KABARDINO-BALKARIA: THREATS TO STABILITY
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Alexander SKAKOV
Alexander Skakov, Ph.D. (Hist.), scientific fellow, Russian Institute of Strategic Stidies.
The main factors influencing the situation in Kabardino-Balkaria are its dual constituency and the political, economic and psychological consequences wrought by the deportation of the Balkars in 1944, which are still having repercussions today. Dual constituency is stirring up rivalry between the national elites, who are incapable of divvying up the power and financial levers between them to their mutual accord. The reverberations of deportation are still making themselves felt in the discontent of those persecuted.1
The Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Region was created as an independent administrative structure in 1922, and transformed into an autonomous republic in 1936.
During the German occupation of Nalchik, the republic’s capital, the Representative Agency of Kabardino-Balkar Interests was created, which formed the “national legion.” Plans were drawn up to separate Balkaria from Kabarda and unite it with Karachai under the protectorate of Turkey. After liberation of the Northern Caucasus from the Nazi aggressors, the Balkars were deported in 1944 under the campaign to stamp out anti-Soviet banditry and terrorism. The republic was renamed the Kabardinian A.S.S.R., whereby the southwestern part of the Elbrus and Nagorniy regions became part of Georgia. The administrative demarcation within the autonomy was also changed; in particular, settling the Cherkessian District was on the whole recognized as inexpedient “due to the absence of conditions for developing the economy.”2
In 1956-1957, a decision was adopted to repatriate the Balkars (35,274 people returned) and restore the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. According to the data for 1989, 70,793 Balkars lived in the republic (9% of the population). In so doing, they occupied approximately 40% of its territory. According to the same data, there were 363,494 Kabardins (48.2% of the population) and 240,700 Russians (32% of the population) in the republic. The number of Russians is declining, due to their migration and low birth rate of recent years. In addition, 9,900 Ossets reside in the republic (1.3% of the population).
At the beginning of the 1990s, instead of resolving the real problems of the Balkar and Karachai peoples, a populist and, as it turned out, unpropitious process to “rehabilitate the repressed peoples” began. In 1991, a law on rehabilitation was adopted in the R.S.F.S.R., which, to put it mildly, did not reckon with all the realities of Kabardino-Balkaria. Rehabilitation problems were replaced by the land issue, which is traditionally a bone in the throat for the Caucasus. The payment of one-time compensation benefits can be considered the only real effort made to eliminate the consequences of the Balkar deportation. The Russian governmental resolution of 10 June, 1993 “On Socioeconomic Support of the Balkar People,” the federal program “Socioeconomic Development and National-Cultural Revival of the Balkar People in 1996-2000,” and the decree issued by the republic’s leader, V. Kokov, of 7 March, 1994 “On Some Measures for Rehabilitating the Balkar People on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Their Repression” are for the most part not being implemented. Whereby not only are economic measures requiring significant financial outlays being ignored, but also those largely symbolic decisions such as restoration of the national cultural facilities of the Balkar people.
The economic aspect of the problem is related to the fact that most of the villages demolished during the Balkar deportation have still not been rebuilt. Nor have the problems of administrative-territorial demarcation of the republic been resolved. The drawing of borders between the Kabardins and Balkars is a particularly acute problem, which is related to the shortfall of pastureland and hay fields for the Balkars, who are traditionally cattle breeders. They can provide their farms with only 10-15% of the hay they need, and the rest has to be bought from the Kabardins. Attempts to use the hay fields and pastureland of Kabardin regions have frequently led to conflicts.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Balkars and Kabardins became immersed in a futile “dispute on historical borders.”
Attention is frequently directed to inexpedient use of the funds allotted to restore the Balkar districts. Their economic restoration program was renamed the Mountain District Development Program. Under this pretext, a significant portion of the funds went to building Kabardin population settlements. The Balkar national leaders sent applications on this to the Comptroller’s Chamber, but received no response.
