EURASIANIST RHETORIC IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN. NEGOTIATING HEGEMONY THROUGH DIFFERENT VISIONS OF SOCIETY
Abstract
This study fathoms the question of what Eurasianist discourse in Russia and Kazakhstan reveals about contemporary hierarchy dynamics between Russia and Central Asia. To grasp these dynamics, the study relies on an English School theoretical framework. It links Filippo Costa Buranelli’s “negotiated hegemony” concept with the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction introduced to the English School by Barry Buzan. While the former provides an analytical framework for contemporary spheres of influence, arguing that great powers need the approval of the sovereign states they seek to influence, the latter opens up room for different approaches to (regional) international society. Whereas gemeinschaft is used to denote an understanding of society as a civilizational entity based on a shared culture with common norms and values, gesellschaft-type societies are understood as a product of pragmatic and functional interaction. This study argues that the degree of hierarchy in a regional international society and the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction constitute two interrelated dimensions. More generally speaking, the analysis suggests that the type of society preferred or promoted by an actor is interrelated with this actor’s stance within a hierarchical relationship. Following this reasoning, a(n aspirational) hegemon will promote a gemeinschaft-type society because this civilizational ideal offers greater leverage to generate legitimacy and wield influence over other actors in the society.
The Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist discourse offers an instructive example of these dynamics. Both countries’ foreign policy rhetoric formulates different visions of an Eurasianist society that are insightful in understanding their relative positioning towards each other. It is suggested that Russia’s invocation of a civilizational gemeinschaft-type society built on a common culture and identity serves to legitimize its hegemonic claims towards Central Asia. The functional gesellschaft vision that Kazakhstan conveys through its pragmatic Eurasianist rhetoric constitutes, in turn, a resistance to these hegemonic claims by highlighting sovereign equality and invoking counter-hegemonic narratives.
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