ISLAM AND THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL OF THE MUSLIM STATES
Abstract
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the political processes in the Islamic world showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that religion is still a viable part of public life in the Muslim countries. moreover, certain states, such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, have restored religion to its rightful place in their policy. The comment by American political scientist John Esposito to the effect that Islamic ideology, symbols, slogans, and actors became prominent fixtures in Muslim politics suits these countries well.1
The stable influence of Islam on sociopolitical life is largely explained by the particular features of Muslim teaching. Islam is usually considered a system that regulates many aspects of people’s lives.
n this interpretation, Islam is not only a religious system, but also offers a model for organizing so-ciety. Moreover, some Muslim scientists believe that sociopolitical activity is a religious duty in Is-lam, and that it is a religious obligation for a Muslim to remain aware of the political realities around him.2 The “ideological meaning” of Islam, in the opinion of Shaukat Ali, a representative of Islamic thought, is also increased by the fact that every Muslim is under religious obligation to understand and respect the past.3 The “past” implies the “unique period” of the life of the Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs.4 In this way, the “ideal past” serves as a model for a perfect human society, to which believers should strive.
As Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949),5 an Egyptian ideologist of Islamism, claimed that the conflict characteristic of Europe between spiritual and secular principles, between religion and the state, has no place in Islam …The Christian idea of “give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s”is missing here, since everything belongs to Almighty Allah.6 From this point of view, Islam is not only a religion, but also a “way of life,” it contains the solution to social, political, and other secular issues.7
According to Muslim fundamentalists, reform in Islam does not mean modification or changes in the way of thinking and practice established by the Prophet and his companions, rather “purifying Islam” of “alien” elements which supposedly deprive it of its original clarity, simplicity, and power.
Such ideologists as Hasan al-Banna and Pakistani fundamentalist Abu al-A’la al-Maududi (1903-1979)8 upheld “theocracy” as an ideal form of statehood. But the representatives of reformative thought in Islam categorically rejected theocracy as a phenomenon incompatible with faith and not espousing the institution of clergy. As Muhammad Abdo (1834-1905)9 emphasized, Islam placed man face to face with God and taught him to manage without any intercession.10 More radical reformers were consistent “secularists.” Ali Abd ar-Razik (1888-1966), who was under the great influence of Muhammad Abdo, “went much further than his ideological mentor, emphasizing the need to separate religion from the state. He referred to the fact that Muhammad was only a prophet and his preaching was not political in nature.”11 According to the provisions of Ali Abd arRazik, the Prophet did not leave an example of an Islamic state.12 Therefore, according to him, Muslims should rid themselves of the belief that they need a caliphate and use their own minds (aql) to look for solutions to social and political problems.
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References
See: J.L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, Third Edition, Syracuse University Press, 1984, p. 153.
See: Sh. Ali, Islam and Politics, Southeastern Massachussets University, Aziz Publishers, USA; Urdu Bazaar, La-hore, July 1990, p. 2.
See: Ibid., p. 3.
The righteous caliphs (Arab. al-hulafa’ar-rashidun) (632-661) are Abu Baqr, Umar, Usman, and Ali who, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, headed the Muslim community for 30 years and, during the Prophet’s life, took part in the community’s activity. They were also related to the Prophet by bonds of blood kinship or marriage. In later centuries,the rule of the righteous caliphs was called the Golden Era of Islam, when “original Muslim virtues flourished” and the caliphs themselves were given the title of “ar-rashidun”—“taking the righteous path.”
Founder and main ideologue who developed the doctrine of the Society of the Muslim Brothers.
See: R.P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, London, 1969, p. 244; M.T. Stepaniants, Musulmanskie kontseptsii v filosofii i politike (XIX—XX vv.), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 110.
This is where the Muslim Brothers’ slogan “Islam is the solution” comes from.
Founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami Society, one of the main ideologists of radical Islam.
One of the Islamic reformers, a mufti, the first to issue a fatwa on the legitimacy of bank interest.
See: O. Amin, Moslem Philosophy, Cairo, 1958, p. 138.
M.T. Stepaniants, op. cit., p. 112.
For more detail, see: J. Delaneau, “Nekotorye aspekty vozrozhdeniia islama v Rossii. Musulmanskiy reformism v
araboiazychnykh stranakh (1800-1940),” Transl. from the French, in: Islam v tatarskom mire: istoriia i sovremennost.
okumenty mezhdunarodnogo simposiuma, Kazan, 29 April-1 May, 1996 (special issue), No. 12, Moscow, 1997.
