RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA: RETURN
Abstract
In the 1990s Russia’s position in Central Asia became significantly eroded, not so much for economic reasons, as some Russian politicians allege, but because of its grossly misinterpreted national interests.
It has become customary to associate the radical revision of Russia’s Central Asian policy with Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This is very true, but the events of 2000 were no more than the first steps toward fundamental changes.
In 2005, the sovereign democracy conception marked a turning point in Russia’s foreign policy: the country finally placed its sovereignty above its foreign policy constants and began to slowly retreat from its previous devotion to the Western liberal-democratic principles.
Sovereignty, understood as a synonym for the country’s political competitiveness, made great changes in Russia’s approach to the CIS: it sided with Uzbekistan in its post-Andijan conflict with the West and began pouring much more energy into the SCO and several other projects. The situation that had taken shape by 2004-2005 in the Western vector of Russia’s foreign policy and on its southern borders pushed the RF into Asian geopolitics. The U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan allowed Russia to interfere more openly than before in the Central Asian political processes, which forced China to act accordingly. The Russian Federation could no longer ignore the new realities—the balance of power in the region of Russia’s vital interests was on the verge of being upset.
In view of the changed style of Russia’s relations with the key international partners and the very real threats it encountered as soon as it began restoring its international status forced the Russian leaders to readjust the approach and very ideology of Russia’s foreign policy. It must stop being reflective: the country badly needs a well-substantiated and maximally long-term foreign policy strategy. This should be done not so much to restore the international balance or create a multi-polar world order: this is a new approach to the old problem of secure borders achieved either by their extension or by at least enlarging the “security zone” around Russia
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References
See: J. Rosenau, “Pre-Theory Revised: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence,” International Stud-ies Quarterly, No. 1, 1984, pp. 3-29.
See: T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 2002, p. 6.
See: F. Vielmini, “Rol’ Rossii v opredelenii evropeysko-tsentral’noaziatskikh otnosheniy,” in: Proekty sotrudnichest-va i integratsii dlia Tsentral’noy Azii: sravnitelnyi analiz, vozmozhnosti i perspektivy, ed. by A.A. Kniazev, Bishkek, 2007,pp. 75-85.
This is best illustrated by the OSCE, which is perceived in the region as an American tool used for carrying out its geopolitical designs; democratization is another such tool (see: P. Dunay, “The OSCE in Crisis,” Chaillot Paper, No. 88,April 2006). The Europeans approach the Central Asian security issue in a fairly technical way that lacks systemic treatment,while the issue as a long-term phenomenon calls for systemic and integral approaches. Today the European approaches are rejected with a great deal of frustration; more and more often the word “Bolshevist” is applied to the European treatment of the human rights issue, while the term “democracy” has become sort of a swear word—the best illustration of the high level of alienation (see: F. Vielmini, op. cit.). The same author offers a more detailed analysis in his Continuità post-sovi-etica, autoritarismo politico e diritti umani in Asia Centrale, ISPI, Milan, 2007.
“Interview with A. Rahr. Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Another New Year’s Gas War,” Russia Profile, 12 January, 2007.
See: V.S. Boyko, “Bol’shaia Tsentral’naia Azia i Rossia: osobennosti istoriko-tsivilizatsionnogo, geopoliticheskogo i ekonomicheskogo vzaimodeystvia,” in: Proekty sotrudnichestva i integratsii dlia Tsentral’noy Azii: sravnitel’nyi analiz,vozmozhnosti i perspektivy, pp. 50-57.
[http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082007a.shtml].
Afganskie uroki: Vyvody dlia budushchego v svete ideynogo nasledia A.E. Snesareva, Compiled by A.E. Savinkin,Voenny universitet, Russkiy put, Moscow, 2003, p. 102.
See: Regnum, 6 June, 2007.
See: V.V. Paramonov, A.V. Strokov, “Ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Rossii i Kitaia v Tsentral’noy Azii—kliuchevoy vopros dlia budushchego EvrAzES i ShOS,” in: Proekty sotrudnichestva i integratsii dlia Tsentral’noy Azii: sravnitel’nyi analiz, vozmozhnosti i perspektivy, pp. 153-160.
The average regional index of Russia’s investment activities is decreasing because of the foreign investments in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas complex: by the beginning of 2007, the volume of American investments reached $13.8 billion,or 30 percent of the total direct foreign investments in Kazakhstan. At the same time, Russian companies are responsi-ble for over half of foreign investments in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector; there are over 450 JVs in Uzbekistan with Russian capital. During President Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in May 2007, the two Central Asian pres-idents confirmed that cooperation with Russia in the oil and gas sphere was a priority. President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan was the most eloquent: “Kazakhstan is wholeheartedly devoted to the idea that, even if not all the oil and gas produced,at least its larger part should be moved across Russian territory.” It was also agreed to increase the load of the transit oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (connecting northwestern Kazakhstan and Russia) from the present 29 million to 40 million tons. There were certain shifts in attracting Russian investments and the resources of Gazprom to maintain and develop gas extraction in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The main event took place on 12 May when the heads of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed a declaration on building a Caspian gas pipeline with a capacity of 10 billion c m and on extending and modernizing the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. The document obligated the sides to present, before 1 September, feasibility studies, and intergovernmental and commercial agreements on a consortium. It is expected that by 2014 the gas transportation capacities will rise from the present 60 billion to 90 bil-lion c m (see: A. Sobianin, M. Shibutov, “Dozhdiomsia li rossisko-kazakhstanskoy global’noy ekspansii?” Respublika.
elovoe obozrenie, Almaty, 25 May, 2007).
A. Bogaturov, “Indo-sibirskiy koridor v strategii contrterrorizma,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 October, 2005, p. 14.
The former will cross the mountains or cross seas, while the second prove to be much shorter. For these reasons,the bypassing routes invariably turn out to be much more expensive. For example, the cost of the trans-Caspian gas pipe-line and the still missing sectors of the Nabucco line are estimated at $10 billion, while the Russian project for moderniz-ing and extending the Central Asian gas pipeline is estimated at $1 billion (see: A. Sobianin, M. Shibutov, op. cit.).
See: E. Abdullaev, “Uzbekistan between Traditionalism and Westernization,” in: Central Asia at the End of Tran-sition, ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, London, 2005, pp. 267-68.
See: F. Vielmini, op. cit.
See: V.S. Boyko, op. cit.
See: Ibidem.
Regnum, 25 July, 2007. According to the Shark Research Center, 94.7 percent of the total flow of labor migrants goes to Russia; 2.4 percent to Kazakhstan, and 2.9 percent each to Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. The real unemployment level in Tajikistan is 11.3 percent; urban unemployment is 13.2 percent; agricultural unemployment,10.9 percent; the share of unemployed among the young people is the largest—68.9 percent.
See: D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Aziatskiy soblazn Rossii,” Kosmopolis, No. 3, 2002/2003 [URL: http:/
risa.ru/cosmopolis/archives/2/shimmelpenninck.html].
See: V.S. Boyko, op. cit.
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