MANAGING DISSENT, LIMITING RISK AND CONSOLIDATING POWER: THE PROCESSES AND RESULTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN KAZAKHSTAN
Abstract
The transition in much of the former Soviet Union has not led to democracy but instead to varying degrees of authoritarianism and dictatorship.1 Yet some states driven by endogenous and exogenous factors are pursuing a proc-ess of constitutional reform for the purpose of democratizing political processes. In the cases of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, among other factors, the process has been driven by the emergence of a “counter elite” that has provided an effective challenge to the incumbent power. The constitutional reform process in both Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan has been characterized by elite conflict, civic pro-test and the paralysis of government in both the executive and legislative branches. In Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev believes his country is pursuing a unique model of constitutional and political reform that is defined by a moderate step-by-step process. Unlike the crises that have enveloped the process in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the Kazakh model places economic stability be-fore political reform and posits gradual democratization over radical change.2 Whereas in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan a counter elite emerged,Nazarbaev has been able to define the political rules of the game on his own terms by disabling the ability of competing elite and opposition groups to compete for power. However, the Kazakh specific model of political modernization does not exist in a vacuum as internal and external factors are driving the process. Externally, approval from the international community has been a driving factor; in particular, the bid for chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009 has added a sense of urgency to complete the process. Internally, the emergence of an economic counter elite, the nontransparent electoral process and conflicts between competing elite groups, were all factors contributing toward the initiation and continuation of the reform process.
On 16 May, 2007, the president announced to a joint session of parliament changes to the constitution that were to signal, in particular to the West, that Kazakhstan is finally moving to reform its authoritarian political system. In the West some analysts and political representatives responded positively to the amendments.3 The administration is arguing the reforms constitute a shift to a presidential-parliamentary system. In this context, the aim of this paper is to survey the process and results of constitutional reform in Kazakhstan. It seeks explore and address two questions: what were the factors influencing the process of reform? And what do the results of the process tell us about the nature of Kazakhstan’s political transition. In answering these questions the article will examine the three bodies4 created by the president that have been used as a conduit for developing a dialog between the authorities,political parties and wider civil society, thus ex-ploring the interconnection between the endog-enous and exogenous variables affecting the proc-ess. The article will also analyze the results of the process in the form of the constitutional amend-ments. In analyzing the activities and role of the three bodies designated as enablers of political reform, the factors driving the process, and the output of the process, this article will argue that the changes were formulated by the presidential administration as an attempt to balance the com-peting demands of internal and external pressures.
his is reflected in a need by the president to manage dissent within the country, while at the same time promoting Kazakhstan’s specific model of political modernization to the international community. However, the results of the process, which has seen the marginalization of opposition voices, suggest the president is limiting the possibility of any form of risk that challenges his position, while at the same time trying to present to the West the democratization of Kazakhstan.
therefore, the reforms amount not to a shift to-ward a presidential-parliamentary system, but instead a further consolidation of presidential power.
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References
See: M. Mcfaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-cooperative Transitions in the Post-Communist World,” World Politics, No. 54, 2004, pp. 212-244; Th. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,”Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, pp. 5-21.
See: “Prezident veren svoemu slovu,” Kazakhstan-skaia pravda, 17 May, 2007, available at [http://www.
azpravda.kz/?uin=1152520370&chapter=1179348899].
See: “US Ambassador Favors Constitutional Amend-ments, but not the Exception Made for Nazarbaev,” Inter-fax-Kazakhstan, 23 May, 2007; A. Cohen, “Kazakh Politi-cal Challenge,” 24 May, 2007, available at [http://
ww.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed052407a.cfm].
The Standing Council on Proposals for Further Democratization and Development of Civil Society (PDS),the National Commission for Democracy and Civil Society (NKVD) and the State Commission for Democratic Reform under the President are the three bodies which have slowly seen the systematic development of proposals for political modernization.
For further reading on the reasons for the emergence of DCK and the crisis that fractured the ruling elite, see:
. Junisbai, A. Junisbai, “The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Inter-elite Cleav-age, and Political Opposition,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, Issue 3, Summer 2005, pp. 373-392.
See: A. Chebotarev, “PDS kak forma kvazidialoga vlasti s obshchestvom,” 15 January, 2003, available at [http://
ww.materik.ru/index.php?section=analitics&bulid=38&bulsectionid=2801], 20 May, 2007.
During this period Ak Zhol was seen as more constructive with the government and the presidential administration.
See: A. Chebotarev, op. cit.
“Lidery ‘Ak zhola’ pozhinaiut gor’kie plody dvurushnichestva: tak s kem vy gospoda?,” Vremia, 26 December,2002, available at [http://freeas.org/?nid=446], 23 May, 2007.
See: “Bolee nechestnykh vyborov my nikogda ne videli!,” Respublika, 1 October, 2004, available at [http://
ww.kub.kz/article.php?sid=6992], 18 November, 2006.
See: Election Observation Mission Report, Republic of Kazakhstan Parliamentary Elections, 19 September and 3 October, OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, 15 December, 2004.
See: “Utverzhden sostav Natsional’noi komissi po voprosam demokratizatsii i grazhdanskogo obshchestva pri presidente,” available at [http://www.government.kz/ru/news.asp?IDspis=1676], 4 June, 2007.
