named the creation of a comfortable living environment as a key priority.

In 2015, the Head of the Republic delivered his Address in the new Honor Hall at the Administration. Its preamble was devoted to the international situation and the problems in the social and economic spheres that have emerged due to the economic sanctions implemented by the Western countries. The President particularly emphasized the concept of import substitution—a new term that became the key thesis of this Address. The positive dynamics of many economic and social sphere development indicators were also noted. As the result of the goal-oriented policy, the republic's dependence on subsidies decreased by 8.7% between 2009 and 2014. A Standard of executive authorities' efforts to ensure a favorable investment climate in the republic was implemented.

The development of cooperation with other regions, first and foremost with those of the Northern Caucasus and those immediately adjoining the republic, is an essential objective of the republic's national policy.

For the first time the head of the Republic expressed his gratitude to the charitable foundations for their work in resolving a number of social issues faced by the republic's population. According to him, "National consolidation and a stable relationship between the society and the authorities have decreased the protest sentiment. It is largely the achievement of social and civil institutions, which are formed by people who feel it their duty to defend their homeland."[9] The crime rate has significantly lowered, and there was not a single terrorist act—an incredible fact in our times.[10]

In 2015, the elections of local authorities became an important political event. On 13 September, the single voting day, elections took place in 40 municipalities. Eight territorial and 134 district election committees were engaged in the process.

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[8] See: "Yunus-Bek Evkurov: Maidanovshchiny v Ingushetii byt' ne dolzhno!" 25 June, 2014, RBK, available at [https://Kuban.rbk.ru], 31 January, 2018.

[9] "Yunus-Bek Evkurov vystupil s Poslaniem k Parlamentu Ingushetii," 29 January, 2016, available at [https://www.parlamentri.ru/index.php/analiticheskie-materialy/ezhegodnye-otchety-glavy-ri-v-ns-ri/2682-poslanie-glavy-respubliki-ingushetiya-yu-b-evkurova-narodnomu-sobraniyu-respubliki-ingushetiya-na-2016-god], 9 February, 2018.

[10] See: Ibidem.

The priorities of social and economic development emphasized in the Address included the resolution of import substitution objectives in agriculture and the industrial complex, the increase in efficiency of budgetary funds' utilization, tax policy and prevention of unreasonable price hikes.

As he indicated the goals for 2016, Yunus-Bek Evkurov had specified 14 priority directions of the republic's development. Budgetary and tax policy and the development of small and medium businesses were designated as essential. The development of the agricultural complex and the environmental sphere, in particular, were underscored.

On 31 January, 2017, the head of Ingushetia made his ninth Address to the People's Assembly. The ceremony took place in the Honor Hall at the Administration of the regional leader.[11] Aside from the habitually invited guests, students took part in the ceremony for the first time.

In discussing the social and political situation in Ingushetia, the regional leader emphasized that in recent years it has been characterized as consistently stable and under indisputable control of the state authorities at all levels. The crisis has been overcome owing to the support from the federal center.[12]

The President had also mentioned the results of the completed FTP Social and Economic Development of Ingushetia for 2010-2016, which allowed to attain high indicators in the economy and the social sphere. A total of 139 facilities was built and reconstructed, including 37 schools, which allowed to switch education to a two-shift mode, with 65% of schoolchildren studying in the morning shift. Kindergarten availability level rose from 7.4% to 27.1%. In 2009, there were 29 kindergartens, while by 2017 there were already 66 such institutions.

The fact that the republic is one of the leaders of the safest regions ratings is also significant[13].

The following were celebrated in the Addresses as the most important events of recent years from a historic viewpoint: the 20th and 25th anniversaries of the restoration of the Ingush people's statehood, the visit of the Grand Duchess Maria Vladimirovna, the Head of the Russian Imperial House to the republic, the pick of the Olympic flame relay in the republic, the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the Ingush people to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the 20th and 25th anniversaries of the Constitution of Ingushetia, the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the 245th anniversary of Ingushetia's integration with Russia, elections to the State Duma and the People's Assembly, the visit of the Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, to the Republic of Ingushetia, the signing of the Law of the Republic of Ingushetia on transforming the Sunzha city settlement into a city district, etc. A special mention was given to the upcoming celebration of the 250th anniversary of integration of Ingushetia with Russia in 2020.

C o n c l u s i o n

It is important to note that all the Addresses, despite their objective evaluation of the shortcomings, contain a positive message. The creators of the text of the address always emphasize the attention on the part of the President of the country. No other names, aside from the minister of the newly created Ministry of the North Caucasian Affairs, have been mentioned in the Addresses. The nature of the Addresses changes depending on the then current economic and political situation in the world.

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[11] See: "The Programmed Document for 2017. Address of the Head of Ingushetia to the People's Assembly of the Republic," *Ingushetia*, an on-line newspaper, available at [http://gazetaingush.ru/vlast/poslanie-glavy-ingushetii-narodnomu-sobraniyu-respubliki], 19 December, 2017.

[12] See: Ibidem.

[13] See: "Evkurov prokommentiroval otmenu rezhima KTO v Ingushetii," 19 March, 2016, available at [https://ria.ru.20160319], 31 January, 2018.

The Annual Address of the Head of the Republic of Ingushetia is one of the significant instruments for the consolidation of society. It is an element of a public dialog with people, which allows to openly address the issues and priorities of state policy. This form of dialog or interaction of executive and legislative authorities promotes the establishment of a specific type of behavior in society, its integration for the implementation of common goals that the state is facing.

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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN CHECHEN SOCIETY

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A B S T R A C T

The authors have offered comparative sociological analysis of the transformations underway in Chechen society in the context of an analysis of institutional confidence and trust.

Social reality and political processes are treated as an object of studies, while the subject of studies and their objective are the comparative analysis of the evolution of public opinion about the structures of power and administration in the Chechen Republic, as well as the dynamics of the chosen development course.

The authors relied on the materials of sociological polls conducted by the North Ossetia Center for Social Studies of the Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Department of Sociological Studies of SOIGSI VNTs, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania in May-June 2003 within the project Chechnia in the Socio-Cultural Space of the Russian Federation: Ethnosociological Analysis and joint studies carried out by the North Ossetia Center for Social Studies and the Department of Philosophy, Political Science and Sociology, Chechen State Pedagogical University, in May-June 2017.

The research objectives postulated the following tasks:

(1) to find out how the respondents in the Chechen Republic assess the state of affairs in Russia;

(2) to analyze the degree of popular confidence and trust in the structures of power and administration, in religious figures and the media.

In their studies the authors relied on the quantitative questionnaire method.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In the late twentieth century the Soviet Union and centralized power collapsed causing tragedies in the lives and fates of each and every member of the multi-million Soviet people. "Common Russian problems caused by social transformations" affected "all the entities of the Federation, the North Caucasian region being no exception. Historical and cultural specifics of its constituencies, one of them being the Chechen Republic, set it apart from the rest of the country."[1] Today philosophers, political scientists and other humanities experts should pay more attention to the situation in the world and in Russia: their profound analysis of the situation in the country should help us find the ways out of crises and create the best possible conditions in which Russian society can successfully develop.[2]

In its practical activities, sociology as one of the applied sciences relies on the results of studies of public trust and confidence in state and public institutions. Political stability, consistent public dialogue and development of democracy are impossible without a high level of institutional trust.

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[1] Kh.V. Dzutsev, *Sovremennaia Chechnia: protsessy sotsiokulturnoy transformatsii. Etnosotsiologicheskoe issledovanie*, 2nd revised and enlarged edition, Monograph, ISPI RAS, Moscow, 2011, p. 3.

[2] See: A. Salgiriev, M. Betilmerzaeva, V. Gaziev, M. Soltamuradov, "Institutional Trust as an Empirical Indicator of the Legitimacy of Political Elites," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 34-41.

Sociologists carry out public opinion polls to acquire the maximally objective and transparent results to be used in sociological and political forecasting. On the eve of the presidential elections in Russia it has become especially important to follow the dynamics of public trust and confidence and views and opinions of citizens of Russia.

Trends Assessed

Comparative analysis of the results of sociological polls of 2003 and 2017 has revealed the dynamics of political situation[3] in Russia and the Chechen Republic and suggested several important conclusions about the prospects and potential of political cooperation between central and local powers.[4] In 2003, the respondents (urban population) offered the following answers to the question "Is Russia moving in the right or, rather, in the wrong direction?": 6.1% of the polled believed that the direction was right; 22.5% believed that Russia was moving "in the wrong direction"; 58.4% described the direction as "right in some and wrong in other respects"; 13.0% were "undecided." The same question asked in 2017 elicited the following responses: 24.0% answered "in the right direction"; 14.0%—"in the wrong direction"; 38.0%—"right in some and wrong in other respects"; 24.0% were "undecided" (see Table 1).

Positive dynamics of "in the right direction" responses to the first question, a smaller number of "in the wrong direction" responses and "right in some and wrong in other respects" are balanced out by a bigger number of "undecided," which cannot but cause concern.

T a b l e 1

Is Russia Moving in the Right Direction or the Direction is Primarily Wrong?

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	**2017**
In the right direction	6.1	24.0
In the wrong direction	22.5	14.0
Right in some and wrong in other respects	58.4	38.0
Undecided	13.0	24.0

The Degree of Confidence and Trust in the Structures of Power and Administration

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the President of the Russian Federation" (see Table 2) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—17%; Trust to a certain ex-

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[3] See: M.M. Betilmezaeva, "Mesto i rol gumanitarnogo znaniia i dukhovnoy bezopasnosti v kontekste multikuturalizma," in: *Gumanitarnoe znanie i dukhovnaia bezopasnost. Sbornik materialov II Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii*, 2015, pp. 74-82.

