THE GREATER CENTRAL ASIA PROJECT: RESENT STATE AND EVOLUTION
Abstract
The Greater Central Asia (GCA) project initiated in 2005 confirmed that the United States treated the region as a foreign policy and security priority. The project was primarily promoted by the changed balance of forces in favor of Russia and partly China, which called for an adequate strategic and geopolitical response. At the same time, the Greater Central Asia idea can be viewed as a conceptual and ideological substantiation of what the United States is trying to accomplish in the region. This is a fresh (and logical) approach to America’s entire previous foreign policy theory and practical regional policy.
In a wider sense the project is a strategic matrix the United States is using in Central Asia,the Caspian, and Afghanistan to channel the lo-cal geopolitical, military-political, and geo-eco-nomic developments in the desired direction. In fact, this is a mechanism for organizing the geo-political expanse akin to the Greater Middle East.
t is no coincidence that theoretically both projects are mutually complementary.
America has run into serious difficulties in Central Asia, which casts doubt on the GCA’s future. In 2008, after concentrating on the Caucasus the United States pushed Central Asia to the backburner. The events in South Ossetia riveted the attention of the U.S. Administration to the Georgian problem and relations with Russia. The Americans had to maintain a far from simple dialog with their European partners, who refused to take any anti-Russian steps. America’s passive Central Asian strategy, however, has preserved some of the key parameters and elements the U.S. will repro-duce in the long term in its regional policies. This means that we should take a closer look at the trends and prospects of the Greater Central Asia project.
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References
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The following recent visits testify that bilateral contacts were stirred up: Deputy Assistant of U.S. Secretary of State E. Feigenbaum visited Uzbekistan on 28 February-5 March, 2007; Deputy Coordinator at the Bureau of International In-formation Programs, U.S. Department of State J. Garvey came on 3-5 April, 2007; U.S. Ambassador to the OCSE J. Finley on 15-17 March, 2007; U.S. Department of State Assistant Coordinator in the Europe/Eurasia Bureau T. Adams on 3-4 June,2007; Ambassador-at-Large for the Office of International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State J. Hanford on 25-29 June, 2007; Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, U.S. Central Command Rear-Admiral J. Miller on 20-22 December,2007; Commander of the U.S. Central Command Admiral W. Fallon on 24-25 January, 2008; Acting Deputy Assistant U.S.
ecretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs P. Spratlen on 28 March-1 April, 2008 (see: Uzbeksko-amerikansk-ie otnoshenia. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Respubliki Uzbekistan, available at [http://mfa.uz/rus/mej_sotr/
zbekistan_i_strani_mira/uzbekistan_strani_ameriki/]).
A. Dubnov, “Tashkent shagaet ‘pozitivno’,” 18 March 2008, available at [http://zarubejom.ru/v-nomere/5-ballov/
id=11180].
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