CENTRAL ASIA AND CHINA: NEW HORIZONS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIONALIZATION
Abstract
Central Asia is currently a hot item on the global agenda. It is not every decade that the world finds itself embracing a new region with the alluring appeal of mass hydrocarbon production and export, large investments, and promising cooperation in the military sphere. What is more, other phenomena adding to Central Asia’s renown are intensifying the glow of the geopolitical theme.
hey include the local governments’ opposition to the extremist movements, the West’s accusations of authoritarianism and violations of democratic rights and freedoms, the Islamic renaissance, the Color Revolutions, and so on. In addition, it is obvious that the West is keeping a sharp eye on the region’s republics, which is shown by its immediate reaction to the events going on in Central Asia, whereby this attention continues to increase all the time.1 Emissaries not only from Western, but also from many other large countries are actively working in the region. There must obviously be extremely good reasons why even the most distant centers of power are showing such an intense interest in Central Asia. And the answers lie deeper than they appear to at first glance.
The domestic sociopolitical evolution of the Central Asian states is of little interest to most for-eign observers. As paradoxical as it may seem, the problem of drug trafficking, which is pertinent to the Central Asian Region (CAR) and urgent for the whole world, is being studied even less. In this case, the priority topics for political analysis—apart from big business issues (read: the production of natural resources)—are the Big Game being waged among the leading present-day nations over the region, Russia’s strategy in Central Asia, and the spread of China’s influence there, which are all closely associated with CAR. In short, we are talking about geopolitical rivalry in the region. It is clear to many that oil and gas cannot be the only reason for this excitement. For as long as hydrocarbons are being produced and are in demand, they will always reach their consumer, whereby these resources will be transported via profitable, and not politically advantageous, routes—this is a law of economics, the violation of which is fraught with serious consequences, primarily for the exporter state. It stands to reason that it is not Kazakhstan that needs new pipelines, but other states that need guaran-teed oil deliveries.
The Central Asian Region was and largely remains dependent on Russia—essentially 100% of the strategic hydrocarbon resources produced here are transported through the Russian Federation.
Only Kazakhstan, which is also linked to Moscow by a pipeline system, retains relative independence over its energy policy. It is likely that the development of the southern and trans-Caspian vectors of energy resource deliveries from Central Asia may indeed prove more profitable compared with the existing ones. However, this will not happen in the foreseeable future while chaos reigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan is being shaken from the inside, and the Caucasus is under permanent threat due to the absence of a normal dialog between Iran and the West. What is more, the current level of scientific developments will not permit putting the Caspian ecosystem at risk. Even if they are implemented soon, the numerous new transportation projects—those already carried out and only just being developed (West Kazakhstan-China, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Turkmenistan-China, Uzbekistan-China, Nabuc-co)—will nevertheless be incapable of radically changing the situation in the midterm with respect to energy deliveries from the region. In all likelihood, the insistent attempts to diversify energy export from Central Asia are simply aimed at undermining Russia’s domination in the region.2 Possible annual deliveries of energy resources in amounts of up to several tens of thousands of tons or millions of cubic meters bypassing the Russian Federation may be detrimental not so much to Russia’s economic, as to its strategic interests. On the whole, the questions relating to the production and transportation of energy resources are only partially raising the veil to reveal what is hidden behind the geopolitical game in Central Asia, what its rules are, and what prize the winner will receive. In our opinion, raising of the problem of international regionalization could provide a more in-depth explanation of the current situation in Central Asia.
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There is the opinion that in recent years “the West has been losing interest in Central Asia” with respect to the prob-lems arising in other parts of the world and, in particular, in Iraq. Well-known American specialist on the region M.B. Ol-cott reinforces such a claim in his recent book by the argument that democratic reforms in the CAR countries are not be-ing carried out as quickly as the West expected (see: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Vol. 18, Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace, Washington, 2005, p. 3). Moreover, it can be considered that this thesis has at least lost its urgency in the time following publication of the mentioned book. This is proven by the activation of the Central Asian vector in American policy presented in the following work: M. Laumulin, “Pod krylom khromoi utki. SShA v TsentrAzii,” Kon-tinent, No. 10 (171), 24 May-6 June, 2006 or at [http://centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st=1148877300].