[4] See: A. Salgiriev, "The Northern Caucasus: Tribal-Clan Structure of the Political Elites as a Factor of Political Tension," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 29-35.

tent—33.6%; Mistrust to a certain extent—20.9%; Do not trust at all—20.0%; Undecided—9.0%. In 2017, the responses were: Trust completely—24.0%; Trust to a certain extent—18.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—16.0%; Do not trust at all—16.0%; Undecided—24.0%. An analysis of the dynamics of trust in the structures of power and administration among the population of Grozny showed that the share of those who trusted the President of the Russian Federation dropped from 50.6% in 2003 to 42% in 2017; the share of those who mistrusted the President, likewise, dropped from 40.9 in 2003 to 12% in 2017 at the expense of the share of "Undecided" that rose from 9% in 2003 to 24% in 2017.

T a b l e 2

To Which Extent Do You Trust the RF President?

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	17	24.0
Trust to a certain extent	33.6	18.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	20.9	16.0
Do not trust at all	20.0	16.0
Undecided	9.0	24.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the Government of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 3) elicited the following responses in 2003: Trust completely—6.4%; Trust to a certain extent—26.5%; Mistrust to a certain extent—34.5%; Do not trust at all—24.3%; Undecided—7.8%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—18.0%; Trust to a certain extent—14.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—22.0%; Do not trust at all—22.0%; Undecided—24.0%.

T a b l e 3

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Government of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	6.4	18.0
Trust to a certain extent	26.5	14.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	34.5	22.0
Do not trust at all	24.3	22.0
Undecided	7.8	24.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the State Duma of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 4) invited the following answers: Trust completely—6.3%; Trust to a certain extent—26.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—32.7%; Do not trust at all—25.1%; Undecided—9.9%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—24.0%; Trust to a certain extent—12.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—20.0%; Do not trust at all—26.0%; Undecided—18.0%.

T a b l e   4

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the State Duma of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	**2017**
Trust completely	6.3	24.0
Trust to a certain extent	26.0	12.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	32.7	20.0
Do not trust at all	25.1	26.0
Undecided	9.9	18.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the Federation Council of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 5) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—6.4%; Trust to a certain extent—26.5%; Mistrust to a certain extent—34.5%; Do not trust at all—24.3%; Undecided—7.8%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—20.0%; Trust to a certain extent—14.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—20.0%; Do not trust at all—22.0%; Undecided—24.0%.

T a b l e   5

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Federation Council of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	**2017**
Trust completely	6.4	20.0
Trust to a certain extent	26.5	14.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	34.5	20.0
Do not trust at all	24.3	22.0
Undecided	7.8	24.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the law enforcement structures of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 6) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—4.1%; Trust to a certain extent—11.2%; Mistrust to a certain extent—28.9%; Do not trust at all—46.9%; Undecided—8.9%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—14.0%; Trust to a certain extent—8.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—20.0%; Do not trust at all—26.0%; Undecided—32.0%.

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 7) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—3.2%; Trust to a certain extent—10.9%; Mistrust to a certain extent—23.4%; Do not trust at all—51.2%; Undecided—11.2%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—18.0%; Trust to a certain extent—18.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—22.0%; Do not trust at all—12.0%; Undecided—30.0%.

T a b l e 6

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Law Enforcement Structures of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	4.1	14.0
Trust to a certain extent	11.2	8.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	28.9	20.0
Do not trust at all	46.9	26.0
Undecided	8.9	32.0

T a b l e 7

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	3.2	18.0
Trust to a certain extent	10.9	18.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	23.4	22.0
Do not trust at all	51.2	12.0
Undecided	11.2	30.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District/North-Caucasian Federal District (V. Kazantsev in 2003; O. Belaventsev in 2017)?" (see Table 8) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—4.9%; Trust to a certain extent—19.2%; Mistrust to a certain extent—25.7%; Do not trust at all—33.7%; Undecided—16.5%. The results in 2017 were as follows: Trust completely—12.0%; Trust to a certain extent—12.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—6.0%; Do not trust at all—0.0%; Undecided—70.0%.

We have relied on the obtained results not only to chronologically compare the degrees of approval of the job conducted by the institutes of power, but also to analyze the degree and the dynamics of trust in any structure of power and administration vertically (see Table 9). In 2003, sociological monitoring of the degree of trust revealed that the President of the Russian Federation enjoyed the highest degree of job approval (17%); in 2017, the share rose to 24%. The State Duma of the Russian Federation scored at the same level. On the whole, in the last ten years people in the Chechen Republic demonstrated a rising level of institutional trust and confidence.

The share of those who do not trust power and administration structures is gradually decreasing, an apparently positive dynamics. In 2003, for example, 51.2% did not trust the FSB; 46.9% felt the same about the law enforcement structures. In 2017, the share of those who mistrusted the

FSB dropped to the historically low of 12%, while the share of those who trusted this structure increased 6-fold.

T a b l e 8

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation
in the Southern Federal District/North-Caucasian Federal District
(V. Kazantsev in 2003; O. Belaventsev in 2017)?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	4.9	12.0
Trust to a certain extent	19.2	12.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	25.7	6.0
Do not trust at all	33.7	0.0
Undecided	16.5	70.0

T a b l e 9

**The Degree of Trust in the Structures of Power and Administration:
Comparative Analysis**

Power Structures	Share of Responses, %									
	2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017
	Trust Completely		Trust to a Certain Extent		Mistrust to a Certain Extent		Do Not Trust at All		Undecided	
President of RF	17.0	24.0	33.6	18.0	20.9	16.0	20.0	16.0	9.0	24.0
Government of RF	6.4	18.0	26.5	14.0	34.5	22.0	24.3	22.0	7.8	24.0
State Duma of RF	6.3	24.0	26.0	12.0	32.7	20,0	25.1	26.0	9.9	18.0
Federation Council of RF	4.7	20.0	22.0	14.0	30.0	20.0	27.0	22.0	16.4	24.0
Law enforcement structures of RF	4.1	14.0	11.2	8.0	28.9	20.0	46.9	26.0	8.9	32.0
FSB of RF	3.2	18.0	10.9	18.0	23.4	22.0	51.2	12.0	11.2	30.0
Representative of the President in SFD/NCFD	4.9	12.0	19.2	12.0	25.7	6.0	33.7	0.0	16.5	70.0

The share of those who had no trust in the President dropped to 16% in 2017 against 20% in 2003.

The dynamics change in the share of those who expressed "trust to a certain extent" or "mistrust to a certain extent" in the structures of power and state administration are especially interesting. In the last 14 years, the President of the Russian Federation lost more votes than any other structure in the "trust to a certain extent" category: 33.6% in 2003 against 18% in 2017.

Despite the 2017 positive dynamics, mistrust in some structures of power did not drop. The State Duma of the Russian Federation is one of the leaders in this respect: 26% in 2017 against 25.1% in 2003. It shares its leadership with the law enforcement structures: the same 26% in 2017 even if there is a drop from the much higher 46.9% in 2003. This means that while the law enforcement structures demonstrated positive dynamics, the attitude to the State Duma cannot but cause concern: the share of those who "do not trust it at all" remains practically the same.

The degree of trust in the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the SFD/NCFD Victor Kazantsev in 2003 and Oleg Belaventsev in 2017 can be explained as follows: in 2003, Kazantsev was negatively perceived by the respondents, hence the low degree of trust. In 2017, most of the respondents still knew next to nothing about Belaventsev, appointed to the post in the summer of 2016, hence a great share of "undecided" (70%).

The "Undecided" group deserves special attention: while the first four lines demonstrate positive dynamics, the share of "undecided" looks like a black spot on the otherwise positive picture of the social and political state of Chechen society. It seems that this is caused by the following:

(1) the social, political and economic situation in the country responsible for political apathy and the fairly big distance between common people and the structures of power and administration;

(2) the fairly unambiguous structures of power and administration that not infrequently exceed the limits of their authority which makes it hard to adequately assess them.

It seems that a deeper analysis of the "undecided" phenomenon might suggest other explanations.

The Degree of Trust
in Religious Figures and the Media

It is highly interesting to compare the dynamics of trust/mistrust in the structures of power and administration and in religious figures and the media.[5] In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the religious figures of the Russian Federation?" (see Table 10) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—11.4%; Trust to a certain extent—33.9%; Mistrust to a certain extent—22.5%; Do not trust at all—19.2%; Undecided—12.9%. The results of 2017: Trust completely—16.0%; Trust to a certain extent—42.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—8.0%; Do not trust at all—10.0%; Undecided—24.0%. This means that in the Chechen Republic the share of those who trust religious figures "completely" or "to a certain extent" rose considerably to reach 58.0% against 18.0% of those who "mistrust to a certain extent" or "do not trust at all." The trend towards a bigger share of "undecided" persisted.

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the federal TV channels?" (see Table 11) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—2.2%; Trust to a certain extent—16.8%; Mistrust to a certain extent—36.1%; Do not trust at all—40.1%; Undecided—4.7%. The results of 2017: Trust completely—18.0%; Trust to a certain extent—10.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—24.0%; Do not trust at all—34.0%; Undecided—14.0%. Dynamics of trust/mistrust are obviously positive.

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[5] See: V.Iu. Gadaev, "Problema dukhovno-nravstvennogo razvitia sovremennoy chechenskoy molodezhi," *Istoria nauki i tekhniki,* No. 3, 2008, pp. 70-73; V. Akaev, "Religious and Political Elites in the Northern Caucasus: Formation, Ideological Contradictions, and Practical Opposition," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 77-89.

T a b l e 1 0

**To Which Extent Do You Trust
the Religious Figures of the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	**2017**
Trust completely	11.4	16.0
Trust to a certain extent	33.9	42.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	22.5	8.0
Do not trust at all	19.2	10.0
Undecided	12.9	24.0

T a b l e 1 1

**To Which Extent Do You Trust Federal TV of
the Russian Federation?**

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	**2017**
Trust completely	2.2	18.0
Trust to a certain extent	16.8	10.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	36.1	24.0
Do not trust at all	40.1	34.0
Undecided	4.7	14.0

In 2003, the question "To which extent do you trust the federal press?" (see Table 12) elicited the following responses: Trust completely—2.6%; Trust to a certain extent—21.3%; Mistrust to a certain extent—29.4%; Do not trust at all—38.2%; Undecided—8.5%. The results of 2017: Trust completely—14.0%; Trust to a certain extent—10.0%; Mistrust to a certain extent—30.0%; Do not trust at all—28.0%; Undecided—18.0%.

