Central Asia and the Caucasus

TURKEY IN THE ANTITERRORIST CAMPAIGN

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• Posted on November 22, 2021November 22, 2021

Zakir CHOTOEV

Zakir CHOTOEV, M.A. in International Relations, works on doctorate thesis at the Department of International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara University (Ankara, Turkey)

Instability in the Middle East and the new threats created by international terrorism made Turkey a front-line state within the present world security system.¹ In addition, Turkey borders on two out of three states Washington included in an “evil triangle or axis of evil.” In the latter half of the 1990s when America tried to create a strategic triangle out of its closest allies in the region (Turkey, Israel, and Egypt) it set itself a task of making Turkey its strategic partner and drawing it into the Mid-Eastern security system.² Washington failed to fully realize these tasks because of the protracted conflict between Israel and Palestine yet the relations between Israel and Turkey and between Turkey and Egypt became stronger. Turkey, as a NATO member and the state seeking a EU membership that was actively involved in peacekeeping in the Balkans has preserved its strategic value for Europe and the United States.

To better understand Turkey’s intentions and possibilities as the West’s strategic partner let us examine some aspects of its foreign policy and security, the course of the U.S.-led antiterrorist campaign and Turkey’s place in the process and trace their impact on Ankara’s Central Asian and Caucasian policies.

Today Turkey is concentrated on joining the European Union therefore its foreign policy department is engaged in settling several problems. The problem of Cyprus is undoubtedly central among them. If the contradictions between the northern (Turkish) and southern (Greek) parts are eliminated within a federal state by 2004 Cyprus will stand a good chance of joining the EU. Otherwise, the Greek part recognized by the international community will join the European Union on its own leaving the northern part out of the process. This will make the Turkish military contingent based in Northern Cyprus to maintain peace and order an “occupation force” in the eyes of the European Union.³ In the eyes of the military in Ankara it guarantees Turkeys’ Mediterranean borders and is therefore of great strategic importance. At the same time, contradictions in dealing with the Cyprus issue lead to political and legal contradictions between the Greek and Turkish parts of the island and echo in Turkey’s domestic policies.

There is another stumbling block on Turkey’s road to the EU: different approaches of Europe and Turkey to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).⁴ As a country resolved to join the EU Turkey fears that ESDP or the so-called “rapid reaction force” will be used against it in the Cyprus context and is trying to find its place in the system. The Turkish government is using the temporal dependence of the EU new military formation on NATO to exercise its right of veto within the North Atlantic Alliance to influence the organizational and political EDSP-related issues.

There is a threat of terrorism coming from the neighboring countries that creates one of the major security hazards. The terrorist organizations that are acting against Turkey and its government can be divided into the radical left ones (DHKP-C, TIKKO), religious (Hizbullah, IBDA/C), and ethnic separatist (ASALA, PKK-KADEK). In the past ten years 34 Turkish diplomats across the world died at the hands of the ASALA (Armenian Secret Liberation Army); from time to time religious Islamic organizations organize attempts at secular-minded Turkish intellectuals.⁵ The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) is the most bloodthirsty of them all: it has already claimed 30 thou lives of military and civilians in the Turkish Republic. The country has already spent nearly $150 billion on fighting it.⁶ However despite Ankara’s successful foreign policy campaign of 1998-1999 as a result of which the party lost its head Ocalan and a great deal of support of Turkey’s neighbors the PKK still presents considerable threat even though it changed the name and became a legal political party. The vacuum in Northern Iraq left by the Gulf War of 1991 is still promoting terrorism: the territory is used for transshipment. The Northern Iraq peopled by over 12m Kurds who have remained outside Baghdad’s control for many years potentially threatens Turkey.

In addition, the Turkish government is facing another problem: the country has to overcome, in the shortest time possible, the consequences of the 2001 economic crisis so that to ensure further economic development. With this aim in view the cabinet is working hard to attract foreign investments.

