THE “FROZEN CONFLICT” THAT TURNED HOT: CONFLICTING STATE-BUILDING ATTEMPTS IN SOUTH OSSETIA
Abstract
The South Ossetians living under the authority of the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia make up one of those peoples, like their fellow Caucasians the Abkhazes or the Transnistrians, trapped in a complete juridic political limbo. The political entities that “claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force”1 over them is not those juridically representing them in the international arena. Having met three of the four criteria required to be recognized as a state according to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State (1933)—that is to say, having a permanent population, a defined territory and a government—the de facto authorities still crave international recognition.2 This situation is more than a mere juridical imbroglio. It has concrete and specific repercussions for the people living in these territories.
Stuck in the midst of competing state-building attempts, from the de facto authorities wanting to cling to power to the de jure authorities trying to extend their influence over the territory, the local population finds itself politicized from all sides. Generally dubbed “frozen conflicts,” especially in the Caucasus (in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and in Transnistria, this actual denomination ignores the dynamic logic at work in these regions.3 The recent conflict in South Ossetia, triggered by the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali on 7 August and the following military response by the Russian army, clearly showed the limits of this perspective.
After describing the current political setting in South Ossetia and examining the logic of a “zone of conflict,” this article analyzes the oppositional logic between the competing state-building attempts in South Ossetia, led by Russia and Georgia, respectively. Showing how the local population is literally squeezed between the militarization of both parties, the article contends that South Ossetians themselves ought to be taken into account in order for a genuine state- building process to take root in South Ossetia
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References
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[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/inter-am/intam03.htm].
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See: S. Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus—Cases of Geor-gia, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2002, p. 3.
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See: D. Lynch, op. cit., p. 23; G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr, E. Allworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
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For a good study on the effect of Soviet federalism and its ethnic policies, see: O. Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, Tauris, London, 2000.
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The upper-end estimates for the population of the region fluctuate between 60,000 and 70,000 (see: International Crisis Group, “Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia,” Crisis Group Europe Report, No. 159, 2004, pp. 5-6).
See: T. German, “Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Collision of Georgian and Russian Interests,” Russie.Nei.Visions,No. 11, 2006, p. 8.
For instance, in 2007, Moscow hosted the second meeting of the Commonwealth for Democracy and Rights of Nations, an informal group bringing together the leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.
However, Moscow stated in 2007 that it may recognize the two separatist regions of Georgia as independent states if Western powers recognize Kosovo’s split from Serbia (“Russia Warns of Kosovo “Precedent” for Separatists,” Reuters,24 October, 2007).
Interview with Anatoli Chachiev, Minister of Information of the Republic of South Ossetia, 30 July, 2007, Tskhin-vali (see also: C. Lowe, “Money the Big Attraction in South Ossetia,” Reuters, 26 July, 2007).
See: S. Demetriou, “Rising from the Ashes? The Difficult (Re)Birth of the Georgian State,” Development and Change, No. 33 (5), 2002, p. 879. However, the process has been completed by Saakashvili.
See: C. King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics, No. 53 (4),2001, pp. 545-546.
See: L. Fuller, “Georgia: Tbilisi Ups the Ante Over South Ossetia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 March, 2007.
See: “Okruashvili is Pushing Georgia to War,” InfoRos, 3 July, 2006.
The defence budget of Georgia reached $600 million in 2007. To give a comparison, the total budget of Georgia in 2003 was around $600 million.
Interview with a South Ossetian NGO leader, 30 July, 2007, Tskhinvali.
S. Walker, “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian… Independent?” Open Democracy, 15 November, 2006.
This list is rather long and includes all individuals suspected to work undercover for Georgian interests. It no-tably includes various businessmen, journalists, and South Ossetians working for international organizations as the OSCE.
See: G. Sepashvili, “Saakashvili Sends Reconciliatory Signals to South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 1 June, 2004.
See: N. Lemay-Hébert, “La Géorgie prise entre évolution et révolution: la (re)construction de l’État géorgien en questions,” Transitions et sociétés, No.11, 2006, pp. 39-47.
See: T. Freese, “A Report from the Field: Georgia’s War Against Contraband and Its Struggle For Territorial In-tegrity,” SAIS Review, No. 25 (1), 2005, pp. 112-113.
R. Santana, “South Ossetia Market Important for Local Economy,” VOA NEWS.COM, 13 February, 2002.
See: “Local MP Says Ergneti Closure a Mistake,” Civil Georgia, 22 June, 2005.