Table 13 offers comparative analysis of the shares of those in the Chechen Republic who trust and mistrust religious figures, federal TV channels and the media.

An average share of trust in the religious figures in Chechnia remains high: 55% in 2003 and 58% in 2017; the share of those who "mistrust to a certain extent" or "do not trust at all" dropped from 41.4% in 2003 to 18.0% in 2017. Positive attitude to religious figures stems from high level of religios-

ity of Chechen society[6] and confirms that cooperation between religious institutes and people is highly productive.[7] The federal TV channels and the media were supported by 18% and 14% of respondents in 2017, respectively, against 2.2% and 2.8% in 2003, which can be assessed as a positive trend. On the other hand, an average share of "completely trust" and "trust to a certain extent" almost remained the same: 19.0% in 2003 and 18.0% in 2017; 24.1% and 24.0% in 2017, the slightly lower shares.

T a b l e   1 2

To Which Extent Do You Trust the Federal Press?

	Share of Responses, %	
	2003	2017
Trust completely	2.8	1.0
Trust to a certain extent	21.3	10.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	29.4	30.0
Do not trust at all	38.2	28.0
Undecided	8.5	18.0

T a b l e   1 3

Trust in Religious Figures, Federal TV Channels and the Media: Comparative Analysis

	Share of Responses, %					
	2003	2017	2003	2017	2003	2017
	Trust in Religious Figures		Trust in Federal TV Channels		Trust in the Media	
Trust completely	11.4	16.0	2.2	18.0	2.8	14.0
Trust to a certain extent	33.9	42.0	16.8	10.0	21.3	10.0
Mistrust to a certain extent	22.5	8.0	36.1	24.0	29.4	30.0
Do not trust at all	19.2	10.0	40.1	34.0	38.2	28.0
Undecided	12.9	24.0	4.7	14.0	8.5	18.0

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[6] See: M. Betilmerzaeva, A. Akhtaev, B. Sadulaev, A. Salgiriev, "Religion and State: Interaction and Sociocultural Transformations (the Chechen Republic Case Study)," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 124-132.
[7] See: M.M. Betilmerzaeva, "Dukhovnaia bezopasnost kak garant zdorovogo obshchestva," in: *Gumanitarnoe znanie i dukhovnaia bezopasnost,* 2014, pp. 60-67.

C o n c l u s i o n

When compared, the combined shares of "Undecided"—118.8% in 2003 and 302.0% in 2017—showed that the number of politically and socially passive respondents increased by nearly 2.5 times, which means that:

(1) to preserve the current level of trust in the structures of power and administration, or even increase it, they should become closer to common people;

(2) secular, religious and educational resources should be tapped to the fullest extent to shape personalities able and willing to make decisions not only in everyday life but also in the sphere of national or even international significance.

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

SUFI IDEOLOGY, SHAMANIST RITUALS: HOW RELIGIOUS GROUPS BECAME POPULAR IN KAZAKHSTAN?

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ABSTRACT

This essay analyzes the tactics and strategies of two so-called extremist groups existed in Kazakhstan within the period of the decade between 2000 and 2010. The research examines the role of music, traditional customs, religious or pseudo-religious rites, rituals and values of Kazakh people in providing support to the extremist organizations. The essay scrutinizes the social and economic factors that favored the development of extremism in Kazakhstan.

Lastly, applying the empirical indicators of extremism, the paper analyzes the level of menace that two organizations constituted to the Kazakhstani society.

KEYWORDS: *Islam, shamanism, Sufism, dhikr, extremism.*

Introduction

On 19 October, 2011 the Almaty City Court of Kazakhstan sentenced nine activists of the *Senim. Bilim. Omir* (Faith. Knowledge. Life) religious organization to various imprisonment terms

up to 14 years. The activists were accused of extremism, organizing a criminal group, depriving of liberty and practicing unlawful medical activities. Months later, in June 2012 the General Prosecutor Office of Kazakhstan has declared *Senim. Bilim. Omir* an extremist organization. The religious sect unofficially referred to as *Zikirshiler* (Dhikr practitioners) or *Sopylar* (Sufists) led by Ismatulla Abdughappar, an ethnic Kazakh repatriated from Pakistan, had become very popular within the decade period, and by the time of the revelation of their wrongdoings had around half a million followers in Kazakhstan.[1] Before that, in February 2009, the Almaty City court closed another popular religious sect *Ata Zholy* (Path of Ancestors) concluding that the activity of this movement negatively affected the social health of citizens and possessed a real threat to the national security of the country.[2] People were shocked by this news, as both of these movements were declaring that they were reviving the ancient Kazakh traditions and customs forgotten as a result of Soviet oppression. The former has been emerging as a cultural, religious and intellectual enlightener of Kazakhs with strong supporters in the government, media and cultural spheres. The latter mostly targeted the psychologically depressed and addicted people playing a role of spiritual facilitator embracing all the ethnic and religious groups in Kazakhstan.

How did these extremist groups manage to grip the attention of the masses in a relatively short period of time? What kind of historical, social and cultural factors has facilitated their efforts? What kind of tools did they apply in their missionary activities? Do they have real patterns of extremism?

"Folk Islam"—The Mixture of Shamanism and Sufism

Senim. Bilim. Omir was established as an apolitical public association in 2000, gaining a national status in 2001 with branch offices located in 17 cities and towns, as well as in 18 residential areas across Kazakhstan. The aim of the organization was to "bring up the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism through propagating the ideas of the 12th century Sufi scholar of Central Asia Hoja Ahmad Yasawi and Kazakh poets Abay and Shakarim, who lived in 19th and 20th centuries. For this they hold classes, meetings and seminars, travelling throughout the country."[3] The main feature of this group was that it combined the Yasawi ideology and the popular Kazakh poems with the Sufi practice of *zikr* (*dhikr*).[4] Interestingly, the video footage of the dhikr of the *Senim. Bilim. Omir* members exactly depicts the same kind of rituals hold at the beginning of the 20th century in the neighboring Turkmen tribe. Referring to the archival documents DeWeese thoroughly describes the process: "...the *īshān* begins to utter '*hu, hu*,' and the people sitting around the tent join in ... and it is accompanied by bodily movements, in four beats, in which the head completes a circular movement from the left shoulder to the right and back again, with both inhalations and exhalations occurring with the head over the left shoulder."[5]

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[1] See: G. Shambayeva, "Rukovodstvo sekty 'Bilim. Senim. Omir' osuzhdeno po polnoj. "Za gody raboty v Kazakhstane Abdugapparu udalos zaverbovat pochti polmilliona chelovek," CetralAsia. Ru, 20 October, 2011, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1319098920], 1 February, 2016.

[2] See: A. Zubov, "Zapreshchennaia v Kazakhstane sekta protsvetayet v Rossii," 365.info, 10 August, 2015, available at [http://365info.kz/2015/08/zapreshhennaya-v-kazaxstane-sekta-procvetaet-v-rossii/], 10 February, 2016.

[3] Khabar TV, "Aqiqat" (Truth) Documentary, 2011, available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGzMYpqnxw], 10 February, 2016.

[4] See: G. Yemelianova, "Islam, national identity and politics in contemporary Kazakhstan," *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 286-301.

[5] D. DeWeese, "Shamanization in Central Asia," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 57, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 332.

Kazakhs were converted to Islam relatively late. Various sources say that this process lasted until the 19th century.[6] The Russian and Kazakh ethnographers of the late 19th century asserted that Kazakhs "were essentially 'shamanists' and were not—or must not be—real Muslims."[7] The nomadic lifestyle of Kazakhs did not allow canonical Islam to spread across the steppe. Even after the conversion to Sunni Islam, Kazakhs continued to use their pre-Islamic rites and rituals, combining it with the Muslim traditions.[8] In some cases they used Arabic words to describe the certain ritual or phenomenon (for example *aruah*—spirit, *aulye*—saint), and ordinary people did not distinguish between them.[9] Proto-Kazakhs' traditional beliefs included the worldviews of tengrism, shamanism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism. As Yemelianova points out, "they believed in the harmonious unity between humans and the surrounding world, the blue skies and endless steppe, and in particular, the helping power of ancestral spirits and the cult of saints and *batyrs* (military chieftains)."[10]

Another historical factor for development of "indigenous" Islam among Kazakhs was the geographical isolation of the Sunni Muslims in the Arab world after the adoption of Shi'ism by Iran.[11] However, ironically, the religious policy of the Soviet Union made the "shamanist" part of the "folk Islam" more salient. Partly banning the institutionalized orthodox Islam, the Soviet authorities facilitated the interpretation of the Islam canons at the communal level in connection with the household-based rituals. Therefore, the "values, traditions, social mores and ethics of the community became 'Muslim' in their own right."[12] The main visible elements of the Kazakh "folk Islam" were visionary experiences and dreaming; healing through pilgrimage to saint places; healing through dhikr and chanting the poetry; asking for help from the spirits of ancestors, etc. While mosques were shadowed as the debris of feudalism, however the government did not try to prevent people from practicing "folk Islam."[13] Consequently, most of the population believed in this "local" type of Islam, which developed outside the official Muslim ideology.[14]

Finally institutionalizing the official Islam after World War II, Moscow gave a preference to the ethnic Uzbeks in running the Islamic institutions in Kazakhstan. Moreover, both of the only Islamic education centers were located in neighboring Uzbekistan, which restricted Kazakhs from studying the "official" Islam. As the religious identity is considered the inseparable part of ethnic identity, Kazakhs were not satisfied with this dominance of Uzbeks.[15]

After gaining independence Kazakhs started to reestablish its own ethnic identity and "turned to historical symbols of Kazakh traditional culture, with which many have not had personal experience, but which still carry considerable emotional power."[16] The Central Asian countries have experienced a cultural renaissance, which was characterized by the reexamining of the colonial "narrative" of the Soviet propaganda, challenging the superiority of Russian culture, and restoring the "pre-colo-

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[6] See: M. Omelicheva, "Islam in Kazakhstan: A Survey of Contemporary Trends and Sources of Securitization," *CCAS*, Vol. 30, Issue 2, 2011; G. Yemelianova, op. cit.