The 9/11 events showed that terrorism could be extremely cruel and destructive; their effects brought to mind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II that had claimed fewer lives. Nobody doubted that the United States would strike back yet many countries concerned with their own safety wanted to know whether al-Qa‘eda and the Taliban, or Saddam Hussein, or North Korea, or Libya, or any other country would be selected as a target. Two days later, on 13 September President Bush asked Congress to give him additional adequate powers. He blamed the terrorist acts on al-Qa‘eda headed by Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden. Later Vice President Cheney announced that the war against international terror would not stop when the Taliban was routed: it would go on against the countries that supported bin Laden and against new terrorist forces.⁷ When the antiterrorist coalition had been knocked together to fight the Taliban that refused to hand over bin Laden it became necessary to provide a legal basis for the coming operation in Afghanistan. Art 51 of the U.N. Charter says that individual or collective action against any country is possible in case of “an armed attack … in the exercise of this right of self-defense.” Resolution 1368 (2001) adopted by the Security Council says that the Security Council: “Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter … calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks … [and] expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001.”⁸ On the whole, the world community approved of the military operation against the Taliban yet neither Resolution 1368 nor all subsequent resolutions (1377 and others) ever supplied a proper legal ground for the armed action in Afghanistan while the 9/11 terrorist acts were not yet described as an “armed attack.” The U.S. Administration took notice of these documents yet it was much more interested in NATO’s reaction. It came on 12 September when the NATO Council ruled that if there were proofs that outside forces had been responsible it would proceed from Art 5 of its Charter that envisaged collective self-defense based on the “one for all and all for one” principle.⁹

As a NATO member Turkey on the same day announced its readiness to support the military operation.¹⁰ The Turkish government gave a positive answer to the U.S. official inquiry made on 13 September and confirmed its support for the antiterrorist coalition.¹¹ On 2 October the North Atlantic Council announced that there were legal grounds for acting in accordance with Art 5—this made the antiterrorist operation legal within NATO. Despite the fact that the U.S. allies had offered their military assistance, approved of the military operation against the Taliban as a NATO operation the United States preferred to remain in control while tapping NATO’s possibilities and relying on individual countries. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described this as a “floating coalition.”¹² Obviously, the United States was unwilling to bind itself with a responsibility to NATO; it wanted free hands and as much support from the allies as was necessary.¹³ The Turkish government that had given a positive response to Washington’s inquiry promptly received an approval from the parliament and allowed the United States to use the military bases and sea ports on their territory and the air corridors above it and to deploy the coalition forces in the country.¹⁴ Turkey supplied the American military that had no adequate intelligence infrastructure in Afghanistan with intelligence acquired through prolonged contact with General Doustom who had spent a lot of time in Turkey.¹⁵

Ankara was well aware of wide prospects opened by its closer cooperation with the United States and of its greater usefulness for its Western partners. It hoped to resolve many problems (EU membership, a role in the European security policy, financial aid) and free its hands to fight local terrorists. At the same time, closer cooperation and greater involvement in the antiterrorist struggle increased a possibility of terrorist acts by radical Islamists; NATO might have used the opportunity to achieve the desired outcome of the Cyprus dilemma. At that time the Turkish government still in ignorance about the U.S. future targets was discussing three possible variants: first, the al-Qa‘eda and the Taliban as the main aims of the antiterrorist campaign. Viewed from Ankara this option was the most favorable for Turkey because the hostilities would be unfolding far from its borders. According to the second variant, the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, etc.) might fall victim to antiterrorist efforts. This was regarded as more dangerous because the events would be unfolding at the Turkey’s borders and might directly affect the country. The third variant that presupposed a global campaign could have ended in a global catastrophe.¹⁶ Despite its fear the Turkish government expressed its readiness to take part in the process that offered the best possible solution to the problem while Turkey was partially dependent on the U.S.