See: D. Rustow, A World of Nations. Problems of Political Modernization, The Brookings Institution, Washing-ton, DC, 1967; idem, “Language, Modernization and Nationhood—An Attempt at Typology,” in: Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. by Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1968, pp. 87-105; S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, London, 1968.
See: A. Ignatenko, “Islamic Radicalism: A Cold War By-Product,” Central Asian and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7),2001.
In particular, the theologians of Al-Azhar issued fatwa, and the religious figures of the HCIA published articles proving the compatibility of Islam and Arab socialism.
The war was waged in the holy month of Ramadan. Whereas Nasser had employed the secular motto “Earth, Sea,and Sky” in the 1967 war, Sadat used “Allahu Akbar!” …”Allahu Akbar!” was on the lips of Egyptian troops as they stormed across the Suez Canal (see: J. Esposito, op. cit., p. 213).
See: M.Sh. Umerov, Formirovanie politicheskoi modeli Arabskoi Respubliki Egipet (posledniaia chetvert XX v.),Abstract of a Ph.D. (Political Science) Thesis, Moscow, 2001, p. 17.
The payment balance deficit rose from 68 million dollars in 1970 to 1,360 million in 1975; the budget defi-cit reached 2,840 million dollars in 1979 (see: A.V. Borisov, Arabskiy mir: proshloe i nastoiashchee, Moscow, 2002,pp. 145-147).
See: Ibid., p. 147.
In the 1990s, Egypt’s economic development became sustainable. The growth in GDP increased from 1.9% in 1990 to 5.7% in 1998, overtaking the growth in population (1.6% a year), and agricultural production growth rates reached 3.2%.
A state of emergency was introduced in Egypt in October 1981, after the murder of President Sadat. Before the presidential election in September 2005, Hosni Mubarak promised the voters he would abolish the Law on a State of Emer-gency, which made it possible to use tribunals to fight radical political opponents, primarily religious-political, and permitted the activity of parties and press publications to be halted. But in 2006, after the terrorist acts in Dakhab, the Egyptian par-liament extended the state of emergency in the country by an overwhelming majority of votes to two years on Hosni Mu-barak’s initiative.
See: M. El-Nahhas, “Awaiting Judgment,” Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), No. 839, 5-11 April, 2007.
See: G. Essam el-Din, “Changing Gears,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 827, 11-17 January, 2007; idem, “Winner Takes All,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 837, 22-28 March, 2007.
In 15 years, the GDP increased 13-fold and per capita income rose 8-fold, reaching 1,600 dollars; at the end of the 1970s, Iran was ahead of Greece and a little behind Portugal and Spain in terms of the socioeconomic structure of society;the capitalist mind-set was both system-forming and predominant (see: Iranskaia revoliutsiia 1978-1979. Prichiny i uroki,Moscow, 1989, pp. 15-23).
J. Esposito gives a term coined by one secular intellectual, “Westoxification or Weststruckness,” that is, indiscrim-inate borrowing from and dependence upon the West” (J.L.Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, Expanded Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 176).
Supervision of a theologian-lawyer who substitutes or represents an “absent” Shi‘ite imam.
F. Halliday, “The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the Challenge to the Secular State,” in:
slam, Globalization and Postmodernity, ed. by A.S. Ahmed, H. Donnan, London, New York, 1994, p. 99.
The Assembly of Experts is an assembly of 96 of the elders of the Shi‘ite clergy chosen every 8 years by direct universal voting (the last election was held in 2006). Its three main functions consist in appointing to a life term, control over the activity, and, if necessary, dismissing the “first person” of the Iranian state—the Supreme Leader (Rahbar).
See: V.P. Tsukanov, “O realizatsii finansovoi polititki Irana v usloviakh neftianykh shokov,” in: Iran: islam i vlast,Moscow, 2001, pp. 83-84.
See: M. Khatami, Islam, dialog i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo, Moscow, 2001, Ch. 2, 3, 9, 10.
S.B. Druzhilovskiy, “O teorii i praktike islamskogo pravleniia v stranakh Srednego Vostoka (Iran, Afganistan,Turtsiia),” in: Islam i politika, Moscow, 2001, p. 63.
See: A.A. Volovich, “Novye otnosheniia Turtsii s arabami: ostanetsia li mesto dlia Izrailia?” in: Turtsiia v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviiakh, Round table documents, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS; Institute of Israel and Middle Eastern Studies, Moscow, 2004, p. 52.
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