IDENTITY-CONFLICT RELATIONS: A CASE-STUDY OF THE FERGHANA VALLEY CONFLICTS
Keywords:
Central Asia, identity, Ferghana Valley, ethnic relations, conflictAbstract
This study aims to describe and explain the relations between identity and conflict by drawing on different theoretical approaches in political science. It examines the questions of whether collective identity, either on a national, civilizational, religious, or social level, is an important variable in trying to understand current conflicts, as well as the prospects for formulating identity-based approaches to conflict. In other words, is it even possible to think about collective identity and conflict simultaneously? This gives rise to another question: Why is collective identity an important factor for explaining the conflict in the Ferghana Valley?
The Ferghana Valley has played a role both in establishing stability in Central Asia and in becoming the starting point of violent conflict throughout the history of the region. The valley became administrationally and ethnically divided into several parts during the Soviet and post-Soviet era. Currently, the tension among the different ethnic, social, and political groups is high because of overpopulation, the increasing scarcity of water and arable land, and the economic hardships and social differentiation that occurred during the political, economic, and social transformation after the Soviet Union collapsed. The Ferghana Valley, at the heart of Central Asia, has become one of the most conflict-prone areas in Central Asia. For these reasons, the valley is a good area for testing the explanatory power of different approaches of political science to explain identity conflict relations.
Ethnic issues are still extremely important for understanding much of the tension arising in the valley. Not only is there division among the Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik people, the issue is further complicated by the hostility between different identitygroups and minorities in the region. Additional pressure is arising due to the fact that not only does this tension exist inside each state, it could also escalate to the interstate level.
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See: R.J.B. Walker, “International Relations and the Concept of Political,” in: International Relations Theory Today,ed. by K. Booth, S. Smith, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 306-328; idem, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 15.
See: “National groups can retain their separate languages and senses of identity, wrote Fukuyama, but that identity must be expressed primarily in the realm of culture rather than politics. The French can continue to savor their wines and the German their sausages, but this will all be done within the sphere of private life alone” (F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Avon Books, New York, 1992, p. 271).
H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, Politics among Nations, 6th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985, p. 16.
Often studies based on the assumption that certain types of identity already exist in a conflict area and not interested in the process of construction of identity end up identifying different conditions that may lead to an escalation of conflict. These conditions may include historical and social aspects that would help to explain the relationship between identity and conflict.
Francis Fukuyama asserts that “the reason why liberal democracy has not become universal or remained stable once it achieved power lies ultimately in the incomplete correspondence between peoples and states. States are purposeful political creations while peoples are pre-existing moral communities” (F. Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 212). This view is supported by the findings Nordlinger, Pye, Rustow, and Verba, and challenged by Wachman, who maintains that the absence of national identity may impede, but does not prevent the consolidation of democracy.
See: H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, op. cit., p. 269.
See: Ibid., pp. 21-22.
The concept of “civilizational identity” was brought back to the current debates by Samuel P. Huntington (see: “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 25). Several authors focused on “civilizational identity” in their works in the 20th century, such as Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, A. A. Knofp, New York, 1926; Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, Oxford University Press, London, 1949; Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994; Ahmet Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World, Quill, Kuala Lumpur, 1994.
See: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London,New York, 1991, p. 19.
See: R. Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, SAGE Publication, London, 1992, pp. 98-99.
The world “cobweb” model was first proposed by John Burton (see: J. Barton, World Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972).
In his article “The Clash of Civilizations,” Huntington put forward a thesis that future conflict is likely to take place between civilizations, or between nation-states and peoples of different civilizations. Differences among civilizations are basic;they are the product of centuries. Since, due to the increased number of interactions (or due to the processes of globalization),the world is becoming a smaller place, these interactions increase the “civilization consciousness,” which inevitably leads to conflict, since differences between the civilizations are basic. Janet L. Abu-Lughod expressed an alternative view to the Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations.” Based on extensive historical evidence, she drew a picture of the world system A.D.
-1350, in which different civilizations co-existed peacefully (see: J.L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Oxford University Press, USA, 1991, p. 20).
The immediate responses to Huntington’s thesis almost exclusively focus on the inaccuracy of Huntington’s “broad brush” when identifying civilization lines (e.g., F. Ajami, “The Summoning”), and the idea that states control civilizations, not vice versa. (“But is it really clear that the greatest potential for conflict lies between the civilizations instead of within them?” asks Robert L. Bartley in “The Case for Optimism.”) The responses are in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, September/October 1993.
Such an approach is advocated by Sheldon Smith in World in Disorder 1994-1995, University Press of America,Lanham, 1995, p. 21.
See: D. Carment, “The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 2,1993, p. 146.
See: Ethnicity and Nationalism: Case Studies in Their Intrinsic Tension and Political Dynamics, ed. by P. Kruger,Hitzeroth, Marburg, 1993, p. 12.
See: F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1969, p. 14.
See: A. Smith, Ethnic Origin of Nations, Oxford University Press, Blackswell, 1986, pp. 22-31.
See: Ch. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, Random House, New York, 1978, p. 54.
See: T.R. Gurr, Peoples against States: Minorities at Risks in the New Century, United States Institute of Peace,Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 5.
See: P. Wallenstein, “Understanding Conflict Resolution: A Framework,” in: Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges, ed. by P. Wallenstein, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988, pp. 119-143.
See: “Zakliuchenie Natskomissii po rassledovaniiu sobytii v iiune 2010 na Iuge Kyrgyzstana,” 8 June, 2011, available at [http://www.ethnic.analytics.kg/2011-05-23-08-59-33/2011-06-08-11-41-10/36--2010-.html], 12 December, 2011.
See: N. Lubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley. Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, Center for Preventive Action, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p. 33.
Ibid., p. 40.
See: Ya. Sari, C. Asanbayeva, “1990 ve 2010 Yıllarında Güney Kırgızistan’daki Etnik Çatışmalar: Nedenler,Benzerlikler ve Farklılıklar,” in: Orta Asya’da Siyaset ve Toplum, Demokrasi, Etnisite ve Kimlik, ed. by M.T. Demirtepe,USAK Yayınları, Ankara, 2012.
N. Lubin, op. cit., p. 47.
See: A. Knyazev, Vektory i paradigmy kyrgyzskoi nezavisimosti, Printhouse, Bishkek, 2012, p. 18.
See: M.B. Olcott, “Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia,” in: Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, ed. by Yavoi Ro’i, Frank Cass Press, London, 1995, p. 330.
See: G. Gleason, “Why Russia is in Tajikistan,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, p. 85.
See: B.B. Ozpek, “The Andijon Events: Demand for More Development or Threat to Stability,” Perception, Winter 2007.
For reasons and actors of the conflict, see: Ya. Sarı, “Kırgız-Özbek Çatışmasının Nedenleri Üzerine Bir Analiz,”Eurasian Analysis, No. 1, 2010, pp. 31-37.
For a more detail account of the conflict, see: Otchet mezhdunarodnoy nezavisimoi komissii po issledovaniiu sobıtiy na Iuge Kyrgyzstana v iiune 2010 goda, 3 May, 2011, available at [http://www.mfa.kg/images/userfiles/file/IKK_001.pdf],8 April, 2012.
See: A. Joldoshov, “Kabilecilik, Bölgecilik ve Etnisite: Kırgız Kimliği Üzerine Çalışmalar”, Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 15, 2013.
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