Washington regarded Ankara’s participation as important. Being a close ally of the United States and a Muslim country Turkey that from the very first days sided with Washington against radical Islamist terror set an example for other Muslim allies of Washington’s (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), thus urging them to close ranks with the United States more resolutely. This is amply confirmed by doubts (that did not last long) of Pakistan that shortly before had been the Taliban’s supporter as well as by the suggestion made by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that the operation headquarters should be moved from Saudi Arabia to Turkey while Riyadh remained in two minds about the use of the Sultan military base.¹⁷ The fact that a Muslim country participated in the antiterrorist coalition provided President Bush with evidence that it was an anti-terrorist rather than an anti-Islamic or anti-Muslim war. In addition, the United States pointed to the Turkish model as an efficient development of Muslim society within a democratic and secular state.¹⁸

As soon as the military phase was completed the allies had to address another no less important problem—that of establishing firm peace and order in Afghanistan. Resolution 1386 (2001) of the U.N. Security Council provided the legal basis for setting up the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) under British command for the first three months.¹⁹ Hamid Karzai’s interim government started functioning in June 2002 amid domestic tension caused by the formation of the cabinet and continued resistance of scattered Taliban groups. In these conditions Germany and Turkey that were expected to command ISAF in the next period expressed their concern. After prolonged negotiations that took the winter and spring of 2002 to be concluded Ankara received guarantees from the allies that for the period of its ISAF leadership the coalition would keep an armed contingent in Afghanistan. It was also promised $228m from the United States to pay to the ISAF commanders and the locally deployed 265-strong troops moved into the country in February 2002. On these conditions Turkey assumed command for six months—from 20 June, 2002.²⁰ The fact that the troops came from an Islamic country helped to defuse conflicts between the peacekeepers and the Afghanis still possible in an unstable situation. On 10 February, 2003 after six mainly uneventful months Turkey transferred command to Germany and the Netherlands. Ankara contributed to building up new armed forces of Afghanistan and was praised for these efforts by Western official figures.

In this way the Turkish government has played a certain role in the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, has supported the United States, Great Britain and certain other countries that had to address their foreign policy problems. The results of this activity came soon: in December 2002 the European Union compiled a new list of terrorist organizations banned on the territories of the EU members which included the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and DHKP-C. The Copenhagen EU summit influenced by the U.S. and U.K. reached an agreement on the rapid deployment forces for Europe and Turkey’s future EU membership. Under these agreements Cyprus and Malta were left outside the ESDP structure; it was decided that Norway and Turkey (both NATO members outside the EU) would be invited to discuss future operations of the European army. Turkey was approved as a EU candidate; it was decided to start talking about its membership immediately after Turkey reported to have fulfilled certain conditions in December 2004.²¹

Having deposed the Taliban the Bush Administration tried to associate Saddam Hussein with WMD and international terrorism; it started talking about the next stage of its antiterrorist campaign. The world community refused to support these efforts; after a short lull, in fall 2002 the U.S. unfolded full-scale preparations for a campaign against the hostile regime entrenched in Baghdad. In his speech at the U.N. General Assembly on 12 September, 2002 President Bush announced that Iraq threatened the United Nations and the world by refusing to abide by the U.N. resolutions on the liquidation of its weapons of mass destruction and Resolution 687 (1991) in particular. He called on the world community to take measures to ensure its security and added that because of its historical traditions and guided by its choice the United States would resort to such measures.²² The Iraqi representative insisted that his country had no nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons of mass destruction. Soon after that the foreign minister of Iraq in his letter to the U.N. Secretary-General invited the U.N. weapons inspectors to come back to the country they had left in 1998 to ascertain whether Iraq was abiding by the U.N. resolutions. On 8 November, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 (2002) that, thanks to the efforts of Russia and France, was a softened variant of the original “American” resolution. The Security Council ruled that Iraq “had violated to a great extent” and “continued to violate” its obligations under the previous resolutions and decided to give it “the last opportunity” to fulfill its obligations and introduce a stricter weapons inspection. The document points out that the Security Council “has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations.”²³ This was the first Washington’s attempt to lay a legal foundation of its invasion of Iraq that proved to be the last.