Of particular concern are the city of Tyrnyauz and the wolfram-molybdenum and ore-enriching plants located in it, which at present are operating at 10-30% of their capacity. This is explained in part by the drop in demand for wolfram and molybdenum on the world market. Two thirds of the workers have been fired. In 1992, 31,100 people lived in the city, now only 20-22,000 remain, leaving several of the high-rise apartments and dormitories deserted. In July 2000, an immense mud slide wrought havoc on the city.
In addition to the Tyrnyauz combine, several insignificant enterprises operate in Balkaria. All in all, Balkaria produces only 1.1% of the consumer goods manufactured in the republic. This led to unemployment, which assumed devastating proportions. Agriculture, primarily cattle-breeding, which is traditional for the region, is unable to extricate itself from the mire. The reprocessing of raw materials extracted in Balkaria (construction materials, mineral water) is also throwing a spanner in the works. There are no hydroelectric power stations in Balkaria, and the Balkars maintain that the small power stations under construction are located in Kabarda. The rate at which tourist and recreational facilities are being built in the Baksan Gorge also leaves much to be desired. Tourist companies are feeling the pinch of non-payments from the republican budget. The Balkar radicals represented in the republic’s leadership believe that clans and groups are trying to establish control over the “extremely rich natural resources of Balkaria.”
The Balkar national leaders believe that if the region gains its independence, it could become economically affluent even without subsidies from the federal center. In so doing, the main emphasis is on raising the competitiveness of wolfram and molybdenum concentrates on the foreign market and increasing the percentage of hard currency revenue. There are also plans to develop the construction material industry, increase the development of mineral deposits, raise the production of wool, transfer national trade and the bottling of mineral water to a commercial basis, and make more intensive use of tourism potential.
Another serious problem is the disproportional representation of Balkars in the local power structures. For example, they are not represented in the administration of several villages in which they constitute approximately one third of the population. Of the republic’s 72 parliamentary deputies, only nine are Balkars.
At present, an authoritarian regime has largely developed in Kabardino-Balkaria. This phenomenon is characteristic of essentially all the state formations both in the Northern Caucasus and the Trancaucasus. The distinguishing features of these regimes are clannishness, strict control over the main financial flows and power structures, a high level of corruption, an emphasis on administrative-power coercion, and the fight against the constructive and powerful opposition, which is intentionally being pushed beyond the boundaries of the political field. Strengthening of the republic leader’s entourage, which is beyond society’s control, is presenting a certain danger. But such regimes are so far successfully coping with their main task—ensuring relative stability in society.
In the economic sphere, new-generation figures are acquiring greater significance—mobile local “oligarchs” with no national prejudices. They will probably also strive in the future for a certain amount of political clout.
During the years of perestroika, two public structures, Nygysh and Birlik, vied with each other in Balkaria. On the initiative of several deputies from the republic’s Supreme Soviet, in July 1990, the Balkar national movement Tiore, or the Balkar Forum, was created. In August of the same year, at a conference of various ranks of Balkar national deputies, a proposal was made to transform the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. into a sovereign federative state within the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. In March 1991, the first stage of the Balkar People’s Congress was held (its subsequent stages took place in 1991-1996). The congress demanded that the KBASSR Supreme Soviet restore the administrative-territorial demarcation of Kabardino-Balkaria abolished in 1944, create a two-house parliament with parity representation in one of the houses of the Kabardin and the Balkar people, and spoke in favor of the Kabardins and Balkars taking it in turns to execute the duties of head of the republic. These demands were substantiated in a version of the Declaration on the Republic’s State Sovereignty revised and adopted by the KBASSR Supreme Soviet, according to which the Kabardin and the Balkar people are sovereign and equal constituents of the republic, but have the right to secede from it and create an independent state. Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet ignored these, just as it did the congress’s other demands.
