UZBEKISTAN’S POLITICAL PARTIES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
Abstract
Uzbekistan’s official1 political parties have become an important institution in the re-public’s political life, but they function very differently from parties in democratic coun-tries.
If we were to make a schematic drawing of Uzbekistan’s political system, the head of state would be in its center as a powerful nucleus, and all the rest—the government, parliament, parties, judicial power, mass media, and society as a whole—would revolve around him, protecting and attending to the country’s leader. Although their proximity to the center (that is, to the nucle-us) and rotation rate around it differ, there is essentially not one political party that would be willing to leave its orbit and exist in free flight or swim against the current, claiming, in so doing,to be creating its own alternative system.
This is legitimate, since the nucleus has al-ways feared any deviations in rotation around it,never sparing any resources to increase people’s disposition and sympathy toward it and always confidently applying negative sanctions, that is,punishing those who tried to launch into free flight or go against the grain.
There is no doubt that this primarily applied to political parties. The president has always had biased opinions regarding many of the democrat-ic values and institutions, including the opposi-tion, mass meetings, free mass media, political parties, and democracy as a whole. He has never had any particular confidence in society and the above-mentioned institutions, always considered it necessary to keep control over them, and essentially seen them as threats to stability and security, as well as to his power.
A vivid expression of the president’s non-confidence in a civil society was his proclamation during the first years of independence of five principles of the transition period. The first of them said: “The state is the main reformer,” which for all intents and purposes entirely contradicted the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. This principle, which had defined Uzbekistan’s entire era of sovereignty, de facto established anetatist system of statehood and greatly strengthened authoritarianism. The “state is the main reformer "thesis defined the government’s unconditional supremacy with respect to other branches of pow-er and a civil society.
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Uzbekistan’s political parties can be divided into “officially registered” and “those not registered by the state.” The latter include such democratically oriented par-ties as Erk, Birlik, the Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs,as well as the Party of Free Peasants. The Erk (Will/Free-dom) Democratic Party and the Birlik (Unity) National Movement Party were set up at the beginning of the 1990s;the first of them was registered by the Republic of Uz-bekistan Ministry of Justice on 3 September, 1991, but when the government gained in strength (or for the purpose of strengthening it), their activity was ceased not only de jure,but also de facto. Two more opposition parties, which define the agrarian-entrepreneurial problem as the most important,were founded in 2002: the Party of Agrarians and Entrepre-neurs and the Party of Free Peasants. One of the main rea-sons for the activation of opposition parties was the Decla-ration on Strategic Partnership between the U.S. and Uz-bekistan signed by the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Unit-ed States, which was perceived by the opposition parties as a new way to legalize their activity. In the past four years,all the opposition party projects submitted documents re-peatedly to the Uzbekistan Ministry of Justice. For example,Birlik alone submitted documents for state registration five times, but not one opposition party project has yet to obtain an official status.
The Erk Democratic Party was an opposition party registered on 3 September, 1991. It was headed by poet and politician Muhammad Solih, who currently lives abroad. The party’s activity was halted by the Ministry of Justice in 1993.
ut according to the legislation, a party’s activity may only be halted by a court order. This situation, according to the party’s activists, gives legal grounds to say that the party exists.
See: V. Tiurikov, R. Shaguliamov, Nezavisimaia Respublika Uzbekistan: Pamiatnye sobytiia i daty, in two volumes,Vol. 1, Uzbekiston Publishers, Tashkent, 1997-1998, p. 8.
See: Mustakillik: Izokhli ilmiy-ommabop lugat (Independence: Scientific-Public Dictionary with Commentaries),Shark Publishers, Tashkent, 1998, 320 pages.
The post of vice-president existed in the history of independent Uzbekistan for a very short time. This institution was abolished after the new Constitution was adopted in 1992. Shukrullo Mirsaidov was the only person who worked as vice-president of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
See: Sh. Akhmajonov, “O shesti zaregistrirovannykh i odnoi ‘skrytoi’ propravitelstvennykh politicheskikh partiiakh Uzbekistana,” available at [http://www.jahongir.org/Russian/opartiyax.html].
Ibidem.
See: Uzbekistonning iangi tarikhi (History of Independent Uzbekistan), Compiled by N. Zhuraev and T. Fayzul-laev. Board of editors: A. Azizkhuzhaev (chairman), B. Akhmedov, S. Kamolov, et al., Shark Publishers, Tashkent, 2000,560 pp.
See: Sh. Akhmajonov, op. cit.