“Demokratiia est’ ‘pravlenie cherez obsuzhdenie’,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 11 November, 2004.
Author’s interview with senior Nagiz Ak Zhol party worker, 8 June, 2007, Almaty.
Prominent figures included: Maksut Narikbaev, Chairman of the Kazakhstan Democratic Party Adilet (Justice), Gani Kaliev, Chairman of the Auyl Party (Village), Azat Peruashev, Chairman of the Civic Party, Dariga Nazarbaeva, Chairman of Asar Party (All Together) and deputy of the Majilis, and Berik Imashev, Assistant to the Secretary of the Security Council.
“V Astane otkrylos’ pervoe zasedanie Natsional’noi komissii po voprosam demokratizatsii i grazhdanskogo ob-shchestva pri prezidente RK,” 8 December, 2004, available at [http://www.zakon.kz/our/news/news.asp?id=31789], 20 May,2007.
“Boevoe kreshchenie NKVD,” Liter, 9 December, 2004.
See: A. Dzhaganova, “V plane demokratii my daleko ne samya otstalaya strana,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 23 June,2005.
Kazakhstan on the Road to Accelerated Economic, Social and Political Modernization, Presidential Annual Ad-dress, 18 February, 2005, available at [http://www.akorda.kz/page.php?page_id=156&lang=2&article_id=80], 25 April,2007.
Kazakhstan on the Road to Accelerated Economic, Social and Political Modernization, Presidential Annual Address,18 February, 2005, available at [http://www.akorda.kz/page.php?page_id=156&lang=2&article_id=80], 25 April, 2007.
A split occurred in the leadership of Ak Zhol after the parliamentary elections which led to three of the cochair-man, Bolat Abilov, Oraz Zhandosov, and Altynbek Sarsenbaev forming Nagiz Ak Zhol. Alikhan Baimenov was left with a rump Ak Zhol Party that was considered to be on more constructive terms with the authorities while Nagiz Ak Zhol was considered far more oppositionist to the president and government.
Author’s interview with senior National Social-Democratic Party figure, 13 November, 2006, Almaty.
See: Y. Dosmukhamedov, Atameken: Building Democracy in Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006, p. 26.
Interview with senior Nagyz Ak Zhol party worker, 8 June, 2007, Almaty.
The conditions were “the national commission to be turned into a state commission, the head of state to chair the
commission and for Kazakhstan to meet the requirements for OSCE chairmanship in 2009.” Author’s interview with sen-ior member of Ak Zhol, 18 January, 2007, Almaty.
Author’s interview with Senior Ak Zhol figure, 18 January, 2007, Almaty.
In all the interviews with party elites where the issue of state funding of political parties was discussed all were in favor.
See: A. Birtanov, “Maslikhaty: novaya rol’ v obshchestve. K predstoiashchei reforme politicheskoi sistemy stra-ny,” Liter, 9 June, 2006, available at [http://www.liter.kz/site.php?lan=russian&id=151&pub=3862], 7 May, 2007.
Author’s interview with Altynshash Dzhaganova, Leader of the Rukhaniiat, 7 March, 2007, Astana.
Ibidem.
Author’s interview with Alikhan Baimenov, 6 March, 2007, Astana.
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 20 February, 2007, p. 1.
Author’s interview with Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, 30 January, 2007, Almaty.
Author’s interview with Serikbolsyn Abdil’din, 30 January, 2007, Almaty.
Ibidem.
Author’s Interview with Sergei Duvanov, 28 November, 2006, Almaty.
This is the claim of lawyers, working on behalf of Nagiz Ak Zhol, who published a comparison of the new amend-ments against the old constitution (see: “Politiko-pravovoi analiz izmenenii i dopolnenii v konstitutsiiu RK ot maya 2007 goda, podgotovlennyi partiei ‘Nagyz Ak Zhol’,” available at [http://www.akzhol-party.info/activity/legislation/2007/05/21/
egislation_1406.html], 23 June, 2007).
See: Final Report of the 18 August, 2007 Parliamentary Election in Kazakhstan, OSCE/ODIHR, 30 October, 2007,p. 1.
The OSCE report suggests that during the 2004 election access to the media, and the tone of the coverage of po-litical parties was highly skewed in favor of propresidential parties such as Nur Otan, Asar, and the Civic Party. Further info can be found in the report itself.
See: A. Cohen, op. cit.
“Prezident veren svoemu slovu.”
See: “Politiko-pravovoi analiz izmenenii i dopolnenii v konstitutsiiu RK ot maya 2007 goda, podgotovlennyi partiei ‘Nagyz Ak Zhol’.”
See: S. Duvanov, “‘Est’ situatsii kogda grazhdanskii dolg stanovitsia grazhdanskoi obiazannost’u,” available at [http://www.kub.kz/article.php?sid=17591], 24 May, 2007.
“Prezident veren svoemu slovu.”
This was certainly the opinion of many opposition figures that I interviewed.
Imperative mandate is based on the idea of direct democracy in that elected representatives have the freedom to carry out the will of those who elected them rather than follow any party line.
Until now the President had been the unofficial leader of Nur Otan, with Bakytzhan Zhumagulov in place as Act-ing Chairman.
See: “Akim Almaty sdelal svoi politicheskii vybor,” 26 June, 2007, available at [http://zonakz.net/articles/18273].
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