REBEL CAUCASIAN REGIONS ON THE BRINK OF ENERGY WARS
Abstract
This article examines the problems associated with the struggle over Caspian energy resources (at different stages of the post-communist period) and the regional interests of the rebel Caucasian regions. We think that this approach might shed light on the reasons for the current conflict-prone nature of the region and help us to understand the true reason for the August 2008 war in South Ossetia and the motives of the sides participating in it.
Downloads
References
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is a pipeline system for transporting Caspian oil to the port of Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean coast. The oil pipeline is 1,773 km long; it passes through Azerbaijan (449 km) and Turkey (1,059 km). At the end of September 2002, an international consortium headed by BP announced that construction of the new oil route would be launched, and in February-March 2003, laying of this route began. The ceremonial opening of the oil pipeline took place on 25 May, 2005; and the first oil was pumped in July 2006. The oil pipeline has the capacity to transport 50 million tons of oil a year; it links Azerbaijan’s Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) fields with the Turkish oil port of Ceyhan. The owner of the oil pipeline is an international consortium in which different companies own a share: BP—30.1%, the State Oil Com-pany of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)—25%, Unocal—8.9%, Statoil—8.7%, TPAO—6.5%, ENI—5%, Itochu—3.4%,ConocoPhilips—2.5%, Inpex—2.5%, Total—5%, and Amerada Hess—2.4%.
In November 2002, talks began between SOCAR and the Kazakhstan State Company, KazMunaiGaz, on Kazakhstan joining the BTC project. In June 2006, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev signed an agreement under which his country joined the oil pipeline project. The agreement envisages tanker shipment of Kazakh oil via the Caspian from Ak-tau to Baku for its further transportation to the foreign markets via the BTC pipeline.
The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, 830 km in length, was built in 1999 to export early Caspian oil from Azerbaijan’s ACG fields. The pipeline goes to the Georgian port of Supsa located on the Black Sea, and from there oil is transported by tank-ers; the pipeline has a throughput capacity of up to 600,000 tons of oil a month. The oil pipeline was of strictly local sig-nificance (due to its low capacity and auxiliary designation), so its launching did not arouse the same international response as the BTC project.
The term “the collective West” refers to the U.S., European Union, and Israel.
See: A. Daalder, J. Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, September-October 2006; A. Bog-aturov, “Sindrom kosy i kamnia,” NG-Dipkurier, 10 December, 2007.
T. Ataev, “Gruzino-osetinskiy konflikt na fone bitvy gigantov za truboprovody,” available at [http://www.islam.ru/
ressclub/analitika/isunerus/]. Further we will show that a very similar motivation was used by Abkhazian politicians in the talks with the leading world energy companies about the prospects for building pipelines through the Georgian territory they conquered in the 1990s.
“Kak gotovilas voyna. Issledovanie A. Illarionova o tom, chto predshestvovalo avgustovskim sobytiam 2008 goda.
konchanie,” Novaia gazeta, 1 July, 2009, No. 69 (1483), pp. 10-11.
[http:www.regnum.ru/news/1037614/html].
Later in his report, Andrei Illarionov also said exactly the same thing, that Russia had launched missiles at the BTC pipeline (see: “Kak gotovilas voyna. Issledovanie A. Illarionova o tom, chto predshestvovalo avgustovskim sobytiam 2008 goda. Posleslovie,” Novaia gazeta, 14 August, 2009, No. 88, p. 4).
[http:www.regnum.ru/news/1040421/html].
See: V. Mishin, “Plata za fors-mazhor,” NG-Energiia, 14 October, 2008.
See: A. Kuzmin, “Zapad vozlozhil vinu za ostanovku nefteprovoda na Moskvu,” Utro.ru, 26 August, 2008; RBK—ussian Information Agency.
See: V. Mishin, op. cit.
See: Zh. Erzhanova, “Astana otzyvaet svoiu neft iz Batumi,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 August, 2008.
These letters were kindly given to the authors of this article by Ya. Kazan, an influential representative of the Abkhazian diaspora in the U.S. (see also: Mission of Abkhazia [http://www.abkhazia.com]).
See: Rossiiskie vesti, 20 February, 1998; K.G. Myalo, Rossiia i poslednie voyny XX veka, Veche, Moscow, 2002,pp. 364, 374.
In a letter of 20 January, 1998 to B. Richardson (permanent U.S. representative at the U.N.), Abkhazian represent-atives criticized the U.S. and Israel for awarding former Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze a prize of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, as well as a prize of the Israeli Institute of Democracy in Jerusalem. The letter ended with the words,
a person with such a reputation cannot bring peace to Georgia and its neighbors” (Mission of Abkhazia [http://www.
bkhazia.com]).
See: O. Nikiforov, “Kaspiyskiy ‘kliuch,’” NG-Energia, 9 December, 2008; M. Chossudovsky, “The War on Leb-anon and the Battle for Oil,” Global Research, 26 July, 2006, available at [http://globalresearch.ca/
ndex.php?context=viewArticle&code].
See: M. Chossudovsky, op. cit.
See: BBC Russian.com. UK, 16 February, 2010.
See: IA REGNUM, 1 December, 2008.
L. Caracciolo, “La Lezione di Putin alla Casa Bianca,” La Repubblica, 18 August, 2008.
M. Dugain, “Vladimir Poutine, un imperialiste moderne,” Le Point, No. 1888, 20 Novembre, 2008, available at [http://www.inopressa.ru/lepoint/2008/11/21/17:39:20/imperialist].
See: S. Korolev, “Pogloshchenie prostranstva. Geopoliticheskaia utopia kak zhanr istoricheskogo deystviia,” Druzh-ba narodov, An independent literary-art and sociopolitical journal, No. 12, 1997.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2010 AUTHOR
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
You are free to:
- Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially.
- Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
- The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
- Attribution — You must give appropriate credit , provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made . You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
- No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Notices:
You do not have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation .
No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how you use the material.
