Politics of Failure: U.S. Miscalculation of Afghanistan’s Dynamics (1979–2021) and Lessons Learned

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between Afghanistan and the United States of America (U.S.) from 1979 to 2021, focusing on U.S. engagements with religious entities referred to as jihadi groups and its influence in establishing a new government post-2001. The analysis reveals that following the Soviet withdrawal in 1992, the U.S. also retreated from Afghanistan, resulting in a power vacuum that precipitated civil war and the emergence of the Taliban. After the Taliban's ousting in 2001, the U.S. facilitated the formation of a new government, national military, police, and intelligence agencies, while also launching disarmament initiatives and development projects. However, these endeavors encountered considerable obstacles, such as corruption, nepotism, and ineffective governance structures. The nation-building efforts faced opposition from the Pashtun ethnic group, many of whom supported the Taliban in opposition to contemporary state-building efforts. During peace talks, the Afghan government was marginalized, which bolstered the Taliban and ultimately allowed for their reconquest of Afghanistan in August 2021. The results underscore that the lack of a holistic approach to governance, security, development, and peace negotiations played a significant role in Afghanistan's persistent political turmoil.