THE ROAD THROUGH QATAR, A DEAD END? Opportunities Promoting and Hurdles Preventing a Political Solution in Afghanistan that Includes the Taliban
Abstract
While a military solution in Afghanistan has failed, the search for a political solution that includes the insurgent Taliban movement has not yielded any significant results, despite initial U.S.-Taliban contacts in Qatar in 2011 and 2012 originally facilitated by Germany. All contacts with the Taliban so far have been preliminary and exploratory and have not yet reached the “negotiations” stage. No substantial progress has been made so far in 2013 either.
There are several other obstacles hindering the start of constructive negotiations, mainly: the U.S. approach that often sidelines the Afghan government, the Taliban’s refusal to talk to the Afghan government, and the Afghan government’s lack of a clear strategy for such negotiations, as well as the general mistrust between the potential parties in the negotiations. Additionally, the failure of all sides to recognize that talks with the Taliban constitute only one element of a political solution complicates matters further. After a period of extremely strained relations with Pakistan, the Afghan government is hoping for Pakistan’s support to open a direct channel to the Taliban leadership, a demand formulated before President Karzai’s August 2013 visit to Pakistan.
The current attempts of the Afghan and Pakistani governments to relocate, and in fact dismantle, the Taliban liaison office have created an additional hurdle that will make substantial negotiations even less likely in the short term. The Taliban have already made it known that they do not want Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—both countries suggested by Kabul as a possible new location for the Taliban liaison office—to play a central role.
A genuine political solution requires inclusiveness. As a first prerequisite to achieve this, the well-founded reservations of large sectors of Afghan civil society, including the organized women’s movement, many young Afghans, and much of the political opposition against any talks with the Taliban and their future role in Afghan politics need to be taken seriously. Their most valid concern is that their own government and its international allies, who have already set the date for the “handover” and withdrawal from Afghanistan, might go for a quick political power-sharing deal between the Karzai government and the Taliban, thereby adding just one more armed faction to the conflict and not addressing the root causes of the conflicts in Afghanistan, of which insurgency is only one.
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For more details, see: B. Osman and K. Clark, “Who Played Havoc with the Qatar Talks? Five Possible Scenarios to Explain the Mess,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 9 July, 2013, available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/who-played-havoc-with-the-qatar-talks-five-possible-scenarios-to-explain-the-mess].
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Earlier, there had been some imposters who showed up in Kabul claiming to speak for the Quetta shura, fooling both U.S. and British intelligence, as well as the Kabul government. Tragically, the killing of Rabbani itself was such a case (for more details, see: K. Clark, “Death of Rabbani (5): Where is the Evidence?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 13 October, 2011,available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2158], 4 September, 2013).
R. Montagne, “Taliban’s New Political Office is a ‘Game-Changer’,” Interview with Michael Semple, National Public Radio, 18 January, 2012, available at [http://www.npr.org/2012/01/18/145384414/exploring-peace-talks-with-the-taliban], 4 September, 2013.
The most precise rendering of these events comes from: A. Rashid, “Talks with Taliban Must Be Secret to Be Successful,” The Globe and Mail, 1 July, 2011, available at [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asia-pacific/talks-with-taliban-must-be-secret-to-be-successful/article2084159/], 4 September, 2013.
See: A.J. Rubin, “Former Taliban Officials Say U.S. Talks Started,” New York Times, 16 January, 2013, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/asia/taliban-have-begun-talks-with-us-former-taliban-aides-say.html?_
=1&ref=world], 4 September 2013; Sh. Mutazawey, “Taliban’s Qatar Office Not Yet Officially Opened: Peace Council,”TOLOnews, 18 January, 2012, available at [http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/5163-talibans-qatar-office-not-yet-officially-opened-peace-council], 4 September, 2013. Background about the five Guantanamo detainees here: K. Clark, “Releasing the Guantanamo Five? 1: Biographies of the prisoners,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 21 June, 2013, available at [http://www.
fghanistan-analysts.org/releasing-the-guantanamo-five-1-biographies-of-the-prisoners-first-posted-09-03-2012], 4 September, 2013.
The Haqqani network considers itself a part of the Taliban movement, recognizes Mulla Omar as its spiritual leader,but acts autonomously at least on the tactical level (see: Th. Ruttig, “Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity in the Taliban Universe,” in: Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, ed. by A. Giustozzi,London, 2009). Ibrahim Omari is often called “Ibrahim Haqqani” in the media, but this is a name prescribed to him in the West to indicate that he is related to the network. Secretary Clinton also indicated that these contacts have stopped the latest high-profile commando-style operations in and around Kabul that have been attributed to this group: the attack on 28 June against Hotel Intercontinental, the massive truck bomb on 10 September against a U.S. base in the Wardak Province, and the attack on 13 September against the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters (see: “Clinton Warns Taliban of ‘Continuing assault’,”BBC, 20 October, 2011, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15379332], 4 September, 2013; “Hillary Clinton: U.S. Held Meeting with Haqqani Network,” BBC, 21 October, 2011, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15399820], 4 September, 2013.
Access is easier for the government to this party: many of Karzai’s most trusted colleagues have been members of Hezb-e Islami at some point. On the Hezb position toward talks, see, for example: B. Osman, “Adding the Ballot to the Bullet?Hezb-e Islami in Transition,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 6 May, 2013, available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/
dding-the-ballot-to-the-bullet-hezb-e-islami-in-transition], 4 September, 2013.
