GEORGIA-SOUTH OSSETIA: A PRELUDE TO WAR Did Economic Assistance Strengthen Competing Spoilers in Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict?
Abstract
Sixteen years after the Sochi agreements an uneasy truce between Georgia and South Ossetia gave way to renewed violence in August 2008. The protracted peace process with lengthy and futile negotiations led to few agreements between the conflicting sides, which were often faulted at the implementation phase. Material and human costs of a failed peace process were huge: hundreds of civilian deaths, thousands of wounded, tens of thousands of people displaced, and millions of Euros spent on rehabilitation projects by local and international actors vanished within days.
With millions of aid money poured into Georgia for conflict prevention purposes prior to 2008, it is only legitimate to ask whether aid could make things worse and contribute to renewed violence, or to a lack of the sides’ interest in peaceful conflict settlement. Much has been written on political, geopolitical and military aspects of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and failed peace settlement that led to renewed hostilities in 2008. This article, however, looks at how aid (intentionally or unintentionally) contributed to dividing lines in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and strengthened competing spoilers in the settlement process. It argues that economic rehabilitation projects, supported by competing actors, in the conflict zone fed into the dividing lines between the local Georgian and Ossetian communities, and the international community failed to bridge the widening gaps between them.
With the ceasefire signed in the early 1990s and stalled peace talks, many observers have branded the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict as frozen. However, the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia once again demonstrated the importance of the consolidation of conflict settlement and necessity to deal with threats to peacebuilding.
Although the negotiation process has been halted since 2006, it would be a mistake to call the Georgian-Ossetian conflict a frozen one. Despite low level of violence and frequent security incidents in the conflict zone, the ceasefire largely held until the summer of 2004, when Tbilisi’s antismuggling operation in the conflict zone led to dozens of casualties and stopped short of the real warfare. Since then Tbilisi has been trying to alter the status quo in the negotiations and peacekeep ing formats, which it, not without merits, saw as disadvantageous. These efforts intensified with the Georgian leadership backing up an “alternative” de facto government of Dmitri Sanakoev in South Ossetia in November 2006. Tbilisi provided Sanakoev, who controlled Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia, with strong financial and political support, putting him in charge of a temporary administration established in May 2007. Attempts were made to include Sanakoev in the established negotiations processes.
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References
St.J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, p. 5.
E. Newman, O. Richmond, “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peacebuilding,” Policy Brief, No. 2,United Nations University, 2006.
Ibidem.
See: “Facts about South Ossetia,” International Herald Tribune, 8 August, 2008, available at [http://www.iht.com/
rticles/ap/2008/08/08/news/Georgia-South-Ossetia-Glance.php].
The villages of the Didi Liakhvi valley were strategically placed along the TransCam road between Tskhinvali and Java. The villages Tamarasheni and Kekhvi mark the valley’s boundaries, located one and eight kilometers north of Tskhin-vali, respectively.
On humanitarian law violations during the 1991-1992 conflict in South Ossetia, see: Human Rights Watch, “Blood-shed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict,” March 1992. Another conflict in Georgia was fought in the early 1990s in Abkhazia, a former Soviet Republic of Georgia locat-ed in northwestern Georgia between the Black Sea and the Caucasus Mountains. The 1992-1993 military confrontation there led to some 8,000 deaths, 18,000 wounded and the forced displacement of over 200,000 ethnic Georgians (see: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol. 7, No. 7, March 1995).
Agreement on the Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, 24 June, 1992.
Ibid., Art 3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also participated in JCC meetings.
The most lucrative trade was allegedly wheat flour (worth some $130 million a year), dairy products ($60.5 million),cigarettes ($60 million), petrol ($23.2 million) and kerosene ($12 million) (see: A. Kukhianidze, A. Kupatadze, R. Gotsiridze,Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Research Report for the American University’s Transna-tional Crime and Corruption Center (TRACC), 2003).
See: D. Darchiashvili, G. Tevzadze, “Ethnic Conflicts and Breakaway Regions in Georgia,” Building Democracy in Georgia, Discussion Paper No. 9, May 2003, pp. 12-13.
Three Georgian MPs and the deputy governor of the region were considered to control parts of the market from the Georgian side, and the son of former South Ossetian leader Chibirov was seen as playing a key role on the Ossetian side (see: M. Areshidze, Current Economic Causes of Conflict in Georgia, unpublished report for U.K. department for Interna-tional Development (DFID), 2002).
Crisis Group Europe Report No. 159, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, 26 November, 2004.
See: “Governor Blows up By-Roads to Prevent Smuggling,” Civil Georgia, 28 December, 2003.
Ibidem.
See: “South Ossetia Crisis Abates,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Caucasus Reporting Service No. 236, 3 June, 2004; “South Ossetia Tensions Still High,” IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service No. 242, 14 July, 2004; “South Ossetia Conflict Heats Up,” IWPR, Caucasus Reporting Service No. 246, 12 August, 2004.
