REALPOLITIK AND THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR: THREE YEARS ON
Abstract
In November 2011, in a dramatic departure from the original claims of the Russian troops rescuing the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Tbilisi’s genocidal actions, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged the real reason behind the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008. Speaking on 21 November, 2011 at the headquarters of Russia’s 58th army of its Southern Military District located in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, Medvedev noted: “If we had faltered in [August] 2008, geopolitical arrangement would be different now and number of countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now.”
This was no slip-up, as Medvedev continued to push this line later on the same day. When interviewed in Rostov on the same day, he further confirmed: “Today I already spoke with the army officers and I will tell it to you too that it was of course a very difficult page in our recent history, but, unfortunately, it was absolutely necessary [decision]. And the fact that Russia’s actions at the time were so tough has eventually secured a situation for us, which, despite of all the difficulties, is now quieter than it was…
“We have simply calmed some of our neighbors down by showing them that they should behave correctly in respect of Russia and in respect of neighboring small states. And for some of our partners, including for the North Atlantic Alliance, it was a signal that before taking a decision about expansion of the Alliance, one should at first think about the geopolitical stability. I deem these [issues] to be the major lessons of those developments in 2008.”
Medvedev’s acknowledgment validated what most Russia-watchers in the West suspected, but few cared to admit: Russia’s war against Georgia was motivated by the age-old realpolitik considerations, and not humanitarian sentiments toward some obscure mountainous peoples. The Russians had apparently decided to stop NATO enlargement by force, and according to Medvedev, the outgoing Russian president, that achievement was a highlight of his presidency. Western allies could respond with nothing of substance, and quietly allowed Moscow to dismember Georgia, the most outspoken pro-American and pro-Western state. This was not the first time when policies of appeasement were offered to an aggressive expansionist state, but it was definitely new for the post-Cold War era.
After the fall of the so-called “Evil Empire,” most political scientists counted on a peace dividend, whereby standing down from permanent high alert would save on defense costs. However, the outbreak of……………
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References
Medvedev: The August War Stopped Georgia’s NATO Membership, Civil Georgia, 21 November 2011, available at civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24168.
Ibidem.
Ironically, before the war, Vladimir Putin chose Munich to announce a Russian comeback and deliver stern warnings to the West in February 2007 (see O. Rolofs, A Breeze of Cold War, Munich Security Conference, available at securityconference.de/Putin-s-speech.381+M52087573ab0.0.html). After the war, the report prepared by the so-called Tagliavini commission served as an example of appeasement at work: the commission concluded that it was Georgia that started the August war (see Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2 December 2008, available at eiig.ch/).
See S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, Introduction, in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, ed. by S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2009.
See P. Felgenhauer, After August 7: The Escalation of the Russia-Georgia War, in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia.
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See M. Lipman, ‘Enemy’ Schoolchildren in Moscow, The Washington Post, 21 October 2006.
See A. Illarionov, The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999-2008, in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia.
See Ch. King, Tbilisi Blues, Foreign Affairs, 25 August 2004.
See Ch. King, op. cit.
South Ossetia continued to be a black market hub after the August war (see Six Months after Caucasus War: South Ossetia Becomes Thorn in Russia’s Side, Spiegel Online International, 24 December 2008, available at spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,598311-2,00.html).
See R. Ratliff, South Ossetian Separatism in Georgia, ICE Case Studies, No. 180, May 2006, available at ww1.american.edu/ted/ice/ossetia.htm.
See Ch. King, op. cit.
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See A. McDuffee, Boehner: Russia’s Putin ‘Harbors Intense Soviet Nostalgia’, The Washington Post, 25 October 2011, available at washingtonpost.com/blogs/think-tanked/post/boehner-russias-putin-harbors-intense-soviet-nostalgia/2011/10/25/gIQAtpOGGM_blog.html.
See H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, D. Clinton, Politics Among Nations, McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences, 7th Edition, 2005.
See After the War, The Economist, 16 October 2008.
See Ch. King, Putin’s Putsch, Foreign Affairs, 22 September 2004.
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See Ch. King, Tbilisi Blues.
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See N. Sharansky, Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy, Public Affairs, New York, NY, 2008.
See A. Karatnycky, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005.
See In Search of Détente, Once Again, The Economist, 2 July 2009.
The “button” was presented by State Secretary Clinton to Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov at their meeting in Geneva. The “button” sported “Reset” in English, but in Russian it read “Peregruzka,” that is “overload,” instead of the proper “Perezagruzka.”
See O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, H. Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, Malden, MA, 2005.
Russia delivered in short order after Putin issued threats in February 2007. Putin’s full speech in English is available at The Washington Post website: Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Monday, 12 February 2007, available at washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.
See M.W. Janis, J.E. Noyes, International Law: Cases and Commentary, Thomson West Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 1997.
See Protests Continue in Tskhinvali, Civil Georgia, 5 December 2011, available at civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24231.
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