GUAM-NATO COOPERATION: USSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
At the outset of this paper, it should be emphasized that although NATO is taking increased interest in the GUAM (Georgia,Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova) member countries there is no formal relationship or co-operation between NATO and GUAM. The declaration of the GUAM summit held in Baku in June 2007 announced a decision to intensify co-operation between the GUAM members and NATO, aimed at promoting democracy, stability and security and building closer ties with Euro-pean and Euro-Atlantic structures. The first step aimed at intensifying cooperation involves the production of a series of joint papers by the GUAM missions to NATO. The first of these joint papers, intended to inform the Alliance and its partners on GUAM developments, structure and policies, was recently released and dedicated to the foundation of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—
UAM (ODED—GUAM) and the 10th anniversary of GUAM. Georgia has taken the responsibility to coordinate the cooperation among GUAM member country delegations within the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
A leading member of the GUAM group-ing, Georgia epitomizes the potential for cooperation between NATO and GUAM member states. Committed to gaining membership of the North Atlantic Alliance, it has taken serious steps to reform and develop its armed forces.
however, while both are necessary conditions for a healthy relationship with NATO, they re-main insufficient. As this article will argue, Georgia’s government remain internally divided on the goal to join NATO, as it must contend with a difficult strategic environment and the views and influence of its powerful Russian neighbor. For these reasons, the Alliance’s relationship with Russia, in particular as it impacts on the cooperation between the GUAM member states and NATO, is in need of readjustment. Ideally, such a readjustment will necessitate shedding the remnants of Cold War thinking and genuinely engaging with Russia on a new equal footing—recognizing that Russia too has a voice in the activities of the Alliance on its southern periphery.
On 6 and 9 March, 2007 both houses of the U.S. Congress approved the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007, supporting further NATO enlargement into the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Washington’s interest in promoting NATO membership for two members of GUAM, notably Georgia and Ukraine, increased markedly as a result of the Color Revolutions of 2003-2004.
although the U.S. decision may have influenced the attitude of other NATO member states on further expansion, problems and reservations remained in some key member states, including France and Germany.
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See: [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1214b.htm].
See: “NATO’s Relations with Georgia,” available at [http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-georgia/index.html].
See: “Individual Partnership Action Plans,” 6 December, 2007, available at [http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/
ndex.html]; [http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/english/index.php?title=nato]; S. Cornell, R. McDermott, W. O’Malley, V. So-cor, S. Starr, Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO, CACI, Washington D.C., 2004.
See: T. Yakobashvili, “Georgia’s Path to NATO,” in: Next Steps for Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wid-er Black Sea, ed. by R. Asmus, Washington, 2006, pp. 186-87.
The decision taken at the Bucharest NATO summit to decline the offer of MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine re-sulted largely from objections raised by Germany, France and Italy among others. Most support for the offer of MAPs came from eastern and Central European members of the Alliance (reminiscent of Rumsfeld’s distinction be-tween “new” and “old” Europe) (see: “NATO: No MAP for Georgia or Ukraine, But Alliance Vows Membership,”RFE/RE, Prague, 3 April, 2008, available at [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/4/F2301CAB-6E1D-4D3C-BAF5-37F0603F0357.html]). Some analysts in the West suggested unrealistically that Germany’s opposition to the MAPs was motivated by its close relations with Russia. Little objective discussion took place about either the objec-tions of Russia or the strategic problems that could result from continued NATO eastward expansion. Russia’s For-eign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented on talks held between Russia and NATO and the bilateral talks with the U.S. in Sochi after the NATO summit in Bucharest. A forthright exchange took place on the most obvious areas in which Moscow and Washington differ, ranging from the missile defense shield to the CFE Treaty and continued controversy about the declaration of independence by Kosovo. Despite this, Russia and NATO signed an agreement on cooperation over Afghanistan, with Moscow agreeing to provide a land transit corridor for humanitarian assist-ance to ISAF. However, future NATO expansion resulted in an impasse: “But I did not sense a readiness to under-stand our concerns with regard to NATO expansion. We regard NATO’s unrestrained expansion as a serious politi-cal mistake. It will not strengthen global security. There are no obstacles to any country, including Ukraine or Geor-gia, involving its intellectual and other resources in the struggle against real common threats like international ter-rorism rather than invented ones. You certainly do not have to be a NATO member to do so” (“Russia’s Lavrov Speaks to Paper about Russia-NATO-U.S. Summit,” Komsomolskaia pravda, BBC Monitoring Service, Moscow,8 April, 2008).
“Georgia Deputy Defense Minister on NATO Prospects, Army Development,” 24 Saati, Tbilisi, 13 December,2007, pp. 1, 4.
“Saakashvili Delivers Pre-Election Speech,” Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi, 3 January, 2008.
See: “NATO to Give Georgia Access to Radar Data—Representative,” RIA Novosti, Moscow, 23 August, 2007.
“Georgia Deputy Defense Minister on NATO Prospects, Army Development.”
Ibidem.
“Journalist to Brief News Corps on Georgian Government’s Raid of Imedi TV,” Kavkaz-Press, Tbilisi, 10 No-
vember, 2007; “Georgian President Defiant on Calls to Lift State of Emergency,” Channel 1, Tbilisi, 10 November,2007.
“Opposition Candidate for PM Says Georgia’s NATO Chances Badly Damaged by Unrest,” Rustavi-2 TV, Tbili-si, 27 November, 2007.
Thus, each conflict in the GUAM area, compared with the Balkan conflicts, has its own specifics, as well as its own development and resolution schemes. For example, the Karabakh conflict is utterly different from the Transnistrian situation, Abkhazia is much closer to a de facto state than is South Ossetia, and so on.