On 17 November, 1991, the second stage of the congress was held. Under the influence of the radical wing, a declaration was adopted on the creation of a Balkar republic within the Russian Federation. The KBASSR Supreme Soviet, which was making advances to the Balkar national movement at that time, supported this declaration, but in 1994, it was cancelled by the republic’s parliament. At the congress, the National Balkar People’s Council was also created, which declared its main goal to be creating the republic of Balkaria on the territory where the Balkars resided before March 1944.
The demands of both sides to review the borders separating the nations and the standoff between the “poor” and deportation-wracked Balkars and the “rich” Kabardins rankled ethnic relations. In 1991-1992, several conflicts were noted between the residents of Kabardin and Balkar villages stirred up by land disputes or on everyday grounds, and pure acts of banditry were registered, in particular, the attack on the residents of the Novaia Balkaria settlement in May 1992. Attempts were also made at religious demarcation between the Kabardins and Balkars, as well as electing the imam of Balkaria independently from the imam of Kabarda. The situation worsened after a decision was made by the Kabardin People’s Congress (10 January, 1992) to restore the Kabardinian republic. Unrest in Nalchik led to the dismissal of the republic’s Council of Ministers chairman, V. Kokov.
Further aggravation was avoided due to the efforts of the delegates at the Kabardino-Balkarian A.S.S.R. People’s Congress held on 14 December, 1991. They spoke out against dividing the republic, but supported the requests of the Balkars on restoring administrative-territorial demarcation and suggested that the republic’s Supreme Soviet form a commission to determine the historical borders between Kabarda and Balkaria based on the border of 1863. Then, on 5 January, 1992, the commission concluded it was impossible to carry out demarcation that would suit both sides and spoke in favor of creating a working group to develop a new conception of national-territorial organization. However, it was later acknowledged that a compromise on the borders could not be reached.
The congress also decided that the Balkars would not participate in the republic-level presidential elections. As a result, on voting day, which was scheduled for 5 January, 1992, 28 polling stations were closed, which gave the Balkar national leaders reason to doubt V. Kokov’s legitimacy as the president of Kabardino-Balkaria. Nevertheless, his victory at this election helped to normalize the situation in the republic.
On 29 December, 1991, a referendum to declare Balkar national sovereignty was held in the Balkar communities. In so doing, each local council made its own decision about the referendum. 94.8% of the voters were in favor of sovereignty. A total of 45,219 people were on the electoral lists, and 38,411 people participated in the voting. In March 1992, the sessions of all the local councils functioning in Balkaria asked the R.S.F.S.R. Congress of People’s Deputies to adopt the Law on the Formation of the Republic of Balkaria.
In 1992-1995, a significant slackening in the activity of the national movement was observed. This was largely promoted by the harsh and comprehensive, but not always democratic, action of the republic’s leadership. In particular, V. Kokov stated that if Balkaria seceded from Kabarda, the government would be forced to resort to force to oust the Balkars from the plain into the gorge.3 The sides expressed their views at a meeting on 20 June, 1994 between the leaders of the Balkar People’s National Council and the republic’s leadership. The Balkar leaders proposed creating either a confederation of Kabardinian and Balkarian republics, or three okrugs, the Kabardin, Balkar and Russian, on KBR territory, and demanded that the republic’s president appoint administration heads of the Balkar districts in cooperation with the Balkar People’s National Council. If these demands were not met, National Council Chairman S. Beppaev threatened to resort to force.
In November 1994, the Balkars were polled about their attitude toward dividing the republic. According to official data, 92% Balkars participated in the poll, 96% of whom were in favor of a united Kabardino-Balkaria.4 But the national leaders were dubious about these results, believing this type of free expression by the people to be unconstitutional. In addition, in several Balkar and mixed Kabardino-Balkar settlements, a referendum was held at the end of 1994 on restoration of the administrative-territorial structure of 1944, whereby the overwhelming majority of the population was against this.5 On this basis, the administrative-territorial demarcation of 1944 was restored only partially, only two of the four regions were revived. In 1995-1997, the participants of the assemblies convened in several Balkar communities demanded putting a halt to the activity of the Balkar People’s National Council.
