CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA: ROM TRADE TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
Abstract
Today China leaves no one indifferent: some experts are overenthusiastic about its socioeconomic reforms, while others fear the threats stemming from the country’s new role in the world. Both groups have a right to their opinion, but in real life nothing is ever quite so black and white.
China is a dynamically developing country, but its “growing might” should not be overestimated: it is accompanied by growing problems. I am convinced, first, that in the context of world and regional security, these problems taken together are much more ponderous than “China’s might.”1
Second, all those who tend to overestimate “China’s might” are breeding irrational fears and all sorts of phobias, are not allowing the world to adequately assess the country’s foreign policy, and are reviving fears of “China’s demographic and economic threat to the countries it borders on.” This is obviously an overstatement. China’s
stronger economic position in Central Asia as a whole and in Kazakhstan in particular has become obvious, but not dramatic. Its share of foreign direct investments and foreign trade volume in Kazakhstan do not exceed 10 percent.2 China’s share in the other Central Asian countries is even smaller. Today, China badly needs new sources of raw materials (energy resources in particular) and markets for its products. Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan) is highly attractive in both respects. The trade and economic relations between China and Central Asia are developing entirely within the worldwide economic globalization trends.
It should be said in all justice that due to its specifics and the nature of the relations among the actors involved in the region, this process is potentially dangerous to national security. This is the background against which China’s presence in Central Asia is assessed.
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References
For more detail, see: K.L. Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaia i bezopasnost Tsentral’noy Azii, KISI,Almaty, 2006.
For more detail, see: K. Syroezhkin, “Kazakhstan-sko-kitayskoe torgovo-ekonomicheskoe i investitsionnoe sotrudnichestvo: sostoianie i problemy,” Kazakhstan v global’nykh protsessakh, No. 1, 2006, pp. 43-49.
See: Zhongya yanjiu (Central Asian Studies), No. 1-2, 1992, pp. 14-15; L.C. Hurris, “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China’s Policy in the Islamic World,” The China Quarterly, No. 2, March 1993, p. 125.
Zhongya yanjiu, Summary issue, 1993, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 29.
L.C. Hurris, op. cit., p. 125.
See: Dongou Zhongya yanjiu (Research on Eastern Europe and Central Asia), ed. by Zhang Baoguo, Urumqi, 1999;Zhonguo yu Zhongya (China and Central Asia), ed. by Xue Jundu and Xing Guangcheng, Beijing, 1999, pp. 183-224; Zhon-guo yu Zhongya yanjiu wenji (Collected Studies of China and Central Asia), ed. by Wu Fuhuan and Cheng Shiming, Urumqi,1998, p. 7.
Zhongya yanjiu, No. 3-4, 1994, pp. 28-29.
See: Dongou Zhongya yanjiu, No. 2, 1997, pp. 29-32.
For more detail, see: K.L. Syroezhkin, “Kitay i Tsentral’naia Azia: politicheskie otnoshenia i torgovo-ekonom-icheskoe partnerstvo,” Kazakhstan-Spektr, No. 1-2, 1997, pp. 61-67.
In June 1997, the Chinese National Petroleum Company won a tender under which it acquired 60 percent of shares of Aktiubinskneft Joint Stock Company. This brought China into the oil-and-gas sector of Kazakhstan and the “project of the century”—an oil pipeline from Western Kazakhstan to Western China.
The main border agreement with Russia was signed in November 1997; and the additional agreement in Octo-ber 2004. The border agreement with Kazakhstan was signed in April 1994, and the additional agreement in September 1997. The dates for Kyrgyzstan are July 1996 and August 1999, respectively; for Tajikistan, they are February 1999 and May 2002.
See: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 6 July, 1996.
For more detail, see: K.L. Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaia i bezopasnost v Tsentral’noy Azii.
For more detail, see: K. Syroezhkin, “Central Asia between the Gravitational Poles of Russia and China,” Central Asia: the Gathering Storm, ed. by Boris Rumer, M.E. Scharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 2002, pp. 109-207.
See: “Dushanbe Declaration of Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Tajikistan,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 13 July, 2000.
ITAR-TASS, 5 July, 2000.
Panorama, No. 23, 15 June, 2001.
V.V. Mikheev, “Obshchie problemy realizatsii interesov Rossii v ShOS. Predlozhenia po povysheniu effektivnosti ee raboty,” Problemy stanovlenia Shanghaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva i vzaimodeystvia Rossii i Kitaia v Tsentral’noi Azii, Institute of the Far East, RAS, Moscow, 2005, p. 28.
According to Ge Dide, an expert at the National Defense University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,
Beijing is very concerned with the appearance of American armed detachments at China’s western borders for the first time in its history… Their presence will ease NATO’s expansion to the East and tie together the American military contingents in Europe and the APR.” Ge Dide is convinced that the United States will have enough troops at the mil-itary bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia to ensure operational control over certain zones and objects in China (quot-ed from: A.F. Klimenko, “Znachenie Tsentral’no-Aziatskogo regiona. Razvitie strategicheskogo partnerstva mezhdu Rossiey i Kitaem v ramkakh ShOS i nekotorye napravlenia sovershenstvovania etoy organizatsii,” Problemy stanovle-nia Shanghaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva i vzaimodeystvia Rossii i Kitaia v Tsentral’noy Azii, pp. 65-66).