Russian President V. Putin said: “…it is wrong to use one set of rules in Kosovo and another in the Transnistrian region, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. How does the Kosovo situation differ from the situation in the Transnistrian region? It does not differ in any way” (Politicheskii zhurnal, No. 53 (130/131), 23 October, 2006, p. 50, available at [www.politjornal.ru]).
The Georgian president said that at the GUAM summit in Baku in June 2007.
The Baku Declaration (GUAM summit, 19 June, 2007).
In the meantime, Russian peacekeepers are carrying out in good faith their mandate for peacekeeping, disengage-ment of the conflicting sides, and maintenance of stability in the conflict zones. The Russian peacekeepers’ performance has often been highly appraised by the U.N. and other international organizations (see: [http://www.peacekeeper.ru/
ndex.php?mid=801]). 13 Thus, each conflict in the GUAM area, compared with the Balkan conflicts, has its own specifics, as well as its own development and resolution schemes. For example, the Karabakh conflict is utterly different from the Transnistrian situation, Abkhazia is much closer to a de facto state than is South Ossetia, and so on.
Russian President V. Putin said: “…it is wrong to use one set of rules in Kosovo and another in the Transnistrian region, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. How does the Kosovo situation differ from the situation in the Transnistrian region? It does not differ in any way” (Politicheskii zhurnal, No. 53 (130/131), 23 October, 2006, p. 50, available at [www.politjornal.ru]).
The Georgian president said that at the GUAM summit in Baku in June 2007.
The Baku Declaration (GUAM summit, 19 June, 2007).
In the meantime, Russian peacekeepers are carrying out in good faith their mandate for peacekeeping, disengage-ment of the conflicting sides, and maintenance of stability in the conflict zones. The Russian peacekeepers’ performance has often been highly appraised by the U.N. and other international organizations (see: [http://www.peacekeeper.ru/
ndex.php?mid=801]).
See: “Smena karaula,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 November, 2006.
Ibidem.
The relevant pipeline construction agreements were signed in 2007.
Georgia’s most problem-ridden enclave, comprising nine large ethnic Georgian villages to the north of Tskhinvali.
See: “Novye vyzovy bezopasnosti i Rossia,” Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike, 2002, p. 6.
Initially, the CIS planned to create joint armed forces and command and control agencies to ensure the CIS coun-tries’ security and their protection against external aggression.
See: Strategiia Rossii: povestka dnia dlia Prezidenta, Moscow, 2000, p. 74.
That was discussed by the CIS presidents at a CIS heads of state meeting in Astana, on 16 September, 2004.
The protocol extending the Treaty was signed in 1999 by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. These states also became members of the CSTO, signing the CSTO Charter and the Agreement on the Legal Status of the CSTO on 7 October, 2002 in Chisinau. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan suspended their participation in the Treaty in 1999.
The only exception is the CIS joint air defense system, but under that system, Russia is effectively building a complex of regional air defense systems on the basis of bilateral agreements with its partners.
The CSTO has also said that it is prepared to cooperate and even build joint institutions with the EU and NATO,whereas the SCO is more oriented toward regional projects and cooperation in Asia rather than in the West.
See: The GUUAM Yalta Charter, 7 June, 2001, available at [http://www.guam.org.ua/180.536.0.0.1.0.phtml].
The decision was made at a meeting of the organization’s foreign ministers on 25 September, 2006 in New York.
Adopted in 1995, the Collective Security Concept is based on the member countries’ striving for cooperation in the military and military-political sphere. The organization’s area of responsibility includes the territory of its member states, while the Collective Security Treaty declares their right to collective defense in conformity with Art 51 of the U.N.
harter, establishing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the Organization/Treaty.
In accordance with the current National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,possible threats to Russia’s national interests include NATO’s strengthening and eastward expansion, and the deployment of foreign military bases and forces in close proximity to the Russian borders.
Speaking in Brussels on 17 May, 1990, NATO Secretary General Verner said: The sheer fact that we are pre-pared not to deploy NATO troops outside the FRG borders gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees.
In accordance with the Law on the Georgian Armed Forces, the country had 31,878 servicemen in 2006. Of them the Georgian Defense Ministry had 26,000.
For example, Georgia’s Navy almost entirely consists of donated vessels: the Grif class patrol craft and the Ko-notop missile carrying ship from Ukraine, a patrol boat from Bulgaria, and two patrol boats and a missile carrying ship from Greece. The United States granted over $20 million for the Navy’s modernization as well as five patrol boats.
ithuania is to hand Georgia two frigates—the Zhemaitis and the Aukstaitis.
At international security conference in Ljubljana on 29 August, 2006.
See: “Novyy razdel Yevrazii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 4 December, 2006.
See: Interview of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister G. Karasin with the Interfax news agency on 8 November,2005, available at [http://www.mid.ru/ns-rsng.nsf/3a813e35eb116963432569ee0048fdbe/432569d800221466c32570b 3002f4f3f?OpenDocument].
Highlights of a report by the CSTO Secretariat at an international conference, A Strategy for Russia/CSTO Dia-log with the European Union on Security Matters, Moscow, 18-19 March, 2005.
The agreement was achieved at a meeting in Rome on 28 May, 2002.
The decision was based on the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Rus-sian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1997), stating that “once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, the Permanent Joint Council will engage in making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case by case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, in-cluding peacekeeping operations under the authority of the U.N. Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.”
See: Political Aspects of a Generic Concept of Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations, Annex 1.
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