On 17 November, 1996, the fourth stage of the congress took place, at which a Message to Boris Yeltsin was adopted with a request to assist in executing the rights of the Balkar people to self-determination within the Russian Federation. The resolution adopted at that time on measures for executing the declaration “On Founding the Republic of Balkaria and the National Sovereignty of the Balkar People” contained an appeal to the president and Russian Federation Federal Assembly to introduce direct presidential rule before forming the Republic of Balkaria on its territory and cancel KBR legislation wherever it contradicted the Russian Federation Constitution and decisions of the Balkar People’s Congress. In addition, a State Council of Balkaria was created and a decision adopted on the creation of voluntary people’s patrol.
Lieutenant-General S. Beppaev was elected chairman of the State Council. He had headed the Balkar People’s National Council since 1993, and before that was deputy commander of the South Caucasian military district. He was dismissed after reports appeared in the mass media on his penchant for illegal arms trade. At the beginning of 1995, the negotiations between Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev and S. Beppaev on coordination of the solidarity movement and insurgent struggle in the Caucasus were made public.
As Mr. Beppaev said later, at the 1996 congress, he upheld a “soft” version of administrative-territorial reform: restoration of the third Balkar district according to the administrative-territorial demarcation of 1944, giving the Balkars the right to appoint the vice-president and their full participation in the republic-level elections. But yielding to the provocation of the Balkar elite, which was interested in routing the national movement and strengthening its own position in the power structures, the congress delegates chose the radical alternative.6
It is unlikely that the Balkar national leaders stirred up the situation in November 1996 by accident. In January 1997, a non-alternative presidential election was scheduled to be held in the republic, which V. Kokov would have naturally won. And this is indeed what happened; according to official data, 96% of the electorate in the Balkar districts voted for him. Destabilization of the situation could play into the hands not only of the radical Balkar leaders, but also of V. Kokov’s political opponents among the Kabardin elite.
On 18 November, a decision was made at an emergency meeting of the republic’s Security Council to send ministerial and departmental heads to the Balkar population areas to conduct explanatory work. Deputy minister for nationality affairs and regional policy, K. Tsagolov, said that the convened congress was insufficiently represented, since it was not attended by delegates from all the republic’s Balkar-populated areas, but only from the Elbrus District.7 And V. Kokov accused the congress organizers of national extremism and undermining peace and consent. The parliament also deplored the congress’s decisions, prohibited the activity of the Balkar sociopolitical organizations, and said they were fomenting ethnic dissent and striving to violate the republic’s territorial integrity. These decisions by the legislative power were approved by representatives of the Balkar clergy, the assembly of the Balkar intelligentsia, and the assembly of Balkar deputies, attended by 195 of the 240 deputies of various ranks. Criminal proceedings were instigated against members of the Balkar State Council, and the leaders of the National Council were asked to come to the republic-level prosecutor-general’s office for questioning. According to the congress delegates, the KBR OMON (riot police) organized a pogrom at the Balkar sociopolitical center.
On 20-21 November, 1996, a delegation of the Russian Federation State Duma headed by deputy chairman of the security committee Mukharbek Aushev came to the republic. The deputies visited the Balkar settlements of Khasania and Belaia Rechka, the residents of which spoke out in favor of retaining a united Kabardino-Balkaria. According to the Balkar leaders, Mr. Aushev’s standpoint, which was supported by V. Kokov, was due to particular relations in the oil business between the deputy and local leadership.8
Under such strong pressure, S. Beppaev admitted the error of his ways and announced dissolution of the Balkar People’s National Council. In response, at a special meeting, he was removed from the council leadership, accused of cowardice, of “carrying out the political order of the enemies of the Balkar people,” and of embezzling monetary funds.9 It appears his excessive inflexibility did not suit the moderate wing of the national movement and was insufficiently radical and consistent for the extremists. After making up with the republic’s leadership and being appointed as executive secretary of the KBR rehabilitation commission in August 1997, S. Beppaev turned down any radical requests, supported the efforts of the republic’s government to pay monetary compensations to deportation victims, and acknowledged the impossibility of restoring all four Balkar regions to the way they were in 1944. Nevertheless, he kept insisting on restoring one more region. As we mentioned above, two had already been reinstated.10
On 18 January, 1998, as a kind of counterbalance to the Balkar State Council, a public organization called Voice of Balkaria, which was loyal to the republic’s leadership and headed by the same S. Beppaev and agricultural academy pro-rector, M. Akhmatov, was created. In September 1998, this organization joined the republic-level branch of the Peace and Consent public movement. And a member of the Balkar People’s National Council, Mikhail Salikhanov (currently Russian State Duma deputy for the Homeland—All Russia party), left the council after the 1996 events and founded the leadership-loyal Unity movement.