There are contradictory statements by President Karzai as to whether he has been briefed about these contacts or not.
hmed Rashid reports, though, that “Mr. Karzai has been fully briefed after each round and has unstintingly supported the Taliban’s desire to hold separate talks with the Americans” (A. Rashid, op. cit.).
His name is Tayeb Agha, a very close confidant of Mullah Omar, also during the Taliban regime when he was Mullah Omar’s ‘head of office’ in Kandahar. For a while, in 1999/2000, he also worked at the Taliban embassy in Islamabad, which might have allowed him to become acquainted not only with the ISI, but also with Western diplomats (see: “Taliban Have Recently Twice Held Talks with Americans under Leadership of Tayeb Agha,” Weesa, Kabul, 20 March, 2011, quoted from BBC Monitoring).
See: S. Koelbl, H. Stark, “Germany Mediates Secret U.S.-Taliban Talks,” Spiegel, 24 May, 2011, available at [http://
ww.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764323,00.html], 4 September, 2013.
For an assessment of the APRP, see: K. Clark, “New Bureaucracies to Welcome ‘Upset Brothers’,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 14 May, 2010, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=751], 4 September, 2013.
The resource flow will definitely decrease drastically, though, after 2014 when NATO is planning to have completed the handover of full security and political responsibilities to the Afghan government.
D. Nissenbaum, M. Abi-Habib, “Afghanistan Halts Taliban Peace Initiative,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October, 2011,available at [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203791904576606921747225488.html], 4 September, 2013.
A.J. Rubin, “Assassination Deals Blow to Peace Process in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 20 September, 2011,available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/world/asia/Burhanuddin-Rabbani-afghan-peace-council-leader-assassinated.html?pagewanted=all], 4 September, 2013. Dr Abdullah now is the leader of the National Coalition of Afghanistan (see: Th. Ruttig, “National Coalition vs National Front: Two Opposition Alliances Put Jamiat in a Dilemma,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 4 January, 2012, available at http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/national-coalition-vs-national-front-two-opposition-alliances-put-jamiat-in-a-dilemma], 4 September, 2013).
The Taliban have neither claimed nor denied responsibility for the killing. In a statement, the Taliban said: “Our
position on this issue is that we can’t talk about it and all the media reports that claim responsibility are groundless” (quoted from: J. Boone, “Taliban Stay Quiet on Killing of Former Afghanistan President Rabbani,” The Guardian, 21 September,2011, available at [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/21/taliban-stays-quiet-rabbani-assassination], 4 September,2013).
Quoted from: K. Clark, “The Death of Rabbani (3): Emerging Details,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 25 September,2011, available at [http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2098], 4 September, 2013.
For more details, see: Th. Ruttig, “The Upcoming Jirga: An Agenda with Possible Backdoors,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 4 November, 2011, available at [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2218] 4 September, 2013.
“Karzai Calls Crucial Meeting on Peace Process, Strategic Partnership with U.S.,” TOLOnews, 28 September, 2011,available at [http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/4045-karzai-calls-crucial-meeting-on-peace-process-strategic-partnership-with-us], 4 September, 2013.
J. Partlow, K. Brulliard, “Afghan Government Seeks Pakistan’s Help in Stalled Peace Process,” Washington Post,8 October, 2011, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-government-seeks-pakistans-help-in-stalled-peace-process/2011/10/08/gIQAxLo0VL_story.html], 4 September, 2013.
D. Nissenbaum, M. Abi-Habib, op. cit.
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The names mentioned as Qatar office staff, besides Taliban top interlocutor Tayeb Agha, include Sher Abbas
Stanekzai, a former Taliban health minister, Shahabuddin Delawar, their former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hafiz Aziz-ur-Rahman, the Taliban’s third secretary in their Abu Dhabi embassy before 2001, and Sohail Shahin, who worked as an unrecognized Taliban representative in New York and for their official newspaper Shariat in Kabul until 2001. The three Taliban members mentioned first belonged to their Political Commission, their movement’s quasi-foreign office (see also:
. Clark, “The Taliban in Qatar (2): Biographies—Core and Constellation,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 June, 2013,available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-Taliban-in-qatar-2-biographies-core-and-constellation-amended-with-more-details], 4 September, 2013).
S. Salahuddin, “Taliban Say Want Peace with Afghans, NATO Troops Out,” Reuters, 26 February, 2009, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/Taliban_Say_Want_Peace_With_Afghans_NATO_Troops_Out/1499836.html], 4 September,2013; “Message of Felicitation of Amir-ul-Momineen (May Allah Protect Him) on the Occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr,” 6 August,2013.
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The names mentioned as Qatar office staff, besides Taliban top interlocutor Tayeb Agha, include Sher Abbas
Stanekzai, a former Taliban health minister, Shahabuddin Delawar, their former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hafiz Aziz-ur-Rahman, the Taliban’s third secretary in their Abu Dhabi embassy before 2001, and Sohail Shahin, who worked as an unrecognized Taliban representative in New York and for their official newspaper Shariat in Kabul until 2001. The three Taliban members mentioned first belonged to their Political Commission, their movement’s quasi-foreign office (see also:
. Clark, “The Taliban in Qatar (2): Biographies—Core and Constellation,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 June, 2013,available at [http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-Taliban-in-qatar-2-biographies-core-and-constellation-amended-with-more-details], 4 September, 2013).
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