STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN GEORGIAN POLITICAL THINKING AND PRACTICE
Abstract
Along with the concepts of “state” and “territory,” sovereignty is one of the central themes both in the study and practice of international relations.1 The sovereignty issue is all-important for Georgia as a post-Soviet “transition state” still working on its statehood.
State sovereignty and state independence are inextricably related to the nation-state2 as the main actor in the contemporary international system. (There is no doubt that Georgia is one such state.) Independence within a nation-state can be rationally substantiated as a political tool used to achieve and realize the highest values, as well as specific positive aims and tasks pursued by the population of any sovereign state taking due account of its economic, scientific, cultural, spiritual, etc. development, which cannot be affected by outside factors. Aristotle regarded state sovereignty as a tool in the context of his “happy state” conception; a sovereign state helped realize the highest values and achieve the ultimate aims of its population.3 On the other hand, Aristotle pointed out: “For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life.”4 This is not a purely instrumental and axiological idea of statehood and sovereignty—the philosopher supplied their final axiological interpretation. Normally nation-states regard sovereignty as their highest value and ultimate aim.5 State and national independence develop into the ultimate value with no fair equivalent, even if overpriced.6 This is particularly typical of peoples with a mythologized national identity; they regard themselves as a living organism with a creative force and spiritual identity.7 For most so-called de-mythologized peoples that mostly regard themselves as a “society” rather than a “nation,”8 sovereignty is an indisputable value. The point has been amply demonstrated by international experience.9
Inevitably, there are exceptions: for example, the Scots, a nation with a highly developed national self-identity, voluntarily abandoned their sovereignty and independence, while the Canadians, Australians, and some other people's formally delegated their sovereignty to the English crown. There is another type of collective self-identification that abandons national and state sovereignty in favor of other, much larger entities. It is rooted in a shared culture, faith, language, etc. I have in mind pan Slavism, pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and other similar phenomena,10 the success of which is always short-lived or even virtual.
The above is part of my discussion, within the limits of the present article, of whether sovereignty as an ultimate aim is self-sufficient and valuable for Georgia at the level of the political elites and society as a whole; how important is sovereignty as a tool for realizing other important values and aims, i.e. what does the political class and society mean by sovereignty, and what specific features can be observed in this connection; how does the present idea of sovereignty in Georgia affect political practice (particularly the country’s foreign policy orientation and implementation of the republic’s strategic objectives)
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References
See: Th.J. Biersteker, “State, Sovereignty and Territory,” in: Handbook of International Relations, ed. by W. Carl-snaes, Th. Risse, B.A. Simmons, London, 2002, p. 157.
See: B. Anderson, Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts, Frankfurt-New York, 1996,pp. 16-17. According to Walter Sulzbach “nation is a group of people that needs a state of its own because it is sovereign in relation to other states” (quoted from: U. Albrecht, Internationale Politik. Einführung in das System internationaler Herrschaft, München, 1986, p. 46).
See: Aristotle, The Politics, Book Seven, Chapter VII. When writing about a “happy state,” Aristotle obviously had in mind a sovereign state with its own territory, even if the term was coined in a different epoch.
Ibid., Chapter VIII.
Cf.: H.-U. Wehler, Nationalismus. Geschichte-Formen-Folgen, München, 2001, p. 37.
See: C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, quoted from Henrique Ricardo Otten, “Wie die Realpolitik in den Mythos umschlägt. ‘Die Sachlichkeit’ des Politischen bei C. Schmitt,” in: Mythos Staat—Carl Schmitts Staatsverständnis,Rüdiger Voigt (Hg.), Baden-Baden, 2001, p. 173.
See: L. Ranke, quoted from H.Th. Gräf, “Funktionsweisen und Träger internationaler Politik in der Frühen Neu-zeit,” in: Strukturwandel Internationaler Beziehungen, Jens Siegelberg/Klaus Schlichte (Hg.), Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 105.
Cf.: K. Hübner, Istina mifa, Moscow, 1996, p. 329.
When talking about the European Union, within which the nation-states voluntarily abandon a considerable part of their sovereignty in favor of supranational structures, we should bear in mind that this was a voluntary act and that only part of their sovereignty was delegated. The recent disagreements over the Iraqi and certain other international issues have shown that the countries retained their own ideas about their national interests—therefore they should be regarded as sovereign sub-jects of international politics.
German nationalist historian of the 19th century Heinrich von Treitschke put it in a nutshell by saying that it was great powers that could realize great aims (quoted from: R. Aron, Frieden und Krieg. Eine Theorie der Staatenwelt, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p. 677).
The Georgian dissidents concentrated on national problems rather than human rights and democracy issues as dis-tinct from the dissident movement in Russia (cf.: J. Gerber, Georgien: Nationale Opposition und kommunistische Herrschaft seit 1956, Baden-Baden, 1997, pp. 64-79).
Sakartvelos Respublika, 8-9 December, 1991 (in Georgian).
See, for example: [http://www.wps.ru/ru/pp/military/1999/11/15.html?view=for-print; http://sovsekretno.ru/2001/
/3.html], etc.