On 1 July, 1997, the KBR parliament adopted the draft of the republic’s new constitution in the first reading, to which the Balkar national leaders had an extremely negative reaction. They were irritated by the absence in the text of the concepts of “Balkar people” and “Kabardin people,” as well as theses on the equal constituents to be formed in the republic, and on the right of the peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria to self-determination.11 On this basis, in the name of their people, the Balkar national leaders declared a breach of trust in the Balkar deputies of the KBR parliament. But on 1 September, 1997, the parliament nevertheless adopted the republic’s new constitution.
On 25 July, 1997, a treaty was signed in Nalchik on the formation of the Interparliamentary Council of Adygei, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia—a consultative agency for drawing up consented approaches on an entire range of issues relating to the national movements in these republics. It was generally believed that V. Kokov was instrumental in signing this treaty and determining the further policy of the Interparliamentary Council. But the Karachais and the Balkars considered this document the first step toward realization of the separatist strivings to create a “Greater Cherkessia” from Abkhazia to Ossetia.
We will note that certain elements are zealously pushing home the proposition of a single nation in the region, Adighe or Cherkessians, to which the Kabardins, Adighes, Cherkessians, Shapsugs, Beslenians, and Mozdok Adighes belong, and to which the Abkhazians and Abazinians are closely related. There is talk about violation of the rights of the Adighe people, who are now a minority on its territory, and on Kabarda’s deprivation of 70% of its land.
At the official level, the Adighe national leaders repudiate the idea of a “Greater Cherkessia” as a myth aimed at scaring the Russian population. In so doing, well-known ethnographer B. Bgazhnikov, who has close ties to the national movement, maintains that the statehood of the Adighes, particularly the Kabardins, as it currently stands, does not meet the interests of the people, but is only being used as a means of more or less organized, planned and painless acculturation and elimination of an ethnic race. The head of the social ecology department of the Russian Academy of Sciences Kabardino-Balkar Science Center, O. Damenia, believes that the activity of the state structures of Abkhazia, Adygei, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria should be integrated on the basis of a national idea.
The monograph that recently came out on the history of Kabardino-Balkaria’s statehood is of particular significance.12 This work skirts around the problem of the statehood of the Balkar people, but talks about the need for the “ethnic or national statehood” of minorities, that is, judging from the context, of the Kabardins. The main tasks of a “separate Adighe nation” are declared to be “bridging the ethnocultural gap, repatriating fellow countrymen, and creating common political structures, the status of which will be determined over time.” Under the guise of “common political structures,” the matter nevertheless concerns the same “Greater Cherkessia.”