The word “Fidokorlar,” which means “Self-Sacrificers,” was possibly borrowed from the national movement “fid-aiyyun” (Arabic for “self-sacrificers,” “self-sacrificing”) of Egypt during the time of President Gamal Abdel Nasser as the idea for a new party. This is evidenced by the head of state’s speeches at this time and articles in the country’s central news-papers, the authors of which were government officials and political scientists. What is more, the idea of “fidoyilik” (“self-sacrifice”) became one of the most important values the country’s president called on civil servants, party members, and society as a whole to observe, particularly after the end of the 1990s (see: I. Karimov, Milliy davlatchilik, istiklol mafkur-asi va khukukiy madaniiat tugrisida (I. Karimov, On National Statehood, Ideology of Independence and Law-Based Cul-ture), Academy of the Uzbekistan Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tashkent, 1999, p. 158).
On the new NDPU program and the party’s tasks for democratizing and renewing society, see: Speech by Chair-man of the Central Committee of the NDP of Uzbekistan Asliddin Rustamov at the 5th NDPU Congress on 2 July, 2005,Tashkent, 2005.
Ibid., p. 9. All the same, with respect to individualism, the NDPU expresses its objections not to a specific liber-al-democratic party, but to the general theory of liberalism, since the UzLiDeP, which regards itself as a liberal-democrat-ic party, also, paradoxically, criticizes “individualism.”
Ibidem.
Ibidem. Mardikor markets—traditional markets of short-term hired workers. In Tashkent, such mardikor bazaars exist in almost every region and next to large markets. What is more, in the last 5-6 years, women’s mardikor bazaars have appeared. Mardikors are mainly people who come from the country’s provinces; among them are both skilled (car-penters, mechanics, welders, etc.), and unskilled workers. The problem of migration in contemporary Uzbekistan is a very urgent and painful issue for society. There are still no precise statistics on how many Uzbek citizens travel to neighbor-ing and more distant countries in search of work, but it is known that most migrants go to the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.
The Democratic Bloc created by the UzLiDeP, Fidokorlar NDP, and Adolat SDP factions constituted the majori-ty, 57%, of the Legislative House at the beginning of its new convocation. The NDPU declared itself to be the parliamen-tary opposition with respect to UzLiDeP and the Democratic Bloc that is headed by the latter. Milliy Tiklanish NDP and independent deputies do not belong to any bloc. The Democratic Bloc is considered rightist from the viewpoint of politi-cal-philosophical categories, but it also represents the government’s interests, since it is headed by UzLiDeP, and one of the members of the UzLiDeP political council is the country’s current prime minister.
For example, according to the surveys by the Izhtimoiy fikr Sociological Center in 2004, 79% of the respondents expressed their support of male politicians, and only 19% were willing to support female politicians. What is more, it is known that 52% of the republic’s population is composed of women.
For example, according to the surveys by the Izhtimoiy fikr Sociological Center in 2004, 79% of the respondents expressed their support of male politicians, and only 19% were willing to support female politicians. What is more, it is known that 52% of the republic’s population is composed of women.
Program of the Milliy Tiklanish DP of Uzbekistan, available at [www.uzmtdp.uz] The party’s website is set up exclusively in Uzbek.
In order to create a faction, parties must have 9 places out of 120; this corresponds to 13% of the total number of places in the parliament’s lower house.
Program of the Movement of Entrepreneurs and Businessmen Party—Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan,available at [http://www.uzlidep.uz/program.php].
The UzLiDeP is the leader with respect to self-advertisement. Its slogans and emblems can be found almost all over Uzbekistan—beginning with large billboards on the streets and ending with small posters in the capital’s metro.
Beginning in 2002, all the opposition parties submitted documents to the Ministry of Justice to obtain an official status. The Birlik National Movement Party became the absolute record-holder in this matter, which in the last four years submitted the necessary documents five times. But the Ministry of Justice refuses to register the party and often does not indicate why the submitted documents do not correspond to the law, although according to clause 2 of Art 9 of the Law on Political Parties, the Ministry of Justice must explain in writing the reasons for its refusal to register.
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Political Parties of 26 December, 1996, No. 337-I, Art 6 (the first part).
Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Political Parties of 26 December, 1996, No. 337-I, Art 8 (the second part).
Narodnoe slovo, No. 30, 13 February, 2004.
The term “Georgian syndrome” was used by the author to describe the situation when the authorities in many post-Soviet countries (including Uzbekistan) began to regard the activity of national and international public associations through the prism of the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (see: “West Presses for Uzbek Reform,” available at [www.csmonitor.com], 7 April, 2004).
See: Law on the Financing of Political Parties, 30 April, 2004, available at [http://ngo.uz/zakon1.php?Lang=ru#8].
