RUSSIA AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES: BILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
Abstract
Retaining its key role in Central Asia (CA)and in the post-Soviet expanse as a whole is one of the main priorities of the Russian Federation’s current policy. Carrying out this strategic task was and still is directly related to the development of security cooperation, which, in addition to being of mutual benefit in the difficult regional and international circumstances, also has a significant political and propagandist effect.
Despite the many disintegrating factors that accompanied the sovereign emergence of each of the post-Soviet republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union, their common historical past, as well as economic, cultural, linguistic, and other traditional ties continue to prompt both the Russian Federation and Central Asia to seek co-operation in both collective and national security. Whereby preference goes to bilateral relations since it is this format that implies more specific and practical forms of military cooperation and is more confidential, making it possible to avoid any negative overtones associated with ambitions and mutual lack of understanding that are particularly vividly manifested in the multilateral format.1
Downloads
References
Particularly within the framework of the Common wealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Due to organizational-establishment measures, the 10th firing range (Sary Shagan) was included as a structural subdivision in the 4th state central multiservice firing range of the Russian Defense Ministry.
Adopted in February 2007 at a session of Kazakhstan’s Security Council.
Repair and modernization will also be carried out at Russian enterprises.
In particular, there are plans to replace the outmoded C-125 missile divisions with more up-to-date C-300 PMU-2 Favorit surface-to-air missile systems.
On the basis of an intergovernmental agreement, in 2006 the Nurek optical electronic unit was transferred to the Russian Federation by way of settling Tajikistan’s debt to Russia.
But it should also be noted that Yeltsin’s administration essentially sabotaged the rendering of urgent military-tech-nical assistance to Uzbekistan (mainly deliveries of ammunition) in the summer of 1998 (the assistance was necessary because of the advance of Taliban formations toward the Uzbek-Afghan border), which noticeably complicated bilateral relations.
From the mid-1990s to 2001, the Tashkent Chkalov Aviation Production Association essentially received no orders from Russia for the assembly of new planes, although the plant did not cease servicing Il-76 airplanes (both at the head
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2009 Author
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
You are free to:
- Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially.
- Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
- The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
- Attribution — You must give appropriate credit , provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made . You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
- No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Notices:
You do not have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation .
No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how you use the material.
