INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND CENTRAL ASIA: PREMATURE ASSESSMENTS
Abstract
In the months leading up to, and the first few years after, the Soviet Union collapsed numerous articles and books were published that claimed Islamic “fundamentalism” was likely to emerge in Central Asia. These fears were predicated on numerous scenarios, the most important being the ongoing political and military crisis in Afghanistan and Iranian attempts to increase its influence in the region. I will argue, however, that these concerns were premature and that the real threat to the stability and security of Central Asia, and the potential threat of Islamic radicalism, is more likely to be during the next transitional phase when the current repressive regimes are replaced by new leaders,what I refer to as the “post-transition transition.”1 I do not believe that Islamists and their actions are the threat, rather that the rhetoric coupled with actions will be used to discredit subsequent leaders and that internal, factional political rivalries will embrace whatever means necessary to eliminate opposition. In this scenario, the power of Islamic rhetoric and propaganda will influence and alter the political evolution in Central Asia and its devolution from authoritarian structures toward liberal democracies. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to posit an argument that early assessments were “pre-mature” and rather alarmist based upon real and perceived weaknesses in Central Asia rather than a better comprehension of the strength and vitality exercised by the transitional regimes. At the conclusion, I have four (although more can be posed) questions designed to augment our “assessments” of the current social, economic, and political transition that is occurring in the region.
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Determining exactly when the “transition” ends is difficult, but for the purpose of this paper the criteria is either the “transition” from immediate post-Soviet leaders (such as Niyazov or Akaev) to “new” leaders or, less definitive, the establishment of economic, political, and social independence from Soviet era structures. Thus, for example, Kazakhstan’s economic environment might be fully emancipated from centralized control, but the political situation remains hindered by Soviet legacies.
The Kyrgyz example is troubling because it has established an unhealthy and, I believe, unproductive mechanism and precedent. Whenever enough mass can be set against the regime, for whatever reason, the expectation might be that it should somehow remove itself. If it does not, will the anger and frustration degenerate into violent efforts to oust a trucu-lent regime?
This assertion is easy to make simply because few serious Islamic extremist tendencies emerged in the region dur-ing the first decade; however, in ten years from now some might be able to argue that this paper was also a “premature”assessment.
Indeed, even before the Soviet Union collapsed, each republic had passed language laws that made each titular lan-guage the official language of the republic. Russian remained semi-official, but, in general, the emphasis on national lan-guages became a political and cultural issue.
The major exceptions are the works by a French scholar and a Pakistani journalist (see: O. Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, I.B. Tauris, London, 2000; A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002). More recently a Russian scholar has produced a work that examines more fully the phenomenon (see: V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, Rowman & Littlefield Publish-ers, New York, 2005).
See: V. Naumkin, op. cit., p. 9.
J. Burke, “Al-Qa‘eda Today and the Real Roots of Terrorism,” Terrorism Monitor, 12 February, 2004, p. 2.
G. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, p. 15.
Sh.T. Hunter, Central Asia since Independence, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1996, pp. 142-143.
Yu. Kulchik, A. Fadin, V. Sergeev, Central Asia after the Empire, Pluto Press, London and Chicago, 1996, p. 54.
hese authors further claim that the “Islam professed by the Central Asian masses at present is largely an uncivilized, crude version of Islam.”
Ibid., p. 6.
J. Critchlow, “Nationalism and Islamic Resurgence in Uzbekistan,” in: Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. by H. Malik, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 237.
Ibid., pp. 238-247. Critchlow suggests that Russia posed a greater threat to Central Asia’s independence than the threat of Islamic fundamentalism if nationalists in Moscow exploited the economic decline and weakened Central Asian leaders to the extent that the former Soviet empire could be reconstituted. He writes: “One should not let today’s fascina-tion with Islamic fundamentalism cause blindness to the possibility of a reconstitution of a new Russian-led imperialism,with the acquiescence of embattled leaders in the new Central Asian republics.”
R.H. Magnus, E. Naby, “Afghanistan and Central Asian: Mirrors and Models,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, 1995, p. 614.
Ibidem. The authors note, too, that the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan was “scarcely revolutionary,” and that it willingly cooperated with secularists and former communists; it was the civil war that “radicalized” the movement.
According to Ahmed Rashid, “Rumors abounded in the Western press that Kazakhstan had sold an SS-18 to Iran and that it was about to provide Tehran with uranium. None of the reports was ever proved but they kept Western intelli-
gence agencies on their toes for much of the year” (A. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Zed Books, London, New Jersey, 1994, p. 235).
See: Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid., pp. 243-244.
See: A. Hyman, “Moving out of Moscow’s Orbit: The Outlook for Central Asia,” International Affairs, Vol. 69,1993, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 291.
Ibid., p. 301.
The prescription for the political difficulties in Central Asian are, perhaps, evident by the post-transition transition in Kyrgyzstan where the mechanism for political change is founded upon the fragile, even dangerous, model of demonstra-tion. Opposition forces in Kyrgyzstan called for public demonstrations against the Bakiev regime on 11 April, 2007. Some opposition groups desire his ouster, Akaev-like, whereas others insist upon further negotiations and political compromise.
n other words, the opposition has seemingly subscribed to only one lesson of the Tulip Revolution: dissatisfaction with a political impasse gives rise to demonstrations that oust the leadership rather than democratic evolution which is ultimately best achieved via elections. An unhealthy precedent has been established in Kyrgyzstan that could prove more destabiliz-ing than the initial transition from Soviet to post-Soviet regime (see, for example: E. Marat, “Bakiev Tries to Save his Pres-idency but Opposition Prevails,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 62, 29 March, 2007).
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