[7] D. DeWeese, op. cit., p. 346.

[8] M. Omelicheva, op. cit., pp. 243-256.

[9] See P. Jessa's article in *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 359-371.

[10] G. Yemelianova, op. cit., p. 287.

[11] See: S. Peyrouse, "Islam in Central Asia: National Specificities and Postsoviet Globalisation," *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 35, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 245-260.

[12] M. Omelicheva, op. cit., p. 247.

[13] S. Abashin, "The Logic of Islamic Practice: A Religious Conflict in Central Asia," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 267-286; K. Lymer, "Rags and Rock Art: The Landscapes of Holy Site Pilgrimage in the Republic of Kazakhstan," *World Archaeology*, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 158-172.

[14] See P. Jessa's article in *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 359-371.

[15] See: G. Yemelianova, op. cit.

[16] M. Rancier, "Resurrecting the Nomads: Historical Nostalgia and Modern Nationalism in Contemporary Kazakh Popular Music Videos," *Popular Music and Society*, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 2009, p. 388.

nial institutions, symbols and rituals."[17] Furthermore, "returning to Islam" was the substitute of the struggle for independence that the region never experienced.[18]

The *Senim. Bilim. Omir* association had a popular choir *Yasawi.* Eight young men, mostly the graduates of the Kazakh National Conservatory in Almaty, in traditional Kazakh costumes with skullcaps sang songs with the lyrics made from the *hikmets* (philosophical poems) of Khoja Ahmet Yasawi. The vocal group was popular in Kazakhstan and even performed in neighboring countries. The *Info-Tses* media outlet reporting from the concert of the Yasawi group in one of the biggest halls in Astana narrates, that "the songs of the group harmonize with the ancient Kazakh melodies of epos and *kuis*."[19] The group used to perform in all the Muslim holidays and within the short period of time launched three CD albums. Their talents were employed by the *Zikirshiler* group during the mass performance of *dhikr,* and they were part of the cultural activity of the *Senim. Bilim. Omir* association.[20] Apparently, the ideologists of the sect relied on the role of folk music in increasing the national self-consciousness of the post-colonial nation, and tried to present the very cultural product which was in a great demand at that period of time. As Sultanova states, "Musical idioms in daily life at a time of crisis ... necessarily reflect the growing sense of nationalism expressed in a society, and lead to music that contains elements immediately recognizable as belonging to the culture concerned."[21] Music is a clue that could mobilize masses around the idea of national unity and through the symbols shape and reshape the cultural identity of the people. Moreover, its vocal, visual and lyric elements are able to send messages to the masses on the particular patterns of group identity.[22]

The result in this section shows that the groups referred to the historical and cultural roots of the country using the musical nationalism and religious sentiments as the primary tool in reaching the long-term goals.

Socioeconomic Factors for the Development of Extremist Groups

Another element of "folk Islam" that the extremist religious groups have efficiently applied in Kazakhstan is the healing procedures. The purification of the spirits of "devil-affected people" through the pilgrimage tours and other related procedures which include the elements of meditation, hypnosis and different varieties of folk medicine were the primary activities of the *Ata Zholy* group. While *Senim. Bilim. Omir* applied the methods of closed sects, keeping people in private houses for a certain period of time, during which they performed dhikr five times a day, and a majority of their visitors were alcohol and drug addicted people, who needed urgent medical and psychological assistance.[23]

According to Penkala-Gawęcka the "ordinary" healers (*tawip*) were prevailing in Soviet-time Kazakhstan, and one could be easily found in the Almaty region through the unofficial ties. These representatives of "folk medicine" cured those, who were affected by "evil eye" or witchcraft. In case

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[17] S. Akiner, "Melting Pot, Salad Bowl - Cauldron? Manipulation and Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Central Asia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, 1997, pp. 363.

[18] See: Ibidem.

[19] "K religii cherez penie," *Info-Tses*, 11 May, 2007, available at [http://www.info-tses.kz/news/k-religii-cherez-penie/], 6 February, 2016. *Kui* is a national instrumental piece of Kazakhs usually played with national musical instruments, such as *dombyra* and *qobyz.*

[20] Khabar TV, "Aqiqat" (Truth) Documentary, 2011.

[21] R. Sultanova, "Music and Identity in Central Asia: Introduction," *Ethnomusicology Forum*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2005, p. 133.

[22] See: M. Rancier, op. cit.

[23] Khabar TV, "Aqiqat" (Truth) Documentary, 2011.

of serious illness people looked for *baksys*[24] who were skilled to exorcize evils from the souls of the patient using *dhikr* elements, while whip, a knife and the Quran were their main attributes.[25]

Similarly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, parallel with the "glasnost" and democracy movements, Kazakhs turned to their own traditions and values, and the charismatic spiritual healers, who were welcomed as the embodiment of the revival of ethnic and religious identity of the nation, abandoned their "underground" activities and came out to the public. The healers and *baksys* launched their curing campaigns, and the séances of the popular "saints" were organized in big stadiums and concert halls with thousands of participants.[26] In addition to that, the overall economic and social situation in the country was deteriorated, raising the unemployment and poverty, especially in rural areas. Moreover, the healthcare system of Soviet times was destroyed, the hospitals and clinics in the villages were closed, and the doctors left their jobs because of low salaries. Neither the government, nor the official Islamic clergy could alleviate the sufferings of the desperate people, and the "saints," whose narrative was understandable and grounded in the shamanic and Sufi traditions of the ordinary people, were the only authorities for them. Furthermore, these sects suggested the universal tool, which were capable of solving all the social, economic, medical, spiritual issues of the people.[27]

Are They Extremists?

None of the researchers, who wrote about "indigenous" religious movements developed in Kazakhstan after the independence, label them as "extremists." Accordingly, they primarily analyze the positive impact of the religious sects that in some cases played a role of movements for national revival, as well as replaced the medical organizations.

Tucek *et al*. have demonstrated the effectiveness of the medical treatment through dhikr exercises in their contemporary experimental research. The dhikr and *baksy* dance, which contain breathing and movement rites, are characterized as part of the Traditional Oriental Music Therapy in the medicine.[28] During the *dhikr* the participant moves his head from upper right position ("the right cheek almost touches right shoulder") to down left ("in the direction of the heart"), while reciting the words *"la ilaha illallah"*[29] in strict sequences.[30] As a result of the experiment, the "participants recite the mantras (beautiful names of God) while sitting, standing or dancing" and this "...improved blood flow in muscles, range of movements, regulatory dynamics of the autonomic nervous system, physical and mental relaxation or activation."[31]

However, the Kazakhstani Committee of National Security has concluded that together with curing from the illness, the dhikr may be used "for neurolinguistic programming of the individual, which is capable to lead the adept to the condition of trance and subjection of him or her to the will of the spiritual leader"[32]. The main danger of the *Senim. Bilim. Omir* ideology was that the members

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[24] Baksy is a traditional shamanic healer, who uses elements of dance, shouting, singing during the process of treatment.
[25] See: D. Penkala-Gawęcka, "Mentally Ill or Chosen by Spirits? 'Shamanic Illness' and the Revival of Kazakh Traditional Medicine in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 2013, p. 41.
[26] See P. Jessa's article in *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 359-371.
[27] See: D. Penkala-Gawęcka, op. cit.
[28] See: G. Tucek, E. Ferstl, F. Fritz, "A Study of Synchronisation Behaviour in a Group of Test Persons During Baksy and Dhikr Exercises Via Psycho-Physiological Monitoring," in: *Music that Works*, ed. by R.Haas, V.Brandes, Springer, Vienna, 2009.
[29] *Arab*.: "There is no God but Allah."
[30] See: G. Tucek, E. Ferstl, F. Fritz, op. cit., p. 274.
[31] Ibid., p. 273.
[32] Khabar TV, "Aqiqat" (Truth) Documentary, 2011.

of this sect blindly followed the instructions of the spiritual leader, which conflicted with the role and status of the individual in the society. In their interviews with the Khabar TV the former members of the group explained, how the fellow members left their families or married to a stranger only because Ismatulla Adbughappar ordered them.[33] The supporters of his ideology believed in his prophetic nature and referred to him as *Taksyr*.[34]

As it is clear from the analysis, the *Senim. Bilim. Omir* pursued long-term goals in the social and media spheres, while the *Ata Zholy* was a commercial project aimed at making profit from the pilgrimage tours to the saint places. The Religious Affairs Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan stated that the members of this sect "were exposed to the psychological, spiritual and physical violence, which may lead to the dismal ends. As a result of the following the ideas of this organization people committed suicides, or made other serious damages to the health."[35]

Albeit noticing some elements of crime and illegal medical treatment in the activities of these groups so far, the "extremist" part of them still needs to be revealed. Schmid provides Wibtrope's division of extremism into three types: "extreme by method but not by goal"; "extreme by goal and method"; "extreme by goal but not method". Labeling the third type as "non-violent extremism" the author, however, reckons that "the absence of violence might be only a temporal tactical consideration with 'true' extremist."[36] As it was concluded before, neither of two religious sects made statements against political or social structure of the society, but their methods of work were becoming increasingly confrontational with the government, as they rejected the major principles and values of the society and functioned outside the basic social institutions. As Asanbayev and Umirzakova pointed out, the main destructive pattern of these sects and cults is their confrontation with the mainstream religious views.[37] In addition to the immediate damage to the social life and health of the involved members, they could lead to the cleavage and conflict in the society.