Publications very clearly show the policy of the U.S. and the West in this sphere with respect to CAR (see, for example, documents at [www.Eurasia.org]: A. Cohen, “Security, Energy and Democracy: U.S. Interests in Central Asia,”Eurasia Insight, 12 June, 2006; R. Hanks, G. Gleason, “Regional Electrical Integration: Panacea for Central Asia’s Economic Woes?” Eurasianet.org, 12 July, 2006).
This approach is shared by several experts. “Some geo-economic circles have recently been voicing the thought that Central Asia is becoming part of the new economic and geopolitical order forming in Eurasia. This process is characterized by the enlargement of markets in the direction of the Southeast Asian states, China, India, Turkey, and Russia. The proc-ess is developing against the background of a slowdown (even stagnation) of economic progress in Europe, toward which many CIS countries headed by Russia previously oriented themselves. Consolidation of the “Asian” paradigm and strength-ening of Eurasian economic independence (in the event of implementing integration projects in the RF and CA) could have far-reaching strategic consequences” (M. Laumulin, “ShOS—‘grandioznyy geopoliticheskiy blef’? Vzgliad iz Kazakhstana,”Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 12, July 2006, available at [www.ifri.org]).
Moreover, American specialists are trying to tie Central Asia to Afghanistan, urging for “the region’s map to be changed.” Apparently, according to their estimates, this could promote its re-orientation from the Russian-Chinese vector to the Western. On the conception of Greater Central Asia, see: S. Frederick Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” For-eign Affairs, July/August 2005, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84412/s-frederick-starr/a-part-nership-for-central-asia.html].
From the Statement of Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, on 26 April,2006 before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia [www.
sinfo.state.gov].
Central Asia is a natural country in Asia, consisting of deserted and populated plains, foothills, and mountains.
ound in the East by the southern part of Greater Hingang and the Taihanshan mountain range, in the South by the exten-sive tectonic depression of the upper Ind and Brahmaputra (Cangpo). In the West and North, the border of Central Asia cor-responds to the mountain ranges of Eastern Kazakhstan, Altai, Western and Eastern Sayan, approximately coinciding with the state border between the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and China and Mongolia, on the other. According to different esti-mates, the area of Central Asia is between 5 to 6 million sq. km. On its territory are large parts of China and Mongolia. The population of Central Asia consists of Mongolian nationalities (halkha, and so on), Chinese, Uighurs, Tibetans, and others (see: “Central Asia,” in: Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1975).
Incidentally, not only external, but also strictly subjective factors are preventing this, which are embedded in the policy of the region’s republics with respect to each other. The Central Asian countries are distancing themselves as much as possible from their “neighbors” in their foreign political activity, trying to prove their own self-sufficiency, while clos-er cooperation with regional “neighbors” and coordinating their foreign policy with them would noticeably consolidate their positions and would have a positive effect on interrelations with various power centers. Paradoxically, international organ-izations in which the Central Asian countries participate are manifesting viability, providing that either Russia or China is one of their members.
From the statement of Richard Boucher, 26 April, 2006…
From an interview by K.L. Syroezhkin “Dlya Kitaia ShOS—instrument, pozvoliaiushchiy ‘sidet na dvukh stulia-kh’” of 14 March, 2007. Radio interview at [www.inkar.info].
Bhadrakumar M.K. “Foul Play in the Great Game,” Asia Times, 12 July, 2005.
Stephen Blank, a professor at the U.S. Army War college, is quoted from L. Goldstein, “China in the New Cen-tral Asia: The Fen (RMB) is Mightier than the Sword,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, Winter 2005, p. 13.
See: Ibid., op. cit., pp. 13-34.
As well-known Russian Sinologist Vil Gelbras noted, “the Chinese question is that of Russia’s further existence.
or the first time in history, Russia has become a small country in all respects compared with China. So Russia still has to fully recognize the new situation and reconcile itself to it, which is tantamount to a giant national and socio-psychological upheaval” (V. Gelbras, “Kitaiskiy faktor vnutrennei i vneshnei politiki Rossii,” available at [http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/
ooks/volume/48315.htm]).
See: M.B. Olcott, “Russian-Chinese Relations and Central Asia,” in: Rapprochement or Rivalry: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia, ed. by Sherman Garnett, Carnegie Institute for International Peace, Washington, 2000, p. 391.
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