Interview with Dov Lynch, Senior Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies, 1 June, 2005, Paris.
Interview conducted in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, 2006-2007. For Tskhinvali, the human rights violations committed by Georgia impede any federal solution for the conflict, while for Georgia, Russia and its puppet regime hinder all mean-ingful process of conflict resolution to happen.
As one observer noted after the 2004 events: “An atmosphere of fear now prevails in Tskhinvali region. In re-cent weeks, there have been various reports of beatings, arrests, and officials losing their positions for communicating with Georgians. Residents report that Tskhinvali authorities have built trenches, delivered arms to unauthorized persons,and that troops with heavy military equipment have entered Ossetia from the North Caucasus. Meanwhile, Georgian peacekeepers and Ministry of Interior troops have set up camp along the conflict zone” (T. Freese, “Will Ossetians Embrace Georgia’s Initiative?” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004, available at: [http://www.cacianalyst.org/
iew_article.php?articleid=2455]).
S. Walker, “South Ossetia Looks North,” IISS Press Coverage, 2006, available at [http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/
iss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/south-ossetia-looks-north/]. In the same line, Saakashvili stated in 2005 that:
There is no Ossetian problem in Georgia. There is a problem in Georgian-Russian relations with respect to certain terri-tories. I have repeatedly said that Russia is a great country with lots of territories, but its borders certainly do not lie on the Inguri river or the Ergneti market” (President of Georgia official website, “Georgian President Outlines Three-Stage De-velopment Strategy at the News Conference,” 9 September, 2005, available at [http://www.president.gov.ge/
rint_txt.php?id=617&l=E]).
He was appointed defense minister in 1996 and vice prime minister in 1998, under the presidency of Ludvig Chibi-rov. He served until 2001, when Eduard Kokoity replaced Chibirov as South Ossetia’s leader.
Kokoity was reelected with 98.1 percent of the vote, while Sanakoev received 94 percent of the vote in the paral-lel election.
Interview with Vladimir Sanakoev, spokesman of the government of South Ossetia, 30 July, 2007, Tbilisi.
International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly,” Europe Report, No. 183,2007, p. 5.
Interview with a political adviser to Dmitry Sanakoev, 26 July, 2007, Tbilisi.
Interestingly, one of the first acts of Sanakoev as a member of the Georgian government has been to go to Brus-sels to address the European Parliament concerning the political situation prevailing in South Ossetia (see: “Dimitri Sana-koev Gave Speech in Brussels,” Medianews, 26 June, 2007). Moreover, according to the political analyst Zaal Anjaparidze,
The wording, idea and political message of Dmitry Sanakoev’s address revealed a ‘Georgian editor’,” Z. Anjaparidze, “The Sanakoev Operation,” Eurasian Home, 2007, available at [http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/expert.xml?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=1162].
See: International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly,” p. 2.
Interviews conducted in Tskhinvali, Summer 2007, especially with Temur Tskhovrebov, former commander of the South Ossetian Army and director of the NGO “Former Combatants” in Tskhinvali, 29 July, 2007.
See: International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly,” p. 4.
Interview with Alan Pliev, vice minister of foreign affairs, Tskhinvali, 30 July, 2007.
Unlike the Abkhaz de facto authorities, which strive to attract international support to counter the Abkhaz Gov-ernment in exile. Interviews conducted in Sukhumi, summer 2007, especially with Maxim Gunjia, vice minister of foreign affairs, and Sergei Shamba, minister of foreign affairs, 9 August, 2007.
Interviews conducted in Tskhinvali, Summer 2007.
The number can be as high as 30,000, although at least 25,000 of them have now returned to their homes, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said.
See: J. Hider, “Russian-Backed Paramilitaries Ethnically Cleansing Villages,” The Times, 28 August, 2008, avail-able at: [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4621592.ece].
See: M. Tran, “Georgia Admits Dropping Cluster Bombs, Says Rights Group,” The Guardian, 1 September, 2008,available at: [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/01/georgia.russia?gusrc=rss&feed=worldnews].
See: “U.N.: Georgians Effectively Blocked from Homes,” Associated Press, 30 August, 2008.
See: D. Bilefsky, M. Schwirtz, “For Thousands of Refugees from the Conflict in Georgia, the Fear Lingers,” The New York Times, 1 September 2008.
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