On 25 November, 2002 when the first group of weapons inspectors arrived in Baghdad the United States had already launched its intensive war preparations; it set up another coalition of its closest allies such as the U.K., Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and certain other states.

This opened the second variant of the “antiterrorist” campaign, this time in the Middle East, that Turkey could have hardly welcomed. Ankara did not want any hostilities close to its borders yet its involvement in the anti-Iraqi campaign promised certain dividends. First, closer relations with the United States ensured greater international and economic support; second, it was promised a role in postwar political rehabilitation of Iraq which would allow it to limit the degree of freedom of the Kurdish autonomy, to acquire guarantees for the Turkic ethnic minorities there, and to reduce to the minimum possible activity of PKK and DHKP-C in Northern Iraq. In addition, Ankara could have set up a buffer zone along its borders to prevent the still memorable refugee complications of 1991.²⁴ While concentrating their forces in Kuwait, along the southern Iraqi border the United States started talking to Ankara about opening the northern front against Baghdad. By insisting that it would never agree to an independent Kurdish state Washington maintained pressure on the new Turkish government: it needed a prompt permission from the Mejlis to start deployment of its troops and to use the military bases and air space. The Turkish government that had agreed on the study and modernization of the military objects in January 2003 for their possible use by the allies did not hasten to ask the parliament for “wartime powers.” Ankara had to address immediate problems: Erdogan, leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party was running for parliament while the Cyprus issue called for settlement. The government wanted first to reach an agreement with the United States on military-political, financial and economic aid confirmed in writing. The mistakes of the 1991 campaign were still fresh in Ankara’s memory: not protected by firm American guarantees the country suffered huge economic losses and made several political blunders.

Washington responded with the following demands: the use of the military bases and air corridors; a permission to move approximately 62 thou men and military machines across the country with part of them remaining on the Turkish territory, next to the border. Ankara formulated its demands: $10 billion of non-repayable loan and a credit of $20 billion; presence of Turkish troops in Northern Iraq to maintain order, extend humanitarian aid and prevent a flow of refugees to the Turkish territory. On 19 February Washington ended haggling with an offer of $6 billion non-repayable loan and an IMF credit of $20 billion together with guaranteed Turkish presence in Northern Iraq. Ankara allowed 30 thou soldiers to cross its territory and let the U.S. use its military bases and air corridors.²⁵ The problem of ratification of these agreements by the parliaments of the two countries remained unsettled: Washington promised to sign and ratify the documents as soon as the Turkish parliament approved them and granted the cabinet “wartime powers.” The allies obviously mistrusted one another—they doubted that the legally unbinding promises would be fulfilled. Meanwhile Washington was stepping up its efforts to make the planned operation legal: it was said that Saddam did not observe his disarmament obligations and refused to cooperate with the U.N. and IAEA. At an extraordinary Security Council sitting convened on 5 February U.S. State Secretary Colin Powell demonstrated that Iraq still had WMD well concealed from the international inspectors. The majority of the Security Council members found these efforts unconvincing.²⁶

In the context of U.S. mounting hostility Saddam Hussein and his government showed their determination to cooperate with the world community and the U.N. and IAEA commissions. This was vividly demonstrated by the second report of the weapons inspectors to the U.N. that stressed that Iraq wanted to cooperate with them and insisted that they should continue functioning. This left Washington in isolation and made the invasion inevitable.²⁷ The situation in which Washington had found itself (the majority of the countries opposed its plans while its NATO allies could not agree among themselves) heated up the U.S. Administration’s ambitions. It was resolved to prove that military intervention was vitally needed. Washington increased its pressure on Ankara by doing a lot to strengthen Turkey’s security with NATO means and possibilities. Despite objections that came from France, Germany, and Belgium in NATO the question of transferring to Turkey AWACS planes, antimissile Patriot systems, and means of defense against chemical and biological weapons (in case of an Iraqi missile strike) was entrusted to the Defense Planning Committee which approved it.²⁸ However, on 1 March the Turkish parliament disappointed Washington by refusing to grant “wartime powers” to the government under a document that the cabinet had hastily drawn.