See: Law on the Rules of Procedure in the Legislative House of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan,Art 9.
See: Law on the Financing of Political Parties. 30 April, 2004, Art 8.
Ibid., Art 7.
Ibid., Art 13.
Today, among the five officially registered parties, the UzLiDeP is considered the party in power. The country’s prime minister Shavkat Mirziiaev (as a member of the UzLiDeP’s political council) participates in its conferences and con-gresses. The party, in contrast to other similar structures, has huge financial and material-technical resources (see: A. Saidov,
Parlament Uzbekistana razdelilsia na ‘partiiu vlasti’ i ‘oppozitsiiu’? available at [http://www.CentrAsia.org/
ewsA.php4?st=1109713020]).
Law on the Financing of Political Parties. Article 15. Limits on Making Donations to Political Parties. Adopted on 30 April, 2004.
For example, when this Law was adopted, the cooperation project with political parties that existed within the frame-work of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Tashkent closed down. Many Western international organizations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany), the National Democratic Institute (U.S.A.), the International Republican In-stitute (U.S.A.), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation can now cooperate with parties through the Institute for Civil Soci-ety Studies.
The president’s unexpected initiative was announced on 9 November, one week before the discussion in the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU of the sanctions adopted a year earlier with respect to Uzbekistan after the well-known Andijan events of 13 May, 2005, which many perceived as a signal to the West that Uzbekistan was ready to con-tinue democratization, and this process could be more intensive if the sanctions were halted (see: [http://www.uza.uz/doc-uments/index.php?id1=14262]).
The second part of Art 34 of the Constitution reads: “No one may infringe on the rights, freedoms, and dignity of persons comprising the opposition minority in political parties, public associations, mass movements, or representative government bodies.” Chapter on Political Rights.
Art 2 of the draft of the constitutional law on Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in the Renewal and Fur-ther Democratization of State Administration and Modernization of the Country.
Ibid., Art 4.
Ibidem. The country’s political practice shows that there has never yet been a situation when a nomination for prime minister or a regional khokim presented by the president was “objected to” by any faction, part of the Legislative House,or the local Kengashes (Councils) of the provinces. The deputies always vote unanimously in favor of supporting the indi-cated candidate. In so doing, the retention of this clause on disbandment of the parliament after three refusals to accept a candidate nominated by the president in the new version of the Constitutional Law is a strictly psychological aspect, which will probably not be implemented during the current generation of politicians.
Ibid., Art 5, clause “d.” Before that, the Law envisaged three ways of dismissing the prime minister from his post:
ased on a personal retirement statement; in the event the prime minister cannot perform his duties; in the event of insur-
mountable disagreements arising among the members of the Cabinet of Ministers that threaten its normal functioning, as well as repeated adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of decisions contradicting the Constitution, Uzbekistan laws, decrees, and orders of the President of Uzbekistan.
Ibid., Art 7.
The monthly salary of a deputy of the Legislative House currently amounts to around 100,000 soms (before income tax), which is approximately equal to $80. This sum is insignificant even compared to the salaries of many state enterprise employees. It is expedient to pay the said persons a minimum of $300-400 for carrying out normal legislative activity and concentrating on urgent sociopolitical problems and their financial independence.
Only the heads of committees and factions, as well as the house speaker, have the right to have assistants; ordi-nary deputies do not have such. It seems particularly urgent for the latter to have assistants, if we keep in mind that there are only a total of 120 assistants for the 27 million population of Uzbekistan.
See: Uzbekistan Law on Elections to the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Art 50.
See: Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Art 102; Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on State Power in the Provinces, Art 1.
See: Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Art. 95.
This definition was also used by the author at the conference on the development of parliamentarianism and po-litical parties held in Vienna on 2-3 November, 2006 and organized by the OSCE/ODIHR.
In Uzbekistan, such Russian television channels as Channel One, NTV, and Rossia are very popular. What is more,the satellite information channel Euronews has quite a large audience. Uzbekistan’s electorate is more informed about the politicians and party activists of the Russian Federation than they are about their own.
See: M. Novak, Dukh demokraticheskogo kapitalizma (The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism), Transl. from the English by V.G. Marutik, Luchi Sofii Publishers, Minsk, 1997, p. 544.
The term used in A.S. Akhiezer’s book Rossia: kritika istoricheskogo opyta, Philosophical Society, Moscow, 1991 (Sotsiokul’turniy slovar’, Vol. 3, 471 pp.).
Ibidem. “Vector of constructive tension.”
Terms used in: A.S. Akhiezer, op. cit.
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