Pursuant to the “Adighe Culture Revival Program,” adopted by the Kabardin People’s Congress in 1992, there were proposals to deprive Russian of its state-language status, leaving it the function of “language of international communication,” make Kabardin the official language in 70% of preschool institutions, some schools, and secondary specialized and higher learning institutions, and make the foundations of Islam, the history of the Adighes, the foundations of Adighe etiquette, and propaganda of the idea of an “independent state, repatriation and ethnicization” a compulsory part of the school curriculum.13 The Adighe National Revival Program, the author of which is Iuri Shanibov, presumed the creation of a single Adighe language with a Latin alphabet and conducting state affairs in it “wherever possible.”14
It should be noted that Islamic radicalism and Wahhabism are more popular among the Balkars than among the Kabardins. The city of Tyrnyauz is considered the center of Wahhabism in the republic. Imam of the Dugulubgei village mosque, Amir Kozdokhov, played an active role in disseminating it. In September 1996, he orchestrated an attempt to seize the KBR Ecclesiastical Administration, stating that he had 50 militants in his entourage. In 1999, according to Kozdokhov, he already had 600 militants.15
Reports on the spread of Wahhabism in the republic appeared in the mass media in 1997-1998. In particular, a native of the village of Khasania, former athlete Anzor Atabiev, who fought in Chechnia, was called a Wahhabi. On 3 March, 1997, he killed two policemen in the town of Dolinsk and formed a gang of six people. According to available data, they underwent training in Chechnia and were sent to Kabardino-Balkaria to set up a training-diversion camp. In August 1998, the gang was eliminated. The bombardment of the KBR Interior Ministry in 1998 and the attempt to blow up (April 1997) a monument erected in honor of the 400th anniversary of Kabarda’s accession to Russia in Nalchik are also assigned to the Wahhabis.16 There are also documented cases of the distribution of extremist leaflets addressed to the youth, as well as clashes between mosque imams and young believers in the population areas of Kyzburun, Baksan and the republic’s mountain villages.
In August 2000, three Wahhabis were detained in the village of Baksanenok, residents aged between 23 and 25, one of whom underwent training at the Khattab’s camp in May 1999. All of them belonged to a gang of four and were accused of the armed seizure of two cars.17 Some residents of Kabardino-Balkaria participated in the first and second Chechen wars on the side of the militants.
The leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria and the republic’s mufti, Shafig Pshikhachev, are launching an active and consistent campaign against Wahhabism, incorporating methods of administrative coercion in their struggle. For example, at the third Muslim Congress of Kabardino-Balkaria in March 1998, a representative of the republic government called the selection of personnel for the Muslim clergy in the provinces one of the administration heads’ vital tasks.
According to the numerous evaluations by political scientists and ethnologists, the national movements in the Northern Caucasus are going through a serious crisis.18 The struggle for territory has passed its peak and in the next few years the situation in the republics should stabilize.19 But this conclusion can only be made in a pinch. The objective slump in separatist tendencies in North Caucasian society after the destructive events in Chechnia is accompanied by a crystallization of the radical nucleus of the national movements. Radicalism finds sympathy among active, but unemployed people, who are marginal elements in public life, primarily young people. The same strata of the population are the potential adepts of Wahhabism. All this promotes the appearance of new, extremely aggressive political leaders. The national democrats of the 1990s could be replaced by new public figures who will give no heed to the consequences and care little for human life.
The new leaders could take advantage of the social protest to their own ends and destabilize the situation. They will get willing help from outside forces—Chechen extremists and Wahhabis. For example, in March 1997, Salman Raduev visited Kabardino-Balkaria, saying the purpose of his trip was to strengthen cooperation in order to liberate the Caucasus from Russian influence. In November 1997, at the conference of the Caucasian Home International Forum in Grozniy, a resolution was adopted on support of the rights of the Balkar people to self-determination.
During the last decade, an ideology has been forming based on cultivating nationalism, historical resentment and confrontation. Taking into account the largely incomplete ethnogenesis of the Karachaevo-Balkars, an attempt is being made by national ideologists to consolidate the Balkars based on their contrast to the Cherkessians, Adighes, and Kabardins. The Balkars are talking openly about how impossible it is for them to live in harmony with the Kabardins and about “the time-honored Balkar land occupied by Kabardins and Ossetians.”