Out of 20 indicators for monitoring extremism provided by Schmid only five are visible in the cases of *Senim. Bilim. Omir* and *Ata Zholy* movements. They include: "Reject universal human rights and show a lack of empathy and disregard for the rights of other than their own people"; "Reject democratic principles based on popular sovereignty"; "Reject equal rights for all, especially those of women and minorities"; "Exhibit authoritarian, dictatorial or totalitarian traits"; "Are unwilling to accept criticism and intimidate and threaten dissenters, heretics and critics with death."[38] This conclusion was made based on the observation and analysis of the documentary and open source secondary information published in the mass media.

Conclusion

This study enhanced our understanding of the tactics and strategies of the religious groups in the transitional post-colonial societies, where the government institutions and civil society organizations are still undeveloped. The organizations created under the cover of charismatic individuals could embrace people's support and obedience if the ideology of the organization is based on the national, religious and cultural values of the society. The religious dogma combined with the traditional rites helps

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[33] Khabar TV, "Aqiqat" (Truth) Documentary, 2011.

[34] The Kazakh word meaning "Lord" or "Master", which indicates the submission to him.

[35] A. Zubov, op. cit.

[36] A. Schmid, "Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *ICCT Paper,* May 2014, International Center for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, p. 12.

[37] See: M. Asanbayev, L. Umirzakova, "New Form of Religious Extremism in Kazakhstan: Destructive Sects and Cults," *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* No. 1 (55), 2009, p. 43.

[38] A. Schmid, op. cit., p. 21.

them to manipulate the fellow members and dictate them the instructions, which could force him/her to change the worldview, confronting him/her with mainstream population. As the charismatic leader could gain a strong support in the masses, this could lead to the cleavage in the society.

IN SEARCH OF A CONFESSIONAL COMPROMISE IN THE "RELIGION-SOCIETY-THE STATE" CONTEXT

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A B S T R A C T

To suppress the worst forms of religious intolerance, the ideas and constructive potential of tolerance and peace need the public support of the constitutional principles of the freedom of conscience and religion in the "religion-society-

the state" context. Today, the so-called ideological platform of nationalist forces, which is taking shape within the extremist and terrorist international organizations, is inspired by the idea of administrative and territorial changes in Russia's regions and, as such, presents the greatest danger to Russia's territorial integrity. The clear statement that, despite the difference in their interests, members of social communities should observe the rules and norms based on compromises, mutual concessions and the principles of tolerance raises no doubts. In real life, however, tolerance is not easy to practice amid different or even clashing interests, ideas, traditions, preferences and ambitions. Intolerance and xenophobia, the reverse side of the gradually increasing religious and cultural diversity, a typical trend of our times, negatively affect the sociocultural context and make coexistence much harder to achieve. Pluralism and actualization of differences and divergences multiply private interests and make it twice as important to find their common denominator. In Russia in recent years the problem of extremism has acquired new meanings, while the threat of extremism in the regions of the Russian Federation became more obvious. Radicalization of society provides fertile soil for extremism to flourish. The state, therefore, should concentrate on the prevention of extremism rooted in axiological shifts, the absence of unifying ideology, social problems that may be exacerbated by an economic crisis, corruption, a low cultural level, numerous phobias (Russophobia, Islamophobia), etc. The widening gap between the rich and the poor, spiritual disorientation and disagreements between religions and confessions, likewise, breed extremism. International extremist and terrorist organizations, whose criminal activities are spreading far and wide across the country, are especially dangerous, partly because young people with no life experience who are left to their own devices by their parents and society are especially susceptible to radical ideas.

KEYWORDS: *tolerance/intolerance, confessions, extremism, Russia, regions.*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Today, the world as we know it is a multilayered structure; simple and straightforward concepts are a thing of the past. Mass consciousness is aware of the mounting wave of changes that have so far eluded adequate academic definitions. The conceptual framework tries to take changes in stride and fails: the fairly vague reality itself should be reformulated.[1]

The attempts to identify the direction and the ultimate aim of the turbulent flow of social life and to guess how things may unfold in the future never stop even in the sensitive sphere of interaction between the state and religion.

In the 1990s, the independent post-Soviet states, Russia included, experienced an upsurge of religious feelings and religious activities; they have not lost their interest in this side of public life:[2] there is a widely shared consent that the interaction between the state that declares its intention to establish a civil society and the confessions present in the territory of any particular state (the followers of which are its citizens) should assume civilized forms.

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[1] See: Yu.M. Ebzeeva, I.S. Karabulatova, *Transcultural Language Personality: Statement of the Problem and Conceptual Space,* Man in India, Serials Publications, New Delhi, 2017, pp. 97, 23, 255-262.

[2] See: I. Karabulatova, S. Galiullina, K. Kotik, "Terrorist Threat in Russia: Transformation of Confessional Relationships," *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 93-104.

Today, there is a growing awareness that the framework of interaction between the state and public forces should be strictly outlined along the fields where this cooperation can be maximally useful for spiritual revival, social harmony and counteracting extremist trends. Experience accumulated all over the world and an adequate analysis of the prospects that have become apparent in other countries can and should be used to create the mechanisms of this interaction with adjustments for any given state. To achieve this goal, we should identify the basic trends that have come to the fore in the process of interaction between the civil society and the religious component. We have written this article to trace the trends that have already taken shape in Europe due to the long history of interaction between the state and religion in their territories and to adjust this experience to the situation in Russia.

Methods and Materials

In Russia the importance of interreligious dialog can hardly be overestimated; in fact, in some constituencies of the Russian Federation it has already demonstrated its efficiency. Special committees for religious and confessional affairs and nationalities have been already established at the republican, regional and municipal level. The Administration for Religious Affairs with the powers of a state structure, transformed by the Decree of President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev of 26 August, 2008 from the Council for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of Tatarstan, is one of the pertinent examples. The same fully applies to the Committee for Nationalities, Religion and Cossacks under the Administration of Rostov-on-Don; the Council for National and Confessional Relationships under the Government of the Sakhalin Region, the Council for Religious Affairs under the Ministry for Nationalities Politics of the Republic of Komi; the Committee for Religious Affairs under the Government of the Republic of Daghestan, etc. Before reaching its highest stage, extremism is preserved in latent forms (extremist ideology and its propaganda) within religious organizations and groups and is gradually heated to its boiling point by social contradictions. This means that preventing extremism is as important as counteracting extremist feelings and actions.

In the Russian Federation federal laws are adjusted to local conditions; today, there is a vast number of regional normative legal acts intended to prevent extremism in interethnic and interreligious relationships.

An analysis of this multidimensional problem is based on six semantic blocks.

- The first comprises scholarly works related to the meaning and content of identity[3] in the context of primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism.

- The second block is represented by the studies of ethnopolitical forms of ethnic groups: diasporas, national-cultural autonomies, their institutional features, properties and functions;[4] the ethnoconfessional identity of the diaspora or diaspora-related identity;[5] search for the ways and means required to integrate the diaspora into the host environment.[6]

[3] See: E.H. Erikson, "Psychosocial Identity," in: *A Way of Looking at Things. Selected Papers*, ed. by Schlein, New York, 1995.

[4] See: R. Brubaker, *Accidental Diasporas and External "Homelands" in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, Vienna, 2000; R. Cohen, "Global Diasporas: An Introduction," in: *Global Diasporas,* ed. by R. Cohen, Second edition, New-York, 2008.

[5] See: M.P. Kovalev, *Etnokulturnaia identichnost diaspory v globaliziruiushchemsia mire: spetsifika sostoiania i vektory izmenenia v protsesse repatriatsii*, Author's abstract of a Ph.D. thesis, Tomsk, 2011.

[6] See: R.V. Borisov, *Iazykovaia kompetentnost kak sredstvo vyrazhenia etnicheskoy identichnosti i formirovania mezhetnicheskoy tolerantnosti uchashcheysia molodezhi*, Author's abstract of a Ph.D. thesis, Makhachkala, 2007.

- The third block contains the works that deal with the political aspects of regional studies;[7] theoretical studies of ethnopolitical processes and conflicts at the national and regional levels, an analysis of ethnic interaction in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.[8] Studies within the framework of conflict-related paradigm were united into a separate group within the third block. They allowed the authors to identify the very important or even decisive role played by the way people involved in a political process perceive ethnic borders.[9]

- The fourth block consists of academic writings related to the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic identity in the contemporary world and an analysis of political governance mechanisms utilized in ethnic and diaspora-related processes.[10]

- The fifth block contains recent works by contemporary scholars engaged in the studies of information space and its interaction with the political and ethnic spheres of social life, as well as the contributions made by the media, Internet portals of regional powers and regional officials.[11]

- The sixth block analyzes the normative and legal basis for ethnopolitical interactions at the regional level.[12]

Discussion

On the whole, philosophers and political scientists agree that society is moving from secular to post-secular development stage. According to the prominent German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, "A 'post-secular' society must at some point have been in a 'secular' state."[13] This means that this terminology is applicable only to the Western community, or, to be more precise, the developed European countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This highly important clarification helps us understand that there is no universalism in the development of the post-secular trend in the contemporary world.

The postmodern generation comprises 40-50% of contemporary Russian population;[14] it lives in a multi-variant milieu and is strongly affected by globalization. Cultures and traditions are being ac-

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[7] See: K.S. Mokin, N.A. Baryshnaia, *Etnopoliticheskoe issledovanie: kontseptsii, metodologiia, praktika*, Nauka Publishing Center, Saratov, 2009; I.Iu. Riabkov, N.B. Cheremin, "Etnopoliticheskie aspekty razvitia sovremennykh gosudarstv v epokhu globalizatsii na primere Rossiyskoy Federatsii," *Vestnik Nizhegorodskogo universiteta im. N.I. Lobachevskogo*, Series *Sotsialnye nauki*, No. 2 (26), 2012.

[8] See: D.I. Igonin, *Diskursivnye osnovania gosudarstvennoy migratsionnoy politiki v sovremennoy Rossii (federalny i regionalny aspekty)*, Author's abstract of a Ph.D. thesis, Kazan, 2012.

[9] See: A.S. Kim, *Etnopoliticheskoe issledovanie sovremennykh diaspor (konfliktologicheskiy aspekt)*, St. Petersburg, 2009; T.G. Stefanenko, *Etnopsikhologiia*, Moscow, 2007.

