THE CASPIAN REGION: DEVELOPMENT RESULTS AND NEW TRENDS
Keywords:
Caspian Sea, Caspian states, non-regional actors, pipelines, oil, gasAbstract
The Caspian region came into the focus of attention of the Caspian and non-regional states even prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The increased global attention to this region was associated with the presence of proven and potential reserves of hydrocarbon resources, which increased the region’s geopolitical significance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region found itself in the center of geopolitical rivalry. From that time on, the subject of energy acquired a new meaning in the Caspian region. Western oil and gas companies and government agencies began to demonstrate an increased interest in the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian region. Moreover, for decades the West has maintained a close focus on the Eurasian space, in particular, on the problems associated with the production and transportation of hydrocarbon resources.
The most acute geopolitical standoff occurred between Russia and the United States, which supported various pipeline projects. For Russia, the key task was to preserve its regional dominance, which had been growing over the course of several centuries. The United States supported the geopolitical turn of the new Caspian states, advocating the creation of new hydrocarbon supply routes that would bypass Russian territory. The key task for the Caspian states was to increase hydrocarbon production and provide reliable routes for their export to foreign markets. Based on these goals, the Caspian states built their own foreign policy, including intraregional policy.
Thirty years later, the results of geopolitical rivalry are visible. The Caspian countries, which rely on financial resources and political support from non-regional actors, have implemented large-scale hydrocarbon export projects. The new pipeline architecture has changed the balance of power in the Caspian region, increasing the involvement of the Caspian states in the energy policy of Turkey, China, and the EU. At the same time, the regional states have managed to solve the problem of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea in a five-sided format.
A new trend of the last decade has in- volved projects related to the construction of coastal infrastructure and expansion of shipping. The Caspian countries are growing increasingly more interested in participating in international transport projects, considering them as an important component of their foreign policy. Despite the attained agreements and solutions to key problems, competition between the Caspian states, which is greatly influenced by non-regional actors, is intensifying.
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