The parliament did that under pressure from NATO allies and because certain political circles did not want to involve the country into the war and dispatch Turkish soldiers to Northern Iraq. The agreement about American financial aid remained suspended; the U.S. government badly needed the northern front to achieve a fast and painless victory in Iraq and had to resume talks with Ankara. They reached an agreement about a small Turkish contingent in Northern Iraq mainly to extend humanitarian aid and maintain law and order.²⁹ The government started drawing another document on “wartime powers” while working together with those of the political forces that supported the plans.³⁰ Domestic political problems created by re-election of Erdogan and his new term as prime minister as well as common conviction that Washington would never go to war without Turkey, or rather without the northern front slowed down the process.

Meanwhile, the Bush Administration having failed to enlist world public opinion and to ensure a smooth adoption of another resolution on Iraq invited the leaders of Britain and Spain to a summit on the Azores Islands and decided to invade Iraq immediately. On 18 March, 2003 the United States presented an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons and gave them 48 hours to leave the country.³¹

The U.S. president justified his military campaign by the following: “Resolutions 678 and 687 of the U.N. Security Council are still valid. Under them the U.S. and its allies have the right to use force to find and destroy WMD in Iraq. This is not a problem of powers, this is a problem of will power.” President Bush emphasized that it was possible neither to come to an agreement with terrorists nor with dictatorships, nor with regimes that had such weapons and supported terrorism. We have to act quicker than they.³² This explains why the military operation launched early on 20 March took Turkey unawares; its government had to hastily pass the document on “wartime powers” through the parliament. The parliament merely allowed the government to use Turkish troops outside the country and to let Americans use air corridors. The very fact that Washington had failed to warn Ankara about the beginning of the war showed that the country had been struck out of the list of America’s closest allies. The relations between Turkey and the United States entered a serious crisis created by the problem of Turkey’s presence in Northern Iraq and the delayed decisions on the air corridors.³³

When analyzing the consequences one has to take into account that the positive decisions of the Turkish parliament had a very good chance to be adopted even if with a slight delay. There is an opinion that this failure was caused, on the one hand, by Washington’s excessive pressure and excessive haste, and mistrust of Washington because it had refused to supply written guarantees. Premier Erdogan pointed out that the American media were criticizing Turkey as a mercenary country. This also affected the parliament’s position.³⁴ On the other hand, the failure can be explained by inadequate political skills of the newly appointed Turkish cabinet, discord and instability in the ruling party. Finally, unofficially military machines and soldiers that were waiting for a permission in Turkish ports and bases were moved to Iraq—this was Turkey’s real help and support for the military campaign.³⁵ Turkey opened the air corridors and certain air bases to be used for humanitarian purposes. Turkey and Washington needed one another during the Iraq crisis and they will need one another in future. This suggests that they will restore their friendly ties and mutual trust. On 23 March Foreign Minister of Turkey stated that there were no contradictions between Turkey and the U.S. and that Ankara was one of the members of the antiterrorist coalition.³⁶ On 25 March Washington informed the government of Turkey that it would give it $1 billion of non-repayable loan and a credit of $8.5 billion.³⁷

The 9/11 events changed regional politics of many countries. The first stage of the antiterrorist campaign against the Taliban, the source of Islamic radicalism, extremism, and terrorism was supported by many countries, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors. This support took the form of the readiness of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to let America use the military bases on their territories. In this way their governments hoped to strengthen their positions at home and be the first recipients of political and economic dividends. Despite the statements about Russia’s priority role in Central Asia that came from the local foreign ministries this could not but affect the balance of power in the region. Turkey, as America’s closest ally and an active partner of the first stage of the antiterrorist campaign also got its share of military presence in the region. In this way Ankara that previously had had no means of opposing Moscow’s and Beijing’s influence there and of being actively involved in Central Asian developments acquired new possibilities with the support of the United States and thanks to its presence in Central Asia.