[10] See: O.V. Kinoian, *Politizatsia ethnicheskoy identichnosti kak faktor mobilizatsii etnicheskikh grupp v usloviakh konflikta*, Ph.D. thesis, Nevinnomysk, 2009; O.V. Borisov, *Fenomen politizirovannoy etnicheskoy identichnosti: teoretiko-metodologichesky analiz*, Doctoral thesis, Moscow, 2000.

[11] See: T.V. Polikanova, *Informastionnoe obespechenie optimizatsii mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniy v Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, Ph.D. thesis, Moscow, 2007.

[12] See: G.F. Gabdrakhmanova, R.N. Musina, *Indentifikatsionnye protsessy u russkikh i tatar Tatarstana v 1990-2000 gg.: kollektivnye predstavlenia i konstruktivistskaia role elit. Etnologicheskie issledovania v Tatarstane*, ed. by G.F. Gabdrakhmanova, G.I. Makarova, R.K. Urazmanova, Issue VI, Kazan, 2012.

[13] J. Habermas, "Notes on a Post-Secular Society," 18 June, 2008, available at [http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html].

[14] See: "Distribution of Population by Age Groups (as of 1 January, 2007)," Blagotvoritelny fond podderzhki molodezhnykh initsiativ 'Moe pokolenie'," available at [http://www.moe-pokolenie.ru/412/389/], 6 August, 2017. From among the total

tively blended, thrusting the familiar black-and-white stereotypes aside along the way.[15] This is a very real process visually apparent on the streets of Moscow and tied closely with the "guest workers" concept.[16]

The question of whether the canonical norms of traditional religions of Russia can be related, legally or otherwise, to state laws, is a particular aspect of the problem posed by constructive interaction between state and religious institutes. This adds special importance to the data obtained in an opinion poll carried out by the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences,[17] according to which the opinion that secular and religious laws should not correlate, was predominant, especially in the non-Christian religious groups.

Results

According to the Federal Migration Service, as of the end of 2012 there were about 14 million migrants in the Russian Federation; 77% of them citizens of the CIS countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine) who came as guest workers.[18] This seemingly large number constituted a meager 6-7% of the total Russian Federation workforce, yet they bring culture and traditions that differ radically from Russian culture and Russian traditions.

Many of the young men who arrive from Central Asia prefer to refer to themselves as Muslims rather than Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc., which causes a lot of problems because of the stereotypes deeply rooted in human minds.[19]

According to the All-Russia population censuses, between 2002 and 2010[20] the total number of those who arrive from Central Asia and are permanently residing in the territory of Russia has practically doubled.

This is especially apparent in Moscow where, according to expert assessments, those who are habitually called guest workers constitute up to one-quarter of Russian capital's total population. This means that Russia today is confronted with the problems that Europe had to sort out some time ago.[21]

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population strength of Russia (142,221 thousand as of 1 January, 2007) the age group of 10 to 39 years (62,108 thousand) can be identified in the first place as a post-modernity generation.

[15] See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Post-modernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

[16] See: G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, G.F. Shafranov-Kutsev, E.R. Kucheryavaya, S.D. Galiullina, L.R. Sadykova, "Problems of Ethno-Confessional Extremism in Russia as a Reflection of Deviation Processes in the Society," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* Vol. 6, No. 6, S. 3, 2015, pp. 95-103.

[17] See: M.M. Mchedlova, Iu.A. Gavrilov, A.G. Shevchenko, "Religia i obshchestvo v Rossii: mezhkonfessialnye otnoshenia i protivodeystvie ekstremizmu," in: *Rossia reformiruiushchaiasia,* An Annual, ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, Issue 8, IS RAN, Moscow, 2009, pp. 344-345.

[18] See: "According to the FMS, Every Year Up To 14 Million Guest Workers Come to Russia," RIA Novosti, available in Russian at [http://ria.ru/society/20121102/908857122.html], 16 December, 2017.

[19] See: I.M. Gabdrafikov, I.S. Karabulatova, L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, *"*Ethnoconfessional Factor in Social Adaptation of Migrant Workers in the Muslim Regions of Russia," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences,* Vol. 6, No. 3, S. 4, May 2015, pp. 213-223.

[20] See: "National Composition of Population. All-Russia Population Census of 2002," available in Russian at [http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/html/TOM_04_01.htm], 30 July, 2012); "National Composition of Population. All-Russia Population Census of 2010," available in Russian at [http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/ croc/Documents/Vol4/pub-04-01.pdf], 30 July, 2017.

[21] See: I. Karabulatova, "Ethnocultural Communication Systems in the Northern Caucasus and the Problem of Radical Islam," *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 71-79.

This also means that education and unprejudiced information about the alien religious culture that has already struck root in the habitual and seemingly immutable space should become another important step towards tolerance in contemporary society. Since the mid-2000s, Russian society has been discussing the question of whether this sort of education should be implemented at schools. The latest opinion poll carried out by the Levada Center to find out what citizens of the Russian Federation thought about religious education for children and whether the fundamentals of religions should become part of the school curricula produced the following results:[22] 74% did not object to religious education for children; 20% preferred purely secular education. More than half of those who supported religious education believed that it should be left to parents; 9% preferred to entrust the task to the Church; 11% wanted the fundamentals of religions to be included in the school curricula. This means that the society has arrived at the conclusion that its members should know more about the variety of religious cultures in Russia and that the Fundamentals of Religious Culture and Secular Ethics course as part of school curricula would push the public opinion towards tolerance and respect of other/alien/different cultures.

In Tatarstan, authorities adopted a paternalist attitude to the Islamic institutes, while in Bashkortostan authorities prefer to keep the religious sphere at a certain distance.[23] In the Nizhniy Novgorod Region the Muslim community looks after its own affairs based on the legal norms of the Russian Federation.

These practical measures related to social life will bring no results if the main factor in the state-religion relationship is ignored.

On the whole, the Muslim structures of the Volga Federal District are working towards a stronger All-Russia civil identity when preserving and developing national cultures, harmonizing international and interconfessional relationships and engaging in intercultural and interreligious dialog.[24]

Much is being done to satisfy the local population's social and spiritual requirements to a greater degree, to establish conditions conducive to the preservation of cultural and spiritual values of local peoples and their multiplication.

C o n c l u s i o n

Sociologists and political scientists should define the fundamental principles of interaction between the state and religion at the current stage of social development. We can be at least sure of the following: despite what liberals say about the present state of religion as having no resources and nothing to offer to all those seeking meaningful self-identification, religion has already assumed the key role in shaping contemporary human identities with all the inevitable and predictable consequences for the state.

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[22] See: "It Turned Out that Citizens of the Russian Federation Wanted Religious Education for Their Children without Involvement of Either the State or the ROC," RIA Novy Region 2, available in Russian at [http://www.nr2.ru/society/426965.html], 24 December, 2017.

[23] See: L.G. Khusnutdinova, Kh.S. Vildanov, L.M. Andreeva, R.Kh. Iliasova, I.M. Gabdrafikov, "Sotsiokulturnaia adaptatsia trudovykh migrantov v Povolzhie: nekotorye aspekty regionalnoy politiki (na materiale Samarskoy oblasti)," in: *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie i gumanitarno-filosofskie problemy sovremennoy nauki*, Vol. 3, UGUES, Moscow, Ufa, Rostov on Don, 2015, pp. 135-142.

[24] See: R.R. Zamaletdinov, I.S. Karabulatova, I.E. Yarmakeev, E.N. Ermakova, "Linguo-Propaedeutics of Ethnic Conflicts as a Basis for Stability in Complex Polyethnic Regions," *Asian Social Science,* Vol. 10, No. 20, 2014, pp. 164-173.

In Russia, the religious factor is even more important than in Europe, since it is moving into the axiological void left by the communist ideology that could not be tolerated indefinitely.

Based on the above we can state that religion is acquiring a new quality in post-Soviet post-secular space. It is moving away from its previous image of a sum-total of dogmas and norms of conduct towards a cultural and civilizational criterion of affiliation[25] able to determine the state's political agenda.

To transform this phenomenon into creative advantage we should rely on the experience already acquired by other countries, Western European countries first and foremost. The secular European society has already learned that without tolerance and a clear understanding of the state's mission, prevalence of civil identity and the desire to build an inclusive state, the process might move in a wrong direction, polarize society and split it along the key social and ethical lines. The relationships between the state and religion as one of the components of contemporary society determine many aspects of social life to a great extent.

In case of Russia, tolerance is seen as an acceptance of traditions of intercultural and interreligious interaction that ensures the stability of Russian civilization in the context of social solidarity among the followers of different confessions.

The problem of tolerance and the related issue of ensuring a constructive interconfessional dialog and overcoming extremism imply that we should take into account a variety of factors in Russia, which is a poly-ethnic and poly-confessional country. Interpreted within the Russian tradition, tolerance may mean the coexistence of different ethnoconfessional traditions. It is not enough to define Russian civilization as Orthodox even if the impact of Orthodox Christianity on Russia's culture and history is much more pronounced than that of all other religions present in Russia. We should admit, however, that the religious traditions of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Protestantism, and national religions, likewise, played an important role. This state of affairs demonstrates their mutual influence and mutual enrichment, as well as the joint efforts to create and protect common values and the state in the integrated geographic, political, economic and spiritual space. As a result, it creates an awareness of a common historical destiny, the archetypical ideas common to different ethnoconfessional communities, and common identities.

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[25] See: M.M. Mchedlova, "Sotsiokulturnaia reinterpretatsia politiki: potrebnosti v novykh gnoseologicheskikh skhemakh i novykh smyslakh," in: *Dialog tsivilizatsiy i postkrizisny mir. Doklady i vystupleniya XI Iubileynoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii s mezhdunarodnym uchastiem, posviashchennoy 50-letiiu RUDN, Moskva, 25-27 noyabria 2010 g.*, ed. by N.S. Kirabaev, Iu.M. Pochta, B.G. Ivanov, RUDN, Moscow, 2010, p. 53.