Izvestia, 13 April, 2004, available at [http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article56054/].
The Act on Georgia’s State Independence adopted on 9 April, 1991 by its Supreme Soviet says: “Georgian state-hood rooted in its centuries-old history was lost in the 19th century when the Russian Empire annexed the country and destroyed its statehood. The Georgian nation will never reconcile itself to the loss of freedom” (Sakartvelos Respubli-ka, No. 70, 10 April, 1991). Whether true or false this statement repeated all over again could not but damage Georgia’s relations with Russia.
Figures supplied by Eurobarometer (see: Prof. H. Best, “Druzhestvenny skepsis: Evropa i Evropeyskiy Soiuz v vospriatii naselenia Gruzii i drugikh stran-preemnikov Sovetskogo Soiuza,” in: Materialy konferentsii “Vneshnepoliticheskie prioritety dlia Iuzhnogo Kavkaza v XXI veke: blokovaia prinadlezhnost ili neitralitet?—Evropeyskiy opyt,” Batumi-Tbili-si, 2001, p. 52).
Figures supplied by the IRI; polls were conducted in April 2006 (see: [http://www.iri.org.ge/eng/engmain.htm],POR-April 2006, diagram 56).
Ibid., diagram 55.
See, for example: [http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-04-15/1_georgia.html].
See: [http://www.bit.prime-tass.ru/news/show.asp?id=43527&ct=news].
See: [http://www.parliament.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=63&info_id=7787&lang_id=GEO] (in Georgian).
[http://nsc.gov.ge/index1.php] (in Georgian.)
See: [http://www.iri.org.ge/eng/engmain.htm], IRI-POR-April 2006, diagram 64.
See: IRI-POR-April 2006, diagram 26.
See: IRI-POR-April 2006, diagrams 65 and 66.
Compared: on 16 October Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee General Ray Henault informed the journal-ists that the alliance did not plan to deploy its peacekeepers in the zones of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Osse-tian conflicts. He pointed out that NATO did not plan to address the issue and added that NATO was involved in negotia-tions with Georgia and other interested countries. He pointed out that NATO regarded the relations between Russia and Georgia as bilateral and, therefore, had no direct influence on them. He also said that NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made an official statement, in which he called on Moscow and Tbilisi to settle the conflict as soon as possible. On his part, the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee pointed out that NATO would stay away; available at [http://
ww.rambler.ru/news/world/georgiaabhazia/8910324.html].
Quoted from: Sakartvelos Respublika, 10 March, 2006.
Speaking on Echo of Moscow radio, the general said that the decision about Georgia’s membership would be made by all members at the political level; to reach this stage, the sides should negotiate several critical points, including an in-vitation to NATO and a certain plan of action. Today, the alliance has not reached any of these points, added the general;available at [http://www.vz.ru/news/2006/10/16/53027.html].
The official spokesmen of the Georgian leaders repeatedly stated that MAP would be initiated by the end of 2006 (see, for example: [http://www.newsgeorgia.ru/geo1/20060404/41638357.html], [http://www.civil.ge/rus/
rticle.php?id=10183], etc.).
See interview Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and Industry Boosting Inno-vations Günter Verheugen gave in December 2005, in which he said that the European Union had to decide how many new members it could accommodate at all. The EU paused to ponder, but, the Vice-President said, it was not so much the pon-dering as the pause; available at [http://linkszeitung.de/content/view/5578/45].
Prominent Russian commentators do not mince words on the subject. See, for example, the comment offered by Viacheslav Nikonov, President of the Politika Foundation, who said: “The Georgian authorities should take into account the fact that Georgia’s desire to join NATO causes displeasure in Moscow” (quoted from: Svobodnaia Gruzia, 23 February,2006). The above-mentioned decision to start an “intense dialog” caused a very negative response of the Russian Foreign Ministry, despite the fact that the time limits remained vague. This shows that Moscow is jealous of Georgia’s desire as such to join NATO. Statement by the Foreign Ministry of Russia of 22 September, 2006 (abridged), available at [http://vsesmi.ru/
ews/112829/294378/].
See: [http://www.uabanker.net/daily/2006/10/100906_0800.shtml] (information supplied by the Finance Ministry of Georgia.) Georgia owes over $1 billion to its main creditors—international financial institutions.
A. Chikvaidze, “No Overcoat, Thank You Very Much!” International Affairs, No. 6, 2005.
Control is realized in the form of assistance (even though control and technical assistance are not mutually exclu-sive). The Georgian energy market is patronized by USAID. For more detail, see: [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
urope_eurasia/press/success/2006-08-02.html].
See: G. Rtskhiladze, “Religion and Conflict Potential in Georgia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (33), 2005,pp. 59, 61, 62-64, as well as letters from the Helsinki Commission of the United States to President Saakashvili relating to the situation with the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Georgia; available at: [http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/
S. Lounev, “Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: Geopolitical Value for Russia,” Central Asia and the Cau-casus, No. 3 (39), 2006, p. 24.
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