EU-GUAM: ENGAGEMENT OR ESTRANGEMENT?

Abstract

The  wider  Black  Sea  and  Caspian  Sea  regions have so far figured as relatively peripheral concerns for the European Union. While the enlargement of the EU has created incentives for a stronger commitment to these regions, the motives for a more strategic European engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and around the Black Sea have always existed. These regions provide access to energy outside the control  of  OPEC and Russia and provide  a  transit corridor connecting Europe with the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Remarkable benefits may also accrue the EU if a proactive rather than reactive  approach  is  taken  toward  the  region.
These benefits do not only include energy diversification and transit but also relate to the security and stability of Europe’s vicinity and, by extension, Europe itself. So far, the EU has, however, showed little  interest  in  working  with  regional organizations such as BSEC, GUAM, the Black Sea  Forum  and  others  but  preferred  to  engage with the states in the region on a bilateral basis. GUAM belongs to the organizations which Europe has given little or no attention despite the fact  that  both  work,  more  or  less,  toward  the same goals.  These include energy  diversification, both in production and transit routes, and a less dominant position of Russia over the energy resources and politics of the region. Conceived as such, it is tempting to conclude that the EU should push for stronger engagement with GUAM (and other similar organizations). However, this article argues that there are few areas in which these two organizations could cooperate fruitfully. This is primarily due to the inefficiency of GUAM, the geopolitics  involved,  and  , to the fact that EU could favorably pursue its interests in other formats.