THE ISLAMIC UMMAH OF RUSSIA AND ISIS: ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN THE TURKIC-SPEAKING REGIONS

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A B S T R A C T

E thnocultural conflicts in the world to-
day are rooted in the increasingly in-
cendiary globalization in the course of
which certain regions cannot cope with mi-
grant flows (EU member countries are a per-
tinent example) while others (the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region in the People's
Republic of China, Tatarstan, Chechnia,
Bashkortostan, the Stavropol Territory, Tyu-
men Region, Adygea, and Ingushetia in the
Russian Federation) are living in the compli-
cated context of ethnic patchwork. Societies
are moving towards blending different eth-
nocultural elements, causing havoc in hu-
man minds, unexpected ethnocultural situa-
tions and social and ethnic deviations which,
as could be expected, consolidates the posi-
tions of the Islamic State.[1] It is difficult to

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[1] This organization is banned in Russia.

study different aspects of the problem in depth in the age of the contemporary digital information society and various brainwashing strategies used by ISIS agents: they present ISIS as the best place for the development of genuine human qualities, which has already brought together members of several ethnic communities. The transnational extremist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami among them, have spread their influence to Central Asia and are gradually moving into Russian territory. Strongholds of extremism are not limited to the Northern Caucasus; they are present in the historically peaceful Volga area where Islamists have their own mosques and training courses and work hard to lure as many young people as possible to their side. Post-Soviet Islamism is a mixture of classic universalist Islamism and xenophobic fundamentalism. In Soviet times local Muslims treated the so-called Muslim world as something abstract, while *Afghan mujahideen caused a lot of irritation in the Soviet Central Asian countries: Uzbeks or Tajiks, for instance, found it hard to associate the mujahideen persistent opposition with the defense of Islam. Today, the situation in the Muslim world is different. Former Soviet republics accept the universalist model of Islam as an endogenous phenomenon rooted in economic, political and ideological prerequisites. Fundamentalism/Wahhabism is seen as an exogenous phenomenon that forced some adherents of classic Islam out and drew the rest into its ranks. Political religions are never neutral. The difference between "us" and "others" is ontological. "Others" are a product of evil (ideologists of political religions do not hesitate to state that their enemies are "soulless"), therefore destruction is the only method to be employed against them. This paradoxical combination of cruelty and flexibility is typical of the post-modernist phenomena.*

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In Russia, the Islamic factor was stabilized to some extent during the wars in Chechnia. It was at this time that public opinion asserted that Moscow was not confronting regional separatism, but the Muslims who were determined to establish what they called Islamic order and a vaguely defined Islamic state. It was during the war in Chechnia that Islamic solidarity in Russia became obvious for the first time—Muslims of the Northern Caucasus sided with the Chechens; numerous Tatars from the Volga area fought on the side of separatists.[2] The Tatarstan elite, represented by the then President Mintimir Shaymiev, was cautiously trying on the garbs of an intermediary between Moscow and Grozny. Radicalization and politicization of Islam that was spreading far and wide across the country awakened the Muslims of Russia to their common religious and cultural identity inside the country and their sense of belonging to the international Muslim Ummah and the Muslim world, which practically unilaterally sided with the Chechens and their struggle. This strongly affected their perception of Moscow's foreign and domestic policies.

Russia and the West are equally concerned with the processes that are gradually transforming political Islam into an extremist and terrorist phenomenon. Russia, however, should keep Western companies that use their investments to move to dominant positions and Western military bases (this

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[2] See: I. Karabulatova, "Ethnocultural Communication Systems in the Northern Caucasus and the Problem of Radical Islam," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 2016, pp. 71-79.

issue is especially topical in Central Asia) at a safe distance. Stability, meaning economic stability in the first place, in Central Asia will help resolve the problems of drug trafficking from Afghanistan and migration. Despite the independence acquired practically three decades ago and the road they chose for themselves, Central Asian states still need Russia as an economic and political partner:[3] they require markets for their natural resources and goods. This cooperation can intensify the development of certain Russian regions, as well as create a new scheme of post-Soviet integration using different mechanisms and based on different principles.

The world community is quite understandably concerned with the successful and large-scale recruitment of militants across the world unfolding in the second decade of the 21st century.[4] Apocalyptic perception can be described as another link (or an element of the puzzle) between religious extremism and leftist ideas. This is pertinent even if the followers of the latter (communists, socialists and anarchists) relied on eschatology and apocalyptic views, which are practically forgotten today, as their cultural and historical roots, while the radical survivalists of our days perceive the Apocalypse as the meaning and aim of their activities. While some perceive the Apocalypse as an immanent phenomenon, others look at it as highly relevant and specific.[5]

The fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, the only dictator who, in expectation of promised lavish economic assistance had abandoned his nuclear weapons program, taught the leaders of many Islamic states a lesson. This means that jihad declared on the Western world will never end.

Methods and Materials

The ideology of political Islam is best described as a set of concepts to be freely used to build up any ideology required here and now. Some of them are rooted in Islam (Jahiliyyah, shirk); others are borrowed from Western liberalism (Islamic democracy), Marxism ("Islamic revolution"), etc.

An analysis of the data obtained in the course of targeted polls within the Russian Ummah and among top Muslim clergy in the Islamic regions of the South Federal District of the Russian Federation in 2016-2017 revealed that an awareness of ethnic and confessional identity among the Muslims of Russia had increased. Russian military operations in Syria strongly affect the Russian Muslims' self-perception. While at the official level it is stated that Russian aviation attacks Islamic Caliphate (ISIS/DAESH) sites, at the grass-root level most of the Muslims are convinced that the goal of Moscow is fighting the Syrian opposition to help Bashar Assad remain in power and consolidating Russian military presence in the Middle East for strategic purposes.

Results

Today, common Muslims and the top echelons of the Muslim clergy support one of the two opposite ideas about radicalization of Islam in ISIS/DAESH.

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[3] See: L. Shkvarya, I. Karabulatova, V. Rusakovich, A. Rapiev, "The Impact of the Customs Union and the EAEU on the Small and Medium Business in Kazakhstan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 93-100.

[4] See: I. Karabulatova, B. Akhmetova, K. Shagbanova, E. Loskutova, F. Sayfulina, L. Zamalieva, I. Dyukov, M. Vykhrystyuk, "Shaping Positive Identity in the Context of Ethnocultural Information Security in the Struggle against the Islamic State," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 84-92; G.V. Osipov, I.S. Karabulatova, A.S. Karabulatova, "Matrimonialnye strategii v polittekhnologiiakh IGIL," *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Series 2: *Humanitarian Sciences*, No. 6, 2016, pp. 69-79.

[5] See: E. Ermakova, M. Jilkisheva, G. Fayzullina, I. Karabulatova, Kh. Shagbanova, "The Media and Fiction: Postmodernist Discourse of Contemporary Terrorism in the Context of Apocalyptic Rhetoric," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 61-69.

The biggest groups of foreign militants fighting on the side of DAESH arrived from

Tunis—6,000 as of October 2015 (hereinafter all quoted figures are official, unless otherwise stated);

Saudi Arabia—2,500 as of October 2015;

Russia—2,400 as of September 2015;

Turkey—2,000-2,200 as of November 2015;

Jordan—2,000 as of September 2015.

The CIS countries and the former Soviet republics have produced the following numbers of militants:

Azerbaijan—104 (an official figure), 216 (unofficial estimate) as of May 2014;

Georgia—50 (unofficial estimate) as of July 2015;

Kazakhstan—300 as of January 2015;

Kyrgyzstan—500 (unofficial estimate) as of November 2015;

Moldova—1 as of January 2015;

Tajikistan—386 as of May 2015;

Turkmenistan—360 (unofficial estimate) as of January 2015;

Uzbekistan—500 (unofficial estimate) as of January 2015.[6]

The quoted figures mean that the extremist groups involved in the civil war in Syria are replenished mostly from local and regional sources: the majority of militants are recruited in Arab countries. Citizens of Tunis, Saudi Arabia and Jordan prevail in the crowds of new recruits from other countries and of other nationalities. It should be said, however, that, after fighting in the ranks of ISIS, foreign militants will return to their home countries in North Africa, Europe and the CIS; this will inevitably tip up the balance of power there.[7]

The border between Turkey and the Islamic State and their ethnoconfessional affinity makes it much easier to recruit those willing to fight for ISIS. According to one of the official reports supplied by Turkish authorities in November 2015, 500 Turkish citizens who had joined ISIS were imprisoned; the same happened to 100 Turkish citizens who had joined Jabhat al Nusra.[8]

Terrorists are working hard to plant separatist sentiments and the idea of potentially joining the caliphate in Syria and Iraq among the Uyghurs and Kazakhs of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The ISIS/DAESH terrorist organization went even further: it composed a song "I am a Mujahid" in Mandarin Chinese to lure Chinese Muslims to its ranks. The fear of Chinese authorities that extremist Islamist ideology might spread through Xinjiang in the country's north-west is another argument in favor of Chinese involvement in the counterterrorist operation. So far, China has limited itself to the second Great Wall of China project to separate the autonomous region from the Chinese territory proper.[9] The Shi'a Axis (Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon) will allow China to lay the land railway route, part of its Silk Road project, an ample argument to side with Assad, Iran and Russia.

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[6] See: "How Many Terrorists and From Which Countries are Fighting in the Ranks of DAESH: Report by The Soufan Group," available in Russian at [https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/03/26/skolko-terroristov-i-iz-kakih-stran-voyuet-v-ryadah-daish-otchet-the-soufan-group], 1 January, 2017.

[7] See: "Eksperty sravnili IGIL s Tretyim reykhom," available at [https://riafan.ru/165629-ekspertyi-sravnili-igil-s-tretim-reyhomъ], 2 February, 2018.

[8] See: "How Many Terrorists and From Which Countries are Fighting in the Ranks of DAESH..."

[9] See: "Kitay postroit 'Velikuiu stenu' v musulmanskom Xinjiange," 24 January, 2018, available at [http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2018/01/24/1676738.html], 2 February, 2018.