According to Xing Guangcheng, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The PRC is not interested in the prolonged American presence in Central Asia close to its borders and does not support it. This threatens China’s interests” (Xing Guangcheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight against Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism,” Central Asian and the Caucasus, No. 4 (16), 2002,p. 19).
According to one of the leading American experts in central Asia Eugene Rumer, “A regional power broker prior to 11 September, China now finds itself marginalized, displaced, and virtually alone, pondering the unenviable (for Beijing)option of playing second fiddle to the United States and a host of its newfound best friends. No matter how much China gains from the U.S. military campaign—and there can be little doubt that it has been a beneficiary of the campaign against the Taliban and the ensuing blow to operations of its own Uighur militants—U.S. preponderance in Central Asia must be a serious setback to the government that aspires to the role of the Asian superpower” (E. Rumer, “Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after 11 September,” Strategic Forum (Washington, DC), No. 195, December 2002, p. 3).
According to Zhao Huasheng, Director of the Department of Russian and Central Asian Studies at SIIS,
“It is true that the geopolitical changes in Central Asia in the wake of 9/11 came as a surprise to China. Notwithstand-ing, its impact on China and China’s self-assessment of its situation are not as strong and pessimistic as perceived by some foreign analysts” (Zh. Huasheng, “China, Russia, and U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (29), 2004, pp. 121-122).
The war on Iraq demonstrated that there was no unity in the SCO: Russia was dead set against the war, while China was more cautious in its rejection of it. Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan announced that they were neutral “within the framework of international law.” Uzbekistan whole-heartedly supported America.
Uzbekistan took part in two out of six meetings of SCO representatives held in April-May in preparation for the St. Petersburg summit. The two sittings it attended dealt with economic cooperation and the draft SCO Charter; the four other sittings discussed regional security issues, which Uzbekistan ignored.
Beijing proceeded from the dynamics of its economic and military potential. Whereas in 1990, there was parity between the Chinese and Soviet GDP volumes, in 2000, the Chinese GDP was five times larger than Russia’s. Military experts have calculated that by 2010-2015 Beijing will achieve nuclear parity with Moscow (see: S. Strokan, “Shanghaiskaia gramota: nachalo novogo etapa v istorii Tsentral’noy Azii,” Kommersant-Vlast, 26 June, 2001).
China was prepared “to extend all possible assistance to Kyrgyzstan in case of more aggression by fighters.” It was with Chinese assistance that not only Uzbekistan, but also other Central Asian countries hoped to increase the number of countries involved in securing their safety and achieving at least minimal economic prosperity.
See: “Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie ministrov inostrannykh del stran-chlenov ShOS,” Renmin ribao, 16 January, 2002.
RIA “Novosti,” 7 January, 2002.
In the majority of cases Uzbekistan invariably took a special position. For example, President Karimov called on the SCO not to hurry with the planned SCO antiterrorist structure based in Bishkek (the headquarters) and Beijing (the Secretariat). In St. Petersburg he addressed his colleagues, particularly Jiang Zemin, with the following words: “The SCO stands a good chance of developing into a serious factor of world politics if it soberly assesses the post-9/11 world. The world is changing together with the balance of forces. Pragmatism of Russia and the United States and the leaders who signed the Russia-NATO documents spoke of a sober approach and understanding of the new situation. We should take this into ac-count.” Translated into ordinary language, this meant that the member states were advised to coordinate their actions with the United States. The puzzled journalists wanted to know: “Have the presidents noticed that the U.S. was virtually present at the summit?” Vremia novostey, 10 June, 2002.
See: Zhao Huasheng, “ShOS i sootnoshenie velikikh derzhav na fone novoy situatsii v regione TsA,” Analitic,No. 1, 2003, p. 5.
Li Lifan, Ding Shiwu, “Geopolitical Interests of Russia, the U.S. and China in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (27), 2004, p. 140.
See: Ibid., p. 142.
Chinese experts suggest three possible options: 1. Continued balance of interests and status quo, if the United States “restrains its egotism,” takes account of the U.N.’s role and decisions and of other international instruments, and discusses with Moscow its most important decisions on global issues and seeks Beijing’s opinion. 2. Confrontation of the powers and clashes among them, if “Russia is aware of the limits of its retreat in the face of the growing threat to its Central Asian in-terests emanating from the United States.” 3. The powers will refuse to maintain the balance of forces in the region, con-sequently there will be chaos, if “Russia, after weighing up all the ‘pros’ and ‘cons,’ abandons its claims to regional lead-ership” (Li Lifan, Ding Shiwu, op. cit., pp. 144-145).
Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia, and U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,” Cen-tral Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (30), 2004, p. 92. He offered the following options: “(1) The United States becomes an observer or interlocutor in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; (2) China becomes an observer or interlocutor in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and takes part in its actions together with Russia; or (3) all three powers find some common ground in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program”
ibid., p. 94).
See: V. Mikheev, “Kitai i ShOS: problemy vzaimodeystvia ‘velikikh derzhav’ i perspektivy organizatsii,” ShOS:
tanovlenie i perspektivy razvitia, KISI, Almaty, 2005, pp. 31-44.
Li Lifan, Ding Shiwu, op. cit., p. 144.
Ibid., pp. 141-142, 144. Zhao Huasheng was even more specific when pointing to China’s role in Central Asia;he wrote: “Securing Central Asia as China’s stable strategic rear area depends on three conditions. First, on resolving the disputed border issues between China and Central Asia and maintaining peace and security in the border areas. Both tasks have been entirely fulfilled, save a few remaining negotiations over uninhabited and inconsequential border areas. Second,on the Central Asian nations adopting a good-will foreign policy toward China and China maintaining fairly good bilater-al relations with the Central Asian nations. Third, on Central Asia not falling under the control of any major power or group of major powers, especially those that have complicated geopolitical and strategic relations with China. It can be inferred that, as another basic principle and target of China’s Central Asian policy, China must maintain amicable relations with the Central Asian nations and prevent these nations from being controlled by any major power or group of major powers” (Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia, and U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (29), 2004, p. 119).
The program contained 127 projects in 11 economic branches; development of transport infrastructure, energy,ecology, and drinking water were the top priority spheres.
See: V. Mikheev, “Kitai and ShOS: problemy vzaimodeystvia ‘velikikh derzhav’ i perspektivy organizatsii,”p. 32.
According to Prof. Zhu Zhenghong of Xinjiang University, “America’s military presence and political influence in Central Asia added, to a certain extent, to the sociopolitical contradictions in the region’s countries and created poten-tially destabilizing factors for their leaders” (see: Zhu Zhenghong, “Regional Security in Central Asia and Russia after 9/
,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 1, 2005).
This perfectly fitted the PRC foreign policy doctrine, which the new generation of leaders changed a lot. The new strategy presupposed abandoning the passive wait-and-see policy designed to create a favorable external context for domestic reforms and shifting to an active policy. China wanted a more active role in global developments. There was a shift from the policy of predominantly bilateral ties to multilateral diplomacy, active and even aggressive protection of Chinese interests,Chinese businesses, and Chinese citizens abroad (see: V. Mikheev, “Vneshniaia politika Kitaia pri novom rukovodstve,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 12, 2005, p. 4).
See: Ch.E. Zigler, “Strategia SShA v Tsentral’noy Azii i Shanghaiskaia organizatia sotrudnichestva,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 4, 2005, p. 21; G. Bates, China’s Security Interests and Activities with Central Asian States. Paper presented to the National Defense University Conference on Meeting U.S. Security Objectives in a Changing Asia. 22-23 April, 2004, available at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2004].
See: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Counterterrorism Coop-eration. 24 May, 2002, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/24].
See: “The Axis of Nay Sayers,” The Wall Street Journal, 7 July, 2005; Ch. Brown, “Signals from Uzbekistan,”The Washington Times, 15 August, 2005; “Russia, China Looking to Form ‘NATO of the East’?” Christian Science Mon-itor, 26 October, 2005; “China’s Question,” Project Syndicate, 20 December, 2005.
See: G. Kunadze, “Shanghaiskaia organizatsia sotrudnichestva—mistifikatsia ili real’nost?” in: ShOS: stanovle-nie i perspektivy razvitia, p. 139.
Here is one of the methods for choosing priorities: “Development of the CSTO will inevitably strengthen Russia’s position both inside the structure and in the region. The Central Asian republics find the SCO more attractive because two powers seeking domination in the region—Russia and China—are involved in it. The SCO has no (openly demonstrated)anti-Western (anti-American) designs. The SCO is trying to exceed the limits of a military organization by expanding the cooperation fields with the member states” (E. Karin, “ShOS i ee znachenie dlia Tsentral’noy Azii,” ASSANDI-TIMES,25 June, 2004).
See: A. Catranis, “NATO’s Role in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (35), 2005, pp. 37-44.
In October 2005, at a meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government in Moscow, Beijing revealed, for the first time at the high level, its geopolitical ambitions and claimed the role of the Central Asian leader by placing on the negotiation table a weighty argument in the form of $900 million export credits for the SCO members with 2 percent in-terest and repayment period of 20 years. At the same sitting, Chairman of the PRC State Council Wen Jiabao outlined the economic priorities, which when realized would create conditions for a China-initiated free trade zone in the SCO expanse.
e also pointed out that his country planned to increase the sum in the near future (see: Xinhua, 26 October, 2005). In or-dinary language, this means that the head of the Chinese Cabinet was prepared to fund the SCO economy. It challenged Russia, which regards the region as its foreign policy priority, not the West.
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