CHINESE MIGRATION TO KAZAKHSTAN: CAUSES, KEY TRENDS, AND PROSPECTS

Authors

  • Elena SADOVSKAYA Ph.D. (Philos.), President of the Center for Conflict Management,Expert of the Research Council on CIS States Migration Studies under the Center for Migration Studies of the IEF of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Almaty, Kazakhstan) Author

Abstract

The “Chinese miracle” phenomenon has many dimensions (dynamic economic growth, trade expansion, and huge demo-graphic potential) that have already attracted the attention of politicians and academics from many countries. Central Asia, and Kazakhstan as part of the region that borders on the People’s Republic of China in the east, has even more important reasons to scrutinize its trade and economic relations with China, related regional and national security issues, as well as the demographic pressure its neighbor is exerting on it.  Today the Republic of Kazakhstan has been paying much more attention to its economic relations which China, which are being carefully studied and analyzed. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about the demographic and migration proc-esses underway between the two countries. How is Kazakhstan affected by the “demographic giant” it has for a neighbor? Is this intensifying migration to and from Kazakhstan? What are the prospects for Chinese migration to the republic? These questions should be carefully analyzed to create an information and analytical basis on which all sorts of policy, including migration policy, can stand.
 I have posed myself the task of analyzing the key causes of migration both in the country of origin and in the country of destination and looking at the main descriptions and specific features of various types of migration to outline the prospects for Chinese migration to Kazakhstan.

 The People’s Republic of China is one of the most dynamically developing countries. In recent years Beijing has been rapidly expanding its economic presence in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular, as well as building up its share in Kazakhstan’s international trade and economic relations.
n the last seven years the trade turnover between them has been rapidly increasing with respect to both growth rate and absolute figures. Between 1999 and 2005, Kazakhstan increased its export to China over 5.2-fold, while China’s export to Kazakhstan grew 15.7-fold. The trade turnover between China and Kazakhstan grew 6.7-fold over the same period.1
 In the last three years China moved to third place among Kazakhstan’s foreign trade partners in terms of percentage, however the structure of their trade can hardly be called balanced. Kazakhstan mainly sells China crude oil, ferrous metals, and copper, while China sends consumer goods (clothes, footwear, domestic electric appliances, and foodstuffs) to Kazakhstan. Much of what arrives in Kazakh-stan is brought by so-called shuttle traders.2

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References

Quoted from: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, Kitayskaia migratsia v Kazakhstane, Almaty, 2007 (forthcoming).

The following figures testify that the volumes of shuttle or unorganized trade are still considerable. According to the customs services of Kazakhstan, in 2005 the foreign trade turnover of the two countries was $3.676 million. Accord-ing to the figures supplied by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, it was $6.810 million. The discrepancy is explained by the fact that China takes so-called popular trade into account, while the Committee for Customs Control of the Finance Ministry of Kazakhstan takes into account the figures supplied by freight customs declarations and ignores “unorganized trade.” At the same time, the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan provides evaluations of trade turnover of cross-border and shuttle trade and uses the results when drafting the annual Balance of Payments of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

[http://www.inform.kz], 15 December, 2005.

See: K. Tokaev, Vneshniaia politika Kazakhstana v usloviakh globalizatsii, AO SAK, NP PIK GAUHAR, Almaty,2000, p. 334.

See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, Migratsia v Kazakhstane na rubezhe XXI veka: novye tendentsii i perspektivy, Galym,Almaty, 2001, pp. 175-176.

[http://www.un.population.org].

Ibidem.

See: Kitay: ugrozy, riski, vyzovy razvitiu, ed. by V. Mikheev, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2000, pp. 297-298.

See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, Migratsia v Kazakhstane na rubezhe XXI veka…, pp. 19-20; E. Sadovskaya, Migratsion-

naia situatsia v Respublike Kazakhstan v 2005 g. Analiticheskiy obzor i rekomendatsii dlia MOT v Rossii, Almaty, Moscow,2005.

[http://www.seminar.kz/articles/?id=68&pageNo=3].

See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, Kitayskaia migratsia v Kazakhstane (see also: K.L. Syroezhkin, Mify i real’nost etnichesko-go separatizma v Kitae i bezopasnost’ Tsentral’noy Azii, Dayk-Press, Almaty, 2003).

Kazakhstani and Chinese experts were well aware of the low quality of Chinese goods and the problems of shuttle and bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China in general (see, for example: Zhao Huasheng, “Problemy politiki Kitaia v Tsentral’noy Azii,” Kazakhstan v global’nykh protsessakh, No. 2, 2004, pp. 63-73; Zhou Xiaopei, “Sotrudnichestvo mezhdu XUAR (KNR) i Kazakhstanom: dostizhenia i perspektivy,” Kazakhstan i sovremennyi mir, No. 3 (10), 2004, pp. 206-209).

See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, Trudovaia migratsia kak sredstvo adaptatsii k ekonomicheskomu krizisu v Kazakhstane,Falym Publishers, Almaty, 2001, pp. 39-89 (see also: Trudovaia migratsia v SNG: sotsial’nye i ekonomicheskie effekty, ed.

y Zh. Zayonchkovskaia, Moscow, 2003.)

Telephone Omnibus poll; multi-stage stratified sampling with random choice at the last stages; representative by sex, age, place of domicile, size and type of settlements. Covered all cities and towns of Kazakhstan with a population of over 50,000 (27 in all), involved 2,000 respondents; error margin—no more than 5 percent. The poll was conducted by GfK Kazakhstan in February 2005.

See: E.Yu. Sadovskaya, “Trudovye migratsii kazakhstanskikh grazhdan v period suvereniteta,” Trud v Kazakh-stane, No. 5, 2007, pp. 17-25.

The figures supplied by the City Labor Department of Almaty, 2005.

[http://www.nomad.su], 19 April, 2007.

See: Novoe pokolenie, 1 October, 2004.

See: V. Gel’bras, “Kitayskie huaqiao—politika Pekina,” in: Mirovoy opyt migratsionnoy politiki: retrospektiva i noveyshie tendentsii, Moscow, Almaty, Mezhd. organizatsia po migratsii, 2004, pp. 326-344; idem, Kitayskaia real’nost’

Rossii, Muravey Publishers, Moscow, 2001, etc.

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 13 December, 1997 No. 204-1 On Population Migration; Law of the Re-public of Kazakhstan of 27 March, 2002 No. 313-II On Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Population Migration [http://www.zakon.kz].

E. Sadovskaya, Chinese Migration to Kazakhstan: A Silk Way of Cooperation or a Thorny Road of Prejudice? 2007 (forthcoming); E. Sadovskaya, “Chinese Migration to Kazakhstan: The Attitudes of Kazakhstani Citizens towards Chinese Migrants. Results of a Sociological Survey,” ANALYTIC, No. 4, 2007 (forthcoming).

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Published

2008-02-29

Issue

Section

ETHNIC RELATIONS AND MIGRATION

How to Cite

SADOVSKAYA, E. (2008). CHINESE MIGRATION TO KAZAKHSTAN: CAUSES, KEY TRENDS, AND PROSPECTS. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 9(1), 160-168. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/1174

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