There are pro-Turkish communities in Tatarstan, which is a far more serious factor than Shi'a, which is fairly exotic for the republic. There are supporters of Nazim Haqqani, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazim. Every year in the Month of Ramadan up to 90 Turks disguised as Koran hafizes come to the Islamic regions of the Russian Federation on spying missions.[10]

At first, Russian Muslims remained indifferent to Moscow's military assistance to Bashar Assad and his regime. In 2013, two demonstrations in support of the Syrian opposition in Makhachkala gathered several hundred each, accusing the Russian leaders of fighting against Islam in Syria.[11] In the same year, the Tatar Public Center (TPC), an organization well-known for its radicalism, announced that it sided with the Syrian opposition. Rafis Kashapov, Chairman of the TPC branch in Naberezhnye Chelny, where Islamists are especially active, declared that his structure supported the volunteers determined to fight against Assad and his army in Syria. According to his information, slogans had appeared on building walls in Damascus environs "Syria today, Russia tomorrow! Chechens and Tatars, Stand Up and Be Counted!", which should be treated as scattered outcrops of disagreement.[12]

It is hard to say how many Russian Muslims are fighting in the Middle East, yet we know for sure that, according to classified information of Russia's special services, in 2016 the flow was diminished to 1,700. There are 5,000 "volunteers" from Russia fighting on the side of ISIS/DAESH. In early 2015, there were 150 Chechens from Russia in the ISIS ranks; the total figure being much bigger: from 1,500 to 2,000 Chechens, most of them arriving from Europe. Akhmet Iarlykapov from Russia quoted 3,000 as the likely figure.[13] By late 2014, there were from 85 to 150 people from Kabardino-Balkaria fighting for ISIS in Syria. In 2015, according to the then head of Daghestan Ramazan Abdulatipov, 643 mujahidin left the republic to fight in Syria.[14] According to the Republic's Ministry of the Interior, there are 900 militants fighting in the Middle East; nonofficial sources offer an even bigger figure of over 2,000. According to the FSB, there are 200 militants from the Volga area fighting on the side of ISIS/DAESH. Several scores left Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tyumen, Novosibirsk, and Astrakhan to fight in Syria. According to Mufti of Crimea Ruslan Saitvaliev, 500 men left the peninsula to join jihad. The Supreme Mufti of Syria quoted the figure of 2,000 Russian Muslims fighting on the side of the Syrian opposition in 2012-2013.

Discussion

Journalists, experts, Muslim clerics and special services quote different figures.[15] According to power and order structures, one out of three Muslims in Russia, convinced that Russia is fighting Islam in Syria, is opposed to this policy.[16]

Part of the Muslim community of Russia pushes aside the arguments offered by the official clergy to the effect that the Syrian opposition and ISIS violate the norms of Islam and that ISIS (to

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[10] See: I.S. Karabulatova, E.N. Ermakova, G.A. Chiganova, "Astana the Capital of Kazakhstan and Astanas in Siberia as a Linguistic-Cultural Aspect of the National Islam of Eurasia ," *Terra Sebus: Acta Musei Sabesiensis*, Special Issue, 2014, pp. 15-30.

[11] See: A. Malashenko, "Voyna v Sirii glazami rossiyskikh musulman," 23 June, 2016, available at [http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/23/ru-pub-63875], 2 February, 2018.

[12] See: "V Tatarstane natsional-separatisty ob'iavili o podderzhke boevikov-islamistov v Sirii," available at [https://regnum.ru/news/1670767.html], 3 February 2018.

[13] See: "IG privlekaet molodykh musulman obeshchaniem sotsialnoi spravedlivosti," 31 August, 2015 // Kavkazskii uzel, available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/268043/], 1 February, 2018.

[14] "'U menia est pravilo: ranshe vystrela ne padat.' Interviu Ramazana Abdulatipova," *Vedomosti*, 24 December, 2015.

[15] See: "Eksperty ob IGIL i voyne s IGIL," available at [http://svobodaslova.su/index.php/travel/162-eksperty-ob-igil-i-vojne-s-igil], 3 February, 2018.

[16] See: "Rossyskie musulmane i krizis v Sirii," available at [http://ansar.ru/person/rossijskie-musulmane-i-krizis-v-sirii], 3 February, 2018.

borrow the term from leader of Chechnia Ramzan Kadyrov) is a state of Iblis (Satan). They remain convinced that Russia is fighting Islam in a Muslim country which makes it an accomplice of the West.[17] This part of the Muslim community would have been even more opposed to Russia's military campaign if Moscow engaged in a ground operation.

According to different expert assessments, from 5 to 17% of the polled believe that Western Europe may become a caliphate.[18]

The number of recruits from Western Europe and Russia is steadily growing despite the efforts of individual countries and the world community to stop the flow.[19]

Nobody knows how many of these recruits perished in this war. According to the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation (the data for the period when part of Russian Military Space Forces had been removed from Syria) 2,000 militants from Russia were liquidated. This means that the Russian VKS liquidated half or even the greater part of Russian citizens who fought on the ISIS side.[20]

It should be mentioned that some countries produce significantly more militants than others,[21] Russia being one of the former. From June 2014 onwards, the number of militants from Western Europe has doubled, while the flow from North America remained more or less the same. The number of foreign fighters from Russia and Central Asia increased up to threefold, according to certain assessments.

C o n c l u s i o n

Sociocultural coexistence of different social groups in a digital society is impossible without a social consensus based on compromises and mutual respect between majorities and minorities. The DAESH ideologists rely on this argument to win over the hearts and minds. In fact, any society, and poly-cultural and poly-ethnic societies first and foremost, is confronted with ethnopolitical myths and the way they affect social realities. Each new generation relies on the historical matrixes of the collective unconscious to revive the memory of the outstanding events of the past that goes back several centuries.[22]

Today, the growing number of foreign militants confirms that the measures taken to dam the flow of foreign volunteers to extremist Islamic groups in Syria and Iraq are not particularly efficient.

The idea of siding with fellow believers in the Middle East has spread across Russia to become a phenomenon of federal dimensions. We can even say that Russia, and Eurasia for that matter, are crossed by what can be called an Islamist route. Chechen militants fighting in Syria believe that they are fighting for the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. There are Chechen units called "brigades" named after Hattab, Shamil Basaev, Djohar Dudaev (no bigger than one company in strength)

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[17] See: "Kadyrov obeshchaet 'otpravit gnit' boevikov IGIL, ugrozhavshikh Rossii i Putinu," available at [http://media-leaks.ru/kadyrov-isil/], 4 February, 2018.

[18] See: "S bezhentsami v Evropu popal khalifat," available at [https://vz.ru/world/2015/9/7/765391.html], 1 January, 2018; I.M. Khrustalev, "Transformatsia immigratsionnoy politiki Frantsii v usloviakh usilenia musulmanskoy immigratsii," *Nauchnoe obozrenie*, Seria 1: *Ekonomika i pravo*, No. 4, 2010, pp. 227-230.

[19] See: B.V. Dolgov, *Genezis islamistskogo dvizheniia v obshchestvenno-istoricheskoy dinamike Alzhira, Tunisa i Arabo-musulmanskoy diaspory Frantsii v 1970-2015-e gody*, Doctoral thesis, Moscow, 2017.

[20] See: K. Rykov, "Liudi Kadyrova ishchut glavaria boevikov IGIL, chtoby unichtozhit," available at [http://rykov.ru/post/2498/], 4 February, 2018.

[21] See: I. Karabulatova, M. Polekhina, S. Lyausheva, N. Dubinina, "How the Discourse of Sufism became the Expressive Discourse of Islamic Radicalism in the Regions of 'Popular Islam' in Russia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 2017, pp. 92-98.

[22] See: I. Karabulatova, S. Galiullina, K. Kotik, "Terrorist Threat in Russia: Transformation of Confessional Relationships," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 93-104.

in the ranks of ISIS and the Syrian opposition. It seems that those who have already returned are united into an informal brotherhood of Muslim veterans of the Middle Eastern war. It should be said that in the Syrian conflict Russia has found itself on the side of Shi'a, namely, Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah and Bashar Assad, an Alawite, whose sect belongs to Shi'a. In Russia Sunni Muslims predominate. While the events were unfolding and the Gulf countries increased their attention to the Shi'a-Sunni aspect, Russian Muslims were confronted with the fact that de facto their country was fighting on the side of the Shi'a against the Sunni. This causes a lot of irritation, while a steadily rising number of Muslims strove to reach the Middle East to fight for Islam and against "Shi'a aggression." This is especially true of fighters from Daghestan where Islam's internal nuances are keenly felt. About a third of the republic's population is convinced that Russia is involved in the Sunni-Shi'a conflict.[23]

Within contemporary ultra-right extremism, the violence and death brought into the world by terrorists are not regarded as something committed of their own will: they are interpreted as something that God approves of and as a sign that the End of Days, perceived by the Christian world as a blessing, is approaching. This interpretation makes DAESH attractive to Christian fighters from Western countries as well.

The leaders of the Russian Federation should closely monitor the response of the Russian Muslims to Russia's involvement in the Syrian war to be able to prevent terrorist acts in Russia and the neighboring states.

The ISIS ideologues rely on the viable myths of Apocalypse to attract supporters from outside the Muslim world. The right extremists have borrowed the model of revolutionary behavior from the French Revolution of 1789, which was later used primarily by left radicals ranging from the members of Narodnaya Volya (the clandestine organization that operated in Russia in the 1880s) and the "urban guerrillas" of the 1960s-1980s. The right extremists do not merely use it. It seems that the history of revolutionary terror seen in the post-historical context looks like a cornerstone of newly synthesized revolutionary Apocalypse and revolutionary activity that will allow extremists to return to the origins of the revolutionary idea. In fact, the new synthesis is an ideological instrument needed to balance out racism and xenophobia by referring to the two highly authoritative historical paradigms—religion and revolution.

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[23] See: A. Malashenko, op. cit.