Ordinary Balkars and Karachais are wont to talk about Udugov’s propaganda on the rights of all the Caucasian peoples to self-determination, right down to secession from Russia, on the Chechen crisis being provoked by the federal center, on the atrocities committed by Russian troops in the “peaceful villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi,” and on the entry of Basaev’s units into Daghestan at the request of the elders and Daghestanian people. Most leaders of the Karachaevo-Balkar national movements do not openly support the Chechen separatists, but even they are forced to reckon with the ideas rampant in society.
The Kabardino-Balkaria leadership is not making contact or entering into dialog with the Balkar national movement, although there are no insurmountable obstacles interfering with their rapprochement. This viewpoint could also promote the appearance of younger and more radical members in the national movement leadership who will cast aside peaceful means of settling the conflicts and place their stakes on force and the “Chechen route.”
In his speech at an extended assembly of KBR law-enforcement, control and judicial agency employees on the results of 1999 and the tasks for 2000, V. Kokov talked about the need to “orient mono-national movements toward developing traditions, customs, languages, and culture, or determine whether it is worth them continuing.” Thus, the national movements are offered an alternative: either self-dissolution, or transformation into national-cultural organizations. For this, “the relevant ministries and departments must analyze and evaluate the charters and practical activity of the republic’s mono-national associations” and make them “abandon their claims to power.”20 In so doing, no heed is being paid to the Daghestan experience, where national movements managed to become integrated into the power structures, which largely dispossessed them of their conflict potential. It is enough to recall how Avar national leader Gaji Makhachev changed when he turned from a radical and populist into a serious politician of national Russian proportions.
The authorities’ desire to knock the wind out of the national movements and to end the irresponsible acts of the national radicals using administrative-coercive methods, could lead to unpredictable consequences. Provocation is highly likely, for example, some lone Balkar may make an assassination attempt on V. Kokov or S. Beppaev. Such an incident would lead to repression and devastation of the national movement, playing into the hands of certain circles in the republic’s leadership.
A stabilizing factor for the North Caucasian republics is the Russian population. Its dwindling size, which was noted in the 1970s-1980s and continues today, can be halted by attracting migrants into the republic from hotspots of the former Soviet Union. In order to do this, several resolutions by the KBR state power agencies must be canceled, in particular, the parliamentary resolution of 5 May, 1994 “On Migration.” Special attention should be directed to the predominantly Russian regions of Kabardino-Balkaria, Prokhladnenskiy and Maiskiy, without permitting any form of “Kabardinization” here, or the ousting of Russians from the local power agencies. A stabilizing factor could also be consolidation of the republic’s Russian organizations.
Dividing Kabardino-Balkaria and particularly unifying Balkaria and Karachai are very unrealistic, economically unjustified and dangerous projects. It is much easier to predict the consequences of dividing two-constituent republics: further deterioration of ethnic relations and an increase in coercion on the poorly protected Russian population, which will be under immense pressure from the mono-ethnic elites. Moreover, the plans for uniting the Adighes or Karachaevo-Balkars into a single state formation, even within the Russian Federation, is fraught with significant danger.
In order to eliminate the prerequisites for destabilization, we must take into account not only the influence of national movements in the republic’s political life, but also think about taking advantage of the Daghestanian “model” that has proven its viability in two-constituent republics. We are talking about the Daghestan State Council, which equally represents the main ethnic groups. This model promotes consolidation of the population, and to a certain extent prevents the formation of an authoritarian regime. It could also be effective in other national republics of the Northern Caucasus that are trying to cope with a complex ethnopolitical situation.
Another step in this direction is the creation of a two-house parliament, in which one of the houses is formed on a parity basis by Kabardins, Balkars, and Russians. To tell the truth, the prototype of such a house has already been created in Kabardino-Balkaria—the parliament’s Ethnic Relations Committee. It is organized on a parity basis by Kabardin, Balkar, and Russian deputies. The committee reviews questions presented on the initiative of two thirds of the parliamentary deputies of one nationality, which should automatically halt discussion of the same questions in other power structures.21 The possibility of creating a House of Nationalities according to the parity principle has been under discussion since 1991 and, on the whole, this proposal meets with approval. But the issue remains unresolved to this day.