Since the end of the Cold War Turkey has been pursuing an active policy in another region, the Southern Caucasus; the antiterrorist campaign further strengthened its positions there. Ankara’s importance as a member of the international coalition increased. Since America still retains its military bases in Central Asia it is necessary to maintain the existing and create new air corridors, one of them being the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan corridor.³⁸ American military experts arrived in Georgia to train the Georgian security antiterrorist forces—this means that the United States is present in the Caucasus where Washington and Ankara have common interests including safe transportation of energy resources.

When analyzing the second stage of the “antiterrorist” campaign or rather the war in Iraq one should say that the plummeting rating of the United States caused by its illegal (from the point of view of many countries) military interference in Baghdad will hardly negatively affect American positions in Central Asia and the Caucasus (though it may provoke mistrust). Meanwhile Russia with an air base in Tajikistan within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty came to an agreement with Kyrgyzstan about deploying Russian planes on the Kyrgyz territory to support the Collective Rapid Deployment Force. To a certain extent Moscow restored the balance of power in the region.

At the same time, the crisis of its relations with the U.S. somewhat undermined Turkey’s positions in the world and the region. This is explained by the problem of Turkey’s military presence in Northern Iraq that can be called the “soft underbelly” of Ankara’s.³⁹ Not only the United States and Britain objected to Turkey’s presence in Northern Iraq: Germany, Belgium, Russia, and many other countries did not want this either.⁴⁰ Abandoned by Washington and its allies and warned by European countries in connection with the Cyprus issue Turkey may find itself isolated. This will hardly affect its regional Caucasian policies but will greatly limit its ability to pursue an active Central Asian policy without American support. On the other hand, possible severance of relations with the United States, its withdrawal from the antiterrorist coalition may move Ankara closer to Europe. France repeatedly hinted that the American share in the IMF was 17 percent while Europe had 32 percent.⁴¹ Germany and the Netherlands expressed their support of Turkey.⁴² This will allow Ankara to continue its present Central Asian and Caucasian policies probably going along with Russia.

By way of conclusion I would like to say that Turkey’s activeness and its involvement in the antiterrorist coalition depended, to a great extent, on the legitimate nature of the operation’s stages. While at the first stage the U.N. Security Council tacitly approved of the operation while NATO resolutely sided with the United States, at the second stage Washington ran across a stubborn refusal of the Security Council and NATO to approve of its plans once more. This determined the relations between Turkey and the United States and affected Ankara’s military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Together with the rest of the world Turkey did not approve of the war against Saddam Hussein; certain Turkish political circles, including members of cabinet faction in the parliament, were dead set against Turkey’s involvement in this war. These sentiments cropped up during parliamentary voting on granting wartime powers to foreign states. The government sided with the United States because Turkey’s involvement (or refusal to get involved) in the war against Saddam Hussein would not affect Washington’s resolution to fight—it can only facilitate (or complicate) such fighting. Had Ankara refused to cooperate it would have been deprived of the postwar political reconstruction of Iraq. This was unacceptable because of Turkey’s relatively vulnerable spot—Northern Iraq—and because it would have deprived itself of very much needed political and economic support, which would have crippled its national interests.

In this way, under political pressure, Turkey had to become a “passive” coalition member that worsened its relations with the United States and made the prospects of dividends doubtful. Being carried away by the ideas of its strategic importance Turkey has found itself a lone figure on the international scene rather than a close and supported ally. The relations with the United States based on mutual interests of the two countries may soon be patched up. This promises certain advantages yet Turkey has wisely decided to stay away from “dangerous games” for a while and try its hand in more cautious policies.