See: “Georgian Police Targeted on Smuggling Faultlines,” Civil Georgia, 1 February, 2005; “Five Die in South Os-setia Shootout,” Civil Georgia, 30 May, 2005.
See: “Staging ‘Alternative Choice’ for South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 7 November, 2006; “Signs of Status Quo Change in South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 14 November, 2006. Dmitri Sanakoev served in the previous Tskhinvali admin-istration of de facto president Ludvig Chibirov (1996-2001).
See: “Simultaneous Polls in South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 12 November, 2006.
See: “Four Die in South Ossetia Skirmish,” Civil Georgia, 8 September, 2006; “Two Die in South Ossetia Shoot-ing,” Civil Georgia, 25 March, 2007.
See: “Tbilisi Proposes New Negotiating Format for South Ossetia,” Civil Georgia, 1 March, 2008.
“Tskhinvali Insists on Talks in Frames of JCC,” Civil Georgia, 24 July, 2008.
See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Press Release, 30 July, 2004; “Russian Foreign Min-ister Warned Tbilisi Against Attempting on Russian Peacekeepers’ Lives,” Regnum, 20 July, 2006 (see also: P.A. Goble,
Russian ‘Passportization,’” New York Times, 9 September, 2008).
See: International Crisis Group, “Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly,” Europe Report No. 183,7 June, 2007.
See: “Government Unveils South Ossetia GEL 6 mln Investment Plan,” Civil Georgia, 24 February, 2007.
See: “Finance Minister Meets S. Ossetian Administration Chief,” Civil Georgia, 22 May, 2007.
According to a June 2008 budget amendment, GEL 19 million was allocated to the temporary administration headed
by Sanakoev in 2008, whereas it was GEL 13 million in 2007 (see: “Defense Spending to Go Up by GEL 295 mln,” Geor-gian Times, 24 June, 2008).
Crisis Group report No. 183, p. 22.
These included the reconstruction of a secondary school, dental clinic, hotel, concert hall, sports hall and hospital lab in Tskhinvali and construction of a road (see: Crisis Group report No. 183, p. 23).
See: Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia and Georgia on Economic Rehabilitation in the Georgian-Ossetian Zone of Conflict, 14 September, 1993.
See: Georgian-Russian Economic Agreement on Rehabilitation in the Zone of Conflict and on the Return and In-tegration of Refugees, 23 December, 2000.
See: “Russia: Ossetia Pipeline Adds Fuel to the Georgia Fire,” RFE/RL, 6 November, 2006.
See: Crisis Group report No. 183, p. 21.
See: JCC Meeting Protocol, Tskhinvali, 11-13 May, 2006.
The pledges were: the European Commission (two million euros), the United States (two million U.S. dollars),Sweden (one million euros), Belgium (one million euros), Germany (500,000 euros), the Netherlands (500,000 euros),Norway (about 250,000 euros), Spain (200,000 euros) and Finland (200,000 euros). Estonia, Turkey, France, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Italy, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland and Andorra pledged amounts of up to 150,000 euros (see: “Donors Pledge EUR 10 mln for S. Ossetia Rehabilitation,” Civil Georgia, 15 June, 2006).
See: “Georgia Pledges More Aid to Promote South Ossetia’s Reconstruction,” Eurasia Insight, 5 November, 2007.
See: “Russia’s Separate Funding for S. Ossetia Angers Georgia,” Civil Georgia, 17 June, 2006.
See: “EU Calls for Calm After Clash in Georgia Rebel Region,” Reuters, 4 July, 2008, available at [http://uk.reuters.com/
rticle/homepageCrisis/idUKL04712416._CH_.242020080704].
See: Information for the Media: About the President’s Orders to the Government of the Russian Federation in Relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 501-16-04-2008, 16 April,2008.
The Georgian army conducted a joint exercise with the U.S. forces near Tbilisi on 15 July; and the same day Rus-sian military launched Caucasus-2008, a military exercise not far from the Roki tunnel connecting Russia and South Osse-tia (see: “U.S. Troops Start Training Exercise in Georgia,” Reuters, 15 July, 2008; “Kavkaz-2008, a Major Joint Exercise,Started in the North Caucasus Military District, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation News Release, 15 July, 2008).
See: “M.I.A.: Five Policeman Injured in S. Ossetia Blast,” Civil Georgia, 1 August, 2008.
See: Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch Report, January 2009, p. 5.
See: “Russian Invasion of Georgia, Facts and Figures,” Government of Georgia Update, 1 October, 2008.
See: “A Two-Sided Descent into Full-Scale War,” The Washington Post, 17 August, 2008.
See: “Medvedev Signs Ceasefire,” Civil Georgia, 16 August, 2008.
See: “Revised Figures Push Number of Georgia Displaced up to 192,000,” on UNHCR website, 12 September,2008.
For more, see: Human Rights Watch Report, January 2009.
Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rus-sian Federation, 26 August, 2008.
See: “Russia Plans 7,600 Force in Georgia Rebel Regions,” Reuters, 9 September, 2008.
See: “Bill on Occupied Territories Signed into Law,” Civil Georgia, 31 October, 2008.
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