A no less important role can also be played by democratization of the election system, in particular, local self-government heads should be elected. And those heads of local self-government elected at all levels should automatically become administration heads. Recently, this kind of system was introduced in Northern Ossetia. According to V. Kokov, electing administration heads to the local power structures is in harmony with the spirit and letter of Vladimir Putin’s federal reforms.
Single-candidate elections of the republic’s leader should not be allowed. The new Constitution adopted in 1997 canceled the restriction on election of the president for only two terms. Whether this provision is compatible with federal legislation is still up for discussion. V. Kokov will most likely run once more at the upcoming elections and again gather more than 90% of the votes. Indeed, there are no viable leaders in the republic at present capable of rivaling him. But multi-candidate elections should also interest V. Kokov, since they could boost his image and reinforce his position as a national Russian politician.
In addition, the question of restoring the Balkar districts within the 1940 borders must be resolved and a real program for their economic development adopted. The greater economic lag of the mountainous regions behind that of the plains, which is characteristic of all the republics of the Northern Caucasus, is being aggravated by the national factor.
The action by Karachaevo-Cherkessian President V. Semenov, who is taking a realistic approach to resolving the urgent Abazinian problem, is promising and justified. He signed documents on the creation of an Abazinian district and changes in the borders of election districts, and approved a socioeconomic and cultural development program for Abazinian auls. It would be a good idea to handle the Balkar problem in the same way.
It can be presumed that the two-constituent republics are in no way doomed to collapse, ethnic conflicts and “Balkanization.” Nevertheless, they are still unstable and require a real compromise among the ethnic elites and observation of the interests of all the ethnic groups to ensure sound development based on peace and consent between the nationalities.
This can only be achieved if the federal center conducts a purposeful and consistent policy in the Northern Caucasus.
1 See: A.A. Yaz’kova, “Konfliktny potentsial ‘dvukhsub’ektnykh’ respublik (opyt Kabardino-Balkarii),” bulletin Konflikt—dialog—sotrudnichestvo, Moscow, 1999.
2 N.F. Bugai, A.M. Gonov, Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh (1920s-1960s), Moscow, 1998, pp. 64-65, 207-210.
3 See: Kabardino-Balkarskaia pravda, 22 March, 1994.
4 See: Kabardino-Balkarskaia pravda, 21 November, 1994.
5 See: Severniy Kavkaz, 24 December, 1994.
6 See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 3 June, 1998.
7 See: Rossiiskaia Federatsiia, No. 23, 1996.
8 See: Tiore, No. 2 (33), May 1997.
9 See: Tiore, No. 5 (36), February 1998.
10 See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 3 June, 1998.
11 See: Tiore, No. 3 (34), August 1997.
12 See: A.Kh. Borov, Kh.M. Dumanov, V.Kh. Kazharov, Sovremennaia gosudarstvennost’ Kabardino-Balkarii: istoki, puti stanovleniia, problemy, Nalchik, 1999.
13 Kabardino-Balkarskaia pravda, 10 July, 1992.
14 Nart, No. 4 (46), April 1994.
15 See: Severniy Kavkaz, No. 37 (495), October 2000.
16 See: Balkaria, No. 1 (1), September 1998.
17 See: Severniy Kavkaz, No. 32 (490), August 2000.
18 See: S. Akkieva, “Sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiia mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii v Kabardino-Balkarii,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz, No.1 (2), 1999.
19 See: I. Babich, “Sootnoshenie politicheskoi, religioznoi i etnicheskoi identichnosti v sovremennom kabardino-balkarskom obshchestve,” in: Faktor etnokonfessial’noi samobytnosti v postsovetskom obshchestve, Moscow, 1998.
20 Kabardino-Balkarskaia pravda, 12 April, 2000.
21 See: M.R. Dyshekova, “Kabardino-Balkarskaia respublika: ot sistemy Sovetov k sovremennomu parlamentarizmu,” Gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 4, 1999.