¹ See: T. Moralı, “Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Perceptions,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2002, p. 59.
² See: D. Wareman, “Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, Issue 1, Winter 1999, pp. 25-31; B. Rabin, “Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 1, Issue 3, July-September 1999, pp. 59-66.
³ Radıkal, 12 March, 2003, p. 11.
⁴ See: T. Moralı, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
⁵ See: A. Recep, “The Struggle with Global Terrorism and the Steps that Must Be Taken Against It,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 4, No. 3, July-September 2002, p. 10.
⁶ See: Ibid., pp. 12-14.
⁷ See: Radıkal, 17 September, 2001, p. 4.
⁸ [http//www.un.org/].
⁹ See: Appendix VIII: North Atlantic Treaty. NATO’s Handbook, NATO’s Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1995, p. 218.
¹⁰ See: Radıkal, 13 September, 2001, p. 9.
¹¹ See: Radıkal, 14 September, 2001, p. 7.
¹² A. Deighton, “The Eleventh of September and beyond: NATO. Special edition: Superterrorism, Policy Responses,” ed. by Lawrence Freedman, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, 2002, p. 119.
¹³ See: Ibid., p. 131.
¹⁴ See: Radıkal, 22 September, 2001, p. 7.
¹⁵ See: Radıkal, 16 September, 2001, p. 7.
¹⁶ See: Radıkal, 15 September, 2001, p. 7.
¹⁷ See: Radıkal, 24 September, 2001, p. 7.
¹⁸ See: A. Makovsky, “Turkey’s Unfinished Role in the War Against Terrorism,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 4, No. 1, January-March 2002, p. 42.
¹⁹ See: M. Erol, F. Burget, “Afganistan’da Son Aşama: ‘Zoraki Güvenlik-Istikrar Anlayışının Gönüllü Gücü ISAF Komutasına Almanya Talip’,” Stratejik Analiz, Cilt 3, Sayı 31, Kasım 2002, p. 58.
²⁰ See: Ibidem.
²¹ See: Radıkal, 14 December, 2002, pp. 10-11.
²² Survey of the U.N. Security Council’s activity in 2002: Iraq [http://www.un.org/].
²³ See: Resolution 1441 (2001) of the U.N. Security Council [http://www.un.org/].
²⁴ See: A. Makovsky, op. cit., p. 47.
²⁵ See: Radıkal, 20 February, 2003, p. 6.
²⁶ See: Radıkal, 7 February, 2003, p. 11.
²⁷ See: Radıkal, 16 February, 2003, p. 11.
²⁸ See: Radıkal, 20 February, 2003, p. 11.
²⁹ See: Radıkal, 9 March, 2003, p. 11.
³⁰ See: Radıkal, 6 March, 2003, p. 6.
³¹ See: Radıkal, 19 March, 2003, p. 9.
³² See: Ibidem.
³³ See: Radıkal, 22 March, 2003, p. 4.
³⁴ See: Radıkal, 24 March, 2003, p. 7.
³⁵ See: Ibid., p. 6.
³⁶ See: Ibid., p. 7.
³⁷ See: Radıkal, 26 March, 2003, p. 12.
³⁸ See: K. Ağacan, “ABD’nın Gürcistan’a Asker Göndermesi: Terörle Mücadelede Üçüncü Cephe mi, Yoksa Köprübaşının Tutulması mı?” Stratejik Analiz, Cilt 2, Sayı 24, Nisan 2002, p. 71.
³⁹ Turkey fears not a possibility of setting up independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq (it will find it hard to survive amid hostile neighbors); moreover, the United States vowed never to allow such state to appear. Ankara is more concerned with a strong Kurdish autonomy that would include oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul and may greatly affect the central authorities. Turkey should never forget that Washington flirted with the Kurds.
⁴⁰ See: Radıkal, 23 March, 2003, p. 6.
⁴¹ See: Hurriyet, 25 March, 2003, p. 12.
⁴² See: Radıkal, 27 March, 2003, p. 5.