INDIA AND GUAM: STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

Abstract

Post-Soviet  Europe-Asia  is  reminiscent  of an  organizational  mosaic  with  many  regional  groups  emerging  around  Russia, both favoring and challenging its dominance in Eurasia. GUAM (later GUUAM) was one of the early  geopolitical  formations  after  the collapse of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  four  former  Soviet states  of  Georgia,  Ukraine,  Azerbaijan,  and Moldova  were  encouraged  by  the  1996  CFE Treaty of the Conference held in Vienna to form an identity opposed to Russia. The geopolitical significance of this was quickly realized by the West, and they saw GUAM as an important play-er in the Black Sea region, where Russia’s strategic access was of vital importance. GUAM was also important due to its location, since it occupied three land-corridors to Mackinder’s Heart-land.  Poland  and  the  Baltic  states  had  already created an arc between Russia and Western Eu-rope. The rise of Ukraine and Moldova against Russia extended this arc from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
 Uzbekistan joined GUAM in 1999, turning it into GUUAM. This transformed the arc into a circle  around  Russia  extending  to  the  Caspian and further East toward China. GUAM reminded the global strategists of the new forms of Cold War tactics that had resurfaced and the spread in the Great Game trends, which energy geopolitics only served to aggravate. GUAM has been particularly  focused  on  Russia’s  influence  in  the Near Abroad. Its effort to check Russia’s energy geopolitics  was  one  of  the  key  features.  The Ukraine-Russia  conflict  over  gas  pricing  is  a well  known  issue.  It  has  also  tried  to  create  a plank  for  NATO’s  advance  into  the  Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has been a success in Georgia and Ukraine.
 The fate of GUAM has already been over-shadowed by wider regional cooperation among the Black Sea countries. This has far more potential for secure economic and political cooperation, unlike GUAM, which has earned a bad reputation  for  being  too  geopolitically  embroiled with Russia. The U.S. has been a consistent sup-porter of the GUAM initiatives. GUAM received another setback when Uzbekistan left the organization in 2005, after seeing the portent dangers of the Color Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the destabilizing Andijan riots. According to Daly,
GUUAM  was  slowly  replacing  its  economic orientation with increased military-political co-operation, including the formation of joint military units. As Uzbekistan does not share a con-tiguous border with the other GUUAM member states, the shift in emphasis away from commer-cial interests, combined with Uzbekistan’s geo-graphical  isolation,  led  Tashkent  to  conclude that its participation was no longer in the coun-try’s best interests.”1 The democratic initiative of  the  West  went  against  the  interests  of  the Central Asian elite, who wish to retain power through  controlled  democratic  transition.  An-other fact that distinguishes them is that most of the Central Asian republics are predominantly Muslim  societies,  whereas  the  GUAM  states are  primarily  Orthodox  Christian,  apart  from Azerbaijan.
 India has been keeping an eye on the ener-gy geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus as its own growing energy need demands diver-sify. This obviously brings the Black Sea region (the  principal  unit  of  GUAM)  into  focus.  The Black Sea region has become one of the most vital outlets for Russia’s foreign energy trade. And it is in hot competition with the Western powers,which  plan  to  bypass  its  traditional monopoly with the help of Georgia and Turkey. India’s relations with GUAM are under strong caveat from the fact that India can hardly afford to associate itself with the groups challenging Russia in its own sphere of influence. India and Russia have successfully resuscitated the legacy of the Mos-cow-Delhi ties of Soviet times. India is also one of  the  biggest customers  of  Russian  military hardware.